The Role of Member States in Crisis Management: 
The Cases of EU and NATO

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Abstract
This paper seeks to address the role of nation states in crisis management in two key international organisations active in Europe and beyond: the European Union and NATO. This has become especially relevant in recent times since Europe faces many crises in its nearer neighbourhood, such as in Libya, Syria and Ukraine. Despite the increasing interests of academic scholars in crisis management as well as in foreign policy-making and bargaining (Thomas 2009), little attention has been paid to the key role of member states (cf. Wessel 2011). One approach is to move forward the debate on EU-NATO conflict management cooperation by analysing the interactions between the two organisations on the member state level. Drawing on findings from the study of institutional interactions and division of labour among institutions (Gehring/Oberthür 2009, Gehring/Faude 2013), this paper adds to the understanding of the role of member states in inter-organisational cooperation. While being member in both the EU and NATO, some member states still prefer one over the other in crisis management. However, as in the case of launching military operations off the Somali coast in 2008, a position shift had been recorded by some key member states, such as the United Kingdom which initially preferred a NATO solution over an EU approach (Grimond/Smith 2009, Riddervold 2014). As this paper seeks to argue, more importance should be given to the role of member states within international security organisations, which would further contribute to the discussion of inter-organisational cooperation among EU and NATO in planning and conducting military crisis management operations. This paper therefore aims to contribute to the understanding of the role of member states and what means they have at their disposal to circumvent institutional constraints and incompatibility to continue institutional interactions between the EU and NATO.

1 Work in progress — please do not cite or circulate without the author’s permission.
1. Introduction

It should be obvious to think that cooperation of the two major security organisations in Europe works efficiently in the field of military conflict management. In particular in recent times, in which Europe experiences ever growing security concerns and finds itself in the midst of simmering conflicts and crises. There is reason for this because of the values and norms that the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) share as well as their similar geographical scope and overlapping memberships — indeed, 22 of NATO’s 28 member states are also members of the EU.

Several studies and analyses so far have concentrated on the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), its civilian and military crisis management operations2, i.e. the conduct, shortfalls and capabilities (cf. Grevi et al. 2009), as well as on NATO’s activities and developments in this field. This paper, in contrast, focuses on the security and defence relations of the EU and NATO, and on the particular role that member states play in this relationship. Despite the increasing scholarly interest in the EU-NATO relationship, little attention has been paid to the key role of member states. It aims to move forward the debate on conflict management cooperation and on inter-organisational interactions of these two security organisations. This paper examines the roles of particular member states that take up key positions: France, the United Kingdom (UK) and Denmark, the latter representing a special case. In 2008, both the EU under CSDP and NATO launched naval anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast which were then expanded to the Gulf of Aden and western parts of the Indian Ocean (CEU 2008c, 2008b, NATO 2016a). All three member states followed different approaches, including those of the two organisations as well as national missions. The anti-piracy efforts off the Somali coast will serve as a case example which demonstrates not only the divergent interests of member states but also their objectives for institutional choice as well as their efforts in regard to EU-NATO cooperation in theatre.

This paper therefore suggests that greater importance should be given to the role of member states within international security organisations, which would further contribute to the discussion of inter-organisational cooperation among EU and NATO in planning and conducting military crisis management operations. It further aims to contribute to the understanding of the role of member states within this cooperation.

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2 In this context, the term *military conflict management operation* implies the immediate reaction to a violent conflict by using military means or, as Rodt defines it, (military) conflict management ‘refers exclusively to actions that seek to address proximate causes that are likely to turn a conflict violent or indeed more violent in the near future’ (Rodt 2012: 378).
states and what means they have at their disposal to circumvent institutional constraints and incompatibility to continue institutional interactions between the EU and NATO.

In the first part, the relationship between the European Union and NATO will be described. The focus is on the concurrent evolutions of their security and defence instruments as well as their approaches to military conflict management. The second part offers the theoretical and methodological foundations for the analysis. It expands on inter-organisational theory and applies it to the EU, NATO and member states. The third part gives an overview of the anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden conducted by the two security organisations. Subsequently, the fifth part focuses on the member states, i.e. France, the UK and Denmark, and looks closer at their engagement within either or both organisations. Finally, the seventh part provides a summary of the most important findings and concludes with an outlook for future research on the role of member states in international security organisations.

