

Divided Loyalty? Political participation and identity of dual citizens in Switzerland

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Abstract

In recent decades we have seen a dramatic rise of dual citizenship; many states are now officially accepting it and many people use this opportunity. Switzerland accepted dual citizenship in 1992 already. In other states, however, dual citizenship is (still) forbidden and very contested. It is especially feared that “one cannot serve two masters”, that loyalty towards the state and thus national cohesion and democracy are undermined. Others conceive of dual citizens as vanguard of citizenship identities and practices above and across nation states, and as an important source for democratizing a globalizing world order. However, these fears and hopes are usually built upon speculations. The actual empirical consequences of such a dual status are not well understood due to a lack of comparative data on this specific group. Based on original data from a large scale representative survey among Swiss dual citizens from 2013 this paper offers empirical evidence on their political identities and activities in Switzerland as well as in the country of their second nationality, in the European Union and beyond. The responses of dual citizens are compared with those of three relevant control groups, namely native and naturalized Swiss citizens without a second nationality, and foreign residents. This comparison allows tracing potential differences in national, transnational and cosmopolitan political identities and activities of dual citizens in Switzerland. This helps to evaluate empirically whether transnational ties and membership in multiple national communities hinder political identity and participation in the country of residence, and/or whether they facilitate the development of transnational and supra-national identities and activities that potentially advance new forms of citizenship and democracy.

Keywords: dual citizens, collective identity, political involvement, transnationalism, cosmopolitanism

Introduction¹

During the 20th century, international norms and state regulations tried hard to make sure that every individual has one, but just one citizenship. Migrants were expected to renounce their former nationality in order to get naturalized in the receiving country. At the turn of the 21st century, this has changed dramatically. An increasing number of states worldwide permit and even promote dual or multiple citizenship and many people use the opportunity to formalize their multiple affiliations. Even those states that do not permit it officially meanwhile mostly tolerate it (Blatter et al. 2009; Brondsted-Sejersen 2008; Vink and de Groot 2010).² Switzerland has been a frontrunner in this respect accepting dual citizenship already in 1992. The census of 2000 revealed that almost two of the overall seven million Swiss citizens have a second passport (Bundesamt für Statistik 2011).³ The large population of foreigners (21 per cent in 2009) and the fact that 36 per cent of marriages in 2009 were bi-national ensures that this already significant number of dual citizens in Switzerland will continue to grow steadily.

In other states, however, such as Germany, dual citizenship is (still) forbidden and very contested (Naujoks 2009).⁴ It is especially feared that “one cannot serve two masters”, that loyalty towards the state and thus national cohesion and democracy are undermined. Defined as a form of overlapping membership in which an individual has full membership in at least two nation-states, such a status contradicts the classical understanding of citizenship as single and exclusive membership in one nation state, constituted by a specific status with related rights and duties as well as expressed by political participation and identification with the community and values of a specific nation state.

These political controversies are reflected in the academic discourse. The “citizenship-debates” (Shafir 1998; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001) in the 20th century were characterized by questions about the breadth of rights connected to the citizenship status (following T.H. Marshall) and about the breadth of expectations which democracies can demand from their members (the liberalism versus communitarianism debate). In recent decades with increasing

¹ The introduction and conceptual sections of this paper largely draw on our proposal for a research project which was accepted by the Swiss National Science Foundation in 2011 (project leader: Joachim Blatter).

² While dual citizenship has always existed due to a lack of uniformity of nationality laws from country to country (*ius soli* or/and *ius sanguinis*), its proliferation today is facilitated by various factors. Especially the dramatic increase in international mobility, marriage, and commerce has elevated the number of dual citizens and with it the growing demand for accepting dual citizenship. We also witness shifting interests of migrant-sending countries when political elites expect from the constituency abroad benefits in terms of political influence as well as financial remittances (Guarnizo et al. 2003; Kivisto and Faist 2007: 108-110).

³ This number does not even include Swiss citizens living abroad: in 2010, 695 101 were registered Swiss abroad, 70 per cent of whom are dual nationals (EDA 2011).

⁴ Germany meanwhile accepts dual citizenship for EU citizens and since the bilateral agreements also for Swiss citizens willing to naturalize in Germany. All other foreigners have to decide whether they keep their former nationality or naturalize in Germany; those who are born in Germany have to decide at latest at the age of 23.

transnational flows of people and various forms of supra-national institution building, however, the connection between citizenship and the nation state is at the centre of the discourse. The congruence between territorial borders of nation-states and the boundaries of membership are mainly challenged in two ways. On the one hand, political institutions of supra-national and global governance triggered demands for the democratization of those institutions. For example, proponents of “cosmopolitan democracy” stress a global legal order in which national polities are embedded, but they also envision the emergence of supra-national forms of citizenship and community building (e.g. Archibugi and Held 1995; Held 1995; Archibugi et al. 1998). On the other hand, high levels and new forms of migration lead to social and political flows and connections across national boundaries. These phenomena are usually discussed under the term “transnationalism” (e.g. Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Portes 1999; Smith and Guarnizo 1998) in the sense of “processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Basch et al. 1994: 6). In respect to citizenship and political community building, the rapidly growing number of people with two or more nationalities⁵ facilitates transnationalism by providing a legal fundament. In addition, dual citizenship might be a stepping stone for cosmopolitan citizenship because it overcomes the monism of traditional nation state citizenship without losing its concreteness.

The cosmopolitan and transnational challenges for national citizenship represent central features of the new citizenship debates. In this context both the empirical relevance and the normative desirability of dual citizenship are highly disputed. In most cases and as introduced above, the citizenship practices of dual citizens are discussed from the perspective of national integration, and the main question is whether multiple memberships and transnational ties endanger the integration of dual citizens into the national community of the country of residence. In contrast, the proponents of cosmopolitan or transnational democracy stress the need for new spaces and forms of political involvement beyond the nation state. Often, they see dual citizens as vanguard and bearers of citizenship identities and practices across and above nation states, and thus as an important source for democratizing a globalizing world order. However, these fears and hopes are usually built upon speculations. The actual empirical consequences of such a dual status are not well understood due to a lack of comparative data on this specific group.

⁵ While nationality defines whether a person is considered a member of a particular state, citizenship characterizes the nature of a national’s rights and responsibilities. Because only few people know the legal distinction between both terms, we use the terms interchangeably.

This paper offers empirical evidence to the debate on whether dual citizenship indeed makes a difference for political identity and participation within and beyond the nation-state. Focussing on dual citizens in Switzerland, we analyse the following question: *In comparison to mono-citizens, to what extent are dual citizens politically involved in Switzerland and to what extent do they practice transnational and cosmopolitan citizenship?* In order to answer these questions, we will first briefly situate dual citizenship within the discourse on new forms of citizenship. We will then offer a definition of the concepts used in the analysis as well as formulate concrete hypotheses. Finally, the empirical analysis is based on a large scale representative survey among Swiss dual citizens which we conducted in 2013. Presenting a first descriptive analysis based on univariate comparisons (ANOVA), our analysis will give a first (limited) answer to the question whether dual citizens are different from single citizens in respect to their national, transnational and supranational political participation and identity.

