Leadership Trait Analysis
Personality as an intervening variable in foreign policy

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Introduction

1.1 Introduction
In the research field of international relations, many have debated on the issue of what level of analysis should be studied to make inferences about the behaviour of nation-states (Waltz, 2010; Morgenthau, 1993; Singer, 1961; Waltz, 1959). There are three levels of analysis: the level of the anarchic world system, the level of nation states, and the level of individuals. Scholars have many objections to studying individuals in international relations (Greenstein, 2004), mainly because environmental variables are considered more apt in predicting foreign policy outcomes. This study looks at objections to studying individuals in foreign policy and assesses these objections by borrowing from the field of developmental psychology. This field argues that social and environmental factors have an impact on personality (Bjorklund, 2011; Bronfenbrenner, 2005; Greenstein, 2004; Hermann, 1986). If this is the case, objections can be discarded by reasoning that the personality of the individual in international relations can be an intervening or interacting variable to explain foreign policy outcomes.

New to this study is that it makes use of Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) to determine the leadership styles of 94 European foreign ministers in coalition democracies. It is also one of the few studies which makes use of a large dataset of individuals in foreign policy. Lastly, this study will zoom in to one of the foreign ministers in particular, Gaston Thorn in Luxembourgian foreign policy during the battle over the seat of the European Parliament, to better assess how leadership style intervenes in the relationship between historical, environmental and social characteristics on the one hand, and foreign policy outcomes on the other.

1.2 The individual in international relations
Kenneth Waltz famously distinguished three ‘images’ of international relations; three distinct levels of analysis where the explanatory factors of international politics can be situated. The first image is that of the individual. The second image is that of the state’s internal structure. According to Waltz, the third image trumps the first two: it is the image of the anarchic world system, in which states take on foreign policies based on all other foreign policies of all other states in the system and the structural features of the system itself. The third image of international relations frames the way in which the first and the second image go about their business (Waltz, 1959).

However, scholars have assessed what goes on inside states in the international system too. Scholars have applied nation-oriented models. Such models look at explanations on the level of analysis of Waltz’s first and second image. When applying such a model as opposed to a system-
oriented model (i.e., Waltz third image), one engages in something which is usually depicted as 'opening the black-box'.

A second image, nation-oriented model attempts to explain the behaviour of states by looking at the internal structure of the state. It assesses, for example, what the long term social and cultural traditions within a state can tell us about the behaviour of a state within the international system. Other variables include the bureaucratic structure of the state, the political party which is in power and the group of individuals who are in power (Hellema, 2010). Each sublevel of analysis provides us with different, constrained types of knowledge. Moreover, they affect each other.

Many have argued that the least likely level to make an impact on states' behaviour is that of the first image, that is to say, the individual and his unique characteristics. Many scholars harbour reservations about studying individuals’ personalities in international relations for three related reasons: 1) individuals are rational, utility maximizing actors 2) individuals are heavily constrained by political environments, and 3) social characteristics are more important than psychological characteristics.

The first objection is that individuals are rational and utility maximizing actors, and therefore, psychological characteristics play no part in any political decision making process (Kurki & Wight, 2013). The rational actor approach is to predict the behaviour of individuals, and it would basically predict the same as the systemic, third image approach would (Holsti, 1989). However, a highly influential study by Simon (1957) criticized the idea that real, existing individuals stand up to a standard of global rationality. In the rational actor model, individuals are assumed to have knowledge of all the relevant aspects of their environment, have a clear-cut set of preferences, and can skilfully calculate whatever path of action has to be taken to reach the highest attainable point on their preference scale. Most of the time, such a rational attitude is simply not possible, owing to a lack of information and cognitive skills (Nye & Welch, 2011; George, 1997; Herek, Janis & Huth, 1989; Simon, 1957). Simon proposed a model of 'bounded rationality', in which individuals only have a limited amount of information, limited cognitive skills and a limited amount of time. Rather than going over all the possible outcomes in making a choice, individuals simplify the choices they make. Instead of maximizing utility, individuals aim for satisfaction. Many distinguished scholars have therefore discarded at least the idea of global rationality (Herek, Janis & Huth, 1989; Sen, 1977; Simon, 1957).

In line with the notion of bounded rationality, decision-making analysts argue that the foreign policy of a nation-state does not address itself to the external world, but rather to the image individual policymakers have about the external world and their place in it (Jervis, 2004; Hill, 2003; Neack, 2003; Walker, 2000; Kowert & Hermann, 1997; George, 1980; George, 1969; Singer, 1961). This image is supposed to be highly influenced by psychological factors (Holsti,
1989). The anarchic world system and domestic political constraints will certainly influence the choices individuals can make. However, individuals are thought to perceive – or frame – these systemic and domestic constraints in their own way and they make their ultimate choices based on that perception, thus having simplified them. Singer (1961) gives the example of an individual that will certainly fall out of a tenth-story building when he steps outside the window – his perception of gravitational forces does not change anything about that. However, that very perception determines in the first place whether he will or will not step outside the window. Decision-making analysts take domestic political contexts into account and apply psychological theories to individuals to assess their capability of information processing and choice processes (Nye & Welch, 2011; Kowert & Hermann, 1997; Holsti, 1989; Herek, Janis & Huth, 1987). Influential concepts in this regard are, among others, the idea of groupthink (Herek, Janis & Huth, 1987; Janis, 1982) and the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962).

The second objection to the studying of individuals in foreign policy reasons that the impact of the individual’s personality is heavily constrained by his or her political environment (Greenstein, 2004), or in other words, third and second image variables (Hellema, 2010). However, Greenstein (2004) argues that the political environment alone does not explain an individual’s behaviour. In fact, an individual’s personality interacts with one’s environment. Through the interaction of these two variables, foreign policy is forged.

A third objection against the study of individual personality is that social characteristics of political actors are more important than their psychological characteristics. However, several studies in developmental psychology show that the relationship between one’s environment, social characteristics and psychological characteristics is bidirectional (Bjorklund, 2011; Bronfenbrenner, 2005; Greenstein, 2004). Some studies show that earlier psychological development can be a determinant of ideological preferences (Tetlock, 2004; Tetlock, Bernzweig & Gallant, 1985; Tetlock, 1983). Other studies investigate the relationship between an individual’s previous experiences and his cognitive development. A study by Tadmor & Tetlock (2006) suggests that exposure to a different cultural environment than one’s own will make it easier to shift between different cultural meaning systems, stimulating a person’s integrative complexity. Because the relationship between environment, social and psychological characteristics appears to be bidirectional, a sole focus on environment and social characteristics would thus render knowledge about the individual’s impact on international relations incomplete, as psychological factors can be an intervening or interacting variable. Environmental or social characteristics could then influence foreign policy outcomes through psychological characteristics.

Therefore, this study will consider the level of analysis of individuals by considering psychological characteristics of individual policymakers to assess the objections made against studying the personality of individuals. It assumes personality to be an intervening variable. More
specifically, this study will assess the impact of several environmental and social characteristics on the notion of ‘leadership style’ as developed by M.G. Hermann (2003, 2002) through a multivariate regression analysis, and will then assess the impact of leadership style on foreign policy by doing a single case study. Most research done by decision-making scholars consists of idiographic, single case studies (Schafer & Crichlow, 2010). While single case studies allow for more insight in whether an individual was truly able to shape foreign policy, they are less powerful in their external validity, that is to say, their generalizability (Gerring, 2007). To be able to make generalizable claims, it is necessary to take a large number of political leaders into account and compare them with each other. There have been only several of such nomothetic, large n-studies (among others: Schafer & Crichlow, 2010; Hermann, 2002; Barber, 1992; Hermann; 1980). When taking a nomothetic approach, it is possible to assess which political leaders are alike and to determine whether identical leaders pursue a comparable direction in foreign policy. If so, then generalization across cases is possible.

