Immigration – left/right or centre/periphery?  
A party competition explanation for the integration policies of national minority regions

Christina Isabel Zuber, GRITIM, Universitat Pompeu Fabra  
mail@christinazuber.com

Paper prepared for the ECPR General Conference 2014, 3 - 6 September 2014, University of Glasgow

Draft, all comments are very welcome! Please do not cite without prior consultation of the author.

Abstract
How do minority regions in multi-national states respond to immigration? Do they use regional decision-making competencies to foster inclusion of immigrants into the sub-state nation, or to tighten the boundaries of belonging exclusively around the minority group? This paper presents first results from a project that explores answers to these questions through comparative case studies of integration policies in the autonomous minority regions of Catalonia (described as inclusive in the literature) and South Tyrol (described as taking a more exclusivist approach). Qualitative content analysis of regional integration bills (the “Integrationsgesetz” in South Tyrol and the “Llei d’acollida” in Catalonia) shows that the policy response differs between regions, but also between the three dimensions of integration policy, the political-legal, the socio-economic and the cultural. The paper hypothesizes that an explanation for the differences can be found in the way parties link the issue of integration to key dimensions of regional party competition.

Acknowledgements
Parts of this paper have been presented at the “3-Länder-Tagung: Politik der Vielfalt”, 19-21 September, University of Innsbruck, the “GRITIM-UPF Seminar Series”, 28 October 2013, Pompeu Fabra University, and the “Inhouse Seminar” of the EURAC Institute for Minority Rights, 20 February 2014 Bolzano. I thank all those present on either of these occasions for inspiring comments and very helpful suggestions. I am indebted to the Fritz Thyssen Foundation for sponsoring me during my stay in Barcelona and Bolzano.
1. Introduction

We, who are different, what do we do with the difference of the others – respect it? Impose our own difference upon theirs? Make friends because we are all different?

(Former policy-maker, Catalonia)

An immigrant who arrives in the Northern Italian province of South Tyrol needs to learn Italian in order to be able to gain Italian citizenship and enjoy mobility throughout the entire Italian state. However, if she wants to have equal opportunities for being employed within the province, she will also have to acquire German (and depending on her chosen place of residence, maybe also Ladin) skills. Last but not least, to interact comfortably with locals on a daily basis, understanding and speaking South Tyrol dialect (in addition to standardised German) will result crucial. Granted, South Tyrol's reality is particularly complex. But Europe is full of examples of multinational democracies where not one, but several groups conceive of themselves as nations. Immigrants who arrive in these countries are confronted with a heterogeneous host society and not one, but several (often competing) proposals for how to define the boundaries of the political, social, and cultural community. Within the minority region, they are expected to integrate into the language and culture of the minority. However, if they want to gain citizenship and enjoy mobility throughout the state, they will be required to learn the majority language and integrate into the state-wide culture. Immigration thus potentially threatens to undermine the nation-building projects pursued by minority nationalists (Zapata-Barrero 2007: 5, Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero forthcoming: 20).

Does a multinational reality complicate the integration of newcomers, or does the long-standing experience of accommodating several national groups within the boundaries of a single state help policy-makers to come to terms with new, immigration-based, diversity? In multi-level systems, decision-making competencies in the field of integration policy (and in the case of Quebec even decisions on setting the conditions for entry) often fall into the jurisdiction of the regional level. As a consequence, in Quebec, Scotland, Catalonia, or South Tyrol, political parties seeking to represent national minority groups are responsible for deciding on integration policies. Political theorists have advocated that national minorities should be empowered to regulate the volume and scope of migration to their regions on normative grounds (Kymlicka, 2001, Zapata-Barrero 2007). However, empirically, little is known about what actually happens once they do get to decide within “their” region. Kymlicka (2001) himself draws on the example of Quebec and expects that once being
empowered, national minorities will adopt a multicultural approach. Hepburn (2011) and Arrighi de Casanova (2012) have recently countered this expectation. Both authors highlight the dynamics of regional party competition as a key factor for explaining the responses sub-state nationalists give to immigration. Devolving immigration and integration related competencies to the regional level enhances the issue's importance in regional party competition. Pressures from anti-immigration parties may then lead regionally dominant parties to advocate exclusive conceptions of regional citizenship. Empirically, these authors have focused on analysing the discourses of minority nationalist parties. By contrast, this paper seeks to contribute towards analysing minority region's responses to immigration at the level of policies by posing two research questions:

1. Which integration policies do minority regions propose?
2. How can variation in minority region's integration policies be explained?

