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The extension of the extra-parliamentary extreme left-wing phenomenon in Europol’s discourse

The following paper is part of my research on how extra-parliamentary extreme left-wing actors are viewed, described and handled by the security, judicial and political agents in the European Union.

Contrasting with the considerable resources gathered by the authorities, there is a lack of academic sources on the extra-parliamentary extreme left-wing actors. Most of them are primary sources, either official (justice, police and intelligence services) or militant (online or published by book houses close to the movements). Not many works have analysed the contemporary extra-parliamentary extreme left in a holistic manner, i.e. combining its theoretical and practical aspect (Curran 2006; Dupuis-Déri 2004, 2005; Garcia 2007; Gordon 2008; Haunss 2008; Jourdain 2013; Katsiaficas 1997; Leclercq 2013; Manfredonia 2001; Miquel 2003; Pereira 2010; Shantz 2011). Most of them are students' MA or PhD thesis (Haunss 2003; Luck 2008; Piperaud 2009; Schiffres 2004, 2008; Schultze and Gross 1997; Schwarzmeier 2001) or journalistic and non-academic works (Bourseiller 2003, 2006, 2009, 2011; Brochier and Delouche 2000; Leclercq 2013; Piot 2008). A certain number of these authors have a militant background (Dupuis-Déri, Gordon, Piperaud, Shantz, Schultze and Gross). In Germany particularly, most of the works on the topic postulate that the (extra-parliamentary) extreme left-wing actors constitute a danger. These works have been undertaken by individuals who are academics and/or security professionals, as they own a consulting agency on security issues or bring their expertise to official actors, be it state institutions or (right-wing) political parties. The German political scientists Backes and Jesse (Backes 2010; Backes and Jesse 1994, 2005, 2006), who founded the Extremismusforschung (research on extremism) epitomise this trend. Bauer and Huyghe (2010a, 2010b) and Raufer (1982, 1986, 2010) represent this development in France. Raufer was one of the main speakers of the European Police Chiefs Convention, which was held at Europol in June 2011, where he took part in a panel on the future of terrorism with Europol’s director Wainwright and chaired the working group on the future of terrorism with EU’s counter-terrorism coordinator de Kerchove.

Defining the contemporary extra-parliamentary extreme left-wing actors represents a
challenge. The different ideological currents make a straightforward definition problematic (Cosseron 2007; Pereira 2010; Sommier 2010). This is all the truer on the European level, as the notion varies from country to country. First, there exist manifold currents that make a straightforward encompassing definition difficult to produce. More than that, some actors concerned resist this label (Girard 2012; Bantigny 2012). Furthermore, ‘extreme left’ is negatively connotated: not only has it been imposed from the outside, but it has been used as an instrument of delegitimation throughout history (Beaulieu 2012; Caron 2012; Haunss 2008). The expression thus appears to be a political, if not a polemical notion, rather than a scientific, or at least objective, concept. As suggested by Haunss (2008) and Pereira (2010), the term ‘radical’ is more appropriate. It is only applicable to the left, which does not allow considering extreme left and extreme right alike, like the Extremismusforschung school does. To draw this parallel does not enable to provide with a precise account of the particularity of these actors, who manifest substantial and incompatible differences with the extreme right. The final aspect of the definition of the extreme left is its relative character. Consequentially, in order to grasp the meaning of extreme and radical, one has to ask: radical or extreme ‘in relation to what?’ To the liberal democracies characterising the European political systems.

The works on the treatment of the contemporary extra-parliamentary extreme left-wing actors by the European authorities (national and EU) are scarce. In a chapter entitled ‘Reflections around the ultra-left “threat” in France’ published in an edited book (2010), Sommier, one of the French specialists on extra-parliamentary left-wing movements and political violence, analyses the ‘production of the threat’ by the authorities of the contemporary ‘ultra-left’. Using Becker’s definition of deviance as ‘a property, not of the behaviour itself, but of the interaction between the person who commits the act and the one who reacts to this act’ (Becker 1997), she studies the process that have led to label these movements as deviant and its effects. Sommier succeeds in determining the genesis of the production of the extreme left-wing threat in a processual and relational way. However, the short length of the contribution does not allow to deepen the analysis: the labels are presented as homogeneous and reduced to three main categories following a basic national distinction and the European dimension of the problem is not tackled. In their edited book, Biard et al. compile contributions on the stigmatisation of the lefts in Europe from the 18th till the 20th century. In their introduction, they define the term extreme and show that the labelling of the political opponent as an extremist turns them into an enemy and ultimately delegitimise them. Focusing on the extreme-left in different times and places, the authors mostly adopt a constructivist approach demonstrating that the extreme is a dynamic and constructed notion
defined relatively to a centre, which is the place of the enunciation and the denunciation. They argue that the category of extreme is a tool to denounce the one who resists normalisation and is very linked to marginalisation processes. The label ‘terrorist’ participates in this undertaking. This approach is fruitful but does not deal with the 21st century’s extreme left.

My research consists in a ‘political sociology of public action’. In this field, some authors have demonstrated that to ‘define a policy does not only mean to solve problems – it also means to construct problems’ (Anderson 1988). Becker (1997) has shown that some actors, who he named ‘moral entrepreneurs’, play an important role in the definition of these problems and the implementation of public policies. Several authors have shown the importance of discourse in this process, adopting a constructivist perspective (Fairclough 1992; Fisher 2003; Hajer 1995; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Schram 1992, 1993; Shapiro 1988; Stone 1989). For Edelman, ‘it is language about political events, not the events in any other sense, that people experience. So political language is political reality’ (Edelman 1988: 104). The author considers that political events do not have an effect in themselves, but through discourses as discourses create a reality. They do so by abstracting some perceptions from the complex world and organising a meaning structure and create beliefs about the relative importance of events and objects. The process of categorisation amongst political-administrative actors is the focus of this paper. Shapiro states that a discourse establishes ‘norms for developing conceptualizations that are used to understand (a) phenomenon’ (1981: 130). As Rose and Millers sum this up: ‘the significance we accord to discourse does not arise from a concern with “ideology”. Language is not merely contemplative or justificatory, it is performative. An analysis of political discourse helps us elucidate not only the systems of thought through which authorities have posed and specified the problems for government, but also the systems of action though which they have sought to give effect to government’ (Rosa and Miller 1992: 178). The research thus aims to analyse public action via representations.

