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Abstract.
The ethno-nationalist conflict in the Basque Country has been the target of a wide array of constitutional and legislative initiatives, including substantial restructuring of governance structures and reallocation of public resources stemming from a responsive approach to conflict resolution. Restructuring of governance includes the democratisation of the Spanish political system; political decentralisation supplying very substantial powers to a Basque autonomous region; the introduction of a proportional representation electoral system that rewards the territorial concentration of partisan electorates; as well as, more recently, the banishing of political and social organisations considered to be involved in insurgent activities. Distribution of resources encompasses the allocation to the Basque autonomous institutions of the main powers on taxation, education, public health, public order, and culture in the region. However, the outcomes of these policies have not always been that of mitigating ethno-nationalist insurgency and terrorism.

This paper briefly recalls the main responsive governmental initiatives with regard to the Basque conflict and relates them to the history of political violence produced by ETA. This is achieved by combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies. It shows that whilst some policies have reduced very significantly the levels of political violence, paradoxically democratisation provided during the democratic transition period an opportunity structure that increased the incentives for violence – a finding that calls into question some major assumptions of mainstream paradigms on democratisation. Furthermore, the foreseeable possible outcomes of the recent banishing of some Basque nationalist organisations are tentatively explored in the light of both theory and empirical evidence.

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Introduction

The ethno-nationalist conflict in the Basque Country has been the target of a wide array of constitutional and legislative initiatives, including substantial restructuring of governance structures and reallocation of public resources, which can be included into the concept of “responsive policies”. This paper briefly recalls the main responsive governmental initiatives with regard to the Basque conflict and relates them to the history of political violence produced by ETA. This is achieved by combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies. It shows that whilst some constitutional and ordinary policies, have mitigated very significantly the levels of violence, the very democratisation provided during the democratic transition period an opportunity structure that paradoxically increased the incentives for violence – a finding that calls into question some major assumptions of mainstream paradigms on democratisation. Furthermore, the possible outcomes of the recent banishing of some radical nationalist organisations are evaluated in the light of both theory and empirical evidence.

In order to diminish extremist behaviour, governments take into consideration a variety of public policies, which may be generally classified as “repressive” and “responsive” policies. In this communication I examine the outcomes of different policies entailing a responsive approach. The Basque case of insurgent nationalist violence provides unusually plentiful data and a wide variation in both independent and dependent variables. Since the last 1970s, different Spanish governments, first within a dictatorial regime, next in the context of a democratic transition period, and finally within a consolidated liberal democracy, have implemented a wide array of repressive policies and responsive policies. The itinerary of the former goes from a rather indiscriminate repression towards Basque nationalism to the selective incrimination of violent activists. Similarly, rejection of the Basque cultural, social and political differences has changed into constitutional recognition of Basque “nationality”, which has provided the Basques
with an unprecedented level of political autonomy. The relation between terrorism and counter-terrorism is a non-recursive and strategic one – i.e. policy-makers and terrorists react to the actions of each other (Hoffman and Morrison-Taw 1999). Yet here I confine myself to account only for one part of the process, focusing on the impact of public policies on insurgent terrorism and attitudinal extremism, aiming at evaluating, and eventually, inspiring policy.

To better understand the outcomes of the different policies qualitative quantitative analysis are combined here. I carry out a statistical multivariate evaluation of the consistency of a number of theoretical hypotheses in the literature. Albeit conventional wisdom - even more sophisticated thought - suggests possible answers to conflict, these rarely are univocal: some might advise no delays to implement a good deal of repression; other would suggest trying to satisfy as much as possible those struggling violently, inasmuch as their cause was considered legitimate. Hence there is still a need for research on the optimal combination of measures to be adopted into different socio-political settings. Here the dataset, with the help of some statistical modelling and qualitative insights, will suggest that the mitigation of Basque nationalist extremism is best explained through a combination of efficacious but flexible and democratically inspired repressive policies, together with very substantial doses of responsiveness. Moreover, it will be underlined the boomerang effect of the abuse of force – for the state as much as for insurgents.

