IOs politicization as a process: the politics of cooperation within NGOs, OECD and non-member states in the issue of state and peace building

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Introduction

One of the concerns about policy issues that go beyond national borders is how International Organizations (IOs) interact with other policy actors, and how this interaction leads to more politicization at the transnational sphere. Recent social mobilization such as Occupy Wall Street in 2011 or, one decade before, the mobilization the Battle of Seattle (1999) against the policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Trade Organization (WTO) have spread globally and show how there is an increasing social scrutiny of IOs’ policy decisions and its direct effects on citizens daily life. Even in the absence of a world government, there is an increasing consciousness between citizens that international authority can deter or influence the final national policy decisions about commerce, ecology, rights, education, retirement and so on. As several authors have demonstrate, this trend is not new, international mobilization against slavery in the XIX Century and other international human rights campaigns are good examples of previous politicization at the transnational sphere (Keck and Sickink, 1998). The goal of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of how politicization occurs in the international arena, depicting politicization as a process constrained by different variables related to the configuration of the World Political System (WPS), the collective action and social mobilization and the issue at stake. We use this conceptualization to analyse the politicization of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the case of state and peace building.

Previous research on globalization, for example, suggests that the politicization of the international sphere is related to alterations in the distribution of power associated to structural changes such as global international trade, the transnational flow of goods, services, communication or people, which have a direct impact in the distribution of life chances all over the globe (Beck, 1997). Based on everyday life experiences, such as changes in consumption habits (online shop) or international mobility to work or study, or even the consciousness of more dramatic events such as terrorism attacks related to international conflicts or immigrants’ dead in the Mediterranean, national citizens are acquiring also consciousness of being a transnational community (Held, 1995; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012). Also international relations theory has developed and explanation about how nation-state society become vulnerable to the cost imposed by globalization, identifying at least to two trends that transform the power distribution: First, national
governments interdependence, states recognize they cannot regulate or solve problems that are beyond their national borders and delegate responsibility to IOs (Keohane and Nye, 1997). Second, the emergence of transnational social mobilization (through different strategies and different type of collective actions) as well as of a global public opinion. 3). Changes in the distribution of power vary across venues (IOs and other international institutions) and also across issues, pushing to the creation of mechanisms and political organization that provide a framework of interaction -exchange of ideas and solutions-; regulation and law enforcement (Zürn, 2004; Tallberg et al 2013).

But we know less about how to explain the differences in the way different IOs get politicized, in this paper we suggest that politicization must be understood as a process and this process is constrained by three main variables, which interact and influence mutually: 1) The way the power is distributed in the international arena through different dimensions of order and disorder. The particular characteristics of the WPS affect the politicization of the international sphere, and at the same time the politicization of IOs. We understand IOs as a part of this structure of order and disorder, and simultaneously they have their own institutional setting. 2) Politicization means the expansion of the conflict and cooperation through different stake-holders affected by a particular issue. The mobilization civil society organization and other transnational actors are by this mean one of the main indicators of politicization. The participate actively in the process of politicization of the international arena, pressing to enter issues in to the agenda and to push particular views and conceptions about the dimension and the interpretation of specific issues. 3) The issue itself and the issue attention it raises. Following the agenda setting approach, stand that not all issues get politicized because there is a problem of agenda capacity both within IOs and also within other transnational actors own agenda.

The paper is organized in four sections. The first is devoted to review previous research on IOs politicization and its main contributions. Building on it, the second section is devoted to conceptualize politicization as a process and to explain which variables intervene in this process. In the third part it is analyzed the politics of cooperation between NGOs, OECD and non-member states on the issue of state and peace bulding. Finally there are some concluding remarks and lines for future research.
1. Politicization of the international arena: transnational activism and global governance