On the theoretical level, the paper takes up previous arguments about the importance of the regional dynamics of party competition for explaining policy output, but adds to this a key insight from the territorial politics literature: that party competition in minority regions takes place within a two-dimensional competition space constituted by a left/right and a territorial dimension. Empirically, the paper presents a qualitative content analysis of integration policies in South Tyrol and Catalonia, two cases that were chosen for being very similar, yet taking a different approach when it comes to immigrant integration. First results indicate that integration policies vary not only between regions, but also between three individual dimensions of integration policy, namely the political-legal, the socio-economic and the cultural dimension (see Entzinger, 2000 and Penninx & Garcés Mascareñas, forthcoming). I suggest that these differences might be explained by whether the integration issue is subsumed into party competition on a redistributive left/right dimension, or whether it is subsumed into party competition on the territorial dimension. Left-right subsuming implies that minority parties compete with each other on the issue and polarise the distributive, socio-economic dimension of integration. As a consequence, regional governments adopt integration policies that restrict access to socio-economic resources, but display a pluralist approach to cultural integration allowing immigrants free choice of whether they prefer to integrate into the state-wide or the minority culture (the case of South Tyrol). Centre-periphery subsuming implies that minority elites compete with state-wide majority parties on the issue and polarise the identity-based, cultural dimension of integration. As a consequence, regional governments adopt integration policies that grant equal access to socio-economic resources, but demand cultural integration into the minority culture (the case of Catalonia).
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses theoretical explanations for the integration policies of minority regions. Section three gives an overview on the research design, justifies the case selection and introduces the two cases. Section four presents comparative insights from qualitative content analysis of regional integration laws and section five provides a tentative, procedural explanation for the differences between them. Section six concludes the paper.

2. Theory

The starting point for theoretical arguments about minority regions' responses to immigration is Kymlicka (2001). He argues that devolution of competencies to decide will reduce fear on part of national minorities that immigration will undermine their cultural distinctiveness, because it allows minority actors to set their own terms for immigration to “their” region. Drawing on the example of the Canadian province of Quebec, which has been granted considerable powers for deciding the volume and scope of immigration, Kymlicka expects that minorities will adopt what he terms a 'post-ethnic nationalism' and a multiculturalist instead of an assimilationist approach towards integration. However, as Jeram rightfully criticises: “Kymlicka takes for granted that empowered minority nations are willing to trade their 'soul' and adopt multiculturalism without explaining why political autonomy automatically leads to expansive rather than restrictive expressions of dominant nationality” (Jeram 2012: 44-45).\(^1\) In other words, Kymlicka (2001) fails to provide a mechanistic causal argument for why empowering minorities should produce the outcome he expects.

Unlike Kymlicka, who argues from the perspective of entire national minority groups, Hepburn (2011) moves to the level of political parties and compares the immigration strategies of minority nationalist parties in Scotland, Quebec and Catalonia. Countering Kymlicka's expectation of a unified multiculturalist stance of the minority as such, she argues that devolving immigration policies to the regional level politicises the issue in regional party competition and brings anti-immigration parties onto the scene. As a consequence, governing parties may begin to advocate a more exclusive conception of regional citizenship (Hepburn 2011: 518). Hepburn (2011) thus draws a clear causal arrow from devolution of competencies via the polarisation of party competition to the dominant minority party adopting a tougher stance on immigration. She progresses from Kymlicka's group-based expectation by taking into account the interactions between key actors in regional politics and theorising a full causal mechanism connecting devolution to more exclusionary

---

\(^1\) Arrighi de Casanova (2012) offers an explanation for why minority nationalist elites (if not groups as such) may indeed begin to embrace immigration and emphasise post-ethnic identity over ethnic belonging: it enhances the internal legitimacy of their claim to self-determination if they represent and govern the entire regional population independent of ethnic belonging, and it enhances the external legitimacy of their claim to self-determination if they can present the region to the central state and international actors as capable of promoting liberal democratic norms.
conceptions of regional citizenship of political parties. However, just like Kymlicka (2001) fails to explain *why* minorities should by default be friendly towards migrants, Hepburn (2011) fails to explain *why* polarisation of the immigration issue should by default pull competition between regionalist parties into the direction of exclusionary stances. Depending on the overall configuration of competition, polarisation might just as well imply that dominant parties adopt a positive stance on immigration, challenging, rather than approximating the stance of anti-immigrant parties.

Whereas Hepburn (2011) considers parties' positioning on immigration conditional on new anti-immigration challenger parties where parties 'outbid' each other on the anti-immigration pole, Arrighi de Casanova (2012) considers positioning on immigration conditional on the parties' position on the left/right dimension, and Jeram (2012) considers positioning on immigration conditional on the position on immigration of majority nationalist parties. Unlike Hepburn (2011), the latter two authors do not link their party positioning argument to regional policies, the outcome of interest in the present study. Nonetheless, their insights are important, because they remind us that party competition in minority regions takes place in a two-dimensional space and that immigration can potentially be subsumed under these dimensions. Arrighi de Casanova (2012: 46) mentions that political parties within the regional arena will link the immigration issue to the left-right dimension, and that they will do so in the same way, as scholars have found this to be the case for 'normal', state-level, party competition. As a consequence, minority nationalists with a right-of-centre position on the left/right dimension can be expected to adopt an immigration-skeptical stance, whereas left-of-centre minority nationalists should adopt a pro-immigration stance: “if support for nationalism strongly overlaps with a left-of-centre ideology, nationalist parties are more likely to seek support among immigrants. Conversely, if the nationalist cleavage is primarily associated with a conservative ideology, nationalist parties are more likely to compete for the anti-immigrant vote”.