The question I will aim to answer in this paper is: how has the extreme left-wing phenomenon been extended in Europol’s discourse? I have used a Foucauldian approach for my discourse analysis, which can be summed up in four questions: 1) which object of knowledge is produced?; 2) according to what logic?; 3) who authorised it?; 4) which strategic goals are being pursued? (Bührmann 2005) Progressively, Europol’s TE-SATs have
assigned particular characteristics to the extreme left-wing actors through their statements. Michel Foucault views discourse as a series of events that are in relation with events of another nature. ‘Eventalisation’ enables to analyse this:

first, one takes groups of elements where … connections between mechanisms of coercion and contents of knowledge can be identified… One would also consider the contents of knowledge in terms of their diversity and heterogeneity, view them in the context of the effects of power they generate inasmuch as they are validated by their belonging to a system of knowledge. We are therefore not attempting to find out what is true or false, founded or unfounded, real or illusory, scientific or ideological, legitimate or abusive (Foucault 1997: 59).

Ultimately, what forms discourse is ‘the way in which [different] elements are related to one another’ (Foucault 2002: 66).

I chose Europol as it is at the centre of the European security policy and because its influence is constantly growing. The establishment of Europol was first agreed upon in 1992 in the Maastricht Treaty. The article K.3 of the Treaty deals with the ‘Establishment of a European Police Office’ to facilitate cooperation among the police of the EU member states. My corpus is constituted by the eleven editions of the European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SA T), since it is in these documents that Europol refers to extreme left-wing actors. This publication aims at establishing ‘basic facts and figures regarding terrorist attacks and arrests in the EU’¹. Its contributors are EU and non-EU countries and Eurojust, the European judiciary agency. The span of twelve years (2000-2012) offers to bring to light how the description of the extreme left-wing actors has dramatically evolved.

My hypothesis in this paper is that the first predicate of the extreme left-wing object constructed by Europol in the TE-SAT is extension. I use extension as it both describes a state (extent) and a movement (stretch). In the TE-SAT, the extreme left-wing phenomenon is presented as fundamentally dynamic and following three axes: time, space and magnitude. Europol’s discourse thereby implements a temporal extension, a spatial extension and a magnitude extension of the extreme left-wing object: these will be the three parts of my paper.

1. The temporal extension of the extreme left-wing object

¹ Europol Review 2011: 27
The temporal extension of the extreme left-wing object applies to the past, the present as well as the future. First, the current groups are associated to the past European extreme left-wing groups of the 1970s and 1980s; second, the newness and acuteness of the phenomenon is stressed; lastly, the prevention perspective of Europol’s discourse projects the studied object in the future.

1.A. Back in the past

The resurrection

In the opening sentence of the section on ‘anarchist terrorism’, the first edition of the TE-SAT (2000-2001) sets the tone for the following reports: ‘First signs of the possible resurrection of left wing terrorism viz. anarchist terrorism were visible in the second half of 2001’. The word ‘resurrection’ is further used again: ‘the possibility of resurrection of left wing and anarchist terrorist groups exists’\(^2\). The first TE-SAT opens the new era of the European ‘left wing and anarchist terrorism’ as the ‘first signs’ of the resurrection and the first edition simultaneously arise.

The second half of 2001 corresponds to two major events which have put extreme left-wing actors on the foreground: the European Union Summit of Gothenburg and the 27\(^{\text{th}}\) Group of Eight Summit in Genoa. The EU summit in Gothenburg took place in the Swedish city of Gothenburg during the three days of the European Council meeting and EU-US Summit, June 14-16, 2001. The EU-US summit included a visit by U.S. president George W. Bush. According to the police, more than 50,000 demonstrators gathered in Gothenburg during the summit. The 27th Group of Eight summit took place in Genoa, Italy, in July 2001. The Genoa G8 Summit protest, from July 18 to July 22, 2001, was a dramatic protest, drawing an estimated 200,000 demonstrators. Over four hundred protesters and about hundred among security forces were injured during the clashes and two people were killed. The Gothenburg and Genoa summits were turning points as they were the first anti-globalisation protest on European Union soil. The year 2001 may therefore have been seen as demonstrating the ‘first signs of the possible resurrection of left wing terrorism’. In Germany and Italy, 1970s extreme left-wing terrorist groups stemmed from the student protests of 1968. The 2001 protests may have been interpreted by the authorities as warnings similar to those occurred 30 years earlier.

The choice of the word ‘resurrection’ in the TE-SAT is particularly meaningful. In the following part, I will show how references to past extreme left-wing groups are numerous. In addition, it is interesting to note both the religious and mythological connotation of ‘resurrection’, which gives a grandiloquent tone to Europol’s discourse. First, the word puts the phenomenon on the ground of theology, a field where moral prevails over politics. Second, it defines the signs of a new extreme left-wing vitality as a fundamental event, a mythical origin. TE-SAT 2000-2001 inaugurates the genesis of the extreme left-wing problem of the 21st century.

The past

Talking about ‘resurrection’ is referring to the dead. Who are the dead ones referred to in the TE-SAT? They are the extreme left-wing terrorist groups of the decades 1960s-1980s. These groups are extensively cited in the different TE-SATs. The second column of the table in appendix shows this. Thereby, Europol recalls the mythology of ‘euroterrorism’, whose danger has been dramatically emphasised in the 1980s. In accordance to the mythological tone of the first TE-SAT, Europol calls upon the characters of the previous extreme left-wing odyssey, the so-called years of lead. The main groups are all mentioned in the TE-SAT (see table).

Although Europol defines the TE-SAT as a ‘forward-looking report’\(^3\), the report frequently refers to past extinct groups. Indeed, the Red Army Fraction has been dissolved in 1998 and its last action took place in 1993, Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ELA) has disappeared in 1995, the last operations of Direct Action dates back to 1986 with the arrest of 22 members on 25 known by the police and those of the Communist Combatant Cells to 1985 with the arrest of all its members. Out of the groups related to the years of lead, the majority was therefore inactive during at least the last 15 years. Yet, it appears that the TE-SAT seeks to remind of these past times. It even does so when no event seems to justify a reminder like in the 2003-2004 edition: ‘After 17 years of confinement, the release, for health reasons, of a member of the dismantled terrorist organization “Direct Action”, had no incidence beyond its relational circle’\(^4\). The mention of the past extreme left-wing groups therefore stretches the actual temporal scope of the TE-SAT by integrating the wider extreme left-wing history or mythology.