2. Overview of the EU-NATO Relationship

Much has been contended about the parallel developments of the EU and NATO in terms of their security and defence structures as well as in regard to their approaches to crisis and conflict management (Ojanen 2006). Whereas some scholars argue that competition — or even a ‘beauty contest’ — between the two organisations has arisen, some assert that they are progressing towards a strategic partnership (Heise and Schmidt 2005, Touzovskaia 2006) as promulgated and reaffirmed in the EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy, which was agreed upon and signed on 16 December 2002 in Brussels (EU 2007, NATO 2002). In 2003, the EU and NATO agreed on the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements, a package of arrangements which imply the access to military assets and capabilities for EU-led military crisis/conflict management operations where NATO does not have interest in conducting one. The Berlin Plus arrangement further include the exchange of classified information with respect to each organisation’s information security rules, using NATO’s command structures under the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) as well as consultation arrangements between EU and NATO (Council of the European Union 2003). Agreeing on these arrangements has moved the EU-NATO relations another step forward towards becoming stronger strategic partners in the field of conflict and crisis management.
Cooperation in security and defence in Europe has become an interesting research topic and has enjoyed high levels of scholarly attention, especially since the agreement on the Berlin Plus arrangements (cf. de Wijk 2004, Græger and Haugevik 2011, Howorth and Keeler 2003, Missiroli 2002). Most contributions circulate around the dominant themes of competition between the two organisations (Duke 2008, Ojanen 2006), the different approaches to crisis/conflict management of the EU and NATO (Major/Mölling 2009, Schleich 2014) or the actors involved in EU-NATO cooperation, i.e. state, international staff and military actors (Smith 2011). This high level of attention has however slowly faded away. The main cause for this, it has been argued, are the numerous ‘deadlocks’ in the transatlantic relationship which have also halted the progress in this research area. These deadlocks include the Cyprus-Turkey issue, the problem of information and intelligence exchange, institutional compatibility, participation problem in regard to EU-NATO meetings, and the so-called complexity trap (Schmidt 2006: 121).

3. Analytical Framework: Theory Inter-Organisational Interaction

Yet, a theoretical framework that has so far been neglected from these analyses is the ‘conceptual framework of institutional interaction’ developed by Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür (2004, 2009; also see Gehring/Faude 2014). Generally, inter-organisational interaction focuses on the emergence of separate institutions and organisations in the international governance structure that are tasked with similar political and geographical scopes. The concept is embedded in the theoretical approach of neoliberal institutionalism (see Keohane/Nye 1977), which examines the formation of international organisations, and broadly shares the following core assumptions: states are the main actors within international organisations and act according to rational decisions; within the international systems, interdependence among states prevails; transnational interdependence leads to a higher interest in cooperation with other states, which then leads to the formation of international institutions and international organisations, and these institutions/organisations develop their own dynamics to act in the international system. The conceptual framework of inter-organisational interaction offers abilities, which other theoretical approaches lack to explain.

3 The purpose of this paper is to focus on the role of member states and not on the EU-NATO relationship. Therefore, this paper does not expand on the several deadlocks listed here.

4 Here the terms ‘inter-institutional interaction’ and ‘inter-organisational interaction’ are used interchangeably.
Gehring and Oberthür initially applied their conceptual framework to the analysis of interinstitutional interactions between global environmental organisations and regimes. Gehring and Faude state that the conceptual framework can also be used to examine the interorganisational interactions between other international organisations and institutions, such as in the field of crisis and conflict management of, for example, the United Nations, African Union, European Union and NATO. I am therefore applying this approach to analysing EU-NATO cooperation in military conflict management operations. Furthermore, this concept has received more attention with the increasing density of international (security) organisations and security alliances. Since the end of the Cold War, numerous security organisations and alliances in Europe have been created. The density of such international institutions and organisations has thus increased tremendously. The most enduring ones are the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU)/European Union (EU). Nevertheless, due to the issue-specific overlap, the concept needs a ‘careful consideration of the different nature of complexes made up of transnational or operational institutions’ (Gehring/Faude 2014: 494).