Arrighi de Casanova (2012) thus expects parties to integrate the immigration issue into the left-right axis by correlating leftist stances with pro-immigration stances, and rightist stances with anti-immigration stances.

By contrast, Jeram (2012: 61) argues that rather than to left/right, minority nationalists will link the immigration issue to the dimension where they tend to have the highest stakes, i.e. the *territorial dimension*. Linking the issue to the territorial dimension implies that minority nationalists will not compete amongst each other on the new issue, but will use it as an additional topic on which to

---

2 Drawing on the example of Catalan politics, this would (hypothetically!) imply that Convergencia i Unió, due to its centre-right position on the left/right axis of party competition, should compete for the anti-immigration vote, whereas Esquerra Republicana, a Catalan nationalist party with a leftist position should adopt a pro-immigration position (for these parties' positions on the left-right axis cf. Massetti 2009: 507). In reality, they are both aiming to attract immigrants.
present a stance against the centre. Consequently, if dominant state-wide parties adopt an anti-immigration stance, minority nationalists should be in favour of immigration (and vice versa): “Minority nationalist elites have an interest in perpetuating the struggle for independence or increased autonomy because of the rational economic and emotive reasons and thus are constantly in search of new issues that can increase the salience of the nationalist conflict” (Jeram 2012: 61).

It should be noted that the three authors' expectations about the positioning of minority nationalist parties on immigration are not mutually exclusive at the theoretical level. Rather, we can plausibly argue that upon choosing (or, later, shifting) its position on immigration, a minority nationalist party will a) consider potential challenges from anti-immigration parties, b) seek to maintain a coherent profile, and c) consider whether the issue can be used as additional “material” within the territorial conflict with the central authorities. Summarising these insights shows that a party-competition explanation for minority regions' policy responses to immigration needs to take two aspects into account: a) that party competition on a new policy issue requires us to take the whole competitive actor configuration, rather than only a two-player game between an anti-immigration party and the governing party; b) that competition over a new issue does not ensue in a vacuum, but within a competition space that is already structured by salient dimensions of political conflict. Importantly, in multinational states, we find at least two salient dimensions: 1) the left/right dimension, and 2) the territorial dimension of competition (Alonso 2012).

The left/right dimension will vary in its content between different contexts but is generally conceptualised in the party competition literature as being itself composed of two dimensions, an economic and a social value or cultural dimension (Kriesi et al. 2006; Marks et al. 2006). According to the conceptualisation suggested by Szöcsik and Zuber (2012), the territorial dimension concerns the stances of parties with regard to the status of national minorities and the nature of the state. Majority nationalists in favour of a centralised nation-state at one extreme end of the spectrum confront minority nationalists in favour of secession at the other extreme. Parties already have their ideological profile at the point in time when immigration becomes an issue. They have several strategic options for connecting the new issue to their existing positions on the left/right and the territorial dimension. Whether party competition will pull governing parties towards immigrant-friendly policy-making therefore depends not only on the appearance of anti-immigration parties that threaten to take votes from minority nationalist parties, but also on how minority nationalist parties decide to link the issues of immigration and integration to their competitive strategies within a two-dimensional political space. Importantly, left/right subsuming of the immigration issue implies that it will be an issue on which minority nationalists contest each other. As a consequence,
the issue will become polarised within the minority arena. By contrast, territorial subsuming of the immigration issue implies that minority nationalists will adopt a similar position on immigration and contest will be transferred to the territorial arena, where minority nationalist and majority nationalist parties confront each other. The case studies will contribute explorative insights of whether and if so, how, the different types of issue linkage can make a difference for the nature of minority region's integration policies.

3. Research design and case selection

Given the interest in the causal mechanisms linking regional party competition to integration policies, I conduct theory-centred, comparative case studies. Theory-centred case studies treat the study of one or a small number of bounded phenomena as instrumental to advancing theoretical knowledge of a wider class of similar phenomena (Rohlfing 2012: chapter 1). Studying only a very limited number of cases allows researchers to not only compare factors at the cross-case level, but to also trace processes connecting causes to the outcome at the within-case level, where the party competition mechanisms are assumed to be operating.

