Transnational municipal networks and urban governance

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Policy Networks in Sub National Governance: Understanding Power Relations

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**Introduction**

In the context of debates over multilevel governance, the ‘hollowing out’ of the state and various forms of ‘glocalization’, local governance can no longer be considered as taking place within a neatly bounded territory. Rather, the recognition of a fragmented polity, where decision-making is dispersed among a number of state and non-state actors, and the ‘new spatiality of policy making and politics’ (Hajer 2003: 179) means that what constitutes local governance is increasingly porous and contested. One manifestation of the changing nature of local governance is the growth of ‘intergovernmental and multi-level networks that have the purpose to co-ordinate and regulate activities at the local level’, as suggested in the outline for this workshop. Of particular relevance in this context is the emergence and development of ‘transnational municipal networks’ (TMN), which link municipal governments within and across national boundaries. Although such networks have been variously labelled as intergovernmental (Rhodes 1997; Ward and Williams 1997), interurban (Leitner and Sheppard 2002), or simply transnational (Bennington and Harvey 1998, 1999), each makes explicit or implicit reference to the concept of policy networks as providing a framework for analysis. In this paper, I want to argue that the policy network concept cannot be stretched to encompass such networks and instead to suggest that the notion of a ‘governance network’ (Marcussen and Torfing 2003) might provide a more fruitful framework for analysis, in turn raising questions as to how TMN ‘govern’, and the implications for local governance.

In the first section outlines the development of TMN in general, and the Cities for Climate Protection networks in Australia and Europe which provide the empirical context for this paper in particular. The discussion then turns to consider the extent to which the concept of policy networks is appropriate for the analysis of such networks drawing on the CCP network as an example, and the ways in which the ‘governance network’ approach might offer different insights into the roles of TMN and their implications for urban governance. In the light of this discussion, the paper considers two of the questions raised in the outline for the workshop, and adds a third derived from the ‘governance networks’ perspective: first, the extent to which networks can be considered as determined exogenously or endogenously; second, the nature of power dynamics within the network; and third, how networks govern. A few preliminary conclusions are then offered.
Transnational Municipal Networks: history and developments

The establishment of links and networks between municipal governments has occurred throughout the second half of the twentieth century (Gilbert et al. 1996: 92), but it has only been since the 1980s that transnational municipal networks have been developed. While traditional national associations of local government associations are membership organisations and claim legitimacy through their representative role, their scope and influence is largely confined to the national arena, with transnational activity conducted by umbrella organisations with national associations as their members. TMN differ in that they are networks of municipalities which operate nationally and transnationally, representing and involving cities directly in policy issues at the international and European levels, and across national borders (Bulkeley et al. 2003). Despite the similarities between TMN, it is nonetheless important to remember that: ‘transnational networks are not a homogeneous category’, and ‘may vary in terms of their legal status, composition of governing bodies, accountability mechanisms, relationships to local interest groups/local and regional authorities/the nation-state and the supranational state’ (Bennington and Harvey 1998: 150).

The existence and impact of TMN has been most closely documented in the context of the European Union, where estimates suggest that there are now several thousand transnational network projects in operation (Leitner 2004: 244). The prevalence of TMN is associated with the increasing mobilization of sub-national actors at the European level in response to increased opportunities for political intervention and securing resources at this level on the one hand, and changing relations between local and national governments on the other (Jeffery 2000; Leitner and Shepperd 2002; Rhodes 1997; Schultze 2003). As Ward and Williams (1997: 440) suggest, ‘networking has come to signify more than just transnational links between authorities or relations between EU institutions and sub-central government, but a rationale behind the way that sub-central government operates in both the European and domestic context’. TMN have become a feature of the mobilization of local governments, as municipalities seek to act collectively in order to influence European and national policy, secure resources, and enhance their capacity, while at the same time being encouraged by the European Commission to co-ordinate their activities as a means of developing and delivering its policy priorities (Bulkeley et al. 2003; Bennington and Harvey 1998, 1999; Ward and Williams 1997). For example, Leitner and Sheppard (2002: 502) document how in the case of structural funds, the Commission has ‘promoted and encouraged interurban networks’ with a
view to improving competitiveness, facilitating the spread of best practice and strengthening economic and social cohesion. In the case of urban environmental policy, the promotion of existing networks and the creation of a new network, in the form of the European Sustainable Cities and Towns Campaign, were seen to be a vital component for the implementation of the 1990 Urban Environment Green Paper (Ward and Williams 1997).

However, TMN are not confined to operating within the European Union. Internationally, a variety of TMN can be identified, including regional networks, such as the Union of the Baltic Cities, and global networks, such as the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), established in 1990 by the International Union of Local Authorities and the United Nations Environment Programme to represent the environmental concerns of local government internationally. Since its initiation, ICLEI has both created an institutional context for the development of TMN and spawned the development of several associated networks. It was the then Director General of ICLEI, Jeb Brugman, who is credited with developing Chapter 28 of Agenda 21, agreed at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, which famously calls for all local authorities to develop a ‘Local Agenda 21’, and also encourages local authorities to engage in ‘increased levels of cooperation and coordination with the goal of enhancing the exchange of information and experience among local authorities’ (Lafferty 1998: 1). As Pierre and Peters (2000: 84-85) point out, such networks and connections represent a departure from hierarchical governance as usual, as ‘the basic idea of LA21 is that subnational governments – not states – are targeted as lead actors to develop programmes of sustainable economic development. Thus here is a case of international governance which aims at subnational political change without much control or interference by the nation state’. The development of Chapter 28 provided the basis for increased network activity in relation to urban environmental issues, including national campaigns, the initiatives of the European Commission outlined above, and further international activity facilitated through the UNCED process and through the UN-Habitat conferences and programmes, including such networks as the Sustainable Cities Programme and the +30 Network.

Despite the growth in the membership and variety of TMN, to date analysis of their importance and effectiveness has tended to focus on urban and regional development in Europe and is divided as to their impact. Jeffery (2000: 3) is quick to caution that while subnational authorities may ‘mobilize in full sound and fury in regard to Europe’ whether this
signifies any changes to the ways in which polices are made is a different matter, as ‘mobilization and influence are not synonymous’ (see also John 2000; Jordan 2001). Shultzze (2003: 135) in contrast suggests that ‘cities not only enjoy access to the policy arena, but they can exert joint influence and/or shared control over policy outcomes together with key institutional actors’. Examining the role of TMN more specifically, Leitner and Sheppard (2002: 509-510) suggest that they give ‘opportunities for participating cities to strengthen their power and authority vis-à-vis the national and supranational scales.’ (2002: 511) by providing ‘new political spaces for localities. By creating space for cooperation among cities, and by operating across the boundaries of territorially based political systems, such networks present participating cities with the opportunity to challenge extant state structures and relations.’ (2002: 509-510). However, Bennington and Harvey (1998) suggest that while the development of TMN points to the importance of horizontal structures of governance in policy formulation, ‘when it comes to policy implementation and resource allocation, the nation states reassert their predominance and competency within the political process and exercise their power through the traditional tiers and channels of vertical representation’ (1998: 166). These contradictory accounts of the nature of sub-national mobilization in general, and TMN in particular, as well as the empirical focus upon the European Union suggest that further analysis is needed in order to disentangle both the nature of TMN, and their implications for (multilevel) local governance.