1. Situating dual citizenship within the discourse on new forms of citizenship

1.1 Are dual citizens and their multiple affiliations a threat to national integration?

Since the second half of the 19th century dual citizenship was a situation to be avoided. One reason was a concern that issues of diplomatic protection of dual nationals could result in conflict between states. A second and related concern involved the matter of military service (Kosłowski 2003). While concerns over diplomatic protection are less relevant in an era of international sensitivity to human rights and the matter of military service is increasingly regulated by treaties between countries, the last and major concern is still largely unsettled. Dual citizenship should be avoided because of potential “disloyalty and deceit, divided allegiances and torn psyches” (Spiro 2002: 22). For instance, dual citizenship has become a major source of tensions between Hungary and its neighbours (Bauböck 2010). But also in West European countries like Germany or the Netherlands, dual citizenship has been a highly controversial and politically salient issue (Naujoks 2009; Schröter et al. 2005; Faist 2007). In contrast, and in light of the rather exclusive citizenship regime surprisingly, the introduction of dual citizenship in Switzerland in 1992 did not trigger a broad debate. However, the right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP) already attacked this right repeatedly.⁶

Critics argue that dual citizenship undermines incentives for cultural assimilation and political participation (Huntington 2004; Renshon 2005) and “is akin to bigamy, a fundamental betrayal of one’s commitment to the country of residence” (Staton et al. 2007a: 3).

⁶ Already in 2004 SVP representative Jasmin Hutter introduced a motion called ‘exclusion from dual citizenship right’ which was rejected (see Achermann et al. 2010: 28f).

Furthermore, it might lead to the devaluation of substantial citizenship when multiple passports are simply managed and used upon one's convenience (Ong 1999). Proponents of dual citizenship deny any negative effect of transnational ties for national integration (e.g. Hammar 1985). On the contrary, the acceptance of dual citizenship would promote cultural and political integration "by encouraging immigrants' naturalization and expanding the "training ground" in which people learn transferable political skills" (Bloemraad et al. 2008: 168; see also Bloemraad 2004). Creating equal opportunities for transnationals to be full-fledged citizens in multiple countries likely enables emancipation also in other dimensions of citizenship (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2002; Castles and Davidson 2000). Dual citizens as migrants in general would be capable to simultaneously become politically engaged citizens in their new countries and maintain transnational ties (e.g. Smith MP 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003).

Empirical evidence for backing up one or the other perspective is rare. Most studies which empirically test the impact of dual citizenship focus on immigrants in the United States (Cain and Doherty 2006; Staton et al. 2007a, 2007b; Ramakrishnan 2005). While the result that the acceptance of dual citizenship increases naturalization rates is well established, its impact on political involvement is ambiguous. Analysing a survey among Latinos (including Cubans), Cain and Doherty (2006) found that dual citizens are significantly less likely to register and to vote in comparison to mono citizens. With respect to non-electoral forms of political participation, dual citizens volunteered and worked less for a Latino candidate than mono US citizens, but more than non US citizens. Asked whether they have attended meetings/demonstrations or given contributions, dual citizens were less active than both groups of mono citizens (ibid. 99). According to Staton, Jackson and Canache (2007a), among first generation Latino immigrants in the US dual citizens are not only less likely to register and to vote than naturalized mono citizens, they are also less likely to express high levels of civic duty. Furthermore this study revealed that dual nationals are less likely to identify as Americans and to consider the US their homeland.

However, this disconnecting effect of dual citizenship did not hold beyond the first-generation (Staton et al. 2007b). Equally in the US context, Ramakrishnan (2005: 93f) even found that dual nationality raises the likelihood of voting among first-generation whites, Asian Americans and Latinos (except for Cubans). Also evidence from Canada revealed that transnationalism (measured by dual citizenship, family in country of descent and travel activities) does not diminish civic participation and sense of belonging to Canada (Wong 2007/2008: 87). While transnationals seem to engage less in political participation, the author points to significant differences among ethnic groups in this respect. Another study analysing

immigrants from Turkey and Surinam in the Netherlands even concludes that immigrants “with dual nationality are more likely to participate in the host country’s political life than those who only have Dutch nationality” (Mügge 2012: 15).

Not surprisingly, studies trying to generalise from specific cases come to mixed results. Jakobson and Kalev (2013), for example, find on the basis of a rich comparison of four transnational spaces (Estonia-Finland, Turkey-Germany, Morocco-France, and Indian Punjab-UK) that no dimension of citizenship was doubled, i.e. exist in the two countries simultaneously. “(R)espondents were in general socially active in one society at a time, even if engaging in vertical forms of participation in the other country; and even if they felt affiliated with both countries of residence, this affiliation was never felt in the same form toward the two countries” (ibid. 205). Thus, overall the empirical evidence on the impact of dual citizenship on political involvement in the country of residence is rather inconclusive. Especially quantitative and representative results in the European context are rare.

1.2 Are dual citizens the vanguard of cosmopolitan and/or transnational citizenship?

Dual citizens are not always seen as a danger for national integration and citizenship. On the contrary, in many accounts of democracy beyond the nation state they figure prominently as vanguard of cosmopolitan and/or transnational citizenship. A first understanding of citizenship beyond the nation state is based primarily on the spread of a legal order above the nation state which paves the way to supplant individual rights based on membership in a particular national community with rights based on supra-national membership or universal personhood (Soysal 1994). Such postnationalism is close to cosmopolitanism which implies less an overcoming of national citizenship than its embedding and complementing through more universal levels of citizenship (e.g. Benhabib 2004, 2008; Archibugi et al. 1998). Cosmopolitanism as a philosophy urges us all to be “citizens of the world”, creating a world-wide moral community of humanity committed to universal values (Vertovec/ Cohen 2002: 10; for an overview see e.g. Carter 2005). Yet, critics doubt that citizenship beyond a narrow liberal perspective on human rights is viable on a global or on a supra-national level. Thus cosmopolitanism would endanger national citizenship, loyalty and solidarity (Carter 2005: 167-176).

However, empirical evidence on these assumptions is rare. In respect to political participation the state of the art is characterized by studies which show the rise of international non-governmental organisations and the political relevance of networks of political activists across national borders (e.g. Della Porta et al. 2006; Tarrow 2005). Yet, for our question most importantly, until now nobody has tried to find out whether dual citizens participate stronger

than other people in supra-national policy-making. In respect to identification beyond the nation state, its relatively small extent has been stressed in the literature (e.g. Norris 2000: 161). In contrast to the overall low numbers of world citizens, scholars analysing feelings as EU citizens came repeatedly to different conclusions: a majority of Europeans (73 percent in 2009) feel attached to their nation and to the European Union simultaneously (Schlenker-Fischer 2011, 2013; Fuchs et al. 2009: 101). Yet again, in these studies there is no differentiation between dual citizens and others. To fill this research gap seems to be even more pressing since recent data shows that respondents, who are themselves or at least one of their parents born in a EU country other than the one in which they currently reside, are 18 per cent more likely to feel attached to the EU than those without such a migration background (European Commission 2007: 86).

In contrast to the literature on cosmopolitan citizenship, there exists a discourse on citizenship beyond the nation state which is focusing on the horizontal overlaps between national communities. Faist and Kivisto (2007: 103) even claim that the horizontal pluralization of citizenship requires more attention than the vertical multiplication because migration and dual citizenship are world-wide growing phenomena in contrast to supra-national citizenship for which they see a strong legal and institutional basis only in Europe. The debate on transnational citizenship is still strongly focussed on the rights of people who live their life across boundaries of nation states (e.g. Bauböck 1994a und b, Bauböck 2006; Fox 2005; on Switzerland see D'Amato 1997). Apart from this rights perspective, migrants' transnational political practices encompass a wide range of phenomena such as transnational election campaigns and cross-border voting, rallies against injustices in the country of origin or demonstrations to defend it, or engagement in hometown associations (Portes et al. 1999). These practices might also be subsumed under the heading "external citizenship". Blatter (2013: 9) further clarifies that transnational political involvement in its proper sense is given when citizens identify (at least partially) with a national community beyond the one in which they are active and/or that their political activities are influenced by an awareness that political decisions by the latter have consequences for the former – or vice versa. Transnational citizenship in a strict sense thus means that there is a (perceived) policy interdependence between the two nation states and that the individual takes this into account (Blatter 2013: 6).⁷ Even though there is an increasing empirical interest in diaspora politics (Vertovec 2005; de Haas 2006; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003), these studies have been concerned largely with the

⁷ Migrants and mobile people very likely practice transnational citizenship more than sedentary people. However, being a migrant is not a necessary condition for such political involvement (see Dahinden 2009).

political (re)involvement of migrants in their sending states and societies without including a real transnational perception (an example is Rubenzer's (2008) study on Cubans in the US).

