Europeanization and Social Movements: The Case of the Stop-TTIP campaign
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**Abstract**

Over the past years, the economic crisis has significantly challenged the ways through which social movements and political parties have conceptualized the EU institutions and policies. Although some research on Europeanization of social movements has already been conducted (Tarrow, 1995; Rootes 2002; della Porta and Caiani, 2009) finding moderate numbers of europeanized protests and actors - more recent studies on Europeanization of social movements have been limited to austerity measures (Bourne and Chatzopoulou, 2015), whereas the TTIP has been studied more from a trade unions’ perspective (Dierckx, 2015) or an international relations perspective (Novotna, Telò, Ponjaert, 2015). The Europeanization hypothesis states that there has been an ‘upscaling’ of protest events and that the EU has become a central target. The TTIP seems to be a crucial test case since it concerns a policy area (foreign trade) which falls under the exclusive competency of the EU, and where political opportunities for civil society actors are ‘closed’. So why and how has this movement ‘europeanized’? And has it had an impact on the policy? Furthermore, among other achievements, the Stop-TTIP movement has collected over 3.2 million signatures among EU citizens with the aim to stop the negotiation of the treaty. The paper will test the Europeanization hypothesis by collecting media data on protest events in the countries of origin since 2014 and conducting (semi-structured interviews in Brussels with key representatives of the movement and policy makers.
1. Introduction
Since 2013 the proposed agreement on TTIP (Transatlantic Trade Investment Initiative) has been one of the most controversial policies discussed at the EU level. In a nutshell, the TTIP agreement is aimed at facilitating trade between the US and the EU via a number of provisions which make up the 24 chapters of the current agreement proposal. The document is divided into three parts: market access, regulatory cooperation, rules which have been at the centre of the 13 rounds of negotiations conducted so far. Formally, the negotiations started in July 2013 after a two year period when a “High Level Working Group on Growth and Jobs led by th EU Trade Commissioner and the US trade representative looked into the various initiatives that could benefit job creation, economic growth, international competitiveness and the development of high international standards in various areas” (European Commission, 2016: 1). Since 2014, the Stop-TTIP coalition – a movement against TTIP and CETA, which is a similar bilateral trade agreement between the EU and Canada – has become increasingly vocal and has organised a collection of signatures aimed at blocking the agreement negotiations conducted by the European Commission which have formally received the backup from both the European Parliament (November 2011) and the EU member states via the European Council (June 2013). Since 2014 over 3,5 million signatures have been collected, for a European Citizen Initiative (ECI) which was rejected in September 2014 as an ECI initiative by the European Commission even prior to the start of the signature collection. In the lawsuit the position of the Stop-TTIP coalition is crystal clear: “We want to prevent TTIP and CETA because they include several critical issues such as investor-state dispute settlement and rules on regulatory cooperation that pose a threat to democracy and the rule of law. We want to prevent employment, social, environmental, privacy and consumer standards from being lowered and public services (such as water) and cultural assets from being deregulated in non-transparent negotiations. The ECI supports an alternative trade and investment policy in the EU”.
Although the signatures collection was not considered to be valid by the European Commission, the Stop-TTIP coalition continued to collect signatures and initiated a lawsuit submitted to the European Court of Justice whose ruling should be available in 2016. Furthermore, between 2014-2016 the STOP-TTIP coalition has conducted a number of initiatives at the national and EU level in order to influence European institutions. Together with the Stop-TTIP coalition (which includes 522 organisations) several other organisations have mobilised over the past years against the TTIP agreement both at the national and EU level. On May 1st 2016, Greenpeace Netherlands unveiled a number of documents connected to TTIP (www.ttip-leaks.org), generating a strong reaction also on the side of EU governments: for example, on May 3rd the French President Hollande released a very strong statement against the TTIP in its current version.
Although several issues are quite controversial, the most controversial aspects of the agreement regard three points: product safety and consumers’ protection, TTIP/CETA economic impact and the ISDS (Investment State Dispute Settlement). Without getting too much into the details, the Stop-TTIP coalition is concerned by the fact that if the agreement were adopted US product and consumers’ protection standards could overrule the EU ones (such as, for example, the precautionary principle); the economic impact of the TTIP agreement is also controversial since according to Capaldo (2014: 19) the overall job losses in the EU could be 600,000, whereas other studies funded by the European Commission (such as ECORYS, 2016) draw a different scenario where an overall growth of 0.5% in the US and 0.4% in the EU – although no specific mention is made in terms of job creation; finally, the ISDS is considered by the negotiators as a possible way to encourage investments and guarantee investors, whereas on the side of the Stop-TTIP movement it is seen as a way to reduce national sovereignty by granting to international investors excessive rights over domestic policies which may oppose to international investment plans.