**Cities for Climate Protection**

This paper undertakes such an analysis with reference to the Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) network. Established in 1993 by ICLEI, the CCP network’s original aim was to recruit municipal members whose combined emissions of greenhouse gas emissions would be equivalent to 10% of the global total. In March 2004, the network had 579 members representing approximately 8% of global greenhouse gas emissions. In order to become a member, a municipality must sign a local government resolution or declaration of intent. The CCP programme itself is described as a ‘performance orientated’ campaign, involving both increasing local capacity to address climate change and campaigning for recognition of the role of local governance in this respect, and for national and international action to protect the climate. In terms of enhancing local capacity, the programme is premised on the belief that one of the main barriers to local action lies in the lack of knowledge about nature of local emissions of greenhouse gases and the measures which could be taken to address them
The ‘milestone framework’ has been established to improve local knowledge and action in the field of climate protection, and requires local authorities to undertake a five stage process of conducting an emissions inventory and forecast, setting a target, developing an action plan, implementing this, and monitoring its impact. The CCP network provides members with technical assistance and training to complete these milestones, in the shape of specially designed software, workshops and so on, and the milestone approach is seen to be critical for enhancing local accountability. In addition, the network places emphasis on the need to develop and share good practice among members in order to increase capacity building, through networking events and the publication of case-studies. In building support for their program, as well as emphasizing the climate-related benefits of controlling local greenhouse gas emissions, the CCP network highlights the co-benefits of taking action, including the potential for economic savings, improving local air quality, addressing issues of waste management and increasing the liveability of communities (CCP 2004).

Although the CCP network is international, recent years have seen the establishment of national and regional campaigns through which to decentralize its delivery. By 2002, national campaigns had been established in Australia, Canada, India, Italy, Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa, the UK and the US (though some have since been subsumed to regional campaigns). In addition, CCP has regional campaigns in Europe, Asia-Pacific, Africa and Latin America. The focus of this paper is on the networks in Australia and Europe. In Europe, the CCP network was established by ICLEI and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions at the Convention of European Municipal Leaders’ on Climate Change in March 1993 in Amsterdam. Members have traditionally been large cities, and although there are representatives from southern and eastern Europe involved in the network, the concentration of membership has been in Germany, Scandinavia and the UK. Given that the language used by the network is English, this is perhaps not surprising. Recent national campaigns in Italy and the UK, and a self-organised campaign in Finland, have also boosted membership from these countries. In terms of its financial organisation, participation in the CCP-Europe network is free, partly because there is a wish to recruit ICLEI members who already subscribe (CCP-Europe 2003). However, fees have been levied for the adaptation and use of the CCP software, and through national campaigns. While membership rose to 135 municipalities from 19 countries in 2001 (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003), following a recent evaluation of the campaign these figures have been revised to 78 municipalities from 14
countries (CCP-Europe 2004). This re-evaluation is in part a reflection of a reconsideration of the wider goals of the programme, away from simply recruiting members to achieving change on the ground, as summed up in the words of the CCP-Europe Director: ‘we are not looking for having a high amount of members or participants, but for very active members who do change something’ (CCP-Europe 2003).

In Australia, the CCP network was launched in 1997 by the federal government after lobbying from ICLEI and municipal governments as a twelve month pilot involving approximately thirty local authorities. A few months into the pilot, the federal government announced additional funding for the CCP programme to the tune of A$13 million over five years, and the pilot phase was abandoned in favour of recruiting 300 local authorities to the programme. Since that time, the CCP network has been run in partnership between the Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO) and ICLEI (initially represented by Environs, a local government environment network), with the reduced target of recruiting 200 local authorities. The AGO has provided funding for customizing the CCP software, for ICLEI to deliver the programme (in terms of training and assistance to municipalities), and to local governments directly for particular initiatives (local action modules). ICLEI has been responsible for delivering the milestone framework, and the associated technical and political support. In 2003, the CCP network was given additional funding of A$2.7 million, to extend the programme for a further year pending the outcome of the development of national climate change strategy. Members pay a one-off fee to participate in the network, ranging from $2000 for the largest cities to $700 for smaller municipalities, and with further discounts for members of ICLEI. In March 2004, there were 186 members of the CCP network in Australia, covering 74% of the population (ICLEI-A/NZ 2004). CCP-Australia suggest that in the first four years of the network, 95 councils surveyed had reduced carbon dioxide equivalent by 1.8 million tonnes, invested A$3.3 million in ‘greenhouse jobs’¹, and invested more than A$67 in greenhouse abatement (CCP-Australia 2003). Clearly, such potential impacts are not inconsequential, and given the growing number of formal networks and short-term network-based projects with which municipalities are increasingly involved, they may be a significant element of new forms of local governance. The question then arises as to how they should be conceptualised and analysed. As suggested above, to date much of the analysis of TMN has used the concept

¹ In Australia, the term ‘greenhouse’ is used to signify anthropogenic climate change and climate protection policy.
of ‘policy networks’ and the next section explore how appropriate and useful this framework is in the context of the CCP network.

**Conceptualising Transnational Municipal Networks**

The concept of policy networks has a long and tangled history, emanating from debates about the nature of the policy-making process in North America and Europe and originally developed as an alternative account of the relations between interest groups and government to that offered by pluralist or corporatist analyses (Marsh 1998; Rhodes 1997; Marsh and Rhodes 1992). A ‘lowest common denominator definition of a policy network, [is] a set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests’ (Borzel 1998: 254). However, in contemporary literatures on policy networks, two distinct schools of thought are frequently identified; the ‘British’ (interest intermediation) and the ‘European’ (governance) approaches (Borzel 1998; Marsh 1998; Marsh and Smith 2000). In essence, ‘to British authors … policy networks are a model of interest group representation … In contrast, [the European School] … view policy networks as a new form of governance’ (Marsh 1998: 8). Interestingly, each regards its own interpretation of policy networks as ‘narrower’, and by implication more sharply defined and conceptually concrete. For example, Marsh and Smith (2000: 4) argue that ‘the German and Dutch literature is much more ambitious, treating networks as a new form of governance … In contrast, most British and American literature is narrower in focus, concentrating upon the role networks play in the development and implementation of policy’. While Borzel (1998: 255) suggests in contrast that ‘the interest intermediation school conceives policy networks as a generic concept which applies to all kinds of relations between public and private actors. For the governance school, on the contrary, policy networks only characterize a specific form of public-private interaction in public policy (governance), namely the one based on non-hierarchical co-ordination’. No doubt each would take exception to its caricature, and much of the distinction as to whether or not policy networks engage in ‘governance’ is down to the way in which governance is defined, a point to which I return below. Furthermore, the two approaches are not mutually incompatible. Nevertheless, in order to consider the utility of the policy network concept for analysing TMN, it is necessary to examine these different perspectives and the extent to which they can encompass and elucidate TMN. After
considering each in turn below, an alternative approach, that of ‘governance networks’, is outlined and its relevance for the analysis of TMN considered.