\(^3\) Europol TE-SAT 2007: 8.
1.B. In the present

The statement of the opening TE-SAT according to which a new ‘left wing terrorism viz. anarchist terrorism’ is forming is several times emphasised in the later TE-SATs. In the 2001-2002 edition, about the GRAPO: ‘New members have been recruited from anarchist and “anti-establishment” extremist circles. The current situation can be defined as a “transition period” where future developments can hardly be predicted’\(^5\) (my emphasis). In the 2003-2004 edition, it is stated that ‘the appearance of the new group, called F.A.I. … coincided with the beginning of a subversive campaign of numerous arsons and minor bomb attacks’\(^6\) (my emphasis), while ‘new violent anarchist-insurrectionist groups or cells’\(^7\) are mentioned further (my emphasis); in 2011, it is written that ‘it is the first time that the Greek terrorist organisation Synomosia Pyrinon Fotias has staged such a large-scale synchronised attack’\(^8\) (my emphasis). These formulations illustrate Europol’s stress on the novel character of the extreme left-wing threat through the assertion that recent and new facts could be the starting points of further developments.

However, numerous groups mentioned in the TE-SAT are old. The table shows that still active past extreme left-wing groups play an important role in the phenomenon Europol reports on. Some date back to the 1970s (Revolutionary Organisation 17 November, GRAPO and TKP/ML), others to the 1980s (Red Brigades-PCC), others finally to the 1990s (Solidarieta Internazionale, Anti-Fascist Action, DHKP/C, etc.). The Secours Rouge even dates back to 1925 with the foundation of the Belgian section of the International Red Aid. The argued novelty of the extreme left-wing phenomenon is thus put in perspective.

All in all, in the TE-SAT, there are 5 non-active past extreme left-wing groups, 10 extreme left-wing groups created before 2000 and still active, 19 extreme left-wing groups created from 2000 and 11 extreme left-wing groups with unknown date of creation mentioned. In the first years of the TE-SAT in a more obvious way, old groups are the most active ones. In the following years, numerous recent groups are listed but they are most of the time one-off as they are not mentioned again in the following editions. This is the case for 19 out of 30 extreme left-wing groups created from 2000 and with unknown date of creation mentioned in

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\(^7\) Europol TE-SAT 2003-2004: 18.  
the TE-SATs. In other words, two of these groups in three are cited by Europol once and disappear then from its discourse. The plethora of group names does therefore not indicate that the danger is more important; it rather means that these groups lead a discontinuous action. These numbers show that the extreme left-wing phenomenon is defined by its continuity rather than by its resurrection. Behind the myth of a rupture, which would take place in 2001 in the first TE-SAT, permanence appears.

1.C. Towards the future

Finally, the extreme left-wing threat is temporally stretched in the future. As the TE-SAT 2007 adopts a new methodology and constitutes the first edition available to the general public, it outlines the principles of the TE-SAT. Europol there states that the TE-SAT is ‘a trend report. Since a trend can be defined as “a general tendency in the way a situation is changing or developing”, the TE-SAT is a forward-looking report’.

This ‘forward-looking’ identity recalls the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy of the Hague Programme adopted in November 2005, which sets ‘out 10 priorities for the Union with a view to strengthening the area of freedom, security and justice’ for the years 2005-2010. It is built around four strands:

PREVENT: to prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment, in Europe and internationally; PROTECT; … PURSUE: to pursue and investigate terrorists across our borders and globally; to impede planning, travel, and communications; to disrupt support networks; to cut off funding and access to attack materials, and bring terrorists to justice; RESPOND …

Since 2005, the central role of PREVENT has been reasserted. In 2009, the Stockholm Programme produced for the period 2010-2014 states that ‘the European Council … calls for a reinforcement of the prevention strand’.

According to the Oxford English Dictionary definition of ‘prevention’, its key-components are anticipation, intention and previous action. In other words, prevention means taking action before something occurs by assessing the intention of the other. It is therefore

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9 Europol TE-SAT 2007: 8
10 http://europa.eu/
11 Council of the European Union, 14469/4/05 REV 4, p. 3.
implemented in advance as signified by the prefix *pre*- that comes from Latin where it meant before. Through the pillar PREVENT the EU terrorism strategy thus adopts a prospective view.

This is clear in the TE-SAT through the terms used like:

- **TE-SAT 2000-2001**: ‘possible’, ‘the possibility … exists’, ‘might function’, ‘possible’;
- **TE-SAT 2002-2003**: ‘most probably’, ‘should they … they could’, ‘can be expected’, ‘are likely to’, etc.;
- **TE-SAT 2003-2004**: ‘The perspective of a renewal of violent actions should not be excluded’, ‘Further violent acts cannot be ruled out. It is very probable that the GRAPO may concentrate future actions around their main objective, i.e. to obtain financial resources. However, possibility exists that GRAPO will also carry out actions against the Spanish state’s financial infrastructure’, etc.;
- **TE-SAT 2004-2005**: in France ‘There is no evidence that violent activities will increase in the coming months, although there could be an upsurge’, ‘it is very likely’, etc.;
- **TE-SAT 2007**: ‘existing potential’;
- **TE-SAT 2008**: ‘may eventually mean that [they] … will change … and become’, etc.;
- **TE-SAT 2009**: ‘has the potential for further escalation’,
- **TE-SAT 2011**: ‘violence can be expected to continue’, etc.

The TE-SAT language modes are those of possibility and probability: Europol thus expects certain people to behave in a certain way.

A second strand of the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy complements PREVENT: it is PURSUIT. The transnational aspect of PURSUIT is particularly stressed: ‘We will further strengthen and implement our commitments to disrupt terrorist activity and pursue terrorists *across borders*’\(^\text{13}\) (my emphasis). For this, ‘the Union will support the efforts of Member States to disrupt terrorists by encouraging the exchange of information and intelligence between them, providing common analyses of the threat, and strengthening operational co-operation in law enforcement’; ‘the Joint Situation Centre’s assessments, based on the contributions of national security and intelligence agencies and Europol,

\(^\text{13}\) Council of the European Union, 14469/4/05 REV 4, p. 12.
should continue to inform decisions across the range of the EU’s policies.’

Europol plays therefore a central role in this second pillar.