But beyond the current political relevance of TTIP, what’s its relevance in political science terms? We argue that the TTIP is a very promising case study in terms of analysing Europeanization and social movements since it answers at questions which have been at the heart of recent research. As it is well known Europeanization has been a very promising analytical tool in order to capture the emerging importance of European integration. Europeanization has been studied primarily with respect to political parties, interest groups and public policy processes (Graziano and Vink, 2012), but less so in terms of social movements due to their scarce capacity to directly target European institutions (Imig and Tarrow 2001; Koopmans and Statham 2010). Traditionally, social movements are not very present in the policy fields which have gone through a major Europeanization process and therefore so far have possibly been less interested – or capable to – frame their preferences with an EU target. Nevertheless, the TTIP has changes the scenario since it concerns trade issues which – to a certain extent – have already been at the heart of the protest events organized by the Global Justice Movement back in the kat Nineties and early Twothousands. For this reason, our research question is the following: has the new policy process linked to the TTIP supported Europeanization of social movements? If so, how can it be explained?

In order to analyze how social movements engage with EU institutions, ‘classic’ hypotheses can be mobilized. More specifically, the political opportunity structure (POS) and the resource (especially in terms of ‘framing’) variables seem to be particularly promising also for our study. As for the first hypothesis, research on social movements has connected their activity to the availability of political opportunity structures. With this respect, we may try to challenge the common view that protest rarely occurs at the EU level since the EU institutions are more open to conventional activities (such as
lobbying) than to protest (Marks and McAdam 1996; Kriesi 2004). But if these observations may lead to forecasting low levels of supranational contentious politics, there are also other considerations which could lead to more EU-level protest. The political opportunity approach stressed the need for social movements to address the territorial levels where decisions are taken. Tilly (1978), for example, illustrated the development of the modern repertoire of protest with the shifting of decisions at the national level. The need to address power holders pushes social movement organizations (SMOs) to invest resources in exploiting new channels of communications (Tarrow 1994). If this holds, then we might expect attempts to develop multilevel strategies, using new channels of communication (among them, internet) in order to reduce the cost of mounting Europe-wide protest campaigns (della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Therefore, and this is our second potential explanatory variable, the framing of the European institutions as a relevant (and possible) level of decision making could be a main factor in the decisions of social movements to target the European level in their struggles.

We will discuss and specify these hypotheses crossnationally. As we argue in this article, for social movements a European level of intervention presents different opportunities, depending on the type of problem being addressed by the protesters. Following the political opportunity approach (and combining the political opportunity structure approach at both the national and European level), we hypothesize that social movements would be more motivated to address the European level when they have less leverage at home, in an attempt to trigger ‘boomerang’ effects (Keck and Sikkink 1998). On this basis social movements to adapt to their national environments, following the climate on the TTIP both with respect to the political elites and public opinion. For example, as the following figure shows (Figure 1), there has been a quite different mass consensus over trade agreements, and this needs to be put in the background since it has been demonstrated indeed national political institutions and the discourse of national political elites exert a strong influence on the claims making of other collective actors (della Porta and Caiani 2007). From an élite perspective, cross-national differences across social movement organizations are influenced by the positions that national governments take with regard to TTIP issue, because national political elites act as opinion leaders and set the tone of the public discourse on European integration (Koopmans and Statham 2015) and may be more or less open to the arguments made by social movements.
In this article, by focusing on the current Stop-TTIP campaign, we investigate the degree and forms of social movements participation in the mobilization concerning Europe – that is, their capacity to take part in the mobilization referring to European issues, targets, and actors. Using as a point of departure some well established definitions of Europeanization (for an overview, Graziano and Vink,
2012) with respect to social movements we define Europeanization as a process of construction at EU level and diffusion at the national level of political action and protest events. More specifically, we focus on the link between Europeanization and social movements in terms of a) capacity of creating supranational actors of organizations; b) supranational mobilization; c) targeting EU institutions. We also look at the ways through which this is done, notably by looking at the forms of Europeanization (della Porta and Caiani 2007) and their repertoire of action.

Our analysis builds on a new comparative dataset that includes supranational actors at the EU level and national actors from six EU countries (Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, Great Britain and France). Although in our research project we use various sources to investigate the degree and forms of participation of SMOs belonging to the Stop-TTIP campaign in European politics, for this paper we used news portals and press section of the Stop-TTIP organizations websites. The article is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the research design and discuss the methods and data collection; in sections 3-5 we present our data and discuss the findings with respect to our hypotheses. A final section concludes and presents the next research steps.