Inter-organisational interaction theory helps to understand and analyse interactions between institutions and organisations as well as to understand and examine an organisation’s causal influence on other organisations in the same policy area. It occurs ‘if one institution (the source institution) affects the development or performance of another institution (the target institution)’ (Gehring/Oberthür 2009: 127). The cumulating amount of such institutions within the same policy domain exist in, what Alter and Meunier (2009) have coined, an ‘international regime complexity’. Jönsson (1986) and Biermann (2008) also call these ‘inter-organisational systems’ and ‘inter-organisational networks’ respectively. These networks develop with the emergence of increasing functional overlap, which refers to overlap of regulatory jurisdiction, tasks, geographical scope and membership. Functional overlap can either be unintentionally or on purpose.

Gehring and Faude (2014) argue that inter-organisational interaction creates opportunities for institutional adaptation — Biermann (2009) calls this institutional transformation in his contribution. Both member states and organisations, due to their own dynamics and autonomy, can exercise influence on institutional adaptation. Institutional adaptation implies that the governance

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5 For an overview of the emergence of international alliances, institutions, organisations and regimes since the end of the Cold War see the dataset provided by The Alliance Treat Obligations and Provisions (ATAP).
activities of both organisations gradually become accommodated and adapted to the respective other. This happens either under symmetric or asymmetric power distribution among the organisations in the institutional network. In this context, power of an organisation denotes ‘its ability to retain, or expand, its capability to pursue its policies within the area of functional overlap’ (Gehring/Faude 2014: 479). Under an asymmetric power distribution, a so-called ‘sectoral specialisation’ (Gehring/Faude 2014: 479) of the organisations is most likely to happen because the weaker organisations has to withdraw its governance activities in the concerned policy domain. In case of a symmetric power distribution, the organisations have to coordinate their governance activities in the particular policy area. Herein, the multiple members play a crucial role as they have to negotiate the institutional arrangements within both organisations to avoid conflicts and malfunctions of the regulatory bodies. Furthermore, under symmetrical power distribution not a role specification but rather co-governance and a division of labour is more likely to occur. Accordingly, Gehring and Faude propose ‘that institutional adaptation gives rise to an institutionalised division of labour among the elemental institutions of an institutional complex’ (Gehring/Faude 2014: 482). This division of labour, as argued by Schleich, results in deeper cooperation of the organisations and thus becoming so-called ‘interlocking institutions’ (cf. Biermann 2009, Gehring/Faude 2014, Schleich 2014).

3.1 The Role of Multiple Member States in Inter-Organisational Interaction

In inter-organisational theory, member states play vital roles in shaping institutional design and in shaping the interactions between organisations. In their framework, Gehring and Oberthür distinguish two categories of actors, or rather member states: multiple members and single members.

Single members are those states are members in only one organisation and who might not be directly affected from functional overlap of organisations. Furthermore, single members do not have the ability to exert influence immediately and are not involved in the decision-making process of those organisations of which they are not member. Multiple members, in contrast, are those states that are members of two or more regulatory organisations and which enjoy the advantage of forum-shopping. By the term forum-shopping it can be understood, in terms of organisational theory, that a member state can chose one organisation over another to put a particular issue on the agenda because it is convinced that in this particular organisation it will receive more gains than it would
receive in the other (Gehring/Oberthür 2009). Gehring and Oberthür claim that multiple members can ‘transmit influence from one institution to another’ (2009: 150), and in particular multiple members play key roles in exerting influence on both institutions and their interactions with other institutions. Hence, multiple members can create functional overlap on purpose to create an organisation ‘to challenge the regulatory dominance of an existing one (…), or if they seek to shift regulatory activities from one to another institution [organisation]’ (Gehring/Faude 2014: 474).

