Abstract

The List Pim Fortuyn is a key example of a new right wing populist party that, according to many observers, have had a strong effect on European party systems. Specific features of the LPF make it a most likely case to observe the effect of a new party on a party system. This paper seeks to survey the effect of the sudden entry of the LPF into the Dutch parliament on the established parliamentary parties and the parliamentary party system. The paper looks at two aspects of the party system in particular: issue saliency and the dominant line of conflict. First, what are the dominant issues on the agenda of the legislature? Did the entry of the LPF increase the saliency of issues such as migration and integration? Second, what is the dominant line of conflict in the legislature? How did the LPF affect the patterns of interaction between the established political parties? Has the LPF been able to create a new line of conflict in the legislature, as some propose it did in the electoral arena (Kriesi and Frey, 2009 and Pellikaan et al. 2007)? Or, as others have proposed for the electoral arena (Van der Brug, 2009) and for the government formation arena (Bale 2003), has the entry of the LPF into the legislative arena actually reinforced the existing conflict between left and right? The study looks at new, behavioral, data from the Dutch legislature: namely parliamentary voting behaviour and the sponsorship of motions, to answer these questions. In a brief epilogue we will also look at the peculiar position of the LPF in the 2003-2006 parliament.

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1. Introduction

The Dutch parliamentary election of May 2002 was the most volatile election in Dutch history (Mair 2008). The Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn, LPF) entered parliament with an unprecedented 17% of the seats. Liberals and social-democrats suffered heavy electoral losses. The events surrounding the entry of the LPF into the political arena have been characterized as a “change of the party system” (Pellikaan et al. 2007), a “revolt of the citizens” (Couwenberg 2004) and a “interruption of the equilibrium” of Dutch politics (De Vries and Van der Lubben 2004). Political scientists have proposed different interpretations of how the entry of the LPF has affected the Dutch party system. One especially contentious issue is how many and which significant lines of conflict underlie the Dutch party system after 2002. There are roughly two positions: there are those who argue that the Dutch party system can best be understood in terms of a two-dimensional space and those who argue for an one-dimensional model. This paper attempts to find out to what extent the interaction between political parties in the legislative arena fits either of these two interpretations. Therefore the main question of this paper is: how did the LPF affect the significant lines of conflict that structure the Dutch political space in the parliamentary arena?

The relevance of the case of the LPF does not end at the Dutch borders. The LPF is one of a growing number of new rightwing populist political parties which have appeared in Europe over the last 25 years. Many observers (Bale 2003; Norris 2005: 264; Kriesi and Frey 2009) have proposed that these parties have a strong effect on the established parties and the party system. The case of the LPF provides a crucial test of this hypothesis. One might even say that the case of the LPF is a “most likely” case study (Gerring 2007: 120). Specific features of the entry of the LPF and the Dutch political system makes it an especially likely case to detect the effect of a new party on the party system. First, the Dutch polity is, in comparative perspective, very open to newcomers, due to the low electoral threshold and the open patterns of cabinet formation (Mair 1997: 212; Krouwel and Lucardie 2008). In an open system like the Dutch new parties can have quite a considerable effect because there are no mechanisms to keep them marginalized (Norris 2005: 269). Second, the growth of the LPF was not gradual. For a party that grows gradually over time it is much more

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2 Eventhough Fortuyn’s eclectic political project appears to defy some of the traditional preconceptions about and definitions of populism (Lucardie, 2008:158).
difficult to pinpoint when it may have had which effect. For the LPF one can easily pin this down. Therefore if it is possible to see the effect of a new party on any party system, it must be this one.

The paper will look at the parliamentary arena. Previous studies have looked at the effect of the LPF in the electoral (Kriesi and Frey 2008; Pellikaan et al. 2007) and government formation arena (Bale 2003). The parliamentary arena has been overlooked so far, while it may provide worthwhile insights into the effect of a new party on the party system: Data from the parliamentary arena offers information about all parties, instead of only those which cooperate in cabinets and gives insight into what political parties actually do instead of what they promise.

This paper will have the following structure: first I will briefly sketch the context of the rise of the LPF. Then I will present the different interpretations of the effect of the LPF on the Dutch party system. These will be placed into a broader theoretical framework based on the Schattschneider-Mair thesis. Then I will touch upon some methodological issues, before presenting the results. Finally I will evaluate the results in a comparative context in the conclusion. In an epilogue I will provide a secondary analysis about the curious position of the LPF in the 2003-2006 cabinet.