2. Research design, methods and data

After the creation of a formalized codebook, we have collected protest events in the countries of origin since 2014. We have done this by using online newspapers, information portals and news sections of the websites of the main Stop-TTIP organizations. A total of 784 events have been coded in six countries (Germany, Austria, Italy, France, Spain and the UK) and also the EU level has been monitored. More specifically, we have conducted a protest event analysis (PEA) based on newspapers (between 2014 and 2016—the first week of May), looking at the degree and forms of offline mobilization of Stop-TTIP organizations as well as at their strategies of action. Following a longstanding tradition of research on social movements and contentious politics (Tilly 1978, Kriesi et al. 1981, Tarrow 1989), this method provides researchers with extensive and systematic sets of data on protest activities and their different components and dimensions. Indeed, despite its limitations and biases (for a detailed illustration see Franzosi 1987; McCarthy and Zald 1996; Mueller 1997), PEA is a technique of quantitative content analysis, that allows for the quantification of many properties of protest, such as frequency, timing and duration, location, claims, size, forms, carriers, and targets, as well as immediate consequences and reactions (e.g. police intervention, damage, counter-protests, etc.) (Koopmans and Rucht 2002). Data sets are constructed on the basis of specifically selected press sources (media) or archival databases, such as police and municipal records, and permit investigation over time and large geographical areas with regard both to quantitative and qualitative aspects of protest actions (Rucht et al. 1999, Forno 2003). In order to conduct the protest event analysis we made
use of a formalized codebook. Our unit of analysis (the ‘protest event’) consists of the following elements (variables for the coding): an actor who initiates the protest event; the form of action; the target at which the action is directed; an object actor whose interests are affected by the event; and finally the substantive content of the event, which states what is to be done (issue). Each protest event concerning right wing actor and taking place in our six countries under studied has been coded.

Finally, an in depth analysis of documents (e.g. reports, papers, archival material, statistical databases, e.g. Eurobarometer, etc.) concerning the Stop-TTIP organizations in the selected countries, as well as of the available primary information produced by the Stop-TTIP organizations themselves (e.g. leaflets, web articles etc.) have helped us to reconstruct the political and cultural context of the movement mobilization, and the characteristics of the Stop-TTIP milieu in each country. The six countries selected are the ones which are represented by the highest number of Stop-TTIP campaign members – the only exception is Hungary which had to be discarded due to linguistic reasons.

3. Political opportunities and Europeanization of the Stop-TTIP mobilization: Country and Time

3.1. The mobilization’s intensity
First of all our protest event data confirm that the Stop-TTIP mobilization is a significant—and increasing—phenomenon in the period under analysis (Figure 2): 784 total actions initiated by movements, NGOs, interest groups and various actors in relation with the TTIp have been identified (respectively 172 in Germany, 129 in Austria, 122 in Italy, 90 in Spain, 94 in France, 87 in the UK, and 90 at the European level). Secondly, considerable variations across the six countries can be observed, with stable or increasing levels of Stop-TTIP mobilization for the majority of our countries. Of the 784 protest events in total, 228 have been organized in 2014, 467 in 2015 and 89 so far (until the first week of May) in 2016. Among the 784 events, the European ones have been 32 in 2014 (14% of the total 2014), 48 in 2015 (10%) and 10 in 2016 (11%) with a total of 83 events (11%). In all the countries there has been a peak in the first semester of 2015, with some very small variations in terms of overall trend.

Fig. 2. Trends in the Stop-TTIP mobilization levels, by country, 2014-16, semesters, absolute values

1 In our study a ‘protest event’ consists in a political event initiated by an actor (either collective or individual, even an anonymous one) on TTIP issues, regardless of the type of actor (e.g. political party, social movement, etc.) and regardless the form the event takes (e.g. Lobbying, protest, symbolic and expressive actions, violence, etc.).
Besides the number of actions, and additional relevant factor related to European mobilization is the number of participants at Stop-TTIPevents. According to our data (Fig. 2) the size of events organized by civil society in Europe around the TTIP is as follows: 796.299 participants in the first semester of 2014; 1.331.069 in the second semester of 2014; 148.649 in the first six months of 2015 and 3.277.768 in the second part; and, finally; 226.940 in the first 5 months of 2016. In all countries, half of the events (50%), involve a high number of participants (on median, 300), confirming that the TTIP mobilization is one of the the biggest ‘European’ mobilizations developed after the GJM of Seattle. However this varies a lot: from thousands of participants (such as, for instance, the case of the German Stop-TTIP sit-in\(^2\) organized at Berlin's Tempelhofer which gathered more than 1500 people, protesting against the agreement with symbolic actions – i.e. they generated a giant stop #TTIP human image or the 2000 people demonstration in Madrid pro-"The people and the earth above the multinationals")\(^3\), to events (usually symbolic or expressive but also demonstrative) involving only a few activists (as for instance the case of the three leaders of the German Stop-TTIP coalition publishing a commentary in a leading national newspaper in the country warning about the effects of TTIP and CETA\(^4\) or the 6 activists disturbing an EU stakeholder briefing meeting\(^5\)).

