Religious freedom is quite limited in Greece, by the standards developed and applied in other Western democracies. The question is whether this situation stems from factors specific to the Eastern Orthodox tradition, and whether it is likely to change in the foreseeable future. Both as a state church and as a national church, the Orthodox Church of Greece has a lot in common with Protestant state churches and even with Catholicism in some countries. Like Ireland or Israel, however, the Greek case demonstrates that, as long as a particular religion continues to be identified with an "endangered" nation, change in the direction of pluralism is even less probable than separation between Church and State. What may indeed be specific to Orthodoxy among Christian denominations is a traumatic and defensive historical consciousness reaching into a far more distant past, but also fuelled by current insecurity.

Paper presented to the Workshop "Church and State in Europe" ECPR Joint Sessions, Copenhagen, 14-19 April 2000
An Odd Case

For a country that is a member of the EU since 1981 and now awaits eagerly its belated integration into the process of EMU, contemporary Greece appears oddly anachronistic with respect to religious freedom. But then, of course, it is the only Orthodox country in the EU.

Surely a most telling recognition of this contradiction is the recent appointment by Foreign Minister G. Papandreou of an advisory group on religious freedom, which is to study such issues as Church-State relations, religious instruction in schools, preconditions for places of worship, the mention of religion on identity cards, conscientious objectors, proselytism, the content of oaths, etc. Under attack by the Archbishop of Athens (head of the Orthodox Church of Greece), the Foreign Minister invoked the international obligations of Greece, especially under the European Convention on Human Rights and before the European Court of Human Rights, where it is his department's responsibility to represent Greece—and usually lose (Ktistakis 1999). Critics objected, nonetheless, that these are domestic issues and the preserve of other ministries (Eleftherotypia, 9 February 2000).

This controversy bears ample witness to the fact that pressure to change is external rather than domestic. By an overwhelming parliamentary majority including both major parties (PASOK and ND), the separation of Church and State was rejected (in 1998) as an item to be discussed in the context of constitutional revision, which is to be carried out by the new Parliament elected on 9 April 2000 (Sotirellis 1999). No new revision is allowed before five years have lapsed since the previous one. Hence, the present status is expected to remain unchanged until at least 2010!

Otherwise, the task assigned to this advisory group also provides a convenient catalogue of the most salient current issues. These may be clarified and supplemented by a brief list of recent developments:

1. The "productivity bonus" instituted for civil servants was extended to the Orthodox clergy, after much pressure from the Church. (Ideas associated with Margaret Thatcher sometimes work in strange and mysterious ways.) The fact that this raised no objections except ironic comments bears witness to the unquestioned acceptance of the Church's status as a "special branch" of the State and of its civil service.

2. State honors due to a Head of State were staged not only
for the funeral of the previous Archbishop of Athens, not only for the visit of the Patriarch of Constantinople, but also for the visit of a holy icon from Mount Athos to Athens.

3. In 1998, the Council of State (supreme administrative court on the French model) ruled unconstitutional a reduction in the hours of religious instruction in the schools, which is exclusively in the Orthodox faith. According to an earlier decision of the same court, in 1995, pupils may be exempted only if they or their parents make a formal request invoking different religious beliefs.

4. The construction of any religious building still requires the permission of the local Orthodox bishop (Eleftherotypia, 4 January 1997; Sotirellis 1999: 37-8). Consequently, despite pressures from Arab countries and despite the presence of many Muslims (both immigrants and internal migrants), there is no mosque operating in the Greater Athens area, nor anywhere else in Greece, for that matter, except (Western) Thrace, where the native Muslim population enjoys minority status by international treaty. Internal migrants from Thrace living in Attica, however, are not only deprived of religious services, but also of valid baptisms and marriages, since the (state-appointed) muftis of Thrace do not have jurisdiction outside their area. Moreover, Muslim cemeteries operate only in Thrace (Eleftherotypia, 23 April 1998; Tsitselikis 1999: 282-4, 310-1).

