Mobilization and protest strategy of the Fidesz-MPP within and after the electoral campaign in Hungary 2002

Máté Szabó

Hungary had the fourth free national election since 1990 in May 2002. Previous campaigns were rather „silent”, focusing on the institutionalized channels of communication, not involving popular protest. There were no serious protests against the electoral results at all. This was a striking difference to South-Eastern-European post-communist regimes, as for example during the 90’s in Serbia, Bulgaria or Albania, where “white hot”, sometimes violent and bloody, mobilization took place within and as a follow up of elections, and popular movements protested against results of the general elections. Elections in Hungary in 1990,1994 and 1998 did not result in massive mobilizations and protest of the political society beyond the institutional channels. In 2002, Fidesz MPP the former leader of the center-right government, mobilised against the victory of the Left,MSZP and SZDSZ , challenging the electoral results, and de-legitimating the new government as a result of “electoral manipulation” which cheated the popular will.

FIDESZ used to be the most active party in political protest in the beginning of the 90’s. After 1992, FIDESZ become more and more institutionally oriented parallel to its transformation of image and programme from a youthful anti-communist „orange” party towards the centre-right. The victory of the centre-right coalition in 1998 resulted in a governing position of the Fidesz MPP, yet combined with mass mobilizations from above, from the government in different celebrations, campaigns, as the opening of the House of Terror-museum of totalitarian regimes from the Left and the Right - February 2002, or a campaign for the Hungarian candidature for the Olympic games at the same year.

Loosing its majority position on a sudden and astonishing way in the first turnout of the 2002 parliamentary elections, Fidesz united its protest party traditions with the bottom up mass mobilization techniques of its governmental period between the two turns of the elections and beyond. Until the second run, the main goal was to mobilize the electorate for the centre-right by mass gatherings, symbolic actions and electronic messages. After the victory of the left-liberal parties Fidesz MPP changed the mobilization goal and challenged the results of the elections. Satellite organizations were established as citizen’s initiatives(polgári körök) and already established Christian-democratic associations and organizations were also involved in
the mobilizations. Demonstrations, blockades, symbolic actions and legal actions were combined in a sudden wave of mass mobilization and protest.

The centre–right mobilization was not a success in challenging the electoral results and the legitimacy of the new government. However, new forms of organizing and protesting were developed within the active supporters of the Fidesz MPP. This is the aim of Fidesz to unite the differentiated field of the Hungarian centre-right parties. The 2002 electoral campaign was unique in the short history of the new Hungarian democracy, in the sense that the Right mobilized protesting masses during the campaign and after the two electoral runs, and continued to protesting against electoral results and set up a broader satellite movement of citizen’s initiative. The victorious Left did not continue the mass mobilization strategy. Generally one may state that the Right after 1989 was rather innovative in terms of organization, strategy, alliances, meanwhile the Left, dominated by MSZP built its stable structure upon the legacy of Kádár’s party. Within the mobilization strategy of the centre-right, there were populist motifs involved, as criticism of the parliament, direct-democracy mythology, anti-party sentiments manifested within the action and discourse of the new centre-right movement.

Efficacy of popular protests in Hungary seems to be bound to the developments of the political field, changes of political opportunity structures of protests(Ekiert-Kubik 1998, Körösényi 1999). The dissolution of Communist authoritarian system with its rejection against all forms of popular protest ended up in a "smiling openness" of the last Communist government towards all popular demands in 1989-1990. Within the established political pluralism and free elections, the necessities of political coalition forming, the permanent constituency building and the possibilities of implementation of new policies gave some political space to the protest politics being able to influence the political processes and decision certain extent. The selectivity, the closeness and openness towards popular demands is based upon the political values and policies of the respective governments and parties, and the "cheerful openness" of the regime change gives way to the "harder" or "softer" implementation of economic and social policies against the will of greater groups of the population, who try to hinder and reject these policies also by protest actions. Changing emphasis and clear cut differences emerged among the new political forces in terms of handling protest, and the "right" which stood for more internal security, for "law and order" adopted in 2002 the strategy for more democracy, participation, tolerance, for "human rights". Fidesz MPP combined its opposition, dissent, mobilizing past and the new orientation towards nation, church and Hungarian demos to a mobilizing populist party of a new type,
which will be compared very often to the Italian right wing leader and present Prime Minister’s Silvio Berlusconi’s “Forza Italia” (Sükösd-Vásárhelyi 2002).