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\(^2\) 06/09/2015, https://www.facebook.com/eci.ttip/
\(^3\) 07/10/2015, http://www.tierra.org/una-semana-de-accion-contra-la-pobreza-la-desigualdad-y-los-tratados-comerciales/
\(^5\) Standing up and shouting ”Hands off our democracy! Stop-TTIP! Hands off public services! Stop-TTIP!” and ”Where are the texts? We want the text!” . 17/07/2014, ”Spontaner Anti-TTIP-Protest wirbelt TTIP-Konferenz in Brüssel auf”, http://www.ttip-unfairhandelbar.de.
Both the data on the number of events and the number of participants may only partially be understood via the POS framework. More specifically, the Austrian POS seems to be particularly open both at the institutional level (both left parties and trade unions seem to be supportive) and at the social level (according to the Austrian Stop-TTIP country report by 2015 61% of the interviewed were against the agreement). Furthermore, on the TTIP there are clear signs of transparency and institutional discussions with respect to the TTIP: for example, the Head of the Austrian government spoke out against ISDS and there are growing concerns across the parties in parliament⁶. Whereas the unions are strongly supporting the initiative, politically the Social Democrats are the (Stop-TTIP) movement main target/problem, because they still refuse to take a clear position (i.e. even if they state that they say no to ISDS, it is always uncertain how it will turn out). “Even if their rhetoric seems reassuring, if it comes to a decision we can not rely on them” (Austrian Stop-TTIP campaing representative 15/07/2015).

In the case of France, there clearly is an institutional POS which is not so clear since on the one hand the Socialist government has clearly spoke against the TTIP only very recently (3 May 2016) whereas

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⁶ The Austrian government held a presentation on March 9, 2016 talking about the content of the 12th round of negotiations on the TTIP agreement to be transparent (22/2/2016).
on the other hand the local authorities are seem to be supportive of the initiatives. For example, on the governmental level, a critical but limited reform proposal on ISDS from the Foreign Affairs Ministry was recently (in 2015) issued to try to influence the DG Trade in its process to come out with reform ideas in autumn\(^7\). In addition, the government is considered ‘hijacked’ by business-oriented agenda. On the party level, although the French Social-Democrats during their congress in early June came out with a clear "no TTIP" statement (and French social democrat MEPs are all clearly against ISDS). At the local level, approximately 385 local authorities of all sizes, from big regions to small villages, have signed Stop-TTIP documents (in July 2015).

In Germany the political and social opportunities for the Stop-TTIP mobilization appears very open: the movement can rely on ‘allies in power’, like the social democrats, as well on the support of the Unions (but also other economic categories such as the small businesses\(^8\)), and the institutions in general (government, parliament\(^9\), MEPs\(^10\), judiciary\(^11\)), that with initiatives contribute to stimulate the debate and information about the TTIP\(^12\). First of all, the governing Social Democrats have been put under pressure after huge rally has been called for 10 October 2015 in Berlin amid increasingly critical media reports. Furthermore, there is an increasing internal criticism of TTIP and CETA within the Social Democratic party. Secondly, there is a huge and increasing societal (awareness and) consensus in the country against the TTIP (e.g. half of the ECI signatures have been gathered), as also it is also testified by the 40,000 Germans joining, in Munich on June 4, 2015 at the anti G7 demonstration.

In Italy, and similarly in Spain, the political and societal opportunities for the resistance to the TTIP appear instead more closed. In the former case, although, common to other countries, local authorities took action against the TTIP (several dozens of municipalities and some important regional authorities such as Tuscany) the Italian Government is one of the main supporters of TTIP negotiations in EU as confirmed by the most recent statement of the recently appointed Economic

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\(^7\) The French Trade State Secretary also said that France wouldn't endorse CETA if the Chapter 33 (ISDS) remains the same, and if its proposals are not taken into account.

\(^8\) E.g. the German Trade Union Federation DGB decided to join the anti-TTIP coalition.

\(^9\) E.g. Germany’s vice chancellor Sigmar Gabriel said that he will not agree to the ISDS (12/02/2015)

\(^10\) E.g. “la eurodiputada del partido de los verdes alemanes Ska Keller, han señalado que este es una amenaza importante para los estándares medioambientales y de consumo a ambos lados del Atlántico; que permitirá que productos y procesos actualmente prohibidos en la UE pasen a ser legales” (fonte PEA).

\(^11\) In a public statement, Germany’s largest association of judges and public prosecutors firmly rejects the European Commission’s proposal to create an investment court system in TTIP (18/1/2016).

\(^12\) For example, the German Parliament established a petition committee about the TTIP.
Development Minister Calenda (Il FAtto Quotidiano, May 30, 2016), the Unions have an unclear and divided position on the TTIP (only the main Trade Union, CGIL, spoke out against the critical aspects of TTIP, but this has happened very recently with the symbolic participation of the national Secretary to the national day of mobilization against TTIP on May 7th).