5. The very idea of a visit by the Pope to Greece, on the occasion of the Millennium, provoked such reactions from the Orthodox Church that it was dropped. Greece is one of the very few countries in the world today that the travelling Pope cannot visit.

6. With respect to Protestants, on the other hand, the highly selective closure of an Evangelical radio station in Athens (Channel 2000) was interpreted as an Orthodox offensive (Eleftherotypia, 9 December 1999).

7. Identity cards and other official records routinely include religious affiliation ("Christian Orthodox" for almost 97% of Greek citizens). Despite demands (specifically from Catholics and Jews) that this be omitted in the future, the Orthodox Church has opposed any such change. Just recently, a compromise is in view. On the new identity cards, mention of religion is to be "voluntary" (thereby placing the burden on the individual). It remains to be seen whether other issues involving the new identity cards will be resolved (or forgotten). Responding to pressure from
below, the Orthodox Church had ruled in 1998 that the "satanic" code 666 would be unacceptable on new identity cards, associated with the EU's Schengen system (Christianiki, 12 February 1998; cf. Eleftherotypia, 11 March 2000 on the identical stand of the Russian Orthodox Church against "satanic" bar codes).

8. Cremation of the dead is not allowed in Greece, because of Church opposition. One has to be cremated abroad, and even then the return of the ashes may face obstruction, if one goes through official channels (Eleftherotypia, 6 December 1997). It now seems that cremation will be allowed at last, but only for those who can prove that they do not belong to the Orthodox Church.

9. Leaving the Orthodox Church of Greece, however, may not be as simple as it sounds. For almost eighty years, the Church refuses to acknowledge the exit of Old Calendar supporters (self-designated as "Genuine Orthodox Christians") and still considers them rebellious members. It protested vehemently when the leadership of their own church was received by the President of the Republic in 1998. On this point, the Church of Greece differs even with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, whose inquiries were recently rejected with the argument that this is a strictly internal affair of the Church of Greece (Eleftherotypia, 8 December 1999).

10. Although conscientious objectors (in practice, Jehovah's Witnesses) have acquired since 1998 the right to alternative service, harassment continues under many guises. Some are even placed in welfare institutions run by the Orthodox clergy, which often refuses to accept them (Eleftherotypia, 13 March 1999).

11. Although ostensibly both proselytism and blasphemy are criminal offenses with respect to any recognized religion, in practice such repressive legislation is invoked only by Orthodox zealots, on behalf of the Church (Ktistakis 1999: 258). Only recently, in early March, the Church openly condemned a novel by M. Androulakis and condoned both the legal and illegal actions of those seeking to ban it. The novel's circulation was in fact suspended until the trial by a provisional court order on 9 March, valid only for Central Macedonia (Eleftherotypia, 10 March 2000).

12. In the wake of its vehement opposition to the NATO attack against Serbia, the Communist Party (KKE) is now apparently hoping to attract electoral support even from religious circles, and has included on its tickets fervent nationalists identified with Orthodoxy.
This survey was intended neither as an indictment, nor as a comprehensive and systematic description of Church-State relations in Greece. Rather, it should help convey the flavor of the current situation.

In terms of models, Greece is a clearcut case of formal establishment, involving not only the Orthodox Church of Greece as a state church, but also two religious minorities: the Muslims of Western Thrace and the Jews (whose communities and central council are established and regulated by state law as public corporations). One might be tempted to speak of "plural establishment", although this would be misleading since no equal treatment is implied. All other faiths are usually treated as private associations. Even so, the status of the Catholic Church as a legal person has been disputed until recently (Ktistakis 1999: 249).

From the point of view of the individual and especially of the nonbeliever, it should be clear that religious freedom is quite limited in Greece, by the standards developed and applied in other Western democracies. Unless one is willing to bear very substantial costs, one can neither live nor die outside the Church(es): the Orthodox Church and the few others recognized or tolerated.