PURSUIT has notably to do with arrests. From 2007 on, i.e. the second TE-SAT generation, arrests are counted in the report: “‘Arrests’ refers to judicial arrests warranted by a prosecutor or investigating judge, whereby a person is detained for questioning on suspicion of committing a criminal offence for which detention is permitted by national law.” The logic of arrest, and consequently of PURSUE, is close to the one of PREVENT. Here, suspicion is the key-notion. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, apprehension, conjecture, expectation, possibility and likeliness are definitional of suspicion – as they are of prevention. In the TE-SAT, they link the two pillars of the EU Counter-terrorism strategy PREVENT and PURSUE as the arrests accounted are also based on a preventive logic. More than that, these two logics are future-oriented.

Various indications show that a preventive perspective prevails in Europol’s discourse. In the TE-SAT 2000-2001, ‘sixty members of the Italian anarchist group Solidarietà Internazionale’ are mentioned because they ‘were arrested [and] allegedly preparing terrorist attacks’ (my emphasis). Some years later, ‘five [individuals] … were suspected of involvement in a terrorist attack or the preparation of an attack’ (my emphasis). At what stage of preparation were the arrests implemented?

Furthermore, these arrests are mostly the results of a ‘suspicion’, notably ‘of membership of a terrorist organisation’. Is the ‘organisation’ referred to here the extreme left? This logic results in high acquittal rates of extreme left-wing actors. In 2007, ‘left-wing … terrorism has an acquittal rate of approximately 20%’ , second with separatist terrorism after Islamist terrorism. In 2009, ‘reported court decisions related to separatist and left-wing terrorism have the highest acquittal rate (15%)’ . In 2010, the acquittal rate amounts to 22%, second with Islamist terrorism after separatist terrorism. In 2011, it rises to 27%, second after separatist terrorism.

From 2008, Europol acknowledges that the high acquittal rates are the consequences of the EU’s prevention strategy in matter of security. ‘Of the total of 449 verdicts in 2007, 331 were convictions. The percentage of acquittals increased from 15 percent in 2006 to 26 percent in 2008’.

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14 Council of the European Union, 14469/4/05 REV 4, p. 12.
17 TE-SAT 2007: 34.
18 43 occurrences of suspect(s)/suspected in the TE-SATs.
2007. This increase may be explained by law enforcement authorities working to disrupt terrorist plots at an early stage in order to avoid casualties or destruction of infrastructure and properties. Individuals planning attacks and promoting terrorist crimes may have been brought before court before they were able to reach the stage of carrying out a successful terrorist attack. It is generally more difficult to produce evidence in court for intent, propaganda and planning than for the execution of attacks\(^\text{21}\) (my emphasis). Thus, in the terrorist cases dealt with, individuals may have been brought before court before even committing a crime.

Eventually, in the TE-SAT, time mixes up. The following statements illustrate how Europol’s discourse blends past, present and future in a criss-cross way. ‘During 2008, three presumed leaders of the DHKP-C in Europe were arrested in Germany. No violent acts which could be attributed to the group have been noticed in Germany since 1999\(^\text{22}\). Although ‘no violent acts … could be attributed to the group … since 1999’, the presumed leaders appear in the discourse ten years later. ‘Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks are motivated by domestic politics but they are also perpetrated as a part of wider international campaigns; for instance, the G8 summit 2007 that still has to be held has already been the target of left-wing and anarchist terrorists\(^\text{23}\). Here, an event that has not taken place yet is already the target of extreme left-wing actors.

Ultimately, in suspicion, a new pair is formed: not power/knowledge, but power/foreknowledge. The aimed scientificity of Europol’s reports turns into pre-science, i.e. the ‘knowledge of events before they happen\(^\text{24}\). This foreknowledge turns into power via the force of a judicial decision. Tangibility does not lie in the cause of the arrest but in the arrest itself. Should the attack or the premises of an attack be questionable, the punishment is on the contrary very tangible.

This preventive strategy is related to the prevalence of the notion of risk put forward by Ulrich Beck:

> The centre of risk consciousness lies not in the present, but in the future. In risk society, the past loses the power to determine the present. Its place is taken by the future, [that is] something non-existent, invented, fictive, as the “cause” of the

\(^{21}\) TE-SAT 2008: 13.
\(^{22}\) TE-SAT 2009: 33.
\(^{23}\) TE-SAT 2007: 4.
\(^{24}\) Oxford English Dictionary.
current experience and action. We become active today in order to prevent, alleviate or take precautions against the crisis and problems of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow (Beck 1992: 34).

Beck’s reasoning is enlightening in that it shows how in a risk perspective future tends to cannibalise past and present. However, I would qualify this omnipotence of the future in the management of extreme left-wing actors. In Europol’s discourse, it is very clear that the past and the present play a significant role in the identification of the threat. Statements on the past have the function to root the threat, to provide it with a denser substance; statements on the present make the discourse timely. I argue with Edelman that ‘the potency of political language does not stem from its descriptions of a “real” world but rather from its reconstructions of the past and its evocation of unobservables in the present and of potentialities in the future’ (Edelman 1988: 109).

In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault emphasises the importance of taking into account the influence of past elements in discourse analysis. First, the examination of statements ‘presupposes that statements are considered in the remanence that is proper to them... To say that statements are … remanent … means that they are preserved by virtue of a number of supports and material techniques … in accordance with certain types of institutions … and with certain statutory modalities’ (Foucault 2002: 139). Statements on extreme left-wing actors are remanent particularly thanks to the security and judicial institutions and their practices. Second, ‘enunciative analysis presupposes that one takes phenomena of recurrence into account. Every statement involves a field of antecedent elements in relation to which it is situated, but which it is able to reorganise and redistribute according to new relations. It constitutes its own past, defines, in what precedes it, its own filiation... And it poses this enunciative past as an acquired truth, as an event that has occurred … or as an object that can be spoken about’ (Foucault 2002: 140). Phenomena of recurrence are particularly visible in Europol’s discourse on the extreme left-wing object via the references to past groups, still active or not. They reorganise history in creating a lineage between contemporary actors and extinct groups and fix these events as ‘an acquired truth’. Thereby, the contemporary experience is singularly redefined and the discourse connects the unknown with the known. In this part on temporality, I have aimed to focus on elements of past, present and future, which, put together, have produced an event.
2. The spatial extension of the extreme left-wing object

In this part, I will show how the extreme left-wing threat has been spatially widened in Europol’s discourse. This extension follows two movements: first, the ‘northernisation’ and dissemination of extreme left-wing actors and then their transnationalisation and internationalisation.