Policies, but not the bases of polity are challenged by the protests after 1990. Before, there is a structural popular protest against the Communist system which approaching 1989 is reacting more and more "friendly" to the protesters, and did not use massive repression. Popular protests were quite efficient the regime was swept away by many-mostly be external-forces, but popular protest had its satisfaction for the energy invested by a victory being the result of many processes, but producing by and large the desired outcomes of democratization and of marketization. Problems and conflict within and among the democracy, market, welfare are inevitable in the new democracies of East Central Europe, so the new system mobilized new protest groups challenging new policy issues of the new Social–Liberal government from 2002 on. Popular protest against the new government in 2002 was much less effective, than the one in 1989 against the Communist power, when other processes and actors, like Western aid, or another actors of foreign policy basically supported the changes demanded by the protesting masses. The protests of Fidesz MPP against the new government and its policies from 2002 were even looked upon by Western politics and political analysis as de-legitimizing forces against a properly and freely elected government, or as protest against rule of law and not as the ones by FIDESZ from 1988-1989 against nomenclatura and "Communist" privileges. However, no post communist government is having a firm blueprint for establishing democracy and market on a perfect way, so political protest could be seen also as important element of policy correction, articulating by the decision-makers neglected issues. Protest could be effective in a consolidated democracy only if it was receiving political support from the new political elite, using the established means of political conflict solving institutionalized. Mobilizations with elite support in 2002 were spectacular, but not having an effect on the institutions, or any policy change. In a parliamentary democracy, policy alterations, innovations may have been produced also with and by political protests but not without the established channels of decision-making and political communication.

The faces of FIDESZ: dissident movement, political party, mobilist party

Analysing the political change of FIDESZ, we have to differentiate the political mobilization of masses from mobilization of social movements and of organised political behavior within a political party (Allen-Braham-Lewis, 161-177.p).

Social movements are characterized as follows in the social science
a./Collective action and behaviour with high symbolic interaction and expressivity, and community structures.

b./Institutionalized, but not organized action, with a certain degree of continuity and structure, low role specification, formalization and division of labour, flexibility and fluidity of goals, actions and organization.

c./Movements are forms of social mobilization, their dynamics is connected with the mobilization of human and material resources.

d./Social movements are the expressions of social-political conflicts and protest.

e./Their macrosocial and political function is social-political innovation, challenge for the organized politics, characterized by high degree of problem consciousness but low degree of problem solving capacity, disproportion between efficacy and democracy. Social movements are based upon either on loosely structured, or on more or less established and institutionalised networks and conflict structures, plus collective identities.

We may differentiate between unorganized mass behaviour, social movements and political organizations, represented here by the political party, regarding their goals, organization patterns and actions.

Mass actions may be stabilized as social movements, and from social movements parties or other sociopolitical organizations may emerge. Not all mass action conclude establishing a social movement, and not all movements build up political parties. There are dynamic interactions in between the three categories. Leaders, distributors of symbols, media specialized organizers are the indices, that certain role differentiation, division of labour is there within mass action. Goals may be overlapping between groups and organizations being the part of the network and infrastructure of the right building up a loosely coordinated social movement from the street corner societies until the political parties. According my view, to analyse the mobilization of 2002 is in a proper categorial context if we differentiate all the three levels, the mass action, the emergence of social movements and in the sudden opposition role reactivated populist, right-wing party and its satellite political organizations as elements of the same mobilizing social trend.

Using the above concepts we may differentiate stages within the development of FIDESZ;

- FIDESZ as a dissident movement from 1988-1990,
- as a party established from 1990 as member of a growing multy-party system, rejecting mobilist strategy in 1992,
- Fidesz MPP adopting top down mobilization as popular government campaigns between 1998-2002,
Fidesz MPSZ after 2002 elections in its 2003 May congress becoming a mobilizing populist party of the right wing opposition. Hence this 2002-2003 mobilization is different from the ones 1988-1992, because it is based upon a nation wide organisational network, a former governing party’s material and personal resources, a new type of populist orientation, and a civil society which can be addressed within the system of political pluralism. Meanwhile in 1988-1992 there was a transition of social, economic, and of political system, there were uncertainties between the roles of parties and movement, Left and Right, an unified civil society supporting democratic transition beyond authoritarism etc. So within the development of FIDESZ to Fidesz MPSZ we may see a change from the Left to the Right, from a social movement to a party, from civil to political, from NGO to governmental responsibility. Based upon these developments, the FIDESZ organisation and strategy in 1988 was an avant-guarde of the system transition, and in 2002 it is following of the models of right wing populist parties in Western Europe.