There is an academic consensus about the increasing politicization of the international sphere; not only the European Union (EU) (Hugh and Marks, 2009) but also other international institutions such as the WTO, IFM and several agencies of United Nations (UN) are in the focus of international debates, involving the general public and transnational actors, not only NGOs but also other private actors (Tarrow, 2005; Zürn et al, 2007; Hanegraaff et al, 2011; Rixen and Zangl, 2012). The interaction between IOs and citizens or transnational actors, such as civil society organizations, has been analyzed from different approaches. The collective action approaches –those centered on transnational activism and global civil society- emphasize the rising social mobilization around global problems, pointing IOs and governments as main responsible to solve those issues and by this mean recognizing them the authority to do it. Transnational activism is an indicator of politicization of the international sphere in general, and in particular of IOs, constituting a third force that express the willingness to contest power distribution and decision making at the international arena (Florinni, 2000). This transnational activism, which is a piece of global governance, is focused mainly in IOs since they are institutionalized and visible venues of policy decisions. Networks of transnational actors (involving academic, experts, civil society organizations and also sympathetic governments) interact with IOs seeking to have a voice in setting the agenda and to pursue their policy goals; and promoting change at national level thanks to international pressure (Tarrow, 2005; Joachim, 2007). These coallitional actors are also known as Transnational Networks of Activism (TANs), though it is important to distinguish them from particular transnational actors such as individual coorporations or particular well known NGOs, for example Oxfam International, Medicins Sans Frontières or Transparency International (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).

By the same token, the analysis of global civil society also explain why concerns about legitimacy and democratization lead IOs to interact and open to NGOs and TANs. These civil society organizations are considered to be a vehicle of healthy democracy since they play a fundamental role in making authorities responsible to voters and supervising their practices and decisions, monitoring government activities at national but also at global level (Held, 1995; Foley and Edwards, 1996; Encarnacion, 2002;
Global civil society sees public problems as global and recognizes the importance of international institutions to solve them (Held, 1995; Anheier et al., 2002). Though recently, more empirical driven research has shown that global society is not equally distributed worldwide and that it also forms an international elite mostly concentrated in western democratic countries, since global civil society needs material resources and favorable political conditions to develop and consolidate as an important political power (Anderson, 2000; Tarrow, 2005; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012).

On the other hand, international relations research has also analyzed the emergence of a system of global governance and interdependence that has transformed the international sphere from a realm of states interaction and unequal struggle for power to a system of interdependence and interaction with new transnational actors, which are mobilized to influence international policies (Kehohane and Nye, 1997; Florini, 2000). Global governance has being depicted in functional and moral terms, Mattias Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012) identifies two logics: 1) the logic of functional interdependence and 2) the logic of normative interdependence. The first one arise from the awareness and perceptions that problems that before were considered as mainly local or national have a transnational or global dimension, such as climate change, poverty, war or immigration. The second one comes from universalism and transnational responsibilities. In other words, interdependence and global governance goes hand by hand due to increasing vulnerability causes by the process of globalization (Beck, 1997). Also, a significant part of authority is now translated to international institutions because they are the main channels to help to solve problems derived from interdependence and because there is the perceptions that the nation state alone is inneficient to solve those vulnerabilities Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012).

In relation to democratization and legitimation concerns, analysis about global governance have also focused on how international institutions are compelled to interact with other international actors -individual NGOs and experts, or TNAs- to legitimate their policy actions; one of the examples of the succesfull politicization of IO by transnational actors is the process that lead to the ban of landmines with the Otawwa Treaty in 1999 (Mine Ban Treaty) (Anderson, 2000).
Some scholars suggest that the concern about legitimation lead IOs to integrate transnational actors in one or several stages of the policy process. This can happen during the implementation phase, and in few cases in the decision making process (Tallberg et al, 2011). Specific case studies, for example the participation of private actors in the Ministerial Conference of the WTO or the degree of succes of NGOs to influence specific policies, also illustrate this trend (Dür and De Bièvre, 2007; Hanegraaff et al, 2011). In particular, the analysis of the opening up of IOs by Tallberg et al (2011) has demonstrated that only few IOs integrate transnational actors in the policy decision stage but also that the increasing open up IOs is explained by the states willingennes to give them access and to a less extent to the civil society mobilization.

Other authors have focused on key concepts such as authority to explain IOs’ politicization. Zürn et al (2012) argue that there is an empirical trend towards politicization of international Institutions linked to the rising authority of international institutions, they show that there is a nexus between IOs politicization and the rise of IOs’ international authority measured in terms of their policy functions as rule definition (regulation mandate); monitoring of national governments decisions; interpretation and enforcement. There is evidence that IOs with high level of authority (they can regulate, supervise and enforce international decisions trough a treaty for example) are more contested by citizens. Building on these contributions, in the following section we define what do we understand by IOs politicization and which variables intervene in this process.

