Konstantina E. Botsiou

“Who is afraid of the Americans?”
The politics of Anti-Americanism in Greece during the Cold War

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to study the origins of anti-Americanism in postwar Greek politics. The focus is on the developments that shaped the body of ‘denial’ towards the major Atlantic ally in the fifties and sixties. This was considered necessary for understanding the structural position of anti-Americanism across parties and political issues before the military dictatorship (1967-74) and the Turkish invasion in Cyprus (1974) gave birth to an axiomatic anti-American bias. A fundamental criterion for assessing evidence and attempting conclusive remarks was the mutual recognition by both Greeks and Americans of anti-American attitudes in the period under examination. The bulk of material is derived from political Greek and American archives, the Greek press and rare secondary bibliography on Greek anti-Americanism. The paper studies major outbursts of anti-Americanism on five major issues: a) the –mutual- manipulation of American assistance, b) the re-organization of party politics, c) the Cyprus question, d) special American prerogatives and priorities (US military bases, immunities of American personnel, stationing of IRBMs, compromise of a distinct regional role for Greece), e) aftermath of the dictatorship.
Introduction

For various reasons, postwar Greece offered a “laboratory” of political and cultural anti-Americanism.\(^1\) Having received massive economic and military aid to withstand communist domination in the civil war (1946-49), Greece was among the first beneficiaries of the United States’ European engagement after the Second World War. The dependence of the country on further American aid (ERP- and direct assistance) and American-sponsored domestic and international security nonetheless, anti-American trends constituted an influential political and social force at the expiry of the Marshall Plan.

The purpose of this paper is to study the origins of anti-Americanism in postwar Greek politics. The focus is on the developments that shaped the body of ‘denial’ towards the major Atlantic ally in the fifties and sixties. This was considered necessary for understanding the structural position of anti-Americanism across parties and political issues before the military dictatorship (1967-74) and the Turkish invasion in Cyprus (1974) gave birth to an axiomatic anti-American bias.\(^2\) A second incentive was the extensive documentation that is available from Greek and international archival sources for the first formative decades. A fundamental criterion for assessing evidence and attempting conclusive remarks was the mutual recognition by both Greeks and Americans of anti-American attitudes in the period under examination. Studying the ‘politics’ of anti-Americanism imposed self-discipline in terms of the nature of sources. The bulk of material is derived from political Greek and American archives, the Greek press and rare secondary bibliography on Greek anti-Americanism.\(^3\) Potentially telling evidence from relevant fields of interest, like, for instance, literature, was not considered, as this would go beyond the scope of a narrow focus on ‘politics’.

The paper studies major outbursts of anti-Americanism on five major issues: a) the –mutual-manipulation of American assistance, b) the re-organization of party politics, c) the Cyprus question, d) special American prerogatives and priorities (US military bases, immunities of American personnel, stationing of IRBMs, compromise of a distinct regional role for Greece), e) aftermath of the dictatorship.

‘Who is afraid of the Americans’?

The United States became a ‘factor’ in Greek politics after their intervention into the civil war. Following the promulgation of the Truman doctrine, numerous American economic and military missions undertook advisory tasks in key governmental agencies to help terminate the communist guerilla war. Under the European Recovery Program (ERP), American involvement


\(^3\) An early penetrating study on anti-Americanism was offered by Couloumbis, Theodore A., Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966; there are also a few recent studies on Greek-American relations that touch upon the issue of anti-American attitudes in postwar Greece such as Stefanidis, Ioannis D., Assymetrical Partners: the United States and Greece in the Cold War, Athens: Patakis, 2002 (in Greek); Rizas, Sotiris, Greece, the United States and Europe, 1961-1964, Athens: Patakis, 2000 (in Greek).
had a two-fold mission: on the one hand, communist defeat, on the other hand, relief and reconstruction.

The exigencies of war promoted Greek-American cooperation and consensus to the highest level. Fully acknowledging that American intervention had pulled Greece back from the verge of collapse, domestic political forces capitulated with the political cost of stabilization and democratization which run through the American reconstruction concept, as a whole. American suggestions prevailed, therefore, with no significant objections in crucial areas, like the allocation of funds, the organization and use of the army, the political profile of the Athens governments a.o.  

The conditionalities of aid produced victory and at least surface reform until 1949, while more aggressive transition was postponed for peacetime. When this finally arrived, however, two distinct processes were at work: first, Greece was still lagging so visibly behind the rest OEEC countries, that further dependence on American assistance was deemed indispensable for maintaining peace and stability by both Athens and Washington; second, the global shift of US priorities to the military containment of the communist camp as a result of the Korean war and other distressing developments (Soviet atom bomb, revolution in China) in 1949-50 were immediately reflected in the urgent reduction of American assistance as well as in the limitation of long-term projects for economic development. US advice pointed now to the most immediate and easily attainable projects, not without often losing patience with domestic petitions for less independence as a means to rejuvenate, under the US financial umbrella, prewar ‘politics as usual.’

From this point on, the Americans began to disaffect many Greeks, apart from the militarily defeated Left. The conditionalities of less aid stroke the very heart of the party system. Washington cast its shadow on the corrosion of the old parties in favor of new party formations that would carry out the intricate policies of pacification and democratization, together with development and stabilization. Broad social coalitions were reshuffled behind center-right and center-left parties which were, at times unscrupulously, backed by the American ‘factor’. Established politicians, favorites of the Crown and traditional ‘personal’ parties and factions were gradually re-engineered into virtually a two-party-system of the Anglo-Saxon breed, which preserved the limited political outlook of the Left. Their political importance nonetheless, the new forces were also evaluated on performance basis with regard to the use of reduced aid and the fulfillment of demanding domestic and international security tasks (Greece joined NATO in 1952, the Balkan Pact in 1953-54). Upsetting the indigenous party system was not a policy to be easily legitimized by those who should either accept marginalization or suddenly adapt to a whole new set of political and economic priorities. Hence, American

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6 About the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO, see McGhee, George, The US-Turkish-NATO-Middle East Connection, Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1990; see Iatrides, John O., Balkan Triangle, Birth and Decline of an Alliance Across Ideological Boundaries, The Hague: Mouton 1968.
interventionism became visible for most Greeks only when it was coupled with economic disengagement and attack on entrenched political structures.

This newly discovered aversion against American methods became a full-fledged anti-American spirit when the internationalization of the Cyprus issue brought Greece face to face with American diplomatic neutrality in the mid-fifties. Crisis after crisis, a basic anti-American sentiment evolved into a magnet for further disaffection with US interference in domestic affairs and non-interference in international questions. Only a few years after the civil war, anti-American attitudes had ceased to be monopolized by the Left. There were, definitely, major differences. Among the non-leftist forces, tides of anti-Americanism were characterized by ebbs and flows concerning both themes and means of expression, whereas the Left never removed it from the top ranks of its polemics. Nevertheless, the recurrent waves of cross-party anti-American protest laid the foundation of a more permanent ‘resistance’ to American policies and ‘rejection’ of the American style of power. This view proliferated under the traumatic impact of the seven-years military dictatorship (1967-74) which swiftly reached diplomatic and economic accommodation with the United States. Anti-Americanism became, thereafter, a universal justification for ‘all things wrong’.7

Anti-Americanism was theoretically not incompatible with the prevailing state ideology of the early post-1949 period which reached its zenith later on, under the junta. The dogma of the ‘nationally minded’ (ethnikofrosyni), namely the nationalist set of values as juxtaposed to the subversive (communist) and treacherous (slavophile) ideology of the defeated in the civil war. Ethnikofrosyni, a cold-war heir to the recently terminated Greek nationalism,8 preached the absolute devotion to Greek values against any influence that could undermine the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the fatherland. This narrow appeal to national interest did not match the supranational spirit promoted by the Americans and Europeans in the cold war.

As the Cyprus crises later demonstrated, ethnikofrosyni was not merely prone to ideological discrimination at home, but also open-ended to latent trends of irredentism. The notion of national victimization by ‘foreign’ powers applied fully to the communist menace in the forties, but it was also forcefully linked by conservative elites to American, and West European, policies in the Cyprus case in the fifties, sixties and seventies. From a cultural point of view, ethnikofrosyni gave a priori precedence to ‘Greek’ rather than ‘foreign’ values, to ‘national’ rather than supranational structures. Not surprisingly, the new leading political forces that broke through the old nationalists in the fifties and sixties (EPEK, Greek Rally, ERE, Center Union) adopted vaguer and more moderate ideological doctrines that secured Greece an unreserved internationalist outlook, pragmatic postwar goals, and cross-fertilization on a broad front of social and economic interests.9

7 From the recent critical commentaries see, for instance, Pantelis Boukalas, “The Polytechnical School in the open market”, Kathimerini, 16 November 2004.
8 For almost one century, the nationalist program of Greece evolved around the Great Idea which aimed at the integration of all territories which were solidly populated by Greeks, but had been left outside the newly formed Greek state (irredenta). The Great Idea was considered to have reached its abrupt end with the Greek defeat by the Turks in the Asia Minor campaign (1919-22) which followed the Treaty of Sevres (1920) and led to its replacement by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) as well as to the compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. About the last phase, see Smith, Lewelyn, The Ionian Vision. Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922, London, 1973.
Cross-party fertilization of anti-Americanism was a key-factor of its dynamics. The Left built, certainly, upon a more consistent ideological foundation. This enabled its major forces, the United Democratic Front (EDA) until 1967, and the Communist parties of Greece (of the exterior and the interior) after 1974, to merge their radical posture with a systemic and habitual, though by no means, ceremonial polemic. The leftist anti-American case rested upon a basic pattern:

1. American assistance was denounced as an instrument of foreign manipulation through puppet governments in Athens. Military assistance, in particular, was presented as direct foreign intervention into domestic affairs; first, for the persecution of fellow Greeks (civil war), later, for exploiting Greek soldiers in ‘foreign’ and chiefly imperialist wars (e.g. Korea) and for making the country a ‘hostage’ of American strategic planning. Economic assistance, concurrently, aimed at the saturation of Greek raw materials, whereas its reduction served the goal of keeping Greece in a ‘semi-colonial’ status under ‘corrupt’ and ‘authoritarian regimes’.

2. American intervention in political affairs aimed to control electoral laws for creating an artificial two-party system which would exclude the Left from the parliament. For both EDA and the KKE, the so-called ‘simple’ proportional system, which facilitated the formation of coalition governments, was a fixed demand in the entire postwar period. One of the prominent connections made between elections and ‘American interference’ concerned the 1961 parliamentary elections which were denounced by the entire Opposition as a product of ‘violence (in the provinces) and fraud (in the cities)’. The physical and legal pressure reported to have been exerted by governmental agencies was supposed to have been based on a anti-communist military operation (Pericles-Plan) under the auspices of the United States. A direct line was also drawn between the American mission in Greece and the colonels in 1967, on the grounds that this had long co-operated with the Greek armed forces, including secret societies (e.g. the IDEA, ENA) and secret services (e.g. the Greek Central Intelligence Agency), in which leading colonels had been active.