In regard to both the European Union and NATO, states of both categories can be easily identified. Only Cyprus is the state is member of the EU but neither member of NATO or its Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. Some EU member states do not join NATO as full members but have joined PfP programme. These are Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden. Taking part in the PfP means that these states do not have the ability to directly influence NATO’s policies, however, they can join military operations under the Alliance’s framework and are granted access to essential classified information and intelligence (NATO 2016b). Among those states that enjoy membership in both organisations, three are of special interest for the purpose of this paper: France, the United Kingdom and Denmark; their approaches and involvement in military conflict management will be elaborated in the following parts (part 6).

3.2 Inter-Organisational Interaction of the EU and NATO

Applying the theoretical concept of inter-organisational interaction to EU-NATO relations, it becomes intelligible that this concept offers valuable insights on their institutional interactions in the regard to the policy area of conflict and crisis management. Especially the role of key member states that enjoy membership in both organisations (multiple members) needs more attention in this analysis.

In the context of the theoretical concept of inter-organisational interaction, NATO can be regarded as the existing organisation and the EU as the newly established, challenging organisation. Particular member states of the Alliance, were the drivers behind the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy. Especially France, a multiple member, is among the most important drivers, which desired to create a competitive institution in the field of security and defence policy in order to defend its own lead role as well as to challenge NATO and its member states (Ratti 2014).
This paper postulates that functional overlap and competition between the EU and NATO in military conflict management cooperation, also called ‘beauty contest’ by many scholars, has steered into institutional adaptation, which was impinged by multiple members which have the steering power to influence the degree of institutional adaptation. Thus, institutional adaptation of NATO and the EU has occurred over time. Institutional transformation took place on both sides which is illustrated by the course of development of the EU’s policy instruments and the introduction of NATO’s Strategic Concepts (1999 and 2010). In addition, the finalisation of institutional adaptation as well as the subsequent division of labour and the first attempts of cooperation in military conflict management operations resulted in the formalisation of EU-NATO relations through signing the EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy in 2002 and the Berlin Plus Agreement in 2003.

In regard to the power distribution between the EU and NATO, however, it can be argued that this is an asymmetrical distribution. The military capabilities of the Alliance predominate those of the member states of the EU and the civilian capabilities of the EU outweigh those of NATO (cf. IISS 2015). This resource dependency on both sides therefore suggests an asymmetrical power distribution which would further call for a sectoral specification of both organisations. In contrast, it can also be argued that a symmetrical power distribution among EU and NATO member states caused a co-governance and a division of labour in which each organisation ‘performs a specific function within the area of overlap that is complementary to the functions performed by other institutions’ (Gehring/Faude 2014: 481) — or the by the respective other organisation.

4. Methodological Approach

This paper seeks to analyse the role of multiple member states in military crisis management, more specifically in the EU and NATO. The emphasis is put on these member states as the key in shaping policies and in contributing to both organisations. Analysing their involvement under the framework of both CSDP and NATO is especially of interest because in the past it has become evident that ‘member states of the EU and NATO have been unable to agree on the political relationship between the two organisations in a way that would allow for joint operational effort and sound strategic cooperation, let alone for a unity of command in this important matter’ (Gebhard/Smith 2015: 108). Despite this ‘inability’, it is in the power of member states to shape and influence potential cooperation between the EU and NATO. Therefore, what is the role of member states in
EU-NATO relations in the field of security and defence? How can member states contribute to move forward the EU-NATO relationship towards a functioning strategic cooperation in military crisis management operations?

Subsequently, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the role of multiple member states. It looks at their involvement on the one hand, and on the other hand, examines member states’ means to circumvent institutional constraints and deadlocks to continue inter-organisational interaction between the EU and NATO. This hopes to open new avenues for future cooperation and for further reducing costs and duplications.

By applying inter-organisational theory to the EU-NATO relationship (see part 3.2), the vital role of member states becomes even more evident (see part 3.1). This theoretical approach helps to understand the various dynamics and processes in the rapprochement of both organisations. As explained above, steps of institutional adaption have already been recorded and member states played an important role therein. In this paper, the focus is directed at the roles of France, the United Kingdom and Denmark. France and the United Kingdom are not only important global security actors due to their permanent membership in the United Nations (UN) Security Council and due to their possessions of nuclear weapons, which makes them the only nuclear powers on the European continent. These two member states also contribute to both EU and NATO operations, but maintain different foreign and security policies in regard to European security (cf. Manners/Whitman 2000), different perspectives on the desired institutional development of these two security organisations in Europe as well as different views on which security organisations should take the lead in a particular conflict management operation. In contrast, Denmark demonstrates the case of a special member state because it is a NATO member state, but chose to opt-out of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CEU 1992), and is even an active contributor to NATO’s UN-authorised operations.