2. IOs’ politicization as a process

Our aim here is to contribute to analyze the meaning of politicization as a concept, to apply it to the international arena, particularly IOs. In order to develop our argument we must be able to provide a certain amount of definitions, among which politics, as well as politicization and other related concepts such as international regime. This is important since in the field of social sciences, where many words are very often submitted to a “polysemic” nature, the final meaning depending of the context in which they are used. First we focus on the concept of politics to later explain what we understand by politicization.

As for politics, it can be defined as the competition for power or influence among actors, within institutions, structures, norms and processes. These processes can go
through the parameters of conflict, negotiation, transaction or sharing (to some extent) a
common agenda. These processes can be formalized (for instance under the rule of law
in a given state political system), or could be only partly formalized but mostly
submitted to more functional criteria, thus the importance of having an operational
concept of international regime on hand. This is basically our case within the WPS, on
the basis of the notion of interdependence between actors.

Politicization can be approached under a narrow perspective according to which actors
operate in order to bring their interests (on a specific issue or set of issues) into the
agenda for a better achievement of their programs. Under this perspective the process
will advance through the principles of negotiation, transaction versus confrontation,
lose-lose game approach, etc. But this definition can be nuanced from an additional
functional perspective, when some issues suffer from some sort of intentional deviation
of the formal agenda, in order to get more “political advantages” in terms of power
competition in a larger sense. Alexander (2014) points out the case through some
sensitive, transnational, especially global problems, each of one would deserve a full
cooperation through actors in order for an objectively needed solution. Out of the five
examples that illustrate his argument, two are especially relevant: how to face the Ebola,
and how to confront Islamism radicalization, in particular the so-called last version of
Jihadism (Daesh, terrorist attacks in France, Belgium or Denmark, etc) and the complex
policies to face it domestically and at large. As he argues, we have to consider that in
politics as a competition of interests every action of all actors is mutually reinforcing
(the competition, not necessarily the common agenda), and can usually become a non-
cooperative one. The two quoted examples show the partisan or “politician” takeover of
the policy process, or the intention to do so, for which the use of media, transnational
and national networks, lobbies, will be used, contributing to a greater confusion of
public opinion both domestic and at a transnational scale. At the same time, both
examples shows how has been reversed the absence of politicization involving the
general public in international politics, a commonly fact until the late 20th Century.

Rixen and Zangl (2013) argue a nuanced different position. Not all politics is
politicized, in the sense that many political decisions are made behind scenes by rulers
and without being reported to or discussed by the public. In other words, politicization
also refers to the act of naming something as political including the controversies
surrounding the acceptance of this naming (problem definition or frame) and also the
degree of openness to action of a specific political arena. In our case, this arena is the IOs in particular, as one of the relevant actors in international politics.

Accordingly, politicization has to do with structures and competition between actors for power of influencing policy results. The degree of politicization though has to do, also, with the scope of conflict around an issue. Following Schattschneider (1960), politicization can be depicted as the expansion of conflict and competition between actors around a relatively locked issue, opening it to controversy and discussions in favor or against. Thus, politicization is also a process where an issue gets more attention and expands to the public sphere generating a public opinion on it, and social mobilization. The social mobilization of transnational actors, especially of NGOs with capacity to spread concern about an issue, is crucial in the process of IOs’ politicization. Social mobilization is one of the main driving mechanisms of conflict (contestation) or consent (mutual partnership) of the general public opinion with IO binding decisions and recommendations to their members.

From here we stand that politicization as a process in the international arena is constrained by different variables, similar to those that characterize politicization at national level but with important particularities that we cannot give for granted: First of all the institutional structure of the WPS, as a set of different formal and informal rules that establish a diversity of patterns of order and disorder. Second, the patterns of interaction with civil society organizations, that we understand as an indicator of politicization and as policy actor embedded in the struggle for power. Third the issue at stake, following the agenda setting approach we understand that not all issues are politicized and not all issues catch the same amount of attention by IOs and other international actors, thus the attributes of the issue and the politics around the issue affects also the degree of politicization.