3. The Cyprus question elicited a strong patriotic rhetoric in the left spectrum of Greek politics. Championing self-determination against the oppressive British colonial rule allowed the Left to trespass the barrier of Soviet-inspired slogans. It now reached to the patriotic past of Greek irredentism that still appealed to many Greeks. It was also a unique opportunity for the Left to try redeem itself for the past support of the KKE to its advocacy of an autonomous Macedonia –an infamous component of the KKE’s ‘treacherous’ image since the interwar years. Last, but not least, resistance against the major Western power of the fifties and

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10 For a case-to-case analysis on the major issues of the fifties and early sixties, see Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction.


sixties was a means to recall the taboo-issue of recent leftish resistance against the Western powers of the forties, the Axis and the –colonial- British. In ideological terms, the leftist movement for Cyprus certainly injected bourgeois nationalist claims into the anti-colonial argument; this was depicted also in the cooperation of moderate candidates with the ticket of EDA when it became the second largest party in parliament (1958). Again, anti-American views helped cement theoretical irregularities.

4. Issues of military and strategic cooperation between the Greek state and the United States (US military bases, immunities of American personnel, IRBMs) routinely brought up pacifist as well as isolationist activism. The Greek governments were being accused of selling out the county’s potential for stronger regional influence and disturbing peace, particularly in the Balkans. Therefore, they exposed the people to Soviet-bloc self-defense planning against the Western neo-imperialists and subordinated national sovereign rights to personal political gain and aggressive US policies.

5. The dictatorship was condemned as a piece of American work in cooperation with Greek military and political protégés. It only confirmed the global American support for corrupt and authoritarian regimes. The United States sought to halt the democratization of Greece in order to marginalize the Left and open the door to the partition of Cyprus.

Anti-Americanism was definitely mastered by the Left. However, it became a politically relevant force after it managed to challenge the ‘nationally minded’. The issues under study were catalysts to that effect.

1. Saying ‘no’ to (economic) tutelage?

The financial intricacies of the Greek Project

When, at the height of the Greek civil war, the Truman doctrine inaugurated the involvement of the United States in Greek politics, the major objective was “to extend all possible aid to Greece [and to a lesser extent to Turkey]... It is of importance to the security of the United States that [the Greeks] should be able to maintain their independence and territorial integrity... legislation would permit the Government to extend financial aid to Greece for economic reconstruction to furnish arms and equipment in sufficient quantity to permit the Greek army to restore internal order, and to detail American personnel to insure effective utilization of such aid.”

The institutional foundation of the intensive American interference was laid in Public Law 75 of June 22nd, 1947. Greece soon welcomed the formation of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) which administered the assistance program, and the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG), responsible for military assistance and advice.

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16 See Chruschev’s statement in August 1961 that “(soviet) missiles will not spare either oil groves or the Akropolis”; Svolopoulos, *Greek Foreign Policy*, 105.
17 The Acting Secretary of State (Dean Acheson) to the Secretary of State (George C. Marshall), 6 March 1947, National Archives of the United States, Washington, D.C. (hereafter NARA), Record Group (hereafter RG) 59, 781.00/3-647.
18 Botsiou, *Griechenlands Weg nach Europa*, 103-123; Stefanidis, *From the Civil to the Cold War*, 15-21.
Relying strongly on suggestions by American officials who were already operating in Greece at that time, that “...day to day guidance by American personnel is going to be necessary”, the Department of State empowered AMAG with exceptional rights to intervene extensively in the shaping of Greek economic policies, public administration, military organization and foreign policy.\(^\text{19}\) Aware of the erratic nature of postwar Greek politics and the pervasive corruption in public administration,\(^\text{20}\) Washington opted consciously for a strongly interventionist scheme as the shortest way to the elimination of the communist menace. The path to this destination passed through local priorities: termination of the domestic strife, creation of a viable democratic political order, rehabilitation of the socio-economic structures, and by-passing of domestic bureaucracy via more flexible US-patronized organizations (e.g. the Currency Committee and the Foreign Trade Agency).\(^\text{21}\)

Two years after the civil war had ended with the defeat of the communist guerillas, the AMAG still insisted that

“The preservation of the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece depends upon continued political, economic, and military assistance from the United States.”\(^\text{22}\)

Definitely, this thesis reflected the painful transition to domestic pacification and the monumental difficulties of reconstruction. However, it failed to arrest the drastic shift of American global political and strategic priorities after the explosion of the Korean war. This was intensely felt in Greece through a major re-ordering of US priorities, coupled with the drastic reduction of economic and military assistance in 1952-53.

Due to the urgency of the guerilla revolt, war politics and economics had smoothly escaped substantial reform since 1945. The failure of Greek cabinets to deliver crucial recovery projects owed, therefore, much to the precedence they gave to aid continuation over emancipation. This same mentality permeated also large segments of society which entrusted their prospects for personal welfare to traditional party clienteles, economic anomaly and direct foreign aid rather than to the unpredictable process of state reform.\(^\text{23}\)

Beneath the surface of formal governance, more and more Greeks also tended to perceive American assistance and authority as fixed concomitants of Greece’s geostrategic importance in the cold war.\(^\text{24}\) To all intents and purposes, elites and electorates did not miss the tremendous symbolic weight that the Greek success story had for Washington as “a showcase of US determination and ability to assist nations threatened by communist blandishments to resist communist aggression or subversion.”\(^\text{25}\) Betting on the heavy exit cost US


\(^{20}\) Memorandum of USAGG: Assistance to Greece, 23 May 1948, NARA, RG 319 1946-1950, Plans and Operations Division, Box 36; see also Botsiou, *Grechmelands Weg nach Europa*, 103-115; Stefanidis, *From the Civil to the Cold War*, 24-51.


\(^{23}\) Staff Study to the National Security Council (hereafter NSC), 6 February 1951, *FRUS*, (1951, V), 459.


\(^{25}\) American Embassy Athens to the Department of State, 22 September 1958, NARA, RG 59, 781.00/9-2258.

\(^{26}\) *Ibid.*
disengagement might have for Washington at a critical stage of Greek reconstruction, had seemed for years a safe bargain. Until 1952, 17 governments had had the responsibility of state affairs since 1946; all with modest results in the most critical areas of reconstruction, including political pacification. For the American mission it became increasingly clear that “United States political support to Greece has been both internal and international. Internally, the United States has advocated the implementation of wholesale political and social concepts as a deterrent to communist subversion and has encouraged the observance of democratic, constitutional political practices as well as the protection of civil liberties to the extent compatible with the security of the State. Efforts of the United States to promote enactment of legislation designed to distribute equitably the incidence of taxation, to improve the efficiency of Greek fiscal and administrative procedures, and to free the Greek economy from monopolistic ...practices have been only partially successful.”

Even more disappointing than economic stagnation itself was the political failure of the Center governments of 1950-52. Old Liberals shared power with a new center-left party (EPEK, National Progressive Center Union) which had been expected to rejuvenate party politics under the moderate influence of its leader, old-Liberal General Nikolaos Plastiras. But EPEK overcame neither the chronic factionalism of traditional parties nor the weakness of new ones to control the state mechanism. The stalemate affected directly the core of EPEK’s political agenda for economic reform and pacification. Quarrels over the extent to which amnesty should be granted to communists and sympathizers made the government vulnerable to accusations that Plastiras was “turning Greece to the communists....”

The influential political advisors from the United States put the government under pressure to set up a comprehensive plan for monetary reform and economic development for the post-1952 era, even though it reckoned that “the stabilization program would make its majority evaporate”. At the same time, the American Mission announced the first drastic cuts in aid: the total for fiscal year 1952 would fall from $182 million in 1951 to $81 million (and $22,8 million in fiscal year 1953).

The first reaction of the government was to maintain that reform was uncertain and pointless, in case it was deprived from its overseas financial collateral. The second reaction was to counteract the American pressure in the realm of security policies. Athens suggested the decrease of the Greek armed forces from 140,000 men to 120,000 which seemed sustainable by the state finances.

This sort of ‘bluff and blackmail’ was symptomatic of the tension instilled in Greek-American relations by the mutual manipulation of reduced US assistance in the post-1952 period. Albeit a routine parameter of the assistance program, it had not been an issue until 1951-52. It was the abrupt decline of aid that transformed it into an acute problem. Disapproval of American methods and suspicion of US motivation started to float up among

27 Staff Study to the NSC, 6 February 1951, FRUS (1951, V), 453.
28 Minor to Acheson, 20 July 1950, NARA, RG 59, 781.00/7-1950.
29 Ibid.
30 The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, 21 December 1951, FRUS (1951, V), 526; see also Stefanidis, Asymmetrical Partners, 241.
31 The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, 21 November 1951, FRUS (1951, V), 524-525.
the ‘losers’ of the multifaceted re-adjustment. Disaffection worked top down through party channels and affiliated press among adherents of both major old parties, particularly the once dominant Populists and Liberals. Growing parallel to the systemic anti-Americanism of the ‘defeated’ in the civil war, the disillusionment of quite a few ‘winners’ set the ground for an idiosyncratic anti-American prejudice on a large social scale. It was against this psychological background that further Greek-American friction rendered
‘...anti-Americanism, for which another name is neutralism, [is] a growing political factor on the domestic scene.’\(^{33}\)

Direct American assistance was officially terminated in 1964\(^{34}\) –17 years after President Truman had delivered his famous speech for the support of Greece and Turkey before the Joint Session of Congress.\(^{35}\) In the first decade, Greece received $ 2,565 million (May 1947-June 1956) –as aptly pointed out,\(^{36}\) “the highest per capita aid received by any under-developed country” after 1945.\(^{37}\) From 1947 until 1958, military aid amounted to $1.5 billion.\(^{38}\) In contrast to the early postwar governments, those that took power after 1952 were endowed with radically less American assistance. The new center-right parties that held power from 1952 until 1963, the Greek Rally (Ellinikos Synagromos) and ERE (Greek Radical Union), based their political programs on this irreversible reality as well as on the credo that Greece needed a shock therapy in order to achieve sustainable economic development and political stability.\(^{39}\)

Nevertheless, the option for pressuring the United States for more assistance or more political support \textit{in lieu} of assistance, remained tantalizing for all cabinets in Athens. In August 1954, just before the conclusion of the Balkan Pact negotiations and right before referring the Cyprus issue, for the first time, to the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Rally government spelled out its expectation for the recognition of her contribution to Western security through American support for Cyprus by making clear that
‘If no additional American aid is forthcoming for FY 1955 ...it might be necessary to reduce the active army from 100,000 to 70,000 in order to find non-inflationary means of financing what they consider to be the acceptable minimum required for both the regular civilian budget and for planned investments. This basic question involves the inability of the Greek economy to support indefinitely a modern peace-time military establishment of the size desired by the US and NATO.’\(^{40}\)

The Americans did not abandon their neutrality on the Cyprus question. But they agreed to a reduction of military manpower from 135,000 to 105,000 and the freezing of aid at $23

\(^{33}\) American Embassy Athens to the Department of State, 8 December 1958, NARA, RG 59, 781.00/12-858; see also National Security Estimate, 26 June 1956, \textit{FRUS} (1955-1957, XXIV), 566.