**Interest intermediation**

For the interest intermediation school, policy networks are ‘power dependency relationships between the government and interest groups, in which resources are exchanged’ (Borzel 1998: 56). As Smith argues, policy networks are ‘constituted from the pattern of resource interdependencies between policy actors. Resource interdependence means organisations have to bargain with one another if they are to secure policy outcomes’ (1997:33). These interdependencies arise between interest groups and government departments in particular policy sectors or sub-sectors, the former wishing to influence policy while the later need the participation of a range of private actors in order to ‘to make, legitimize and eventually implement policy’ (O’Riordan and Jordan 1996:74). The form and structure of the policy network will vary with the extent and nature of resource interdependencies. In their now classic typology of policy networks, Marsh and Rhodes (1992b) suggest a continuum of network structures ranging from the ‘policy community’ to the ‘issue network’, according to the membership of the network, the participants, the level of interaction, the existence of continuity and consensus amongst members, as well as the distribution of resources and power within the network. The policy community is a ‘strongly institutionalised form of policy-making arrangement’ in which there are shared values, world-views, resources and where ‘members tend to agree upon what specific problems justify a policy response and how, in turn, that response should be structured’ (O’Riordan and Jordan 1996:74). In addition, some groups are consciously excluded from participation in policy communities (Rhodes 1997: 43). Issue networks, in contrast, are fluid in terms of access, membership, ideas, values and interests, and interaction within the network and policy influence is based on ‘consultation rather than negotiation or bargaining’ (Rhodes 1997: 45). On the basis of several case-studies, Marsh and Rhodes concluded that ‘policy networks exist in most areas of policy making, and access to the policy process is limited to the privileged few. An issue network, as opposed to a policy community, will exist only if there is no threat to the interests of either an economic/producer group or a professional group. Issue networks exist, but they are the exception rather than the rule’ (1992b:254). However, these types of policy network should not necessarily be seen as mutually exclusive: “policy networks can have two tiers, a core and a periphery. In other words, within a policy network, there is a clear distinction between
members with resources and influences and those without” (Marsh and Rhodes 1992b: 255). The asymmetrical relations of power and dependence within policy networks are therefore a critical issue to be taken into account in analysis.

In addition to providing a descriptive typology of policy networks, Marsh and Rhodes made three important analytical interventions in their approach to policy networks (Marsh 1998: 11). First, policy networks are seen in essentially structural terms, second, network structures influence policy outcomes, and finally, policy change is primarily orchestrated through changes to networks by exogenous factors, such as economic factors, ideological shifts, new knowledge or institutional restructuring, which in turn effect the power and resources of different actors (Marsh and Rhodes 1992a). Critics took issue with the conception of agency within this approach, as well as to the lack of sufficient explanation as to how network structure affected policy outcomes, and how policy change took place2 (Dowding 1995; Hay 1998). In response, a dialectical approach3 to policy networks has been developed which focuses on the processes and practices of networking, and the relationships between structure and agency, networks and policy contexts, and networks and policy outcomes (Hay 1998; Marsh 1998b; Marsh and Smith 2000; Toke and Marsh 2002). Rather than debate whether structure or agency determine interactions within the policy sector, networks are seen as structuring the roles, responses and resources of actors, who in turn may have different views and values and who ‘interpret and negotiate constraints or opportunities’ potentially leading to the restructuring of the network (Marsh and Smith 2000: 5-7). Equally, policy networks are not divorced from the socio-political contexts within which they are embedded, so that they reflect policy contexts and mediate exogenous factors of change, while policy outcomes may in turn change the nature and structure of policy networks. While the focus on the dialectical relations of policy networks has helped to ‘identify the questions we should ask’ (Toke and Marsh 2002: 232) in analysing the policy process, the nature of these processes underlying these relations has not been closely defined. For example, in arguing that exogenous change is

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2 Though it is worth noting that Marsh and Rhodes saw endogenous change within networks as significant (Bulkeley 2000; Marsh and Rhodes 1992b: 260; Smith, A. 1997:44) and also argued that consensus about a policy problem within a network is not the product of “one-off negotiations but of a continuing process of re-negotiation which can be characterised as coalition building” (1992b:260), indicating more subtlety in their analysis of policy network dynamics than is usually credited. Nonetheless, network relations are conceived in resource dependent terms, which promotes the idea of policy stability and fails to acknowledge other social relations through which policy change occurs and policy outcomes are produced.

3 Defined by Marsh and Smith (2000: 5) as ‘an interactive relationship between two variables in which each affects the other in a continuing process’.
mediated ‘through the understanding of agents and interpreted in the context of the structures, rules/norms and interpersonal relationships within the network’ (Toke and Marsh 2002: 233) the processes of mediation are left for empirical analysis. This may be no bad thing – clearly, dialectical relations between structures and agents, networks and context and networks and outcome will vary over space and with time – but it does point to the fact that an insistence on recognising dialectical relations does not provide an explanation of the nature and implications of network transformation or policy change in any particular instance.