Overall, although there exists a long and extensive research tradition focusing on the integration and political participation of migrants in receiving countries, the more recent challenge of multiple affiliations was so far mostly taken up by analyses of legal changes and political discourses, not of the actual involvement of dual citizens. We know little whether formal membership in the receiving and sending country makes any difference although the membership regulations have been a highly salient political issue in many receiving and sending countries alike. In addition, there is hardly any research on dual citizens' cosmopolitan and transnational political involvement. This highlights the need to empirically investigate interdependences between national, transnational and cosmopolitan citizenship practices.

2. Definition of major concepts and hypotheses


2.1 Citizenship and political involvement

Citizenship has been commonly defined as membership in a political community and can be disaggregated into four dimensions: legal status, rights, participation, and a sense of belonging (Bloemraad et al. 2008: 154-156; Faist 2007; Jakobson and Kalev 2013; Sassen 2002; Schlenker and Blatter 2013). In the political controversies about the rules which regulate the inclusion and exclusion of individuals into political communities (granting a legal status), different theoretical or philosophical understandings of citizenship and democracy played a major role (Blatter 2011; Gerdes and Faist 2007). Liberals are mainly concerned with the expansion of individual rights as a means for personal autonomy and with securing the congruence of individual rights and responsibilities. Accordingly, rules regulating inclusion and exclusion should be based on considerations about liberty and justice (Bauböck 1994a). In contrast, republicans are more concerned about the stability and vitality of political communities. Therefore, for them interest in politics and informed participation in political communities is crucial (van Deth et al. 2007: 5). For communitarians, in turn, identification with the community, a common culture and solidarity are seen as essential for the vitality of democracies and therefore necessary ingredients of citizenship (e.g. Taylor 2002).

Although each tradition in democratic theory highlights one aspect of citizenship, within the context of the Westphalian system of nation states, it was commonly assumed that all dimensions are necessarily connected and congruent for an adequate understanding of citizenship. Yet, not only Cohen considers the decomposition of this modern paradigm of citizenship and demands to "abandon the modern ideal (and ideology) of unified, uniform

citizenship with each component mapped onto the same institutional level and protected by the same sovereign legal/ political instance” (1999: 258). Reflecting about the logic of each dimension, he makes a normative case for the partial disaggregation and reinstitutionalization of the components of citizenship on different levels of governance. In order to find out whether such a differentiation is actually taking place we trace the different dimensions of citizenship separately. Next to the increasing relevance of human rights and denizenship, dual citizenship is the most encompassing form of de-(mono-)nationalizing the membership and rights dimension. The focus of our research is therefore on the question how such a status affects the other dimensions of citizenship: information, participation, and identification.

Figure 1: Dimensions of citizenship and research design



We will operationalize these broad concepts along the following lines: Political information is encompassing the extent of attention or interest paid to politics in general (see e.g. Huddy and Khatib 2007). This will also be assessed by media consumption. Political participation is measured by the most common indicators. Following Verba and Nie (1972) political participation covers four activities, namely participation in elections, election and campaign related activities, community-oriented activities as well as individual contacts to politicians. Yet as introduced by Barnes and colleagues (1979), it also includes unconventional forms of political participation, namely legal protest activities such as participation in demonstrations and signing of petitions (see also Jennings et al. 1990). We will consider actual behaviour as well as statements on the willingness to act.

Finally, political identity is understood as a special kind of social identity: the individual identifies with a political community (Brewer 2001; Fuchs 1999). According to social psychology, one has to know about one’s membership in a social group (whether it is voluntarily chosen or ascribed against one’s will) and this membership has to be emotionally

relevant in order to found identification (Tajfel 1981). These two operations – awareness of one’s membership in an entity and a sense of group attachment – also apply to identification with a political community: First, the individual cognitively ascribes herself to this community (self-description); secondly, this belonging is emotionally relevant (attachment).⁸ Table 1 gives an overview on the analysed concepts, their subdimensions and operationalization.

Table 1: Operationalisation of political involvement

Concept	Subdimensions	Indicators
<i>Information</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • attention • interest 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • media consumption • interest in politics
<i>Participation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • electoral • nonelectoral 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • voting and vote intention • contacts to politicians or media, signing of petitions, demonstrations etc.
<i>Identification</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • cognitive • emotional 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • self-description • attachment

Furthermore, in order to answer our research questions, we have to clarify first what is meant by national, transnational and cosmopolitan political involvement. In the following we list the relevant political communities in which dual citizens can be involved.⁹ The first and traditional field of citizenship practices is the national community of the country of residence. We will investigate how strong dual citizens identify with it and how far they are interested and participate in its politics. The second relevant field is the transnational one which encompasses political involvement in its various forms in the country of descent¹⁰. If the identities and political activities of dual citizens are clearly geared towards the country of descent, they are part of a diaspora community. The more this involvement is characterised by the awareness of policy interdependencies, the more it is genuinely transnational.

In addition to the national and transnational field we will also take into account the supra-national level in order to get an idea how far cosmopolitan citizenship is practiced by dual citizens. We follow those approaches that do not only focus on the universal community of mankind but also see the European Union as part of an emerging cosmopolitan order (e.g. Carter 2005: 119-141). Table 2 summarizes these three fields of political involvement.

⁸ Further ingredients of political community building (from a more relational perspective than identity) are trust and solidarity. These aspects of citizenship have also been part of our survey and will be analysed at a later stage.

⁹ We will concentrate on territorial communities on the national and higher levels. There are of course also subnational levels as well as other potentially relevant communities, like religious communities.

¹⁰ Here and in the following we refer by country of descent in general to the country of the second citizenship in which the respective dual citizen currently does not live, irrespective of a personal migration background.

Table 2: Different fields of political involvement

<i>National arena</i>	Political interest in/ political activities in national political arenas / identification with the political community of the country of residence
<i>Transnational arena</i>	Political interest in/ political activities in/ identification with the political community of a non-resident country
<i>Supranational arena</i>	Political interest in/ political activities in supranational political arenas/ identification with political communities on continental/ global scales

2.2 Hypotheses: The influence of dual citizenship on political involvement

Naturalisation policies and the rules of formal membership in political communities are highly contested and politically salient issues (e.g. Helbling 2010). As elaborated above, in political and academic debates it is explicitly or implicitly assumed that formal membership has an influence on participation and identification.¹¹ This is however empirically not unambiguously proven, especially not when also forms of political involvement are included for which formal membership is not a necessary precondition. The aim of this paper is to find out whether the legal status of dual citizens does actually make a difference in respect to their political involvement in and beyond the country of residence. Based on the discussion above, we formulate in the following hypotheses for each field of political involvement.¹²

Most disputed are the consequences of dual citizenship for *national political involvement*. On the one hand, opponents of dual citizenship argue that membership in multiple political communities endangers citizenship practices in the country of residence. A first set of arguments is based on the communitarian understanding of citizenship: First, dual nationals like immigrants with strongly different cultural backgrounds endanger the collective identity and solidarity among members of the community. Having an easy exit option would endanger loyalty to a specific community, thus dissipate patriotism, as well as it would inhibit the development of a consistent personal identity (Renshon 2005: 54-78, 167-191; also Huntington 2004). In addition, the spread of multiple citizenship potentially leads to an instrumental use of citizenship and to the dilution of state-based identities (Ong 1999; Spiro 2008). A second set of arguments focuses on rather liberal and deliberative concerns. Limited (time) capacities of individuals make it very likely that those who are members in two polities at the same time have less time to get thoroughly informed about the issues in each polity in comparison to those