As mentioned, besides taking a nomothetic approach, this study will conclude with a case study of Luxembourgian prime and foreign minister Gaston Thorn’s role in the seat issue of the European Parliament. This case study will argue that Gaston Thorn’s leadership style had a profound impact on Luxembourg foreign policy, and it will help to illustrate how Hermann’s leadership trait analysis (LTA) can be used aptly to study the role of individuals in foreign policy.

1.3 Chapter outline
The first part of this study takes a nomothetic approach to the leadership styles of 94 foreign ministers in Western-European coalition democracies from 1945 to the present day. Chapter 2 will go into detail about the ecological systems model which will serve as the basis of several hypotheses and the Leadership Trait Analysis-method (LTA) used to obtain the leadership styles of 94 foreign ministers. It will then proceed to go into formulating hypotheses. Chapter 3 will describe the dataset and the variables, and will then present the results of the statistical analysis. The hypotheses will be tested using SPSS to see whether environmental and social characteristics have an impact on leadership style.

The second part of this study will consist of an idiographic, single case study of one of the ministers in the dataset, Luxembourg minister of foreign affairs (1969-1980) Gaston Thorn and the impact of his personal leadership style on Luxembourg foreign policy regarding the issue of the seat of the European Parliament. Chapter 4 will describe Mr Thorn’s unique leadership style and will then assess his behaviour regarding the seat issue of the European Parliament.

All of this will be followed by a conclusion on whether individuals’ psychological characteristics have any meaning in the study of international relations.
Approaches & Methods

First, this chapter will go into the LTA developed by Hermann (2005; 2002; 1980), which is used to measure leadership styles. Secondly, this chapter discusses the ecological systems approach developed by Bronfenbrenner (2005) in a more detailed fashion, which will be used to formulate several hypotheses dealing with the relations between factors stressed by the ecological systems model and leadership style.

2.1 The Leadership Trait Analysis

LTA has been developed by Hermann (2005; 2002; 1980), who has assessed leaders’ personal styles based on a content analysis of written or spoken words by 122 national leaders spanning the 1980s and 1990s. Based on these analyses, Hermann succeeded in categorizing leaders into different categories of leadership styles. To be able to categorize these leaders, one needs to distinguish leaders according to the following questions:

a. Does the individual challenge or respect political restraints in his or her environment?

b. Is the individual open or closed to incoming information?

c. What is the individual's motive for seeking his or her position?

Questions a) and b) assess the individual’s cognitive psychology. Question c) focuses on his motivational psychology. The answers to these questions suggests what kind of leadership style a particular leader fits. If the leadership style has been uncovered, it can be applied to assess propositions about the relationship between the individual and foreign policy.

To answer all three questions and determine a leader’s personal style, Hermann (2005; 2002) has identified seven psychological traits. By doing a content analysis, a leader’s individual scores on each of these seven traits can be assessed. These scores can range from 0 to 1.

The first two traits give insight in the question whether a leader challenges or respects political constraints. They are the belief in one’s ability to control events and one’s need for power in influence. If a leader scores high on either one of these traits, it can be said that the leader challenges constraints. If a leader scores moderate or low on both traits, he will respect political constraints (Hermann, 2002).

To measure a leader's openness to information, the traits that are measured are conceptual complexity (does the leader view the world as being made out of many colours, or does he or she have a black-and-white-view?) and self-confidence. Hermann (2002) judges that whenever conceptual complexity is higher than self-confidence, the leader is open to incoming
Whenever self-confidence is the higher of the two, the leader is closed to information. When both are high, the leader is open to information, and when both are low, the leader will be closed to information (Hermann, 2002).

Lastly, three traits are used to assess the leader’s motives for seeking his position, namely, task orientation, distrust of others and in-group bias. The idea is that leaders are motivated by either problems or relationships. Being motivated by problems is to say that the leader is internally driven by a particular cause, an ideology or a specific set of interests. These leaders accentuate problem solving and getting tasks done. Being motivated by relationships is to say that leaders are in search of affection, acceptance or support from others. These leaders are more focussed on maintaining group spirit and morale (Hermann, 2002). A high score on task orientation means a leader is more focussed on problem solving, whereas a low score means relationships are more important to him or her. When both distrust of others and in-group bias are low, the focus is on relationship building. When both are high, the focus is on problem solving. Whenever in-group bias is lower than distrust of others, a leader focuses on relationships but remains aware of what others are doing. Whenever in-group bias is higher than distrust of others, the focus is on problem-solving, while, however, leaders with these scores might perceive personal opportunities in some situations (Hermann, 2002). Table 2.1 gives an overview of the eight leadership styles that can be found by doing LTA.

Notice how the expansionistic leadership style could be said to resemble the style realists presume rational actors to have, namely, a style that is focused on power. Moreover, it can be argued that some of the other leadership styles focus on security.

To establish whether a leader scores high on one of the leadership traits, the leader’s traits can be compared to the average scores of a so called norming group. A norming group consists of the aggregated scores of other leaders on the seven traits. The idea is that several leaders are analysed with LTA and that all have an individual score on all of the traits. An average and a standard deviation can then be calculated for each of the seven traits. These averages and standard deviation form a norming group to which we can compare leaders that are comparable to other leaders in the norming group (e.g., you can have a norming group with only Western European leaders). When a leader scores at least one standard deviation above average of the norming group, he or she scores high on that trait.

LTA has, among others, been applied by Dyson (2009; 2006) to investigate the cases of British Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair. In a slightly altered form, the method has also been utilized by Preston (2001), who did case studies on American Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Bush sr. and Clinton during foreign policy crises. Schafer and Crichlow (2010) have used LTA to compare a couple of American presidents and British Prime Ministers.
Moreover, software called profiler+ has been developed to conduct LTA. It allows for a quick and accurate content analysis of an individual’s speeches and interviews.

Table 2.1: Leadership styles (Hermann, 2002: 9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsiveness to constraints</th>
<th>Openness to information</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Relationship focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Challenges constraints</td>
<td>Closed to information</td>
<td>Expansionistic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Focus is on expanding one’s power and influence)</td>
<td>Evangelistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Focus is on persuading others to accept one’s message and join one’s cause)</td>
<td>Charismatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges constraints</td>
<td>Open to Information</td>
<td>Incremental</td>
<td>(Focus is on achieving one’s agenda by engaging others in the process and persuading them to act)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respects constraints</td>
<td>Closed to information</td>
<td>Directive</td>
<td>(Focus is on monitoring that important others will support, or not actively oppose, what one wants to do in a particular situation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respects constraints</td>
<td>Open to Information</td>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>(Focus is on reconciling differences and building consensus, empowering others and sharing accountability in the process)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1 Ecological systems theory: an approach to human development

Ecological systems theory is a theory in the field of developmental psychology. The theory is mostly thought out by Urie Bronfenbrenner. Central to the ecological systems model is the bidirectional relationship between a developing individual and his historically embedded environment (Lerner, 2005). Bronfenbrenner regards the following as the cornerstone of the entire theoretical structure:

The ecology of human development is the scientific study of the progressive, mutual accommodation, throughout the life course, between an active, growing human being and the changing properties of the immediate settings in which the developing person lives, as this
process is affected by the relations between these settings, and by the larger contexts in which the settings are embedded (Bronfenbrenner, 2005: 107).

While Bronfenbrenner’s model is mainly used to study the development of children, it is argued that the model is also apt to study the development of adults (Bjorklund, 2011; Bronfenbrenner, 2005). Moreover, Bjorklund (2011) and Greenstein (2004), the latter of which develops an approach similar to Bronfenbrenner’s, argue that Bronfenbrenner’s model can be used to study the development of an individual’s personality as well. Bjorklund (2011), coming from a more psychological perspective, argues that environmental and social factors are expected to have some impact on personality.