How, then, might TMN be conceived in terms of the interest intermediation approach to policy networks? A critical issue concerns how the membership of the network is delimited. On the one hand, the network could be said to comprise those municipalities who are members (in the guise of the officers and members who take part in network activities) and the regional and international secretariats who manage and sustain the network. On the other hand, taking the issue of urban climate protection more broadly, the network widens to include those parts of the European Commission, national governments and charitable foundations who provide funding for the network, sections of the UNFCCC secretariat who are lobbied by the secretariat, the range of municipal and national government departments who have some purchase on climate change protection policy and action locally, national and local networks of relevant municipal officers, as well as non-state actors at the local (and national) level who inform and implement policy (Table 1). The ‘narrow interpretation’ of CCP as a policy network suffers from being just that, too narrow to fit the conventional interpretation of a policy network. In the main, policy networks are considered to be heterogeneous, and to involve private and public actors. The CCP is more homogenous, involving municipal government officers and politicians, and the Secretariats[^4], who if not ‘public’ actors act in the public interest. At the same time, the variation within the network between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ in terms of integration, resources and power means that it does not sit easily within the typology of policy networks commonly in use but is rather a ‘tiered’ network (Bulkeley 2000). More fundamentally, network interaction is not only determined by resource interdependencies – actors in the network can ‘donate’ resources (in the forms of cases of best practice, for example) without (necessarily) being resource recipients (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003). While the ‘broad interpretation’ does entail at least some relations which

[^4]: Borzel (1998: 258) suggests that it is the very heterogeneity of policy networks which creates resources interdependencies, as actors dispose of different interests and resources, which in turn link them together. However, the homogeneity of actors involved in the network should not be equated with a homogeneity of interests and resources as this interpretation implies.
could be considered resource interdependencies, the very breadth and complexity of the network militates against using the ‘policy network’ approach. As Richardson argues (2000: 1008), in emerging complex policy arenas, such as climate change or indeed the sub-arena of urban policies for climate protection:

‘Policy communities and networks may become linked in a rather messy and unpredictable chain of actors, who do not know each other well and who do not speak the same “language”. …Such large and diverse collections of stakeholders may be a “network” only in the very loosest of senses. They inhabit the same policy arena or domain but only minimal interaction occurs.’

In particular, as Richardson goes on to suggest, the shifting of policy scales to the European level and the concomitant diversity and proliferation of actors involved in the policy making process means that whatever coalitions and networks are created, the process is too ‘ad hoc and unpredictable for it to be shoe-horned into a definition of “policy community”’ (2000: 1016). In part, the problem here lies in determining where the network begins and ends, or indeed, where one network begins and another ends. In particular, there is a question as to whether European policy networks at should be confined, as is the case in many previous studies which have examined the European policy-making process (Bomberg 1998; Skogstad 2003) to actors who operate at that ‘level’ or should, as is implied with the CCP network and other TMN (REFS) include actors operating across scales. While an encompassing demarcation of network membership may better represent policy reality, the danger is that this becomes to complex to analyse so that the term ‘network’ is used in a purely metaphorical sense and explanatory power is lost. This conundrum is evident in a recent paper by Schultze (2003: 129), which argues that ‘due to the influence of a coalition of actors including cities and their interest groups … “the urban policy network” – urban development measures within the Structural Funds have increased significance’. Despite this assertion, a footnote remarks that the term network is being used as a metaphor for the pattern of interaction between actors and that the paper

‘does not attempt to map out the large and loosely coupled ‘urban policy network’ that clusters formal and informal interaction between a number of actors sharing an interest in the urban dimension of structural policy …. Trying to map out this network would encounter a number of difficulties, the most obvious being the lack of
a clear-cut methodology to determine the borders of the network, which are fluid, with many overlapping actors.’ (Schultze 2003: 140).

The issue of how to bound networks reflects a wider critique of the policy network approach, that it focuses on one point of intervention in the policy process – the determination by departments in national government of a policy agenda or decision. Those who have sought to apply the concept at the supranational or sub-national level have usually replaced the national government with the appropriate authority – be it the European Commission or local authority. However, this still leaves doubts as to whether the policy network approach advanced by the British school can be applied where a network has multiple points of intervention in what is an increasingly multilevel and fragmented polity (Hajer 2003; Richardson 2000). Moreover, the fact that the network not only determines policy problems but also attempts to implement particular policy measures and to monitor compliance with network goals, means that it can not be thought of in terms of ‘interest intermediation’. Indeed, there is some ambivalence as what policy networks do. A recent interpretation suggests that policy networks have a role in ‘the development and implementation of policy’ (Marsh and Smith 2000: 4). However, elsewhere there is an acknowledgement that it ‘may be worth paying some attention to the relationship between policy networks and implementation networks. In a given policy area they may not be synonymous.’ (Marsh 1998b: 192). The implication being that while determining policy agendas and goals is the bread and butter of policy networks, policy implementation is an optional extra.

Neither the narrow or the broad interpretation of the CCP network as a policy network fit comfortably with the interest intermediation approach – the network is too homogenous or too diffuse, too simple or too chaotic, and its ‘intervention’ in relation to policy outcomes multiple with no focus on a sovereign decision-maker and process of policy implementation.

**Network governance**

The European school offers an alternative, suggesting that rather than being a form of interest intermediation, policy networks are a new form of governance (Borzel 1998; Marsh 1998a). The argument is made that in the contemporary world, differences between state and civil society are dissolving and that these ‘changes have favoured the emergence of policy networks as a new form of governance – different from the two conventional forms of
governance (hierarchy and market) – which allows governments to mobilize political resources in situations where these resources are widely dispersed between public and private actors’ (Borzel 1998: 260). The emergence of policy networks is seen as a response to failures of hierarchy or markets - the self-organizing and mutually dependent nature of policy networks means that they can more effectively govern in the context of changed relations between state and society. Despite this fundamental difference, some similarities with the British school can be seen. First, in both cases, policy networks are seen in structural terms. For the interest intermediation school, the type of policy network structures interactions between different actors and in the governance school, policy networks are seen to provide ‘a framework for the efficient horizontal co-ordination of the interests and actions of public and private corporate actors, mutually dependent on their resources’ (Borzel 1998: 263). Second, both approaches stress that policy networks influence policy outcomes (Marsh 1998a: 7), though this is more pronounced in the governance school where, in effect, the policy network produces the policy outcome. However, another key difference can be discerned in relation to how each approach views policy change. In the interest intermediation school, much attention has been given to the relationship between endogenous and exogenous change shaping policy networks and in turn policy outcomes. The governance school, in contrast, focuses on the dynamics of networks and the extent to which they provide the opportunity for non-strategic action through creating conditions of mutual trust as well as dependency, rather than their membership, as shaping governance outcomes. Borzel (1998) suggests that the negotiations to reach a common outcome in policy networks can be guided either by bargaining or by problem solving, so that the question becomes one of when each mode dominates and with what effect. Two different approaches have been developed to explain such dynamics, actor-centred institutionalism and cognitive approaches, and although each focuses on different factors as explaining the nature of policy networks, Borzel (1998: 265) argues that they need to be considered as mutually constitutive.

