BEYOND PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND BEYOND: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES

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“The importance of stable partisan loyalties has been universally recognised in electoral studies, but the manner in which they should be defined and measured has been a subject of some disagreement” (Campbell et. al, 1960, p. 122).

Since there are alternative methods of measuring long-term predispositions, the debate over party identification could be viewed merely as a measurement controversy about what constitutes the best method of estimation, rather than assuming from the outset that party identification is in some metaphysical sense the only true method (Budge et al, 1976, p. 9).

"So often used in sequence, the two words 'party' and 'identification' roll off the tongue automatically – so much so that we have stopped noticing the second word. Usage has evolved toward treating the whole as meaning some amalgam of ties toward party. This usage shift has gone so far that it is now common for scholars who explicitly reject the idea of identification to continue to use the term.” (Erickson et. al, 2002, p. 116)

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ABSTRACT
In this paper we examine various attempts to explain *individual level* partisanship (defined in terms of stability of political preferences). In order to highlight the principal issues at stake, we focus largely on the ‘directional component’ of partisanship (which party a voter is predisposed to support) rather than ‘distance’ (strength or intensity) of partisanship. We outline two basic ways of conceptualising partisanship: (1) a *social identity* approach that treats partisanship as a highly stable self-identification based on group identities and partisan stereotypes and (2) an *attitudinal* approach that treats partisanship as simply a predisposition towards parties. We go on to examine the various ways that partisanship has been measured, drawing particular attention to the slippage between theoretical constructs and operational indicators. We then consider whether it is possible to distinguish between various ‘types’ of partisans and identify some fruitful areas for future research.
1. INTRODUCTION

We take as our starting point for this paper the simple empirical observation that, in most established democracies, many people vote for the same party at election after election. The evidence for this proposition is both common place and uncontroversial. It is worth repeating again, however, in order to underline the importance of the issues raised in this workshop.

Almost any election anywhere in the world provides evidence of substantial continuity of voting behaviour. Britain is as good as any place to start, however, because there is high quality panel data that speaks directly to the question of stability of voting behaviour between several elections. Table 1 displays evidence from the British Election Panel Study (1987-92). This reveals that some 65 per cent of those who voted in the 1987 general election reported voting for the same party when they were interviewed some five years later. Once non-voters are excluded from this analysis, moreover, this fully 70 per cent of all 1987 voters behaved in the same way. As table 2 shows, even in the landslide election of 1997 that catapulted New Labour into office on the largest swing since 1945, fully 61 per cent of all 1992 voters behaved in exactly the same way as some five years later (a figure that again rises to 70 per cent once movement in and out of non-voting is excluded).

The most compelling evidence for continuity of preferences in the British case, however, comes from the 1992-97 British Election Panel study, which interviewed
respondents on no fewer than five separate occasions.\textsuperscript{1} This evidence spanned a period of dramatic political change when New Labour effectively replaced the Conservatives as the dominant party. Nevertheless, the panel study provides evidence of significant stability. Fully 57 per cent of all those who were interviewed on those five separate occasions either voted for (or intended to vote for) the same party on every single occasion.\textsuperscript{2} Setting aside for a moment any doubts about the consequences of panel attrition and conditioning, this appears to be good evidence that many voters stick with the same party for long periods of time.\textsuperscript{3}

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Table 2 about here

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Further evidence on the stability of voting behaviour comes from aggregate level evidence. While this is, by its very nature, less persuasive on the issue of individual-level stability it is informative and speaks directly to a (related) issue: the stability of vote shares. Between 1992 and 1997, for example, the Conservative government under John Major became enormously unpopular as a result of Britain's exit from the ERM, tax increases, divisions about Europe and allegations of 'sleaze' (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997). The party regularly lost ground in the annual round of local elections, suffered by-election defeats and was almost humiliated in European elections held in 1994. Yet figure 1 shows that while the Conservatives were subject to almost unrelentingly bad news, and an even worse 'press', their support -- as measured in the monthly polls -- never fell below the 20 per cent figure recorded in

\textsuperscript{1} The principal investigators for the BES 1992-97 panel study were Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell and John Curtice. The data set was obtained from the UK Data Archive, at the University of Essex (Study SN: 3888)

\textsuperscript{2} This statement obviously only applies to general elections or intended vote at general elections. The amount of vote switching at general elections would obviously be greater. See Rallings and Thrasher (date).
April and June 1995. Similarly, while New Labour (under Tony Blair) its support in the polls never exceeded the 59 per cent recorded in March and June 1995. It seems only natural to suggest that party support has a ‘floor’ below which it does not fall and equally a ‘ceiling’ above which it never rises. This ‘all weather’ support clearly requires explanation and needs taking into account whenever one wishes to produce an overall characterisation of an election outcome (Miller and Shanks, 1996; Erickson et al., 2002).

We can further illustrate the resilience of party support by regressing party vote at each general election for the post-war period on support for the same party at the previous election. If there were a perfect association, of course, the coefficients would all be 1 (and that would make for a very boring election). As table 4 shows, the coefficients do not approach 1, but they are all large. The coefficient is particularly strong in the case of the Liberal Democrats and Labour, but is even close to 0.7 in the case of the Conservative Party. Yet again this seems that there is an inertial element in the vote that cannot be ignored (Erickson et al., 2002).

Individual level, aggregate poll and election data all strongly suggest that party support has a strong inertial component. It is clear, therefore, that something other than contemporary policy proposals, current feelings about leaders and reactions to

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3 It may be, for example, that the politically inattentive -- who have less strong identities or attitudes are more likely to lose interest and drop out of the panel.
recent events influence individual vote decisions. As students of political behaviour, it seems important to specify what the 'something other' actually consists of.