**Responsive Approaches in the face of Nationalist Insurgent Extremism**

The study of governmental response to insurgent nationalist extremism tends to be confined into two areas of study hardly communicated with each other. Though with interesting exceptions, most analyses and prescriptions tend still to focus either on public-order policies or on responsiveness policies *vis-à-vis* minorities. Nevertheless, here they will be considered as two different but compatible dimensions. The view that authority and force are intrinsic to the nature of the state predominates in the former. By contrast, the latter corresponds to integrative views of public power where authority is conceived as sensitive to social needs and demands, and where communication, attention to the material and cultural bases of conflicts, as well as the quest of mutual compromises, are regarded as useful instruments.
Although a comparison of these two frames could be attempted, inquiring which is the most effective in reducing insurgent nationalist extremism, one might suspect that the correct picture of the problem is not so much of a disjunction than of a more complex dialectic nature. It is plausible that a strategy combining sanctions and rewards, with a reinforcing effect, tends to be the most efficacious. “Insurgent nationalist extremism” is under consideration here. The term “extremism” will refer to a perception of political conflict in a war-like way, where extremists practice, advocate, or at least accept the use of violent means to reach their goals—the extremist does not necessarily carry out a violent behaviour, but shows at least a supportive attitude towards that potential conduct. The analysis will only consider “insurgent” nationalist extremism, which for its social group of reference aims at increasing its self-government until secession. Therefore, “surveying” nationalist extremism (and its terrorist materialisation), though it has been also present in Spain, will not be examined here.

From an historical and comparative perspective viewpoint, the most usual policies towards any kind of political violence have been those of “repression” (Gurr 1993; Gurr & Moore 1997). These interventions develop an intrinsic attribute of the modern state (democratic or otherwise), namely that its authority is supported by violence (legitimate or not, legal or not, monopolised or not, normative considerations aside). By having the use, or threat, of force as its main resource of power, a hierarchic and coactive logic of imposition of values on the social environment tends to predominate in policy. Within the subject under study here, authority and force materialise in coercion and eradication of anti-system extremism, all the more so in its violent materialisation. Furthermore, another idealypical attribute of the repressive framework is the reception of conflict in terms of its symptoms. Either reactive or preventive, the objective of those policies is to combat violent or simply threatening effects of conflict rather than to face its deep causes (Martínez-Herrera 2003). Apart from that, repressive policies show broad heterogeneity (Reinares 1998: chap. 4; Hoffman and Morrison-Taw 1999). Albeit not being the primary focus of this communication, a number of variables involving repressive policies have been taken into account as control variables.

In turn, the term “responsive policies” alludes to those polices oriented at reducing the social and political causes that lie in the background of political extremism as well as reducing their effects or symptoms. The approach that predominates in them tends to inclusiveness, being typical for the pluralist democratic approach and, more generally, for
E. Martínez-Herrera. Diverging outcomes in the Basque Country

regimes that are sensitive – though this could be in a paternalistic manner – to the needs and demands of every social group. In the face of the eruption or risk of extremist behaviour, authorities pay attention to its social bases, both structural and cultural. The rulers are ready to engage in a dialogue with the dissatisfied groups, ready to listen their demands, and even try to anticipate them. The rulers may also be ready to negotiate and cooperate with them in pursuit of mutual benefit. Thus, their instruments, rather than force, are: (a) the recognition – not necessarily formal - of either material or perceived conflicts; (b) reciprocal communication and compromise; and (c) a disposition to share, to some extent, material resources, prestige positions, and even power. It should be stressed that responsiveness does not necessarily entail weakness and unilateral concessions. Therefore, it does not necessarily satisfy any claim. Nor does this approach have to be the result of certain ultimate principles or values either, since it can also, for simply instrumental reasons, be developed in a tactical fashion. Furthermore, responsiveness does not need to entail a zero-sum game where improvement for some implies harm for others, but it can supply all the involved actors with a general improvement greater than the eventual costs of renouncing to maximalist ambitions.

As for the sectors, levels, and manners of action, these policies can be extremely heterogeneous. According to the roots of the conflict, responsive policies can involve many different policy fields (e.g. culture, religion, education, etc.) as well as the very distribution of public power. As for their juridical rank and degree of institutionalisation, they can be enforced in the form of constitutional engineering policies, as common legislation, or even as simple administrative decisions (cf. Gurr 1993; Hoffman and Morrison-Taw 1999).