\(^{34}\) Rizas, \textit{Greece, the US and Europe}, 37.

\(^{35}\) Harry S. Truman, Speech to Joint Session of Congress, 12.3.1947, US Congress, Congressional Record, 80\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} Session, S. 198 12.3.1947, US Congress, Congressional Record, 80\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} Session, 1981.

\(^{36}\) Couloumbis, \textit{Greek Political Reaction}, 28.


\(^{39}\) The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, 23 November 1951, \textit{FRUS} (1951, V), 525; The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, 10 April 1953, \textit{FRUS} (1952-1954, VIII), 816-821.

\(^{40}\) The Ambassador to Greece (Cavendish W. Cannon) to the Department of State, 8 May 1954, \textit{ibid.}, 863.
million for the following fiscal year (1955-56). The White House added later $19.2 million (in sum, ca. $33 million) for extra defense assistance and support of agricultural projects.\textsuperscript{41}

The danger that American neutrality in the Cyprus debate would generate neutralist tendencies across the Greek society loomed persistently behind Greek requests for more support by the United States in the economic sphere. Later leader of ERE Constantine Karamanlis, who was confronted with the Cyprus issue since the first day he succeeded Papagos in the Rally and the government, could be no exception in linkage policies. At the height of anti-American agitation in his early days in office (1955-56), he also urged Washington that

“...it was essential...to offset harassment and failures...in foreign affairs. [with] a financial aid program in agriculture."\textsuperscript{42}

“...it is of the utmost importance that Greek people should always believe that the US are on their side. ...It is one of the greatest importance not for himself or for the sake of his [Karamanlis] government, but for Greece as a whole, as well as for Turkey and for the Balkan pact. It is the only way for Greece to remain faithful to her alliances.”\textsuperscript{43}

The issue of aid resurfaced parallel to impressive Greek efforts to promote economic growth on the basis of domestic resources, but also to participate in the process of European integration. Instead of direct aid, which was reaching its final stages, Washington sought to provide Greece with diplomatic support in her effort to become associated with the EEC, after a brief espousal of the EFTA deliberations.\textsuperscript{44} The French and the Germans were persuaded to put aside their reservations for the Greek candidacy and support Greek agricultural and industrial development.\textsuperscript{45} The ‘Six’ were urged to realize that

"If Greece [were] put outside the circle of Western European Nations, it would be necessary for the Greek Government and people to reconsider their policies in regard to the economic and political orientation of their country. If these things cannot be accomplished by cooperation within the OEEC, other methods will have to be explored."\textsuperscript{46}

"Greece’s future depends to a very large extent on the crossroad she takes now at this stage in her economic development."\textsuperscript{47}

Shortly before Greece concluded during the negotiations for an Association Agreement between Greece and the EEC (July 1961), the National Security Council estimated that

"unless external assistance is forthcoming from Western European sources, it appears clear that the United States must continue to extend economic support to Greece, in addition to military assistance, after FY 1961."\textsuperscript{48}

Karamanlis himself attributed great political importance to the European connection as a compass for long-term institutional reform and Western identity, beyond the Pax Americana.

\textsuperscript{41} Office memorandum, Allen to Dulles, 19 June 1956, Lot File 59 D3, office files of F.F. Lincoln.
\textsuperscript{42} Memorandum from the Director if Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Secretary of State, 26 May 1956, \textit{FRUS (1955-1957, XXIV)}, 563.
\textsuperscript{43} Memorandum of Conversation Between Prime Minister (Karamanlis) and the Chargé d’Affaires in Greece (Thurston), Athens, 19 December 1955, \textit{FRUS (1955-1957, XXIV)}, 322.
\textsuperscript{44} American Embassy Athens to Department of State, 31 March 1959, NARA, RG 59, 881.00/3-3159, Box 4895; see also Botsiou. \textit{Griechenlands Weg nach Europa}, 403-415.
\textsuperscript{45} American Embassy Athens to the Department of State, 13 November 1957, NARA, RG 59, FW 881.00-Five Year/11-1357, Box 4894.
\textsuperscript{47} American Embassy Athens to the Department of State, 1 May 1957, NA, RG 59, 881.00/5-157.
\textsuperscript{48} NSC 6101, NARA, February 1960, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1954-60, 16.
The fact that General De Gaulle’s was at that time a major influence among the ‘Six’ and also an emblematic figure of ‘resistance to the American Superpower’ led many Greeks to believe that the emancipation from the United States passed through a united Europe. Some went so far as to suggest that Karamanlis’ fall in 1963, a few weeks after De Gaulle’s official visit to Athens, was connected with the endorsement of the ‘French’ influence by Karamanlis; a view not sustained, however, either by existing material or by the overriding importance that Karamanlis attached to Atlantic defense. His conviction proved actually so strong that, even at the brink of war with Turkey for Cyprus in 1974, it allowed solely a temporary and cautious withdrawal from the military planning of NATO (1974-81).

2. The politics of aid and the aid to politics

“The system has...been unable to cope with the staggering post-war economic problem, because the solution of this problem would require large scale temporarily unpopular measures, such as tax reforms and the imposition of low maximum standard of living, and the system of personal politics does not permit a politician the luxury of temporary unpopularity. It is possible that a determined and courageous leader could have explained the necessity for such temporary sacrifices and could have carried out such a program, for the Greek people have shown themselves capable of tremendous sacrifices in the past, provided they have understood the need for it. The sad fact is that none have tried.”

“We should and presumably will be able to continue to exercise guidance and leadership of a very important character but we should tend to become increasingly fraternal than paternal.”

The reduction of American economic assistance alone was certainly not so unexpected as to explain recurrent crises in Greek-American relations. These were rather due to the constellation it created together with unambiguous American interference in the domestic balance of party politics as a means for safeguarding stability after the exodus of the Truman- and ERP- missions. It was at this very beginning of the end of direct American involvement that the accusation of Greece’s ‘abandonment’ at the most critical juncture of reconstruction was fused with reproaches of American favoritism for ‘accommodating conservative regimes’ in Athens; a thesis that was duly diffused from the ‘losers’ of American re-engineering: the aspiring left, the failed new center and the dwindling old conservaties.

When the reduction of American aid was announced, ‘determined and courageous’ leadership was expected from war and civil war hero Field Marshal Alexander Papagos, and his party, the Greek Rally, a “reaction to old parties” and a hope for those “disgruntled with old political leadership.” Around the new government rallied many prominent politicians, but also numerous ‘new men’ from right- to- center political milieus, who shared the Marshal’s

49 See Rizas, Greece, the US and Europe, 41.
51 American Embassy Athens to the Department of State, 28 September 1950, NARA, RG 59, 781.00/9-2850.
52 The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, 25 September 1952, FRUS (1952-54, VIII), 808.
54 The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, 1 August 1951, FRUS (1951, V), 492.
view that Greece could, if needed, be, increase her active Greek armed forces, and emancipate herself from American day-to day guidance and dollar-patronage.55

On that account, the American mission in Greece felt compelled to estrange a substantial portion of the traditional political forces that had been the pillars of the anti-communist struggle and, therefore, America’s loyal domestic partners after the enunciation of the Truman program. American political intervention hence precipitated the electoral decline of the new and old Center parties that, in varying coalitions, had been in power since the first post-civil war elections of March 3, 1950. It also dealt a fatal blow to the fading Populist Party, which shrank from its predominant position as the largest single party in the first postwar elections (1946) to a meager 18,80% of popular vote and 62/250 seats in parliament in 1950 and 6,6% of votes and only 2 seats in 1951 –the party practically evaporated in the 1952 elections.56

American intervention was epitomized in a much cited statement of Ambassador John E. Peurifoy. Following consultations with Washington as to the necessity of a public expression of US opposition to the rumored return of the ‘simple’ proportional system which favored coalition governments,57 Peurifoy backed the thesis of the Opposition and the ailing Prime Minister Plastiras “that the next general election should be held under the majority system.” Peurifoy’s statement in a leading conservative daily (Kathimerini) on March 13, 1952 noted that

“the American government believes that the reestablishment of the ‘simple’ proportional system, with its unavoidable consequences of the continuation of government instability, would have destructive results upon the effective utilization of American aid to Greece.”58

Amidst broad protest on the part of the rest political parties and the affiliated press, Papagos was finally offered the chance to fight the next elections in November 1952 under the majority representation system, which secured to his party an impressive 49,22% of the votes and 247/300 seats in parliament.

The 1952 election was a landmark in Greek-American relations. On the one hand, Washington’s aim to urgently conclude its assistance project was sensibly served by the accession to power of Papagos’ ‘strong solution’. On the other hand, the political implications on the balance of the domestic party system echoed on the disposition of the rest political forces towards the ‘American factor’ which was held greatly responsible for their crude ostracism. Prominent pro-government newspapers were hammering the American behavior warning that “resentment at US controls will increase.”59

Among the much-publicized reactions to the US initiative, the editorials of the major newspaper of the Center, Eleftheria, stood out. It attacked the United States for their blatant ‘invasion’ of Greek internal affairs, while increasingly promoting an effective underdog sentiment of ‘small’ nations suffering under pressures and interference of powerful

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55 The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, 10 April 1953, FRUS (1952-1954, VIII), 817-819.
56 Nikolakopoulos, Parties and Elections, 165-168; Dafnis, Grigoris, Sofoklis Eleftheriou Venizelos, Athens, 1970 (in Greek), 517-518.
57 The Ambassador to Greece (Peurifoy), to the Department of State, 17 March 1952, FRUS, (1952-1954, VIII), 789.
58 The text from Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction, 53-54; Philip Axelrod to John E. Peurifoy, 3 February 1955, NARA, RG 59, 781.00/3-255.
59 The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, 17 March 1952, FRUS (1952-1954, VIII), 789.
“protectors”. Public protest mushroomed around the government’s official statement that it “acknowledged the right of the US Government in the adequate administration of aid, for which we are grateful”, but “... it is up to the Greek people and their government to decide on (the country’s) electoral system.” In an ostensibly paradox way, the anti-American furor merged reaction against undue US interventionism and protest for the abandonment of Greece at a critical moment of her reconstruction. It was, indeed, this explosive amalgam that rendered Peurifoy’s intervention a milestone in Greek-American cooperation. To be sure, though, this was by far neither the first nor the worst case of American interference in domestic affairs.

