Introduction

Many accounts claim that social citizenship has declined during the last twenty years in Britain under the Conservative and New Labour Governments (eg Culpitt 1992; Wilding 1992; Mishra 1999). 'The New Right project of the 1980s was to undermine the post-war concept of citizenship as rights' (Lister 1990: 22). 'The usual point of reference for this claim is the account of T H Marshall (1963: eg Mishra 1981; Vogel and Moran 1991; Roche 1992; Hay 1996). As Esping-Anderson (1990: 21) argues, 'Few can disagree with TH Marshall's proposition that social citizenship constitutes the core idea of a welfare state.' However, a more precise conceptualisation and operationalisation of social rights has remained underdeveloped. It follows that it is difficult to see exactly which measures best characterise social citizenship, let alone measure the extent of their change over time.

The problem of defining social rights has been clear since the original imprecise definition given by Marshall (1963: 74): 'from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society.' A number of writers point out the vagueness of this definition (eg Mishra 1981: 31-3; Robertson 1988: 227; Esping-Anderson 1990: 21; D. Hill 1994: Ch 2; Culpitt 1992, Roche 1992; Rees 1995a; Hay 1996). Twine (1994: 106) claims that Marshall's work may be criticised for its failure to specify the level, form and content of social rights. This is a little unfair since as Reisman (1977: 72) says of Titmuss, 'it is no criticism of an intellectual pioneer to say that he asked more questions than he answered.' Moreover, in the period of almost half a century since Marshall delivered the original lectures, few have attempted this task.

Hay (1996: 77-8) presents a 're-worked neo-Marshallian' conception of citizenship, including more on outcomes, the distinction between formal and substantive rights, the constantly changing and renegotiated nature of citizenship, the obligations and duties of citizenship, and the apparent incommensurability of civil and social rights and the gendered basis of the Marshall framework. Some of these concerns are addressed in this paper, but in some ways such as his focus on outcomes, Hay abandons rather than extends Marshall and moves 'beyond citizenship'. Some fear that the concept may have become too elastic. Rees (1996: 13) warns that with fragmentation comes the danger that the concept will disintegrate into a cacophony of unrelated tunes, cross-cutting and obscuring each other.’ This paper revisits the original Marshall framework, treating it on its own terms in its historical context. In other words, it focuses on the basic model rather than on extensions of the model such as those that incorporate a gender dimension (see eg Lister 1997b)

Jessop (1999) suggests that the Keynesian National Welfare State is being replaced by the Schumpeterian Postnational Workfare State. In a similar 'ideal type' sense, an amalgam of recent arguments claim that a national statist model of post-war
citizenship based on rights and equality is being replaced by a hollowed-out, civil society model based on duties and inclusion. There is some validity in these views, but they do not represent the whole picture. This paper presents an alternative account - 'the hidden history of social citizenship' - based on the less cited parts of Marshall's essay (the 'other T H Marshall') and other writings which points to a more limited, conservative notion of citizenship. Just as in some ways the British welfare state is moving back to as well as away from Beveridge (Hewitt and Powell 1998), in some ways, Conservative and New Labour governments have moved back to as well as away from this more limited version of citizenship. This view suggests a resolution to the apparent paradox that the 'social democratic' Marshallian social citizenship is an integral part of a 'liberal' welfare state such as the UK (Esping-Andersen 1990). In short, it is claimed here that many writers on social citizenship have stretched it beyond its original meaning, mistakenly assuming a strong or maximalist version of a weak or minimalist concept (cf Rees 1995b).

**Equality versus Inclusion**

According to Lister (1998: 215), 'from equality to social inclusion' effectively encapsulates an important paradigm shift in thinking about the welfare state. However, both terms need unpacking. It has been claimed that there have been a number of moves away from 'equality' in terms of abandoning redistribution, increasing means-testing, increasing charges, and transforming equality of outcome into equality of opportunity.