In Bronfenbrenner’s ecological systems theory of human development, individual characteristics and micro-, meso-, exo-, macro- and chronosystems have an impact on the development of individuals. Human development is defined as “the phenomenon of constancy and change in the characteristics of the person over the life course” (Bronfenbrenner, 2005: 108). One of the central theses of the ecological systems theory is that “the characteristics of the person at a given time in his or her life are a joint function of the characteristics of the person and of the environment over the course of that person’s life up to that time” (Bronfenbrenner, 2005: 108). The environment is operationalized in terms of the micro-, meso-, exo-, macro and chronosystems.

Greenstein (2004) identifies macro- and microenvironments as having an impact on an individual’s personality traits, as well as personal predispositions, such as one’s gender. Macrofactors include the current state of political affairs. Microfactors include the state of one’s immediate environment and one’s social background. The mesosystem is made up of all the microsystems together. The exosystem is the system which is not directly part of the individual’s world, but still influences it from close by. For example, for children, the exosystem could be the parent’s workplace (Bjorklund, 2011). For foreign ministers, the exosystem could be their children’s schools, but also more politically relevant variables such as the number of seats their coalition partner has. The chronosystem dictates that human development is unique dependent on the development’s place in time and historical events. It matters for the personality of individuals what historical events they have experienced (Bjorklund, 2011, Bronfenbrenner, 2005; Hermann, 1986).

2.3 Conceptual model and hypotheses
In the following section, several hypotheses will be formulated on the basis of Bronfenbrenner’s micro-, macro- and chronofactors. Keep in mind that the leadership trait scores are measures of when the foreign minister was in office. The variables that are thought to influence these are
variables measured at points in time before the minister’s time in office. That way, we can be sure that there will be no cases of endogeneity.

2.3.1 Previous career experience

A variable of interest in the study of leadership styles is their previous career. A study by Tadmor & Tetlock (2006) suggests that individuals who were, in their careers, exposed to a different cultural environment than one’s own, will more easily shift between different cultural meaning systems, developing their ability to differentiate and integrate in the cognitive processing of various arguments and perspectives (Suedfeld & Bluck, 1988; Suedfeld, Tetlock & Ramirez, 1977), or, in other words, their conceptual complexity. From the suggestion made by Tadmor & Tetlock, we might expect foreign ministers who have had experience in different cultural environments before their tenure in office, to be more open and agreeing of several types of information. In the model of Bronfenbrenner, a previous career environment is typically an aspect of the microsystem. From this we can formulate a first hypothesis, [H1]: foreign ministers who have studied or worked in different cultural environments, are more likely to have an open leadership style.

Previous career experience (x) → leadership style (y)

2.3.2 Ideology

Several studies go into the relationship between an individual’s cognitive style and his or her political ideology (Greenstein, 2004; Tetlock, 2004; Tetlock, Bernzweig & Gallant, 1985; Tetlock, 1983). Some of these studies conclude that centre right wing individuals (i.e. Conservatives) are less conceptual complex than centre left wing individuals. These conclusions chime in with what is known as the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis. This hypothesis claims that right-winged individuals have been the victim of extreme cognitive dissonance in their early childhood and will thus more frequently feel threatened by belief-changing events. To avoid any more cognitive dissonance, right wing individuals view issues in a black-and-white style, and can thus be said to be less conceptual complex than left wing or centre-party individuals, meaning that they will be less open to information. From this, a second hypothesis can be formulated [H2]: foreign ministers aligned with a right wing party, are less likely to have an open leadership style than foreign ministers aligned with a left wing or centre party.

Ideology (x) → leadership style (y)

Even though Bronfenbrenner (2005) and Greenstein (2004) argue that the relationship between environmental, social and psychological factors is bidirectional, we want to avoid endogeneity here, because one of the goals of the study is to see whether psychological factors intervene in the relationship between environmental characteristics and social characteristics, and foreign policy outcomes on the other.
2.3.3 Historical events

Lastly, this study considers the time in which foreign ministers started their tenure in office. According to Bronfenbrenner (2005) and Hermann (1986), historical events have an impact on personality. Therefore, it is expected that there is a difference between foreign ministers that started their tenure during the Cold War, and foreign ministers that became foreign minister after the Cold War. [H4] is formulated as the following: leaders who started their tenure during the Cold War, exhibit different leadership styles than those who started their tenure after the Cold War.

Cold War (x) $\rightarrow$ leadership style (y)
An analysis of 94 foreign ministers

3.1 The dataset

For the purpose of testing the hypotheses formulated in chapter 2, a dataset has been constructed using Hermann's LTA. It consists of 94 foreign ministers from Germany, Austria, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg who have been in office after World War II. The scores of individual ministers are based on both interviews as well as speeches given mostly during their time in office. For some individuals, only speeches have been assessed because of a lack of better materials and for some, speeches have been assessed before or after their time in office. It is thus expected that a few profiles of foreign ministers are not completely accurate. However, especially foreign ministers who were in office after 1990 will have reliable profiles, since for these ministers, there were more speeches and interviews available.

Hermann (2002, 2005) discusses two important conditions to come to an adequate assessment of the leadership styles of individuals. Firstly, she judges from past experiences with this method, one needs 50 interview responses of at least one hundred words or more in length to come to a reliable profile. A couple of units of analysis in the constructed norming group will suffice in that condition and a few others might come close. For a more reliable and valid general analysis of the data, it might be advisable to take out a few of these ministers in future studies.

Secondly, Hermann argues, it is important that the speeches and interviews span the individual's tenure in office and cover a range of varying topics and speech- or interview-settings. This is to ensure that the results of LTA are not specific to certain contexts, as leaders may have a very different style when dealing with topics in which they are, for example, more knowledgeable. Also, for interviews, leaders may differ in topics of high politics and low politics. Leaders can also be affected by the type of audience that attends to his or her speech. For example, it could be expected that a minister displays some difference between giving a speech to a large group of students and giving a speech to the parliament. Moreover, it could be useful to assess whether the audience is a domestic one or an international one. Hermann (2002, 2005) points to the notion that Third World leaders often are far more charming and diplomatic when dealing with international audiences than when they deal with domestic ones. Finally, leaders' scores can highly differentiate between crisis and non-crisis situations. Speeches and interviews have to be, preferably, analysed from both types of contexts.

The speeches and interviews analysed in the dataset vary enough to suffice in the second condition. However, as remarked above, some profiles are made with speeches from before or after a minister's tenure in office. Secondly, it can be said that for some ministers' the materials
were so scarce that their profiles can be heavily context-biased. Again, these ministers could be taken out of the dataset.

Most of the ministers in the dataset are men. It contains only thirteen female foreign ministers. Four of them are Swedish, three are Italian, two are Luxembourgish, two are Austrian, one is Portuguese and one is Danish. The foreign ministers have, moreover, varying backgrounds. Some have been parliamentarians before their time in office, while others have been diplomats, scientists, bureaucrats, bankers or have held another position in the cabinet. Some ministers have even been prime minister before their time as foreign ministers, and some ministers held both positions at the same time.

The dataset might have been richer in information if it did not just consider each individual apart, but if it considered every tenure in office of every minister apart. The unit of analysis would then not have been a foreign minister, but a foreign minister for only one of his tenures in office, or even for every year he or she was in office, as some of the foreign ministers have been foreign minister in several (consecutive or not) coalitions. However, there weren’t enough speeches and interviews per year available to construct a reliable profile per year. Future research might want to focus on constructing a dataset like that.

Table 3.1 presents the LTA scores of the 94 foreign ministers.

Table 3.1: Norming group of 94 European ministers of foreign affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Average score</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belief in ability to control events</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for power</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual complexity</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-confidence</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Orientation</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust of others</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In group bias</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 The dependent variable

The dependent variable is leadership style. Leadership style is measured by the seven traits in Hermann’s LTA. These traits can be combined into four measures of different aspects of leadership style.
3.2.1 Leader is prone to challenge constraints
The first aspect of leadership style measures whether a leader challenges environmental constraints. This variable is measured by adding up an individual's score on belief in ability to control events and need for power. This results in a ratio variable which can, theoretically, vary from 0.00 to 2.00. However, scores practically range from 0.33 to 0.76. The higher the score is, the more prone a leader is to challenge environmental constraints.