The question is whether this situation stems from factors specific to the Eastern Orthodox tradition, as is often claimed. If so, is this situation likely to change in the foreseeable future?

**A State Church**

The contradiction between the promise of religious freedom and the establishment of a state church was built into the very first constitution of independent Greece, adopted in Epidaurus on 1 January 1822. It has remained at the heart of the matter under successive constitutions until the present day.

The establishment of a state church was certainly in keeping with the Eastern Orthodox tradition. "In Orthodoxy, God is Caesar's junior partner" according to Huntington's lapidary formulation (Huntington 1997: 70). As a prominent Greek theologian was to argue in 1852, "the Eastern Church is everywhere joined to the state, never being separated from it, never divided from the sovereigns since Byzantine times, and always subordinate to them" (Frazee 1969: 188).

From the very beginning, under Constantine the Great,
the status of the Eastern Church as a state church subordinate to Caesar had been firmly established. This relationship was never questioned nor challenged throughout the Byzantine millennium, in sharp contrast to the course taken by the Western Church, especially after the Great Schism of 1054.

The Byzantine Emperor, at least, was considered "equal to the Apostles" (isapostolos). The same relationship persisted, nonetheless, when his place was taken by an infidel, the Ottoman sultan, after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Previously a Byzantine dignitary, the Patriarch of Constantinople now became an Ottoman official, responsible for the "Rum millet", i.e., all the Christian Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire (Frazee 1969: 1-8).

When Greece declared (in 1821) and eventually won (by 1830) its independence from the Ottoman Empire, precisely the logic of a state church required that the Orthodox Church in Greece should also be independent of the Patriarch in Istanbul (i.e., "autocephalous"). Formally proclaimed in 1833, this independence was eventually accepted by the Patriarchate in 1850 (Frazee 1969). Subsequently, with each expansion of the Greek state, the corresponding dioceses were removed from the Patriarchate and added to the Church of Greece. Only the Dodecanese, annexed by Greece in 1947, remains under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate, together with the autonomous Church of Crete (Ware 1983: 209, 212).

Although exploited at the time for political purposes, the subordination of the new autocephalous church to the first king of Greece, a Bavarian Catholic, did not, in fact, represent an anomaly with respect to the Ottoman past. (If anything, it was an improvement if viewed from a Christian angle.) By 1844, anyway, the constitution that was forced upon the king required his successors to be Christian Orthodox, although a new royal dynasty had to be imported (from Denmark in 1862) before this requirement could be met. The same is now required of the President of the Republic.

As the latest presidential inauguration demonstrated once again, on 11 March this year, the Orthodox Church of Greece continues to perform the primary function of a state church: it is essential to the formal legitimation of state authority. No regime and no government ever did without religious ceremonies performed by the Orthodox clergy: oaths of office (typically administered by the Archbishop of Athens), masses celebrated in the Athens Cathedral, and so on.
Consequently, the Greek state has always sought to protect its official Church as a matter of self-preservation. A case in point involves the Old Calendar movement (Ware 1983: 210). The change from the old (Julian) to the new (Gregorian) calendar in Greece coincided with the proclamation of the interwar Republic, in 1924. Until its overthrow in 1935, the repression of Old Calendar supporters (palaiochmerologites) not only aimed at preserving the integrity of the established Church of Greece. It also aimed at safeguarding the authority of church leaders loyal to the regime, and at suppressing agitation openly hostile to the supposedly sacrilegious Republic (Mavrogordatos 1983: 268-271).

Early subordination to the state may have bred certain traits which, in turn, have always helped the Orthodox Church maintain its collaboration with Caesar and thereby safeguard its position as a state church. Foremost among them are (a) the lack of doctrinal rigidity and consistency, and (b) the concomitant lack of corporate solidarity and discipline. The Orthodox Church has never been as monolithic as the Catholic Church has always aspired to be, under a single "infallible" leader. Consequently, the Orthodox Church has never experienced anything like the Reformation or the Counter-Reformation.