In this approach, policy networks and governance have become synonymous, so that the term ‘network governance’ is commonly used to describe both the means of governing – self-organised networks – and the particular institutionalised relations through which it takes place – policy networks (Kohler-Koch 1999; Schout and Jordan 2003; Skogstad 2003). Unlike the interest intermediation school, network governance is frequently applied to the European Union (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Kohler-Koch 2002; Schout and Jordan 2003; Skogstad 2003) and to the analysis of transnational networks. Indeed, the recent White Paper on
Governance places much emphasis on self-organising networks as new means of governing the Union (Bulkeley et al. 2003; Schout and Jordan 2003). In conceptualising European network governance, Kohler-Koch (2002) argues that the multi-level system of the EU should no longer be conceptualised as a ‘layer cake’, but rather as a ‘marble cake’, a ‘penetrated system of governance’ in which ‘European policy-making has moved from striking bargains between actors endowed with a given territorial responsibility … to engaging in negotiations within – functionally separate – transnational arenas’ (Kohler-Koch 2002: 5). Nonetheless, Skogstad (2003: 326) cautions that while ‘a growing body of empirical work testifies to the existence of network governance in several policy sectors, there is no clear evidence that policy networks contribute to effective problem-solving and democratic legitimation’ or, in other words, to policy outcomes. At the same time, Schout and Jordan (2003) suggest that there may be significant limits on the extent to which networks can be self-organising in an international context and that evidence from an examination of environmental policy integration shows that policy networks remain sectorally based with little horizontal co-ordination.

Certainly, TMN could be conceptualised as part of a system of network governance, given that they are engaged in ‘governing’, ‘purposive acts of ‘steering’ a society or polity’, and are a form of ‘governance’, ‘the instituted process that is both created by these acts and serves to guide and constrain future governing behaviour’ (Lowndes 2001: 1961). However, as argued above, whether this can be considered in terms of their role as a policy network is more doubtful, given the assumptions about the membership and resource dependencies which underlie both approaches. Moreover, whether the interpretation of policy networks as a new form of governance offered by the governance school is appropriate is moot. In noting a shift away from hierarchical modes of governing, the network governance approach has much in common with the multiple interpretations of ‘governance’ which now proliferate on the social science scene. However, neither stretching policy networks to encompass all that is more often implied by the term ‘governance’, nor narrowing governance perspectives to encompass only those activities which are undertaken through policy networks seems analytically or conceptually satisfactory. Governance, broadly defined, encompasses different ‘systems of governing’ beyond self-organising networks. Rather than seeing ‘government’ and ‘governance’ as necessarily opposite, focusing on a plurality of ‘systems of governing’, in which state and non-state actors play a variety of roles, allows for the possibility of a continuum of governing relations and arrangements which take shape around particular
objects of governance (Cowell and Murdoch 1999: 655; Jordan et al. 2003; Pierre and Peters 2000). Equally, this enables a recognition of the multiple ways in which states undertake governing and may be implicated in governance, both as actors in networks and through processes of ‘metaheterarchy’, organizing the conditions for network governance, and ‘metagovernance’, ‘rearticulating and collibrating different modes of governance’ (Jessop 2002: 241).

**Governance networks**

Clearly, networks are an important component of governance, but they do not comprise everything which might be considered as governance, and nor do all networks engage in governing. Rather than equating policy networks with network governance, an alternative, as yet embryonic, approach suggests that analysis needs to focus on governance networks (Marcussen and Torfing 2003). The concept is ‘heavily inspired by the notion of policy networks. It readily adopts the network metaphor to account for the multi-dimensional patterns of interaction between political actors, but it shifts attention from the question of vertical interest representation to that of the role of horizontal actors in processes of societal governance. … The basis for analysis is the production of public policy and the contribution of public and private actors in this respect’ (Marcussen and Torfing 2003: 4). So far, so ‘governance school’. However, in contrast to others who have theorised networks as a form of governance, Marcussen and Torfing (2003: 7) make the argument that ‘governance networks represent a particular kind of governance and a particular kind of network’. In order to assess whether such an approach can provide a useful framework for the analysis of TMN in general, and the CCP network in particular, it is necessary to examine in some detail the defining features of governance networks offered by Marcussen and Torfing, and the extent to which they extend to the CCP network (Table 2).

Governance networks are defined by Marcussen and Torfing (2003: 7) as involving five related features: ‘1) a horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors; 2) who interact through negotiations; 3) transpiring within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework; 4) that to a certain extent is self regulating; and 5) which contribute to the production of public purpose within a particular area’ and it is worth spending a little time considering these in more detail. In relation to the structure of the network, there is much here drawn from the policy networks literature and networks are seen
to be either more ‘tied’ or more ‘untied’ depending on the level of dependency between actors within the network. An interesting departure is the shift from focusing on ‘resource’ interdependencies, to focusing on the ‘need to get things done’ collectively, as what structures the network. Network relations are seen to be horizontal and based on exchange, though there is an acknowledgement that asymmetries exist. Differences in network interactions are also hypothesised, between those which are focused on deliberative negotiations and those which entail elements of bargaining. However, it may be worth considering in more detail whether these interactions easily lie at the opposite ends of a spectrum as is implied, and indeed whether they are exhaustive of the forms of interaction which may occur in governance networks. The third feature which is identified relates to the framework within which network interactions and governance take place. Here, the framework provides the ‘rules of the game’ and is created by and through the network. It is seen to have ‘a regulative aspect in the sense that it provides rules, roles and procedures; a normative aspect in the sense that it conveys norms, values and standards; a cognitive element in the sense that it generates codes, concepts and specialised knowledge; and an imaginary aspect in the sense that it produces identities, ideologies, common hopes and visions’ (Marcussen and Torfing 2003: 9). The mixture will vary from network to network, but will enable and constrain negotiation among network actors, so, for example, norm-based negotiation will be ‘primarily structured by collective rules of appropriateness’ while epistemic negotiation will involve ‘shared cognitive codes, scripts, and schemes’ (Marcussen and Torfing 2003: 14). Though the consideration of the framework conditions within which networking takes place are certainly important, there is little discussion about how these conditions are created and why they might vary – bringing us back to the perennial problem of explaining the relations between endogenous and exogenous factors in shaping networks and explaining policy/governance change in (policy) network analysis.

The last two factors address the issue of the effects of governance networks. In relation to the ‘internal’ self-regulation of the network, it is suggested that the ‘rules of the game’ are continually being defined and redefined through negotiations between network actors (hence emphasising endogenous factors in changing the network), and the function of self-regulation is to ensure mutual control, commonality and predictability in this process through the formation of rules, norms, new knowledge and identity construction (Marcussen and Torfing 2003: 17). Though this explanation may be somewhat tautological – (regulative) rules of the game produce (regulative) modes of governing which produce (regulative) rules of the game –
it does begin to throw some light on how networks might ‘govern’. Marcussen and Torfing (2003: 18) argue that the purpose of such negotiations and the rules, norms etc. they produce is to ‘impact on the behaviour, the beliefs and the social attachments of the network’ and that should members not comply, sanctions, either imposed from members, from an authority in the network, from an external party or through self-exclusion, will take place. Finally, attention is turned to the external impact of governance networks - the creation of public purpose. The argument is made that governance networks perform different types of governance, containing regulative, normative, cognitive, imaginary elements, which shape the ways in which public purpose is determined and enacted. While it is argued that whether or not certain sorts of governance dominate, or are effective, is an empirical question, what ‘governing’ means in this context is not made clear. In addition to variations in these five defining characteristics, Marcussen and Torfing (2003) suggest that differences in the formality, origin, scope, duration, actors, sphere and level will shape the ways in which governance networks are configured and the ways in which they negotiate and govern, suggesting that both endogenous and exogenous factors will shape network interactions and effects.