Since 1947, other Greek political forces, particularly conservative ones, had also put up with far more aggressive encroachments on their domestic authority and prestige. For instance, the winner of the critical 1946 elections, Constantine Tsaldaris, had been persuaded by Washington to compromise his broad parliamentary majority through coalition cabinets with the Liberal Opposition after September 1947. The objective was to enhance the representative and democratic profile of the Athens cabinet in order to weaken reservations for US involvement at home and de-legitimize Soviet diplomatic harassment. The Populists appeared to do the ‘right thing’ for the war on communism as well as for their momentary political survival, but they stroke an unfavorable bargain for the party itself. The party agenda was being swiftly consumed by the Liberals, who had already made inroads into the Populists’ domain réservé, by tacitly adopting a pro-monarchical outlook after 1945-46.

But it was further undermined by the preference of the Palace to Populist-Liberal coalitions. The Crown decided to frustrate its Populist pillar in parliament only under intense American re-education, as well. The ‘great democracy’ did not separate the Crown from political change in Greece. King Paul tried to win over the trust of the Americans in his effort to make the monarchy a rallying point for all non-communist Greeks, contrary to its prior self-destructive interference in party politics. For this, the monarchy often had to accept American advice that ran contrary to the Crown’s freedom to influence politics at will. A major blow to royal influence was, for instance, the blockade of the armed forces to royal interference. Fateful was also the role of the two generals that contested power after the civil war. General Plastiras, a personal enemy of the royal family because of his involvement in the expulsion of Paul’s father (Constantine I, 1922) and the anti-royal crusade against his brother (George II, 1933 and 1935), received the royal mandate in 1950 and 1951 only under heavy American pressure.

Field Marshal Papagos, an old champion of the Palace, frustrated King Paul’s effort to sustain the armed forces as a royal stronghold, inflicting wounds on “most vulnerable area of royal anatomy.” The Crown condemned Papagos’ resignation from the army as part of an American master-plan for national subjugation. It also accused Papagos that his politicization would evoke destabilizing memories of royal and military dictatorships which could only harm politics, the army and the Crown itself—as a usual suspect for military solutions.

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60 For a detailed account, see Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction, 54-55.
61 Government communiqué, 15 March 1952, in: Philip Axelrod to the Ambassador of the Unites States to Greece, 3 February 1955, NARA, RG 59, 781.00/2-355, 4.
62 The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State, FRUS (1948, IV), 180-181
63 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece, 24 August 1951, FRUS (1951, V), 502-503.
64 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece, 8 June 1951, ibid., 480.
65 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece, 25 June 1951, ibid., 483-485.
Americans were also accused of tacitly opening up the thorny ‘regime’ issue in order to force the King to accept Papagos.66

The conservative press manifested once again its fractional nature. *Akropolis*, owned partially by the wife of the Grand Marshal of the court Dimitris Levidis, voiced loudly the opinion of the Palace against Papagos’ candidacy; the most conservative *Estia* and *Ethnikos Kyrix* appeared unwilling to accept anything else than the strong ‘Papagos solution’, whereas the Populist-friendly *Vradyi* reminded that the “American mission had always been …wrong.”67 The liberal *Vima* and *Eleftheria*, in particular, warned that the Americans were “hurting the feelings of the Greeks lately. This might make them revise many ideas, which will be regrettable for the entire world.”68 Both the Plastiras and the Papagos ‘affairs’ ended with the embarrassing capitulation of the Palace, a lesson that led the royal family to claim that it would never again oppose the Americans in public.69 Peurifoy’s intervention attacked the *modus vivendi* that had been established between aid and political fragmentation—well served by proportional’ electoral systems. Old parties had to give up both their economic safety and their familiar practices, so they uniformly “were attacking Americans, accusing [them] of unwarranted intervention.”70 The leader of the Populist Party Constantine Tsaldaris warned that “Papagos’ entry into politics is the product of a conspiracy with grave dangers for the nation,” pointing to the newspapers *Vima* and *Nea*, which were thought to mirror the new American spirit of leadership.

Striking at this point was also the emphasis attached by the losers of the ‘Peurifoy incident’ to the negative image the deprivation of American support inherited to them. More than the public ‘shaming’, it was the popular conception that whoever lacked American backing was being politically demobilized that they sought to fend off, when leading center politicians were, for instance, pressuring the US to proceed with only gradual and discreet aid reductions.71

In the postwar political jargon, the ‘Peurifoy syndrome’ became synonymous with ‘neo-colonial’ American interventionism in Greek affairs. From a diametrical viewpoint however, it also introduced, for the first time *publicly*, the American ‘factor’ as a buffer that absorbed the political cost of unpopular developments. Being presented as a threat to national interest, the American recommendation, on the one hand, produced ‘public shaming’ for the powers it supported, on the other hand, gave the kiss of life to the crumbling Center. Anti-American theses—that lightened up the causes of electoral defeat in 1952—created in the long-term a uniting point of reference for its divided forces; appeals to national assertiveness also helped the Center to gradually differentiate itself from the Right, with which it looked desperately alike at the 1952 elections (hence, the devastating Leftist slogan that Plastiras and Papagos were equally intolerable, “Ti Plastiras, ti Papagos”).73

66 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece, 24 August 1951, *ibid.*, 502-503.
67 American Embassy Athens to Department of State, 28 September 1950, NARA, RG 59, 781.00/9-2850.
69 American Embassy Athens to the Department of State, 11 September 1959, NARA, RG 59, 781.00/9-1159.
71 *Tharros* (Kalamon), 31 August 1951.
72 The Commander for Economic Affairs of the Embassy in Greece (Turkel) to the Department of State, 10 November 1951, *FRUS* (1951, V), 518-519.
73 Linardatos, *From the civil war to the junta*, vol. I, 530.
After US interventionism had been discovered, it could be hardly forgotten ever since. Washington proved distressingly right in its estimate that

“...as memory civil war fades and Greek recovery proceeds ...resentment of US controls will increase and accusations of intervention will multiply.”

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Until the 1967 coup d’ état, numerous incidents kept bringing a latent anti-American drive out of the closet. Transitional periods and governmental crises also invited the US to fill in the power vacuum. It happened twice in 1955. First, when opposition parties negotiated the formation of an electoral popular front with the Left, and prompted Ambassador Cavendish W. Cannon’s public statement in April 2, 1955, that

“Once more the liberal elements are misled to an alliance which can be terminated only through their destruction. A healthy opposition is the one thing. Cooperation for reasons of political expediency with a Communist or Communist-controlled party is a different thing because this cooperation always ends in one and the same way.”

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Again, all opposition elements condemned this as a blatant intervention in Greek internal affairs, 76 except for the daily Kathimerini that published it and a few ultra conservative newspapers (e.g. Ethnikos Kiryx). The flagship of the Center, Eleftheria, pointed out the “crude public intervention”, and saw in Cannon a “common Rally agent.”

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The second and more telling occasion emerged when, in October 1955, Constantine Karamanlis, a successful ‘new man’ of the Rally that had earned himself a sound reputation in relief and reconstruction ministries, succeeded the deceased Papagos. The mandate came from King Paul, on the basis of his constitutional prerogatives, but was attributed to American instructions. As has been amply shown, the popular belief that Karamanlis had been the “Embassy’s” candidate is not sustainable by existing archival evidence.

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Meant to add insult to injury, this reproach grew parallel to the persisting argument that the appointment of Karamanlis constituted a royal coup d’état. 79 The American-royal conspiracy –a standard explanation for ‘foreign’ abuse in postwar Greek politics- and the new Prime Minister of ‘favoritism’ made headlines in the entire Opposition press. More strikingly, though, in Rally-friendly governments that promoted more obvious candidates, 80 but also seized the opportunity to charge the United States for the maltreatment of Greece, as in those very days Greece failed to inscribe the Cyprys question in the agenda of the UN General Assembly. 81 The conservative Estia, promoter of the ex-Rally minister Spyros Markezinis, hosted a classical verdict that “the Rally had been murdered by Karamanlis and the CIA”. 82 Kathimerini attacked directly NATO, stating that “Greece has no longer friends.” 83

74 The Ambassador to Greece (Peurifoy), to the Department of State, 17 March 1952, FRUS, (1952-1954, VIII), 789.

75 Interview to the newspaper Kathimerini, 2 April 1955; the English text from Mary G. Crain (Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, hereafter GTI, Department of State), to Baxter (GTI), 8 April 1955, NARA, RG 59, 781.99/4-855.

76 Ibid.

77 Eleftheria, 3 April 1955; see also Linardatos, From the civil war to the junta, vol. II, 283-286.

78 For a thorough analysis of Karamanlis’ rise to power, see Hadjivassiliou, The Rise of Karamanlis to Power, esp. 227-229.

79 Ibid.

80 Defense Minister Panayotis Canellopoulos and Foreign Minister Stefanos Stefanopoulos seemed to be the strongest candidates. Actually, Stefanopoulos had been appointed by Papagos himself as Acting Prime Minister a few hours before he died; ibid., 225ff.

81 See Kathimerini, the famous article “SHAME”, 22 September 1955; also ibid., 25 September 1955.

82 Estia, 7 October 1955.

83 Kathimerini, 22 and 25 September 1955.
few days after the entire Greek press - with few consistent exceptions (*To Vima*)- had uniformly asked for Greece’s withdrawal from NATO as a reaction to the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir, the attack was directed at a very vulnerable target.

The furor released by the appointment of Karamanlis in 1955 was not matched by comparable reactions when he was practically ousted from power, again upon royal initiative, in June 1963. It was not only that the all-encompassing Cyprus item had lost élan in the domestic political agenda, although it had by no means disappeared, since the promulgation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. It was mainly the shift of the polemic to the corrupt and anti-democratic spirit of the so-called ‘Karamanlis regime’ after the 1961 elections (‘relentless struggle’ of the Center), whereas the ‘usual conspirators’, the United States and the Crown, were offered a moratorium of polemics for their apathy in Karamanlis’ disintegration and their support of governmental change.  

This period of mercy lasted –with sharp intervals around the Cyprus issue- until the resignation of George Papandreou, the veteran leader of the unified Center (Center Union), in July 1965, under the pressure of King Constantine II. The emphasis of the endless political demonstrations that followed was on everlasting domestic issues, such as the constitutional role of the monarchy and popular sovereignty in determining the Greek government (e.g. slogan 1-1-4; reference to art. 114 of the 1952 constitution). The political protest entailed a broader social disaffection, though. Questioning authority and resistance to political conventional wisdom filled in gaps in the realm of political freedoms and social opportunities. Paradoxically enough, from a generational point of view, the antipode of the 25-year old King Constantine was not 77-old Papandreou, but rather young aspiring politicians of the Center, with prominent among them his 46-year old son, Andreas, an accomplished symbol of American liberal academia and bourgeois local urbane activism.