The impression of immutable traditionalism usually associated with Orthodoxy may mask its malleability. Over the centuries, there is not a single issue on which the Church has absolutely refused to compromise with the State, except one: their separation. Only in such an eventuality, when the Church would have nothing more to lose, would it risk a total break with the State. Otherwise, the Church has been apparently willing to compromise on practically everything.

Marriage is a case in point. If the Orthodox Church allows three valid marriages in one's lifetime, this is obviously arbitrary, and not the logical outcome of theological argument, as in the case of the Catholics (one marriage) or the Protestants (as many as you need). At one time, the Church allowed up to four valid marriages, simply because a Byzantine emperor wished it. Under a successor, the number went back to three, and has stayed there ever since. Perhaps no other issue illustrates better the historic contrast with Catholicism. In a similar situation, the Pope was willing to break with Henry VIII of England, with momentous consequences.

In more recent times, abortion is another case in point. Although the Orthodox Church of Greece did protest
the legalization of abortion in 1986, its reaction was distinctly subdued in comparison to its major confrontation with the PASOK government in 1987, over the issue of church property and church administration. By now, abortion as a religious issue has been completely forgotten.

In practice, the Orthodox Church demands nothing of its nominal members in terms of their daily lives. Fasting may look like an exception, but it has long become merely a custom associated with certain holidays—a tradition devoid of actual religious meaning. Short of other arguments, the current Archbishop recently chose to promote fasting as a superior diet formula.

On the other hand, the absence of corporate solidarity has meant that, in any situation of conflict with the State, part of the clergy has always been available for collaboration. On the very day that Patriarch Gregory V was ignominiously executed in 1821, as responsible for the Greek revolt that he had vainly excommunicated, there was a willing successor. "On the way to the sultan's palace to seek confirmation of his election, he had to pass through the gate from which the body of his predecessor still hung" (Frazee 1969: 33). In occupied Athens, in 1941, Archbishop Chrysanthos may have refused to swear in the first Quisling government appointed by the Germans, but his rival Damaskinos was ready to take his place (which he considered rightfully his ever since 1938). Finally, no less than two archbishops were willing to accede to their throne thanks to the last dictatorship (1967-74), the latter serving until his death in 1998. Out of twelve archbishops of Athens during the 20th century, hardly one can be identified whose accession and tenure was not affected by state intervention (Karagiannis 1997). Only the election of the current incumbent, Archbishop Christodoulos, in 1998 may be considered free of such interference.

Under these conditions, no regime and no political party in Modern Greece ever had cause to break with the Church as such, and opt for its separation from the State. For its part, the Church as such was never identified with any single regime or party. At all times, there were clergymen friendly to each and every side, including the Communist-controlled National Liberation Front (EAM) during the Occupation, in World War II. Only briefly, in the ensuing Civil War (1946-49) and its immediate aftermath, was the Church more narrowly identified with anticommunism. This was precisely the time when the project of a political party on the Christian Democratic model found some support, although it was quickly abandoned (Karagiannis 1997: 96-7). Again after the last dictatorship (1967-74), what saved the
Church from a potential reexamination of its constitutional status was the fact that only some of the contending personalities and factions in its midst had been unambiguously identified with the military regime.

When all is said, however, the obvious contrast with the Catholic Church in all these respects does not amount to a specificity of the Eastern Orthodox tradition. As a state church, the Orthodox Church of Greece has a lot in common with Protestant state churches. Indeed, the settlement of 1833 has often been regarded, then and later, as a distinctly Protestant scheme. The Orthodox Church of Greece also has in common with these churches the character of a national church. Therein lies today the most insuperable obstacle to religious freedom.

A National Church

As a state church, Eastern Orthodoxy or, more concretely, the Patriarchate of Constantinople could entertain ecumenical pretensions with some plausibility only as long as it was identified with an empire: first the Byzantine, then the Ottoman. Both thwarted repeatedly the aspirations of Bulgarians and Serbs to break away from the Patriarchate (Frazee 1969: 5-7). Only the Russians were in a position to do so irrevocably, after 1453.