¹¹ Naturalization policies are also debated as a matter of justice and in light of feared or hoped for socio-economic consequences. Furthermore cultural assimilation is also at stake (e.g. Centlivres et al. 1991)

¹² At this stage we only formulate hypotheses regarding political involvement in its encompassing meaning (information, participation, identification). At a later stage we will disaggregate them and formulate more specific hypotheses for different subtypes of political involvement as well as for different groups of dual citizens.

who belong to just one. In consequence, they are also less inclined to participate (Renshon 2005: 150). Indeed, Staton, Canache and Jackson (2007a) found that dual national Latinos in the US are less politically involved than naturalized immigrants who did not keep their former citizenship (see also Jakobson and Kalev 2013). Thus according to the traditional view on immigration and assimilation we can expect:

*H1a: Dual citizens are less politically involved in the country of residence **than mono-citizens** (autochthonous and naturalized).*

On the other hand, proponents of liberal naturalization regulations and dual citizenship see the granting of formal membership as an instrument that not only facilitates the socio-economic integration of immigrants but also stimulates their political involvement. In one respect it is even a precondition since only full membership provides immigrants with the right to vote. Whereas this right is seen mainly as a matter of justice it is also assumed to induce political interest and other forms of political participation. Furthermore, granting citizenship is seen as an act of recognition by which the receiving community welcomes and accepts the immigrant (Bauböck 2003: 31). This in turn, opens up the door for developing feelings of belonging to and identification with the community and inciting political involvement. In addition, political socialisation and skills learned in one context can be transferred to another. Since involvement in any political community enhances the (sense of) individual autonomy, it is a trigger for further political involvement also in other contexts.¹³ With an increased sense of empowerment and self-worth immigrants will feel more efficacious and interested in dealing with the affairs of the host country, thus fostering political participation there as well. In sum, the status of citizenship is seen as a regulatory institution that has an effect of socializing new members into the practices of citizenship and a symbolic institution that signals mutual recognition among the (old and new) members (Gerdes and Faist 2007: 63f). It thus fosters participation, and identification within the country of residence. On the basis of these reflections we formulate the competing hypothesis to the traditional one elaborated above:

*H1b: Dual citizens are **more** politically involved in the country of residence than **resident foreigners** and **not less** involved than **naturalized mono-citizens**.*

With respect to **transnational political involvement**, the picture is not clear either. On the one hand, upholding two memberships with full political rights in two political communities might enable and promote an intensified involvement reaching from the country of residence to the country of descent. The socialization and recognition effects are not confined to one political

¹³ As Portes argues “participation in transnational political activities can empower immigrants and invest them with a sense of purpose and self-worth that otherwise would be absent” (1999: 471).

community only but is transferred to the country of descent thus further justifying (dual) citizenship for emigrants (Escobar 2004; Itzigson 2007). On the other hand, the multiplicity of membership and rights might also lead to the contrary effect because of the same reasons the sceptics raise with respect to the national political realm. If Spiro's (2008) interpretation of dual citizenship as an instrumental status which dilutes loyalty is right, we could expect that dual citizens are less involved in any politics, especially less involved in the country of descent in comparison to those foreign residents who have not taken a new and additional citizenship. Thus, we have two hypotheses for this field of citizenship practices:

*H2a: Dual citizens are **more** politically involved in the country of descent than naturalized mono-citizens.*

*H2b: Dual citizens are **less** politically involved in the country of descent than **resident foreigners**.*

Finally, the influence of dual citizenship on cosmopolitan or *supra-national political involvement* is only rarely treated in the literature and hardly any expectations are formulated so far. One of the rare exceptions is Mau (2010) who analyses the potential of social transnational ties on cosmopolitan attitudes. Similarly expecting a positive influence of multiple political ties across borders on more supra-national involvement, we argue that membership in multiple horizontal political communities facilitates political involvement on various vertical levels as well (Blatter and Schlenker 2012). Dual citizens experience the relativity and compatibility of membership in different national communities and might thus be more able and motivated to transfer this awareness also on the perception and activation of membership in various vertical political communities. Transcending national membership horizontally and thus enlarging mental horizons might simultaneously increase global awareness. We therefore assume that dual citizenship might be a stepping stone to cosmopolitan citizenship:

*H3: Dual citizens are **more** politically involved on supra-national levels **than (all kinds of) mono-citizens**.*

3. Data description

Our hypotheses cannot be tested with existing data sets. Many international as well as national surveys include political involvement but usually with respect to national citizenship practices only. In addition, regarding our independent variable, political membership, the datasets are not complete for our purposes: no international survey raises double nationality. Nevertheless, we used these surveys as sources in another respect: The established questions on political involvement, our dependent variable, used in these surveys served to elaborate the

questionnaire for our own survey making it comparable to existing findings. This survey was financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation and conducted by one of the leading Swiss survey institutes (LINK). The main added value of our survey is that we assessed citizenship status in an appropriate way as well as span the national, transnational and supra-national field of political involvement. Thus, while drawing on established indicators, we concentrated on the so far neglected aspects of simultaneous political participation and identification in different arenas of political involvement of Swiss dual citizens.

The sampling procedure was three-fold, inspired by the well-established procedure of the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SAKE) (see Bundesamt für Statistik 2004). The basic population of the study was defined as those living in Switzerland who can be interviewed in German, French, Italian or Albanian. In addition the sample design defined further traits in order to sample various subgroups: dual citizens (by naturalization and by birth), foreigners, naturalized Swiss mono-citizens as well as autochthonous Swiss. Unfortunately, dual citizenship is not documented in any official register. In order to target a sufficient number of dual citizens (in order to be able to compare different political opportunity structures in the country of descent in a later analysis) we selected three very different countries of descent (presumably implying very different migration backgrounds): Germany, Italy and Kosovo. Addresses from the official register of the Federal Office for Migration were thus randomly selected according to the following criteria: naturalized citizens (dual and mono), gender equally distributed, with the minimum age of 18 (in order to have the right to vote) who have naturalized between 2008 and 2012 and had the German, Italian or Kosovar nationality before (or still have). Foreigners had to have a permanent residence permission (Permis C) and the German, Italian or Kosovar nationality. Swiss (autochthonous) citizens were randomly selected from the sampling register (SRPH) of the Federal Office for Statistics based on Swiss nationality, gender (equally distributed), age (older than 18) and geographic location (spread all over Switzerland). Dual citizens by birth were interviewed via the LINK Internet-Panel. Their selection was possible on the basis of available information on Panel participants.¹⁴

For quantitative analyses we aimed at around 100 respondents per category of each group, yet since they were differently spread over the sample and differently participated in our survey, we could not reach this aim for dual citizens by birth (except for Italians) nor for naturalized mono-citizens (except for Kosovars). Since a definite assignment to the various target groups was not possible neither in the registers nor in the Internet-Panel, this was ensured ex post by screening questions in the survey. This assignment revealed that most naturalized

¹⁴ In addition 21 persons among this target group could be contacted via the German and the Kosovar embassy as well as via personal contacts.

persons of German and Italian descent keep their former nationality so that naturalized mono-citizens in these groups are seldom.¹⁵ In addition, there are no dual citizens by birth with Kosovar nationality since Kosovo officially only exists as an independent nation-state since 2008 (and our respondents were at least 18 years old).