As a matter of fact, the sixties found Greece increasingly engulfed in the protest culture that permeated most Western societies, including the United States. The trend that has been widely described as the beginning of ‘mass politics’, was strongly connected with the political platform of the unified Center parties that propagated democratization, welfare economics and ideological liberalization to beat the austerity of the fifties. For the emerging war generation, provocative societal values made the difference, thus bridging the Greek youth with analogous protest movements in other (Western) societies. Therefore, it readily adopted the idiomatic tongue of their contemporaries’ opposition to the remnants of colonialism, Vietnam war, social and political discrimination, and the conservative comebacks at the cost of youthful icons like Kennedy, or Willy Brandt. These were issues many Greeks could relate to, particularly if they could re-filter them through local memory and experience.

The protracted governmental crisis was occasionally associated with backstage American activities that kept the flame of anti-Americanism burning as long as Greece walked on the rocky political path of the sixties. What made it flare up, though, was the aloofness of the United States at the collapse of democracy in 1967.

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3. The ‘betrayal’ on the Cyprus question

“shock and resentment at the attacks on Greeks ... and at the fancied indifference of the American government ... and of the American people, as indicated by alleged conspiracy of silence of the American press...Behind all the events of the period has been Greek pre-occupation with the future of Cyprus.”

Until 1954 anti-Americanism spread slowly and unevenly among the disaffected in a top-down direction. Ever since the first abortive Greek effort to raise the issue at the General Assembly of the United Nations that year, it turned into a grass-roots phenomenon. Not abandonment by a donor, but rather betrayal by the closest ally was the dominant emotion that produced widespread ideological aversion against virtually all American policies.

Despite repeated efforts to use “silent diplomacy” for Cyprus in order to “prevent the question from being raised at the United Nations,” the point of no return was reached when the Greek government stopped resisting the overtures of the Greek Cypriots to take their claims to the General Assembly. Most unexpectedly, the decision came from Field Marshal Papagos, the trusted ‘stability solution’ of the American Embassy. But Papagos had started to weigh the risk of appearing less patriotic than the increasing leftist Cyprus-protesters in Greece and Cyprus.

In 1954, the Rally government embraced “the movement for the acquisition of Cyprus with its solid popular base in Greece”, as “irredentism was deeply ingrained feature [of] Greek nationalism.” British intransigence on what London considered to be a matter of strictly ‘domestic jurisdiction’ was a source of embarrassment and irritation for Papagos himself, who had tried in vain to secure a British move of good-will.

The anti-colonial rhetoric provided the leftists with an excellent opportunity to circumvent the ideological quarantine of the special security legislation that had been haunting them since the civil war. Behind the controversial calls for Cyprus’ right to self-determination, usually meaning enosis (union with Greece), demonstrators were disseminating a much broader protest against the Athens ‘system’ and its foreign protectors, “the imperialist US as well as UK.”

The general argument encrypted three capital assertions. First, that the ‘nationally minded’ were incapable of defending the national interest because they always succumbed to foreign masters (neo-colonialism argument). Second, that the Left, was, inversely, the genuine

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86 American Consulate Salonica to the Department of State, 18 February 1956, NARA, RG 59, 781.00/2-1856, 1.
87 Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 6 September 1954, FRUS, (1952-1954, VIII), 708.
88 Memorandum of Conversation, by Ben F. Dixon of GTI, 1 October 1951, FRUS (1951, V), 539).
89 The Minister in Greece (Charles Yost) to the Department of State, 4 May 1951, ibid., 533.
90 Hadjivassiliou, Evanthis, Greece and the International Status of Cyprus, University of Minnesota, 1997, 10-11.
91 The Minister in Greece (Yost) to the Department of State, 20 February 1951, FRUS (1951, V), 529.
92 The Ambassador to Greece (Peurifoy), to the Department of State, 17 March 1952, FRUS, (1952-1954, VIII), 685.
94 The Ambassador on Greece to the Department of State, 22 March 1951, FRUS (1951, V), 529-531; The Consul in Nicosia (Wagner) to the Department of State, 7 December 1951, ibid., 541-543.
advocate of national interests (legitimacy argument). Third, that the United States anti-colonial views and the pledges for self-determination, democracy and allied solidarity were merely a fig leaf for the control of the small and the weak (underdog argument).\footnote{See Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction, 86-89, 106-107, 157-163182-185, 196-202.}

But also further to the right, the royalist and usually USIS-friendly Akropolis would wonder on the “Incomprehensible American Policy”:

“Why? All men of good will in our country wonder why Greece which was the first to fight in the camp of her friends and allies has now come to be reckoned as the last by them... Britain, a colonial power, is using every means, legitimate and illegitimate, to take revenge on the Greek people because of the fire they started in Cyprus. In this case there is an explanation. But the United States?...In particular: The United States has with generosity laid the foundations for Greece’s economic recovery...This is all the more why [the Greeks] should be wondering and asking why the Americans have abruptly abandoned us in the middle of the road...” (emphasis in the original).\footnote{Akropolis, 13 September 1958; From the newspapers reviews sent by the American Embassy Athens to the Department of State, 17 September 1958, NARA, RG 59, 611.81/9-1758.}

This attitude was inopportune for the additional reason that the government was advertising the closer connection of Greece with the West, after her entry into NATO and the conclusion of the Balkan Pact which would indirectly link Yugoslavia’s defense with NATO. The Westerners in Greece appeared helpless when they were supposed to be at the peak of their prestige and influence among their allies, who by now offered less aid, were granted more rights and privileges (1953 agreements for US bases and facilities), and urged them to cooperate with historical enemies (Turkey, Yugoslavia) for the common Western cause.

Under the circumstances, Papagos decided early in 1954 to take upon himself the responsibility of an “Application under the auspices of the United Nations, on the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the island of Cyprus.”\footnote{Position paper Prepared at the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, 14 September 1954, FRUS (1952-1954, VIII), 704.} The application was submitted in August 1954, and rendered Papagos overnight the ‘Paladin of Greek nationalism’.\footnote{Yost to Department of State, 26 August 1953, ibid., 677.} The unspoken assumption was that the stronger ties with the West would limit the collateral damage for all Western parties involved. The Americans fully realized that “...the Government of Marshal Papagos has staked his prestige at home and abroad on obtaining an airing of its views on Cyprus at this Assembly.”\footnote{Position paper in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, 14 September 1954, ibid., 677.}

Anti-American demonstrations flooded the country as it became more and more obvious that the United States would oppose the inscription of the Cyprus question in the agenda of the General Assembly. In July 1954, John F. Dulles made a futile appeal to Athens to back down on raising the issue.\footnote{Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 6 September 1954, ibid., 706; see also Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 6 September 1954, ibid., 703.} Papagos felt compelled to communicate with Washington his “concern that the attitude if the United States on the question of Cyprus in the UN is becoming increasingly opposed to the Greek position... if this trend continues the sympathies of the Greek people will be estranged from the United States.”\footnote{Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, 2 November 1954, ibid., 721.}
Alienation between Greeks and Americans looked imminent when, in the end, the United States voted against a resolution on the Cyprus issue “for the time being” in December 1954. Anti-Americanism became an unmistakable ideological and physical force of Greek-American relations in view of the equidistant American policy towards Greece and Britain in the UN discussion. With the final discussion on a ‘Cyprus resolution’ pending, American observers concluded in December 1954:

“Greece has a tremendous public opinion problem on its hands. The Greek public should have some reassuring statement from a US source to permit the quashing of rumors in Athens that the US has been one of the principal ‘bad boys.’”

Official complaints to Washington did not absorb public outrage. Anti-American demonstrations became now a frequent occurrence throughout Greece. In December 1954 violent protests took place in Athens and Thessaloniki; during an attack against the USIS in Thessaloniki, in December 1954, the library was damaged and a portrait of President Eisenhower was burned. Two more bombs exploded also in the American bases in Ellinikon, near the Athens airport, and the USIS Library in the capital. The Greeks believed that the American position had blocked the Cyprus question from reaching the General Assembly. As next step, the events were expected to reflect negatively in the American press and the American public opinion. According to a public opinion poll ordered by USIS in 1957, 47% of those who participated in the survey believed that Greece should follow an equidistant policy between the Western and the communist block.

The three factors the United States had considered pivotal for the handling of the Cyprus question, namely, the government, the press, and the church, were all engulfed in the crisis. From an ideological point of view, the church was widely regarded the ultimate guardian of Greek identity, having added to its nationalist mission in phases of Greek irredentism (e.g. the Macedonian struggle) its anti-communist profile. It was only natural for the church – following the Greek-Cypriot Ethnarchy- to join the Cyprus campaign, even if with the preface that this was too much of a serious issue to be left in the hands of the communists. The American Embassy recognized at an early point that “frustration over Cyprus and differences between the Greek government and the Greek Orthodox Church over the issue, might lead to a series of less stable governments still drawn primarily from conservative and moderate groups but subject to a varying degree of leftist influence.”

The Cyprus question permeated all aspects of Greek politics in the following years, creating, as George Papandreou put it, a “psychological dis-association”, “recognized and deplored by

102 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of GTI (Kitchen), 23 December 1954, ibid. 748-753.
103 Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in France (Brewster) to the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs (Merchant), 16 December 1954, ibid., 741.
104 American Embassy Athens to the Department of State, 17 December 1957, NARA, RG 59, 781.00(W)/12-1757.
105 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter), 16 December 1954, FRUS (1952-1954, VIII), 743.
106 Penfield to State Department, NARA, RG 59, 4 November 1957, 681.81/11-457; Stefanidis, Assymetrical Partners, 305.
107 The Minister in Greece (Yost) to the Department of State, 20 February 1950, FRUS (1951, V), 529.
108 For an insightful analysis of the role of the Greek Church, see Mavrogordatos, George Th., “Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case”, West European Politics, 26/1, 117-136.
the Embassy as well as by responsible figures in public life in Greece." Following the state
sponsored anti-Greek riots in Turkish cities in September 1955, Greece declared that
"Under such conditions further cooperation in the Balkan alliance or in NATO was
impossible."

A few days after the crisis, the Greek delegation at the United Nations failed to achieve the
inscription of the Cyprus question in the agenda of the General Assembly by a vote of 28 to
22 and 10 abstentions; among the 28 that voted against the inscription of the Cyprus item on
the agenda of the General Assembly were the United States and the United Kingdom; positive
votes came instead, from countries like the Soviet Union and Poland. The Americans
themselves readily observed that

"There is no doubt US prestige and influence has taken sharp downward turning Greece.
[Greek] pride has been hurt that leader ‘civilized’ world has not voiced expected
humanitarian sense of shock. Behind this is a real feeling of abandonment and isolation."