2.A. ‘Northernisation’ and dissemination

Just as for the temporal broadening process, the further evolutions of the report were already present in embryo in the first TE-SAT (2000-2001). ‘Under an umbrella name “International Solidarity” attacks were carried out in the southern part of the European Union… As left wing and anarchist web-sites in the Northern European countries cover this situation in depth, the possibility of resurrection of left wing and anarchist terrorist groups exists, in which the southern terrorist activity might function as an example.’ Here, the extension of the threat is operated from South to North. The actual danger occurring in the South would virtually sprawl to the North via the Internet to finally become reality there. Without any explanation or material proof that a risk may exist in the North, the TE-SAT concludes to the contagion of this region by the extreme left-wing threat. Not only are there no evidence provided to support this argument, but the only facts recounted in this edition of the TE-SAT concern only one country – Italy. The generalisation is therefore twofold: Italy embodies the whole Southern European Union; Southern European Union stands for the whole European Union. By generalising to the whole European Union a phenomenon which affected only one of its members, the TE-SAT 2000-2001 may have intended to legitimise its European scope. More than that, it has laid the foundations of a spreading threat.

According to the TE-SAT 2001-2002, ‘small anarchist violent groups integrated in a form of international network represent a real threat to Spanish institutions…’. Again, the scope of these ‘small anarchist’ groups is enlarged from one country to the international level. The term ‘network’ furthermore conveys a sense of organisation: it makes the threat more present.

In the TE-SAT 2002-2003, Europol coins an expression to underline the common traits between Greece, Italy and Spain in regard to extreme left-wing actors. According to Europol, these three member states form a ‘Mediterranean Anarchist Triangle’: ‘…anarchist terrorism

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is still active in the south of the European Union, essentially within the so-called Mediterranean Anarchist Triangle which includes Greece, Italy and Spain.\(^{27}\) And later: ‘There is no prospect for an end to violent actions of anarchist inspiration perpetrated, at least at the beginning, within the so-called Mediterranean Anarchist Triangle’.\(^{28}\) This expression is a creation of Europol. It is thus surprising that it is preceded by ‘so-called’, as if the TE-SAT would re-use an idiom already existing. Moreover, the expression does not bring any element for a better comprehension of the phenomenon it describes. In footer, six pages later, the triangle becomes an arc: ‘Spain, Italy and Greece, form a sort of Mediterranean arc, where the anarchic element causes minor trouble’.\(^{29}\) Triangle or arc, the concept appears to be loose. Furthermore, Europol insists that the described phenomenon does not only apply to three countries: ‘However the scope of the movement is wider as demonstrated by the number of foreigners arrested in June in Salonique [sic] (Greece). In recent years the anarchist movement worldwide has been increasingly active… Extreme left-wing anarchists are “travelling” around… The next natural step for these extremists could be moving from anarchist activism and extremism to anarchist terrorism as already experienced in the southern part of Europe’.\(^{30}\) ‘Wider’, ‘worldwide’, ‘“travelling” around’ indicate again the enlargement of the threat by the discourse. Furthermore, the warning of mimetic behaviours by the Northern countries reappears here. About Italy, it is stated that ‘[a number of groups] are often in contact with movements in Europe pursuing the same objectives…’.\(^{31}\) In 2003-2004, the argument of a possible contagion of the extreme left-wing threat without further explanation is used again. About France: ‘The perspective of renewal of violent actions should not be excluded bearing in mind the recent actions realized and claimed by Italian anarchists, end of 2003/early 2004, targeting the European institutions. This anarchist violence with a libertarian tendency shows itself regularly in Spain and in Greece which form with Italy a sort of “Mediterranean triangle” of the anarchist violence; ‘to date, France has not been affected by these violent actions; nevertheless, the possibility that the country will experience anarchist terrorist attacks cannot be ignored’.\(^{32}\) Despite the non-existence of a threat, the discourse establishes a relationship between a country non-affected (France) and countries affected.

The TE-SAT 2004-2005 is the last report in which the ‘so-called Mediterranean triangle of

\(^{27}\) TE-SAT 2002-2003: 16.  
\(^{29}\) TE-SAT 2002-2003: 22.  
Greece, Italy and Spain\textsuperscript{33} appears. ‘The close links between the Italian anarchist structures and those of Spain and Greece’\textsuperscript{34} are put forward on several occasions\textsuperscript{35}. The threat remains mostly limited to these three countries.

### 2.B. Transnationalisation and internationalisation

In 2007, the change in the TE-SAT’s methodology makes the division into countries disappear. The European identity of the discourse prevails over the national differences in a more perceptible way than in the previous editions. The discourse now definitely applies to the whole European Union, whereas it seemed to only concern some of its members the years before.

The transition is done in the beginning of the 2007 TE-SAT: ‘left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks are motivated by domestic politics but they are also perpetrated as a part of wider international campaigns’\textsuperscript{36}. Therefore, although ‘[the] campaigns of [left-wing and anarchist terrorists] mainly targeted Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany’\textsuperscript{37}, Europol notes ‘that almost all terrorist campaigns are transnational’\textsuperscript{38}. The word ‘transnational’ appears for the first time in a generalised manner\textsuperscript{39} and announces a shift in Europol’s discourse.

In the TE-SAT 2009, Europol insists twice that ‘left-wing and anarchist groups are increasingly establishing links across Europe. Most of their actions reflect a common agenda’\textsuperscript{40}. Moreover, ‘activities by left-wing and anarchist terrorists and extremists are increasing in … geographical spread in the EU’\textsuperscript{41}.

In the 2011 edition, the transnationalisation of the extreme left-wing threat is particularly put forward. ‘Evidence shows increased international cooperation between terrorist and extremist groups in and outside the EU. Left-wing, but also separatist groups, are collaborating internationally’\textsuperscript{42}. One of the key points of the report that heads the chapter on ‘Left-wing and anarchist terrorism’ points to the ‘increased transnational coordination between terrorist and