The universe of cases consists of minority regions in multinational societies, i.e. “societies where a dual belonging exists: that of the dominant state political community and that of the community expressed by the minority nation” (Zapata Barrero, 2009: 20). Since I am interested in studying how minority nationalists actually govern immigrant integration, rather than how they fit migrants into their construct of the minority nation through their discourses, regions inhabited by national minorities that do not have competencies to decide on integration policies do not form part of the universe of cases. Out of the cases with decision-making competencies, Quebec is the only minority region that decides not only on reception and integration policies, but also on the very selection of immigrants on the basis of self-set criteria and therefore stands out as a uniquely devolved case. Another special case that would be hard to compare is presented by the Åland islands, where the hembygdsrätt, “a sort of regional citizenship (...) is a prerequisite for the acquisition of land and real property, the right to stand and vote in the Åland parliament elections and the right to establish a business and provide services on Åland” (Granholm 2009: 71), i.e. citizenship is a devolved matter, whereas admission is managed by the Finnish central authorities. From the remaining cases, I apply the logic of Mill's method of difference and select two cases that share many potentially causally relevant features while being presented in the literature as having a different outcome in terms of how immigration is dealt with by minority nationalists: The autonomous province of Bolzano/South Tyrol in Italy and the autonomous community of Catalonia in Spain.
Since no systematic comparative measure of regional integration policies is available so far, classifying integration policies in the two cases constitutes the first contribution of my project. To select the cases before the analysis, I therefore had to rely on how the cases are roughly described in the literature where Catalonia is presented as more immigrant friendly and inclusive in its regional conception of citizenship (Hepburn 2011) than South Tyrol which appears to propagate a model of regional identity, that “cannot be described as post-ethnic or intercultural [...] but can rather be characterised by the acronym NIMBY (Not-In-My-Back-Yard)” (Medda-Windischer 2011: 28).³

Potential explanatory factors the cases have in common are that both regions are economically advantaged vis a vis the rest of their states, and (have) depend(ed) on immigration for economic reasons. The overall integration policy regime provided by the respective states, Italy and Spain, are also comparable (Migrant integration policy index, Results 2010). Additionally, both regions share the experience that historically, immigration has meant first and foremost migration from the South of the same state to their respective Northern region, long before international migration started to make its contribution. The electoral system used for regional elections in both regions is closed list proportional representation, so that Catalan parties’ greater openness cannot be explained by incentives of the electoral system to appeal to voters with an immigrant background. Indicators for the integration of immigrants into the minority language show that voters of the minority groups should have a similar impression on whether immigration is or is not undermining their cultural specificity. On the basis of data from the national survey of immigrants (Encuesta nacional de inmigrantes, 2007)⁴, close to 50% of the immigrant population in Catalonia answered that they do not understand, speak and write Catalan (Solana, de Miguel, Rodríguez and Pascual, 2012: 113). For South Tyrol, the only survey targeting foreigners directly was conducted by EURAC's Institute for Minority Rights in 2010. The results are not directly comparable to the Spanish immigrant survey, since the selection criteria for interviewees were different.⁵ But in the absence of a directly comparable source, they can give at least an indication of linguistic integration in South Tyrol. 24.6% of foreigners interviewed stated that they do not speak any German at all, and 61.9% stated

---

³ Arguably a comparison between Catalonia and the Basque country could control even better for contextual factors, but as Jeram (2012) shows in his detailed case study of immigration in the Basque country, the region has opened its nationalism to the extent that variance in the outcome between the cases of Catalonia and the Basque country is not given.

⁴ The sample is composed of people of at least 16 years of age who were born outside of Spain and had spent at least one year living in Spain, or had the intention of living at least one year in Spain. This group includes both persons with and without Spanish citizenship (22% had citizenship). See Solana, de Miguel, Rodriguez and Pascual, 2012: 108.

⁵ The sample consisted of foreigners 18+ years old with residency in the province that come from countries defined as countries with high pressures for migration (“Ländern mit hohem Migrationsdruck”: Central and Eastern European countries, African and Asian countries (excluding Israel and Japan) and Central and South American. The actual number of German speaking foreigners is therefore a lot higher, since immigrants from Germany constitute one of the largest immigrant groups in South Tyrol (see http://www.provinz.bz.it/astat/de/bevoelkerung/auslaender.asp)
that they do not speak any South Tyrolean dialect at all (Eurac 2011: 77, table 6.2.). Understanding and speaking dialect is important if one wants to integrate socially and interact with South Tyroleans on a daily basis.

The distribution of competencies between the state and the minority region in the field of immigration and integration is almost identical, providing both regions with the possibility to legislate on integration. The Spanish immigration law of 2000 (Organic Law 4/2000) granted all autonomous communities competencies to intervene in the fields of social benefits and services, residence and employment (Generalitat, Citizenship and Immigration Plan 2009-2012, p. 48, see also Climent-Ferrando, 2013). The second step came with Royal decree 2393/2004 that treats autonomous communities and municipalities as partners in the management of immigrant integration (Generalitat, Citizenship and Immigration Plan 2009-2013, p. 48). In the third step, the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy of July 2006 (Generalitat de Catalunya 2006/ organic law 6/2006) then explicitly assigns to the Generalitat exclusive powers with regard to the initial reception of immigrants (art. 138.1), and the development of policies on their social integration and the use of Catalan (143.1 and 166.1). Furthermore, Catalan authorities have the power to authorise work permits for foreigners who are to be employed/self-employed in Catalonia. The autonomous province of South Tyrol is similarly responsible for the social, cultural and economic integration of migrants and consequently regulates health, schooling, housing, participation in public life and anti-discrimination measures (Medda-Windischer 2011: 23). In the case of South Tyrol, these competencies had already been devolved with the autonomy statute of 1972. However, the province has for a long time remained largely inactive with regard to legislation in this field and only began to work on its own integration policies in 2006 (ibid., footnote 19).