The evidence of continuity in electoral preferences naturally suggests that many voters have enduring predispositions to support a particular party. The search for an explanation of stability has united scholars across disciplines and across borders. Sociologists, social-psychologists and rational choice theorists alike, have all proposed explanations for this essential continuity. Scholars of the United States (Campbell et. al, 1960; Nie et. al. 1976; Keith et. al, 1992; Miller and Shanks, 1996) Britain (Butler and Stokes, 1969, 1974; Crewe, 1976; Heath et. al, 1985, 1991; Clarke et. al, 2004), France (Converse and Pierce, 1993; Fleury and Lewis-Beck, 1993), Germany (Kasse, 1976), Sweden (Holmberg, 1994), Netherlands (1976), Norway (Jensen, 1999), Taiwan (Szu-yin and Jau-shieh Wu, 1996) and Post-Soviet societies (Miller and Klobucar, 2000; Brader and Tucker, 2001) have all sought a common approach or language that would enable them to engage in meaningful exchange of ideas. Whether the technical language is that of 'partisanship', 'party identification', 'party attachment', 'party predisposition' or 'standing vote', scholars of political behaviour have sought to account for this observed continuity.

In order to clarify the issues raised in this paper we will use the term partisanship to denote the tendency to vote for the same party time and time again (Miller, 1991). There are, we contend, essentially two basic explanations of this phenomenon. We refer to these as (1) social identity approach and (2) attitudinal approach (which encompasses a large number of explanations). For the moment, we treat these approaches as alternative explanations that might be pitted against each other in a theoretical and empirical tournament. In the final section, however, we
introduce the (possibly un-nerving) possibility that both these approaches may be required in order to account with the varied origins of partisanship (Bartle, 2005).

Thirty-two years ago some of the sharpest minds in the field of political behaviour met in order to establish a common ground that would promote greater comparative research on partisanship. The fruits of their deliberations were published in *Party Identification and Beyond* (Budge *et. al*, 1976). Yet though the book was widely cited, it failed to produce anything approaching a consensus about the analysis of partisanship. As a consequence there is a continuing confusion about one of the most fundamental aspects of political behaviour (Bartle, 2003; Clarke *et. al*, 2004). It is hoped that this workshop will help establish whether there is a continuing need for explanations of partisanship, what concepts are most appropriate, how these are measured and the future direction for research.

2. CONCEPTUALISATION

(a) Partisanship as a social identity

The traditional way of conceptualising partisanship is rooted in the literature on social-psychology and has been set out in three major works *The American Voter* (Campbell *et. al*, 1960), *Political Choice in Britain* (Butler and Stokes, 1969 and 1974) and *Partisan Hearts and Minds* (Green *et. al*, 2002). Although the first of these publications represents the starting point for most analyses, it was surprisingly "terse and vague" as to what party identification actually is (Green *et. al.*, 2002, p. The authors of *The American Voter* defined it simply (and obliquely) as “the individual’s affective orientation to an important group object in his environment” (Campbell *et al*, 1960, p. 121). Butler and Stokes (1974, p. 39) defined it almost equally as vaguely as

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*The use of the relatively neutral word 'predispositions' here is quite deliberate: it seeks to convey the notion that voters are disposed to support a party before they receive any information or form any*
being where "electors think of themselves as supporters of a given party in a lasting sense". The ambiguity was acknowledged in Miller's frank confession in *Party Identification and Beyond* that, "It may be that the time has passed when a single 'Michigan view' on the nature of party identification can be specified" (1976, p. 22).

The earliest accounts of partisanship drew upon small group theory and asserted that party identification is an enduring, emotional and largely unconscious identification with a political party (Campbell *et al.*, 1960). More recent accounts have shifted ground somewhat and suggested that voters identify not so much with the *party* as with those *partisan groups* (or partisan stereotypes) who are thought to support a party (Green *et al.*, 2004). Whether people identify with the party or party supporters, this psychological attachment is supposed to be distinct from behaviour. People can think of themselves as being a supporter of a party without being a fully paid up member, attending party meetings, wearing badges or displaying posters (Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Miller and Shanks, 1996). It is, however, also perfectly possible for voters *not* to 'think of themselves' as being a supporter of a particular party and be an 'independent'. This might happen, for example, where someone has characteristics that predispose them to support different parties and feels 'cross-pressured'. Independence or non-identification, however, might also result almost complete unfamiliarity with politics (Campbell *et al.*, 1960).

According to traditional interpretations party identification is the product of (largely unconscious) social learning about self-concepts and party attachments. Party identification is initially heavily conditioned by familial loyalties (Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Butler and Stokes, 1974). Electors simply come to think of themselves as ‘being Conservative’ or as ‘being Labour’. More recent accounts, however, place impressions about the issues in a specific contest.
almost equal emphasis on the learning of partisan stereotypes. According to these accounts voters learn (or perhaps more accurately absorb) the answers to several questions:

2. *What groups support that party?* (To establish partisan stereotypes)
3. *Which assemblage of groups (if any) best describes me?* (Green et al., 2002, p. 8). (To establish a lasting sense of party identification).

The newer formulations of theory are useful in clarifying that party identities shift in response *either* to changes self-identities or partisan stereotypes. Thus, idiosyncratic changes in life circumstances such as marriage, social and geographical mobility might modify self-conceptions as individuals eliminate the 'dissonance' of being 'middle class' and 'Labour' or 'a trade unionist' and 'Republican'. Equally, however, changes in the behaviour of groups can also modify behaviour. This 'contagion effect' is important. However, only “(l)arge cataclysmic events of national scope and extended temporal duration” can shake social groups free of established party loyalties (Miller and Shanks, 1996, p. 132). The latter is much rarer, though – as recent Italian experience shows – not impossible.

Party identity can exert a powerful direct impact on voting behaviour. Indeed, it is supposed that voters derive some rewards from simply recording their identities. As the social-psychological model makes clear, however, party identification is *not* the only influence on vote decisions. Electors are also influenced by short-term factors, such as the policies advocated by the parties, their perceptions of party competence, the personal characteristics of the party leaders and specific aspects of party image (Miller and Shanks, 1996). If these are sufficiently strong (another party's

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5 This latter formulation is particularly helpful since it suggests that, even if party membership is in decline, partisan stereotypes may still persist and serve as the basis for partisan predispositions.
policies or leader particularly attractive) identifiers may vote for another party. Thus, it is perfectly possible for someone to think of themselves as X while voting Y. If a voter identifies with a party, however, then they can be predicted to return 'home' once the short-term forces that pushed (or pulled) them away have disappeared.