While the concept of governance networks is still in embryonic form, it appears to offer more potential for the analysis of a TMN such as the CCP than existing concepts of policy networks (Table 2). The CCP network is fulfils the five criteria outlined above which are considered to be defining features of governance networks, as mutually dependent but operationally autonomous actors, engaging in (primarily) deliberative negotiations, and operating within an institutional framework which incorporates regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary aspects, and through which self-governance is undertaken and public purpose produced. However, the conceptual approach needs to be developed further if questions concerning how particular institutional aspects and modes of governing come to dominate certain governance networks and the ways in which networks ‘govern’ are to be answered.

**Governance networks in practice: CCP-Australia and CCP-Europe**

While the switch to an analysis of governance networks may be more appropriate for considering network relations and roles in a fragmented, multi-level polity, this does not remove questions concerning the relationship between endogenous and exogenous factors in shaping the network and its outcomes, the nature of power relations within the network, and
issues of how networks govern (or, in policy network speak, affect policy outcomes). Here, these issues are considered in turn through an analysis of the CCP network in Europe and Australia.

**Networks and context**

As noted above, the question of the extent to which policy networks are determined by endogenous (e.g. resource interdependencies) or exogenous (e.g. economic, political, ideological) factors has been superseded in recent literature by questions concerning the dialectical relationships between network and context (Marsh and Smith 2000; Toke and Marsh 2002). Here, two points are made, that policy networks reflect exogenous structures and that contextual changes, such as public opinion or the other networks, are dialectically related to changes within the network and to policy outcomes. While in the main emphasis is placed on how exogenous changes are mediated through the network and affect policy outcome, there is some consideration of how policy networks may affect the context (Toke and Marsh 2002: 247). Considering both the CCP-Australia and CCP-Europe networks, it is evident that both in their formation and consequent development the line between exogenous and endogenous factors in shaping the network is hard to draw. In both cases, the establishment of the network involved ICLEI, municipalities and either the national government or the European Commission. The rationale for the establishment of the network in both places was shaped both by internal factors in the CCP network – the wish to meet the recruitment target and the need to get global coverage in membership – and by exogenous factors, related to the political priorities of particular municipalities, the roles of individual ‘champions’, the broader politics of climate change, especially in Australia, and changes in approach to governing, particularly in the European Union. In Australia, changes in the network have been determined by: the changing membership, so that, for example, as more smaller and rural councils have joined the programme has been adapted to meet their needs (e.g. in the CCP Rural Victoria campaign); by members seeking to shape the activities of the network, e.g. in establishing the ‘Alliances’ initiative to work with developing country municipalities; and by the network linking with other agencies and responding to (and provoking) shifting government programmes, e.g. in the development of the ‘sustainable transport’ programme in Victoria. In Europe, the first ten years of the CCP network saw a rather laissez-faire approach to network membership and activity where members had access to a broad range of information resources but not to specific initiatives, so that changes in the
network membership did little to affect the nature of the network as a whole. However, a recent internal evaluation of network participation has seen membership revised from over 130 to 78, signalling a change in what ‘membership’ means – active rather than passive participation. This change has taken place from within the secretariat, and can be seen as a response to shifting relations between networks concerned with climate protection in Europe (also including energie-cites, Climate Alliance) and the European Commission, so that as the networks come to work more closely together on some issues, e.g. lobbying the European parliament, it could be argued that the CCP-Europe network is seeking to maintain a sense of individuality by focusing on the ‘performance orientated’ nature of its approach. Equally, the growth of national CCP networks (including in the UK and Italy) which focus on the rigorous implementation of the five milestone approach is changing the culture of the network globally towards a more hands-on, involved approach. At the same time, it is possible to see a shift in emphasis within the network internationally towards stressing the wider benefits of climate protection – e.g. air quality, congestion – rather than only focusing on ‘saving the planet’. In part, this is due to the drive internationally to recruit municipalities in developing countries, and in part in order to broaden the appeal of the network in developed countries.

The governance network approach, offers a useful means through to consider how these changes are mediated through the network, in terms of the ways in which the ‘rules of the game’ or institutional frameworks of the network are in the process of continual construction and negotiation through the process of self-regulation among members and in response to the demands of external agencies. At the same time, it is important to develop the argument that networks can also affect context. This is significant because not only does the CCP network respond to exogenous and endogenous change, but it can shape the contexts within which change takes place – i.e. it can be instrumental in determining exogenous change, hence raising questions as to the extent to which the terms are useful. For example, the CCP network was initiated in Australia as a pilot programme, but through the lobbying of ICLEI and municipal members, and in response to wider political pressures on the issue of climate change, the Federal Government dramatically increased funding for the network, which in turn shaped the recruitment of members and the activities which the network undertook. The multiple points of intervention at which TMN operate suggest that the concept of ‘exogenous’ and ‘endogenous’ change is perhaps more difficult than usual to determine in relation to such networks which operate in a multilevel governance context. Furthermore, while the policy network approach focuses on what the implications of network change are for policy changes,
the governance network perspective draws our attention to the ways in which through processes of self-regulation networks seek to shape the practices of members, and hence change the implementation and impact of policies.

**Power in networks**

Although the notion of self-organizing networks is often associated with equal and horizontal exchanges of resources, Leitner and Sheppard (2002: 512) warn that within TMN:

‘unequal power relations among the cities within a network are … common. … Even where a network’s organizational structure gives all participants equal voice in principle, initial differences in bargaining power can result in correspondingly unequal distribution of the benefits of network participation’.

Here, differences in resources are seen to affect the bargaining power of cities in the network, and hence their ability to participate in and benefit from the network. However, while in the policy network literature ‘resources’ have tended to be narrowly defined in political and economic terms, there is increasing recognition that such resources also include cognitive and discursive elements. As Bennington and Harvey (1999: 216) suggest, within transnational networks ‘resource exchange, and resource dependency … included not just material resources (such as money or information) but less easily measurable resources (such as knowledge, intelligence, values, vision, judgement)’. Indeed, the broader literature on transnational networks suggests that information, knowledge, values, ideas, and discourses, are the ‘glue’ through which networks are formed, and through which power is exercised (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Lipschutz, 1996; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Moreover, any sense that such resources are ‘given’ independently of the network may also be unhelpful, as ‘in many cases the networks were not so much involved in resource exchange as resource production” (Bennington and Harvey 1999:216). This suggests that the power of members of the network can not simply be read off from their pre-given resources, but is rather a function of how resources (broadly defined) are mobilised and created within the network. In relation to transnational advocacy networks, for example, Keck and Sikkink (1998: 2) suggest that “[a]ctivists in networks try not only to influence policy outcomes, but to transform the terms and nature of the debate”. This meshes with the approach of governance networks, so that power is deployed not by means of who ‘holds’ more resources, but by means of defining the
(regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary) ‘rules of the game’ within which the network operates.