In addition to analysing the roles of these three member states, this paper also examines their involvement and contributions to EU and NATO military operations. For this purpose, the anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden serve as useful case studies. Prior to the launch of both EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta in December 2008 and NATO’s Operation Allied Provider in October 2008, the EU and NATO have been involved in similar geographical territories, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Darfur. However, except for their cooperation efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other cases have not be categorised as successful or effective (cf. Haugevik 2007).
5. Piracy off the Somali Coast and in the Gulf of Aden

The root causes for the emergence of piracy attacks in parts of the West Indian Ocean originate back to the devastating political situation in Somalia as well as the instability and insecurity in the region. For over two decades Somalia suffered under the suppression of the dictatorship under Major-General Mohammed Siad Barre (1969-1991). During this time, however, Somalia received humanitarian and economic aid from Western states as well as the Soviet Union in order to recover from several conflicts with neighbouring states (Loubser/Solomon 2014). With the emergence of the civil war in Somalia (1988-1991) Barre’s authoritarian regime ended and the country was left in a state of civil war, dominated by clan-based groups. This has resulted in a state of political chaos and fragmentation as well as in state of economic dislocation. In addition, in 1992, Somalia was heavily hit by drought and subsequently by famine which cost the lives of thousands of Somali people. Despite numerous international efforts and military interventions, such as the UN-led Operation Restore Hope (1992-1993) and the US-led military operation named Operation Gothic Serpent (1993), Somalia tumbled deeper into instability and chaos (cf. Petrovic 2012, Loubser/Solomon 2014). It has since then been characterised as a failed state and divided into three autonomous and independent regions: Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland.

Consequently, poverty, insecurity and corruption as well as political instability, insecurity and a dysfunctional economy prevail and have been among the trigger points for organised crime (Beri 2011). Illegal fishing, predominantly by international fishing companies, has thus become an increasing challenge due to the higher competition among Somali fishermen because of the limited resources (Beri 2011). Others also explain the piracy attacks as a result of the security vacuum which was left after the military interventions by the United Nations and the United States as well as by the lack of functional political institutions and the absence of the rule of law (Petrovic 2012). Piracy activity has begun in the 1990s as a succession of individual attacks off the Somali coast. The number of successful attacks has increased over time. Whereas in 2004 only two attacks have been reported, this number has grown rapidly to 35 in 2005 and even up to 80 in 2009 and 139 attacks in 2010. Piracy attacks that have been committed by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden have also increased to 53 attacks in 2010. In the Red Sea a total of 25 piracy attacks and in the Arabian Sea a total of two attacks have been recorded (IMB 2008, 2010, 2014; Onuoha 2010). These numbers illustrate not only a rise of successful piracy attacks by more than 100% between 2005 and 2009 off the Somali coast, but also a geographical shift of the attacks from Somali waters further into the Red Sea and into the West Indian Ocean.
Growing numbers as well as increasing international threats have attracted the attention of the international community to respond to the piracy problem off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden. Among individual operations by national navies, the African Union, coalitions of the willing led by the United States (Combined Task Force CTF-151) as well as initiatives by non-state actors (for more information see Møller 2009 or Hansen 2009), two military operations stand out: EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta and NATO’s Operations Allied Provider/Allied Protector/Ocean Shield. The international efforts by multilateral operations is coordinated through the framework of Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) which meets on a regular basis.

5.1 Background Information and Mandate of EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta

Operation Atalanta is the EU’s first naval military operation and was agreed upon on 10 November 2008 by Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP by the Council of the European Union (CEU 2008c) — called the Council hereafter — and then officially launched on 8 December 2008 by Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP (2008d) as a reaction to the United Nations Security Council’s call for action against piracy off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden (UN 2008a, 2008b).