The original questionnaire was drafted in German and translated in French, Italian and Albanian. In order to check the questionnaire and the length of interview, a pretest with 48 interviews was conducted in February 2013. While the survey itself was in the field from 11th April 2013 until 1st July 2013 overall 1764 interviews were realised (see Table 3). 1068 of them were realised as adhoc online interview, 239 via the online Panel, and 457 as written interviews upon request of the participants. Having contacted 4963 persons, the response rate of the group contacted via the registers was at about 34 per cent, the response rate of those contacted via the online panel was 48 per cent. Although we aimed at a higher rate, surveys among persons with migration background traditionally have a low response rate (see Lipps et al. 2011; for further information on the survey see Appendix).

Table 3: Effective sample of the survey

Categories	Second/ former/ foreign nationality			Source	N
	German	Italian	Kosovar		
a. dual citizens by birth	47	103	1	Online Panel	151
b. dual citizens by naturalization	335	246	197	BFM	778
c. naturalized mono-citizens	14	16	108	BFM	138
d. foreign citizens with permanent residence	183	118	111	BFM	412
e. autochthonous (Swiss) mono-citizens				BFS	285
<i>Total N by Random Quota</i>					1764

4. Results

4.1 Political information

Dual citizens are significantly more interested in Swiss politics than foreigners and naturalized Swiss mono-citizens, even slightly more than autochthonous Swiss mono-citizens. This is true on the national as well as on lower (local and cantonal) levels (Table 4). Concerning interest in politics in the country of descent, foreigners living permanently in Switzerland significantly

¹⁵ This can be explained by the fact that our sample only includes persons who have naturalized between 2008 and 2012. In this period, Italy (since 1998) and Germany (since 2002) had already accepted dual citizenship with Switzerland. Although this is also the case for immigrants of Kosovar descent, apparently this group has more incentives to give up their former nationality when naturalizing in Switzerland – feelings of discrimination or fear of expulsion are certainly among these incentives. In consequence, our sample contains by far more naturalized Swiss mono-citizens of Kosovar descent – which unfortunately creates a strong bias. However, this bias will be less relevant once we will analyse the data with multivariate methods which will be the next step.

overtake dual citizens while naturalized Swiss mono-citizens are – as one can easily expect – the least interested. With respect to the supranational level, dual citizens, foreigners and autochthonous Swiss are almost equally interested in EU politics as well as in international politics at large. Significant differences are only present in comparison to those having naturalized without keeping a second nationality who seem in general less interested in supranational politics.

Table 4: Political interest in Switzerland and beyond (means, standard deviations in parentheses)

	Dual citizens	Foreigners	Naturalized mono-citizens	Autochthonous mono-citizens
Interest in Swiss national politics	6.75 (2.55)	5.61 (2.69)***	5.48 (2.66)***	6.46 (2.64)*
Interest in local/cantonal politics	6.73 (2.54)	5.56 (2.67)***	5.76 (2.78)***	6.50 (2.64)†
Interest in politics in country of descent	5.07 (2.84)	5.53 (2.99)**	4.16 (3.07)***	Not asked
Interest in EU politics	5.32 (2.71)	5.27 (2.81)ns	4.39 (2.83)***	5.11 (2.86)ns
Interest in supra-national politics	5.67 (2.74)	5.50 (2.90)ns	4.62 (2.93)***	5.23 (2.80)*

Minimum 0 = not at all Maximum 10 = very strong

The asterisks indicate the degree of significance of the mean differences between the groups of respondents, with dual citizens as reference group: ***p<0.001;**p<0.01;*p<0.05; †p<0.1; ns=not significantly different
N: 929 dual citizens, 412 foreigners, 138 naturalized mono-citizens, 285 autochthonous mono-citizens

A similar pattern becomes apparent in respect to the amount of media consumption on politics (Table 5). Dual citizens slightly overtake foreigners as well as Swiss mono-citizens (naturalized and autochthonous) in their consumption of Swiss media. They are less informed on politics by media from the country of their second nationality than foreigners, but still more than mono-Swiss¹⁶.

Table 5: Media consumption in Switzerland and beyond (means, standard deviations in parentheses)

	Dual citizens	Foreigners	Naturalized mono-citizens	Autochthonous mono-citizens
Consumption of Swiss media	3.67 (0.61)	3.40 (0.81)***	3.52 (0.73)**	3.59 (0.67)*
Consumption of media from country of descent / foreign media	3.03 (0.96)	3.22 (0.93)***	2.80 (1.04)**	2.78 (0.99)***

Minimum 1 = never Maximum 4 = often

The asterisks indicate the degree of significance of the mean differences between the groups of respondents, with dual citizens as reference group; ***p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05; ns=not significantly different

¹⁶ Autochthonous mono-Swiss were asked about media consumption of ‘foreign media’


Thus, overall there seem to exist significant differences between dual citizens and mono-citizens. In spite of the fact that political information on more than one country is very time consuming, those with two passports seem to be politically rather more interested and informed than the control groups. In contrast to the results on four different transnational spaces by Jakobson and Kalev (2013), according to our data, dual citizens in Switzerland apparently do not divide their political attention and subtract it either from their country of residence or from the country of their second nationality, but rather tend to double it as the definition of transnationalism (Vertovec 2009) would suggest.

4.2 Political participation

About 61 per cent of dual citizens have actually participated in the last national elections in Switzerland which is about five per cent less than the percentage of autochthonous citizens, but almost 27 per cent more than the ratio of naturalized Swiss mono-citizens. In their intention to vote in the next national election, they even surpass both kinds of mono-citizens. While these general differences between dual and mono citizens in electoral participation are already significant, there are big differences in this respect depending on the second or former nationality involved (see Figure 2). Swiss-Germans as well as naturalized Swiss of German descent clearly overtake all other groups. Swiss-Italians vote to a similar extent as native Swiss and considerably more than naturalized Swiss mono-citizens of Italian descent. Yet, Swiss-Kosovars and naturalized mono-Swiss of Kosovar descent vote by far less than all others. This might be caused by the relatively little experience with democracy these two groups have. However, feelings of discrimination or a more widespread political malaise in general might also be relevant. In general, we have to be careful with self-reporting on electoral participation since considerations of social desirability might influence the answers.¹⁷ Probably for this reason, the percentage of all Swiss citizens together who report having voted is with 64 per cent 6 per cent higher than the official electoral participation in the last election of 2011. Since 1979, continuously less than half of Swiss citizens participate in national elections (BFS admin.ch).


¹⁷ The constantly higher percentages of those who intent to vote in all groups might demonstrate the difference between intention and eventual action, but this might also be caused by beliefs of respondents in social desirability.

Figure 2: Electoral participation in Switzerland (percentages)



Our data reveal less significant differences between dual citizens and mono-citizens in their electoral participation in the country of descent. The share of dual citizens who voted in the last national elections abroad is with 2 per cent difference only slightly smaller than the share of foreigners (25 per cent). The difference is with eight per cent points slightly bigger in their intention to vote in the next election in their home country (around 37 per cent compared to 29 per cent of dual citizens). However, again there are much bigger differences between nationalities (Figure 3). A considerably bigger share of Swiss-Italians (41 per cent) and of Italians (57 per cent) voted in the last election to the Italian parliament in 2013 in comparison to 17 per cent of Swiss-Germans and 20 per cent of Germans who voted for the last Bundestag in 2009. Hardly any Swiss-Kosovars (4 per cent) and Kosovars living in Switzerland (3 per cent) participated in the last national elections in Kosovo in 2010/11. These big differences can certainly be explained by the very different political opportunity structures in these countries of descent. While Germany and Italy are both old democracies in which citizens are socialized into regular and free elections, this is not the case for Kosovo which only exists as an independent state since 2008. Still, many more Kosovar dual citizens and even almost a third of Kosovar mono-citizens intend to vote in the next national elections. Italy consciously reaches out to his expatriates and encourages their participation by reserving seats in parliament for them and even paying the journey home for elections (...). It is therefore not surprising that this group is most active in home country elections.