The simple act of thinking of oneself as a supporter of a particular party has important consequences. It enables first-time voters to cast a vote even if they do not have enough direct experience to judge parties (Achen, 2002). It provides all voters with a 'reason' to vote even if they believe that the outcome in their constituency or the national result is a foregone conclusion. It also predisposes them to vote for a party when there are no 'instrumental' reasons for choosing a party.

Butler and Stokes (1974, p.36-7) maintained that:

"As long established actors on the political stage it is natural that they parties should have become objects of mass loyalty or identification. As a result, the success of a given party and the confounding of its enemies has a value in its own right for many electors, quite apart from the uses which the party might make of power. The dramatic idiom is not misplaced. A protagonist in the political drama can evoke from the electoral audience a response at the polling station which has mainly to do with the values of having one's heroes prevail" (emphases added).

They went on:

"our view of the 'intrinsic' values of party should be broad enough to include a number of psychic or social utilities that party may have for the voter that are distinct from the values government may supply. The intrinsic value of partisanship may, for example, be those of preserving harmony in the friendship group or the home or the nuptial bed…….We shall indeed speak of a variety of such personal and social uses of party allegiance as 'intrinsic'
values to set them off from the utilities that may flow from the actions of
government. There is no doubt that these residual values are often in the voter's
mind" (emphasis added).

The party identification approach to partisanship has theoretical underpinnings
in social-psychology, though the reference group theory that they drew upon has now
been replaced by social identity theory (Greene, 1999, 2002; Weisberg and Greene,
2003; Green et. al, 2004). Evaluations of the theory depend, therefore, in no small part
on one's general evaluation of the social-psychological literature or, at least, its
applicability to the study of voting behaviour. It is unarguable, however, that this
general approach has produced useful explanations of a wide range of social
phenomena (Smith and McKie, 2000). The social identity approach ties in well with
those accounts of party systems that emphasise the importance of social structure and
organisation (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). In Britain, for example, many trade unions
have traditionally fostered Labour identities by providing their members with
information favourable to that party (Butler and Stokes, 1971, chapter 7), while in
Italy, union membership and religious practise have nurtured the two adversarial
political sub-cultures (Catholic and Communist) as the basis of voters’ choice for
forty years. The social identity approach also fits in well with what we know about the
inattentiveness to politics among the mass public (Campbell et. al, 1960; Butler and
Stokes, 1974). Since group memberships are usually more important to voters than
their political beliefs it seems only natural to suggest that voters select political beliefs
to fit in with group memberships rather than vice-versa (Harrop and Miller, 1987).

The point to be highlighted here is that identity is a ‘form of closure of social
relationships’ (Bartolini, 2000, p.18). Students of political cleavages refer to
‘encapsulation’ as the process through which parties and their collateral agencies are
(were) able to develop an external closure of partisans from outside pressures
(Bartolini and Mair, 1990). As Bartolini argues, a political cleavage incorporates three dimensions:

“an empirical element, which identifies the empirical referent of the concept and which we can define in socio-structural terms; a normative elements, that is, the set of values and beliefs that provide a sense of identity and role to the empirical element and reflects the self-awareness of the social group involved; and an organizational behavioural element, that is, the set of individual interactions, institutions, and organizations, such as political parties, that develop, as part of that cleavage” (Bartolini, 2000, 17, italics in original)

There is a vigorous debate as to whether mass-cleavage parties still exist in contemporary polities; whether social stratification exert any impact on party choice; whether secondary organization reinforce political identities (Miller et al., 1991; Beck et al., 2002; Bellucci, Maraffi, Segatti, 2006). But it cannot simply be assumed that identification with parties has disappeared because of the changing nature of parties in contemporary society. On the contrary, it is precisely the diminishing importance of traditional (class and religious) cleavages – that were once the socio-structural bases of encapsulation and political identity -- which may enhance the role of parties as direct object of identification (Berglund et al., 2005). From this perspective, there is an exciting research agenda extending from the source of group identity and political cohesion to its behavioural consequences (Huddy, 2003).

Some find the social-identity conceptualisation of partisanship absurd and use the term 'party identification' to denote partisan attitudes. It must be conceded that there is surprisingly little direct evidence either that party identities are of particular significance to electors or that they think about partisan stereotypes (cf. Green et al., 2002). There is also something curiously circular in the proposition that group members form loyalties to conform to group norms since it is unclear how such norms are established in the first place. The principal objection to the approach is, however, ‘definitional’ in nature (Shanks, 1994). By suggesting that electors use their vote to
express their identity or solidarity with others the social identity approach radically diminishes the instrumental significance of the vote decision.

Many psychologists regard the proposition that people act unconsciously to express their identities as uncontroversial (see Eckstein, 1991; Johnston, 1991, Abelson, 1996). Some, however, find the proposition objectionable on moral grounds alone (Robertson, 1976). Others believe that there are good reasons for believing that political actors are oriented towards goals. Those accustomed to working within the constraints of methodological individualism find it difficult to accept that voters may waste their vote in order to express their loyalties to a group.6 The individual is, however, every bit as much an abstraction as the group (Stimson, 1999, p. 2). Thus, the fact that the social identity approach acknowledges the social nature of the individual can, therefore, be counted among its principal strengths.

It is worth noting here that scholars working from purely instrumental assumptions about human motivation have also developed a theory of voting behaviour that permits expressive considerations. Brennan and Lomasky (1994) take as their starting point the well-worn ‘paradox of voting’ that, in any large scale electorate, it is instrumentally irrational to vote. This is because even if the pay-off from having one's preferred candidate win is very large the probability of being decisive (or pivotal) is very small and the expected benefit is always likely to be less than the cost of voting. Brennan and Lomasky note that rational choice theorists invariably suggest that people vote because they obtain some benefit from merely expressing their identity but then go on to assume that when they decide how to vote they must weigh up the costs and benefits. They regard this 'dualism' as highly

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6 There are other, less noble reasons for rejecting expressive behaviour, such as protecting academic. Downs arguments for instrumental behaviour, for example, seem to be "we must assume men orient their behaviour chiefly toward [their economic or political welfare] in our world; otherwise all analysis..."
unsatisfactory. Voting models must, therefore, either permit both expressive and instrumental behaviour or accept that some voters are expressive while others are instrumental (Bartle, 2005).