2.1 Order and disorder in the WPS: implications for IOs

At macro level, there is a structural tension in the international system related to the politicization of IO which can be explained using the notion of order and disorder (Vilanova, 2006). This structural tension is due to its nature as a divided power system and can be described by three dimensions or parameters. The first is the horizontal dimension of the international system, which refers to the principle of sovereign equality among States, the principle of non-interference in their domestic issues
between the parties, which are formalized in IOs and the principles of public international law as well as in the UN Charter. The second is the vertical dimension, which raises the issue of power hierarchy among actors (meaning a “de facto hierarchy”). The bipolar world (and its aftermath) and the use of force exemplify this dimension of “hierarchy of power” in the practice of the international system, in spite of its horizontal/normative dimension. Interestingly enough, even at the UN, the relationship between the General “horizontal” Assembly and the Security “vertical” Council (with the veto of the five permanent members) prove the difficult coexistence of these two parameters. The third is more complex to describe because it comprises the horizontal and the vertical dimension. Two apparently contradictory trends happen simultaneously: 1) the state as main actor would no longer have the importance it had in previous international systems (for example, before 1939), it competes with other actors, with IOs and many other heterogeneous actors; 2) At the same time, the state is the essential subject of IOs; it is the main actor with the legitimate capacity to promote (even if many times it does the opposite) the development of international law; it can be the main driver of the most effective international regimes, from arms control to the EU integration process, with all its ups and downs (Hass, 1970; Laird, 1988). Also, the state is the indispensable protagonist of successful negotiations, should it be in bilateral or multilateral levels, as well as within IOs. In other words, it is at the core of all international debates. And most conflict management processes, when they enter in negotiation, must inevitably go through a formalization of the resolution that only states (and IOs under state control) can assume and guarantee. In other words, the state remains a central, inevitable and indispensable actor in the international system. In conclusion, therefore, the state must adapt itself to an increasing difficulty, derived from the fragmentation of its environment: the international system “in transition”, and not yet showing any trends of “stabilization” of the alleged “post-bipolar system”

The exploration of several questions can be useful to advance in times of overcoming our theoretical uncertainty. First, the further analysis of the systemic crisis of the WPS that is in a process of forming a global political system. Second, this leads to the idea of global transition, applying a global scale the theoretical concept of transition well rooted in political science (when it has to do with government changes). The main contradiction lies in the fact that the study of transitions in the classical sense focuses on the changes visible at the level of state institutions, forms of government, constitutional
rules, multiparty system, basic rights, in short, the rule of law and its mechanisms. And that does not exist at a global scale, therefore, the question is what kind of transition for what kind of global system?

In line with this argument, we think it’s time to close the thesis of the “unipolar world”, its refutation has been clearly established by facts and the real world as it works. Why the world is not unipolar at all?. In different issues or parameters: military, economic, cultural, religious, demographic, cultural, for example, one can quite accurately measure the degree of superiority or power or leadership of this or that state actor, as the United States or China, but there is none which can pretend to be the comprehensive superpower in all of the parameters. The Iraq or Afghanistan wars and its aftermaths illustrate perfectly the lack of correlation between a clear military superiority in quantitative terms, and ensuring that this power guarantees compliance with the political or economic agenda set for the post-war stage of the conflict.

Another important question is does the WPS working in a way so that all actors (who act within it) have the ability to act globally in the main issues of the agenda? The answer is no, some of them do partly, others have more fragmented action spaces, and they do not tend to decrease the degree of incompatibility among many of them. Furthermore, the number of actors in the system has tended to increase, and therefore their interactions as well, but not regulated set of interactions. Interdependence governs the WPS.

On the other hand, when talking about order, special mention deserves the notion of international regime which, in our case, has nothing to do with the traditional concept of “political regime” applied to the theory of the state, comparative governments or constitutional law or the political right, and yet, directly affects the State actor on the international arena. As Barbé (1989) points out, "the international regime is a theoretical construct that seeks to explain not the situations of anarchy and classic conflict of international politics, but the order emergency situations that occur in a given field of international activity (issue area). " Therefore, the international regime could be a set of principles, formal norms and rules, and decision-making procedures around which expectations converge in that given field of activity. In other words, an international regime occurs when a certain sustained process is consolidated around a
particular theme, with the convergence of interests of a group of actors, and a set of transactions going on.

For example, Brzoska (1992) applies the concept to the issue of nuclear proliferation during the Cold War and how main actors managed to control this phenomenon. More broadly, this notion can be applied to the entire process of Arms Control of nuclear weapons. From 1972 to 1979, with the SALT I Treaty has had a significant result (McLean, 1986). Indeed, through the bipolar diplomacy among US and the USSR, the process of negotiation on nuclear weapons over many years has built a dynamic nuclear conflict prevention. It can not be ignored as control mechanism of risk even in moments of maximum tension in the cold war at its peak\(^1\). Stephen Krasner's (1983) influential definition seeks a middle ground between "order" and explicit commitments; it stresses the normative dimension of international politics. Krasner defines a regime as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." Despite the care with which this complex hierarchy of components is defined, "principles" (which include not only beliefs of fact and causation, but also of "rectitude") shade off into norms, "standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations." Norms, in turn, are difficult to distinguish from "specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action." This means that those issues under the umbrella of an international regime enjoy from a previous consensus about their relevance between stakeholders that could affect the degree of politicization in the international arena.