2. The rise and fall of Fortuyn

Between 1977 and 2002 there were three major political parties in the Netherlands: the social-democratic PvdA, the Christian-democratic CDA and the conservative liberal VVD. These three parties were the largest parties in parliament. They got around 80% of the popular vote. They formed the main parties in every coalition cabinet. De Beus et al. (1993) spoke of a “Dutch triangle” to describe this political constellation: a triangle with a Christian-democratic, social-democratic and liberal corner. The VVD and PvdA disagreed strongly on matters of economic management: the VVD favoured the free market, the PvdA state intervention. They agreed on matters of morality however, both favouring a neutral government. The CDA advocated government intervention in the personal sphere, while taking a centrist stance on economic matters. In addition to these three parties there is a fourth party, which participated in coalition cabinets: the progressive liberal D66. It agreed with the VVD and PvdA on moral issues, while on economic issues, it was close to the political centre. At the political extremes there were two groups of smaller parties in parliament. The “small left” was a group of secular, leftwing parties. These merged
to form the leftwing green party GL in 1989, but by 1994 another new small leftwing party had entered parliament: the socialist SP. The “small right” was a group of fundamentalist protestant parties, which favoured a moral state and were close to the centre on economic issues. The small right was composed out of the RPF, GPV and SGP. Since 1994 the Netherlands had been governed by a coalition of VVD, PvdA and D66, the so-called “purple coalition”, in which the liberalism (“blue”) of the VVD was mixed with the social-democracy (“red”) of the PvdA (Lucardie, 2008:153). An overview of all these parties is presented in table 1.
In 1999 the first signs of political change started to show. Livable Netherlands (LN) was formed, an “outgrow of a motley collection of local protest parties” (Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 16). The party focused on democratic reform and rejected technocratic politics (Lucardie, 2008:154). They combined this with pragmatic perspective other political issues. In November 2001 they elected Pim Fortuyn as political leader. Fortuyn had become a prominent public figure through his columns in a centre-right weekly. In these columns he criticized the purple cabinet for the way it managed the public sector and for the way it dealt with the growing migrant, Islamic, population. In February 2002 LN dropped Fortuyn as its leader after he said in a newspaper interview that Islam was a “backward” culture and that article 1 of the constitution, the prohibition of discrimination, should be abolished (Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 16; Lucardie, 2008:154). Within days Fortuyn started his own party: the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). The party program focused on migration and integration and advocated reform of the public sector. Fortuyn dominated the following general election campaign. Nine days before the election Fortuyn was shot (Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 16).

According to Andeweg and Irwin (2005: 17) “[g]iven the extraordinary circumstances, the (electoral, SO) results came as no surprise, although they were without precedent.” The parties that formed the purple cabinet lost heavily. The LPF made the most “impressive début” (Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 17) a new party had ever made in the Netherlands: from 0% to 17% of the vote. A cabinet was formed by the CDA, the LPF and the VVD. The cabinet was short lived however: by the fall of 2002, the cabinet had fallen due to internal struggles within the LPF, a party that was left without its leader (Lucardie, 2008:163). In the short period it was in parliament the LPF had already seen three MPs leave its ranks.

New elections were held in January 2003. The LPF lost 18 of its 26 in the election, while social-democrats made considerable gains. A new cabinet was formed by the Christian-democrats with progressive and conservative liberals. In the following three years the LPF disintegrated: by 2006 the eight men strong parliamentary party had divided into three parliamentary parties and there had been four changes in the leadership of the LPF parliamentary party. In the 2006 election three parties participated that were led by (former) members of the LPF. None of them were able to win a seat in parliament. The Party for Freedom formed a former VVD MP now is the most prominent rightwing populist party in the Netherlands.
3. *Different interpretations of the “Fortuyn effect”*

The entry of the LPF into the political arena is associated by some authors with a major change in the Dutch party system, in terms of the lines of conflict that structure interaction between political parties. There are roughly two positions on the effect of the LPF on these significant lines of conflict: the first position is that the political space after the entry of Fortuyn into the political arena can best be understood as two-dimensional, the second position proposes a one-dimensional model of Dutch politics after Fortuyn. Authors base their different interpretations on different analyses, which look at different political arenas, with different kinds of data and different assumptions. Therefore they come to different conclusions.

The first position is taken by Kriesi and Frey (2008). They show that due to the entry of the LPF into the political arena, the traditional configuration of Dutch political parties in the political space was “disturbed” (Kriesi and Frey 2008: 178). This change in the Dutch party system is put into a European context. All over Western Europe the significant lines of conflict are changing: in their view the politics in most Western European states can be understood in terms of two dimensions: one economic and one cultural. While the economic line of conflict remains unchanged, the cultural dimension is changing. This dimension used to concern religious and moral issues, but now it divides “a libertarian-cosmopolitan-multicultural world view, and an authoritarian-nationalist-monocultural world view” Kriesi and Frey (2008: 172). Since the 1970s issues related to this new cultural cleavage have become more salient while the issue related to the old cultural cleavage became less salient. The entry of the LPF into the political arena further increased the saliency of these new cultural issues (Kriesi and Frey 2008: 176). Moreover its unconventional positioning on these issues caused the established parties to change their positions. In this way the LPF caused a “disturbance of the dimensionality of the Dutch political space”. (Kriesi and Frey 2008: 179). The entry of the LPF into the political arena accentuated an ongoing transformation of the cultural line of conflict into a line that divides cosmopolitan parties from nationalist parties (Kriesi and Frey 2008: 180).