FIDESZ as a dissident movement

The protest tradition we have in Hungary before 1989 is the one of the protest of younger, urban, professional ,white collar workers, especially of students, artists, scientists, clerks, social workers, educators, the “dissent”, “opposition” (Tökés 1988) The diffusion of protest was concentrated on the capital Budapest, and some bigger university towns as Pécs, Szeged, Miskolc. These protests of "intellectuals" grew parallel of the opening up of the systems, become internationally networked with especially Polish, and Czech dissidents but also with protests of ethnic Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, and of course with the Hungarian emigration in the Western countries. Small scale as it was, but this protests established some skills and courage for organizing and articulation in a segment of the population, which become the part of the new political elite in the regime change. These people, the dissidents were rooted also among public sector employees, had their communication networks of samizdat within this strata. If there were at all traditions of protest preserved and built up, than within this strata and especially among its new generations, who read and discussed samizdat literature and analyzed it since the mid eighties. This tradition again is rooted in the educated segment of the public sector employees and of students, of course. The anti-communist protest of these groupings may have exerted some influence on their post-communist protest behaviour.
The share of youth protest in Hungary was one of the highest among the communist countries. Younger people, especially the students of the higher education are generally more likely to be mobilized in the modern societies, than established professionals with jobs and family. Younger people are more accepting risky situations, they have less boundaries, more free time and energy, than workers and employees. The students were clearly dominating protest actions in the eighties in Hungary, in ecology, peace and human right issues, although some of them were excluded from the university, hindered in traveling abroad, or had to enter military service not speaking on other, softer forms of repression. Youth and students mobilized in 1989 may have references to the Hungarian revolutions of 1848 and 1956 when youth and students played initiative role.

After 1989, when no anti-communist democratization issue and no repression against protesters is there, the youth and students are further mobilized, but for different political issues. The reform and restructuring of higher education, involving more and more self and family finances in the share of the cost of the studies provoked some nation wide campaigns of the students with the support of the professionals of higher education, teachers and employees as well. Basic and secondary student pupils were mobilized too in some local and institutional issues, but not on national level. The political and social organizations of youngsters, related to parties, churches and trade unions mobilized youth protest in the issues of unemployment, religious freedom or welfare issues.

The FIDESZ was established upon the former autonomous student movement, and organized protest against the Communist system from 1988 on. They organized most of the protest among the political parties in the first legislative period 1990-1994, but only in between 1989-1992. Latter on, the popular leader of the party, Viktor Orbán launched a new strategy, to gain constituency among all strata of population, and the party abandoned in 1992 its former 35 year age limit for membership, gave up the intensive protest strategy, and made a right wing, pro-establishment reorientation, with an orientation towards public sector, and a high mobilization of youth and students. The party lost its provocative and protest character, and groups who wanted preserve the former identity were leaving or pushed out by the centre-oriented mainstream in 1993.

**Protest of FIDESZ as a political party**

The protest activities of the parties of the first Hungarian parliament 10990-1994 were portrayed in a the framework of an international comparative project on protest
behaviour (Ekiert-Kubik 1998). Among the parties in the first parliament (Körösényi 1999)

**FIDESZ** is ranked to be the most active party in politics of protest between 1989-1994 (see here and latter Table 1.). But if we look at the distribution of these protests, than the events concentrate on the first three years 1989-1991 of the period investigated. FIDESZ left totally the market of protests after this year. There was a change of the party strategy, and the direction bound to the social movements, especially to youth and alternative movements were pushed out from leading positions of the party (Petőcz 2001). The activities of FIDESZ were concentrated exclusively on the parliament, and they tried to escape their past as anti-communist social movements by highly conformist political behaviour within the new institutions. FIDESZ finisheed its protest politics against the Communists within the first years of democratization, and did not participate in the campaigns of SZDSZ and MSZP against the new Christian-democratic government. Moreover, FIDESZ approached the Christian parties by collaborating with them, and latter distanced to the parties of the governing coalition of 1994-1998 and of the 2002- SZDSZ and MSZP.