This second debacle in the United Nations had the potential to alienate large segments of
Greece’s political leadership and electorates. Not only the Greek government, but also the
King had been rebuffed in his appeal to Washington for the inscription if the Cyprus question
in the agenda of the General Assembly, warning that

“assistance in securing inscription of the Cyprus issue at the United Nations would be the
most effective means by which the United States can help stop an alarming trend towards
neutralism in Greece."

Papagos’ death and his replacement by Constantine Karamanlis came only a few weeks after
the Greek-Turkish crisis and the ‘betrayal’ in the United Nations. The King appointed the
young Macedonian Karamanlis in the hope that this staunch opponent of irredentist populism
was best fit to rescue stability. At that time, former conservative leaders like Constantine
Tsaldaris were urging that Greece should take a “third road between the blocks.”

As anti-Americanism was surging in Greece, Karamanlis indeed managed to lessen serious
political repercussions through a long and tenuous diplomatic effort for the settlement of the
question between Greece, Turkey and Britain. Minister of Foreign Affairs Evangelos
Tossizza-Averoff was instrumental in the incessant negotiations that covered the second
half of the fifties, and finally led to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1959-60
(Treaties of Zurich and London). But the preservation of Greece’s Western orientation did not
suffice to check the long-term psychological detachment of many Greeks from the United

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111 Despatch from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, 4 November 1957, ibid., 599.
112 American Embassy Athens to the Department of State, 17 December 1957, NARA, RG 59, 781.00(W)/12-1757.
113 FRUS (1955-1957, XXIV), 303; see also Hadjivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 39.
114 Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, 13 September 1955, FRUS (1955-1957, XXIV), 289 (comment); see also Letter from the Counselor of the Embassy in Greece to the Director of GTI (Baxter), 12 September 1955, ibid., 541.
115 Message from King Paul to the Secretary of State Dulles, undated, ibid., 301. For a systematic analysis, see Hadjivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 39.
118 Telegram from Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, 21 September 1955, FRUS (1955-1957, XXIV), 302.
119 Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, 12 March 1956, ibid., 348.
120 His own account is valuable; see Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos, Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question, 1950-1963, New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1986.
States. Neutrality became a highly popularized solution for winning back national ‘independence’. As many put it, it seemed that Greece would be anyway left alone to fight national battles –a reminder of past ‘betrayals’ by the West (notably British and French neutrality in the Asia Minor Disaster, 1922).

Calls for more ‘independence’ from the West appealed to the deep-seated suspicion of many anticommunist voters vis-à-vis the powerful West. The Americans had no illusions when they noted that

“We have been criticized for what Greece feels to be a policy inconsistent with our traditional opposition to colonialism. This has contributed to...a desire for greater independence in foreign affairs, and removal of the more obvious indications of Greek dependence on the U.S. In its more emotional sense it has resulted in occasional questioning of the NATO alliance and suggestions that Greece has to look elsewhere for political support... The probable result would be further deterioration in Greek-Turkey-UK relations and more neutralist and, conceivably, Soviet influence in Greece.”

The diplomatic settlement of the Cyprus issue allowed Karamanlis to focus on the implementation of the 5-year plan for economic development (1959-1963), and substantiate Greek orientation to the West. The firm treatment of neutralist sirens did not save the Western orientation from injuries, though. The rejection of American requests for landing rights on Greek soil during the intervention in Lebanon (July 1958), was an example of unavoidable ‘resistance’ on the part of the Greek government at a time when anti-American agitation was reaching a climax; on the other hand, Greece had unreservedly joined the Eisenhower doctrine and had discouraged Nasser’s non-alignment advances.

Foreign Minister Averoff actually tried to win some sort of compensation for Cyprus by comparing the American “decision to take risk in Lebanon with hesitation to intervene in the Cyprus case...US intervention could at long last [be] offset ... by active intervention for solution of Cyprus.”

Definitely, the most profound repercussion was the rise of the leftist EDA as the second largest party in the Greek Parliament in the elections of May 1958, with 24,42% of votes and 58/300 seats. The electoral result was largely the product of an electoral system which aimed to favor the second largest party in votes, in an effort to help the Center parties consolidate themselves into a ‘nationalist opposition.’ The Center’s weakness, however, allowed the Left to become the leading opposition force until the next elections in 1961. From an ideological point of view, EDA’s strategy spoke out the spirit of the day when it made again the Cyprus question and the need for more independence towards the United States in many fields the epicenter of its electoral campaign.

Now that anti-Americanism proved also a winning horse, the non-leftist public opinion makers did not refrain from fomenting it in their own way. A widespread feeling was represented in comments like:

121 NSC 5719, August 1957, NARA, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1954-60.
123 Allen to Dulles, 10 September 1957, NARA, RG 59, 781.19541/9-1057; Riddleberger to Dulles, 16 July 1958, NARA, RG 59, 781.195411/7-1658; Stefánidis, Asymmetrical Partners, 123.
124 Ibid., 123; American Embassy Athens to Secretary of State, 18 July 1958, NARA, RG 59, 781.00/7-1758.
125 Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction, 119-133.
126 Estia, 22 November 1954.
127 Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction, 119-133.
“In Greek-American relations an unfavorable reality has been created, that is capable of having unforeseeable psychological repercussions...American economic assistance is becoming more and more scanty. But that amounts to a blow to our peaceful effort which is going through its most critical phase...there is the danger that whatever was achieved these last few years with so much toil, so much money and so many hope will collapse....unfortunately there are many things the Americans cannot understand lately. Its is as if the United States had forgotten that the Greeks opened the door to hope for the Allies in 1940 and that they resisted with rivers of blood the drive of Slavism to the Mediterranean...Bitterness has filled the heart of every Greek...anti-Greek elements must not be lacking in the State Department where Turkey especially has stretched out her tentacles plotting against her neighbor...maybe they adopted the argument that with the increased extreme left in Greece and the 24% secured by EDA our country no longer affords guarantees of steadfast and decisive participation in the responsibilities of the Atlantic alliance...But there is also the Cyprus question. The Americans reduce aid to Greece and constantly increasing aid to Turkey...In other words they strike up Greeks who have always proved loyal and militant friends in peace and war in order to flatter the Turks who in two world wars remained outside the camp of allies. Those are the sources of the anti-western spirit in Greece which caused blind reactions in wide masses of the Greek population and resulted in the 24%.”

Evidently, anti-Americanism had grown into a wholesale theory for international failures and domestic grievances.

The Zurich and London Treaties did not seal permanently the status of Cyprus. In November 1963, shortly after Karamanlis’ resignation from the premiership and his self-exile to Paris, Archbishop Makarios submitted to Turkish Cypriot Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus, Dr. Kutchuk, a memorandum requesting constitutional amendments, especially with regard to the position of the Greek ethnic majority. The problem entered again a violent phase which soon came to coincide with the destabilization of the Greek democracy. The new Center Union government that took office in Greece in 1963 tried to link Cyprus more closely with the West by centralizing Greek and Greek-Cypriot policies on the status of the island in the ‘national center’ Athens.

Makarios rejected the second Acheson Plan for an ‘agreed settlement between Greece and Turkey, but welcomed openly Soviet and non-aligned diplomatic support for independence. Leftist agitation went along by rejecting the idea of the ‘national center’ as inimical to the independence of Cyprus as it would indirectly imprison her into Western objectives.

The governments of the so-called apostates that split from Papandreou’s Center Union and formed coalition governments with the Rightist opposition (1965-67) submitted a new Greek application for a resolution on Cyprus, in December 1965. The resolution was approved by a vote of 47 to 6 and 51 abstentions. Again, favorable vote was owed mainly to non-aligned countries, whereas the United States, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Albania voted against the

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128 Akropolis, 13 September 1957; see also criticism in Eleftheria, 27 September 1957.
130 Linardatos, From the civil war to the junta, vol. V, 46-77.
132 Linardatos, From the civil war to the junta, vol. V, 51-74.
133 Rizas, Greece, the US and Europe, 173-187.
Soviet Union and its satellites abstained. What was considered an achievement of Greeks and Cypriots, after many unsuccessful attempts for a substantial resolution, left once more the door open to anti-American fervor. The Left, but also the ousted part of the Center Union condemned the government that it was incapable of promoting these positive developments out of discretion towards the Turks.

As anti-American protests escorted Greece into the dictatorship, an earlier American observation had not lost its relevance: 

"[...] there is a net feeling that we have let Greece down on what has been to her most important single issue of this critical decade. Cyprus is the key to much of our troubles with Greece. When the Greek public sees its desires with respect to Cyprus supported without stint in the United Nations by the Afro-Asian Bloc, by Tito, and, however tardily and hypocratically, by the Soviet bloc, and sees the United States and each of its partners in NATO either thwart those desires or remain indifferent or neutral toward them, it lends an ever more receptive ear to those who in public speeches and in the daily press ask what Greece’s ties with the West have gained her and why she should continue to maintain them. To many Greeks, and to an increasing number of them, this seems a logical question."

4. The ‘semi-colony’ argument: bases, missiles and regional priorities

“Greece is smarting under the impact of a Cinderella complex, the most marked manifestation of which is acute sensitivity towards any marks of favor shown towards Turkey. This is almost a conditional reflex: if a warship is given Greece, the press needs must point out that Turkey has received three... It is probable that most thinking Greeks regard their country as the orphan of NATO, with all the repressed emotional reaction that that connotes.”

The elections of 1958 presented a kaleidoskop of the issues that disturbed Greek-American relations. The Cyprus question was the key for understanding the neutralist and isolationist agenda. The reduction of American aid was contrasted with the rising significance of the timeless Turkish foe. The pacifist movement made a noticeable appearance with demands for the participation of Greece in the Balkan nuclear free zone which was then propagated by Rumanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica - a project that was supported also by non-communist politicians, like the leader of the Progressive Party Spyros Markezinis, the Populist Constantine Tsaldaris, and occasionally the Liberal Sofoklis Venizelos. But also practical matters were brought to the fore.