The second position comes close to the position of Kriesi and Frey, with important differences. As Kriesi and Frey (2008) Pellikaan et al. (2007) see a change in the dimensions of the Dutch party system: the line of conflict dividing secular from religious parties became obsolete as the Purple cabinet had legalized gay marriage and
euthanasia (Pellikaan et al. 2007: 291). Due to the entry of the LPF into the political arena a new line of conflict took the place of the religious-secular line of conflict. This line of conflict divides parties that favoured a monocultural society from parties that favour a multicultural society (Pellikaan et al. 2007: 295). Meanwhile the economic left/right dimension remained significant. It is important to note that Pellikaan et al. observe that there is “a strong relationship between the two dimensions (the economic and new cultural line of conflict, SO), and one could therefore argue that the two-dimensional model can be reduced to a single dominant conflict line” (Pellikaan et al. 2007: 296). Pellikaan et al. (2007: 296) choose to present the space as two-dimensional because the two-dimensional space provides crucial insight into the differences between political parties. There is one important difference between Kriesi and Frey and Pellikaan et al.: while Kriesi and Frey see a gradual change in the Dutch party system which is accentuated by the entry of the LPF into the political system, Pellikaan et al. (2007: 283) describe the events of 2002 as “an example of an abrupt party system change”, an interpretation that is followed in this paper.

In contrast to Kriesi and Frey and Pellikaan et al., there are some authors who claim that the Dutch party system can best be understood as one-dimensional. One such position is taken by Bale (2003). He hypothesizes that after the entry of LPF into the political arena the dynamic of political cooperation changed: it essentially became one-dimensional. In the Netherlands, as in several other West-European countries rightwing populist parties were integrated into governing coalitions, and/or electoral alliances of political parties of the centre-right. This further reinforced a trend towards a bimodal pattern of political cooperation, already set in motion by the incorporation of green parties into leftwing coalitions (Mair 2001): in many West-European countries one finds two coalitions: one of leftwing parties, social-democrats and greens, and one of rightwing parties, Christian-democrats, liberals and/or conservatives now joined by radical populist parties. In those systems where political cooperation was structured by multiple lines of conflict, the radical rightwing parties have caused a reduction of the number of lines of conflict. The dominant conflict is now between a bloc of the left and a bloc of the right. The Netherlands is because of the formation of a centre-right cabinet of CDA, LPF and VVD a prime example of this phenomenon. The co-optation of the issues of the rightwing populist parties by the centre-right has eased cabinet formation (Bale, 2003: 75).
A similar position is taken by Van der Brug (2008) and Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009), Van der Brug (2008: 10 own translation) finds that “positions of political parties on very different issues are strongly correlated”. Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) analyzed party positions in 15 different countries, including the Netherlands, specifically incorporating those issues which Pellikaan et al. and Kriesi and Frey link to the new cultural dimension, such as immigration. They find that most of these issues, new and old, are integrated into one dimension: the left-right dimension (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009: 320). The only issues that are not related to this dimension are issues related to European integration.

It is important to note that these four accounts do not directly contradict each other. These authors make different claims about different political arenas. These claims are based on different assumptions and employ different methodologies. First, the analyses refer different political arenas and use different sources of data. Kriesi and Frey look at how the positions of political parties are presented in the media during the election campaign, Pellikaan et al. look at election manifestos, Bale looks at cabinet formation, and Van der Brug and Van Spanje use expert surveys which are supposed to look at the party position “in general”. The differences in the findings may be resolved by saying that in different political arenas different lines of conflict are significant.

Second, the analyses appear to rest on different assumptions about how one should approach differences between political parties. Pellikaan et al. on the one hand and Van der Brug and Van Spanje and Kriesi and Frey on the other, work with different assumptions about what justifies calling a particular space one- or two-dimensional. Pellikaan et al. (2007: 296-297) maintain a two-dimensional political space because of the analytical value the second dimension has if one wants to study electoral competition or government formation. They appear not to be interested in the “true” dimensionality of the space but rather the analytic usefulness of adding additional dimensions. In contrast, Van der Brug and Van Spanje and Kriesi and Frey have a more statistical approach. These authors look at look at the statistical relations between party positions on different issues and issue dimensions to justify placing them in a space with one or more dimensions. Their justification of the dimensionality of the space in the end is based on the “goodness of fit” of a particular solution. That is the extent to which a solution with a certain number of dimensions fits the data. They emphasize that they “find” solutions with a particular number of dimensions.
(Kriesi and Frey 2008: 281) or “reveal” particular structures (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009: 327). For these authors the dimensionality of the space is an empirical outcome not a matter of analytics utility.

4. Theoretical Framework

The LPF is not a stand-alone phenomenon. The number of new parties entering the political arenas in Western democracies has increased strongly since the 1950s (Hug 1997: 81). In political science this trend was picked up and since the late 1970s there has been a growing number of studies of new political parties (for an overview see Hug 1997). One of the aspects of new political parties that has peaked the interest of scholars is their ability to affect the policy positions of established parties and even the political space of parties cooperate and compete in (Meguid 2005; Huijbregts 2006).

The way political parties interact with each other can best be understood in spatial terms. Such a political space is structured by a number of significant lines of conflict (Schattschneider 1960). The most prominent example is the left-right line of conflict. Parties on the left tend to agree with other parties on the left and disagree with parties on the right. The interaction between political parties in some countries, such as the Netherlands, can perhaps better be understood in terms of multiple significant lines of conflict.