There is a similarly descending tendency in the protest participation of the **MDF**, the party with the second biggest record on the protest market in 1989. They gave up much less radically the protest in their strategies, despite of the fact that they were the integrating force of the first government coalition. The bulk of their protests was there also in the times of the beginning of transformation but they keep up their presence latter too on the protest market. The background of this difference is rooted in the differentiated character of this originally bigger party, where the different directions challenged each other, the one being in the government and the parliament in powerful positions and the adherents challenging them on the streets, by protesting against the same parties government policy. Although FIDESZ were in opposition, and MDF in the government 1990-1994, for the MDF the relation of the character of a mobilising party were much longer the object of strategic discussion and dissent than in the FIDESZ, where the mobilising character was given up early and consequently in 1992-1993. Radical right within the MDF organized rallies and demonstrations against the taxi driver blockade in 1990, participate actively in the media conflict, and always stressed and put on the agenda of protest politics solidarity with the Hungarian minorities abroad, especially in Romania and Slovakia. MDF was split up along the lines of the internal cleavages, and some of the extra-parliamentary small right wing parties continued its protest culture.

In the place three (Table 1) we find in the protest participation among the parties the **SZDSZ**. The distribution of its participation is more balanced, than of FIDESZ and MDF, but
descending to zero in the year of elections, 1994. Of course, in case of SZDSZ we knew that it supported heavily the human rights initiative, the Democratic Charter, which organized many bigger demonstrations against racism and right wing tendencies. SZDSZ coming to the government in 1994 put aside its protest strategy until 1998, coming into opposition again.

Originally FIDESZ institutionalized a new political generation of the Hungarian opposition; with a 35 years membership limit the ones of the 80’s and a liberal party, SZDSZ the older generations. FIDESZ was strongly affiliated with the Hungarian student, ecology and peace movement activists and SZDSZ was based on the liberal groups of the 1956 veterans and of the traditions of the Hungarian dissent, the "Budapest School" the Georg Lukács-circle and the civil right opposition of the 70’s and the later "samisdat" circles. The different political traditions moved the two parties in different directions: SZDSZ remained more liberal oriented, meanwhile FIDESZ tried to be "pragmatic" and power-oriented seeking for alliances of nationalist parties. SZDSZ had and still has a strong tendency towards social liberalism meanwhile FIDESZ merged first patterns of liberal conservatism with alternative orientations (ecology, feminism, youth movement); and than with Hungarian nationalism and Third Way orientation. The differences of the two parties were more and more based upon the different quality of political values and orientations of the political generations, than of their ages. FIDESZ abolished in 1992 its age limit 35 of membership, but despite of the inclusion of older generations, differences in political values, strategies and organizational forms was upheld to the SZDSZ. The two parties coming from ant-communist protest movements were different to each other in their leadership and professionalization dynamics. In SZDSZ, the generation of founders, with its political culture of the "clandestine", "underground" movement is pushed out from the party’s leadership, and rather professionalized types of technocrats took their place, without "catacomb" backgrounds. In FIDESZ, "Founding Fathers" preserved their continuity in the core group of party leaders, but they become the professionalized politicians and technocrats themselves. The younger generation of movements activists, who were never "outlawed" for a longer period of time, could fit into the parliamentary politics, meanwhile significant part of older protest generation with longer lasting political persecution behind left the professionalized political scene to upheld their original creative, intellectual professions and roles.

Sources of internal differentiation and conflict among intra-party groups with different values and strategies of the two parties is based also on their differing strategies and relations towards other social movements. In FIDESZ, there was from the beginnings an internal division between "movementist", socially engaged, participatory oriented line of Gábor
Fodor, and the yuppie-technocrats supporting professionalization and "unsocial" market led by Viktor Orbán, popular leader of the party. The "movementists" tried to upheld direct, "basis" democratic elements within party organization, and supported civil right’s activism, peace and ecology campaigns of social movements. This orientation was pushed back in FIDESZ gradually by the pragmatic and power-oriented line, and their final fight occurred in 1993, during the strategic discussions for the coming elections, when Gábor Fodor and his circle left FIDESZ for SZDSZ.