Within the CCP-Australia and CCP-Europe networks, the power dynamics entailed in defining the rules of the game lie both with the Secretariat, and ICLEI more broadly, and with ‘core’ municipalities, who are more closely tied because of a belief in a collective need to ‘get things done’ locally, nationally and internationally in relation to climate protection. In each case, the regional Secretariat, under direction from ICLEI, has shaped the regulative practices of the network, in the form of the milestone framework and benchmarking activities, the normative approach, in defining the role of local authorities in relation to climate protection, what constitutes best practice, and giving recognition and awards to some activities rather than others, the cognitive development of the network, through the shaping and exchanging information and knowledge, and the imaginary approach, in terms of defining the core principle and beliefs of the network. However, some municipalities have been central to this process of defining the rules of the game. In the Australian case, Newcastle (NSW) was instrumental in lobbying for the development of the network in the first place, and has since taken a role in developing and extending it in Australia, through conducting ‘roadshows’ of how municipalities can take action to address climate protection and being responsible for the development and delivery of various ‘action modules’ within the programme. Informally, Newcastle is often considered a point of reference amongst other municipalities, with many referring in interviews to their informal contacts with the council and its value in providing them with information and confidence to undertake activities within the network. In Europe, some municipalities tend to be more involved with EU projects facilitated by the CCP network than others, and hence shape the nature of the projects undertaken, while in the development of the UK national programme, Leicester, who has had a long history of involvement in TMN, were influential in both persuading the Government to adopt the programme and shaping its development, through lobbying for more data to be made available from the energy utilities. Nonetheless, even the ‘core’ group of municipalities is not always successful in setting the rules of the game. In Australia, Newcastle were unsuccessful in persuading the CCP-Australia programme to adopt a more rigorous system of emissions modelling, while in Leicester, concerns about the availability of data for modelling were not addressed by the CCP network or the Government, and could be seen to have had a detrimental impact on the network by ‘bogging it down’ in this issue and hindering other members from developing simple models and action plans.
Conceptualising the TMN in governance network terms, and of power dynamics as the ability to set the rules of the game, allows the possibility for considering the role of the state in metagovernance/metaheterarchy, organizing the conditions for network governance (Jessop 2002: 241). It is clear that in both CCP-Europe and CCP-Australia, state and supra-state agencies have had a considerable impact on the nature of the network. In Australia, the CCP network is dependent on funding from the federal government to sustain its main activities, and through projects and partnerships with state governments for other activities. Here, the state was instrumental in defining the network, in terms of membership numbers, and constraining and enabling the activities of the network. In Europe, the network has equally been dependent on funding from the Commission, and in the case of the national programmes (UK and Italy) on national government funding. However, unlike other networks where the Commission is seen to have used its ‘regulatory powers to circumscribe closely their goals, network agendas, types of co-operation, and geographic reach’ with the effect of ‘promoting policies and policy changes which further Commission goals and institutional interests.’ (Leitner et al 2002: 293), the relative independence of the CCP in defining its own ‘rules of the game’ means that the extent to which the Commission directly shapes the nature and scope of the network is reduced. However, as discussed above, the Commission exerts indirect influence on the network, through changing the context within which it operates, which in turn has lead to a redefinition of network membership. Rather than focusing on material interdependencies between members of the network, and focusing on whether network change is endogenous or exogenous, the concepts of network governance and metagovernance/metaheterarchy provide a more useful framework for analysing such dynamics. However, this raises the significant issue that if such networks are ‘governance’ networks, how do they govern?

**How do networks govern?**

If governing refers to ‘purposive acts of “steering” a society or polity’ (Lowndes 2001: 1961) or ‘authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and co-ordination’ (Rhodes 1996: 653), then the capacity to govern is the capacity to undertake these roles. The question then becomes one of how governance networks, in this case the CCP network, produces this capacity. Here, two related means through which this takes place within arenas of local governance are identified: defining the problem of climate protection locally and providing
resources through which to address the issue. First, the CCP network effectively renders the issue of climate change ‘visible’ locally, in turn creating a ‘problem’ that requires a ‘solution’. In the Australian case, the CCP milestone framework has been adapted to include milestones for ‘corporate’ and ‘community’ emissions, and together with problems of gathering data for community emissions, this has meant that the capacity to govern climate protection locally has primarily been focused on corporate emissions, despite their relatively small contribution to the issue as a whole. This is equally true in the UK, where a similar national programme had the same effects. However, in Europe, many of the cities which joined the network had already undertaken some action on energy or climate protection issues before and so making the issue technically manageable was not such a significant part of the networks governance. This process of making climate protection visible locally can be conceptualized as one of ‘policy learning’ (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Bulkeley 2000; Jordan and Greenaway 1998), and the means through which the ‘rules of the game’ are negotiated and redefined continually within the network. This can include both the creation of new knowledge about a particular policy problem, or appropriate means of regulation, as well as processes in which “issues are reframed, or selected, organized and interpreted in new ways” so that what was taken for granted is problematized (Owens and Cowell, 2002: 170) and hence the normative and imaginary frameworks of the network are shifted.

The second, related, way in which the CCP network has produced the capacity to govern, is through making political, financial and knowledge resources available to those parts of the municipality which have been involved with the network for the production of ‘public purpose’ locally. In Australia, involving councilors through award ceremonies has been an integral part of the network, and participants spoke of the importance of having political members involved, and the added kudos and legitimacy that local initiatives received as part of the CCP programme. Financially, the network has provided access to both additional internal funds – making corporate energy use visible has in many cases led to innovative financing mechanisms through which savings are invested in energy conservation or renewable energy measures – and access to specific funding initiatives, usually supported by the state or federal government. In Europe, the political and financial resources created by the network have been less direct, with municipalities having to promote the scheme internally as a means of achieving recognition, and accessing additional resources primarily through bids for EU project funding. While both networks place great store on providing knowledge resources – in the form of information about local emissions through monitoring and
modeling, and best practice case-studies – for municipalities with experience of undertaking action in relation to climate protection these were not seen to be valuable (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Bulkeley and Betsill 2003). However, the ability to discuss the ins and outs of particular technologies, projects, schemes and so on with people who had experience of putting them into place was often seen to be invaluable to all participants, reinforcing the notion that it is the negotiation and deliberation over the cognitive and normative ‘rules of the game’ which are more important in shaping the network than the knowledge resource itself.