In Spain, similarly, the movement has to face closed political opportunities structures, made of the majority of political parties (i.e. PP, PSOE, UPyD y CiU) that have approved the treaty (with the exception of Podemos) and scarce information on the topic by traditional media. For example in May 2015, the PSOE voted, along with the majority of the European S&D group, in favour of the TTIP/CETA (in particular voting in favour of the ISDS compromise amendments negotiated by the EP President Schulz with the EPP). Also the opinion public support of the movement is so far quite moderate in Spain (with the ECI signatures quorum was only at 17%), also due to the complicity of mass media (“controlled by TTIP supporting forces”, according to the Stop-TTIP representatives in the report of July 15) that do not provide citizens with an accurate and non biased information on this topic.

Finally, in Great Britain the political (and especially) societal opportunities are open for the movement. This is due by a configuration of power that sees: the independentist parties mobilizing against the TTIP, as well as the national opposition\textsuperscript{13}, local authorities against the treaty, and in general a significant debate around the topic and information kept alive by several government committees and report. The societal awareness is high with artists, celebrities and intellectuals taking openly critical positions against the TTIP\textsuperscript{14}. For example, the pro-TTIP conservative government elected in May 2015 gave, according to the Stop-TTIP representatives, an opportunity to build anti-TTIP across opposition parties\textsuperscript{15}. In addition, the Scottish National Party, dominant in Scotland and opposing the TTIP, opened up new opportunities for the TTIP campaigning in the region and pressure on Westminster. Business Innovation and Skills Select Committee of MPs held and inquiry and produced a report on TTIP in April 2015 which strongly criticised the UK government position on TTIP saying the case had not been made on ISDS, pubic services need to be explicitly protected from

\textsuperscript{13} Although Cameron is in favour of the TTIP, which will bring “millions of working places”.

\textsuperscript{14} A lot of TTIP awareness has come via organised concern about the National Health Service, indeed there has been a strong UK contribution to the ECI Campaign and ISDS consultation.

\textsuperscript{15} However, the Stop-TTIP representatives complained about the support by both main parties for TTIP a lack of a coherent alliance of opposition groups. The Labour Party uses arguments of protection of the NHS in the election but supports TTIP overall, whereas the Greens and the Independence Party both opposed to TTIP, but only have one MP each.
TTIP\textsuperscript{16}. The Local Government Association in England has already made severely critical noises about TTIP, saying that the deal is “currently unsatisfactory” and insisting on the removal of ISDS; similarly also the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities has expressed its concerns about TTIP.

In terms of societal consensus, the public demand for TTIP information is very high – much being produced by different groups and organisations. Provision of leaflets, speakers and online petitions has created a good level of public awareness despite mass media blackout. For example, students against TTIP launched in April and spearheading a campaign in universities; artists Against TTIP launched in July with high profile artists opposed to the deal and planning to write plays for TV and host events to raise awareness. This adds onto other 'celebrity' engagement, e.g., chef Jamie Oliver meeting the UK Business Secretary to voice concerns on food, and Russell Brand highlighting TTIP in his cinema release film. Table 1 summarizes our assessment of the POS in the various countries.

Table 1. Perceived POS in the European Countries under scrutiny

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Perceived POS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Open</td>
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<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Slightly open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Very open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Slightly open</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we try to match the findings regarding the number of protest events and the number of people involved in the events, the POS hypothesis holds with the exception of Italy. In fact, the most numerous events are in countries characterized with an open opportunity structure (Austria and Germany), whereas in the others – characterized by less open POS – the number of events are less numerous. The Italian exception still needs to be explained, but we shall come back to the Italian case once the data regarding the targets of the protest events are described further (see Figure 4 below).

As far as the European level goes, our findings are significantly in line with the apparent opening of the decisionmaking process, i.e. the peak of the protest events is registered in the first semester of 2015 when it seemed that the European Parliament could have supported the positions of the Stop-

\textsuperscript{16} This backs up findings from other government committees, e.g., the Environmental Audit Committee, which stated that ISDS threatens the right to regulate and a race to the bottom in environmental regulation, and the (pro-TTIP) House of Lords EU Committee which specifically criticised the use of growth stats from the CEPR report.
TTIP movement. As a matter of fact, in April 2014 the European Parliament postponed the vote on the TTIP agreement to the July and these months were the months when the protests at the EU level reached their peak. Once the Parliament passed a resolution which, although with some criticism, was substantially in favour of the agreement, the only possible opening of the opportunity structure at the EU level was closed since the European Commission has always been following the mandate which came from the governments (which may be confirmed in the 28-29 June 2016 session) to negotiate and possibly sign the agreement by the end of 2016.