1957-58 was a period of intensive domestic discussions about the advisability of stationing IRBMs (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles) on Greek soil. The discussion had been opened as a result of the re-organization of American and NATO nuclear planning under the

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134 Unsuccessful attempts to reach a resolution: 1954, 1957, 1958, 1960; in 1955, failure of inscribing the Cyprus question on the agenda of the General Assembly; see Hadjivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus.
135 Linardatos, From the civil war to the junta, vol. V, 320-321.
136 American Embassy Athens to Department of State, 4.11.1957, NARA, RG 59, 611.81/11-457.
137 American Embassy Athens an Department of State, 22 September 1958, NARA, RG 59, 781.00/9-2258.
139 Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction, 154; Stefanidis, Asymmetrical Partners, 175; Markezinis Spyros, Modern Political History of Greece 1936-1975, Athens: Papyros, 1994 (in Greek), 83-89.
‘Sputnik alarm’ in fall 1957. The United States proposed the creation of a nuclear stockpile in European countries that would be under the command of SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) and would eventually include not only tactical weapons, but also IRBM s.\textsuperscript{140}

The possibility of Greece hosting IRBM s was raised in Washington in the beginning of 1957, when it was more or less certain that Turkey would accept IRBM s in 1961. So long as vague rumors were circulating, leaders of the bourgeois camp suggested that they would have no objection, if all NATO members participated in the project. But after Denmark and Norway rejected the plan, things became more complicated. In the months preceding the elections of May 1958, Greek dailies from the entire political spectrum were speculating on the threats to which Greece would expose herself, if she was pressured to accept a country-to-country approach. EDA condemned the anti-communist parties that they appeared eager to attract nuclear repercussions in the name of imperialist Atlantic objectives\textsuperscript{141} and instigated demonstrations in Athens and Crete, which was a possible location for the missile installations.\textsuperscript{142}

The government in Athens reassured that no missiles would be installed without the consent of the Greek Parliament.\textsuperscript{143} The Americans realized that the moment was most inopportune to include an additional issue into the overburdened Greek-American agenda:

“Missile bases: the issue is potentially much more serious. If a decision were made by NATO to negotiate with the Greek Government for permission to locate IRBM bases on Greek soil and this became public knowledge, the question could be exploited by the Communists and any coalition partners they may acquire. This issue, playing on Greek tendencies toward neutralism, could be decisive in preventing establishment of working majority by center or right-wing groups.”\textsuperscript{144}

No decision was taken in 1958 and Karamanlis attempted to close the subject by declaring that sole criterion for any such initiative would be the interest of the nation.\textsuperscript{145} In 1959, NATO officials restarted contacts with members of the alliance. Greece again expressed her reservations with regard to the reactions that could be expected at home and in the neighboring communist countries, which were actually supporting her on the Cyprus question.

Finally, the Greek government signed a draft Cooperation Agreement on 9 May 1959. A secret Stockpile Agreement was added on 30 December 1959. It provided for the stockpiling of nuclear heads (special ammunition). The first nuclear heads were installed in December 1960. The public debate remained opened for years, however, as a source of anti-American reasoning. For this situation Washington put the blame on Athens for

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Ibid.}, 167; Couloumbis, \textit{Greek Political Reaction}, 112-117.
\textsuperscript{142} American Embassy Athens to the Department of State, 24 December 1957, NARA, RG 59, 781.00(W)/12-2457; Linardatos, \textit{From the civil war to the junta }, vol. III, 272-273.
\textsuperscript{144} Department of State Instruction to American Embassy Athens, 13 March 1958, NARA, RG 59, 781.77/3-1358.
\textsuperscript{145} Riddleberger to State Department, NARA, RG 59, 781.56381/5-658.
“ERE has exploited its ‘independent policies’, a line which occasionally verged on anti-Americanism, and failed to take forthright stand on such matters as missile base questions.”

The IRBMs case fed the leftist argument that American policies had one single purpose in Greece: the transformation of the country into an American ‘semi-colony’. According to this conception, Greece was condemned to lose its independence and national sovereignty, since the United States systematically brought her anti-communist puppets to power. On a more sophisticated level, which retained a long-term influence on Greek writings about the postwar era, the country’s postwar underdevelopment and instability originated, as well, in the American policy of ‘using’ Greece for the defense of NATO and blocking her economic development in order to keep her under political control.

From this standpoint, the IRBMs would further facilitate American abuse of power. This had become an endemic problem since the inauguration of US military facilities in Greece back in October 1953, following her accession to NATO. The bases-agreement, the argument went, had not only conceded sovereign security rights to the United States, but they were also responsible for the recognition of extensive immunities to the American military personnel that joined the old economic and military missions.

The most disturbing issue seemed to be the recognition of the American military penal code when US personnel committed a crime (art. 7 of the bilateral Greek-American Status of Forces Agreement, SOFA, February 4, 1953). Protests recurred every time an incident reminded the existence of the immunities. A prominent example was definitely the fatal injury caused to former leader of the left resistance army, Stefanos Sarafis, by a member of the American Air Force in Greece (1957). At that time, the so-called ‘extraterritorial rights’ had been just amended on (September 7, 1956) upon Karamanlis insistence since the first days he had been sworn in as Prime Minister in 1955, for “revision of extraterritoriality provisions very soon, otherwise he will be forced to issue public declaration.”

In 1959, about 4,800 Americans were still residing in Greece as members and families of members of political and military missions. Washington never ceased to consider the matter, which was also brought to the attention of President Eisenhower himself during his official visit to Greece on December 14-15, 1959. Yet, it was perpetually shelved, and remained thus a source of friction in the following decades.

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146 American Embassy Athens to Department of State, 27 May 1958, NARA, RG 59, 781.99/2-2758.
147 Representative works are, for example, Linardatos, From the civil war to the junta; Kofas, Intervention and Underdevelopment; Meynaud, Jean, Les forces politiques en Grèce, Montreal: Études des Sciences 10, 1965, Roubatis, Yannis, The Trojan Horse: American penetration in Greece 1947-1967, Athens, 1987 (in Greek).
148 Cannon to Department of State, 9 November 1955, FRUS (1955-1957, XXIV), 522; Robert D. Murphy (Deputy Under Secretary of State) to Gordon Gray (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs), 25 November 1955, ibid., 557-560.
149 Axelrod to Department of State, 5 November1953, NARA, RG 84, 1943-1955, Box 133; American Embassy Athens to Department of State, 18 November 1958, NARA, RG 469, Near Eastern Central Files Subject Files 1953-1959, Box 5; McDonald, John W./Bendahmane, Diane B. (Hrsg.), US Bases Overseas. Negotiations with Spain, Greece and the Philippines, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press 1990, 159.
150 Linardatos, From the civil war to the junta, vol. III, 234.
151 Stefanidis, Asymetrical Partners, 137-191.
152 American Embassy Athens to Secretary of State, 2 November 1955, UNSA, RG 59, 781.00/1-255.
After 1974, the Greek socialist party (PASOK, Panhellenic Socialist Movement) under Andreas Papandreou systematically propagated the suspension of the facilities agreement and the consequent termination of upsetting immunities. This did not happen when the socialists came to power (1981). A new agreement was signed, however, in 1983, which provided for the increase in American direct assistance and the adoption of the Greek position on the Greek-Turkish dispute about the Aegean field of operations as a trade-off for the maintenance of the military facilities for another 5 years; the bilateral agreement was declared ‘terminable’ after that period.\(^\text{154}\)

The ‘satellite’ rhetoric pointed frequently to the side effects of this sort of commitment. First, to the opportunities Greece was losing in order to be a loyal ally of the ‘unfaithful’ West. Second, to the limitations it had to tolerate with regard to her defense against her ‘real’ enemies, namely Turkey. The latter notion reached its zenith after the 1974 crises in Greece and Cyprus. It was only partially satisfied, when, in the mid-eighties, the Papandreou government redirected the Greek security doctrine against the Turkish ‘enemy from the East’, in place of the communist ‘enemy from the North’.\(^\text{155}\)

A recurrent theme on lost opportunities included the alleged compromise of important regional initiatives that promised to place Greece in an advantageous position in the East-West confrontation and beyond. The advocates of this approach pointed back to Greek initiatives for the formation of Balkan alliance and cooperation schemes in the first half of the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century. The main areas in which Greece was considered capable of becoming an important regional actor, but her international commitments prevented her from doing so, were the Balkans and the Near/Middle East. For obvious reasons, the Left insisted on more contacts with the communist Balkan states, often advertising the contribution of the existing clearing trade with Eastern block countries to the Greek balance of payments and the absorption of socially critical products, like tobacco.\(^\text{156}\)

The same view shared many non-communist politicians as well. Especially established figures from diverse parties, like Populist Constantine Tsaldaris, Liberal Sofoklis Venizelos, or Spyros Markezinis of the Progressive Party and former second-in-charge in Papagos’ Rally saw in ‘third way’ populism a means to regain lost political ground across the Greek society. ERE was more reluctant to open up economic relations with communist countries; it, therefore, resisted also American suggestions to promote cooperation in order to “help break the monolith” in the early sixties\(^\text{157}\).

The Near/Middle East had been an area of interest for the Greeks on the grounds that large Greek communities existed in countries like Egypt, Lebanon a. o., but also because Athens deemed it necessary to always counterbalance the involvement of Turkey in the region, particularly after the formation of the Baghdad Pact and the following ‘loss’ of Iraq.\(^\text{158}\)

Traditional Greek conservatives, chiefly of the Populist Party, raised the issue quite often for the additional reason that they had devoted a great deal of time and energy to the ephemeral

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155 Ibid.
156 This subject is thoroughly discussed by Wallden, *Greece and the Eastern countries*.
British-American project for a Mediterranean pact which would include Greece as an ersatz for her exclusion from NATO. This scenario withered away when Greece and Turkey started membership negotiations with NATO, but it remained popular among many political circles. The ‘cinderella’ syndrome aimed here clearly at getting together with countries of comparable geopolitical profile and manageable international leverage. For the Left, the direction should be to take distance from the West. For the rest, the immediate gain would be added political value in the eyes of allies and some extra room for maneuver when things got tricky: in essence, making other friends was supposed to make Washington understand that Greece was not to be taken for granted...

Regional concepts became for the first time full-fledged political initiatives after the collapse of the junta. The Karamanlis governments of the seventies revitalized Balkan cooperation through bilateral and multilateral agreements for trade, educational exchanges, transports, tourism, a.o., while contacts with the Arab countries were promoted again. The socialists continued this policy and expanded it into other areas, e.g. the Mediterranean, largely following, from a safety position, the French socialists who were publicizing their interest in the ‘South’ in the beginning of the eighties, when Greece joined the European Communities. The Greek contacts with Libyan leader Kadafi and Yassir Arafat were quite irritating for the United States as were also socialist suggestions that regional policies indicated a more ‘independent’ outlook in Greek foreign policy towards both the United States and the European Communities. There was no practical evidence, however, that the socialists would challenge either, after all. In the late eighties, regional moves remained half-way and were easily washed away by the dramatic collapse of the entire communist camp. In the post-cold war era, Greece sought to gain an important role in Southeastern Europe as pact and parcel of her position and influence in the European Union.