Much of the existent IOs in the international arena respond in part to this dynamic in the WPS, being an expression to diminish caos and disorder and at the same time, IOs are constrain by this structural tension of order and disorder. To understand in particular IOs politicization it is also important to look at their internal structure; which is configured by the set of internal norms. This means that there are important differences among them in the settings of policy decision making; interaction with external stakeholders; or in their efficiency to achieve their goals and compel the state members to fulfill collective decisions. In other words, it can be a difference in terms of policy.

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\(^1\) For example: in 1979 the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II) Treaty between Carter and Brezhnev was agreed, but the tensions arising from the issue of so-called "Euro-missiles", and by the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the US Senate refused to ratify the treaty. So from a legal point of view, it never came into force. And yet, both parties adhered to its "spirit" until in 1987 the changed situation, Gorbachev hand, it became obsolete and was later transformed into the START (I and II) accords.
efficiency between IOs with capacity to take binding decisions and those that have narrow capacity of action, depending on rhetoric statements of intentions. Here we have examples of IOs such as the Union for the Mediterranean that historically has demonstrated low capacity to achieve agreements and then to take policy decisions, also there other examples of IOs that have transform over time from being low profile organizations to high and increasingly efficient such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Efficiency is also related to IO’s authority and legitimacy, as well as with formal and functional recognition of this authority by external stakeholders. To understand IOs efficiency and its implication for politicization it is useful take into account the contribution of Zürn about IOs’ authority. Those that fulfill their policy functions as rule definition (regulation mandate); monitoring of national governments decisions; interpretation and enforcement are also perceived as more efficient (and with more authority) than other IOs with few capacity of decision; we stand that this efficiency criteria would lead to more politicization, towards more contestation but also towards more cooperation in implementing policy programs.

2.2 Patterns of interaction with transnational actors and civil society organizations

Transnational actors, more specifically NGOs, are seen as the responsible for changing the way the game is played in world politics (Anderson, 2000; Kaldor, 2008). They reshape the terms of international debate over several issues, redefining them or shedding light into an issue to gain international attention. Their substantial irruption in the international sphere has realigned alliances and coalitions of powerful players, forming TANs. Their interaction with international authorities, looking to change policy outcomes at international and national level, has restructured the struggle for power, since they pressure to set the agenda and also to visualize issues by giving them moral and emotional force (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Joachim, 2007). They politicize the international debate by providing relevant information about a particular issue; providing credible data and using the problem framing process to change the terms of the debate. In other words, they use symbolic politics to reframe the issue and leverage politics to gain important allies. Finally, they monitor the actions of international authorities to make them responsible for their actions. They use accountability politics to signal who is responsible and who must solve the problem (Kriesi et al, 1995; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 2005). This mobilization respond to new characteristics of citizens with a global consciousness, concentrated in western democracies and
expanding beyond, that constitutes an emergent global public opinion and that adopts the axiom think global act locally. One of the main roots of this trend is the environmental social mobilization and also several social movements of the global social justice movement, for example the international mobilization supporting the Zapatistas action against the Mexican government in 1994, when officially the implementation of North-America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) started. The increasing number of NGOs seems to provide the vertebral column of the political mobilization of individuals on a transnational and global scale (Tarrow, 2005; Risse-Kappen 1995). In other words, “whether politicization occurs or not depends crucially on the existence of civil society structures that motivate and enable individuals to organize themselves and make their interests heard” (Rixen and Zangl, 2012: 367). These structures endow civil society and other type of transnational actors to interact with international authorities, giving them the pace to pressure to set the agenda, framing issues, or implementing policy programs. Transnational actors mobilization has questioning the central relevance of the state in international politics and the intergubernamental institutions that defend or represent national interests.