The direction of Fodor’s "exit" from FIDESZ in 1993 shows the clear-cut difference between SZDSZ and FIDESZ in their strategies towards social movements. Victor Orbán argued even on a general level for the "political monopoly" of political parties in parliamentary politics, and blamed both Left and Right extra-parliamentary movements competing with political parties on Hungarian political scene. SZDSZ had also its internal debates and leadership conflicts along the "movement versus party" frontier, but on the contrary, even the party’s technocrats lost its positions, and SZDSZ preserved its openness towards social movements and political protest. This went so far, that during the taxi-driver blockade in October 1990 FIDESZ rejected the protest, meanwhile the leaders of SZDSZ based on their experiences on "resistance" against communist system demanded the government’s retirement under protest’s . This "extra-parliamentary" engagement preserved in SZDSZ and diminished in FIDESZ during the 1990-1994 legislature period, so Gábor Fodor found his second "political home" in the leadership of SZDSZ with his engagement toward civil right’s activism.

The real mobilization of the "new right" in Hungary on a larger scale occurred only in the Autumn of 1992 (Bayer 2002, Mude-Kopecky 2003). Encouraged by the radical populism, mixing anti-semitism and anti-communism of the novelist István Csurka, vice-president of the MDF that time, latter founder and leader of MIÉP there was a mobilization of the right wing popular protest against the according Csurka "still communist" mass media, where groups of the skinhead subculture—recently called as "national-democratic youth"—with old symbols of Hungarian fascism and populism protested against the liberal minded mass media management organized by right wing politicians. After this series of right wing demonstrations against mass media, the most spectacular and scandalous incident occurred on the 23.10.1992 on the anniversary celebration of the declaration of Hungarian Republic, and memorial day of the Revolution of 1956, when hundreds of right wing demonstrators hindered the president of the republic, Árpád Göncz in delivering his speech on the state celebration before the building of the Hungarian parliament. This incident provoked a nation-
wide discussion on the responsibility on the for the right wing tendencies. This time FIDESZ and SZDSZ rejected right wing populism both.

Following this demonstration, a series of anti-fascist demonstrations occurred in Budapest and in the whole of the country, especially in local towns. The liberal public has been provoked by the fact, that there seems to exist a slight tolerance if not a direct support of the biggest governing party toward the right wing tendencies. The government refers to the absence of legal regulations against the public usage of fascist symbols, and some MP’s of the MDF prepared a bill against the public use of all "totalitarian" symbols, including red stars too. There was a split within MDF in 1992-1993, which led to the exit of Csurka, who built up its own party the right wing MIÉP member of the parliament 1998-2002 supporting FIDESZ –MDF from the parliamentary opposition role.


Fidesz-MPP as a governing populist and mobilist party

The changing occurrence of political demands within protests in Hungary are the subject to political changes. The political character of protests diminished in the respective years of elections, 1990, 1994, 1998 when political issues were highly integrated in the campaigns. The high politicization in 1989 is rooted in the political conflicts of the regime change, meanwhile the one in 1991/1993 is based upon the political polarization of the pro/government and the anti/government initiatives and organizations for example in the media issue or church education in schools. 2002 is a peak point of the protest from the Right, accusing the parliamentarism and constitutionalism manipulated by the Left and winning the elections by a clandestine conspiracy of Communism and Capitalism.

The demand for elite and officials change, to withdraw personalities from their positions is highest, of course in 1989, when Communist are still in power, and the old nomenklatura is there. This demand disappear parallel to the institutional re-structuring and the change of the
political elite. However, it does not disappear, because Hungarian Communist could transform their political power to economic and social one, within the process of marketization and privatization (Tökés 1998, Körösényi 1999), and they remained politically influent further on, as symbolized by the governments leadby the MSZP in 1994-1998, and from 2002-on. Of course, the Christian/democratic parties MDF and MIÉP and its new ally Fidesz MPP supported by right wing protesters challenged the “still Communist” governments of MSZP and SZDSZ to step down 1994-1998, and especially 2002 on. This type of demand raised first 1994, following the rhetoric of the electoral campaign, but it does not raised dramatically. That time the campaigning right wing parties did not needed an extension of their campaign into the protest politics of the civil society, they remained mainly within the frames of the electoral competition. This changed dramatically in 2002, when Fidesz MPP parallel to its electoral defeat opened up towards “citizen’s initiatives” (polgári körök) from the right, which supported its policy to organize a new count of the electoral votes or even demanding the step down of the new government and to make new elections.