3.2.2 Openness to information
The second dependent variable is openness to information, which combines the individual scores on conceptual complexity and self-confidence. For this variable as well, scores can range from 0.00 to 2.00. However, in this dataset, the lowest score is 0.71 and the highest score is 1.36. The higher the score is, the more open an individual is to incoming information.

3.2.3 Task orientation
The third dependent variable which measures a distinct aspect of leadership style is task orientation. The scores on task orientation are directly obtained from the LTA. Scores can range from 0.00 to 1.00. In the dataset, the lowest score is 0.41 and the highest score is 0.81. The higher a score is, the more focused an individual is on solving problems rather than keeping up team morale and building relationships.

3.2.4 Worldview
The fourth dependent variable measures a leader's worldview. This variable is obtained by adding up the individual scores on distrust of others and in group bias. Scores thus range from 0.00 to 2.00. Scores practically range from 0.11 to 0.43. The higher an individual scores on worldview, the more hostility he perceives there to be in the international arena and the less he will believe that cooperation is mutually rewarding.

3.3. Independent variables

3.3.1 Previous career
If a leader has had an international career or not, has been measured by the dummy-variable 'previous career'. This variable measures whether a foreign minister has either studied or worked for more than a year in a foreign environment before his tenure in the foreign affairs office. When a foreign minister has had previous international experience, he scores a 1 on this variable. When he has not, he scores a 0.
3.3.2 Ideology

In this study, ideology as a measure is taken from the Manifesto Project Database, which scores political party manifests on their ideologies ranging from -100, which is very left, to 100, which is very right. In the Manifesto Project Database, each party is scored for every single election. Whenever a minister has been in office as a result of one than more election, the average of the scores is taken for this minister. Moreover, the measures have first been recoded to range from 0 to 200, in which 0 is very left and 200 is very right. Secondly, to interpret the regression results more easily, these scores have been divided by 10, so that scores on ideology range from 0,0 to 20,0.

In the case of ideology, one might argue that there is a problem of endogeneity, meaning that personality would explain ideology rather than vice versa. In this dataset, this will not be the case, as the personality traits of foreign ministers have been measured in a time period after these ministers have chosen to join a certain party. The leadership style measures are thus measures from a later point in time than the measures on ideology.

3.3.3 Tenure in Cold War

As the end of the Cold War, this study takes the year 1991, the year in which the Soviet Union officially ceased to exist. When a foreign minister had his tenure in the foreign affairs office start before 1991, he scores a 1. When he was not minister during the Cold War, he scores a 0.

3.4 Control variables

Greenstein (2004) and Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) argue that several variables play roles in the development of individuals. Greenstein identifies macro- and microenvironments as having an impact on an individual’s personality traits, as well as personal predispositions, such as one’s gender. Macrofactors include the current state of political affairs. Microfactors include the state of one’s immediate environment and one’s social background (Greenstein, 2004). Based on Greenstein’s argument, the following variables have been selected as control variables.

3.4.1 Gender

The first control variable is gender, which is measured as 0 for males and 1 for females. In the models of Bronfenbrenner and Greenstein, gender should be considered a biological disposition.

3.4.2 Age

Another biological disposition is age. Age is measured as the number of years a foreign minister has lived before entering the foreign affairs office. Bjorklund (2011) argues that age can have a meaningful impact on personality, as individuals of different ages interpret the events in their
lives differently. The foreign ministers in the dataset vary surprisingly much on age, with the youngest foreign minister being Sebastian Kurz of Austria at age 27, and the oldest being Konrad Adenauer of Germany at age 75.

3.4.3 Christianity

The second control variable is whether the foreign minister is a member of a Christian party or not. When the foreign minister is not, he scores a 0. When the foreign minister is a member of a Christian party, he scores a 1. In the models of Bronfenbrenner and Greenstein, Christianity should be considered to be a measure of a leader’s microenvironment. Having a Christian background could possibly have an impact on a leader’s personality traits.

3.4.4 Parliamentary career

Another microsystem variable is whether the foreign minister has previously been a parliamentarian, in which case he scores a 1, or not, in which case he scores a 0. Hermann (1986) argues that different career paths amount for changes in personality.

3.4.5 Prime minister is from the same party

Another variable measuring a foreign minister’s microenvironment is whether the prime minister is from the same political party as the foreign minister. When the Prime Minister is from the same party, a foreign minister scores 1 on this variable. When the Prime Minister is not, the foreign minister scores 0. This variable is a measure of a foreign minister’s immediate environment. It might be reasonable to think that a foreign minister might feel more at ease when the Prime Minister shares his ideological outlook on the world.

3.4.6 Membership of the European Union

Membership of the European Union is also a dummy variable, which scores 0 for foreign ministers’ whose countries were not member states of the European Union and 1 for foreign ministers’ whose countries were. Membership of the European Union is a variable which can be considered a measure of the macro-environment of a country. It is important to be aware of the fact that the score depends on the foreign minister’s tenure in office. Sweden, Denmark, Austria and Portugal have entered the European Union on a later point in time than Germany, the Benelux and Italy. Thus, some Swedish, Austrian and Portuguese ministers score a 0, while others score a 1. Moreover, Norway has never been a member of the EU, and thus all Norwegian foreign ministers score a 0.

3.4.7 Membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
This variable works the same as membership of the European Union. When a foreign minister's country is a member state of NATO, the minister scores a 1. When the country is not a member state, the minister scores a 0.

3.4.8 Economic crisis

The last control variable measures whether the minister was in office during the OPEC oil price shock crisis in 1973, or during the Eurozone crisis which started around 2009. The international economic environment can also be considered to be a macrosystem variable, and can thus be expected to have some impact on the foreign minister's leadership style. When a minister had to deal with any of these crises during his or her tenure, he or she scores a 1. When not, the score will be a 0.

3.5 Statistic analysis

First, only the relationship between the dependent variables and the independent variables will be assessed by doing a regression without the control variables. The results can be found in Table 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent:</th>
<th>Challenges constraints</th>
<th>Openness to information</th>
<th>Task Orientation</th>
<th>Worldview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Career</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>0.090***</td>
<td>0.042**</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure in Cold War</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>0.054*</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

As Table 3.1 depicts, the only variable that has a somewhat significant impact is whether a foreign minister has had an international career before his tenure in office. When this is the case, a foreign minister scores, on average, 0.09 higher on openness to information, which is a measure which ranges from 0.71 to 1.36. The increase in openness to information for ministers with a previous international career is thus quite big. The influence of a previous international career on task orientation is also quite strong as scores on task orientation range from 0.41 to 0.81.
Table 3.2 shows the results of the regression analysis for the independent variables as well as the control variables. From Table 3.2 can be concluded that foreign ministers who have had previous international career experience, are more open to information than foreign ministers who have not. An international career makes a foreign minister score 0.088 higher on openness to information on a scale from 0.71 to 1.36. The same accounts for their task orientation. Foreign ministers who have had an international career score 0.058 on task orientation on a scale from 0.41 to 0.81. Thus, the regression analysis seems to corroborate [H1], which holds that foreign ministers who have previously had an international career are more open to information.

Ideology does not seem to affect leadership style. Therefore, the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis [H2] should be refuted. The third hypothesis [H3] dealt with the impact of historical events. The regression analysis shows a small sign that historical contexts may have an impact on leadership style. The regression shows that whether a foreign minister's tenure was in the Cold War or not, matters for their openness to information. Foreign ministers who became foreign minister during the Cold War score 0.063 higher on a scale from 0.71 to 1.36. The relationship is not as significant as the relationship between international career and openness to information, but it is somewhat significant. Therefore [H3] can, for the time being, be corroborated on.