Actually, one of the reasons of the recent attention to IOs’ politicization is the increasing pattern of interaction with transnational actors (ie private business or interest groups representing economic interests as well as NGOs representing other societal interests). In this line, the analysis of Tallberg et al (2013) systematically details the patterns of access of these transnational actors to IOs, and the variables that explain this access. But politicization goes beyond formal access to IO and it is also related at least to two patterns of interaction among international authorities and transnational actors: 1) a pattern of contentious politics manifested throughout outsiders’ strategies, such as protest or boycotts; and 2) a pattern of mutual interest and partnership, which can be also depicted as an exchange relationship. NGOs have leveraged their unique expertise, the trust granted them by represented publics, their non-official/non-government status, and their social purpose to help decision-makers in other sectors to recognize common ground for mutually beneficial collaboration. This pattern of interaction can lead to stable and institutionalized interaction reducing the degree of conflict or to the consolidation of iron triangles that reduce the possibility of considering certain issues or integrating new participants. The interaction can be also bi-directional, with episodes of conflict and cooperation through time.
2.3 The issue at stake

The issue at stake is also important to understand the degree of politicization of IOs. Not all issues raise the same amount of attention of policy makers and not all issues are politicized as stated before. Thus politicization is related to attention dynamics over certain issues and with agenda setting, or which issues are prioritized or are considered to devote serious consideration in policy venues such as IOs. Attention to an issue varies depending on their scope and their attributes, technical issues get less attention than issues that directly affect citizen’s life conditions such as poverty, development, human rights or climate change.

The issue or problem addressed by an organization is important itself to understand IO’ agenda setting. In general, issues are multidimensional and complex subjects. Perception of issue importance, abstractness and urgency varies within organizations. New information about and issue or emphasis in a new dimension may define the issue in different ways, making it appear more or less appropriate for agenda inclusion. In other words, the issues addresses by IOs are dynamic; we can expect that the meaning and interpretation of the issue may change through time.

In the international arena certain issues such as development, peace, human rights and environment enjoy favourable conditions to get into the agenda, since they are the kinds of issues that generate consensus about their political importance, using the international relations theory terminology we can say that there is an international regimen around several aspects of those issues, as well as in the case of arm control. Few voices arise against protection of human rights or against peace but still we can find differences in the attention devoted to this issues at the international arena and within particular IO. By the same token, we can find variations in the way those issues are politicized by IOs and transnational actors. For example, Carpenter has demonstrated that child born from sexual violence in conflicts don not get the same amount of attention within transnational advocacy networks’ agendas than other issues such as orphans child or soldier child (Carpenter, 2007). From this theoretical perspective, an expectation would be that IO’s politicization is conditioned by IO’s agenda capacity as well as by TANs’ agenda capacity, as well as by the issue itself.
Also, we know from the agenda setting perspective that attention is scarce and that the policy process and institutional structure are important variables to understand why some issues are prioritized and others do not (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; Jones et al 2005; Wilkerson and Green Pedersen, 2006). The set of issues to which IOs can pay attention at one point is not open; institutional and cognitive constrictions put limits on what policy makers are able to accomplish. The agenda capacity of organizations is therefore restricted; there are limits in terms of time and resources, which vary over time and depending on each organization structure. Also, organizations are constrained by bounded rationality and information processing bottlenecks (Jones et al, 2005), IOs as well as other societal and economic organizations have cognitive limits in processing information, that means they are not able to process all the information they have, and also the time they have is not infinite.

The following figure resums the main ideas about IOs politicization as a process, depicted as a result of the interrelation of the WPS structural tension in order and disorder and the internal structure of each IO; the social mobilization of transnational actors and therefore the expansion of the competition or conflict around the issue at stake. From here we analyze how this conceptualization works in the case of dialogue between the OECD, non-member states affected by a situation of institutional fragility and peace building and the NGOs involved in the issue.
3. NGOs, OECD and non-state members cooperation in the international dialogue for state building and peacebuilding

OECD is probably one of the most known IO. It is recognized being an important source of statistic and knowledge about its member states, as well as on economics and development world wide. OECD’ policy recommendations and reports are followed and cited as important source by governments, NGOs and other stakeholders, this means it has an expertise prestige. The OECD belongs to the international club of organizations that set and/or enforce the rules of global economy (others would be WTO and the IFM), together with international institutions that set the agenda for liberalization and regulation (G-8 and G-20), in the era of globalization this role may increase its politicization. Tough at the same there is a certain stability and institutionalization of its policy decisions that reduce the degree of conflict with other stakeholders, for example NGO recognize their legitimation to be a forum of discussion and policy making in the international dialogue...
several issues from international development to public administration and corruption; environment and climate change; or state building and peace.