FIDESZ, having criticized in 1992 the mobilization strategy of SZDSZ against the government as Fidesz MPP in 2002 declared its own new mobilization strategy and the opening up towards civil society to re-compensate its electoral failure.

Elements of populism within 2002 Fidesz electoral campaign, party organisation, strategy

As we have seen FIDESZ/Fidesz- MPP developed many faces from the dissident subcultural democracy movement until the governing party with center –right character from 1988-2002. There were elements of its development, which were to be combined fast and successfully to gain a new image and organisation under the pressure of the electoral defeat in May 2002, which brought the MSZP-SZDSZ social –liberal coalition to the government in the Summer of 2002. For stressing the populist character was made crucial by the defeat itself. Fidesz MPP as governing party, within the centre-right coalition acted like a “populist” government; stressed the “national” and “popular” character of the government coalition, organised government’s meeting in small village’s one never heard about, and Viktor Orbán as a strong prime minister behaved as having direct linkeages with the masses, as a “popular leader”. However, tasting the electoral defeat already during the two turnout of the 2002 elections, the situation grew Fidesz-MPP to a mobilist populist party, to targeting and challenging “Them”, the “Communists” who came back, as they did it by victory on the elections in 2002. This
way Fidesz-MPP could try to reassert his image fastly as an anti-Communist dissent movement, as it was indeed 1988-1990.

Elements of populism gained the momentum within Fidesz –MPP as follows;

- anti-establishment, anti-elite, anti “political class”, nomenclature orientation
- going with the people, civil society, national and rural plus ethnic community identity against the “alienated aliens”
- blaming the institutions as elections and parliamentarism, which manipulated the “popular will”, the need for reviewing electoral results or even to annihilate them and repeat the elections
- new forms of organising, building an “Citizen’s Alliance ”( Polgári Szövetség) with nation and civil society, where national and religious symbols play a role, cultural and social community building to establish hegemony beyond the sphere of politics in other social subsystems
- remaking the form of the party giving momentum to the spontaneously developed civic initiative’s (polgári körök) on the one hand, and dissolving the organisational identities of the centre right parties within a common frame led by Fidesz-MPSZ on the other hand.

These elements of populism emerged partly by recalling former experiences, structures and traditions of the anti-Communist dissent, or referring to Western center right party models in Germany(CDU as a Volkspartei) and Italy(Forza Italia). The latter development synthetised these elements already present within the campaign to a political strategy and organisational form within the May 2003 Fidesz party conference calling the party with the new name to express the organisational and strategical alterations within the identification logo a “Fidesz-Hungarian Citizen’s Alliance”(Fidesz- Magyar Polgári Szövetség) of the civil society, nation and the center right parties under the strong leadership democracy model of Viktor Orbán and based upon the governing role of Fidesz. This idea of the hegemony of the right based upon one organisational form provoked political discussions, and is at the moment rejected by the two other still existing parties of the Right, MDF and MIÉP: However Hungarian electoral system is majoritarian character may establish the bloc of the right with the hegemony of the Fidesz-Citizen’s Alliance , “Polgári Szövetség” despite of the political will of these parties.

Consequently, Fidesz as opposition mobilist party moved to the side of the “Euroscepticists” with the MIÉP, which rejected the Europeanisation, meanwhile MDF upheald its partisanship
for the EU developed already earlier (Kopecky-Mudde 2002). The new strategic and organisational attempts did not bring a visible political success for Fidesz yet, its lost the municipal elections too in 2002 Autumn, and was neither a winner of the EU-referendum campaign. However, on the long run it may be profitable to gain votes from other parties of the Right, but it is unclear at the moment whether it could bring back Fidesz to government.