From explanatory political science, the most outstanding example of a responsive approach to interethnic or nationalist conflicts is the “consociational” model of Arend Lijphart (1984 and 1999). He analyses institutions that induce the protection, and possibility of both expression and decision of organised minorities in plural societies. These institutions are also directed towards enabling their elites to participate in power and thus towards increasing the integration of political systems that otherwise tend to break up and/or to underperform. However, I use the concept of “responsiveness” instead of Lijphart’s “accommodation” because political integration is not always based on an institutionalisation of minorities’ rights and power. Other opportunities rest on pluralist policies (Dahl 1971) and on attempts at co-optation seeking the assimilation of minorities
into the majority in exchange for economic and prestige advantages – less theorised but often put into practice (see Bloom 1990; Gurr 1993; Hoffman and Morrison-Taw 1999; cf. Saideman et al. 2002).

One of these institutions is federalism, which tends to reduce the levels of ethnic violence (Horowitz 1985; Saideman et al. 2002). However, some scholars have also warned about possible risks of federalism, which could induce an escalation of ethnic conflict (Roeder 1999). As a matter of fact, some argue that some plurinational states such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union disintegrated because of their federal design, which fostered the perception of conflict in terms of ethno-nationality while providing the groups with state organisation resources to organise large scale rebellion (Roeder 1991; Linz 1993; Skalnik Leff 1999; Snyder 2000; Saideman et al. 2002).

In any case, there are many other policies that fall on the analytical category of responsiveness. Some policies are directed directly to the allocation of resources among social groups. These include the distribution of income and wealth, opportunities of education, access to health, as well as the distribution of social positions praised in terms of status or social prestige and resources of the preservation of certain socially valued cultural heritage such as language. An allocation of resources between groups that can satisfy their needs and claims can be achieved without giving to the groups the power of allocation nor formal quotas or guarantees. However, alike the example of federalism, the steps in that direction usually involve formal guarantees of political inclusion that can be achieved by means of structural reforms. Thus, besides the redistribution of resources, responsive policies in the face of interethnic and/or nationalist conflict typically involve a governance restructuring that may even reach the formalised shape of constitutional restructuring. Political restructuring measures comprise such developments as federalist arrangements, proportional representation, and several types of power-sharing institutions, such as groups quotas in public and private work positions (Horowitz 1985). However, the most salient but also controversial political restructuring consists of the democratisation.

Dankwart A. Rustow (1970), Robert Dahl (1971), Juan J. Linz (1978), and more recently other authors have alluded to the difficulties that a feeling of alienation with regard to the political community involves for the instauration and persistence of democracies. Rustow contended that “national unity” is the ‘single background condition’ for a transition to democracy. Among other things, his “political unity” entailed that the existing political community is not challenged by alternatives among its members. Other
authors have further developed some of his arguments. Certain measure of “national unity” could be necessary, in the first place, because for existing freedom of speech and association, a disposition to coexistence is indispensable. Secondly, because ethnic differences may easily be politicized and sharpened, since they constitute an accessible and profitable resource of political mobilisation to win elections (Horowitz 1985; Skalnik Leff 1999; Saideman et al. 2002). The combination of intolerance, the “winner takes all” formula (majoritarian electoral system), and the existence of structural ethnic political majorities is likely to lead to protest, rebellion, civil war, and secession (Lijphart 1984).

Yet, in despite of the importance of conflicts on the political community in many scenarios around the world, the main literature on transitions to democracy overlooked them until democratisation reached Eastern Europe. Even more, some authors still suggest that democracy could be the most appropriate regime to settle conflicts within contested political communities, contending that if the challenging groups have access to channels of representation and accountability enabling them to express their demands, they will have fewer incentives to resort to force, and thus the negotiation of compromises will be easier (Saward 1998). However, implementing a multivariate research design, Saideman and his colleagues (2002) found that democracy tends to be more prone to both ethnic protest and rebellion than autocracy, although they also found a sort of honeymoon effect by which younger democracies are less prone to ethnic conflict than the older ones.

**Insurgent Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Basque Country**

The attitudinal inclination to use violence for influencing public decisions I have called “political extremism”. The most prominent materialisation of political extremism and violence in the Basque Country is terrorism carried out by Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Euskadi and Freedom). ETA is one of the most long-lived terrorist organisations in the Western world, with more than forty years of existence, more than thirty years of personal attacks, and more than eight hundred homicides (Domínguez-Iribarren 1999; Reinares and Jaime-Jiménez 1999). I employ the term “terrorism” here in a simple descriptive and precise sense of the use of violence for intimidating a social group beyond the sub-group of direct victims, without evaluative connotation (Reinares 1998: chap. 1).