Even prior to the UN’s initial call for action, the EU expressed its concern of the rise of piracy activity and acts of armed robbery in its Council Conclusion of 26 May 2008 (CEU 2008a). As a first reaction to the UN Security Council Resolutions 1814(2008) and 1816 (2008), the Council established NAVCO which is the EU’s coordination cell to be based in Brussels in order to coordinate the various actions in the field (CEU 2008b).

The overall objective of Operation Atalanta is the protection of vessels of the World Food Programme that deliver humanitarian aid to Somalia as well as the protection of vulnerable vessels, such as merchant and commercial ships, passing by Somali waters (CEU 2008c: Article 1(1)). Furthermore, Operation Atalanta shall ‘take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where it is present’ (Article 2(d)) as well as ‘to liaise with organisations and entities, as well as States, working in the region to combat acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (…)’ (Article 2(f)).

Operation Atlanta is under political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee, and monitored by the EU Military Committee. Its Operation Headquarters are located in Northwood, United Kingdom, which is commanded by the Operation Commander. Since its
launch, ten member states⁶ have been participating in Operation Atalanta along third states⁷, and these provide a manpower amounting to 2,000 personnel (cf. Helly 2009). The common costs for the military operation were agreed for €8.3 billion for the first twelve months (CEU 2008c). In 2009, as well as in the following years, Operation Atalanta was then extended until 12 December 2016 (EEAS 2014).

5.2 Background Information and Mandate of NATO’s Anti-Piracy Operations

In August 2009, the member states of NATO launched Operation Ocean Shield, a naval military mission operating off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden. Prior to this, NATO has already been active in the area through Operation Allied Provider (October 2008-March 2009) and Operation Allied Protector (March 2009-August 2009).

The operation’s overall mandate is to counter maritime piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast and, after expanding the mandate, the Horn of Africa and the West Indian Ocean (NATO 2016a). NATO acts in accordance to the UN authorisation of regional organisations to combat the problem of piracy (UN 2008a, 2008b) by taking necessary means. These include helicopter surveillance and patrol of the waters by aircrafts and warships as well as disrupting potential pirate attacks. Another task is the escort of vessels delivering food aid to Somalia under the World Food Programme and commercial vessels passing the Gulf of Aden towards Europe and Asia (NATO 2016c). Among the participating member states are nine EU member states, including Denmark and the United Kingdom⁸. In the field, NATO collaborates with other multilateral efforts such as the US-led Combined Task Force (CTF-151), the African Union and with EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, as well as with national commands.

Since its launch of Operation Ocean Shield, NATO has been able to deter numerous piracy attacks and has contributed to reducing the numbers of successful attacks of piracy and armed robbery in joint efforts with Operation Atalanta and CTF-151. However, it is important to note that in the case of anti-piracy efforts off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden, NATO does not play the lead

⁶ Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden

⁷ Croatia, Montenegro, Norway and Ukraine

⁸ Other participating EU and NATO member states are Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
role. In contrast, ‘it is clear that it is an ESDP lead; it is a European force first, and NATO co-operates with it’ (House of Lords 2010).

6. The Role of Member States
This part focuses on the roles of particular member states within both the European Union and NATO. In each section, a general role and position is identified and described first, and then the theoretical approach of inter-organisational interaction is applied. Subsequently, the case study of anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden as outlined above, is used to demonstrate the member states’ roles in reality. When examining the roles of France, the United Kingdom and Denmark it becomes evident that these states have divergent interests and ambitious when it comes to security and defence on the one hand, and when it comes to choosing over participation in security organisations on the other hand.