\textsuperscript{33} TE-SAT 2004-2005: 10.
\textsuperscript{34} TE-SAT 2004-2005: 12.
\textsuperscript{35} TE-SAT 2004-2005: 11, 12, 13.
\textsuperscript{36} TE-SAT 2007: 4.
\textsuperscript{37} TE-SAT 2007: 32.
\textsuperscript{38} TE-SAT 2007: 10.
\textsuperscript{39} It appeared once in the TE-SAT 2004-2005 in the fundamentalist jihadist terrorism section.
\textsuperscript{40} TE-SAT 2009: 31, 40.
\textsuperscript{41} TE-SAT 2009: 40.
\textsuperscript{42} TE-SAT 2011: 7.
extremist left-wing and anarchist groups. Traditionally, these groups are most active in Greece, Italy and Spain. However, a number of other countries have also seen increased activity in 2010; ‘the modus operandi in a number of attacks showed signs of increased internationalisation of left-wing and anarchist groups’. The indications that international coordination is developing, is exemplified by the choice of common targets in different cities or countries... In this regard, the increase in arrests in Greece will result in some important court cases which could trigger more solidarity attacks across Europe. Therefore, anarchist violence can be expected to continue developing in the European Union in 2011. The spatial widening reasoning of Europol is particularly clear in this edition of the TE-SAT (‘international’ twice, ‘in and outside the EU’, ‘internationally’, ‘transnational’, ‘a number of other countries’, ‘internationalisation’, ‘different cities and countries’, ‘across Europe’). It is emphasised by the use of the lexical field of the ensemble: ‘cooperation’, ‘collaborating’, ‘coordination’, ‘common’, ‘similar’, ‘solidarity’ twice. In 2011, Europol therefore insists on the threatening spread of extreme left-wing attacks.

In the TE-SAT 2012 again, the threat is expanded: ‘Attacks linked to Greek or Italian anarchist circles occur frequently in Europe. In most cases, the motivation is an expression of solidarity with imprisoned anarchists. Similar to 2010, signs of increased transnational coordination between groups were observed in 2011. Communiqués issued by the Greek terrorist organisation Synomosia Pyrinon Fotias advocated the need to establish “an international network of anarchist individuals and groups”. The renewed activism of the FAI can be seen in this context. In documents found inside their parcel bombs, reference is made to the call by Synomosia Pyrinon Fotias.

2.C. Hypertrophy and atrophy

Through this examination, key findings have been unveiled. First, in the first generation of the TE-SAT, the broadening strategy of the discourse has mainly consisted in stretching the extreme left-wing threat from the Southern countries of the European Union to the Northern ones. This is even reaffirmed in the TE-SAT 2012: ‘attacks linked to Greek or Italian anarchist circles occur frequently in Europe”.

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43 TE-SAT 2011: 25.
44 TE-SAT 2011: 25.
46 TE-SAT 2012: 27.
47 TE-SAT 2012: 27.
Second, from 2007 on, this movement left room for a more dispersed motion. The TE-SAT 2007 represents a shift in Europol’s discourse. The extension (from South to North) becomes a generalisation: the extreme left-wing threat does not stem from a centre but gets ubiquitous. This is when the expression ‘Mediterranean Triangle’ disappears from the discourse, probably in order to rub out the impression that the problem only concerns three countries. This is clear in the conclusions of the first European Police Chiefs Convention, which celebrated the official opening of Europol’s new headquarters in The Hague in 2011: ‘EU-based terrorist groups try to shelter in other countries due to successful law enforcement activities. This will lead to a displacement of terrorist activities in those Member States traditionally less affected by terrorist activities’\textsuperscript{48}.

Third, increasingly, the European extreme left-wing community has been depicted as international. Notably from 2011 on, the transnational danger is singularly emphasised. This binds the extreme left-wing phenomenon to terrorism. Indeed, in the first TE-SAT of the second generation, it is ‘noted that all terrorist campaigns are transnational’\textsuperscript{49}. Thereby, the extreme left-wing actors are linked to the broader plague of international terrorism. This could explain the fact that from 2007 on, the Turkish Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP/C) is put in the extreme left-wing section while it earlier appeared in the ‘international terrorism’ section after the ‘fundamentalist djihadist terrorism’. It is even presented as the epitome of ‘left-wing terrorist groups’ in the introduction of the first TE-SATs of the second generation as it exemplifies the definition of the left-wing trend\textsuperscript{50}.

Nevertheless, from 2000 to 2012, Greece, Italy and Spain clearly remain the centres of the extreme left-wing phenomenon. According to the years, this or that country is added to the list and disappears in the next edition. As the table 2 shows, the number of countries affected by extreme left-wing ‘terrorism’ has remained stable during the last twelve years.

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
Editions of & Number of countries affected by & Percentage of countries affected by  \\
the TE-SAT & ‘extreme left-wing terrorist’ & ‘extreme left-wing terrorist’ \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{48} European Police Chiefs Convention Conclusions and album: 15-16.
\textsuperscript{49} TE-SAT 2007: 10.
\textsuperscript{50} ‘Left-wing terrorist groups, such as the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army (DHKP-C), seek to change the entire political social and economic system to an extreme left model and their ideology is often revolutionary Marxist-Leninist’ (TE-SAT 2007: 10 and also TE-SAT 2008: 8; TE-SAT 2009: 9).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5/27</td>
<td>18%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3/27</td>
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<td>3/27</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>4/27</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5/27</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hence, with the successive enlargements of the European Union, the extreme left-wing phenomenon, far from having grown, has lost in significance in terms of the proportion of European countries affected. More importantly, Europol’s discourse has geographically stretched the scope of the extreme left-wing actors. After the temporal extension, the spatial expansion has followed the four lines described above: ‘northernisation’, dissemination, transnationalisation and internationalisation. The next part will focus on the third extension implemented by the discourse, which could be depicted as a deepening: the magnitude extension.

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51 From 2011 on, ‘terrorist and extremist attacks’ are put in the same part. However, actions considered by Europol as ‘terrorist’ or as ‘extremist’ are named as such in the paragraphs. This is the way I could count the ‘terrorist’ deeds.
3. The magnitude extension of the extreme left-wing object

The third extension of the extreme left-wing object described by Europol concerns its intensity. To convey this, the discourse resorts to several devices. First, it assimilates the extra-parliamentary extreme left-wing actors described with terrorists. Second, it stresses the violence of the described actors. It then underlines their vitality and finally it shows the quantitative and qualitative extent of the extreme left-wing phenomenon. These devices are, however and in an interesting way, contradicted, or at least qualified, by several indications that the danger is marginal.