Some see the reduction of vertical redistribution as diluting citizenship. Twine (1994: 140) considers that tax 'is a neglected yet crucial aspect of citizenship.' Lister (1997a) claims that we might once again use the tax system as an instrument of redistribution and as an expression of the responsibilities of citizenship.

Perhaps the most popular claim is that the essence of social citizenship lies in universality while its antithesis is found in residualism (eg Miller 1989: 89; Hill 1994: 77-8; Heater 1990: 286; Twine 1994: 96-7).

Some have seen free services (or de-commodification in a narrow sense) as the hallmark of citizenship: charges may be seen as reducing citizenship. 'Policies that involve de-commodifying social relations are considered as the basis for social rights' (Twine 1994: 5). Moran (1991: 35) defines health care citizenship as a right of health care for all citizens free at the point of treatment, but concludes that no western country offers this right.

It has been claimed that equality of outcome has been redefined as equality of opportunity. Fairness is defined in terms of a meritocracy (eg LeGrand 1998; White 1998). However, Brown (1999) has argued that New Labour offers a 'real' and dynamic equality of opportunity which is radical and achievable.

None of the above characterisations fully fits with Marshall's account. Marshall (1963: 83-4) recognised that the Poor Law was universal, but the minimal social rights of the New Poor Law were detached from the status of citizenship, treating the claims of the poor, not as an integral part of the rights of the citizen, but as an alternative to them. Stigma remained, leading to the 'divorce of social rights from the status of citizenship.' Harris (1996: 124-5) argues that the Poor Law was a system of relief rooted not in contribution and contract, but in membership of the community. Poor relief was, in the last resort, available to all who needed it as a matter of citizen right. ‘An armchair
political theorist who analysed the two systems ... might conclude that ... it was the Poor Law that carried connotations of universality, communitarianism and citizenship, while it was social insurance that entailed exclusion, differentiation and limited contractual rights.'

In the twentieth century the Liberals used social insurance to remove categories of need from the Poor Law. Although this is based on contribution rather than citizenship, there is little doubt that it established a partial but de facto citizenship that was in tune with the spirit of the times. The feminist critique points out the gendered assumptions inherent in 'everybody'. As benefits are dependent on previous employment status, in the words of Barbara Castle married women were 'second class citizens entitled to third class benefits.' (in Lister 1990: 57). However, Beveridge (1942) based his 'universalism' on contribution, pointing to the widespread popularity of the insurance mechanism.

The citizenship of Marshall is associated with equality of status and horizontal redistribution rather than vertical redistribution. Bulmer and Rees (1996: 273-4) argue that the equality of social citizenship is equality of access - entitlement rather than provision. Hay (1996: 73) considers that Marshall's remark that 'equality of status is more important than equality of outcome 'is a deeply condescending suggestion. It is true that 'this remark...could perhaps only have been made by someone with both status and income. Equality of status does not buy many loaves of bread, or care for many children' (Hay 1996: 73), but equally Hay's argument could only have been made by someone unfamiliar with the historical context of qualitative socialism or citizenship theory. It is perhaps significant that Hay does not cite Tawney, Titmuss, Crosland, and Ellison in this section. It was appreciated at the time that the welfare state was concerned with horizontal rather than vertical redistribution and that greater vertical redistribution could potentially be achieved by selective services, residual like the Poor Law (see Powell 1995a). Reisman (1977: 71) claims that 'Any de facto absence of universality may encourage redistribution but it impedes integration.'

Marshall (1963) argued that some degree of class fusion or class abatement would result from the common experience of cash and kind benefits, with the extension of services having a profound effect on the qualitative aspects of social differentiation. As the labels of 'ex-elementary schoolboy' and 'panel patient' disappear, class differences are blurred and society becomes more homogeneous. Crosland (1964: 85) is a little less optimistic: it seems rather doubtful whether the fact that everyone now has an insurance card, and repairs to the local post office, really does much to foster social equality. These cash benefits are too small in relation to the total incomes of better-off people to make much difference. However, high quality public services result not in 'a greater equality of real incomes, but certainly a greater equality in manners and the texture of social life.' Universal benefits symbolise the fact of social equality by conferring on everybody a badge of citizenship, eliminating any public distinction between the social classes, between rich and poor, the eligible and the non-eligible.