The social-identity approach suggests that party identification has direct effects on vote decisions, acting as a 'tie-breaker' when other (short-term) forces cancel out. It also suggests also have indirect effects on short-term factors. The authors of The American Voter, for example, contended that enduring partisan commitments had a heavy impact "in shaping attitudes toward political objects" (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 135). In particular, it has been supposed that identifiers tend to adopt the policies advocated by their parties, judge their party more highly than others (more 'caring', 'effective' and 'competent') and prefer their leaders to those of other parties. Analysts, accordingly, learned to control for party identification when estimating other psychological variables such as policy preferences, evaluations of conditions and assessments of candidates. The 'funnel of causality' heuristic set out in Figure 2 suggests that analysts must control for prior variables in order to estimate the unique contribution of each variable on the 'average' voter (Miller and Shanks, 1996).

There are also supposed to be psychological mechanisms that insulate the identification from further modification. It was argued that "Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what if favourable to his partisan orientation" (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 132). Thus, while shifts in opinion could theoretically promote shifts in party identities, they rarely do so in practice (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 123). Party identifiers were accordingly portrayed as 'unmoved movers' and party identification was treated as "exogenous" with respect to opinions and evaluations (as shown in Figure 2).

of either economics or politics turns into a mere adjunct of primary-group sociology" (Downs, 1957: 8).
This proposition that party identification has widespread indirect effects on other variables and that it is self-insulating from contrary information appears to elevate it above all other variables in models of voting behaviour. Not surprisingly, therefore, it remains controversial to this day because measured party identification is often found to respond to changes in variables that it has hitherto been assumed to cause (Jackson, 1975; Converse and Markus, 1979; Fiorina, 1981; Clarke et. al, 2004). Even those who emphasise social identities are sceptical about the proposition identifiers perceptions are distorted in the manner assumed by the authors of The American Voter. Green et. al (2002, chapter 5) provide evidence that identifiers are made just as aware as others of the failings of their party. Identifiers may find it painful to be confronted with evidence of their own party’s incompetence or corruption, but that does not mean that they are not capable of forming negative impressions of their party. Party identities may continue to have direct effects on the vote and they may still vote for their party ‘despite’ differences or disappointments, but they are not blinded by party loyalty. 

The perceptual screen hypothesis is more often asserted than demonstrated. While recent research by has provided some evidence in support of ‘pervasive’ partisan effects in case of the United States (Zaller, 1992; Bartels, 2002), there is by no means general consensus on the subject. Yet, as we shall now demonstrate, even those who think of partisanship as an attitude are also forced to concede that these may exert an influence on other attitudes and beliefs.
(b) Partisanship as an attitude

The second approach treats to partisanship treats it as a mere attitude (albeit one of particular relevance and importance for the vote decision). Before going any further, however, it is worth clarifying exactly what we mean by ‘attitude’ since, like ‘identification’, this term has both been used in different ways by different authors and in different ways by the same authors. We take attitude simply to mean "some positive or negative disposition toward an attitude object" (Converse, 1995, xi). We distinguish between attitudes (like identities unobservable) and opinions or opinion statements (observable responses to a specific question or stimuli).

The attitudinal approach to partisanship is, in general, more compatible with individual rational (or cognitive) accounts of political behaviour than the social identity approach. The objects that are the focus of positive or negative dispositions are the parties rather than those groups that are assumed to support them. The individual, therefore, has a personal relationship with the party that is not conditional on perceptions of partisan groups.

There are several ways of in which attitudes towards the parties are created, sustained and modified (see Erickson et. al, 2002).

1. Party identification. Voters who think of themselves as being Labour generally have a positive attitude towards the party as a result of their group identity (though some may be ‘negative partisans’ and base their sense of ‘being Labour’ on their opposition to the Conservatives, (see Crewe, 1976)).

2. Standing vote. Voters decide to support a party for a variety of reasons (eg., family traditions) but are otherwise inattentive to politics. They continue to vote for that party in ignorance (Downs, 1957, p. 100; Miller, 1976, p. 23). Alternatively, partisanship can be treated as a ‘heuristic’ or as a way of
simplifying complex decisions (Popkin, 1994, Sniderman, 2000; cf. Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000). Indeed, according to one author, it is the ‘ultimate heuristic’ that voters can deploy (Dalton, 2005, p. 180).

3. **Ideology, core beliefs and ideological positions.** Voters assess the parties' beliefs about the way the world is, the way the world should be and how to get from one to the other (Downs, 1957). They support the one whose 'ideology' most closely matches their own (Scarborough, 1984; Popkin, 1994). In purely spatial terms attitudes towards the parties can vary in inverse relation to the 'distance' between party and voter.

4. **Cumulative political experiences.** Voters assess the parties according to their past performance (Fiorina, 1981, 1981; Achen, 1992). If they do well voters' attitudes become more positively disposed to them. If they do badly voters become less positively disposed. Partisanship represents a 'running tally' that is modified by experience. It is 'valenced partisanship' (Clarke et al., 2004).

This approach suggests that there are a variety of ways by which voters develop attitudes towards (or predispositions to support) parties. With the exception of 'true identifiers', however, voters are regarded as instrumental (calculative) individuals who make decisions designed to maximise their interests subject to imperfect information and uncertainty (Downs, 1957; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Lupia et al., 2000). They are not guided by unconscious group loyalties. Thus, although most advocates of this approach use the word 'identification' to describe partisanship, they regard that identification as essentially 'hollow' (Green et al., 2002). Parties are not valued in themselves but for what they produce and partisanship is “an evolving indicator of an individual’s relationship to a party” (Fiorina, 2002, p. 98).
The attitudinal approach to partisanship has strong attractions. While the social identity approach largely focuses on voters' relationship with one particular party, the attitudinal approach suggests that voters have attitudes towards all the parties. In principle, therefore, they can help understand how voters rank the parties, view coalitions and predict strategic voting. The approach suggests that attitudes towards the parties are essentially changeable. Shifts in ideological position or changing evaluations can increase or strengthen or weaken their attitudes toward the parties. If these predispositions do not change, it is assumed that this is as a result of a rational (or, at least, reasonable) decision (Popkin, 1994).