The concept significant line of conflict has got two components: the line of conflict and its significance. A line of conflict is a set of patterned differences and similarities in opinion between political parties on a set of issues (Bovens et al. 1998: 11). In multiparty systems a simple dichotomy (left-right) is too simple to catch the nuanced differences between political parties. Therefore Pellikaan et al. (2007: 285-286) propose to understand a line of conflict as dimension on which parties position themselves: for instance on the far left or the centre right. A line of conflict is significant in the sense that it marginalizes other lines of conflict (Schattschneider 1960: 64). Other issues (related to other lines of conflict) are excluded from the political debate. Marginalization is an effect of the significant line of conflict on the saliency of other issues.

New political parties may seek actively to change the lines of conflict. For instance LN wrote in its election manifesto: “[w]e oppose the old parties which seek to maintain the ideological lines of conflict which do not give citizens political
clarity” (Leefbaar Nederland 2001 own translation). There are three ways in which the lines of conflict can change: a new line of conflict can be added to the existing ones (Meguid 2005), a new line of conflict can replace one of the current lines of conflict (Pellikaan et al. 2007; Kriesi and Frey 2008), or the number of lines of conflict can decrease (Mair 2001; Bale 2003). Affecting the significant lines of conflict is one of the strongest effect a new party can have on a party system: “[a]lliances are formed and re-formed; fortresses, positions, alignments and combinations are destroyed or abandoned in a tremendous shuffle of forces redeployed to defend new positions or to take new strong points.” (Schattschneider 1960: 72).

In order for a change in the significant lines of conflict to occur, the saliency of issues must change: some issues must become more significant and others must be forced to the margins of the political agenda. If the parties’ positions on this new issue are markedly different from their positions on the issues related to the established lines of conflict, a new line of conflict might arise. Contrariwise, if the new issue crowds out an issue on which parties positioned themselves markedly different than on the other issues, including the new one, the number of lines of conflict may decrease. If one wants to attribute a change in the significant lines of conflict to a new party, it must be its issue(s) that become more salient. Therefore one needs to look at the reactions of the individual established parties to the new party. Individual established parties may spend more or less attention to the issues the new party raised (Huijbrechts 2006). These reactions on the level of the individual party have effects on the level of the party system: if all parties spend more attention on the issue the new party raises it becomes more salient at the level of the party system. If all parties spend less attention on the issue the new party raises, it becomes less salient. If parties react mixed or neutral, the saliency of the issue stays the same.

Within this framework one can now understand the different positions discussed before: Kriesi and Frey (2008) explicitly talk about how the LPF increased the saliency of the issues related to the new cultural cleavage between cosmopolitan and nationalist parties. This caused the disturbance in the political space they observed. A similar argument is made by Pellikaan et al. (2007): before 2002 the significant lines of cleavage were related to economic and religious issues. The religious line of conflict became obsolete and a new line of conflict, related to migration and integration replaced it. This issue was a very prominent during the election campaign. Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) simply claim that the
positions on migration and integration are very similar to party positions on other, economic issues. Therefore whether this issue became more salient or not, it cannot form a separate significant line of conflict. Finally, Bale (2003: 75) links the rising saliency of migration and the dimensionality in the a different way: by emphasizing migration the established parties on the centre right become more similar to the far right, preparing coalitions between centre and the far right, which lead to one-dimensional pattern of political cooperation.

5. Research design

There are a few issues with the research design which will be addressed before the results are discussed. To avoid repetition and discussing measures without empirical context, questions about how particular measures are operationalized are addressed in the empirical sections. Here three more general issues about the 2002 election that influenced the research design are discussed.3

3 There are specific drawbacks to the methods Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009), Kriesi and Frey (2008), Bale (2003) and Pellikaan et al. (2007) employ and the arenas they look into. Bale (2003) looks at cabinet formation, finding that the formation of a centre-right government of CDA, LPF and VVD provided a break with previous cabinets. Looking at cabinet formation is problematic because one has such a small number of observations. Between 1994 and 2008 7 cabinets were formed, but over 19,599 votes were held in parliament. Moreover even if one looks at cabinet formation the formation of a centre right cabinet is not an exception in Dutch politics: rather for over 40% of the period since 1946 the Netherlands was governed by centre right cabinets.

Kriesi and Frey (2008) look at descriptions of political parties in newspapers during the election campaign. First, again there is a problem of the number of observations: small parties get very little media attention, therefore several parties represented in parliament are excluded from this analysis and for several other parties the number of observations is small and thus measurement is very uncertain and unstable. To take one example: the GL, by far the most multicultural party in Pellikaan et al.’s analysis (2003) shifts from very anti-immigrant to radically pro-immigrant to radically anti-immigrant according to Kriesi et al. (2008:278). Second as Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009:238) hypothesize the media may not be the best way to observe the ideological positions of political parties, because what the media reports is very sensitive to changes in the political agenda.

Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) use expert surveys. There are two problems with using expert surveys for inferring the dimensionality of the political space. First expert surveys tend to exclude issues which are not deemed relevant or which are seen as a subsidiary of another dimension. So for instance in the Hooghe et al. (2009) expert survey of party positions in 2002 which Van der Brug and Van Spanje employ, migration is not included. This makes it very difficult to see whether party positioning on migration is really different from other issues. Second, expert surveys will tend to “echo” the academic community, so if the academic community believes that party position on economic issues is related to party positioning migration, this will come out of the analysis. But this is exactly what one wanted to know: one cannot arbitrate a difference of opinion within the academic community by looking at the opinions of the academic community. Pellikaan et al. (2003; 2007) select a limited number of issues, which are perceived to be salient in the election campaign by experts. They then develop scales for these issues and score parties on these scales. The difference between the approach used here and their approach is perhaps best stated by Kriesi and Frey (2009:173): “[b]ut note that contrary to their analysis (the Pellikaan et al. study), our study does not make any a priori assumptions about the two-dimensionality or the contents of these two dimensions. Our results provide an empirical test of the two-dimensionality and its interpretation in terms of new structural conflicts.”
First, because the LPF went from 0% to 17% of the vote in a single election, one can study its effect as a natural experiment: one can attempt to discern what the effect of a particular stimulus (a new party) was on a particular group of respondents (the established parties). This requires two observations to be compared: a time point before the entry of a new party and a time point after the entry of a new party. That is compare the behaviour of MPs in the parliamentary session before the entry of a new party and in the first session after the new party has entered parliament. One should note however that we are looking for “structural” or “systemic” change. This implies two things: first that the change does not concern a single party but the interaction between them (Mair 1997:49-54), but also that the change is permanent and does not disappear in a matter of months. Therefore it may be prudent to not limit the analysis to the short-lived 2002-2003 parliament but also to the 2003-2006 parliament.

Second, in the 2002 elections the LPF was not even the only new party. As discussed above Livable Netherlands (LN) entered the parliament in the same election. This makes studying the LPF effect more difficult as one needs to distinguish it from the LN effect. On the other side one can compare the effect of the LPF on the party system with another party, forcing one to constantly consider alternative explanations of changes. Moreover one can see whether the effect of the LPF is really that exceptional compared to another, smaller newcomer.

Third, as seen above, there is considerable disagreement about what justifies claiming that a particular constellation of political parties can best be modeled in a one-dimensional or a two-dimensional political space. And this appears to be the key question of the study: did the entry of the LPF change the number of significant lines of conflict? Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) and Kriesi and Frey (2008) rely on statistical measures to justify their claims. When the levels of fit of a particular solution are sufficiently high they claim that a space can best be modeled in an n-dimensional space. One can however not completely rely on statistics to answer this substantive question (Poole 2005: 141), as the standards for the levels of fit themselves are arbitrary and depend upon individual interpretation (Clausen 1998: 23-25; Poole 2005: 141-155). What these levels of fit can indicate however is whether a particular constellation fits better in a n-dimensional space than another constellation.

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4 There was even a third “new” party: the CU. The fundamentalist Christian CU was a merger of two small fundamentalist Christian parties, which had previously been in parliament. In this sense it is not the birth of a real new party (Mair 1999).
By comparing the levels of fit for different years, one can see whether the *extent to which* the differences between political parties can represented in a one- or a two-dimensional space has changed. In this way the question about what the “true” dimensionality of the space is, can be shelved, and one can still see how a new party affects the pattern of interaction between political parties.

6. Parliamentary space

For the parliamentary space, there are significant differences between the period 1998-2002 and 2002-2003, while there is considerable stability for the period 2003-2006. The issue of integration and migration increased in saliency. Between 1998 and 2003 the Dutch parliamentary space changed significantly.

The parliamentary agenda is first on the agenda. Motions are used to measure the attention of parliament. Motions are selected because they are most encompassing form of parliamentary activity. These are used in the two primary functions of parliament: when controlling cabinet ministers motions are used to come to a conclusion. They are also used to influence government policy, following the legislative agenda of the government and the budget cycle. The *Tweede Kamer* has divided all the motions in a very precise system of categories. These have been re-categorized into the categories of the scheme of the Flemish branch of the Comparative Agendas Project, which consists out of 19 issue categories from macro-economy to the environment (Walgrave et al. 2006). We look at two categories “civil rights, migration and integration” and “democracy and governance”. These have been selected because they play a dominant role in the 2002 manifestos of LPF and LN respectively: the LPF spent 19% of its manifesto on “civil rights, integration and migration” and LN 25% of its manifesto on “democracy and governance” (Louwerse 2009).

In figure 1 one can see the development in the share of motions on “civil rights, migration and integration” and “democracy and government”. On both issues one can see an increase in attention for the period 2002-2003. For “civil rights, migration and integration” this increase is relatively small: only one-and-a-half percentage point. For “democracy and governance” the increase is much more marked. The attention to this issues more than doubles from 4% to 8%. The increase is not just absolute, the issues also become more salient in relative terms: “civil rights migration and integration” moves from third to second most salient issue and
"democracy and governance" moves from twelfth to fourth most salient issue. In these terms the increase for "civil migration and integration" is less marked than the increase on "democracy and governance". "Civil migration and integration" was already on the parliamentary agenda before 2002, while "democracy and governance" was less prominent. After the 2003 parliamentary elections, the attention for "democracy and governance" decreases again, while the attention for "civil rights, migration and integration" continues to increase. "Democracy and governance" falls to 6% of all motions, the sixth most prominent issue. With 12%, "civil rights migration and integration" is the most prominent issue on the parliamentary agenda for the period 2003-2006. It also saw the biggest change in attention when comparing 1998-2002 to 2003-2006. Between 1998 and 2006 the attention for "civil rights, migration and integration" the most prominent issue on the agenda of the LPF, increased markedly and consistently.⁵