3.A. Terror

In the section on extreme left-wing actors of the TE-SAT, ‘terrorist’ is the fifth most used term (all editions included). The software NVivo 9 offers to see in which context certain notions are used. It shows that the terms ‘communist’, ‘anarchist’, ‘extreme left’, ‘left-wing’, ‘Marxist-Leninist’, ‘ultra-left’, ‘autonomous’ and ‘Marxist’ are mostly used in conjunction with ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’. Furthermore, extreme left-wing actors are more than three times as much defined as terrorist than as extremist, with 127 occurrences vs. 38. This is to say that extreme left-wing actors are clearly more viewed as terrorists than as extremists. The association of the notions ‘left-wing’, ‘anarchist’, ‘extreme left’, etc. on the one hand and ‘terrorism’ on the other hand poses an equivalence between the two: extreme left-wing movements would be, a priori and per definitionem, terrorist. Thus, the proprieties of the notion ‘terrorism’ fade on the terms just mentioned, in particular ‘left-wing’ and ‘anarchist’. Thereby, the TE-SAT implements a syllogism, resting on the two following premises ‘All terrorists are dangerous’ and ‘Extreme left-wing actors are terrorist’ leading to the conclusion that ‘Extreme left-wing actors are dangerous’. ‘Terrorism’ embodies one of the most serious security threats, so does the extreme left-wing object. Other lexical fields assimilate the extreme left-wing actors with danger and fear.

3.B. Violence

52 Extremism had been taken into account from the TE-SAT 2002-2003 and been part of the analysis from the 2008 report.
The lexical field of violence is very present in Europol’s reports. It is first manifest through the use of the term ‘violence’ itself or its adjective violent. Second, it is visible in the use of the lexical field of aggression: thus, the word ‘attack’ and its derivative are by far the most used terms in the TE-SAT (232 occurrences). These ‘attacks’ can take the form of a ‘fight’\(^{53}\), a ‘struggle’\(^{54}\), ‘quasi-riots’\(^{55}\), ‘riots’\(^{56}\), ‘vandalism’\(^{57}\), ‘confrontations’\(^{58}\) or ‘clashes’\(^{59}\). These notions all point to the ‘threat’\(^{60}\) represented by the (‘dangerous’\(^{61}\)) extreme left-wing actors. This violence is reinforced in two ways. First, by the criminal terms employed, particularly ‘arrest’/‘arrested’, which belong to the 10 most employed words of the TE-SAT, but also expressions like ‘criminal proceedings’ or ‘detention’\(^{62}\), ‘anti-fascist criminality’ or ‘crimes’\(^{63}\), ‘suspect’\(^{64}\), ‘criminal offences’\(^{65}\), ‘offences’\(^{66}\), ‘criminal damage’\(^{67}\). These terms are most often used in the second generation of the TE-SAT, which is driven by a criminalisation of the extreme left-wing actors.

Second, the sense of threat is conveyed by the very detailed description of the arsenal used by some extreme left-wing actors. This is often emphasised by the use of accumulation that is a figure of speech in which a speaker or writer gathers scattered points and lists them together. For example: ‘weapons, explosive devices, rockets, hand grenades and other material’\(^{68}\), ‘committing assassinations, launching of rockets, bombing attacks as well as bank robberies’\(^{69}\), ‘eighty five (85) Molotov-cocktail bombs, metal bullet firing devices, gas masks, globs, hammers, slingshots, gloves, hoods’\(^{70}\), ‘criminal activities such as kidnapping, extortion and money laundering’\(^{71}\), ‘seizure of several machine guns, a rocket launcher, hand

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\(^{56}\) TE-SAT 2008: 36.
\(^{65}\) TE-SAT 2007: 35.
\(^{67}\) TE-SAT 2012: 27.
\(^{68}\) TE-SAT 2001-2002: 19.
\(^{71}\) TE-SAT 2007: 34.
grenades, and explosive materials’, etc.

In the same way, there is an accumulation of group names. Some groups can be mentioned even in no relation to any fact. This is for instance the case in the TE-SAT 2002-2003 about the four Greek groups listed: “’Revolutionary Organization 17 November’, whose dismantling is complete’, ‘’Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ELA)’ … [which] has ceased its activities since 1995’, ‘’Revolutionary People’s Action’ [for which] there is no evidence’ and ‘’Revolutionary Struggle’ [for which] there is no evidence so far’. All in all, the accumulation of both terms and names provide with a feeling of a major impending threat.

Lastly, violence is stressed by the consequences of extreme left-wing acts. First, the material consequences: ‘property damages’, ‘material damage’, ‘damaged’, ‘with the aim to damage structures or property’, etc. Second, the human consequences: ‘murdered’, ‘assassination(s)’, ‘injuries’, ‘killed’, ‘died’, etc. The second generation of the TE-SAT clearly resorts more frequently to the human consequences of extreme left-wing deeds than the first generation, following the criminalisation process described above. The lexical field of death underlines the lethal threat represented by the extreme left-wing actors.

3.C. Vigour

The vocabulary of terror and violence is supported by terms and formulations showing the vitality of the extreme left-wing threat: ‘activity’ and its derivative (‘active’, ‘actively’, ‘activism’) are indeed the ninth most used terms of the TE-SAT and ‘action’ the 17th.

Terms conveying increase and large number also put forward the vigour of the extreme left-wing actors. They are numerous in the TE-SAT and describe both a quantitative and qualitative trend.

First, the quantitative aspect is stressed via the repetition of ‘number’, which is the 13th most used terms in the reports, as well as through the following utterances: (‘substantial’,

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78 TE-SAT 2007: 33.
‘marked’\textsuperscript{84} ‘increase’\textsuperscript{85} (e.g. ‘in the activity of extreme-left groups’\textsuperscript{86} ‘in attack’\textsuperscript{87} ‘in action’\textsuperscript{88} ‘of 43\%’\textsuperscript{89} ‘increasingly’\textsuperscript{90} (e.g. ‘active’ or ‘violent’\textsuperscript{91} ‘several (incidents)’\textsuperscript{92} ‘numerous (arsons)’\textsuperscript{93} ‘high number (of violent confrontations)’\textsuperscript{94} ‘further escalate’\textsuperscript{95} ‘accelerated (their campaigns)’\textsuperscript{96} etc.

Second, adverbs and adjectives are the terms that mostly convey a sense of qualitative intensification: ‘severe (property damages)’\textsuperscript{97} ‘very (active)’\textsuperscript{98} ‘most (active)’\textsuperscript{99} ‘of particular worry’\textsuperscript{100} ‘various’ ‘continued (threat)’\textsuperscript{101} etc.

Europol’s discourse therefore demonstrates that the extreme left-wing threat is dynamic, large and permanently growing.