Evaluations of the attitudinal approach are heavily influenced by basic assumptions about human behaviour (Shanks, 1994). Those who believe that electors use their votes in order to achieve political goals find the cognitive element attractive. Partisanship, according to these accounts, has no especial significance (or importance) for the vote decision. Others, however, feel that this characterisation of partisanship in terms of an overall summary judgment is implausible. It seems only natural that parties become objects of affection in their own right. In representative democracies voters are not asked -- or required -- to choose from an infinite range of policy possibilities. They are generally presented with structured choices and asked to choose between them (Sniderman, 2000). Although there are signs of a new style of non-partisan politics parties continue to provide structure for voters (Allen, 2006). It seems only reasonable, therefore, to suggest that attitudes towards the parties are of especial significance (and not just in elections).

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The social identity literature on partisanship is remarkably silent about other parties. Miller and Shanks (1996: 120) suggest that "Neither religious identification nor party identification necessarily speaks to one's regard, positive or negative, for other persuasions". Others have long suggested that party identification may be the result of negative feelings towards other parties (See Crewe, 1976).
In recent years there has been a great deal of attention has focussed on so-called 'strong attitudes' (Petty and Krosnick, 1995; Boninger et. al, 1995). These are, very simply, positive or negative dispositions towards an attitude object' that are:

1. durable
2. resist attempts at persuasion in contrary directions
3. exert an influence on the formation of related perceptions and beliefs
4. predict behavioural decisions with highest fidelity (Converse, 1995).

Strong attitudes, like identifications, are stable at the individual level. Attitudes towards the parties may be strong simply because voters have a great deal of information (or many ‘considerations’) about the parties (Zaller and Feldman, 1992). Thus, each additional unit of information is unlikely to alter overall attitudes, since each bit represents a small fraction of the total (Zaller, 1992). The effect of party may, however, not simply depend on the large number of experiences that electors have.

Partisan frameworks (or schemas) and symbols are commonplace and readily called to mind (Hamill et. al, 1985; Lodge and Hamill, 1986). Research has handsomely demonstrated that accessible attitudes have a powerful effect on behaviour and the coding of information (Fazio and Williams, 1986; Fazio, 1989, 1995; Petty and Krosnick, 1995). It seems only plausible to suggest that attitudes towards parties are particularly durable and resistant to change. Not surprisingly, attitudes towards significant social groups, for example, have a strong influence on behaviour (Miller et. al, 1991, Miller and Shanks, 1996; Beck et. al, 2002). Thus, even from the attitude approach there are strong reasons for treating attitudes towards groups and parties as particularly important.

Despite the sharp distinction that we have tried to draw between the social identity and attitudinal approaches it appears that there is significant convergence.
This should hardly be surprising. Not only are the theories not quite as distinct as their chief protagonists would like to have it, research is constrained by the available data. As Achen (1992, p. 195) notes "good data make for consensus".

(c) Theoretical debates about partisanship

The concept of party identification dominated all discussions of political partisanship both in the United States (Nie et. al, 1977; Keith et. al, 1992; Clarke and Stewart, 1998) and elsewhere until the early 1970s. In Europe, however, the concept was treated with considerable scepticism (Budge et. al. 1976; Thomasen, 1976). In general it was thought that the concept was either only or better suited to the special circumstances of the United States, where the two-party system, large number of elections, lack of class or ideological politics, first-past-the-post electoral system and unique practice of registering as a Republican or Democrat encouraged voters to distinguish between their long-term party identification and short-term political preferences (Budge et. al, 1976). In Europe, by contrast, the multi-party systems, proportional electoral systems, strong class cleavages and ideological parties were thought to make the concept superfluous or -- at best -- unhelpful (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Bartolini, 2003). Only in Britain, which used a similar electoral system and -- until the mid-1970s -- approximated a two party system, was party identification taken very seriously.\(^8\)

The debate about partisanship has taken place at several levels. According to some the whole theoretical apparatus of the social-identity approach is deeply suspect (even in the United States) (Fiorina, 1981; Clarke et. al, 2004). Some have questioned just how central parties are to voters. Others have suggested that while the party

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\(^8\) This was also a product of the close collaboration between Donald Stokes one of the authors of *The American Voter* and David Butler, Britain's leading psephologist to produce *Political Choice in Britain*. 
identification approach was of some (or greater) relevance in less developed societies where primary groups provided a useful guide for action, the erosion of mass parties (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002), the individualisation of behaviour in post modern societies (Refs), the weakening of parental transmission of partisan attitudes (Bellucci, 1995) has greatly altered the nature of partisanship. Put quite simply, partisanship used to be tribal, irrational and expressive; it is now best thought of as a heuristic, standing vote or cognition (Dalton, 2005). Whether or not partisanship has changed among voters, way of conceptualising it has changed.

The theoretical debate about the best way of conceptualising partisanship is of considerable importance. The social identity approach suggests that partisanship is stable because voters are rooted in social groups and that this basic self-image is unlikely to change until primary group identities change. It also suggests that partisanship has an emotional component. The attitudinal approach, on the other hand, suggests that voters are basically rational instrumental voters who regularly update their partisanship. Although there is a measure of agreement about some issues, these contrasting portraits of the electorate are not always easy to reconcile. While an increasing number of studies emphasise the emotional of affective content of attitudes (Rahn, 2000). Ultimately, the choice between the social identity and attitudinal approaches depends on matters of ‘taste’ and whether one ‘feels comfortable’ with rational actor assumptions rather than empirical tests alone (Stokes, 1963, p. 377; Fiorina, 1981, p. 190). Measurement issues are, however, likely to prove just as important as theory in the long run. It is to these that we now turn.
3. MEASUREMENT OF PARTISANSHIP

Neither of the two principal conceptualisations of partisanship is of much practical use unless we can measure them (Bishop et. al, 1994, Greene, 1999, 2002). Yet, as we have stressed above, neither identities nor attitudes are directly observable. It follows that if we are to measure these at the individual level, we must produce reliable and valid survey questions (Schumann and Presser, 1994).