Still, manifestations and consequences of extremism on a polity do not confine themselves to terrorism, however implacable and persistent this can be. Extremism must
be observed from a broader perspective: to begin with, because its repertoire of actions able to destabilise the political system is broader than terrorism; and then because, if one wants to give an account, specifically, of armed struggle, one should try to understand the conditions in which it is formed and sustained. First of all, not all violence is “terrorist”, in the sense that it intimidates a social group beyond its direct victims. Secondly, the above-defined extremism gives place to varieties of equally destabilising non-conventional, but also non-violent types of political behaviour – e.g. general strike, petty sabotage and civil disobedience (Tarrow 1994; Dalton 1996). Thirdly, extremism can obstruct institutional performance and destabilise the system from within the system itself, by means of conduct that is formally legal but is actually contrary to the principles of the political regime. Finally and, more generally, the presence of impenetrable political subcultures, strongly internally structured and antagonistic, makes cooperation and coordination in favour of the whole society exceedingly difficult (Almond and Verba 1963; Boix and Posner 1998) – this being specially true where there is an inclination to justify, promote or practice violence.

On the other hand, ETA’s origin and persistence could not be understood without its exchanges with the broader environment. Like other organisations, its own internal dynamics explain, to a large extent, its persistence and autonomy (organisational culture, opportunity costs for its members, internal incentives and sanctions, etc.) Nevertheless, its interaction with the broader social context becomes crucial. Its obvious aspect is the success or failure of the police in arresting ETA activists and in the protection of ETA targets. However, the inputs that favour ETA are no less important. ETA reproduction for decades has required, above all, regular generational replacement of its commandos. In the same way, the role of the environment in the provision of information, ammunition, infrastructure and moral support cannot be neglected (Reinares 1998: chaps. 2 and 3).

In this sense, in the Basque case at least, it is possible to consider a system of concentric circles. In the centre, there are the terrorist organisations. In a broader circle, there is a network of interconnected support organisations, including political parties, trade unions, associations (among them, prisoners relatives associations), mass media, even firms, which are often called the Basque National Liberation Movement (MLNV). Next, there are the voters for those parties. The external circle corresponds to those who share ideas of rejection towards Spain, independence for the Basque Country, and come to terms with violence as a means. In the case of ETA and the MLNV, this portrait is
consistent with a hierarchical relation empirically documented (Mata 1993). I will consider two indicators of Basque nationalist extremism that, approximately, correspond to those nested circles and which constitute, at the same time, two dimensions of Basque nationalist extremism.

Terrorism victims

Violence must be regarded as a dimension of extremism. All the more so when, by acquiring the form of terrorism, the perpetration of homicides results from the desire for public impact, and when terrorist organisations exert an outstanding leverage over the whole extremist movement. An annual number of fatalities (deceased victims) denotes, to some extent, the operability of the Basque nationalist terrorist organisations and, especially, their capability of psychologically influencing great numbers of people. I refer basically to ETA, but also to its several factional splinter groups, such as the ETA-m (“military”), ETA-pm (“political-military”), and the Anti-capitalist Autonomous Commandos. As a measurement, this turns out somewhat unsatisfactory, since from a propaganda angle, the impact of every victim – a First Minister or an ordinary member of the public – is not identical, and from an operative angle, a massive attack with a car bomb, which is relatively safe, produces many more victims than one directed to a protected public personality, which is much more risky. However, these are the best available data both for their validity and time extension. Anyhow, for the period 1968-1999 there is a strong correlation between mortality and frequency of attacks with victims (Pearson’s r = 0.95), which means that the variation in homicide techniques (small weapons vis-à-vis car bomb) hardly changes mortality in the long-run.

Thus, in this communication I aim to assess the contribution of responsive policies to explain changes in time-series of the number of ETA homicides from 1968 to 2003. The maximum activity took place between 1978 and 1980, coinciding with the delicate period of the twofold transition to both democracy and political decentralisation and the trend since then has been decreasing (see Figure 1). The task will be to account for this development by attending to the possible impact of the different state policies.