Figure 3: Electoral participation in country of descent (percentages)



Overall dual citizens demonstrate a comparably high rate of electoral participation in national elections in their country of residence, where they participate almost equally often than autochthonous mono-citizens. Yet, dual citizens vote less in the country of their second nationality. Swiss-Italians vote considerably more also in Italy than the other groups, but still 23 per cent less than in Switzerland. Thus, there seems to be a clear bias in favour of the country of residence in respect to electoral participation which needs more (time) resources and motivation to act than political information and interest.

In respect to non-electoral political participation, dual citizens are not less involved than autochthonous Swiss citizens, there is no significant difference (Table 3). When asked whether they have ever signed a petition, participated in a demonstration, contacted a politician, donated money for politics etc., they are however significantly more active than foreigners and naturalized Swiss mono-citizens. When such activities are asked with reference to the country of descent, dual citizens are as involved as foreigners and naturalized Swiss mono-citizens, no significant differences exist. Larger differences come up when political participation on supranational levels is at stake. Dual citizens are significantly more involved in European and global politics than foreigners or naturalized mono-citizens. In comparison to autochthonous Swiss mono-citizens, the difference is small and not very significant. Thus, being active in politics in the country of residence goes well with political activities with an international outreach for dual citizens as well as for native mono-Swiss. Living in a country without its citizenship however does not enhance being politically active neither in the country of residence nor in wider supranational arenas.¹⁸

¹⁸ We refrain from interpreting the difference to naturalized mono-citizens here because of the bias in our sample.

Table 6: Non-electoral political participation (means, standard deviations in parentheses)

	Dual citizens	Foreigners	Naturalized mono-citizens	Autochthonous mono-citizens
In Switzerland	1.87 (0.04)	1.24 (0.05)***	1.33 (0.10)***	1.82 (0.07)ns
In Country of descent	0.89 (0.02)	0.93 (0.04)ns	0.86 (0.08)ns	Not asked
Concerning Europe	0.94 (0.02)	0.78 (0.03)***	0.62 (0.06)***	1.03 (0.04)*
Concerning global topics	1.19 (0.03)	0.94 (0.04)***	0.73 (0.08)***	1.22 (0.05)ns

Scale constructed from answers to the following question: “Have you ever participated in one of the following forms of political activity: Signed a petition/ Participated in a demonstration/ Contacted a politician/ Donated money for political issue/ Contacted media/ Discussed politics with family/ friends/ Took part in online political forum” ; Minimum 0 = none of it Maximum 7 = all of it

The asterisks indicate the degree of significance of the mean differences between the groups of respondents, with dual citizens as reference group; ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; ns=not significantly different

In sum, dual citizens seem to be politically very involved, strongest in their country of residence, but also considerably in the country of descent and even on supranational levels. Since the political and academic debate is often suspicious towards their loyalty, this high participation rate even increases the importance of the question in whose interests they act. Our survey reveals that dual citizens participate in politics mainly in the (perceived) interest of Switzerland, even slightly more than autochthonous Swiss mono-citizens, as well as to a high degree also in the (perceived) interests of the world (Table 7). There is no significant difference in their loyalty towards the country of descent between them and foreigners. Furthermore, compared to all kinds of mono-citizens, they participate significantly more in the interest of Europe. Since Europe and the world appear so prominently in dual citizens’ reflections on the question in whose interest they are politically active, this might be a hint for the kind of cosmopolitan attitude some scholars hope for.

Table 7: Political participation in the interest of ... (means, standard deviations in parentheses)

	Dual citizens	Foreigners	Naturalized Swiss mono-citizens	Autocht. Swiss mono-citizens
Switzerland	7.67 (2.50)	5.34 (3.69)***	6.55 (3.21)***	7.40 (2.55) †
Country of descent	5.50 (3.39)	5.26 (3.54)ns	5.02 (3.64) †	Not asked
Europe	5.63 (3.07)	4.95 (3.52)***	4.89 (3.37)**	4.78 (2.79)***
World	7.71 (2.79)	6.51 (3.65)***	7.23 (3.21)*	6.86 (2.86)***

Minimum 0 = not at all

Maximum 10 = very much

The asterisks indicate the degree of significance of the mean differences between the groups of respondents, with dual citizens as reference group; ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; †p<0.1; ns=not significantly different

Another indicator specifically raises the extent of transnationalism that is preferred. When asked whether they think that the interests of all affected people also beyond national boundaries should be taken into account in national political decisions, dual citizens, foreigners and naturalized mono-citizens are significantly more willing to agree to this question than autochthonous mono-Swiss (Table 5). Having a migration background irrespective of the actual status seems to make more sensible to transnational policy interdependencies. When this question is amplified in the sense that in political decisions with transnational effects, affected people should even have the right to vote, dual citizens are not significantly different from naturalized mono-citizens. Again autochthonous Swiss mono-citizens are least in favour of such transnational voting rights compared to the three groups with migration background among which foreigners lacking voting rights in their country of residence are the most in favour of such rights. Thus, in average dual citizens (just as foreigners and naturalized mono-Swiss) are more conscious about policy interdependencies than native mono-Swiss and also willing to remedy the existing injustice caused by national boundaries. Only foreigners seem to be even more convinced that electoral rights are needed beyond national borders.

Table 8: Opinion on transnational effects (means, standard deviations in parentheses)

	Dual citizens	Foreigners	Naturalized mono-citizens	Autochthonous mono-citizens
Transnational interests taken into account	2.19 (0.02)	2.23 (0.04)ns	2.09 (0.07)ns	1.75 (0.05)***
Transnational right to participate	1.43 (0.03)	1.65 (0.05)***	1.45 (0.09)ns	0.99 (0.05)***

Questions: “Some national political decisions have effects across national boundaries. Would you say that also the interests of affected people beyond national boundaries should be taken into consideration?”

“Some national political decisions have effects that transcend national boundaries. Would you say that in these cases affected people beyond national boundaries should also have the right to participate in the decision making process?” Minimum: 0 = do not agree at all Maximum 3 = totally agree

The asterisks indicate the degree of significance of the mean differences between the groups of respondents, with dual citizens as reference group; ***p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05; ns=not significantly different

This excursion on the question whose interests are or should be taken into account in political participation thus reveals that dual citizens in Switzerland tend to think more of supranational and transnational needs than Swiss mono-citizens. The political involvement of foreigners is slightly more characterised by transnationalism, but less by cosmopolitanism.

4.3 Political identity

As elaborated above, political identities have, as all collective identities, a cognitive as well as emotional dimension in the sense that an individual assigns herself to belong to a group and this belonging is also endowed with emotional relevance. We consciously chose several indicators of identity which allow for simultaneous identification with several national entities. Nevertheless, we also included two items which explicitly push to choose between them.

Concerning the (cognitive) self-description, there is no significant difference between dual citizens and naturalized mono-citizens. Yet, autochthonous Swiss mono-citizens describe themselves significantly more as Swiss (Table 9). Interestingly, dual citizens conceive of themselves almost to the same extent as the other nationality they hold. As could be expected, foreigners overtake them significantly in this respect and naturalized mono-citizens report less the identity of their country of descent. In addition, dual citizens seem to cognitively identify slightly more with Europe and the world than autochthonous mono-Swiss, but the differences here are not very significant. Only naturalized mono-citizens describe themselves less as European or world citizens than the others.