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⁵ On basis of the election manifestos one would expect LN to concentrate on issues surrounding democracy and governance and the LPF to focus on migration and integration in parliament. This is not the case. LN was first or only sponsor of only eight motions. Most concerned (38%) macro-economic affairs. Not one motion was proposed on subjects in the category democracy and governance. For the
So how did these increases in saliency affect in the political space? The spatial representations are obtained through W-NOMINATE, a method that is used to uncover the dimensional structure underlying votes in parliament. The method was developed by Poole (2005). It treats each vote as cutting point dividing parties, which vote “yes” from parties, which vote “no”. If one does this for a larger number of votes, one gets a dimension where parties, which vote similarly, are on one side of a dimension and parties that vote differently on the other side. The method can produce a model of the political space at any number of dimensions, which allows one to model voting in complex party systems, where some parties vote together with particular parties on some issues and with others on other issues. For technical reasons this study will only look at a specific subset of votes, namely those proposals (motions, amendments and laws), which are sponsored by the governing parties and the coalition cabinet (Otjes and Van der Veer 2009). In the Netherlands votes in parliament are documented in the minutes of parliament, the Handelingen. For most votes the Handelingen only include votes per parliamentary party, not per individual MP. Therefore only parties will be studied. To enhance interpretation the dimensions from the expert survey and dimension from Pellikaan et al. (2003) were regressed onto the models. The results of these analyses are listed in table 2. W-NOMINATE

LPF the image is similar. The party proposed 55 motions. Most motions concerned on agriculture (18%). Only 7% of the party’s motions concerned migration, integration and civil rights. Apparently the attention the LPF and LN spent in their manifestos on issues is not a very good indicator of their activity in parliament. The parliamentary activity of these parties can much better be explained by the interests of individual active and capable MPs. In the case of the LPF most motions were proposed by MP Van den Brink, a former farmers’ leader, who focused on agriculture.

The basic logic behind this is that in legislatures in parliamentary systems parties do not simply vote on basis of the merit of a proposal, but concerns about the stability of cabinet will always also play a role. In Otjes and Van der Veer (2009) Van der Veer and I show that these concerns are prevalent for proposals of the opposition parties and less for the proposals of the coalition parties. The coalition parties vote against almost every proposal of the opposition.

This has been done by a method which is called property fitting (Van der Brug, 1997:60-62). A regression model was estimated where the two dimensions from the analysis were used as independent variables and the values from the expert survey as dependent variables. These regression coefficients can be interpreted geometrically. In this case a line was drawn with slope β2/β1, a procedure which yields similar results as Van der Brug (1997:60-62). Regressions which had a R² higher than .7 were plotted in black, indicating that the model explained the positions on the expert survey well. Regressions which had a R² higher than .6 were plotted in grey, indicating that the model explained the positions on the expert survey moderately well.

A proxy for the old cultural dimension was used, as the expert surveys employed did not have an estimate for parties on the religious/secular dimension in each of the surveys. The question used was: “Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. “Libertarian” and “Post-materialist;” parties favor expanded personal freedom, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition and stability and even believe that the government should have a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.”
Figure 2: Parliamentary Space 1998-2002

This figure is a two-dimensional result of the W-NOMINATE analysis of parliamentary voting behaviour between 1998 and 2002. The lines are the dimensions from the expert positioning, which were regressed on the model. The black lines relate well to the model. They grey lines relate moderately well to the model.

Figure 3: Parliamentary Space 2002-2003

This figure is a two-dimensional result of the W-NOMINATE analysis of parliamentary voting behaviour between 2002 and 2003. The lines are the dimensions from the expert positioning, which were regressed on the model. The black lines relate well to the model. They grey lines relate moderately well to the model.
also supplies eigenvalues, which express the extent to which the data fits a solution with a particular number of dimensions.

In figure 2 one can see the two-dimensional model for the period 1998-2002, before the entry of the LPF into the political system. One can see roughly three clusters of parties: in the lower left quadrant one can find the SP, GL, PvdA and D66, secular leftwing parties. In the lower right quadrant one can find the Christian-democratic CDA and the conservative liberal VVD. In the upper half of the figure, near the centre one can find the RPF, GPV and SGP, fundamentalist Christian parties. It appears that the horizontal dimension coincides with the left/right dimension, while the division between more secular and religious parties is related to the vertical dimension. The regression analysis sustains this interpretation. The two dimensions from the expert survey are plotted into the figure.

For the period 2002-2003 the two-dimensional model from the W-NOMINATE analysis is presented in figure 3. If one moves from left to right, one can see the following pattern: at the far left one can find the SP, GL, PvdA and D66, all leftwing parties. There is quite some distance between them on the vertical dimension, while on the horizontal dimension their differences are much smaller. To their one can find the fundamentalist protestant CU and SGP. At the far right finally one can find the CDA, LPF, LN and VVD, the difference between these parties is stronger on the vertical dimension than the horizontal dimension. It appears that the horizontal dimension follows a left-right pattern from the GL to the VVD. The regression analysis sustains this interpretation: the economic left-right dimension from the expert survey is closely related to the positions of the parties in the model. There is a second dimension which is related to the model although considerably less strong than the left-right dimension, the multicultural-monocultural dimension from the Pellikaan et al. (2003) study, hence it is plotted in grey. As Pellikaan et al. (2007:296) observed however these two dimensions are closely related to each other. The religious/secular dimension is related even less strongly to the model: the relation is so weak that it has been omitted from the figure. There is no trace of a pro-anti democratic reform dimension in the model either.