Marshall considered that services need not necessarily be free at the point of delivery. His discussion of legal aid considered the problem of combining social justice with market price (1963: 101-5). What is important is that the 'rendering of the service should not be conditional on the ability to pay' (Marshall 1981) but open to all, and used by the majority rather than merely by the poorer section of the community like the 'elementary schools' and 'panel patients'. Similarly, Crosland (1964: 85-6) is clear that
services need not necessarily be provided free to all, or without a test of means; nor need they be universally used. It is much more a matter of relative standards. The mark of inferiority attached to public services will disappear, whether or not these are provided entirely free, and whether or not they are universally used. Crosland gives examples of education, housing and health. For the latter, the service is neither free nor universally used. Private practice still continues; and a number of charges are made, subject to relief after a test of means. 'It appears, then, that while social equality requires universal availability of the public service (though not necessarily completely universal use), it does not always require universal free availability' (Crosland 1964: 87). This is due to the difference between a test of means which determines the right to use a service (eg if beds in state hospitals were to be provided only for national assistance beneficiaries), and one which determines only the question of payment. The latter need neither offend against social equality, nor cause humiliation, provided that two conditions are fulfilled. First, the benefit or service must not be so essential, and so large in relation to the recipient's means that he or she may reasonably consider that he has a social right to it, so that both his real income and self esteem would be severely affected by a test of means. Second, the income-line should be set as high as possible. In short, 'Social equality mainly requires the creation of standards of public health, education and housing so high that no marked qualitative gap remains between public and private provision. It will then matter little whether or not occasional charges are imposed, subject to the above conditions' (Crosland 1964: 88). This begs the question of what are central, essential services (eg prescriptions, optical and dental charges, long term care?) and what is a high income threshold.

It follows that a simple equation of citizenship with universalism and its denial with means-testing is too simplistic. The claim of Esping-Anderson (1990: 58) that 'Lord Beveridge and TH Marshall have exhorted to the world the peculiar and essentially ethnocentric assumption that universalism is the hallmark of an advanced welfare state' requires qualification. Universalism was not seen as an end in itself, rather as a means to the end of integration. Citizenship has some clear parallels with the 'Strategy of Equality' of Tawney (1964: see Hindess 1987; Harris 1987; Ellison 1994; Powell 1995a; Wright 1999). Titmuss (1968: 129) reflects Tawney's ideas about citizenship as comradeship, claiming that the fundamental historical reason for universality is the avoidance of stigma. Whether expressed in terms of Tawney's fellowship, Marshall and Crosland's equality of status or Titmuss's 'one nation', this concept is central to the welfare state (Powell, 1995a). Such universality was seen as vital to prevent selective services becoming a 'poor service for poor people' (cf Le Grand 1982; Le Grand and Goodin 1987).

Thus, 'open to all' universalism is by itself insufficient. There must be further ingredients to transform this into de facto universalism. One possible criterion is that the quality or texture of the service (Twine 1994: 87-8) is an important factor discriminating between de facto and de jure universalism, or mass and residual services (see Crosland 1956, above). This is clearly implied by Taylor-Gooby (1988: 18): 'The withdrawal of the state from a policy of national minimum provision in mass services, such as pensions and education, is now a possibility. National standards may continue but at so low a level as to be irrelevant to most people's experience. Use of basic state provision will then signify membership of a social minority rather than citizenship....Such a crisis would signal the collapse of the post-war tradition of welfare citizenship...' (see also Alcock 1989: 33;
Wilding 1997: 723). Just as Bevan argued for high quality public housing in order to include the middle class (Foot 1975), declining services such as pensions and dentistry exclude the middle class (Timmins 1996) and may lead to moves to develop universalism in the private sector (Lister 1997a; Oppenheim 1997).