Fig. 1. Victims of ETA, 1968-2003.
Basque Exclusivist Identification

At the basis of the extremist behaviour under consideration here lies a system of beliefs that constitutes a clear example of a political subculture. It is a structured, consistent and stable system of rejectionist attitudes towards Spanish identity, while adhering to a Basque national identification, preferences for secession and an inclination to violence.

A quite reliable proxy variable of the extremist Basque nationalist subculture lies in the exclusive identification with the Basque Country, expressed on a survey bipolar scale – thus rejecting multiple social identifications. As Linz and his collaborators (1986) showed, these attitudes are closely associated with both the degree of “sovereignism” and the perception about ETA members. Specifically, the perception of ETA militants as patriots or idealists is much more likely to occur among citizens inclined to exclusive Basque national identification than among the rest. In fact, the rate of acquiescent attitudes towards ETA kept fairly stable among the former during the 1980s (Llera 1994). Moreover, it has been observed by means of in-depth interviewing that one of the most widely shared attitudes among ETA convicts is their hatred towards Spain (Reinares 2001). Although it is important to underline that a much significant part of these identifiers do not sympathise with terrorism, all those identifying with terrorism are
exclusivist Basque identifiers. Thus, a decline in this attitudes also entails a decrease of the probability of support this kind of violence.\textsuperscript{11}

Figure 2 displays the trajectory of the percentage of the Basque adult population that expresses a rejection towards Spain within the personal feelings of belonging.\textsuperscript{12} Between 1969 and 1982 approximately forty per cent of Basques expressed this attitude in a number of surveys. However, since 1984 the average of “Basque only” identifiers is around twenty-five per cent. I shall also supply an interpretation for this important shift in political culture.

Figure 2. Basque only identifiers and terrorism victims, 1968-2002

![Graph showing Basque Only and Terrorism Victims](image)

Source: Author’s elaboration of survey and police data.

**Responsive Policies in the Basque Country**

As contended above, the repertoire of state policies is extremely wide. Nevertheless, within this mixture, responsive frameworks and repressive frameworks stand as the two most relevant dimensions. Next I will describe the main policies in both domains, although with a particular stress on responsive policies, and particularly on the restructuring of the political system and the reallocation of resources within.
Responsive Policies

In relation to the social background of Basque extremism, an historical dynamic of political centralisation and decentralisation synthesises and articulates most of the policies. After the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), the Spanish nationalist winning side dismantled most Basque self-government institutions, minimising the responsive framework. Contrary to this, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the Basque Autonomy Law (with the rank of constitutional law) of 1979 enacted an unprecedented political autonomy. This juridical frame establishes a Basque parliament and a Basque executive chosen by universal suffrage. The matters over which they have jurisdiction include education, health, culture and social services, as well as the collection of the most important taxes, a share of which is then passed on to the central state, after mutual agreement. Moreover, they also command a regional police force that has largely taken over from that of the state. The current Constitution also shows an important symbolic intention, since it recognises the existence of “nationalities” within the “nation” (Spain) and establishes, as a doctrinal fundamental principle of the état de droit, the protection and fostering of minority languages and cultures.

As a consequence, the administration of the regional self-government institutions have a great volume of staff, physical assets and financial resources (Aja 1999), thus implying a remarkable reallocation of resources. In fact, it has been often claimed that most good jobs depending on those institutions are taken up by Basque nationalists. Moreover, these institutions allocate many resources by means of subventions that favour associations and cooperatives leaded by Basque nationalists. Last by not least, the Basque language and folklore has been resolutely fostered by means of both staff and financial resources, the Basque language is compulsory in the schools, and it enjoys of positive action measures in university – such as quotas for lecturers teaching in the vernacular. Responsiveness, however, also stands up in other domains.

Another factor is the type of political regime. One of the motives that originated nationalist extremism was the dictatorial context, which in the collective imaginaire associated the idea of “Spain” with the idea of oligarchic domination (cf. Pérez Díaz 1993). It could thus be possible that the dissolution of such conditions has contributed to the mitigation of the rejection towards the Spanish political community. Even so, the type of regime entails theoretically a certain paradox, since in each one of the considered
dimensions – responsiveness and repression – it would influence in an opposed direction: whereas autocracy has more “operability” in the administration of force, it tends to provoke a greater rejection. The opposite, in both dimensions, seems to happen in a democracy (Reinares 1998).