Table 9: Identity: Self-description (means, standard deviations in parentheses)

	Dual citizens	Foreigners	Naturalized Swiss mono-citizens	Autocht. Swiss mono-citizens
Swiss	7.80 (0.07)	4.58 (0.17)***	7.60 (0.21)ns	9.39 (0.08)***
Country of descent	7.23 (0.08)	7.61 (0.13)**	6.66 (0.28)**	Not asked
European	6.89 (0.10)	7.09 (0.14)ns	5.71 (0.32)***	6.58 (0.18) †
World citizen	6.66 (0.11)	6.22 (0.19)*	6.00 (0.38)*	6.20 (0.21)*

Question: „How much does the following statement apply to you? I am a Swiss (German/ Italian/ Kosovar/ European/ world citizens).“ Scale: 0 = Not at all, 10 = totally

The asterisks indicate the degree of significance of the mean differences between the groups of respondents, with dual citizens as reference group; ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; †p<0.1; ns=not significantly different

With respect to the question how attached dual citizens feel to the various national communities they are member of, our survey reveals that they are almost as emotionally attached to Switzerland as autochthonous Swiss citizens (Table 10). Both groups are overtaken in this respect by naturalized Swiss mono-citizens. But even foreigners proof a relatively high degree of emotional attachment to Switzerland, yet still significantly less than citizens. Dual citizens feel less attached to their country of descent, but still almost to the same extent as foreigners. Interestingly there is no significant difference in attachment to the country of descent between dual and naturalized mono-citizens. Thus, the latter still feel attached to the country whose

citizenship they once held. These results show that it is too simple to draw conclusions from a formal status, such as foreigner, to feelings of belonging. Concerning attachment to supranational entities such as Europe or even the world, all four groups of citizens seem similarly less attached, with naturalized mono-citizens showing the least supranational identities. Thus, citizenship status does not seem to make a big difference for such emotional attachment to supranational entities.

Table 10: Identity: Emotional attachment (means, standard deviations in parentheses)

	Dual citizens	Foreigners	Naturalized mono-citizens	Autochthonous mono-citizens
Switzerland	8.55 (0.06)	7.99 (0.11)***	9.04 (0.16)**	8.82 (0.10)*
Country of descent	6.37 (0.08)	6.80 (0.13)**	6.13 (0.28)ns	Not asked
Europe	5.72 (0.09)	6.01 (0.13)*	4.84 (0.27)***	5.68 (0.15)ns
World	5.56 (0.10)	5.70 (0.15)ns	5.18 (0.28)ns	5.52 (0.17)ns

Question: “How much do you feel attached to Switzerland (Germany/ Italy/ Kosovo/ Europe/ the world)?”

Scale: 0 = not at all 10 = very much


The asterisks indicate the degree of significance of the mean differences between the groups of respondents, with dual citizens as reference group; ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; ns=not significant

As individuals always have multiple social identities, there is no principled reason why they should not be able to identify with various national communities simultaneously. Our data offers empirical evidence that dual citizens in Switzerland apparently indeed identify with both national entities they are members of, even if giving a clear priority to their country of residence. Nevertheless, we could not resist to include two items which invite to choose between these multiple identifications imagining a situation of exclusivity. One question asked being forced to give up one passport, which one they would prefer to keep. Overall, a clear majority of our respondent dual citizens (56 per cent) would like to keep their Swiss passport, only 14 per cent would rather choose the passport of their second nationality, 21 per cent could not decide. Thus, when forced to choose their official status, apparently being a full member in the country of residence is more important for most dual citizens than the citizenship of their country of descent.

However, in this respect there are again considerable differences depending on the second nationality involved (Figure 4). 20 per cent of Swiss-Germans would rather keep their German passport in comparison to only 13 per cent Swiss-Italians and 5 per cent Swiss-Kosovar. The latter are 11 per cent more likely to choose their Swiss passport. We can assume

that instrumental considerations are not irrelevant in this respect: German and Italian passports together with EU citizenship seem to be more relevant to their holders.

Figure 4: Decision on identity of dual citizens (giving up a passport, percentages)




Question: „If you were allowed to keep only one passport, which one would you choose to keep?“
 Swiss-Germans N = 382, Swiss-Italians N = 349, Swiss-Kosovar N = 198

The main trend in this decision looked slightly different when our respondents were asked a question of which we assumed that most would react in a more emotional manner. We used the widespread passions connected to football in order to tap a situation of a potential emotional conflict of identity. We asked which national team they would be in favour of when the Swiss team plays football against the German (Italian or Albanian) national team. Here, only 20 per cent of dual citizens are in favour of Switzerland (Figure 4). Almost 30 per cent are in favour of the country of their second nationality and another fourth could not decide. As expected, foreigners are significantly more in favour of their country of descent, but even among this group a fifth could not decide. Again, naturalized Swiss mono-citizens are significantly more in favour of Switzerland, but among this group the portion of undecided is with 27 per cent even the highest. Certainly, this question is particular in the sense that fans might also have reasons to support specific sports teams other than feelings of national belonging.¹⁹ Nevertheless, we suppose especially in comparison to the question on which passport they would keep that a passport is first of all something more or less useful and when forced to choose the decision which passport is more important seems easier. In contrast, the emotional dimension of being a member in one or multiple national communities is less subject to rational calculations and does not easily disappear even if one gives up one’s former passport or even if one is not yet an official member.

¹⁹ To those who expect a gender bias in the answers to this question, we can report that only two per cent more female respondents answered that they would not care.

Figure 5: Decision on identity (football, percentages)



Question: “When the Swiss national team plays football against the German (Italian/ Albanian) national team, who are you in favour of?”

Dual citizens N = 929, Foreigners N = 412, Naturalised mono-citizens N = 138

5. Discussion

Our results strengthen some of our expectations as well as they make us reject others. Our first hypothesis (1a) expected that dual citizens are less politically involved in the country of residence – here Switzerland – than mono-citizens, be they autochthonous or naturalized. Based on the comparatively high degree of political interest, participation as well as identification of dual citizens on the national level, this hypothesis can clearly be rejected. Secondly, we expected dual citizens to be more politically involved in Switzerland than resident foreigners which is true according to our data. Surprisingly, they are even somewhat more involved than naturalized mono-Swiss in respect to political information and participation, however not in respect to political identity. Our results of more political information and participation of dual citizens in Switzerland are thus in line with Mügge’s (2012) findings on the Netherlands and deliver counter-evidence to what Staton, Jackson and Canache (2007a) found in the US context. Yet, the same authors had also found less political identification with the country of residence among first generation dual citizens (see also Wong 2007/ 2008 on Canada). In light of the fact, that this dis-connecting effect of dual citizenship disappeared beyond the first generation, we might have to disaggregate our data further in this sense. Furthermore, even if dual citizenship slightly reduces identification with the country of residence, this could be seen less as a problem than as an opportunity, especially when we take other political arenas also into account (Blatter 2013; Blatter and Schlenker 2012).

In our interdependent world today it might be essential in the long run that more and more people are aware of policy interdependencies. The results of our survey show that individuals with migration background – be they dual citizens, naturalized mono-citizens or foreigners – are indeed more inclined to consider transnational needs in political decision making in the sense of the “all affected principle”. Concerning political transnationalism in the sense of political involvement in the country of descent, our data shows that resident foreigners are slightly more involved than dual citizens (Hypothesis 2b confirmed). Nevertheless, when assessed in whose interest they act politically, both groups equally take the interests of their country of descent into account. Since only dual citizens can in the end fully participate in their country of residence, this constitutes transnational citizenship in a normatively demanding sense. And in addition to their involvement in Switzerland, our respondent dual citizens are, as expected in Hypothesis 2a, in most dimensions more involved in the country of their second nationality than naturalized mono-citizens.