What differs between the cases is the share of foreigners. In South Tyrol, 8.8 % of the population are foreigners (Autonome Provinz Bozen Südtirol, ASTAT, figure from 2013) compared to 15.34 % in Catalonia (Generalitat de Catalunya, IDESCAT, figure from 2013), the share of foreigners in Catalonia thus being nearly twice as high as in South Tyrol. However, the divergent numbers would imply that if anything, South Tyroleans should feel less threatened by immigration than Catalans, which should make South Tyrolean regional elites adopt a more inclusive approach than Catalan ones, not the other way round. We can therefore rule out an explanation based on the divergent share of foreigners.

Finally, the structure of party competition and the location of parties in multidimensional space varies between regions, which is important if the aim is to probe the explanatory power of theoretical explanations based on party competition. Among the German-speaking parties in South
Tyrol, the dominant and governing Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP) is challenged by the Union für Südtirol (UfS, which changed its name into Bürgerunion in May 2011) and by die Freiheitlichen (dF). Both parties were classified as radical right by Massetti (2009: 507), however, the Bürgerunion has been trying to change its profile since renaming the party now and is now mostly emphasising social policy issues. In Catalonia, there used to be competition between a centre-left minority nationalist party, the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) and a centre-right minority nationalist party, Convergència i Unió (CiU) (Massetti 2009: 507). Traditionally, also the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) that used to be the Catalan branch of the state-wide leftist PSOE before developing into a party of its own, has played an important role, but has recently lost ground. Following the 2012 regional elections, CiU formed a minority government supported by ERC, with the two parties focusing on the goal of self-determination that unites them on the centre/periphery dimension. A vigorously anti-immigrant party (PxC) that deliberately avoids to position itself on the territorial dimension exists, but has so far been successful only in local elections (Arrighi de Casanova 2012: 267).

The lower temporal bound of the case studies is set by the inception of external immigration that establishes the question of the integration of newcomers as a societal problem to be solved through public policy, and the upper temporal bound is set by the adoption of a regional integration law. Whereas both regions had already had extensive experience with internal immigration from the Southern party of Italy and Spain respectively, external immigration only started to become an issue during the early 2000s, but then the number of foreigners rose quickly, and at a particularly remarkable pace in Catalonia. In 2000, the share of foreigners in Catalonia was 2.9%. It reached a peak of 15.95% in 2010, to then slightly decrease to 15.34% by 2013 (IDESCAT). In South Tyrol the share of foreigners reached 8.8% by 2013. The endpoint of the process dealt with in the case studies is the approval of an integration law in South Tyrol in October 2011 and in Catalonia in May 2010 (see more details below).

4. Regional integration policies: conceptualization and coding
Following Czaika and de Haas (2011), it is important to conceptually differentiate between policy discourses, policies on paper, policy implementation and policy impact. This paper focuses on policies on paper made by the governments of minority regions thereby adding a new element to...
the literature on minority regions and immigration that has so far mostly focused on the immigration and integration discourses of minority nationalist parties (for Catalan parties, see Franco-Guillén & Zapata-Barrero, forthcoming, for South Tyrolean parties see Carlá, forthcoming). In this regard, it will be interesting to see to what extent policy output reflects the discourses of parties, be it inclusive or exclusive, or whether we find a “discursive gap” (Czaika and Haas 2011: 21) between the two.\(^7\)

Despite the manifold definitions and controversies about the concept of *integration*, there appears to be an emerging consensus in the literature that integration has to be conceptualised as a *process* (see e.g. Ager & Strang 2008: 177, Banting 2012: 85, Boswell 2003: 75, Penninx & Garcés Mascareñas, forthcoming: 3, Seidle & Joppke 2012: 9). Consequently, *integration policies* can be defined as policies that “intend to guide and steer […] integration processes of immigrants” (Penninx & Garcés Mascareñas, forthcoming: 10). Furthermore, several scholars agree that these processes occur in *three* distinguishable *domains*, though the denominations used to refer to these domains may differ slightly.\(^8\) Seidle and Joppke (2012: 9) talk about economic, social and civic/political integration, Penninx & Garcés Mascareñas (n.d.: 5 ff.) refer to legal/political, socio-economic and cultural/religious, and Boswell (2003: 75) talks about incorporation into the economy, the society and the political life. In sum, despite using different labels, there seems to be agreement that integration processes happen in a political, a socio-economic and a cultural domain. However, often there is no explicit analytical foundation for this three-dimensional approach. An exception is the conceptualisation by Entzinger (2000). He does not just propose three domains, the political/legal, the cultural, and the social/economic, but he also explains *why* integration policies aim to steer processes in precisely these three domains within European contexts. In European nation-states, immigrants have to find their place within the triangle set up by the *state* (the civic/political dimension), the *nation* (the cultural dimension of integration policy), and the *market* (the socio-economic dimension). Entzinger (2000) argues that when classifying integration policy models in the context of European nation states, it can therefore be thoroughly misleading to focus on only one of these dimensions, because approaches might be different across the dimensions. A similar