Table 3.3: Regression analysis with control variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent:</th>
<th>Challenges constraints</th>
<th>Openness to information</th>
<th>Task Orientation</th>
<th>Worldview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Career</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.088***</td>
<td>0.058***</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure in Cold War</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.063*</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.002*</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.082*</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Career</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>-0.030*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister is from the same Party</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of EU</td>
<td>0.057**</td>
<td>-0.091**</td>
<td>0.041**</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of NATO</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Crisis</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.073**</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.664</td>
<td>0.850</td>
<td>0.673</td>
<td>0.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***=p<.1 **=p<.05; ***=p<.01
Apart from the impact of the dependent variables, the regression analysis shows another interesting result. It appears that being a foreign minister in a member state of the European Union can profoundly impact leadership style, as these foreign ministers score higher on challenging constraints, lower on openness to information and higher on task orientation. All these scores are somewhat significant. The effect of this variable on leadership style might be a corroboration of the Normative Power Europe (NPE) hypothesis.

The variable Age seems to impact leaders’ inclination to challenge constraints. Age is measured per year, and thus the effect seems to be very small. Whether a foreign minister is from a Christian political party or not seems to have some influence on their openness to information. This finding might still mean that party ideology might have some effect. However, it is also likely that the true variable impacting leadership style is a Christian upbringing. What also seems to impact openness to information is whether a foreign minister had to deal with an economic crisis. This relationship is somewhat significant and it amounts for an increase on openness to information of 0.073, which is quite high. Lastly, the relationship between a previous career as a parliamentarian and the leaders’ worldview seems to be a little significant. Those ministers who have had a parliamentary career, score 0.030 lower on a scale from 0.11 to 0.43. This means that foreign ministers who have had a career as a parliamentarian are more inclined to believe in mutual benefits from international cooperation and are less distrustful of others.

3.6 Chapter conclusion

This study has assessed three hypotheses about the personality of individual policymakers. From the results of the multivariate regression analysis done in SPSS, it can be concluded that a previous international career and the Cold War (and economic crises) as a historical event, have some impact on leadership style. However, this study concludes that ideology does not matter in this regard. These findings seem to partly confirm the ideas of Bjorklund (2011), Bronfenbrenner (2005), Greenstein (2004), Tetlock (2004, 1983) and Hermann (1986), who have argued that historical, environmental and social factors influence one’s psychology, and that through these factors, psychology influences foreign policy. The latter claim will be discussed in the next chapter.

If an individual’s psychological characteristics influence foreign policy, then it can be an intervening variable, as the regression has shown. First of all, the regression analysis shows that previous career experiences – both international and parliamentary – have some impact on overall leadership style. Leaders which have had an international career are more open to information and are problem solvers as opposed to team-motivators. Leaders who have had a parliamentary career seem to have a brighter worldview: they believe that mutual benefits from international cooperation are possible, have lower distrust in others and lower in group bias. All of this means that, again, if psychology has an impact on foreign policy, it matters what a foreign
minister’s previous career was if we want to predict his foreign policy style. According to the model of Bronfenbrenner (2005), previous environmental characteristics matter in studying an individual’s development. In this study, Bronfenbrenner’s hypothesis holds, as a foreign minister’s previous environment (a different cultural environment) influences his leadership style later on. Moreover, the regression showed that when a foreign minister’s country was a member state of the European Union, this had a profound impact on several attributes of a leader’s style of foreign politics.

According to the regression analysis, ideology, measured in terms of right-wing and left-wing, does not matter for leadership style. However, whether the leader is a member of a Christian political party does: Christian politicians seem to be more open to information than non-Christian politicians. This means that, although \([H2]\) cannot be corroborated, it can be argued that some social characteristics matter for leadership style. This study thus refutes the rigidity-of-the-right-hypothesis, but it can corroborate somewhat on the idea that social characteristics determine leadership style.

Lastly, this study set out to test the hypothesis that historical events influence personality. This seems to be somewhat the case, as foreign ministers were more open to information when they were minister during the Cold War or during a major economic crisis. In this regard, it might be useful to refer back to Singer’s (1961) description of how individuals can influence foreign policy by interpreting historical events differently: by being sure that when they fall out of a window, gravity will pull them down, but that they can choose not to jump out of the window. In this description, psychology seems to be more of an interacting variable rather than an intervening one. Future studies might assess Singer’s claim by somehow making a measure of foreign policy as a dependent variable and then run this interaction effect.

All in all, historical, environmental and social characteristics, seem to influence leadership style in several, sometimes unexpected, ways. The question remains if leadership style has, consecutively, an impact on foreign policy. This question will be dealt with in chapter 4, which presents a case study on Gaston Thorn and Luxembourg during the seat issue of the European Parliament.
The case dealt with in this study is that of Luxembourg foreign minister Gaston Thorn attempting to establish the European institutions in the city of Luxembourg in 1969-1980, during the battle over where the parliament would have its seat. This case has been selected specifically because of Thorn's expansionistic leadership style, which is a leadership style which we certainly do not expect to find for a foreign minister of Luxembourg. Thorn is representative for the average Luxembourg foreign minister, who generally has high belief in his or her ability to control events, low conceptual complexity and extraordinarily high task orientation.

This chapter will first describe Luxembourg's foreign policy after 1945 to give an impression of the general context in which a Luxembourgian foreign minister operates. It will then go on to describe the LTA findings for the speeches and interviews analysed for Thorn. Thirdly, it will give a historical background of the seat issue of the European Parliament. Finally, this chapter will assess how Thorn's personal leadership style influenced Luxembourg foreign policy in this matter and will conclude with a short discussion.

4.1 Luxembourg foreign policy

Luxembourg is a least likely case of a state to engage in expansionistic behaviour. Luxembourg is a small state which behaviour is heavily constrained by its geopolitical environment. Its prevalent foreign policy concern has been the relationship between its large neighbours, France and Germany, and Luxembourg has been a theatre of war between these great powers many times in its history. Since the end of the Second World War, Luxembourg's foreign policy took a major turn. Luxembourg abandoned formal neutrality and joined several international organizations such as the UN, OECD, NATO, and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (Flesch, 2014). Post World War II Luxembourgian foreign policy has been primarily concerned with minimalizing its own vulnerability in conflicts between France and Germany. To this end, Luxembourg views European integration as an ongoing project of peace and its best guarantee of security (Frentz, 2010). Moreover, rather than attempting to build an impressive military force – which is an important asset for nations that wish to remain neutral – Luxembourg has embraced collective security in the form of NATO and has pursued a pro-Atlantic foreign policy (ibid.). Flesch (2014) believes that through its membership of international organizations, Luxembourg gained more influence on the international scene than it would have had, had it remained neutral.

Luxembourg's foreign policy administration is considered very small. It consists out of approximately 200 staff members, which also translates into a modest diplomatic network and a
low profile-style in foreign relations. Luxembourg takes part in many international decision making processes as a particular low-key participant. However, it is an active, constructive player in the European Union, often proposing a compromise between conflicting member states on issues in which it has not got major interests itself (Flesch, 2014). Furthermore, Luxembourg relies on the external action service of the European Union in many areas of its own foreign policy making (Frentz, 2010).

The Luxembourg foreign minister tends to hold office for a considerable amount of time, usually sitting out their term of five years. Thorn became foreign minister of Luxembourg in 1969 and held the office until his nomination to become president of the European Commission in 1980. Next to being foreign minister, Thorn was also prime minister of Luxembourg from 1974 until 1979 and he was the president of the United Nations General Assembly from 1975 till 1976. Frentz (2010) considers Thorn to be the first individual who had a strong imprint on Luxembourg's foreign policy by positively raising Luxembourg's profile and role in diplomatic relations. This image is somewhat confirmed by Flesch (2014), who stresses that Thorn knew how to handle diplomatic relations, and that he was well liked by his foreign counterparts such as Hans Dietrich Genscher.

4.2 Thorn's leadership style

Having analysed 18,676 words from several speeches and interviews by Thorn, Profiler+ ascribes the scores on the seven traits depicted in Table 4.2 to Thorn’s leadership style. In the following section, that style will be operationalized in more detail.