Titmuss differentiated between various types of means-tests (1968: 115-8) and was not against selectivity per se, but when stigma or second class citizenship resulted (Reisman 1977: 45). Indeed, he saw 'positive discrimination' as, in some ways, combining universality with selectivity. In a famous passage, Titmuss (1968: 135) considered that the real challenge was 'what particular infrastructure of universalist services is needed in order to provide a framework of values and opportunity bases within and around which can be developed socially acceptable selective services aiming to discriminate positively, with the minimum risk of stigma, in favour of those whose needs are greatest?'

It is unclear whether the second class status of means-testing derives from the mechanism per se, discretion or the poor quality of service. Stigma may be contextual: not automatically associated with all means tests in all places and times. For example, means testing does not have negative connotations in Australia. In Britain student grants were means-tested, but compatible with citizenship as they were not associated with stigma.

Hay (1996: 73) argues that Marshall conveniently assumes a simple correspondence between equality of status and equality of opportunity, a proposition which does not stand critical scrutiny....Post war Britain society was for Marshall characterised by legitimate inequality. Like Crosland, Marshall was (contra Hay's account) against simple equality of opportunity. For example, Crosland (1964: Ch 8) clearly argues that 'equality of opportunity' was not enough (cf Brown 1999). Similarly, for Marshall, citizenship was characterised by legitimate inequality, but post-war Britain was an imperfect realisation of citizenship. In this sense, the death of redistributive politics is not necessarily the end of citizenship. Indeed, citizenship was seen as the architect of legitimate inequality (Marshall 1963: 73).

Like equality, social inclusion is a complex concept. The neat progression 'from equality to social inclusion' (Lister 1998) is deceptive, and hides the more difficult issues of identifying the more precise conceptions of the terms. Indeed, a number of writers, including Lister, have discussed citizenship is seen in terms of relative poverty, social exclusion and the underclass (Twine 1994: 78; Hill 1994: Ch 4; van Steenbergen 1994 Levitas 1996: 7). The 'Exclusive society' excludes the poor from citizenship (Lister 1990). Scott (1994) has made the clearest link between the citizenship of Marshall and the relative poverty of Townsend (1979). 'While the word "citizenship" is not used by Townsend, the concept permeates the whole of his work' (Scott 1994: 80). Scott sees participation as the central idea of citizenship, and uses the 'poverty lines' of Townsend and the Breadline Britain surveys in order to define citizenship. However, this is too strong (Rees 1996). The 'right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society' (Marshall 1963: 74) is the 'maximalist' part of the citizenship range, with 'the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security' at the minimalist end. In other words, participation is, at best, one of the two central ideas rather than the central idea, with the modicum approach seemingly having much more in common with absolute approaches to poverty. Similarly,
while in general terms moves towards means-testing, charging and inequality suggest a decline in social citizenship, the issue is more complex and contextual. A minimalist rather than a maximalist conception of citizenship may be compatible with a very limited type of citizenship. For example, according to Mishra (1981: 32) it could be argued that public elementary education of the kind provided in England towards the close of the nineteenth century meets the requirements of citizenship.