---

\(^7\) For an example of how this can make a difference, confer Kymlicka and Banting (2013) who argue and show on the basis of their Multicultural Policy Index that: “the retreat from multiculturalism in Europe is more complete at the level of discourse than policy” (2013: 579). It has to be acknowledged, however, that at the level of analysing policy documents and legal acts, we are still not at the level of what is actually being done, since it may take a long time until measures foreseen by a law take effect and are implemented in practice.

\(^8\) It should be noted, however, that the perhaps most prominent conceptualisation of integration policy that is frequently used at the level of large-N research is not three, but two-dimensional, namely the scheme suggested by Koopmans and Statham (2000, see also Koopmans, Statham Giugni and Passy 2006). They work with an ethnic/civic dimension and a monist/pluralist dimension (the poles of the latter have also sometimes been called assimilationist/multiculturalist) of integration policy. For a critique of the two-dimensional approach and arguments in favour of a three-dimensional conceptualisation see Manatschal (2011: 345-347).
argument is made by Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (forthcoming) who argue that an immigrant may be perfectly integrated in one domain, but not in the other. This shows that though interrelated, the dimensions are not fully dependent on one another, and cannot be conceptually reduced.

I will therefore analyse and classify integration policies aimed at steering integration processes within each of Entzinger's three dimensions. For each dimension, I developed mutually exclusive subcategories and always included a residual category in order to be able to classify the region's approach in each dimension on the basis of qualitative content analysis (QCA, following Schreier 2012) of the regions' legislative acts. Figure 1 displays the coding frame. I choose a qualitative method for the analysis because my aim is to establish which of the regions has a more inclusive, and which has a more restrictive approach in each domain of integration policy. The intention of passages of the law therefore constitutes latent meaning that has to be interpreted. This excludes quantitative content analysis as an option. I choose QCA over other methods of qualitative analysis because the highly systematic procedure for coding all segments of the material into one and only one of a set of mutually exclusive subcategories demanded by QCA establishes a sound basis for comparative inferences.

Figure 1. Coding frame for regional policies.

Both regions have passed laws dealing with the integration of immigrants into the regional society. These laws constitute the primary source to classify the regional approach to immigrant integration at the level of policies:

- The 2010 “welcome law” in Catalunya (LLEI 10/2010, del 7 de maig, d’acollida de les persones immigrades i de les retornades a Catalunya Diari Oicial de la Generalitat de Catalunya Núm. 5629, 14/05/2010).

As should be clear from the titles, however, the Catalan law is designed as a welcome law and therefore only deals with the initial period shortly after immigrant arrival. In subsequent analysis I will therefore additionally have to take Catalan acts in the respective individual areas of housing, education, labour market and health into account to which the welcome law refers the reader. The welcome law does however, in itself cover all dimensions of integration policy. For data analysis, I imported the PDF documents of the laws as published in the official regional bulletin into MAXQDA, a software designed to assist qualitative data analysis. I then reduced the data through analytical categorisation, applying theoretical concepts from the same coding frame through the cross-sectional code and retrieve method to both documents to enable comparative analysis (see Spencer, Ritchie and O'Connor, 2009: 203-206).

Figure 2 displays the results of a QCA of the laws by region. Only subcategories with at least one coded segment are displayed and the thicker the connecting line, the more segments in the respective document were coded under a subcategory. A first thing to note is that the categories belonging to the political legal dimension have been used sparingly, which could be expected, given that regions do not have the competencies do decide on the status of the immigrants as citizens and their political rights. For the region's approach in this dimension, it might therefore be more appropriate to analyse whether regional actors lobby for enabling or for restricting the status and possibilities for representation and participation of immigrants in the political legal domain at the central level, where key questions of citizenship and political rights are being decided.