In the 19th century, however, the rise of nationalism in the Balkans and the progressive dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire dealt a fatal blow to ecumenical pretensions, as each breakaway nation-state required its own independent ("autocephalous") Orthodox Church. For the liberated Greeks, it was essential that their state church not be under the jurisdiction of an Ottoman official (the Patriarch). For the other nations, it was also essential that their respective churches not remain under the jurisdiction of a Patriarchate perpetually controlled by the Greeks.

In Greece, the identification of the Nation with Orthodoxy proved irresistible from the very beginning. During the War of Independence itself, religion was the only fixed line of demarcation between the warring sides, in full conformity with the preexisting Ottoman system. To change sides irrevocably, one was typically required to convert. The religious split within the large population of Albanian ethnic stock proved particularly decisive: whereas Muslims identified with the Ottoman Turks, Orthodox Christians readily identified with the Greek cause, without even speaking Greek. The same was also true of other ethnic groups, like the Vlachs (or Koutsovlachs). Accordingly, the
first constitution in Epidaurus simply stated that all the native inhabitants who "believed in Christ" were ipso facto Greek.

Although the wording could be understood to embrace all Christians, it was not persuasive enough for the Greek Catholics, concentrated in the Cyclades. Despite their language and culture, they refused to recognize themselves as part of the newborn nation and join the struggle. Under the protection of the Kings of France in Ottoman times, they did not expect to be accepted on an equal footing in a Greek state dominated by the Orthodox (Frazee 1969: 42-3, 50-1, 61, 82-4).

A century later, an unprecedented and momentous event, which was to complete the process of national integration for Greece (save the Dodecanese), again equated religion with nationality. This was the compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, agreed in 1923 following the Greek defeat in Asia Minor. In the absence of any other indisputable criterion for a compulsory process of expatriation, the Christian Orthodox population of Turkey was considered Greek and resettled in Greece (although many spoke only Turkish). Conversely, the Muslim inhabitants of Greece were considered Turks and resettled in Turkey (although some also spoke Greek). Only the Chams in Greek Epirus were eventually exempted, thanks to the argument that, although Muslims, they were in fact Albanians and not Turks (Mavrogordatos 1983: 252-3). This is enough to prove that religion was used merely as a substitute for nationality. Otherwise, the very idea of an exchange between Greece and Turkey would have been patently absurd.

Even today, Orthodoxy serves as a convenient test of Greek national identity. It serves, for example, to sort out those immigrants from Albania who can be classified as members of the Greek minority there, and are entitled to special treatment in Greece.

For their part, Orthodox clergymen have continued to serve as national leaders, especially for the Greeks outside the Greek state. The most recent and notorious example was Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus.

Can one be fully Greek and not be, even nominally, an Orthodox, i.e., a "Greek Orthodox"? Although many would accept it in principle and some have even proved it in practice, with their own lives, the overwhelming majority of the nation would still respond in the negative, if they did not reject the question as meaningless (cf. Ware 1983: 208).
In all these respects, however, the Orthodox Church in Greece and elsewhere (e.g., Serbia or Russia) is far from unique as a national church. Historically, Protestantism has also been identified with the nation in several other cases, such as England, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries. Even Catholicism, despite its unique supranational organization (and its ultramontanism), remains the equivalent of a national church for the Irish or the Poles. What may still distinguish the Orthodox Church today is that it is not likely to follow the path of other national churches towards pluralism—at least not in the foreseeable future.

A Siege Mentality

Inevitably, the identification of a particular church with the state and/or the nation has always been at the expense of religious freedom. Although intolerance may be more readily associated with Catholicism, in Protestant countries as well Catholics and various nonconformists were first persecuted and later discriminated against, until as late as the end of the 19th century. The ever closer approximation of religious freedom and state neutrality, under various models of church-state relations (cf. Monsma and Soper 1997), was adopted in most cases only in the 20th century.