Its increasing recognition as an international authority, with capacity to enhance decision and drive policy change, is also an indicator of its efficiency or in other words of its capacity match the goals of its agenda with the results of the process. Another indicator of its stability and efficiency is the expansion of its areas of intervention from the nineties. During decades centered in international economy and development, at present OECD’s areas of intervention are more than 20, from tax or science and technology to industry entrepreneurship and bribery and corruption. It attracts transnational actors because it is effective in promoting their policy goals, through binding decisions and mainly recommendation based in its expertise and knowledge. It is a resourceful IO, in terms of its staff, state membership. The OECD is formed by 34 countries, known as a “club of rich and developed countries” in recent decades it has opened to other countries with different status of development, such as Mexico, Turkey, Russia and Chile. At the same time, it has a stable relation of cooperation with 100 countries, most of them country recipit of Official Development Aid (ODA) devoted by the OECD member states, including the main ODA donor (OECD, 2011).

The OECD has decision power and have a directly mandate over their national governments membership decisions; the 1998 decision to curb harmful tax competition and the 2001 decision of the OECD’s Global Forum on Taxation (GFT) that tax havens have to exchange information on foreign taxable income with other countries are examples of this (Rixen and Zangl, 2012).

In the case of state and peace building there are several factors that explain the degree of the OECD’ politicization. Around the issue, the OECD has promote policy instruments such as the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, which is a forum for with participation of non-members states in the list of fragil states and NGOs. The executive branc, the International Dialogue Secretariat, is hosted by the OECD, abd

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2 As State in OECDs institutional webpage: policy sectors of intervention are: 1) agriculture and fisheries; 2) bribery and corruption; 3) chemical safety and biosafety; 4) competition; 5) corporate governance; 6) development; 7) economy; 8) education; 9) employment; 10) environment; 11) finance; 12) green growth and sustainable development; 13) health; 14) industry and entrepreneurship; 15) innovation; 16) insurance and pensions; 17) international migration; 19) internet; 20) investment; 21) public governance; 22) regional, rural and urban development; 23) regulatory reform; 24) science and technology; 25) social and welfare issues; 26) tax; 27) trade. http://www.oecd.org/about/, consulted 15th February, 2015.
works in close collaboration with the G7+, the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), and civil society secretariats.

3.1 WPS structural tension and the OECD

Here we refer to the vertical and horizontal dimension in the structural tension of the WPS that affect the interaction with non-state members, an inside among the member states. More clearly, we think that the position (economic and political) of the member states implicated, those represented by the OECD and also the position of the recipient countries would affect the politicization of the OECD over the issue at stake. The structure of power relationship between the national states implicated, those that belong to the OECD and those that are the direct recipients of its policies, programs, reports and policy analysis create the macro level scenario where the policy and politicization are developed. In the specific case of policies related to state and peace building, the OECD has a leading role, which it enforce and supervise the agreements made by the country members. At the same time, it act as policy entrepreneur since the state and peace building is one of the goals of its policy of development and governance in poor countries.

In this specific policy area, the OECD is politicized because there is an historical trend of international agreements enforced by the organization that have an impact in their member states’ public policies, more specifically in the case of the ODA, since their member states are the main donors worldwide. For example, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding was created in 2008 but emerged from the 2005 Paris Declaration, which recognized the need for special measures to improve aid effectiveness in situations of conflict and fragility. The Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness was promoted by the OECD and UN. This forum developed a set of peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives for fragile states approved in the 4th High Level Forum in 2011 in Busan, where the main donors of the OECD and the g7+ group of fragile countries achieve the commitment to endorse the principles and policies suggested by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

3.2 Mutual interest and partnership between transnational actors and the OECD
Interaction with transnational actors, particularly NGOs with long experience in foreign aid and world poverty. Politicization is related to its increasing inclusiveness at different levels of NGO and non-member states in the agenda setting and policy implementation. This inclusion leads also to diminish external critics or adversaries activity coming from transnational actors. Through the process of inclusiveness it is less likely the upbringing of radical positions and critics tend to become more moderate. The long term relation of the OECD with transnational actors, especially with NGOs and civil society organizations coalitions, has lead to a pattern of mutual interest and partnership, which can also be depicted as an exchange relationship. Also in the case of the state building and peace building policy there is a TANs which already exemplify the important degree of consensus between different stakeholders, in this TAN there is the New Deal for Peace formed by 14 countries considered as fragile states, the international NGOs coalition, the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, formed by 20 NGOs active in more than 100 countries. Besides the OECD, there are five other IOs involved: the World Bank, UN, African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank and the European Union.