In both Australia and Europe, the CCP network is therefore producing some capacity to govern through the provision of additional resources. However, two caveats are worth stating. First, municipalities need some resources – time, officers, knowledge, political support - in order to be able to access the resources provided by the network. Second, the competitive nature of many of the resources offered (awards, grants, being a ‘best practice’) means that not all members can be ‘winners’, in turn leading to the real possibility that in increasing the capacity to govern in some places, the network is actually decreasing the capacity to address climate protection in others. This suggests that there is a need to look governance networks may be just as prone to ‘governance failure’ as other modes of governing.

In considering these three issues, of context, power and governing, the governance networks perspective has much to offer in the analysis of TMN, though many of its core concepts and approaches need to be developed in the light of further empirical analysis. However, as this discussion has shown, some lessons from the debates on policy networks offer a useful means not only of suggesting what questions we should ask of governance networks, but also of beginning to think about their dynamics. If policy networks can not capture the multi-level nature of TMN nor their role in processes of governing, rather than shaping policy outcomes, core concerns about the dialectical relations between networks and context, and the nature of power in networks will be important if the ‘governance networks’ concept is to be successfully developed.

Conclusions

This paper has argued that the concept of ‘policy networks’ can not be stretched far enough to encompass the analysis of networks of municipal governments which operate within the contest of multilevel governance. Rather, the embryonic notion of ‘governance networks’ was
seen to offer a more useful framework for enquiry into the nature, role and implications of such networks for local governance. Nonetheless, four points can be raised by way of conclusion which might apply to the further development and use of both approaches. First, there is a need to consider the multiple points of intervention through which such networks operate, whether that be in relation to different levels of government, or different policy spheres, and the implications this has for considering how networks shape the context within which they operate. Second, while the focus of much network analysis has been on power dynamics within networks, attention also needs to be paid to the ways in which agents which are ‘external’ to the network act through means of ‘meta-governance’, for example by shaping the conditions and goals of networks, to determine the policy/governance outcomes. Third, and in particular related to the concept of ‘governance networks’, there is a need to further explore how networks govern, and the ways in which this is enabled or constrained by other forms of governing to which actors in networks are subject – locally, nationally or internationally. Finally, tracing examples of governance failure within networks is equally important, if more methodologically challenging, as looking at examples of ‘successful’ points of intervention, and should form part of the research agenda in this field.
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### Table 1 - CCP as policy network: two interpretations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network characteristics</th>
<th>Narrow interpretation</th>
<th>Broad interpretation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>Secretariat (regional and international); member municipalities (officers and politicians) - homogenous</td>
<td>Secretariat (regional and international); member municipalities (officers and politicians); funding bodies; local and national government departments; other municipal networks; non-state actors at local and national level - heterogeneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>Varies between a core group of municipalities and the secretariat who have a high level of interaction, continuity and consensus, and other members whose participation is more subdued, fleeting or partial.</td>
<td>Varies both within and between regions, can involve a core group including the secretariat, some municipalities and the funding agency who have a high level of interaction, continuity and consensus, and other members whose participation is more subdued, fleeting or partial.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Resources, primarily in the form of kudos, information, knowledge and access to funding, vary between municipalities and between members and the secretariat. Resource interdependencies exist and exchanges take place, but network relations are not determined by them. Exchange relations are primarily horizontal.</td>
<td>In addition to the resource relations described, funding agencies hold financial resources and there is competition between networks and between municipalities to access these resources. Local and national government departments also provide resources in the form of finances and information directly to municipal officers and departments. Relations are based on resource inter-dependency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Power is horizontal and is shared between actors in the network, though its capacity varies – in the core, high levels of influence and dependence, in the periphery low levels of influence and dependence.</td>
<td>Power ‘mess’ – hierarchical relations between central and local governments, horizontal relations between secretariat, funding agencies and municipalities, both horizontal and hierarchical relations between non-state actors and state actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence and policy outcomes</td>
<td>‘Core’ determines nature of policy problem and solutions; enacts policy at municipal level both within municipalities and within the community through ‘soft’ instruments, monitors and evaluates progress. In ‘periphery’ members action is confined to municipality. Collective and members lobby international and national bodies to shape policy context. Interventions take place at multiple levels and within multiple arenas.</td>
<td>Network is part of the climate change ‘policy mess’ - international, regional, national and local levels are “interacting, with actors influencing the activities of different levels simultaneously” (O’Riordan and Jordan 1996: 101). Network shapes policy outcomes and implements policy through range of market, network and regulatory measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network characteristics</td>
<td>Ideal model</td>
<td>CCP network</td>
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<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td>Members are dependent on one another to ‘get things done’ but ‘operationally autonomous’ Variation in dependency and autonomy produce ‘tied’ and ‘untied’ networks</td>
<td>Network of autonomous local authorities who have a degree of dependence on one another to effectively lobby on the subject of local climate protection, to exchange information and knowledge, to gain additional resources, and to implement projects and strategies.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Interaction</strong></td>
<td>Interaction takes place through negotiations, which combine varieties of bargaining and deliberation depending on the network and its maturity.</td>
<td>More evidence of deliberation, exchange and learning than internal bargaining for resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional framework</strong></td>
<td>Formed through the network this provides the ‘rules of the game’ for network interactions and means of governing. This framework comprises a mixture of regulative (rules, roles and procedures), normative (norms, values and standards), cognitive (codes, concepts and knowledge), and imaginary aspects (identities, ideologies, common hopes and visions), though one is likely to dominate.</td>
<td>Includes all aspects: regulative (milestone framework, declaration); normative (criteria for best practice, benchmarking, awards); cognitive (creation and exchange of knowledge about local climate protection); imaginary (‘act local, think global’, vision of alternative urban energy futures).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Means of governing</strong></td>
<td>Self-governing, self-regulating through the continual construction of the ‘rules of the game’. This leads to formal rules, the formulation of norms, generation of new knowledge, and identity construction in order to have ‘an impact on the behaviour, the beliefs and the social attachments of the network members’ which can be achieved through sanction and mutual enforcement.</td>
<td>Includes all aspects (see above) though enforcement is weak beyond core actors and sanction rarely used.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Governance outcomes</strong></td>
<td>Production of public purpose – governance as ‘steering’ – through regulation, norm formation, knowledge generation and identity construction. Non-compliant behaviour is regulated through other arenas (e.g. courts, markets)</td>
<td>Includes all aspects, e.g. changing local policies and regulations, forming new norms through which to evaluate decisions, generating new knowledge about policy implications or the impacts of new technologies, and through framing policy problems and solutions.</td>
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