Several factors have been responsible for this development, including the irresistible advance of secularization. One should not overlook, however, that all this became possible only long after religion-related historic challenges to the nation-state and its security were over. The one case in Western Europe where this has not yet happened is Ireland, and it is highly instructive. Ireland is indeed the single non-Orthodox but Christian case that most resembles Greece.

An "Orthodox revival" has been under way for several years in Greece, spearheaded by various "neo-Orthodox" thinkers, and eventually crowned by the accession of Archbishop Christodoulos in 1998. Despite some renewed interest in spirituality and monasticism, centered on Mount Athos, this revival is quite unlike that in the United States, for example. In content, it is not a revival of religion as such, but rather of nationalism identified with Orthodoxy. This is why secularization, on which Greece compares with Western countries, appears quite irrelevant in this context. Christodoulos has won the highest popularity ratings (after the President of the Republic) not as a defender of the faith or morality, but rather as an
outspoken guardian of national identity under threat. Beneath a trendy style beloved by the media, he has assumed the traditional role of an Orthodox clergyman as national leader.

Recourse to tradition might prove ineffectual by itself without the continuing linkage between religion and critical issues of foreign policy and even national security. The status of Muslims in Greece is a prime example. It cannot be addressed simply and abstractly as a matter of religious freedom, since most of the country's Muslim citizens are in fact Turks, living near the border with Turkey. On the other side of the same border, the Patriarchate of Constantinople remains a captive of the secular Turkish Republic, just as it was a captive of the Ottoman Empire (cf. Runciman 1968).

Why should the Patriarchate be a concern of Greek foreign policy, and why should it remain in Istanbul in the first place? These are assumptions that are best left unspoken and unquestioned in Greek public life. For more than a thousand years, the Patriarchate has embodied a glaring contradiction: an Ecumenical Church in Greek hands (cf. Zizioulas 1998: 160). As attested by the dictionary, "Greek Orthodox Church" is still a popular name for the Orthodox Eastern Church as a whole. The contradiction could stand as long as it was backed by imperial power, both Byzantine and Ottoman, but not thereafter.

Unlike the Papacy, moreover, the Patriarchate of Constantinople never acquired a secure territorial base, from which to exercise its nominally "ecumenical" leadership, even after the demise of empire. Perhaps its only real chance to do so was in 1922, when the victorious Turkish Republic demanded that it be removed from its soil, to Mount Athos. This eminently practical scheme was rejected by Greece with the backing of the Western powers, in a rare show of Christian unity. Clinging to the fiction of an Ecumenical Church in Greek hands, Greece chose, instead, to keep a Turkish population in Western Thrace as a Muslim minority, so that the Patriarchate could remain in Istanbul, surrounded by an equivalent Greek Orthodox minority (Alexandris 1992: 83-95). This was a momentous breach in the logic of the compulsory exchange of populations, which was supposed to remove completely past causes of friction between the two countries.

Under Turkish pressure, in successive stages, the Greek Orthodox minority has practically vanished from Turkey (Alexandris 1992), but the Patriarchate remains. Although nominally "Ecumenical", it has become in fact the Church of diaspora Greeks, in America, Australia, and Western Europe.
For them, the Orthodox Church indeed provides the principal and, increasingly, the only vehicle for the preservation of their ethnic identity. A Greek cannot be a Protestant or a Muslim in Australia either. Insofar as the Greek state expects diaspora Greeks to serve as pressure groups for Greek national interests, it retains a perpetual and vital interest in the Patriarchate, which has jurisdiction over them. That the latter should remain in an alien and often hostile environment, hostage to the secular state of a Muslim nation, is of course a political absurdity. It reflects, nonetheless, the enduring and inextricable embrace between the Greek nation-state and Orthodoxy on a worldwide scale.