Before we go any further it is worth reflecting on just how difficult it is to formulate a question that would enable individuals to distance themselves from their current feelings towards a party and record either their enduring self-image or their attitudes towards a particular party. We are, in effect, asking people to put aside their current concerns, ignore the latest political news and record whether or not they usually attach a party label to themselves. It seems necessary, therefore, to remember that there is often a world of difference between ‘answering questions’ and ‘revealing preferences’ (Zaller and Feldman, 1992).

It follows that analysts need to distinguish carefully between theoretical constructs and operational indicators. To take just one example, it might be thought to be quite odd to speak about “the dynamics of party identification” in the context of two adjacent elections spaced just four or five years apart if identifications are regarded as enduring emotional attachments (Clarke et. al, 2004). It might be wiser – and indeed more accurate – to speak of “the dynamics of partisanship” or “the dynamics properties of party identification measures”.

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9 This proposition suggests that we might never be able to measure identifications; a possibility that we discuss below.
(a) Party identification

European scholars have long been suspicious of party identification because it is so closely associated -- and not clearly causally antecedent -- to the vote itself (Budge et. al, 1976, p. 5). The fact that those who switched vote also switched their reported identity hardly demonstrated that party identities were exogenous. Adherents of the social-psychological approach suggest that this closeness may be the result of inadequate measures and, therefore, more apparent than real (Green and Palmquist, 1990, 1994). Critics might suggest that such arguments assume -- almost without critical reflection -- that party identification really exists.

Converse and Pierce (1985, p.144) note, there are two elements that are ‘absolutely central to the whole notion of party identification’. These are a feeling of self-identity and an extended time horizon. This observation suggests that identities cannot be attributed to individuals simply by observing their behaviour or inferred from a particular set of attitudes, opinions or evaluations. This is because party identification is just one among many influences on voting behaviour. It equally implies that identities cannot be imposed on individuals by the question (wording, order in which the questions are posed or the response options supplied). Party identification is, above all, a self-assigned identity. If we are to measure it we must, therefore, rely on respondents themselves to assess whether they think of themselves as 'Republican', 'Democrat', 'Conservative', 'Labour', 'Christian Democrat' and so on.

Before going any further we must note that the ultimate test of any party identification measure must be based on panel data. Specifically:

- Recorded party identification should be more stable than evaluations of the parties, leaders and vote over pairs of elections.

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10 There are other reasons not to allow past vote in cross-sectional studies, since memories are fallible. Literature here.
Those who switch votes at time $t_2$ should retain their party identification at $t_1$.

There should be a detectable ‘homing tendency’ so that party identification in time $t_1$ is a better predictor of vote in $t_2$ than vote in $t_1$.

In order to provide a more concrete example we will again draw upon British example. This decision arises from our familiarity with the literature. It is hoped, however, that this exercise will also point to some common concerns across countries.

The ‘traditional’ measure of party identification used in the British Election Study is worded as follows:

“Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, [Nationalist] or what?”

At first blush this seems to capture both elements of party identification. The expression “think of yourself” represents a concise and, to our minds, accurate reflection of a self-identity. The phrase “generally speaking”, although somewhat terse, does appear to conjure long-term considerations (although, to be sure, some might take it as referring to policies).

Closer analysis of this question and the original British Election Study questionnaire raises doubts as to whether it would enable someone to distinguish between their current preference and their long-term predisposition. The first thing to note is that the party identification question is asked immediately after respondents are asked about their recent vote. It has been suggested that this ordering of the questions produces a tendency to 'rationalise' vote by reporting a party identification with the party one has voted for. Heath and Pierce (1992) maintain that this inverted the proper order between general predisposition and specific behaviour. This question order effect may be compounded by the relative vagueness of the phrase “generally
speaking”. Later analyses suggested that the question order did not make any difference in the case of the BES question (McAllister and Wattenberg, 1995). This is perhaps hardly surprising given additional problems with the question and, in particular, the lack of a clear 'non-identification' option (Johnston, 1992). To see the implications of this consider the case of an individual who does not think of themselves as Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat or Nationalist. How could they possibly respond to the traditional BES question? The question itself contains no clues, no hints or words to convey the fact of their non-identification. Respondents are required, in effect, to construct their own response category: so it represents a hybrid closed and open-ended question. They can hardly declare themselves an “or what”! It seems only too plausible to suggest that they will try to find some way of complying with the ‘rules’ of the interview and provide an answer (even if it is wrong) (Krosnick, 1991). It is only natural that they will report an identity with the party that they voted for: an identity that does not exist. How much more likely is this to occur given that they have just a few seconds ago been asked, “Which party did you vote for in the general election?”

These differences in both the question wording and question order (between vote and party identification) perhaps explain why electors who switch votes are more likely to switch their reported party identification in the United States. While some have taken this as suggesting that British voters are less likely to distinguish between long and short-term preferences it may be – at least in part – a product of a particularly appalling piece of question design (Butler and Stokes, 1974). In hindsight, it is clear that the traditional BES question lacks face validity as an indicator of individual party identification (Bartle, 1999, 2001).

From 1963 to 1970 the question read, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself...”. The reason for the deletion of the word ‘usually’ is not clear. It was perhaps thought that the phrase was
There have been several attempts to remedy these defects by producing new questions. Sanders et. al (2003) recommended a two-stage question which read as follows:

“Do you usually think of yourself as a supporter of a particular party?
Yes/No

“Which party is that?”