Levitas (1998) points to three discourses of social exclusion. RED is a redistributive, egalitarian discourse that embraces notions of citizenship and social rights, with a primary objective of social justice. MUD is a moralistic discourse that uses images of the underclass and the dependency culture and focuses on individual behaviour and values. SID is social, integrationist discourse that is focused on achieving social cohesion through paid work. In short, the excluded lack money in RED, morals in MUD and paid work in SID (Levitas, 1998: 27). She suggests that New Labour has tended to abandon RED in favour of MUD and SID, but arguably social citizenship was characterised more by SID and MUD and less by RED than Levitas allows. Social citizenship focuses on status rather than outcome, and on horizontal rather than vertical equality. Work has always been central to social citizenship (see below). Bilateral transfers have always been more important than unilateral gifts, with a central fault line dividing the 'deserving' and the 'undeserving' poor (Harris 1987: 80-2; Taylor-Gooby 1988; Golding and Middleton 1982). New Labour's 'diverse but inclusive society' (Blair, 1998: 12), 'egalitarian enough to be socially inclusive.' (Wright 1996: 143; see Levitas, 1998: 63-67) is not such a radical break. Field's (1998) claim that 'the principle that all people- rich and poor- should be included in the welfare contract is as valid today as ever' has parallels with the citizenship school (Harris 1987), the qualitative socialists (Ellison 1994) and the 'Strategy of Equality' or more accurately the 'Strategy for Fraternity' of Tawney (1964: see Le Grand 1982; Powell 1995a; Wright 1999). Bulmer and Rees (1996: 272) point out that Marshall's social citizenship is about inclusion and exclusion, even through he uses the terms 'equality' and 'inequality' instead.'

Rights versus Responsibilities

Many writers claim that the Conservative and New Labour governments have broken the post-war settlement based on social rights and have moved towards conditional welfare (Dwyer 1998; Faulks 1998; King 1999; Mishra 1999). Lister (1990: 11) claims that citizenship is being re-defined in terms of conditionality. This argument is based on establishing that rights were unconditional, but have more recently been linked with duties as part of a contract. The second element is relatively clear. New Labour's third way is based on rights and duties (see Blair, 1998; Dwyer, 1998; Le Grand, 1998; Lister, 1999; King 1999). In line with Etzioni's communitarianism (see Levitas, 1998; Driver and Martell, 1998; Dean 1999), Giddens (1998: 65) argues that the prime motto for the new politics is 'no rights without responsibilities'.

The first element is more problematic. Some writers are clear that citizenship involves 'dutiless rights'. Dahrendorf (1996: 32-3) has argued forcefully that rights cannot be linked with obligations as a quid pro quo: citizenship is a social contract; work is a private contract. Social citizenship is a non-economic, unconditional status, like the
political citizenship of voting. In workfare rights are dissolved into marketable commodities: they are offered for sale. On the other hand, there is growing and diverse body of work which stresses obligations, including those from the right eg Murray (1996) and Mead (1985) and communitarian writers such as Etzioni (1994) and Selbourne (1994).

This debate has clear parallels with the work of Esping-Andersen (1990) on de-commodification, who draws on Marshall (1963). Esping-Andersen (1990: 21-23) claims that if social rights are inviolable and if they are granted on the basis of de-commodification rather than performance, they will entail a de-commodification of the status of individuals vis-a-vis the market. De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market.

In spite of some similarities, there appear to be three main differences between de-commodification and Marshallian citizenship. First, as we have seen, writers such as Marshall and Crosland did not consider that all services should be free. Second, de-commodification assumes no relationship between market position and welfare or as Twine (1994: 102-4) argues, living standards should be independent of pure market forces. In contrast, Marshall argued that welfare should not be proportionate to the market. Moran (1991: 35) is mistaken in his claim that the rights of citizenship bear no relation to individual income or wealth. In statistical terms, de-commodification requires a zero correlation between market and welfare, while citizenship merely requires that the correlation is less than perfectly positive. Citizenship theory wishes to not to replace, but to restrict the domain of the market (cf Harris 1987). As outlined above, neither de-commodification nor citizenship necessarily involve significant redistribution, which requires a negative correlation between market and social income. Third, with particular reference to cash benefits, de-commodification is clear that benefits are inviolable and pitched at replacement wage levels. If benefits are low and associated with social stigma the relief system will compel all but the most desperate to participate in the labour market. In contrast, the position of citizenship on benefit levels (see above) and obligations are less clear.

Notwithstanding these differences between de-commodification and citizenship, it is clear why Esping-Andersen (1990) terms Britain a 'liberal' welfare state. Poor Law and social insurance programmes were deliberately designed to maximise labour market performance. In short, they were liberal because they aimed to avoid de-commodification. On the other hand, many benefits in kind such as the NHS do fit the criteria of de-commodification as they bear no relationship with the labour market, behaviour or obligations.