The situation is perhaps most comparable with that of Israel and the Jewish diaspora. In both cases, religious freedom and state neutrality cannot be addressed simply as an internal question, confined to the borders of the state. Moreover, the question impinges upon national security in both cases, since a religious minority inside the borders may be disloyal to the state. In both cases, finally, a siege mentality is bred not only by the immediate security environment, but also by a historic consciousness of national uniqueness and solitude, which is grounded in a particular religion.

According to its architect Constantine Karamanlis, Greek membership in the EU was to terminate in 1981 this "secular solitude". If the national identity of Modern Greece had been constructed exclusively or even primarily with reference to classical antiquity, bypassing Byzantium (as some had sought in the 19th century), it would be indeed quite secure today, in the context of both European integration and globalization.

As it happened, however, this identity was constructed primarily with reference to Orthodoxy, that is, the Byzantine and Ottoman legacy. Consequently, membership in the EU (and NATO) where Greece is the only Orthodox country, has actually worked, on balance, in the opposite direction. Despite the manifold material benefits and changes, it has also exacerbated insecurity and even alienation from the West. By 1985, the unlikely successor of Karamanlis as President of the Republic was to coin the term "without siblings" (anadelphon) to define the existential status of the Greek nation. Now Archbishop Christodoulos can successfully promote the Orthodox Church as the only ark of Greek national identity, threatened by European integration and globalization (e.g., Eleftherotypia, 20 March 2000).

The defense of national identity in terms of religion
is perforce anachronistic and, in the case of Orthodoxy, exceptionally so. If it revives a siege mentality, the siege in question is that of Constantinople in 1204 (when it fell to the so-called Fourth Crusade) rather than 1453 (when it finally fell to the Ottoman Turks). By 1453, hostility to the West was such that the Orthodox majority perceived the Ottoman Turks as a lesser evil than a reunion of the Churches on the Pope's terms. As a Byzantine dignitary famously put it, it was "preferable to see the turban of the Turk in the City than the miter of the Latin" (Clogg 1979: 14).

Insofar as the Greek national consciousness has been shaped by Orthodoxy, it still carries the trauma of 1204 and the spirit of 1453. In the 1830s, for example, a Catholic King was considered more offensive than a Patriarch chosen by Muslims. Even today, and despite the tension between Greece and Turkey, no objections are ever heard in Greece, as in some Western countries, that Turkey has no place in Christian Europe. Religion is never invoked against Turkey, but it is invoked against NATO, for example. During the continuing crisis in what used to be Yugoslavia, Greek public opinion has been swayed by recurrent waves of unthinking solidarity with Serbia as a "sister" Orthodox nation, while at the same time a particularly "sinister" role has been attributed to the Vatican. Nowadays, in reaction to the Pope's various statements on the past responsibilities of the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church and public opinion in Greece apparently demand a full apology to Eastern Christianity as well, extending as far back as 1204 or even 1054.

**Conclusion**

Even a sketchy and brief survey such as this one should be enough to show that religious freedom cannot be achieved simply as a matter of conformity to constitutional and international norms, as long as the linkage between a particular religion and a particular national identity remains active and vital for the latter's self-preservation, in the minds of those concerned. This is by no means specific to the Orthodox Church (in Greece and elsewhere), as both Ireland and Israel demonstrate. What may indeed be specific to Orthodoxy among Christian denominations, in this respect, is a traumatic and defensive historical consciousness reaching into a far more distant past than even in Ireland, for example. If Orthodoxy is indeed uniquely anachronistic in this sense, this is no doubt related to its plausible claim to be the original Christian Church, from which all other denominations subsequently
broke away. Moreover, the anachronism is kept alive today by current sources of manifold insecurity (in Greece and elsewhere).

In terms of models (cf. Monsma and Soper 1997), it would appear that, as long as an established church continues to be identified with an "endangered" nation, change in the direction of pluralism is even less probable than an outright separation between Church and State. Religion in the Greek schools, for example, is defended nowadays solely on national grounds—and not on moral grounds, which could lead to education in "consensual" religious values (as in Britain or Australia).

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