6.1 France
France has been the driver behind the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy since the creation of the European Community and desired the establishment of a European Defence Community, which however failed in the mid-1950s. Ever since, France maintains its ambition of fostering Europe’s role in the world, especially in the field of security and crisis management. Due to dissatisfaction with NATO’s approach to the Suez Canal issue in the mid-1950s, France has distanced and disassociated itself from the Atlantic Alliance. In 2007, then President Nicolas Sarkozy announced France’s re-integration into NATO (Ratti 2014). Despite its rapprochement with NATO, France has been strongly involved in moving forward the EU’s security and defence policy and also, it has been the initiator of most of the EU’s military crisis management operations under CFSP. France has further acted as framework nation in military operations and has thus taken the lead especially in operations conducted on the African continent (Lakomy 2011, Ratti 2014).
As a member of both the EU and NATO – despite its temporary disintegration – is considered a multiple member. It has decision-making powers under both frameworks; whereas in the case of NATO, it regained such powers through its re-integration, i.e. its full participation in the Integrated Military Command Structures since the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit held in April 2009 (France
France can therefore enjoy the advantages of forum shopping as well as from blocking modifications and progress in the institutional structure of one of the organisations – in this case of the Alliance – or it is able to create functional overlap as in the case of the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy.

Even prior to the launches of Operation Atalanta and NATO’s anti-piracy operations, France launched its national naval mission called Opération Alcyon. The French navy was tasked to support vessels from the World Food Programme that deliver food aid to Somalia (Nováky 2015). As the ‘political mobiliser’ with Spain (Riddervold 2014: 554), France participates in and contributes to EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta. In fact, Atalanta was launched during the French Presidency in the European Council. The French naval operation occurred due to the increasing hijackings of French vessels and private yachts such as the Care d’As in autumn 2008. Furthermore, France had a strong interest in clearing the Gulf of Aden off piracy attacks because of the high number of international trade going to and from France. Operation Atalanta, it can be argued, was not only a success ‘for the EU as a whole, but especially for France’ (Nováky 2015: 503). In contrast, however, France did not participate in or contribute to any of NATO’s naval operations off the Somali coast despite its efforts to re-integrate into the Atlantic Alliance.

6.2 United Kingdom

In contrast to France, the UK sees the European Union as an economic power and it therefore follows an economic-driven approach in the Union. It did not envisage to move integration forward in the field of foreign, security and defence policy. The UK was therefore opposed to ideas such as the creation of a European Army or the European Defence Community and still opposed the idea of creating European operation headquarters (OHQ) (Biscop 2012). A change of course of the UK’s direction occurred under Tony Blair’s Labour government by signing the Franco-British St.Malo Declaration in 1998, when the UK made another step towards EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and permitted deeper integration in this policy field. In 2010, the UK further strengthened its bilateral defence cooperation with France when both states signed the Lancaster House Agreements. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom has been a long advocate of NATO and the alliance’s approaches
to military conflict management operations. Some even argue that NATO still is and will remain the UK’s cornerstone in security and defence.

As another multiple member, the UK enjoys membership in both the EU and NATO. There is a long record of the country’s involvement in the decision-making procedures and how it has used its veto power in general in the EU decision-making process, and also in particular in regard to the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (xxxx 20xx). More than taking the advantage of forum shopping, the UK thus makes use of its right to veto and to limit the progression of the EU in the field of security and defence. In the EU-NATO relationship, plays an essential role linking the two organisations. The outstanding outcome of the upcoming UK referendum on its EU membership and the possibility of Brexit is therefore critical for future of this special relationship.

The UK participates in both Operation Ocean Shield and EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Initially, it opposed the launch of the EU’s first naval military operation but then was convinced that it should not block it to enable France’s re-integration into NATO (Nováky 2015). Due to British engagement in international trade, it was of their interest to secure the trade route through the Gulf of Aden, which thus triggered the UK’s participation in Operation Atalanta. However, it does not contribute any naval personnel or capabilities in theatre. Instead it decided in October 2008 to provide the operational headquarters in Northwood which is located exactly where NATO’s OHQ are situated (FCO 2015), and thereby taking over the command for Operation Atalanta. The UK further participates in the EU’s comprehensive approach, i.e. it does not only participate in Operation Atalanta but also in the EU’s civilian missions EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor. In addition, this facilitated the UK to act as the contact as well as the connection point between the EU and NATO.

6.3 Denmark

In regard to integration in the field of security and defence policy of the European Union, Denmark represents a special case. In the course of the Danish referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, in which the Common Security and Defence Policy was created, the Danish citizens voted against Danish participation. Hence, ‘Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications, but will not

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9 This was debated at a conference on Brexit and security and defence implications held at King’s College on 20 April 2016.