3.2. The mobilization’s actors and targets

A second step in assessing the degree of Europeanization process linked to the Stop-TTIP social movements, is to examine to what extent the collective actors who make the events, their targets, and the framing of their events have a European scope\(^17\) (Fig.4). When looking at the scope of the actors who enters the public sphere with their protest events, in all countries, European actors account for a moderate proportion of events (in 4.5% of cases, but the figure rises if we consider also the transnational actors, i.e. those mobilizing simultaneously or come from more countries). Not surprigly, according to our research hypotheses, in Austria and Germany the EU targets represent only 3.9% and 15.7% respectively of the overall targets, whereas in the Italian and Spanish protest events against the TTIP the target is the EU in over 70% of the cases, 30% in France, 15% and 8% in the UK. These findings are particularly relevant, especially when compared to previous social movement and NGOs mobilization around Europe. A recent research, based on the analysis of the claim-making made on various policy filed, by different types of collective actors in seven European countries, stressed the paucity of claims with European targets by civil society organizations\(^18\), vis-à-vis institutional actors and interest groups Europe with their demands much more (della Porta and Caiani 2007).

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\(^{17}\) The notion of ‘scope of the actor’ (or of the target) refers to the organizational extension of the organization and/or institution. In our coding scheme, the categories for the scope of the actor that initiates the event and for the target vary from local (city/district or regional), to national, to European. Either for the variable ‘actor scope’ and for the variable ‘event scope’, we included also the category 'crossnational/multilateral', which refers to 'involving actors from two or more countries'.

\(^{18}\) To be noted that the definition of claim is even less restrictive than the definition of events, including either protests and demonstrations but also verbal statements. Therefore it is easier to find claims with an European target.
3.3. The emerging Europeanization from below: A Diachronic Perspective

Regarding historical trends (Fig. 5), when we compare our protest event data over time, it is interesting to observe that: (i) if the period between 2014 and 2015 – and especially during the first semester of 2015 – the intensity of mobilization increases significantly, this is also the period when the EU targets lose some of their relevance, before rising again; (ii) the Stop-TTIP mobilizations by supranational actors, very high at the beginning of the campaign (28% in the first semester of 2014), tend however to decrease towards the end of the period analysed. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the mobilization of crossnational actors, initially absent, increased reaching a 5% at the end of our data collection period; (iii) EU target and EU events tend to increase across time. In particular events with an EU scope double, from 14% in 2014 to 38% in 2015 (and 18% in the first 4 months of 2016). Events with EU targets remain stable, from a very high 43% at the beginning of 2014 to the 40% in the first 4 months of 2016. In sum, the increasing competences of EU institutions seem to have been recognized by movement organizations: our data point to a significant and slowly growing adaptation among non institutional actors and Stop-TTIP mobilization to the shift in competences to the supranational level, especially in those cases where the POSs are closed.
4. Forms of Europeanization: Domestication, Externalization, Transnational Pressure or Supranationalization?

Beyond the actors, strategies and mobilizations and the supranational or national level, we should also consider the multilevel nature of the European Union (Piattoni 2010). In fact, taking recent trends into account, research on the Europeanization of social movements has started to develop more differentiated hypotheses on the interaction between the creation of Europe and social movements (della Porta and Caiani 2009). If Europeanization is seen as supranational construction of policies and institutions and subsequent domestic diffusion, protest may tend to adapt itself to a multilevel governance that includes variable networks of both territorial and functional actors.

The link between Europeanization and social movements can take different paths (della Porta and Caiani 2007). A typology of the different forms of Europeanization of the collective mobilization can be built by combining—for events framed as involving European issues, as the TTIP is by default—the territorial scope and the target of the protester. In a fully supranational polity, all important claims would be made by European political parties, interest groups, social movements, and other collective actors targeting European institutions (supranationalization). National public mobilizations may also target the European level when European actors exercise transnational pressure by intervening in...
national public discourses, criticising national policies or propagating European integration. A third path to the Europeanization of the collective action is domestication (Imig and Tarrow 2001), where the EU or its policies are either the source or the indirect target of claims by domestic actors but the direct target remains the nation state. Domestication can be considered as proof of the dominant position of the nation state (Imig and Tarrow 2001), but also as a stimulus for innovations in the organizational structure and the frames of the protests (Luoisa 2014; della Porta and Caiani: 2007, 7). Finally, a form of externalization is present if and when the mobilizations and communications of national actors target the EU directly: this often takes place in an attempt to place pressure on the groups’ own governments (Chabanet 2002). This form is typical of regimes and authoritarian states, where collective actors hope to obtain a ‘boomerang effects’ by targeting external actors (see, Keck and Sikking 1998).

Applying this typology on forms of Europeanization to our data on claims making in the six European countries under study (Table 2)^19, we observe that the most frequent form of Europeanization is domestication (55.3%)^20, followed by externalization (27.2%), supranationalization (14.9%) and transnational pressure (2.6%)^21.