Moving on to the other two dimensions of integration policy, we find that most categories from the coding frame could be applied in both cases. There are, however, two important differences: On the socio-economic dimension of integration policy, only the South Tyrolean law includes provisions for a differential treatment that is unfavourable to the immigrant, restricting access to provincial social benefits to those who had resided at least five years in the province. The mirror image of this is a subcategory of cultural integration that was used only in the Catalan law: a monistic approach to cultural integration, based on the minority culture and language. An example of a segment that received this code is: “Catalan, as Catalonia's own language, is the common language for implementing reception and integration policies. It also is the language of training and information, a basic instrument for full integration in the country” (Llei d'acollida, article 9, paragraph 4).
To sum up, the content analysis shows that South Tyrol adopts a more differential approach in the socio-economic dimension, both including more provisions for special treatment that is favourable to immigrants but also some provisions for unfavourable treatment, whereas Catalonia shows a stronger preference for equality in this dimension. The cultural dimension appears not only to be more salient in the Catalan law, than in the South Tyrolean one, Catalonia also defines the regional culture into which immigrants are expected to integrate predominantly in monistic terms, i.e. requiring integration into Catalan language and culture. South Tyrol by contrast, and when the law does make a statement about cultural integration, adheres to the equal status of the three provincial languages (Italian, German and Ladin) and does not seek to prioritise any of them in welcoming and integrating immigrants. Both regional laws show some limited support for more plural models of cultural integration that also make references to accepting and promoting the cultures of
immigrants. Finally, the political-legal dimension plays only a minor role in both laws, which could be explained by the lack of legislative competencies in this dimension.

5. Explaining regional integration policies – a first take

As discussed in the theoretical section above, Hepburn (2011) expected the immigration issue to become politicised with the devolution of decision-making competencies to a region, which then forces governing parties to adopt a more restrictive stance. The Catalan case defies this theoretical expectation in terms of the causal order and in terms of the substantive outcome at the level of actual policies. In Catalonia, formally devolving the right to decide on integration policies with the Catalan autonomy statute of 2006 appears to not have been the causal starting condition for dealing with the issue politically. Very much to the contrary, Catalan civil society, governments and administrations had long dealt actively with integration, thereby not only pre-empting the transfer of an explicit integration-competence, but also the arrival of significant numbers of immigrants, as well as policy-making on part the Spanish state. Concrete measures for dealing with the integration of immigrants to Catalonia were presented as early as 1992 in the Girona report (“Informe de Girona”), that contained an analysis of immigration and integration challenges as well as 50 concrete policy recommendations. It was proposed on 9 July 1992 by civil society actors from the province of Girona. In the same year, the Catalan parliament unanimously urged the government to develop measures to deal with immigrants' social integration, not disturbed by the fact that no explicit competence for this had so far been assigned to the Generalitat (Pinyol, 2012, p. 29) The initiative eventually led to the first of a series of interdepartmental integration plans edited by the respective governments until the present day (Plans for the periods 1993-2000, 2001-2004, 2005-2008, 2008-2012, and 2013-2016). In the year 2000, the Secretary for Immigration was set-up, designed to deal with immigration and integration in a transversal way, connecting the work done within the individual Catalan departments which, due to their respective competencies, were all dealing in one way or another with immigrant integration in their respective sectoral competencies (e.g. the departments of welfare and family, of education, of health, of labour, etc.).

Beginning to deal with the issue was also not accompanied by politicisation and polarisation, but by deliberate efforts from part of Catalan nationalist elites to forge a consensus and avoid instrumentalising it in electoral competition. A milestone of this is the National Pact for Immigration that was signed by all major Catalan parties, social and economic actors, immigrant associations and actors the third sector on 19 December 2008 (Generalitat 2009). Of the parties that held seats in the Catalan parliament at the time, only the Catalan branch of the state-wide Partido
Popular did not sign the pact. This provides first evidence that coalescence exists fully between Catalan nationalist parties on immigration, but only imperfectly between Catalan parties and parties representing the Spanish state, underlining the argument made above, that we need to take the full dynamics of regional party competition into account. The key reason for why the PPC refused to sign the pact was not a diverging stance on the issue of integration as such, but a diverging stance on the predominance of the Catalan language and culture in defining the symbolic community into which to integrate newcomers according to the Pact (Interview with member of the PPC executive, 29 May 2014, Barcelona). Thereby, the key conflict about immigrant integration came to be about defining the identity of the community. Catalans actors came to an agreement that prioritised Catalan identity for the integration of newcomers, thereby adding the issue to a number of controversial issues in their conflict with the Spanish centre on the territorial dimension, but keeping it outside of Catalan competition. When the Llei d'acollida was proposed in parliament, the minority nationalist ERC took the lead in proposing the law.

This very first take at providing a still very rough overview of the process of how Catalunya came to deal with immigrant integration thus shows 1) that devolution was not the starting condition for the causal process, 2) that we have to differentiate whether politicisation happens between minority nationalist parties on the left-right dimension, or between minority nationalist and state-wide parties on the territorial dimension, and which dimension of integration is politicised, if we want to link this to the policy outcomes. Within the minority nationalist arena of competition, immigration was depoliticised, i.e. characterised by “relatively restrained political discourse and a high level of cooperation and compromise in decision making” (Peters, Doughtie and McCulloch, 1977, 336). Within the centre-periphery arena of competition, however, the cultural dimension of integration policy was politicised, and the cooperating Catalan parties on one end of the spectrum of the territorial dimension were confronted by the Spanish PP at the other end.