Thorn scores high on belief in ability to control events and high on need for power. This means he is inclined to push the limits of what is possible in any particular situation. Thorn is likely to make sure he is in charge and he is confident in his knowledge of what course of action he should take. According to Hermann (1999, 2002), leaders who score high on their beliefs in their ability to control events and high on need for power, will be very clever in their use of power. Leaders that score high on both traits can be manipulative and less easy to read than leaders who score lower on both traits. Thorn is thus expected to take a direct approach to the policy making process, but also to influence events behind the scenes.

A high score on belief in ability to control events means that Thorn will take an interest and an active role in the policy making process. He will want to have control over the process and ensure that everything goes as (he) planned. It is expected that, due to this high score, Thorn will regularly check on his subordinates’ actions and will less likely delegate authority to lower policy making levels. Moreover, he will take the initiative in the policy making process himself, rather than waiting for anyone else to make suggestions. Thorn is likely to have confidence in his knowledge of how things should be done, and it is unlikely that he will attempt to make
compromises on what he thinks is best. Lastly, he will prefer to meet other leaders face to face during negotiations, as to be able to exert more influence over them.

Table 4.2: Thorn’s leadership style

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Thorn’s score</th>
<th>Thorn’s score in comparison to 94 foreign ministers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belief in ability to control events</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for power</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual complexity</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>Moderate-low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-confidence</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Orientation</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust of others</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In group bias</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thorn scores moderately-low on conceptual complexity and moderate on self-confidence. Because of this, he will tend to be closer to new information than most other foreign ministers, but will not per se be inclined to think that he is right. He will be likely to try to persuade others of his position. It is expected that Thorn will also, more than the average foreign minister, emphasize the importance of his existing beliefs. In the policy making process, Thorn will make others adopt his visions of what needs to be done. Because of these scores, it is also more likely that Thorn will organize the decision making process in a hierarchical manner, so that he can maintain control over the nature of the implementation.

Conceptual simple leaders will fall back on their intuition and will usually want to take action quickly, preferring action over thinking thoroughly about several paths of action that could be taken. Moreover, these leaders will categorize incoming information into a set of stereotypes. Because Thorn leans low, it is possible that he will exhibit some of these behaviours. If we look at the results of the regression analysis in the previous chapter, Thorn seems to deviate from the standard foreign minister in his score on openness to information, as he has had an international career (he studied in France and he was a long-time member of the European Parliament).

Thorn scores high on task orientation, which is typical for the average Luxembourgian foreign minister – as shown in the previous chapter. His high score on task orientation means that Thorn will highly emphasize problems at hand and solving these problems. He will less likely focus
on the needs and feelings of the individuals who are part of his decision making group. Moving the group forwards to the goal is Thorn's main reason for assuming a leader's role.

Lastly, Thorn’s score on in group bias is low, while his score on distrust of others is moderate. This can be interpreted in a way as Thorn not seeing the world as a threatening place. Thorn will recognize that Luxembourg, as a state in the international arena, has to deal with certain constraints and that it is limited in what it can do. Moreover, Thorn will be more inclined to believe that cooperation through international organizations is both feasible and possible.

Table 4.3 summarizes the operationalization of Thorn’s leadership trait scores. In the right column are the LTA’s predictions of how Thorn is expected to approach policy making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traits</th>
<th>Predicted behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Challenges constraints</strong></td>
<td>I. Pushes the limits of what is possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High belief in ability to control events</td>
<td>II. Knows what course of action to take</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High need for power</td>
<td>III. Direct approach to policy making process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV. Active, interested role in policy making process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V. Not likely to delegate authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VI. Not likely to compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VII. Likely to manipulate others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VIII. Likely to attempt influencing events behind the scenes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Closeness to information</strong></td>
<td>I. Insensitive for incoming information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate to low conceptual complexity</td>
<td>II. Classifies information into stereotypes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate self-confidence</td>
<td>III. Preference for hierarchy in policy making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV. Uses intuition in approaching policy making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V. Preference for acting over thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problem focus</strong></td>
<td>I. Emphasizes problems at hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High task orientation</td>
<td>II. Less likely focused on feelings of group-members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low in group bias</td>
<td>III. Recognizes constraints and limits of foreign policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV. Believes in mutual gains through international cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expansionistic style</strong></td>
<td>Focus on expanding one's power and influence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The regression analysis in chapter 3 predicts Thorn to be inclined to challenge constraints, as he is a foreign minister in a member state of the EU. It also predicts Thorn to be open to information, as he was foreign minister during the Cold War and he has enjoyed an international career. However, because Thorn is foreign minister of a member state of the EU, his openness to information will also be lower, so it is expected that he will score moderately on this trait. Thorn is also expected to have a task orientation, since he has had an international career and because Luxembourg is an EU member state. Lastly, as a former parliamentarian, Thorn is expected to believe in mutual benefits through international cooperation by exhibiting low distrust in others and low in group bias.

When we look at the operationalization of Thorn’s leadership style, Thorn seems to, generally, exhibit the characteristics predicted by the regression model in chapter 3. He is inclined to challenge constraints, he scores moderate on openness to information, high on task orientation and he has a somewhat positive worldview. Thus, if Thorn can be said to have influenced foreign policy, it is probable that his leadership style played a role as an intervening variable, intervening through historical, environmental and social characteristics, and foreign policy outcome.

4.3 The Seat Issue of the European Parliament

In 1952, when the ECSC was founded, the Special Council of Ministers established the doctrine that there should be a single capital for all existing and future European organizations. This doctrine resulted in a constant battle over which city would host the European institutions which lasted until 1992, when the Council agreed to have three capital cities: Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg (Hein, 2004). However, since 1952, Luxembourg was appointed to, for the time being, host the ECSC’s institutions, except for the Parliamentary Assembly, which would have its meetings in the same building which hosted the Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. This was for reasons of practicality (Corbett, Jacobs & Shackleton, 2011). Luxembourg, however, hosted the Assembly’s secretariat. It has also been the seat of the European Investment Bank (EIB) since its founding in 1958. Flesch (2014) assumes that reasons for the decision to make Luxembourg the seat of the institutions were its central location in the Europe of the Six and because of the belief of the other member states that Luxembourg would not misuse its role as Europe’s capital for national interests.

After the creation of the EEC and EURATOM in 1958, the Parliament began holding its sessions in Brussels, because most decision-making EEC and EURATOM institutions, such as the Commission, had then settled themselves there. At that time, Luxembourg did not attempt to become the host of the EEC and EURATOM commissions:
When the European Economic Community and EURATOM were founded [...], we [Luxembourg] didn’t attempt to get the Commission to come to Luxembourg. [...] In those days Luxembourg was small and there were many conservative forces which thought we would lose our soul if we brought so many foreigners to Luxembourg (Flesch, 2014: 75-79).

It was later decided that the Parliament would have its committee meetings in Brussels and its plenary meetings in Strasbourg. Again, for reasons of practicality (Flesch, 2014; Corbett, Jacobs & Shackleton, 2011). In 1965, the merger treaty, which fused the EEC, EURATOM and the ECSC into the European Community (EC), again appointed Luxembourg the provisional – and thus temporary – location for several of the European institutions, such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the secretariat of the Assembly, and several departments of the European Commission. Luxembourg would also be the location for the meetings of the European Council. From 1967 onwards, the European Parliament began to hold its meetings in the city of Luxembourg, simply because it was more convenient to meet close to where its secretariat was (Flesch, 2014). In 1973, Luxembourg-city finished the Robert Schuman building in the district of Kirchberg to be able to house meetings of the Parliament and in 1976 and 1977, more parliamentary sessions were held in Luxembourg than in Strasbourg. However, in turn, the Robert Schuman building got major competition from the Palace of Europe-building constructed in Strasbourg in 1977, which had its own hemicycle – a half circled meeting room typical for many national parliaments (Hein, 2004).