In figure 4 we can see the distribution of parties in the period 2003-2006. Compared to 2002-2003 there is only a limited number of changes: progressive liberal D66 moved closer to the centre, the orthodox Christian CU closer to the right
This figure is a two-dimensional result of the W-NOMINATE analysis of parliamentary voting behaviour between 2002 and 2003. The lines are the dimensions from the expert positioning, which were regressed on the model. The black lines relate well to the model. They grey lines relate moderately well to the model.

**Table 2: Expert positioning and the parliamentary space**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>$\beta_1$</th>
<th>$\beta_2$</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-02</td>
<td>Economic Left/Right</td>
<td>Hooghe et al. (2009)</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious/Secular</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.986</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>Economic Left/Right</td>
<td>Hooghe et al. (2009)</td>
<td>0.836</td>
<td>0.943</td>
<td>-0.204</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious/Secular</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mono-/Multicultural</td>
<td>Pellikaan et al. (2003)</td>
<td>0.731</td>
<td>0.832</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People/State</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.622</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-06</td>
<td>Economic Left/Right</td>
<td>Hooghe et al. (2009)</td>
<td>0.967</td>
<td>0.990</td>
<td>-0.172</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious/Secular</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.930</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.715</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mono-/Multicultural</td>
<td>Pellikaan et al. (2003)</td>
<td>0.711</td>
<td>0.841</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People/State</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.616</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>0.668</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows the statistical relationship between the models based on the W-NOMINATE analysis of parliamentary votes and expert positioning of political parties on relevant issues.

**Table 3: Eigenvalues for parliamentary spaces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-02</td>
<td>0.457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>0.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-06</td>
<td>0.590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows the eigenvalues for solutions with different dimensions for the W-NOMINATE analysis of parliamentary voting. The eigenvalue is the percentage of all the variance that is explained by adding a Nth dimension the model.
and the LPF dropped from the upper left to the lower left. At the leftwing of the figure we find the GL, the SP, the PvdA and D66. There is considerable diversity on the vertical dimension between them. D66 stands closest to the political centre. On the rightwing side of the figure we find the CDA, CU, SGP and the VVD and LPF. The three Christian parties cluster in the upper right quadrant and the secular rightwing parties in the lower right quadrant. It appears that on the horizontal dimension the parties are ordered from left to right. Seen the concentration of religious parties in the upper right quadrant, the vertical dimension divides parties between religious and secular. The regression analysis more or less corroborates this perspective. The left-right dimension from the expert survey elates closely to the model, especially the horizontal dimension. The religious/secular dimension relates to both dimensions about evenly. There monocultural-multicultural dimension also relates to the model but weaker as the other two policy dimensions. It roughly follows the left-right dimension.

In table 3, one can see the eigenvalues for solutions with different dimensions. The eigenvalues show how much the variance in the voting behaviour can be included in the model by adding an additional dimension. For all three periods the first eigenvalues are quite high. Beyond the third dimensions a new dimension makes almost no contribution, in terms of explaining variance. This indicates that these spaces are indeed low dimensional. The model for 2002-2003 and 2003-2006 fit a one-dimensional space much better than the model for 1998-2002. A single dimensional model includes more than 50% of the variance of the voting behaviour. It appears that after the entry of the LPF into the political arena, the political space became more ‘one-dimensional’, although this effect was stronger in the years, especially when comparing the period 1998-2002 to the period 2002-2003.

7. Conclusion

Two conclusions will be drawn here: first about the Fortuyn effect as such, and second, about what this says about the effect of new parties in general.

First, the LPF has had its effect: the political space in parliament became more one dimensional as the saliency of migration and integration issues increased. I found, as Bale (2003) found that the interaction between political parties became more one-dimensional after the entry of the LPF into the parliamentary arena: the value of
adding a second dimension to the model decreased after 2002. The LPF did not introduce a new line of conflict into the parliamentary arena, or replaced the old cultural line of conflict as Kriesi and Frey (2008) and Pellikaan et al. (2007) observed in the electoral arena. However migration and integration did become more salient and there is a link between expert positioning of parties on the mono/multicultural dimension. The crux is however that there is a strong relationship between the left-right dimension and mono-multicultural line of conflict in the political space we modeled on basis of parliamentary behaviour. This reinforces similar findings by Pellikaan et al. (2007) and Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) and raises doubts about the extent to which one can differentiate party positioning on migration and integration from party positioning on economic issues.