Marshall in stressing rights wrote little on obligations and his views on obligation remain unclear (Roche 1992; Hay 1996: 77; Rees 1995b: 348-9). However, it is clearly untrue that Marshall totally neglected obligations. 'Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed' (Marshall 1963: 87). In the first phase of public education, 'rights were minimal and equal. But...a duty was attached to the right' (p. 111). Obligations involve the duty to pay taxes and insurance contributions. Education and military service are also compulsory. The other duties are vague, and are included in the general obligation to live the life of a good citizen, giving
such service as one can to promote the welfare of the community. Of paramount importance is the duty to work. It is no easy matter to revive the sense of the personal obligation to work in a new form in which it is attached to the status of citizenship. It is not made any easier by the fact that the essential duty is not to have a job and hold it, since that is relatively simple in conditions of full employment, but to put one's heart into one's job and work hard. (pp. 122-4) What is not clear from these fragments are Marshall's views on what follows is someone fails to carry out their duties, or how these vary in periods of high unemployment.

However, liberal contractarianism or conditionality has a long history in Britain including the New Poor Law and test work in the inter-war period (King 1999: Ch 7). The Beveridge Report (1942) advocated attendance at a training course as a condition of receiving unemployment assistance. Beveridge argued that people ought not to be able to hold out for work that they were accustomed to do nor need it be near their place of residence (Hewitt and Powell 1998). One interpretation of this coercive regime is that unemployed doctors in Glasgow could be forced to work in burger bars in London. King (1999: 234) claims that 'it was the Beveridgean view that was dominant amongst policymakers after 1945.' Training courses were not enforced, but time limits were placed on insurance benefits. However, these were substantial, and rarely tested in periods of full employment. An alternative reading of King's work stresses not the sharp break of the introduction of conditional welfare in the 1980s, but the puzzle of why the period between the 1940s and the 1970s were relatively unconditional. Beveridge disliked the term 'welfare state.' He saw 'citizens' as insured persons, as this emphasised that the State was not a 'dispenser of gifts for which no one needs to pay. Such earned entitlements should give no more than the national minimum. This amounts to a bilateral rather than a unilateral transfer- certainly not a 'gift relationship'.

Glennerster (1999: 30, 35) argues that New Labour's stress on paid work is nothing new. It was there in Beveridge and Marshall. Rights and responsibilities are firmly embedded in Marshall, especially the later Marshall- even if some superficial readings of his work missed the point.

National versus Local

A number of recent arguments suggest clear limitations on the national welfare state. There has been a process of 'hollowing out' with powers moving upwards to the supranational level and downwards to the local level. It is claimed that powers have been transferred from the nation state to multinational companies and to supranational organisations such as the IMF and WB (Deacon 1997; Yeates 1999; Mishra 1999). Within Europe, powers have moved outwards through Europeanisation or Social Europe to the EU (Leibfried and Pierson 1995). For example, the Maastrict convergence criteria may have restricted the freedom of national governments. On the other hand, there has been some 'localisation' as powers are devolved to local government, regions and nations such as Scotland and Wales

All this assumes that the nation state is the 'natural' location for citizenship. A number of accounts (Ashford, 1986, 1990; Segalman, 1986; de Swann, 1990; Page, 1991) stress the historical roots of local welfare systems. Indeed, Segalman (1986) traces the move from the 'gemeinschaft' of the poor law relief systems to the 'gesellschafter' of the
national welfare state. In the UK the 'Welfare State' is often portrayed in national terms, and social citizenship is associated with the national level, often with citations to Marshall (1963). One of the objectives of the national welfare state has been the promotion of national social solidarity (Giddens 1994: 136-7) and a particular conception of 'the nation' (F. Williams 1989; Hughes and Lewis 1998; Dean with Melrose 1999: 80-81).