In the 1970s, the European Council discussed direct elections for the European Parliament. For Luxembourg, two related problems arose in this issue. First of all, it was decided that the first direct elections for the European Parliament would be held in 1979 and these would come about with a great increase in the number of European Parliamentarians. Member states in the Council had to agree unanimously with the direct elections. The only member state which remained unsure about the direct elections, was Great Britain (Hamilius, 2013). Secondly, Luxembourg anticipated that the results of the direct elections would spur new debates on where the Parliament would have its permanent seat, and at that time, Luxembourg did not have a building that would be able to house the Parliament in its enlarged form after 1979 (Hein, 2004). So while, on the one hand, it was unsure if the elections would be held in 1979 because Great Britain still had to agree to the elections, on the other hand, Luxembourg needed to build a new building if it wanted to continue being a host of the Parliament.

For the purpose of harbouring the European Parliament after 1979, and to avoid losing the parliament in its capital city, Luxembourg built its own hemicycle (Flesch, 2014; Hamilius, 2013; Corbett, Jacobs & Shackleton, 2011; Hein, 2004; Schleich, 1980). The building project of this hemicycle was an initiative of the national government led by Gaston Thorn, which took office in
1974. Thorn instructed Jean Hamilius, minister of public works in his government, to find an architect to build an impressive building for the European Parliament in the district of Kirchberg. However, Thorn instructed Hamilius to do it ‘discretely’, since those not in favour of the project could object to it by arguing that it was still unsure if the elections would be held in 1979 because of Great Britain (Hamilius, 2013). Hamilius hired the French architect Taillibert. However, the building Taillibert proposed, known as “centre 300”, was after long debates in the Luxembourguian chamber of deputies discarded as too ambitious (Hamilius, 2013). Therefore, the government decided on a new, smaller project which involved the building of a parliamentary hemicycle. The hemicycle was built in a record time of 16 months and was ready for use in June, 1980 (Schleich, 1980).

The direct elections indeed brought consequences for the seat of the EP. After the direct elections in 1979, the number of Members of the European Parliament (MEP) greatly increased from 198 to 410. Only the Palace of Europe-building in Strasbourg had a hemicycle big enough to house these members. The parliament therefore favoured to switch locations only between two cities – Brussels and Strasbourg (Corbett, Jacobs & Shackleton, 2011). That marked the definite end of the Parliament’s meetings in the city of Luxembourg. However, Luxembourg went to the European Court of Justice a number of times to claim its right to host the European institutions (Flesch, 2014; Corbett, Jacobs & Shackleton, 2011).

4.4 Thorn and the seat issue

From a realist perspective on international relations, it seems odd that a very small, satisfied power such as Luxembourg, which highly benefited from taking part in European cooperation in terms of security, economic benefits and an increase in international influence, would trouble its allies (Belgium and France) so much in the issue of who would host the European Parliament. Luxembourg even went to the European Court of Justice over the issue, which implies how important the issue was for the small member state. Its importance was also stressed by Flesch, who noted that the seat issue is “a major problem always for all Luxembourgers who are interested in European affairs” (Flesch, 2014: 13).

Even though Luxembourg hosted many of the ECSC institutions in 1958, it did not attempt to get the institutions of the EEC and EURATOM to the city. Flesch (2014) considers this to be a mistake, and in the years after the merger treaty in 1965, Luxembourg started to become more of an active player in hosting the European institutions. Especially in the issue of the European Parliament, Gaston Thorn is likely to have had personal influence on Luxembourg’s foreign policy. Thorn believed, like Flesch, that Luxembourg had made a mistake in not wanting to host the EEC and EURATOM in 1958 (Emringer, 2013). This reflects in the results of his policy: Thorn managed to permanently establish in the city of Luxembourg the European fund for monetary cooperation.
in 1973 and the European Court of Auditors in 1977 (Mart, 1993). Moreover, Thorn had been a member of the Parliament from 1959 to 1969, which had shaped his belief that the European Parliament was an essential element of European integration:

He was convinced that the European Parliament was an important element of European integration [...] he was really a parliamentarian. He was a great foreign and then prime minister in Luxembourg, but basically, from the outside, he was a parliamentarian. And he believed in parliamentary democracy. He was absolutely convinced that this was an important element of our democratic societies, and that Europe needed that also. And he was totally committed to the European Parliament. He brought this over into his government role more so than his predecessors, who had never been – that long at least – European parliamentarians (Flesch, 2014: 198-204).

Thus, Thorn was, more than his predecessors, a proponent of getting the European Parliament to Luxembourg. In 1969, Thorn became foreign minister. At that time, the Parliament began to hold more meetings in Luxembourg. When Thorn became prime minister as well in 1974, he got actively involved in the development of the district of Kirchberg to attract the European institutions as to catch up with the mistake Luxembourg made in the past with the EEC and EURATOM (Flesch, 2013; Emringer, 2013; Hein, 2004). At that point in time, Thorn knew that direct elections for the European Parliament would be held in 1979 and he anticipated that this would, again, lead to discussions about where the seat of the parliament would be. It was also evident that the Parliament would have an increase in members (Hamilius, 2013). Therefore, it was necessary to quickly build a hemicycle that could house more members than the then existing Robert Schuman building could. There was, so to say, time pressure. At the same time, the Palace of Europe-building was being developed in Strasbourg and in 1977, Brussels completed its own buildings for the Parliament’s committee meetings (Hein, 2004). Thorn thus took a risk in spending time and money in the “centre 300”-project at first, and later on Luxembourg’s hemicycle: the Parliament would inevitably have its committee meetings in Brussel because the Commission was there. For the plenary meetings, the Palace of Europe-building in Strasbourg was big enough – and it was already in use. Why, then, would Thorn have pushed through the building of Luxembourg’s hemicycle anyway?

Part of that decision could have originated in his leadership style. As illustrated by table 4.3, Thorn typically had a vision of what needed to be done in a particular situation. This is also confirmed by Flesch (2014; 2013), who described Thorn as an intelligent, clever politician who was not afraid to make decisions:
he was extremely quick in thinking things out and if you wanted to be successful in discussing with him you had better be as quick as he was because otherwise he would lose patience. He was not somebody who would sit back and listen to you and say well [...] I’d like to sleep over it and maybe we will see it tomorrow. Mr Thorn would take decisions (Flesch, 2014: 305-309).

As the LTA predicts, Flesch described Gaston Thorn as someone who was actively involved in policy making, not afraid to confront problems and make decisions and someone who could quickly assess a situation and come up with a thought out reaction. Nothomb (2013), Belgian minister of foreign affairs from 1980 until 1981, corroborates this by calling Thorn a man of deeds rather than a man of words. Thorn decided on policy himself and passed that down to his civil service. The initiative for policy making lay with him. Civil servants could disagree with him and convince or advise him of different courses of action, but debates with Thorn could last very long (Emringer, 2013) and he could be very persistent in his arguments (Cerf, 2013). Flesch (2014) also mentioned that to convince him, you had to be a quick thinker – at least as quick as Thorn was himself – otherwise, he would lose patience. Most of the people who knew Thorn intimately describe him as somewhat authoritarian on the one hand, but also cheerful and lively on the other (Flesch, 2014; Cerf, 2013; Heirens, 2013; Helminger, 2013).

Thorn’s high score on need for power also predicts that he was inclined to influence events behind the scenes. This predictions seems to manifest itself in public works minister Hamilius’ description of how he was instructed by Thorn to “approach an architectural bureau without public announcement and with every discretion” (Hamilius, 2013: 63).

There is some more empirical confirmation of the LTA’s scores for Thorn. For example, Thorn would only delegate authority to civil servants he knew he could trust, and at times, he would interfere in the hierarchical policy structure (Flesch, 2014). Moreover, Thorn could be quite demanding of his closest civil servants, his chief of cabinet Paul Helminger and his personal assistant, Irène Heirens, but he was also very satisfied with the work they did for him (Heirens, 2013; Helminger, 2013). These descriptions confirm the LTA predictions in his high scores on belief in his ability to control events, need for power and task orientation and subsequently show that these attributes influenced how he would go about in the policy making process. Flesch (2014) could also confirm that Thorn’s style of politics was focused on gaining more influence and prestige for Luxembourg – which would confirm that he exhibited some behaviour of typical expansionistic leaders.