Second, what do these outcomes mean for the study of the effect of new and populist parties in general? As the case of the LPF was selected as a most likely case some conclusions can be drawn about new parties in general: first it is likely that new parties can affect the saliency of issues. For the LPF we saw a change in the saliency of the attention of “their” issue after their entry into parliament. For their smaller counterpart, LN was saw an even more interesting development: while the attention to “their” issue “democracy and governance” increased after they entered parliament in 2003, this attention disappeared when they disappeared from parliament in 2003. Given the results presented here, it is however unlikely that other many new populist parties were able to introduce new significant lines of conflict, which completely upsets interaction between established political parties. It seems more likely that these new lines of conflict will remain weak and subjugated to the established lines of conflict.
Table 4: Votes similar to CDA & VVD by party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes with CDA &amp; VVD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>73.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>67.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPF</td>
<td>75.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGP</td>
<td>80.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=2628 Percentage of the votes in which VVD and CDA voted the same in which the respective party also voted as the CDA and VVD. Note that the VVD and CDA voted differently in 457 votes (which is 14.8% of all votes).

8. Epilogue: the LPF after 2003

In the 2003 election the LPF lost most of its parliamentary representation. The PvdA made major gains and the CDA remained stable in electoral terms. In the final round of negotiations the VVD and CDA negotiated with several parties to form a coalition: the progressive-liberal D66, rightwing populist LPF or orthodox Christian CU and SGP. Each of these combinations had a parliamentary majority. In the end the option with D66 was pursued. During the parliamentary period the relationships between D66 and the other two coalition parties were strained. While the party agreed with its coalition partners on the economic agenda of the cabinet, D66 did not agree with cabinet policy on migration and integration, (elements of) foreign policy and the environment. That is where the CU and SGP and LPF come in. Even when D66 voted against its coalition partners on these issues the VVD and CDA could still count a majority to push proposals trough or block proposals from the leftwing opposition, because the LPF or the CU and SGP would supports its policies. This situation allowed the VVD and CDA to continue to govern for several months after D66 had left the cabinet over a final row on migration (specifically the case surrounding the nationality of MP Ayaan Hirshi Ali). During the entire parliamentary period the situation was similar to this minority cabinet: the VVD and CDA did not need to count on its coalition partner D66 to create a majority in parliament but they could also cooperate with the LPF or the orthodox Christian parties which were formally in the opposition. They were able to create shifting majorities in parliament.

Table 4 provides some quantitative evidence for this phenomenon: it shows the percentage of votes in which a particular party votes the same as the CDA and
Table 5: Votes similar to CDA & VVD by subject

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>D66</th>
<th>LPF</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>CDA &amp; VVD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macro-economy &amp; Taxation</td>
<td>87,5%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights, Integration and Migration</td>
<td>62,6%</td>
<td>80,7%</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>88,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>90,8%</td>
<td>71,1%</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>88,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>50,7%</td>
<td>82,7%</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>89,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>67,7%</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>73,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>75,7%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>84,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>61,7%</td>
<td>88,3%</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>93,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>73,2%</td>
<td>73,2%</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>83,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>63,9%</td>
<td>82,9%</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>87,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>76,4%</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>78,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
<td>73,9%</td>
<td>77,5%</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>84,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>88,5%</td>
<td>85,1%</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-Economy</td>
<td>89,8%</td>
<td>81,6%</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>80,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>72,9%</td>
<td>78,8%</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>92,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>89,7%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>61,2%</td>
<td>85,1%</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>90,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs &amp; Development Aid</td>
<td>65,9%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>78,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy &amp; Governance</td>
<td>78,9%</td>
<td>62,6%</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>83,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Management</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>88,6%</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>89,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncodable</td>
<td>97,1%</td>
<td>71,4%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>87,5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First two columns represent the percentage of the votes in which VVD and CDA voted the same in which the respective party also voted as the CDA and VVD. Third column the number of cases, and the fourth, the percentage of cases in which the CDA and VVD voted differently. Uncodable are those motions for which have only tags which refer to the budgets of specific departments, which span multiple issue areas.

VVD if they vote the same. It is not D66, which votes most similar to its coalition partners. The SGP votes more similar and the LPF as well. The comes D66 followed by the CU. The leftwing opposition parties vote against the CDA and VVD considerably more often. The traditional division between opposition and coalition which one expects in a parliamentary system with majority government is not present (Laver 2006:137, Hix and Noury, 2007, Otjes and Van der Veer 2009). There is a group of opposition parties that vote with the government as often as some coalition partners do. The same phenomenon is also visible in figure 4 where LPF, CU and SGP are closer to the VVD and CDA than D66.8

In table 5 we have further examined two parties: D66 and LPF, both of which could vote with the CDA and VVD to form a majority. We looked at different issue areas. Here we can see that the dissent of D66 is limited to several policies areas. On

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8 Note that this phenomenon is reinforced because of the selection of votes which is meant to decrease the dynamic between government and opposition
economic issues such as macro-economy, micro-economy, labour and science D66 votes with the coalition more often than LPF, this is also true for education and democracy and governance, to issues on which D66 had gotten considerable concessions in the coalition agreement. On civil rights, migration and integration, the LPF agrees with the CDA and VVD more often than D66. The same is true for environmental issues such as agriculture, environment, land management and transport, and foreign policy (defense, foreign affairs and trade). There is a strong negative significant relationship between the extent to which the D66 votes with the CDA and VVD and the LPF does (Pearson’s r = -0.52 significant at 0.05 level). On those policy areas where the LPF votes with CDA and VVD, D66 does not. Even after the CDA and VVD broke off their cabinet cooperation with the LPF in 2003, the party continued to cooperate in parliament with the CDA and VVD.
8. References