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160 Svolopoulos, Greek Foreign Policy, 226-258.
5. The aftermath of the dictatorship

The thesis that Washington did nothing to prevent the colonels from staging the coup d’ état in 1967, or, once in power, undermine them, consisted one part of the second ‘betrayal’ of the US, apart from the struggle for Cyprus. The direct line drawn between the colonels and obscure American interests, on the basis of Washington’s contribution to the re-organization of Greek armed forces after 1947, was perceived as evidence for the ‘bankruptcy’ of the American democratic values. The anti-American bias kept flourishing as Greek-American relations remained unscathed by the establishment of military rule.\(^{162}\)

From that point on, the rejection of American policies smoothly enveloped all real or presumed American interventions around the world. From this radicalized viewpoint, the American war on Vietnam was not just another ‘unfair’ war, not even a battle of the cold war. It was the emblematic icon of the Greek suffering, the tragedy of the fellow man who resisted American coercion. In comparison with the Europeans that had ousted Greece from the Council of Europe in 1969,\(^ {163}\) the Americans were unequivocally identified with authoritarianism and political cynicism. Ironically, this thesis was also shared by a substantial portion of the colonels themselves, who considered American modernity and rationalism inimical to the chauvinistic provincialism of their of ‘Greek-Hellenic civilization’-dogma which could be contaminated by American cosmopolitanism.\(^ {164}\)

Looming in the political background during the repressive rule of the junta, anti-American anger came boldly to the open when the regime collapsed amidst the havoc of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus. The withdrawal of Greece from the military planning of NATO in 1974 clearly sought to remove at least one thorny item from the public debate on the proper response to Turkish aggression. Was it only the newly legalized Communist Party of Greece (KKE)\(^ {165}\) and the radical socialism preached by Andreas Papandreou’s PASOK, that brought anti-Americanism back with a vengeance throughout the seventies? The spontaneous answer would be that these actors made the biggest contribution to that effect. Again, the picture would be incomplete without the occasional upsurge of anti-Americanism chaque couleur. The torrential demands of the Left and Center-Left for “withdrawal from NATO”, abolishment of the US military facilities,\(^ {166}\) could find chauvinistic matches, for instance in the political platform of ultra rightists, that presented a distinctive force (EP, Ethniki Parataxi) in the 1977 elections.\(^ {167}\)

Anti-Americanism –and a rigorous Euroscepticism- remained a strong influence in the mixture of populism at home and neutralism abroad which the first socialist cabinets

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163 Ibid., 274.
165 The KKE had been banished from Greek politics from December 1947 when the communist guerillas formed a “Provisional Democratic Government” in Northern Greece until September 1974. From the internal split of the party on the issue of the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the stalinist prototype had lost a fraction to the so-called Communist Party of Greece of the interior, which combined dogma with domestic, in a local version of Eurocommunism; see Mavrogordatos, George Th., Rise of the Green Sun. The Greek Election of 1981, King’s College, Occasional Paper 1, London: Centre of Contemporary Greek Studies 1983, 6-7; Karamanlis Archive: Facts and Texts, vol. VIII, 162-165.
promoted in the eighties. Appearing now as a state-sponsored position, anti-Americanism
tended to become a conventional obligation of every thinking Greek, no matter how
nationalist or internationalist his outlook was. There was hardly any conflict the US was even
allegedly entangled in, from Grenada to Nicaragua, that the Greek press and public opinion
would side with Washington.\textsuperscript{168} The Greek government had set the spirits high when, for
example, she refused to join her EC partners for condemning jointly the shooting down of the
South Korean jumbo by the Soviets in 1983.\textsuperscript{169} Detailed mass media accounts on the
successes of anti-American forces around the world aimed to compensate in retrospect the
obsessive presentation of US successes in the Vietnam front during the dreary dictatorial
rule.\textsuperscript{170} The classical PASOK-rhetoric practically sought to offset the subterranean
normalization of Greece’s Atlantic affiliation: non-withdrawal from NATO after re-
integration in the allied military planning, confirmation of US base rights on Greek soil,
rejection of the war option vis-à-vis Turkey, despite the formation of the Turkish pseudo-state
in Northern Cyprus (1983) and the Greek-Turkish crisis of 1987\textsuperscript{171} -to name only a few
fundamental issues.

The end of the cold war found the Greeks on the side of the ‘winners’. Greece’s obvious
advantages in a neighborhood where she was the only NATO and EC-country changed her
image among many Greeks from that of a weak Western country to that of a regional power
in a broader Euro-Atlantic community. Until this became conventional wisdom in the mid-
nineties, the conflict with neighboring FYROM about the name and the symbols of the new
state produced anti-American feeling in huge demonstrations both in Greece and the United
States, reminders of the uniqueness of historical Greek Macedonia. In essence, that was the
last case of protestation upon purely national argument.\textsuperscript{172} The next mass protest would be on
international issues. Anti-Americanism reached new peaks in Greece during the military
campaign in Kosovo (1999) - but not the genocide in Srebrenica- and the war against Iraq
(2003), when almost all Greeks were reported to oppose American initiatives (99.5% and
94%, respectively). Again, the Greek reaction was largely articulated as the local story of an
international concept.

The symbolic language of post-dictatorial anti-Americanism as important for its endurance.
From the variety of references, at least one stands out: the habitual protest before the
American Embassy in Athens in the end of every demonstration that could be even remotely
associated with US policies. The ‘Embassy’ remains the axiomatic final destination of the
annual celebration that commemorates the uprising of Greek students against the colonels on
November 17, 1973, reminding the ‘role of the US’ in the dictatorship, but also an abstract
wish for a ‘better world.’\textsuperscript{173} This ritual is widely considered as a crucial tribute to the recent
heroes of –any- Greek ‘resistance’. On a totally different level, the strong anti-American basis
of terrorism in post-1974 Greece entailed a clear intention to seek some kind of social

\textsuperscript{168} Ifantis, Kostas, “State interests, dependency trajectories and ‘Europe’: Greece”, in: Kaiser, Wolffram/Elvert,
\textsuperscript{169} Valinakis, With Vision and Program, 291-292.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 59.
\textsuperscript{171} Botsiou, Konstantina E., “Greek –Turkish Relations since 1974: efforts for rapprochement and co-operation”,
\textsuperscript{172} Valinakis, With Vision and Program, 252-258.
\textsuperscript{173} In 1976 the Karamanlis government had unsuccessfully tried to ban the ‘march’. For critical approaches, see
former the article of former socialist Minister George Romeos, “It ‘lives’ but does not move any more”, To
Conclusion

A standard American question about the development of anti-American feeling in postwar Europe is “why have quite many Europeans embraced anti-Americanism, whereas Western European countries had welcomed for decades generous US aid for their reconstruction, development and security?”

Without denying the unprecedented opportunities for growth and welfare democracy provided by American involvement in Western Europe, the mainstream European observer is usually as quick as virulent critics to point out a number of basic sources of anti-American attitudes. The conflict between the burden of US involvement and the fear of US disengagement is considered a key for deciphering European resentment towards the “primus inter pares” ally, from the aftermath of the Korean crisis until the “Star Wars”-project (SDI). Explanations include also major disagreements as to transatlantic security planning (De Gaulle imbroglio), occasional clashes between national and allied interests (e.g. Berlin-Wall-crisis), or friction over the US understanding of interventionism and political change (Suez-crisis, Arab-Israeli wars). Their random nature nonetheless, the recurrent tides of anti-American spirit, have hardly hidden a persisting subterranean rejection of the values, methods or, simply, power of the Atlantic superpower. The inputs of this historical background into the rather effortless articulation of anti-Americanism throughout Western Europe after 1989 could be considered all but negligible.

Greece presents a case-study of long-term anti-Americanism. Even though she had welcomed the American “deus ex machina” against the threat of partition and communist domination (Civil War, 1946-49), Greece was among the first Marshall- and NATO-partners to face widespread anti-American campaigns in the fifties. The perennial fear of abandonment by the United States elaborated unfulfilled hopes for indefinite economic dependence on American funding (1956-65, and diverging security concerns (friction over US and NATO military bases -1953, 1961-62, 1981-83- and the stationing of IRBMs, 1958-61). The crisis surfaced as a result of massive frustration over American ‘betrayal’ in issues of national priority for the sake of allied unity, or worse, to the benefit of historical contenders (Cyprus issue, since 1954), and toleration of authoritarianism in the name of international stability (military dictatorship, 1967-74). Helping merge Third-World neutralism with anti-American populism, Greek policies of the eighties granted further legitimacy to an embedded underdog mentality and recent historical traumata.

Anti-American ideas neither overturned the Western orientation of Greece nor provided the Left with sufficient social backing to come to power. Yet, they successfully built an endemic ideological current that permeated almost all political parties for over five decades. The major issues were connected with the balance between American interference and non-interference/abandonment regarding Greek affairs. Therefore, the limitation of economic interference helped create hostile images that magnetized objections over American neutrality

174 Pappas, Tasos, 17 November: From Myth to Reality, Athens: Protoporia, 2002 (in Greek); see also Greek newspapers of July 2002.
in the Cyprus question. Political interventionism in Greek party politics alienated many forces in the anticommunist camp and led them to take up ideological assets of the Left.

On the other hand, anti-American positions lay at the heart of the neutralist and isolationist agenda which bestowed the Left the leadership of the Opposition from 1958 to 1961, and weighed considerably when Greece pulled out of the military planning of NATO after the fall of the junta and the Turkish crisis in 1974.

While the left forces saw in anti-Americanism a blueprint for challenging, in line with their anti-Western obligations, the anti-communist political order in postwar Greece, the bourgeois parties did not stay immune to the mesmerizing ‘resistance image’ that anti-Americanism promised even to its remote champions. An ostensible excuse was that the electoral appeal produced by the anti-American perceptions on large social groups was too strong to let fall in the hands of the Left. Beyond that, more immanent ideological fixations vis-à-vis foreign influence, in general, and American interventionism, in particular, were also at play.

To be sure, rapid democratization after the junta, including the legitimization of the communist parties, moderated the effects of anti-American radicalism expected after the fall of the dictatorship and the dispute with Turkey over Cyprus. The pressure exerted by the anti-American mobilization of Greek public opinion on overtly pro-Western governments revealed, nevertheless, significant ideological and political potential.

From a sociological point of view, the Greek creed of anti-Americanism fell in the mainstream European paradigm with regard to its dominant position in youth, leftists and ex definitio conservative social milieus (peasants) and institutions (Church). It also verified the imposing widespread expression of anti-Americanism through US-inspired political and cultural forms. The Greek case furnished solid evidence to the premise that Europeanization renders a broader manifestation of anti-American attitudes safer, hence bolder.

To its rather distinctive features, belong, however, first, its evolution across the party spectrum in the entire period under discussion, and, second, its gradual transformation into a widely accepted “narrative” of contemporary Greek history.