Our third hypothesis which expected dual citizens to be more involved in supranational political arenas than mono-citizens is partly confirmed. They are certainly among those who are most involved, but depending on the dimension there is no difference to foreigners or native Swiss. Dual citizens overtake native mono-Swiss only in interest and self-description as world citizens. Yet also here we have to remind that in addition to Swiss interests they consider in their political participation, even if it is not on the supranational level, to the same extent global concerns and also significantly more European interests than native mono-Swiss. In a world in which nation states are still the most potent actors, such political participation in the national arena might even be more efficient than supranational participation as such. While dual citizens and foreigners are similarly involved via interest and identity, foreigners are significantly less active in this arena. This might be explained by the lack of formal membership in their country of residence, a status which might be perceived for many even informal political activities still as an important factor. Overall, naturalized mono-citizens seem to be the group which is politically less involved in supranational arenas. This result might be explained by the strong bias in our dataset, which is caused by the fact that there are three times more Kosovar naturalized mono-citizens than respondents with the same status and another former nationality. After all, citizens of Kosovar descent are among our respondent groups those who are the least used to democracy and thus eventually less socialized into active political participation.²⁰ Table 11 gives a (simplified) overview on the results.

²⁰ Of course, this mostly applies to the first generation. With the second generation, we can expect that this effect is less salient, though it probably does not totally fade away because of socialization at home.

Table 11: Political involvement of dual citizens in comparison

		National arena	Transnational arena	Supranational arena
Political interest	<i>Interest</i>	Dual citizens > aut. mono-citizens >> foreigners >> nat. mono-citizens	Dual citizens << foreigners >> nat. mono-citizens	Dual citizens = foreigners > aut. mono-citizens >> nat. mono-citizens
	<i>Media</i>	Dual citizens > aut. mono-citizens >> nat. mono-citizens >> foreigners	Dual citizens = foreigners >> nat. mono-citizens >> aut. mono-citizens	
Political participation	<i>Electoral</i>	Dual citizens < aut. mono-citizens >> nat. mono-citizens	Dual citizens < foreigners	
	<i>Non-electoral</i>	Dual citizens = aut. mono-citizens >> nat. mono-citizens >> foreigners	Dual citizens = foreigners = nat. mono-citizens	Dual citizens = aut. mono-citizens >> foreigners >> nat. mono-citizens
Political identity	<i>Cognitive</i>	Dual citizens << aut. mono-citizens = nat. mono-citizens >> foreigners	Dual citizens << foreigners >> nat. mono-citizens	Dual citizens = foreigners > aut. mono-citizens >> nat. mono-citizens
	<i>Emotional</i>	Dual citizens << nat. mono-citizens < aut. mono-citizens >> foreigners	Dual citizens < foreigners = nat. mono-citizens	Dual citizens = foreigners = aut. mono-citizens >> nat. mono-citizens

“>>” means “a lot more involved” (highly significant differences, p below .01 or .001)
 “>” means “slightly more involved” (modestly significant differences, p below .1 or .05)
 “=” means “equally involved” (no significant difference)
 “<” means “slightly less involved” (modestly significant differences, p below .1 or .05)
 “<<” means “a lot less involved” (highly significant differences, p below .01 or .001)

By selecting three very different nationalities (in addition to the Swiss one) with different migration histories in Switzerland we hoped to capture exemplary the range of possibilities and at the same time we aimed to take different political opportunity structures in different countries of descent into account. This analysis gives foremost an overview on general tendencies. Some indicators, however, had to be disaggregated since the differences between nationalities were bigger than the ones between dual and mono-citizens. In order to interpret these differences, we will as a next research step investigate in more details these different opportunity structures in home countries.

Furthermore, the specific context of our survey has to be taken into account. Foreigners and persons with migration background are in general sensitive when they are asked upon their loyalty (Lipps et al. 2011). In Switzerland especially, not only the right-wing Swiss People’s Party repeatedly politicises on nationalist or even racist topics. Therefore the answers are

potentially biased in the sense to overestimate the loyalty of our non-native Swiss respondents.²¹

Conclusions

Based on original data on dual citizens in Switzerland and three relevant control groups of mono-citizens we can conclude that dual citizens seem to be politically very involved, in their country of residence as well as in the country of descent and even on supranational levels. Even if dual citizens report slightly less intense identification with Switzerland, if forced to choose a clear majority would keep their Swiss passport. Also in another respect fears about divided loyalty are not backed by our data: dual citizens participate in politics mainly in the (perceived) interest of Switzerland. We thus cannot find any evidence for dissipated patriotism (Renshon 2005) the dilution of state-based identities (Spiro 2008) or a hollowing of citizenship as such (Ong 1999). Consequently, the already considerable amount of dual citizens in Switzerland and the further growth of this number will most probably not cause major problems for national integration or questions of loyalty in Switzerland.

Additionally dual citizens in average seem to take the interests of their country of descent into account, just as foreigners, but in contrast to the latter their formal status as full member of their country of residence enables them to practice real transnational citizenship as Blatter and Schlenker (2012) assumed. Furthermore, in line with previous research (Mau 2010), dual citizens report a lot loyalty to global concerns as well as more interest in favour of Europe than all kinds of mono-citizens. Thus, transnational ties and membership in multiple national communities apparently do not hinder political participation in and identification with the country of residence. What is more, overcoming the singularity of mono-national citizenship seems to facilitate the development of transnational and supra-national identities and activities.

This analysis is constrained in that it is based on simple ANOVA only, i.e. descriptive univariate comparisons. To establish more systematic differences, of course, multivariate regressions are needed. Our data will allow to include first of all established control factors such as socio-economic status, religion, and gender. Furthermore, among the many research avenues we would like to pursue in the near future we plan to tap into the constructs “identity” and “participation” and their relationship in different political arenas by more sophisticated methods such as multi-group structural equation modeling. In further analyses, we will pay

²¹ For example, one respondent called and reacted quite angry to our survey since she assumed that we would like to take away here Swiss passport again if she does not give the “right” answers.

more attention to differences between the groups we selected for our survey as well as to the political opportunity structures of the different countries of descent.

In addition, our data allows to explore subnational variation within Switzerland by means of multilevel analyses. Switzerland as country of residence is an ideal case for this purpose since it allows controlling for many factors and at the same time ensures variation in respect to political opportunity structures. Within the same national context we have the unique possibility to study differences in citizenship regime on the cantonal and local level. In spite of accepting dual citizenship, Switzerland has one of the most restrictive naturalization regimes in Europe in which naturalisation procedures are long, very demanding and depend on the approval of three administrative levels (the local, cantonal and national level). Since some municipalities pursue more restrictive naturalization policies than others subnational variation is given (see Piguet and Wanner 2000) offering a quasi-natural experiment. This variation might have a considerable influence on national political involvement of dual citizens since integration in the end takes place on a local level.

Overcoming the idea of homogeneous nation-states and at the same time taking transnational ties adequately into account might lead the way to understand new forms of citizenship that are substantially grounded and simultaneously outwards directed, thus bearing a significant potential for the advancement of democracy in a globalizing world.

APPENDIX

Survey Descriptives

This survey was financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation in the context of the project “Dual citizens in Switzerland” (project leader: Prof. Dr. Joachim Blatter)

Language

German 1'164 (66%)
French 202 (11,5%)
Italian 219 (12,4%)
Albanian 179 (10,1%)

Gender

Men 906 (51,4%)
Women 868 (48,6%)

Age

18 – 29	325	18.4 %
30 – 39	339	19.2 %
40 – 49	464	26.3 %
50 – 59	329	18.7 %
60 – 69	168	9.5 %
70+	139	7.9 %

Settlement

Urban downtown	572	32.4 %
Agglomeration	822	46.6 %
Isolated town	17	1.0 %
Rural area	353	20.0 %

Response rate (register sample)

Overall contacted:	4'471	100 %
Netto interviews	1'525	34.1%
Online	1'068	23.9%
Written	457	10.2%

Response rate (online panel)

Contacted	492	100%
Completes	239	48,6%

Length of interviews

Mean 32 min, median 28min

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