This question again seems well designed at first blush. It contains an appropriate phrase “think of yourself as” and the single word (“usually”) to capture the extended temporal duration component. Moreover, since the question does not include any party names it provides few partisan clues. That makes some sense: If identities are “real”, it could be argued, voters would have little need of reminding their names.

This question was included on both the 2001 and 2005 British Elections Studies. Unfortunately, however, responses to this question are even less stable than those to the traditional BES item! This finding could count against the proposition that voters do distinguish between their long-term identities and short-term preferences. It is possible, however, that it points to flaws in the question. It appears far too easy to say “No” to the first question. “Yes/No” questions do not typically require much thought. Moreover, answering “no” for some voters might be a convenient way of closing down political discussion and shortening the length of the interview (Krosnick, 1991).

Bartle (2003) reported the findings of a series of focus groups on various measures of party identification. He recommended experimenting with questions in the following form:

redundant given the presence of “Generally speaking..”
“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, [Nationalist] or don’t you usually think of yourself as any of these?”

This question is designed to allow voters to record their non-identification ("or don't you think of yourself as any of these?") and clarify the extended temporal dimension (by re-inserting the word "usually"). It is designed to approximate the question posed on the National Election Study, which permits Americans to distinguish between their long-term loyalties and short-term preferences. Regrettably, this sort of question has not yet been subjected to the sort of panel study test as the other two items examined above. It is, however, clear that party identification – as measured by the traditional BES item – does not tap an enduring attachment.

In short, it is no easy matter to measure party identification. Although political science has invested a great deal in the analysis of the causes and consequences of party identification, it has invested surprisingly little in the measurement. Maintenance of the time series (vital if vote models based on voting data are to be generated) has taken precedence over the validity and reliability of individual level measures. The self-evident weakness of the measures has not prevented some from declaring the theory wanting. Yet while it may well be that the social identity approach is every bit as flabby as many declare it to be, it is not clear that prior empirical work -- based on flawed measures -- has demonstrated this.

(b) Partisan attitudes

The larger revisionist literature, which argues that party identification is unstable, attests to the fact that traditional measures of party identification can double up as measures of partisanship (Fiorina, 1981; Achen, 1992; Clarke et. al, 2004). This
is hardly surprising because identifiers can be safely assumed to have attitudes
towards at least one of the parties (either as a result of their attitudes towards groups
or directly towards the parties). It is also possible to use information from the
supplementary question about the ‘strength’ of partisanship to construct a measure of
partisan attitudes. In the British case this would produce a seven unit scale ranging
from ‘very strong Labour’, ‘fairly strong Labour’, ‘not very strong Labour’, ‘other’,
‘not very strong Conservative’, ‘fairly strong Conservative’ and ‘very strong
Conservative’.12 This strategy, however, relegates identity with ‘other’ parties to the
status of ‘none’ or ‘neutral’ identities. This seems unwise when – as at present – a
large proportion of the electorate thinks of themselves as neither Labour nor
Conservative (Allen, 2006). It still seems doubtful, furthermore, as to whether
something as complex as partisan attitudes (which have both emotional and cognitive
elements) can be adequately captured by these two questions, particularly if the first
question does not provide a clear non-identification option (Greene, 2002).

Other methods of measuring partisan attitudes include the classic ‘feeling
thermometer’, which asks respondents to report a score between 0 and 100 in order to
express how they ‘feel’ about the party in question. This appears to produce a very
useable indicator of dispositions towards the parties. The main problems with such
questions are that (1) extreme scores might not equate with attitude strength (Abelson,
1995), (2) such questions are usually phrased in terms of current feelings rather than
enduring dispositions (Greene, 2002), (3) respondents vary in the degree of
‘generosity’ (some think ‘9’ represents a very high score, others would take ‘7’)
(Green, 1988) and (4) they do not distinguish between cognitive, affective and
behavioural elements of partisanship (Greene, 2002). Some respondents inevitably

12 In passing it should be noted that ‘very strong’ and ‘fairly strong’ partisans behave in very similar
ways. It must be doubted whether any shifts between the two categories are of much importance.
gravitate to the ‘middle’ producing what Converse (1995, p. xv) has labelled the problem of the ‘overstuffed middle’, consisting of those who are genuinely ‘neutral’, those who are ‘ambivalent’ and those who ‘cannot be bothered’ to think about the question (Krosnick, 1991).

In general indicators of partisanship based on multiple item scales have greater reliability and validity (Greene, 2002). The ‘semantic differential’ approach to measuring partisan attitudes has been used with some success. Respondents are presented with words and asked how well they describe the parties. Responses are then summed to create an overall partisanship score. This method has the usual advantages of multiple-item scales (cancelling out of random error, possible correction for ‘wording direction’ and so on) (Spector, 1994; Carmines and Zeller, 1994). It also enables researchers to assess the contribution of cognitive and affective components of partisanship (eg. the relative importance of ‘competence’ and ‘caring’). While most major studies contain a variety of possible indicators of partisanship there appears to have been less interest in measuring partisanship outside the United States (cf. Brader and Tucker, 2001; Bartle, 1999, 2001, 2003, Sanders et al, date)

In Britain there have been several attempts to establish the long-term ideological basis of partisanship. Some authors have relied on respondents own reports of their positions on a general left-right scale. This method is, however, problematic. Voters may not understand the terms 'left' and 'right' (Butler and Stokes, 1974) but are still capable of responding to ideological appeals (Scarborough, 1984). Reliance on such measures risks confusing partisan attitudes for sophistication. More interestingly Anthony Heath and his colleagues have tried to measure voters’ positions on socialist/laissez-faire (conventional left-right), liberal-authoritarian
(tough v tender) and British national sentiment (nationalism v internationalism) dimensions (Heath et. al, 1993; Heath et. al, 1998). These scales correlate highly with party identification (and therefore vote) (Bartle, 1998). However, further research is required to establish the causal relationship between such variables and partisanship (or party identification).