What we may result, is that in Hungary there is an influential opposition party with right wing populist character, combining the tradition of the anti-Communist dissent with the new forms of populism in Western democracies. Fidesz this way will move on the equilibrium between populist mobilisation and democratisation and Europeanisation. First is a supply for its voters identified with the “Citizen’s”(polgárok) second is the demand from the EU, NATO and OECD countries, where Hungary seek for stable membership and support. At the moment the Left seems to be more successfully combining populism and Westernism, than the Right, but this may change under the uncalculable and unintended social consequences of EU accession or during the pressures of the so called New World Order of the USA, and than nationalism, populism from the Right could be the winning alternative with much less approval from the NATO and the EU.

In the field of party politics, the relationship to MIÉP and MDF will be decisive, because all the three parties of the Right declared not being ready to make any alliance with the Left. So the dominance on the Right is the game of the three parties, under the Fidesz-Citizen’s Alliance is an important opposition party, MDF is a weak opposition party, and MIÉP is at the moment in extra-parliamentary opposition role. Fidesz–MPSZ seems to build upon a strategy of making a socio-cultural hegemony of the Right with the citizen’s initiatives and the new organisational form, meanwhile the two other parties seems to stick to their former organisational and social forms of networking. This regard Fidesz-MPSZ seems to be much more creative and open both to the traditions of the anti-Communist dissent as towards Western developments of right wing populism. Uncertain futures, but new type of competitors and competition are developing, and new frameworks and opportunities by Europeanisation, as the elections for the European parliament in Hungary, adopting new administrative structures and electoral framework according EU’s regional policy may and will influence the political field of Hungary and of Fidesz consequently in the coming years.
References


Appendix

Timetable of FIDESZ development

1988 established as a political movement
1989 political party, fighting against the Communist power with SZDSZ
1990 participating the first elections
1993 exclusion of the movementist group, mainly going with SZDSZ, the party leadership of Viktor Orbán is practically unchallenged until recently
1994 participating second parliamentray elections
1998 participating and winning the third parliamentary elections with MDF-FKGP coalition
2001 FKGP split, and becoming politically marginal by scandals and outward influence
2002 participating and loosing the fourth parliamentary elections
2003 conference establishing “Treaty/Alliance” (Szövetség) with the civic initiatives(polgári körök) and aiming an unified force of the Right beyond party membership, new party statute is allowing double membership

Electoral results

of FIDESZ, MSZP, MDF, MIÉP on national elections % of the seats in Hungarian parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>FIDESZ</th>
<th>MSZP</th>
<th>MDF</th>
<th>MIÉP</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5,7</td>
<td>8,5</td>
<td>42,8</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>5,1</td>
<td>54,1</td>
<td>9,8</td>
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1998 38,1 34,7 6,6 3,7

2002 48,7(with MDF) 46,11 (only with FIDESZ) 0


**Party names/acronyms**

Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, **FIDESZ**, Alliance of Young Democrats used this acronym on the 1990 and 1994 elections, changed this acronym so latter in 1998 is was Fidesz- Magyar Polgári Párt,**Fidesz-MPP**, Fidesz- Hungarian Citizen’s Party, and in May 2003 conference the acronym Fidesz,-Magyar Polgári Szövetség, **Fidesz –MPSZ** appeared Fidesz –Hungarian Citizen’s Alliance

Független Kisgazda és Földmunkás Párt, **FKGP**, Independent Smallholders Party

Magyar Demokrata Fórum, **MDF** Hungarian Democratic Forum

Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, **MIÉP** Party of Hungarian Life and Truth

Magyar Szocialista Párt, Hungarian Socialist Party, **MSZP**

Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, **SZDSZ**, Alliance of Free Democrats
Tables

Table 1. The protest events initiated by political parties within the parliament in Hungary 1989-1994*

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<td>3,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

* N=Participation of political parties in protest events per year / semester. We have here only the first semester data for 1994. MIÉP is not included. KDNP disappearad since.

The research on collective protests in 1989-1994 was based upon newspaper data, collected with the same methodology and questionnaire was carried out in Poland, Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, in the former German Democratic Republic by Christiane Lemke, and in Slovakia by Darina Malová (Ekiert-Kubik1998). The study was based on the newspapers content analysis to interpret of protest events in Hungary 1989-1994. The sample contains the systematic recherche of daily newspapers "Népszabadság","Magyar Hírlap","Magyar Nemzet" and on the weeklies of "168 óra" and "Heti Világgazdaság".