The fact that Thorn initiated the building of Luxembourg’s own hemicycle, whilst Brussels and Strasbourg already provided the Parliament with working space, may be attributed to Thorn’s moderately-low score on conceptual complexity. As mentioned before,
Thorn was highly convinced that the European Parliament greatly contributed to the process of European integration. In turn, Thorn was a great proponent of European integration as it meant a great deal of added influence for Luxembourg (which might be why he scores low on in group bias, which predicts that Thorn saw mutual benefits in international cooperation). Thorn’s fear was that the Parliament would no longer meet in Luxembourg after the direct elections in 1979, so there had to come a big hemicycle in a short time. The building was built in only 16 months, and it most likely cost Luxembourg time and resources which it could have also used in other matters. Initially, the government even wanted to build the much more ambitious and costly “centre 300”, which was later cancelled because of parliamentary objections (Hamilius, 2013).

The idea that a building for the European Parliament in Luxembourg would definitely make it settle in Luxembourg, might have been an error in Thorn’s judgement, since, after the elections, the hemicycle in Luxembourg would not be taken into use by the Parliament. Flesch (2014) described Thorn’s course of action as taking a risk, as the Parliament would have never settled in Luxembourg if Thorn would not have ordered the building of the hemicycle at all. Thorn also took a risk because it was not even sure that Great Britain would agree of the direct elections of the Parliament, and therefore, Luxembourg might have ended up investing unnecessarily in an impressive building. This risky behaviour could also be explained by Thorn’s high scores on his belief in his ability to control events and his high need for power, instead of his moderate conceptual complexity.

4.5 Conclusion
As the previous sections have shown, Hermann’s LTA can be used to, for a large part, describe a leader’s style of politics and then predict how this leader will behave when confronted with a foreign policy problem. It is very likely that because of his strong convictions about the benefits of European integration for Luxembourg and his expansionistic leadership style, focused on gaining influence and power, Gaston Thorn influenced Luxembourg’s foreign policy in the battle over the seat of the European Parliament. Thorn’s leadership style seems to be, in turn, affected by his environmental and social characteristics, and the historical conditions in which he found himself. Especially the international, parliamentary environment which he has experienced, seems to have played a seminal role in his unquestioning belief in European integration and subsequently, his wish to establish the European Parliament in Luxembourg. Thus, in this case, leadership style can be said to have intervened between historical, environmental and social characteristics and Luxembourg’s foreign policy.

The case study of Gaston Thorn in Luxembourg foreign policy might bring up an interesting notion for those studying individuals in foreign policy. The case of Gaston Thorn was
chosen because of his expansionistic leadership style, which we do not expect to find for Luxembourg foreign ministers, as an expansionistic style, focused on expanding or keeping one’s power, influence and prestige, does not seem to fit the role of Luxembourg in international relations. We could, however, expect to find an expansionistic leadership style in already powerful nation states such as the United States or China. What we do not expect to find in these states is, for example, the *accommodative style*, which is highly focused on building consensus and working together in international organizations (Hermann, 2002). The point here is, that future research might want to assess whether *expansionistic leaders*, or more aggressive, initiative or active leaders, only make a difference in foreign policy when they lead a small, satisfied state, while *accommodative leaders*, or more soft, passive leaders, will only make a difference in foreign policy when they lead a powerful nation. This might be an interesting hypothesis to test in further research.
**Conclusion**

The debate about the personal influence of individuals in the foreign policy of their nations is an ongoing one. Leadership Trait Analysis might be the answer for those who strive to systematically study individuals and their personalities in foreign policy analysis. The perks of this technique are manifold in both qualitative and quantitative studies. First of all, the software profiler+ makes it easy to construct leadership styles of many individuals in a relatively short time. Secondly, for qualitative research, this technique has up to now been found to be quite valid and quite reliable in several case studies, including the above case study of Gaston Thorn. However, more case studies have to be done as to establish continuing trust in the LTA’s validity and reliability. Such case studies can be conducted by using the norming group of European foreign ministers which has been constructed for the purposes of this study. It is also important that more European foreign ministers will be added to the norming group, so that it can provide us with a representative picture of the average leadership style of European foreign ministers.

As demonstrated, LTA can also be applied in large n case studies that make use of regression analysis. The LTA measurements are all scores ranging from 0 to 1. The scores on the seven traits can be brought back to four scores by adding up scores on individual traits. These traits can then be used either as dependent variables, such as in this study, or independent variables, whenever we want to assess their impact on quantified foreign policy outcomes or political variables of the sort. The LTA can even be used to assess the impact of individual leaders on domestic politics.

This is not to say that the LTA does always give explanations for foreign policy outcomes. Of course, many other factors play a role in foreign policy outcomes. More often than individuals influence foreign policy, it is influenced by systemic-level factors or factors at nation-level. The LTA simply provides us with a promising method which can be used whenever we suspect that individuals profoundly influenced foreign policy.

By having constructed a dataset of 94 foreign ministers in coalition democracies and having run a regression analysis on the relationship between historical, environmental and social characteristics on the one hand, and leadership style on the other, this study attempts to argue against the objections which are made against studying individuals. One of these objections is that psychological factors do not play a role of importance in explaining foreign policy behaviour and that environment and social characteristics do. However, the regression analysis and the case study done in this study appear to point to the notion that psychology can be an intervening factor. This seems to partly underwrite Singer’s (1964) claim that individuals’ personality can have an impact on foreign policy through their interpretation of historical, environmental and social cues.
It also seems to confirm, for the time being, the ecological system theorists view on the development of personality.

From what has been shown by the case study of Gaston Thorn and the seat issue of the European Parliament, it might be asserted that Thorn’s leadership style explains some of the foreign policy behaviour of Luxembourg. Thorn’s leadership style was described as *expansionistic*, focused on gaining influence and prestige. His scores on the seven traits of LTA were useful in predicting some of Luxembourg’s foreign policy behaviour. What can be said at least is that the LTA of Thorn’s speeches and interviews predicted Thorn’s style of politics quite accurately, as this was the style which many of Thorn’s former colleagues and friends asserted he had.

Overall this study can conclude that psychology can be an intervening variable between historical, environmental and social characteristics and foreign policy outcome, that it is useful in considering these characteristics in case studies of individuals that matter for foreign policy, and lastly, that the LTA developed by M.G. Hermann is an overall apt method of making inferences about the study of individuals in foreign policy.

*Further research*

An essential notion in which this study lacks, is a large scale measurement, or quantification, of foreign policy outcomes. If such outcomes could be quantified in any way, it would not have been necessary to conduct a single case study. Moreover, if foreign policy can be measured as a variable in SPSS, it is possible to better study the role of psychology as an intervening variable – and even better so, as an *interacting* variable. Further research could attempt to do this.

Moreover, further research could more accurately study the ecological system theory of Bronfenbrenner by measuring leadership style through time. For the 94 foreign ministers in the dataset, this proved to be an impossible task, as there would not have been enough materials to conduct such study. However, further research could attempt to look at individuals for whom there are abundant materials in the form of speeches and interviews over the span of several years, and assess whether Bronfenbrenners claim that future individual characteristics are a joint function of earlier individual characteristics and environmental characteristics can be corroborated on. Such research would make for interesting results.

Future research could also focus more on the study of different individuals in international relations. This study is new in that it provides a case study of Luxembourg foreign minister (and prime minister) Gaston Thorn. Most previous work focuses on American presidents or British Prime Ministers. The use of LTA should be expanded to a wide range of leaders everywhere in the world, both leaders of nation states and leaders of international organizations.
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Interview
Collette Flesch, 16 June 2014. Transcript is available on request.

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