However, Marshall's definition of citizenship as 'membership of a community' seems to suggest a local focus (cf Rees 1995b: 345-6), as 'local welfare states' or 'local citizenship' (Cochrane 1993; Ashford 1990). Ironically, the less cited section of Marshall's essay examines earlier traditions of localised welfare. Both the historical importance of localism in British welfare policy (Powell 1995b) and localist systems in other countries should be noted. Local voluntary welfare existed in combination with the decentralised Old Poor Law (Ashford, 1986; Segalman, 1986; de Swann, 1990). In the Nordic countries there is a long tradition of municipal services (eg Page, 1991). Sub-national units of Federal systems by definition have considerable autonomy. Indeed, it is difficult to speak of 'the national' welfare state in countries such as the USA and Canada as policies vary between States and Provinces respectively (Peterson, 1995; Banting, 1987). Thus, historically and comparatively, the 'national' welfare state may be the exception rather than the norm.

Localists such as Robson (1953) have pointed out that local autonomy is an essential ingredient in citizenship (Regan and Stewart 1992; CLD 1995; Jenkins 1996; Marr 1996). Effectively, the national citizenship of entitlement has eclipsed the local citizenship associated with the Republican tradition (see Oldfield 1990; Freedland 1999). Most commentators have pointed to the Conservative attack on local government, reducing its functions and autonomy (CLD 1995; Jenkins 1996; Marr 1996). However, in the NHS, the rhetoric of devolution co-existed with centralisation. While there has been significant operational devolution, centralism has increased for strategic issues (Jenkins, 1996; Timmins1995: 511).

A similar mixed pattern has been in evidence with New Labour. Both for local government and the NHS, there has been rhetoric and action emphasising both devolution and centralisation. However, most commentators suggest in practice centralism will win out over localism: there may be more 'command-and-control' under Labour than under the Conservatives (Boyne 1998). Even with devolution to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and London, the Labour leadership has found great difficulty in letting go of the central reins.

There has been a recent return of interest to localism (CLD 1995; Marr, 1996). A number of traditions such as associational democracy (Hirst, 1994), communitarianism (Tam, 1998) and Christian socialism (Field, 1996) have all explored more local mechanisms of delivering welfare. As Ashford (1990: 230) puts it, the eclipse of localities, so common in the early development of the welfare states, is probably coming to an end. It is possible that the heyday of the *national* welfare state has passed. Recent 'hollowing out' may have shifted powers away from the nation state. This undermines
national social citizenship, but may revive earlier Republican traditions of local citizenship.

State versus Civil Society

Recent accounts have noted moves away from the state towards the private and voluntary sector, resulting in a greater mix in the mixed economy of welfare (Johnson 1999). The Conservatives 'privatised' or 'voluntarised' some state activities (I. Williams 1989; Drakeford 2000).

New Labour also stresses partnerships with the private sector and with 'the community' within civil society. Private or 'DIY' welfare can, like all DIY schemes, go disastrously wrong, even if subcontracted to Robert Maxwell or 'the man from the Pru'. There will also be increasing partnerships within civil society. Field (1997) argues that we need to break out of the 'welfare equals State' mentality, but 'I want to make one point crystal clear: the re-drawing of the boundaries between state and individual responsibility is not simply an exercise in downsizing state responsibility. [but] crucial to the recreation of a civil society based on a partnership between individuals, organisations and Government (cf Wright, 1996; Giddens, 1998; Blair, 1998). Labour places less emphasis on charitable activity than the Conservatives, but favours using National Lottery money to fund some developments in health. This raises questions about public responsibility and the division into 'essentials' and 'luxuries'.