Yet while measures of ideological position are undoubtedly useful and provide clues about the origins of partisanship, they omit any reference to the intrinsic (non-instrumental) appeal of parties. As the authors of The American Voter were well aware, there is no necessary relationship between instrumental factors (ideological position, evaluations of conditions) and party identification.

4. DISTINGUISHING SOCIAL IDENTITIES AND STRONG ATTITUDES

Throughout this paper we have largely side-stepped the issue of whether partisanship is best viewed as an enduring social identity or as an attitude. This seems to us to represent what Downs (1957, p.3) might regard as a ‘reasonable evasion of problems that are intrinsically insoluble’. It cannot be side-stepped forever, however, and here we put our cards on the table. Let us assume, for the moment, that we have formulated a question (or series of questions) that does seem to identify partisans: those who tend to support the same party time and time again. Even if we achieved this, however, the problem would remain: we would still be uncertain whether they behaved in this partisan manner as a result of either a social identity or the existence of strong attitudes.

The key to distinguishing between these two groups of partisans appears to lie in identifying what distinguishes identifiers from those with strong attitudes (Butler and Stokes, 1974). The answer, it is clear from our theoretical discussion, is simple:
party identifiers should have a “we feeling” or set of “emotional attachments” to a party that should be absent (or virtually absent) among other partisans. We add the qualifying phrase “virtually absent” to reflect the growing body of research that claims to demonstrate that there is a significant emotional (as well as cognitive) element to many political attitudes (Rahn, 2000).

The practical possibilities are illustrated by the work of Steven Greene (1999, 2002). In his work respondents are asked to complete a short additional battery of questions that can be simply summed to produce an index of group identities. Answers to these questions are used to compute an index of social identities that approximates the “we” feeling that is crucial to party identity. (The full battery of questions set out in the Appendix.) In principle such data would enable us to sub-divide partisans into those with partisan attitudes and those who are real identifiers.13

It may well be that genuine identifiers constitute a very small proportion of the electorate. If we could identify such individuals, however, we would go some way to understanding the complex (and variable) micro-mechanics underlying voting behaviour (Bartle, 2005). Parallel research is also required, however, as to whether electors do think in terms of partisan stereotypes and it must not be beyond the wit of some political scientists to devise experiments in order to establish the effect of groups on opinion formation and voting behaviour.

In short, although much has been written we have barely scratched the surface of the debate about partisanship. It is time to seriously assess party identification theory rather either take its assertions as gospel or dismiss it on purely theoretical grounds alone. There are many routes to partisanship and equally there are very many ways of measuring partisanship. We thoroughly agree with the proposition that we
should "not assume from the outset that party identification is in some metaphysical sense the only true method" (Budge et al., 1976, p.9).

5. CONCLUSIONS

The debate about partisanship has progressed surprisingly little since the ECPR workshop in 1974 and the publication of *Party Identification and Beyond*. Issues of conceptualisation and measurement are separate in principle but overlap in practice. Given the limited resources available for experiments on question wording on most election studies, however, it appears plausible to suggest that theory is always likely to run ahead of measurement. Thus, the complex interrelationship between theory and measurement is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. As many wiser heads have realised, interpretations of the data will inevitably turn on matters of ‘taste’ and whether one ‘feels comfortable’ with social-psychological or rational actor assumptions rather than empirical tests (Stokes, 1963, p. 377; Fiorina, 1981, p. 190). Prior beliefs about the basic ‘model of man’ that is most appropriate to the study of voting behaviour are simply not capable of direct empirical inquiry (Shanks, 1994).

We end with a final observation. We have supposed throughout this paper that it is important to establish the correct way of conceptualising and measuring party identification at the individual level. Like our predecessors we are intrigued about the processes by which individual voters acquire the configuration of attitudes, opinions, evaluations and impressions of candidates and parties is of some scientific interest. Controlling for either past vote or (worse) recollections of past vote is unlikely to provide us with a good estimate of the. Like other scholars, however, we are impressed by arguments that – at the aggregate level – it might be useful to control for

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13 In reality the decision to label someone as an identifier or as partisan may be arbitrary. One of Greeene's (1999, 2002) findings is that many self-reported identifiers evince evidence of some identity
past vote, especially when forecasting elections (Campbell and Garand, 2000). That is, as they say, however, another story….

Appendix: items used for index of group identities

(a) When someone criticises [], it feels like a personal insult.

(b) I don't act like the typical [] person.

(c) I'm very interested in what other think about []

(d) The limitations associated with [] apply to me also.

(e) When I talk of [], I usually say "we" rather than "they".

(f) I have a number of qualities typical of [] supporters.

(g) [] successes are also my successes.

(h) If a story in the media criticised [], I would feel embarrassed.

(i) When someone praises [], it feels like a personal compliment.

(j) I act like a [] to a great extent.

Bibliography


Robertson, David (1976) 'Surrogates for Party Identification Within the Rational Choice Framework’ in Budge et al Party Identification and Beyond, pp. 365-82.


### Table 1: The turnover of the vote 1987-92

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote in 1987</th>
<th>Did Not Vote</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote in 1992</td>
<td>Did Not Vote</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Con</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lib Dem</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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</table>

*Source:* British Election Panel Studies, 1987-92. Note: The figures in the table do not add up to 100 per cent, since some voters moved between ‘other’ parties.
Table 2: The turnover of the vote 1987-92

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote in 1992</th>
<th>Vote in 1997</th>
<th>Did Not Vote</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Vote</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>22.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>37.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
<td>31.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lib Dem</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>----</td>
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<td>25.7</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

*Source:* British Election Panel Studies, 1992-97. Note: The figures in the table do not add up to 100 per cent, since some voters moved between ‘other’ parties.
Figure 1: Trends in the opinion polls 1992-7
Table 3: Relationship between party vote and previous vote 1945-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>Lib</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Previous vote</td>
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<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>(11.6)</td>
<td>(4.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=17

Coefficients in brackets not significant at p<0.05
Figure 1: The Funnel of causality

Social Groups

Social identities

Value orientations

Party identification

Evaluations of current conditions/Current Policy preferences

Evaluations of partisan objects (party images and evaluations of leaders)

VOTE