10 The UK’s EU referendum will be held after the submission of this paper, on 23 June 2016.
prevent the development of closer cooperation between Member States in this area’ (European Council 1992: 54, Section D). Since the end of World War Two, Denmark exercised its security and defence policy through multilateral organisations, and more specifically through the UN and the Atlantic Alliance. Contrastingly to CSDP, Danish membership in NATO received high support among the Danish population and was followed by Danish active engagement in multilateral operations. This also led to Denmark’s transformation from a soft power to a hard power making using of its military capabilities (Pedersen 2006, Rye Olsen/Pilegaard 2005).

Even though Denmark would need to be considered as a multiple member because of its *de facto* membership in both organisations, it should rather be treated as a single member due to its opt-out. Whenever decisions are taken in regard to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy or when it comes to military conflict management operations, Danish representatives are requested to leave (Pedersen 2006). Hence, Denmark does not have the advantage of forum shopping or of influencing the institutional development of the EU’s security and defence structure, and it therefore does not take its share in the process of institutional adaptation like those multiple members such as France and the UK.

As a seafaring and trade nation, Denmark has an interest in securing the essential sea route. Due to its opt-out of CSDP and its non-participation in Operation Atalanta, it is strongly involved in Operation Ocean Shield. Its participation and contribution is in line with the Danish maritime strategy as outlined in the *Strategy for the Danish Measures against Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea 2015-2018* (MoFA of Denmark 2016). Apart from its military contribution Denmark also participates along France, the United Kingdom and other member states of both the EU and NATO in the prosecution of pirates. Under NATO’s framework, Denmark has contributed with a maritime helicopter, a ship, surveillance aircraft and a Special Maritime Insertion Unit (MoFA of Denmark 2016).

7. Conclusion and Future Research Agenda

The main objective of this paper was to put an emphasis on the role of member states in military crisis management and in international security organisations, in particular in the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. Recognising the importance of member states in military conflict management contributes to scholarly debate on the relationship between the EU and NATO, and also contributes to the understanding of their possibilities to cooperate. The debate on cooperation
in military operations varies from non-cooperation and illusionary cooperation to first attempts of successful cooperation efforts. By suggesting that member states are key actors in the EU-NATO relationship, I provide an additional dimension to the study of multilateral military operations and a contribution to the study of institutional cooperation in the field of security and defence.

By applying the theory of inter-organisational interaction based on the studies of Gehring and Faude and of Biermann, I have illustrated the role of multiple member states and of those special cases such as Denmark cannot be neglected anymore in the analysis of the EU-NATO relationship in military conflict management operations. Member states are the ones that take decisions, whether on the conduct of military operations or on the institutional development of the respective organisations. Hence, member states are the key actors in moving EU-NATO cooperation forward. They can either facilitate future cooperation efforts or diminish any such visions and block any progression. Despite the numerous deadlocks in this special relationship, which also includes tensions between individual so-called single members, member states can decide over the future institutional path.

Since this paper is embedded in a wider research project on the Euro-Atlantic relationship and more specifically on EU-NATO cooperation in military conflict management operations as well as on the role of multiple member states, these findings here will be used to explain additional case studies. The theoretical approach of inter-organisational interaction will be applied to crises and conflicts in which both the EU and NATO are or have been involved. So far, not many missions demonstrate such cases; hence, EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia and NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour would serve as cases to illustrate the potentials of EU-NATO cooperation. For future research I will therefore seek to contact military staff from both the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance as well as representatives from the field of security and defence from Denmark, France and the United Kingdom in order to investigate this issue further. The focus on member states can also be extended by looking at additional multiple members such as Germany which would illustrate an interesting case due to its war past and its subsequent constitutional constraints in regard to the conduct of military operations. The theoretical framework of inter-organisational interaction will be of great use for this endeavour. It sheds light on the interaction of international organisations with similar portfolios, such as security and defence, and on structural adaptions and institutional changes with a particular emphasis on the role of member states.
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