Table 2. Forms of Europeanization of the Stop-TTIP mobilization (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All actors (N=772)</th>
<th>Target scope national</th>
<th>Target scope – European</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor scope - national</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor scope – European</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own PEA

If we distinguish between the four forms of Europeanization by country, it emerges quite clearly that Italy and Spain are characterized by externalization (73.8% and 69% respectively) – in line with the predictions of such a type of Europeanization in a closed POS case (keck and Sikking 1998). Austria,

^19 For the typology and the related analyses, we consider all events related to the Stop-TTIP mobilization, since they by default involve claims launched in response to the EU policies and institutions (i.e. they are “EU based” events). To obtain the four types of Europeanization we focus, as for the scope of potester as well as for the scope of the target, on the two levels, national and European.

^20 An example of domestication are the lobbying activities on the political parties trying to have them introduce the TTIP/CETA issue in their program for the general Spanish elections (Stop-TTIP Country Report 2015).

^21 An example of this may be the event called ‘Municipalities against TTIP’ that was celebrated in Madrid with the participation of European local government representatives and political parties (30/06/2015).
Germany and the UK show primarily forms of domestication (89%, 84% and 79.5% respectively), which could be linked to their limited availability of resources which is in line with our expectations of open POS. As far as supranationalization is concerned, although with very low percentages, we see Spain and France (between 7% and 9%), whereas in terms of transnational pressure France (5.5%) and the UK (6.9%) stand out as the most important cases.

Another relevant dimension to investigate is the degree of conflict in the process of Europeanization. More specifically, in a context where politics have been so weakly legitimized, where trust towards EU institutions is at an historical low (from more than 50% in 2004 to 31% in 2013) and where in 20 member states out of twenty the majority of citizens believe that the EUY is ‘going in the wrong direction’ (Caiani 2014), the question is when we find events/actions concerning Europe and the TTIP, are they consensual/moderated or conflictual/critical of the European polity, politics and policies? Put differently, what do social movement organizations actually do when they want to address European institutions in relation to the TTIP? With reference to the action strategies developed by various collective actors, in general we can expect poorer actors to have more difficulties in developing insider strategies, tending instead to influence decision makers by addressing public opinion via disruptive (and newsworthy) tactics (Lipsky 1965). The Stop-TTIP movement should therefore use protest more often than other actors. On the other hand, the low democratic (especially electoral) accountability and the tendency towards consensual decision making that permeates European institutions (Balme and Chabanet 2002; see also Hooghe and Marks 1999) promotes the use of insider strategies, namely the use of lobbying instead of protest.

According to our data in general TTIP mobilizations are demonstrative actions (in about 50% of the cases) and then conventional actions (e.g., contacting/lobbying, consultation/cooperation, action

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In order to classify the repertoires of action, we distinguished six main action strategies, typical of social movement studies (for similar classifications see for instance Tarrow 1989): Conventional actions, that are those political actions usually associated with conventional politics and the institutional arena, like actions related to electoral campaigns. Media related actions are initiatives related to the mass media (e.g. organizing press conferences, distributing releases or pay for advertisements, giving interviews to newspapers /tv or radio, letters to newspapers). Demonstrative actions, that are legal actions usually aiming at mobilizing large numbers of people (e.g. street demonstrations-legal and nonviolent- rallies, petitions, public meetings, etc.). Expressive actions are initiatives whose aim is more to unite the militants inside the organization than to display the strength of the movement to a wider public. Confrontational actions are also nonviolent, but they aim at disrupting official policies or institutions, and for that reason are usually illegal. In social movements research confrontational actions are associated with the strategy of "civil disobedience" e.g. blockades, occupations, illegal (but nonviolent) demonstrations, and disturbances of meetings of political adversaries (Koopmans 1993, 640). Finally, on line actions like for example net strike, email-bombing, and any kind of action performed online (Mosca 2007).
toward courts – 20.9%)\(^{23}\). 12% of the events take the form of *media-related actions* and 7% are *online actions* (such as publications of articles, petitions and donations). 9% of the events are *expressive actions* aimed at activating citizens no the Stop-TTIP issues with cultural and symbolic events such as – in the words of representatives of the Spanish Stop-TTIP organizations “Rising social awareness with conferences, talks, lectures, training sessions, articles, radio and TV programs”; Stop-TTIP Coalition 2015. Only 1% (only 6 events in absolute terms) are *confrontational actions* such as clashes with the police.

If we focus on how the strategies change when the take into account the institutional level of action, the decision making style at the European level stands out as a particular one. In this sense, we see that when acting at the EU level, the TTIP social movement tends to use strategies traditionally adopted by interest groups and not social movements.

Figure 6. Institutional level of action forms and actors of the Stop-TTIP movement (%)

More specifically, if in general conventional actions represent about one fifth of the total, they one the one hand increase to about one third of the total (31.2%) at the EU level, becoming the most important form of action – and this is particularly true for in the cases of France, Germany and the UK where the percentage is between 40 and 50%\(^{24}\); on the other hand, demonstrative actions decrease significantly from the overall data when we focus on the from about 50% to about 25%.