However, Beveridge was clear about the limited role for the state, leaving space for voluntary action (Beveridge 1942, 1948; Williams and Williams 1987; Hewitt and Powell 1998). The views of Marshall are less clear. Marshall (1963: 105) argues that the State 'guarantees a minimum supply of certain goods and services...or a minimum money income....Anyone able to exceed the guaranteed minimum out of his own resources is at liberty to do so.' Marshall (1970) argued that whoever provides services, the overall responsibility for the welfare of citizens must remain with the state. This suggests that the role of the state is not necessarily a direct provider, but a guarantor or enabler, compatible with voluntary or private provision coupled with state finance and regulation. Moreover, it stresses the minimalist provision, similar to Beveridge's views on the extension ladder above the national minimum. Elsewhere, Marshall (1970) distinguishes between the minimum of cash benefits and the optimum of benefits in kind such as education and health. However, he appears unsure about whether benefits in kind are part of the rights of citizenship or 'legitimate expectations' (eg Marshall 1963: 108-9; Marshall 1981: see Rees 1995a, b).

Finlayson (1994) and Hudson (1998) distinguish between the politics of entitlement and the politics of contribution. Both right (eg Green 1996) and left (Hirst 1994; Field 1996) have advocated moves from centralist and statist welfare (see also Freedland 1998). At one level, this may be criticised as privatising citizenship (Lister 1990; Hudson 1998), a misplaced nostalgia for a better yesterday. At another level, it may be seen as a revival of civic-Republican citizenship, reinvigorating communities and turning passive subjects into active citizens and welfare states into welfare societies (see eg Oldfield 1990; Pestoff 1998; Giddens 1998; Blair 1998). The debate turns on the issue of whether 'the shift away from direct state provision is not necessarily a cause for
concern about the diminution of citizenship rights' (Taylor-Gooby 1993: 463; cf Johnson 1999: 272).

**Conclusion**

This account has presented an alternative, more limited interpretation of Marshall's citizenship. It is based on a re-reading of Marshall grounded in its historical context and understanding of contemporary actors rather than the views of 'armchair theorists' (cf Harris 1996). It is ironic that Hay (1996: 72) warns that selective readings of Marshall can sustain a great variety of mutually contradictory accounts as this account of the 'hidden history of social citizenship' has suggested that the decline of social citizenship thesis is misleading in some suspects. Just as Esping-Andersen (1990:33) claims that Adam Smith is often cited, but rarely read, Marshall has suffered from secondary quotations which at best oversimplify and at worst distort a complex, and at times an unclear and possibly inconsistent argument (but see the sympathetic, yet critical and nuanced accounts of Barbalet 1988 and Rees 1995a, b).

This revisionist account leads to three main conclusions. First, it has suggested a weak rather than a strong version of citizenship, with a less centralist, statist citizenship incorporating duties and inclusion more compatible with Marshall's citizenship and the wider post-war settlement than is often granted. This fits with citizens' limited and conditional definitions of citizenship which are linked with 'earned entitlements' from work and taxes (eg Conover et al 1991; Dean with Melrose 1999; Dwyer 1998). As Pinker (1971) argues, citizenship is an intellectual conceit of socialists and social scientists: 'most applicants for social security remain paupers at heart....The ghosts of less eligibility still haunt the social consciousness of the British people.'

Second, it is important not to see citizenship as an undifferentiated mass. It needs to be disaggregated into the minimalist, conditional citizenship of cash with the maximalist unconditional citizenship of kind, reflecting the minimum and the optimum (Marshall 1970: 90). This contrasts the 'liberal' element of social security with the social democratic element of the NHS (see Esping-Andersen 1990). Rather than being a unified status, citizenship consists of a range - from...to (Marshall 1963: 74).

Third, citizenship is more nuanced than simple equations with universalism. Conversely, means tests may be associated with differing degrees of stigma over time and space: for example, between students and pensioners in Britain, and between Britain and Australia.

An examination of the 'other T H Marshall' and the 'hidden history of social citizenship' suggest that citizenship is not merely a 'legitimation, a rhetorical device, a mirage, an illusion, a myth (Hay 1996: 80-1), but in its historical context a vital concept for understanding the British welfare state.

**References**