Similar to Catalonia, devolution appears not to have been crucial for politicisation of immigration in South Tyrol, either. From a legal point of view, the province had enjoyed competencies to decide integration that could be derived from its powers to legislate on health, education, and housing since the autonomy statute of 1972 but the issue became politicised after the party die Freiheitlichen was founded in 1992 and imported the extreme right discourse and positions of Jörg Haider's FPÖ in Austria into South Tyrol. Politicisation thus pre-empted the arrival of immigrants in significant numbers, but did not follow causally from devolution. With regard to the inception of policy-making, the South Tyrolean case shows yet an additional procedural pattern. Whereas Catalan authorities pre-empted the arrival of immigrants in significant numbers with policy-proposals,
South Tyrolean governments remained for a long time in what Alexander (2003) has termed the “non-policy phase”. When the province adopted its integration law in 2011, it was the last among Italy's regions to do so and it was proposed in parliament by a minister from the Italian coalition partner of the SVP, Roberto Bizzo from the PD. While successive SVP-led governments avoided policy-making in the area, immigration and integration constituted highly politicised topics within the province, mainly due to the fact that “die Freiheitlichen” capitalised on the issue with a very outspoken anti-immigrant discourse. Within the German arena of party competition, the immigration issue was thus occupied by an anti-immigrant player that put the SVP under pressure, which stands in stark contrast to ongoing cooperation on the issue between Catalan parties. Apart from the insignificance of devolution, the South Tyrolean case thus fits Hepburn's expectations about the pressure from anti-immigrant regional challengers.

From an early stage onwards, immigration and integration also came to be perceived as issues that are directly linked to questions of the right- or wrongful distribution of wealth and benefits to immigrants, which was then made fully explicit in the differential treatment preferred in some provisions of the integration law of 2010. On the account of an MP who had served in the provincial parliament since 1998, the issue of immigrants first began to enter parliamentary debates in South Tyrol when the distribution scheme for housing benefits had to be reformed (Interview with South Tyrolean MP, 3 February 2014, Bolzano). In addition to this, and in stark contrast to the Catalan case, the German SVP seems for a long time to have fully disregarded the challenges immigration might pose to the cultural and linguistic future of the German minority and has not actively engaged in gaining immigrants for the German language and culture. Immigrants had since the beginning been integrated more into the Italian pillar of the segmented South Tyrolean society and the German-speaking politicians only very recently became aware of the fact, that in the long run, this might be detrimental to the position of the German minority when it comes to distributing resources and public offices on the basis of the share of each group according to the census, since immigrant children who have entered the Italian, rather than the German educational track are unlikely to declare themselves as German-speakers once they have to decide come the next census (Expert interview with researcher from EURAC, Bolzano, January 2014).

Figure 3 below tries to summarise this still very preliminary and tentative tracing of the processes leading to the definition of integration policies to steer processes in the domains of the socio-

---

9 The other regions had all adopted integration laws in the 1990s and 2000s. A particular striking comparison can be made with the province of Trentino that has a similar development of immigration patterns as South Tyrol and adopted a law on extra-communitarian immigrants setting up a provincial immigration council and dealing with immigrants' access to social services, health, housing, education in the labour market as early as in May 1990 (Provincia autonoma di Trento, 1990).
economic and the cultural. It suggests that the question whether minority parties cooperate or contest each other on the issue and whether, relatedly, they seek to subsume it under the territorial or the left/right dimension of party competition is connected to whether the policy will be more restrictive in the socio-economic or the cultural domain respectively. In South Tyrol, controversies evolve around distributive and redistributive issues connected to the left/right dimension and the law therefore makes a statement conditioning access of immigrants in the socio-economic domain. In Catalonia, minority nationalists together use the welcome law to make a statement against the central state and reflect their joint, cooperative position on the territorial dimension, where identity issues come to the fore.

Figure 3. Tentative tracing of causal processes in South Tyrol and Catalonia

6. Tentative conclusion and further steps

This paper has sought to answer two questions: Which policy responses do minority nationalist parties in regional government give to cultural diversity resulting from immigration to 'their' region? How can variation in minority region's integration policies be explained? With regard to the first question, the analysis has shown that South Tyrol conditions access on the socio-economic dimension. At the same time, it adopts a pluralist stance on cultural integration, leaving it to the immigrants themselves to choose whether they want to integrate into the Italian or the German language and culture. Catalonia's welcome bill constitutes the exact mirror image to this. The Catalan law emphasises unconditional and equal access to all services provided by the Generalitat. At the same time, Catalonia opts predominantly for a monist model on the cultural dimension of integration policy, expecting immigrants to integrate into the Catalan language and culture. I have then tried to address also the second research question, probing the plausibility of a party competition explanation that emphasises the importance of strategic interaction between minority
nationalist and state-wide parties and the way parties link immigration to the existing dimensions of the competition space. However, here the analysis is still very tentative since I have not yet analysed the material systematically and have not yet begun to engage in systematic, theory-testing process tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2013). A systematic qualitative analysis of the variety of different sources I have collected during field research in both regions will now constitute the next step within the project.
References