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\(^{23}\) An example of conventional action is the event of the British organization ‘38 Degrees’ which presented ‘Save Our NHS’ petitions to local parliamentary candidates in front of the Bristol Cathedral (25/04/2015).

\(^{24}\) Cramer V fra issue scope e forma azione (diviso per country) = 0.22*** (per issue scope nat), e 0.26** (per issue scope eu).
whereas they occur especially at the national level (55.6%) and even more so in the cases of Italy (76%), Austria (73%) and France (57%). For example, in order to support their preferences for the vote in the European Parliament in early June 2015, local French Stop-TTIP activists mobilized a mass email action in which thousands of persons took part was organized (report July 2015). Similarly, on April 18 2015, more than 50 Spanish cities participated in the Global Day of action against TTIP/CETA/TISA. A great number of initiatives took place throughout the country with big demonstrations in the main towns like Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Bilbao or Sevilla (ibidem). Differently from other research findings (della Porta and Caiani 2009), media-related actions are not so used at the EU level (6.5% versus the 12% figure of the overall data), whereas online activities are more used at the EU level than at the national one (22% vs. 7%). As examples of online actions at the EU level we can mention the case of the Stop-TTIP UK movement that two weeks before the last EU elections, emailed 150 European election candidates to ask for their position on TTIP (19/03/2016) or the case of the Spanish Stop-TTIP movement that tried to exert pressure on the Spanish social democrats MEPs (after their vote in May 2015 in favour of the TTIP and CETA negotiations), via email and twitter bombing, forcing them to turn back and rectify their vote. Finally, confrontational actions are used more at the EU level (around 6%) rather that at the national level (0.2%). This figure confirms that with a closed POS mobilization is more difficult, but when it occurs it is more radical (della Porta and Diani 2006). The quantitative evidence has been also supported via the semi-directive interviews since all seven interviewees state that cognitive resources are the ones most used at the European level, whereas the at the national level political resources are used the most – whereas economic resources are not used often due to the poor overall available budgets.

5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was aimed at testing the POS hypothesis with respect Europeanization and social movements. As we do not find too many cases to look into, the Stop-TTIP movement occured as an adequate test case in order to better understand the specificities of recent social movements in terms of strategies, actors, targets, scopes and types of Europeanization. We can summarize our findings as follofws. Firstly, our data show a strong adaptation in terms of multilevel governance: the Stop-TTIP movement is playing a ‘double-level’ game (Putnam, 1988) since EU institutions are a growing target, together with national governments. Furthermore, there is a well organized European level coalition which is capable of framing specific issues and diverse repertoire of actions with respect to the institutional level targeted. Put differently, the Stop-TTIP movement is fully exploiting in a differential way the multilevel governance setting of the EU in order to have its voice heard in the most effective way both at the national and European level. Secondly, in line with the POS
hypothesis, the EU is a target especially in those countries (Italy and Spain) which may be characterized as ‘closed opportunity’ structures, whereas in the other countries (Austria, Germany, France and the United Kingdom) the main targets are the national governments since the POSs are more open. Furthermore, as hypothesized the countries vary in terms of their varieties of repertoire of action - externalization being the most frequent type of Europeanization in the cases of closed POSs (Italy and Spain) whereas domestication is the most frequent in the other countries (Austria, Germany, France and the United Kingdom), more open with respect to POS. Thirdly, only partially in line with our hypotheses we find that conventional actions are more frequent at the EU level, whereas demonstrational actions ar more present at the national level. It must be noted how online actions are becoming increasingly relevant in terms of repertoire of action at the EU level. Put differently, SMOs have clearly adopted a multilevel strategy using a variety of strategies in order to increase effectiveness. As a matter of fact, although it is still early to draw any conclusion on the formulation phase of the TTIP agreement, on this occasion it seems pretty clear that SMOs are part of the game – although the POS at the European level became increasingly closed over time (first under the form of extreme secrecy in the negotiations mandated by the European Council, then with the rejection of the ECI by the European Commission, and finally under the form of a general approval of the TTIP negotiations by the European Parliament). For example, the so called ‘TTIPleaks’ were determined by an organisation (Greenpeace) which has playing a low profile in the campaign so far but has been challenged in a ‘competition’ by the Stop-TTIP movement which seems very determined (and, so far, effective) in having its voice heard at various levels of government. Europeanization from below is a full reality now, although it does not mean that European policies are formulated by SMOs; for the moment, it means that the European public space is fully acknowledged as a vital one, not substituting the national level but complementing it. From our research, it seems that SMOs have definitively come of age, and may possibly soon be an increasing challenge to EU institutions in other policy areas.

7. References (to be completed):