In addition, the established electoral system, combining proportional representation with small electoral districts, eases especially the representation of minorities that are territorially concentrated. Hence, during several legislatures, the parties ruling at the Spanish level – either social-democrats, centre-right or conservative parties – but lacking an absolute majority in Parliament have reached agreements on investiture, even on legislature, with the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). There have also been many coalition governments in the autonomous community between this party and the Spanish-wide social-democrats. In turn, both types of inter-partisan agreements have eased multilevel government collaboration (Aja 1999).

Moreover, the quest of some Basque nationalist governments of an agreement with the organised extremist movement which could integrate the latter into the political system and thereby reducing its inclination to violence is also noteworthy. There have been dialogue round tables, meetings and certain agreements, including one concerning the investiture of the autonomic president – even if, for this investiture agreement in 2000, other reasons could have had a greater weight, the result of an advance in integration would not have differed greatly.

Prospects about an association between responsiveness and extremism can be briefly expressed as a negative hypothetical causal relation. It is possible to expect that every government action satisfying a need (articulated or not as a demand) or making up for a motive of reactivity in different domains (culture, self-government, economy) of the social bases of Basque extremism and the extremists themselves, will contribute to the reduction of both rejection towards Spain and support for insurgent nationalist violence.

**Repressive Policies**

However, to disentangle the effects of these policies, it is necessary to take also into account the simultaneous effects of factors stemming from the parallel repressive side. The repressive approach includes the development of policing and judiciary policies. All of these have varied greatly in relation to Basque nationalist extremism. The better
quantified repression variables, which I have included into my analysis, are: (a) the number of arrests of alleged ETA members; (b) the number of imprisonments; (c) a ratio denoting police “efficiency” in terms of the scope of repression; (d) the number of arrests in France, a consequence of foreign policy and international judicial and police collaboration; and (e) the number of reintegrated terrorists, product of a judicial policy.\textsuperscript{13}; (f) the introduction of a regional (both in recruitment and direction) police force broadly replacing the state corps; (g) direct negotiations with ETA with a disposition to penal concessions; and (h) state terrorism against ETA and its environment.

Two general hypotheses can be postulated about the links between these interventions and extremist behaviour and attitudes. There is the position that the more efficacious – for example, in the number of imprisonments – the repression of extremism, the more likely extremism will be reduced. Throughout history, this hypothesis has often been taken, in practice, as an assumption, from which a prohibition of any expression and organisation, even peaceful, of extremist views has followed. Supposedly, this policy would produce a loss of influence of the core group of extremists over their social environment, and consequently the reduction of extremism among the population.

This proposition, however, can be substantially amended if one considers that the efficaciousness of the whole policy will be greater in so far the violence of the state is considered legitimate in the relevant contexts, such as in the social milieu where force is applied and an international environment where human rights and political freedoms are highly valued. This involves aspects related to the public image of the whole policy, such as accuracy in the application of force, type of agencies implementing it, and the respect of human rights.

**Empirical analysis and discussion**

In order to reject spurious causal relations and to unveil hidden relations, multivariate regression analyses have been produced. Technicalities have been reduced to the minimum in the main body of this communication.\textsuperscript{14}

**The development of violence**

In this part of the analysis, I aim to explain changes in time-series of the number of ETA homicides from 1968 to 2001.\textsuperscript{15} As said above, the maximum activity took place between
1978 and 1980, coinciding with the delicate period of transition to democracy, and the trend since then has been decreasing. The task is to explain this development by attending to the possible impact of the different state policies. In the first place, hypothetical relations between variations in fatalities and several public-order interventions will be examined, then those involving responsiveness. Table 1 summarises the main variables in the analysis and their hypothetical relations to the number of ETA’s victims. It is important to note that the analysis only accounts for changes since 1979, due to the lack of prior information about several factors.