Ultimately, the three devices formed in the TE-SAT – temporal, spatial and magnitude extension – converge on this last part. These three discursive patterns all underline how the extreme left-wing actors represent a threat, which is dynamic (reinterpreting the past, active in the present and crossing borders), large (transnational, numerous and violent) and growing (in the future, in the world and in capacity). The discourse consequentially constructs a total threat, a three-dimensional object, with time, space and magnitude being its axes, as the following figure suggests it.
Through its treatment of the extreme left-wing actors in relation to time, space and magnitude, Europol’s discourse provides the extreme left-wing threat with a concrete dimension – it materialises it. The TE-SAT has therefore constructed the first predicate of the extreme left-wing object, namely its extension.

3.D. Extension/contraction

This extension is however qualified, if not contradicted, by the numerous terms that describe the extreme left-wing actors as a minor phenomenon following a contraction, a ‘downward trend’. Even though for instance the term ‘increase’ is twice more used than ‘decrease’ (similarly for ‘high’ and ‘low’), the cohabitation of these two extremes is remarkable. In other words, Europol’s discourse seems to imply: ‘the threat is clearly major, but is however minor’. There is an element of dissonance in this stating of one thing and its contrary. My hypothesis is that Europol’s discourse has amalgamated, in the chemical sense, the extreme left-wing threat, and the extreme left-wing actors, individuals or groups. The first is potentially ubiquitous and omnipotent; it is self-feeding and tends to reject singularities. The seconds are pieces of a loose construction, be it a triangle, an arc, a network, etc. In the TE-
SAT, these two elements are melted in one entity, which as a result is constituted by antagonistic and mutually influential forces. These forces struggle with each other in the discourse according to a movement of alternative extension and contraction. Hence a seeming paradox exists between the major and the minor in the reports.

When these contradictory messages emerge, the discourse of the European police is redirected towards the extension pole. For instance: ‘the actual residual but still sporadically active terrorist capacity of a very dynamic and determined cell of the armed group could lead to some violent actions in the future’\textsuperscript{102}; ‘there is no evidence that violent activities will increase in the coming months, although there could be an upsurge’\textsuperscript{103}; ‘there are no active domestic groups that may be labelled terrorists. However, several of the groups and organisations … do aim at obtaining political change by using threats and violence …, thus posing threat to internal security’; ‘although the number of attacks decreased, Italy noted a general increase in the threat’\textsuperscript{104}, etc.

These statements illustrate how contradiction is managed in Europol’s discourse. Conjunctions expressing contrast (‘but’, ‘however’, ‘although’, ‘at the same time’) link one side with the other, extension with contraction. Moreover, the utterances are mostly constructed on an opposition pattern: the contracting element is first mentioned (‘modest’, ‘residual’, ‘little’, etc.), then the extending aspect is recalled (‘international’, ‘very dynamic’, ‘excessive violence’, etc.). Europol’s discourse substantially tells us: ‘If some elements seem to indicate that the extreme left-wing threat is low, some others prove the contrary’.

All in all, via these two poles, Europol’s discourse plays both ends. It constructs the predicate of the extreme left-wing object that I have examined in this paper, that is, extension. Extension comes from the Latin \textit{ex-tendere} that literally means ‘out-stretch’. The examined object exCEEDS the limits, the borders owing to its duration, its extent, its magnitude. In this way, it is extreme: it presents the characteristic of extension – in time, space and magnitude – in the utmost degree. Now, it is extreme in a second sense. Ex-treme means ‘the outermost’, \textit{extremus} being the superlative of \textit{exterus}, ‘outer’. More than that, \textit{exterus} means ‘outward’ but also ‘on outside’, ‘far’ and further ‘of another country’, ‘foreign’ and even ‘strange’ (Lewis and Short 1879). Thus extreme: ‘the most outward’, ‘the most on outside’, ‘the farthest’, ‘the most foreign’ and ‘the strangest’. Extension via ‘extreme’ leads to marginality.

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{TE-SAT} 2002-2003: 25.  
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{TE-SAT} 2004-2005: 14.  
\textsuperscript{104} \textit{TE-SAT} 2008: 37.
This is the second predicate of the extreme left-wing object in Europol’s discourse which my thesis ultimately focuses on.

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Appendix: Table 1.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Non-active past extreme left-wing groups</th>
<th>Extreme left-wing groups created before 2000 and still active</th>
<th>Extreme left-wing groups created from 2000</th>
<th>Extreme left-wing groups with unknown date of creation</th>
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<td>- <em>GRAPO</em> (1975)</td>
<td>-Revolutionary Front for Communism</td>
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<td>-Nuclei Territoriali Antimperialisti (1995)</td>
<td>- <em>Laiki Epanastatiki Drasi</em> (Revolutionary People’s Action) (recent)</td>
<td>- <em>Rete del Sud Ribelle</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Comitati d’ Appoggio alla Resistenza per il Comunismo (Committees in Support of the Resistance for Communism) (1992)</td>
<td>-‘Black bloc attack group’</td>
<td>- <em>CCCCC – Celula Contre el Capital, la Carcel, los Carceleros y sus Celdas</em></td>
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<td>-Revolutionary Organisation 17 November (1975)</td>
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<td>(Cell against the Capital, Prison, Gaolers and its Cells)</td>
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</table>
- ELA (Revolutionary Popular Struggle) (1971-1995)  
- Revolutionary Organisation 17 November (EO17N) (1975)  
- GRAPO  
- BR-PCC  
- Laiki Epanastatiki Drasi (Revolutionary People’s Action) (recent)  
- Federazione Anarchica Informale  
- Revolutionary Offensive Cell  
- Militante Gruppe  |
| 2007   | - Direct Action  
- Anti-Fascist Action (1994)  
- BR-PCC  
- GRAPO  
- TKP/ML (1972)  
- DHKP/C (1994)  
- Fronte Rivoluzionario  
- Revolutionary Brigade  
- Revolutionary Liberating Action (2002)  
- Federazione Anarchica Informale  
- Militante Gruppe  
- Working Group on Colonialism and war in the militant anti-G8 campaign  |
| 2008   | - Red Army Fraction (RAF)  
- Brigade Rosse (Red Brigades) x3  
- Cellules Communistes Combattantes  
- Secours Rouge (APAPC)  
- GRAPO  
- Fronte Rivoluzionario per il comunismo (Revolutionary front for communism)  
- Partito Communista politico-militare (PCP-M) (2007)  
- Federazione Anarchica  |
<table>
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