3.1 The issue of state and peace building

The issue at stake as suggested by our conceptualization of politicization. Also there is the issue attention factor and the policy dynamics of peace and state building. The OECD has being one the main promoters of the international development agenda, being their members the main donors in the development aid system. The broad issue of development is one of the so-called global issue easily identified, an important amount of issues that have been politicized in the last decades in the international arena are related to this macro-issue (sustainable development, human rights, governance, corruption, poverty; immigration, war, etc).

The focus on fragile states - those that are in process of recovering peace after a destructive civil war and lack of strong public institutions to achieve development - arises as part of the broader agenda of development and governance. They are considered to be the farest in achieving the Millennium Development Goals, which is the main framework of international development since two decades ago. Fragile states have

3 Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor Leste and Togo.
being defined as a such by the OECD, transnational actors mainly NGOs and it is also adopted by those states agrupped under this label. According to the OECD “fragil and transitional situations comprise a broad spectrum of contexts –from one-party state of North Corea to war-torn Syria and relatively stable Bosnia and Herzegovina. Close to half -23 of 51-are middel-income states and economies, and many of them are rich in natural resources” (OECD, 2014: 15).

The issue at stake explains to a great deal the OECD politicization, focus on state and peace building cames from the general debate about human security and development. Human security as an issue belongs to those issues that nobody wants to show disagreement about their priority or their relevance, since it influence directly human surviving and human life conditions in general. Accordingly to Human Security Report Project “it is a relatively new concept, now widely used to describe the complex of interrelated threat sassociated with civil war genocide and the displacement of populations” (HSR, 2013).

**Concluding remarks**

We know from previous research that there is an increasing politicization of the international institutions, especifically of IOs. States are still the main protagonista of the WPS but interdependence limits their capacity to solve unilateraly vulnerabilities risen by the process of globalization. Also we know that IOs politicization is related to legitimation and recognition of authority, as well as increasing delegation from states to IOs of competences to supervise and manage transnational affairs. At the same time NGOs and other transnational actors also recognize them the authority and the responsability over an increasing amount of policy issues.

In this paper we depict IOs politicization as a process where it is important to take into account the variables intervening: 1) the structural tension in the WPS that constrained by the parameters of order and disorder, related to the structural distribution of power worldwide. Also, here it is important to analyze the specific position and the institutional setting of each IO. 2) The patterns of interaction with transnational actors that lead to the expansion of the conflict or/and cooperation. This patterns can lead to long term establish and institucionalized relationship between stake holders, diminishing the degree of conflict and leading to the politics of mutual partnership and
cooperation. 3) The issue at stake as well as changes in the nature of a particular issue are also an important variable of IOs politicization.

This leads us to another consideration, which is the issue of efficiency. It is crucial to this kind of processes of interaction among actors to have the capacity of measuring the output, meaning what is the result of the dynamics. Of course, this has to do with an approach based on a systemic perspective, in which the institutional and legal nature of actors (namely OIs, states and even NGOs) is not enough to understand the mechanics of the process. For instance, any comparative analysis of IOs shows, as one of the key elements, the different level of efficiency they have. Efficiency could be defined as the capacity of an actor—in this kind of processes—to match the goals of its agenda (as well as the common agenda) with the results of the process in every given moment of the process.

The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and the policies around the issue of state and peace building reveals that interaction between OECD and transnational actors, especially NGOs is characterized in this case by a high degree of consensus on which is the problem and how to solve it. It means, the logic of OECD politicization over this issue can be depicted as mutual cooperation politics since its role is not contested, on the contrary the OECD belongs to the TAN formed to supervise and advise the so-called fragile states, this means that there is a certain degree of institutionalization and stabilization of the interaction between NGOs and the OECD. Future research must to be done to explain better how the conceptualization of IOs’ politicization can be operationalize and apply to different cases in order to compare and generalize possible findings.

REFERENCES


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ACRONYMS

Association of Southest Asian Nations (ASEAN)

European Union (EU)

Global Forum on Taxation (GFT)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)

International Organizations (IOs)

North-America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

Official Development Aid (OAD)

Transnational Networks of Activism (TANs)

World Political System (WPS)

World Trade Organization (WTO)

United Nations (UN)