Table 1. Variables Utilised in the Modelling of the Number of Victims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Observed period</th>
<th>Expected relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of victims of ETA</td>
<td>1968–2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public-order variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Observed period</th>
<th>Expected relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of arrested in Spain</td>
<td>1977–2001</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of arrested in France</td>
<td>1975–2001</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of reinserted</td>
<td>1982–1990</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algiers negotiations (1989)</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of victims of GAL and BVE</td>
<td>1978–1987</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bidart intervention (1992)</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responsiveness variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Dummy</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>1975–2001</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% “Basque only” identifiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exogenous Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Dummy</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Games (1992)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA Truce (1998/9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first general hypothesis is that repressive policies should reduce violence directly by removing active violent actors and indirectly by increasing the subjective cost of those actions. Most prominent aspects of a repressive policy are arrests. In the case of ETA, both variables are related to the number of victims. A preliminary regression model showed an association according to which for every victim six arrests will occur in the same year. Understandably, police activity increases when a terrorist attack occurs.
However, it seems more useful to know the reverse impact of arrests on attacks. The foreseen relation should be negative and its effect should have, at least, a delay of one year, since the substitution of commands needs some time. This relation does not show up at the first glance.\(^{17}\)

However, an effect of the measurement method could bias the results. In an organisation with a hierarchical structure, the arrest of a leader should have a greater impact than, say, the arrest of a militant in charge of logistics. Thus, a (dummy) variable representing the detention of major ETA leaders in Bidart (French Basque Country) at the beginning of 1992 has also been computed.\(^{18}\) These arrests were the result of international cooperation, as French police carried them out after an investigation by the Spanish Guardia Civil. Its outcome was a drastic decrease in fatalities, apparently definitive, seemingly due to the organisational problems – lost of infrastructures and the most experienced leaders – for ETA and the information obtained by security agencies (Reinares 1996; Sánchez-Cuenca 2001). Once its impact controlled, ordinary detentions in Spain show a negative effect with a delay of two years. Though more than thirty arrests would have been required to save one victim (see Table 2, especially Model 5), standardised betas point out these interventions among the most effective.\(^{19}\)

### Table 2. OLS Regression of the number of mortal victims of ETA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>111.77 ***</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>87.66 ***</td>
<td>21.72</td>
<td>113.28 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrested Spain(-2)</td>
<td>-0.03 **</td>
<td>-2.72</td>
<td>-0.03 ***</td>
<td>-3.33</td>
<td>-0.03 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution(-2)</td>
<td>-41.66 ***</td>
<td>-5.48</td>
<td>-32.81 ***</td>
<td>-5.08</td>
<td>-42.10 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Only(-5)</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
<td>-0.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinserted(-6)</td>
<td>-0.94 ***</td>
<td>-3.40</td>
<td>-0.76 ***</td>
<td>-3.62</td>
<td>-0.94 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAL-BVE(-2)</td>
<td>0.99 .12</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>0.91 *</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.02 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrested France(-2)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.03 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajuria Enea Agreement</td>
<td>-2.38</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>-2.38</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>-2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alger Negotiations</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bidart</td>
<td>-43.16 ***</td>
<td>-5.23</td>
<td>-37.44 ***</td>
<td>-6.08</td>
<td>-43.33 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympics</td>
<td>15.88 **</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>14.33 **</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>16.02 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cease-Fire</td>
<td>-24.40 ***</td>
<td>-3.72</td>
<td>-22.74 ***</td>
<td>-3.10</td>
<td>-24.69 ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sample(adjusted): 80-01 79-01 80-01 79-01 79-01

N 22 23 22 23 23
R\(^2\) 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97
Adj. R\(^2\) 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.95

Sign.: *** .01; ** .05; *.10; other in figures
Thus another relevant factor is international coordination and collaboration. For many years ETA benefited from a de facto sanctuary in France. For this reason Spanish governments have considered as a foreign policy priority to persuade the neighbouring country to prosecute ETA and to extradite its activists. As Reinares (1998) and Hoffman and Morrison-Taw (1999) plausibly argue, this could become a key element of an efficacious antiterrorist policy. The shift occurred in 1983/84, when anti-terrorist collaboration started in both the judicial and police domains (Domínguez Iribarren 1999; Jaime-Jiménez and Reinares 1999). However, apart from the dramatic effect of the intervention in Bidart, French ordinary arrests do not show a statistically significant effect (Models 1 and 3).20

Another device employed early by democratic rulers was the social reintegration of fighters. By the mid 1980s, governments thus supplied an outlet for almost 150 activists, most of them from the “political-military” ETA splinter group, which had unilaterally renounced its armed struggle in 1982. 86 amnesties were added between 1982 and 1990 (Domínguez Iribarren 1999: 221-228; Jaime-Jiménez and Reinares 1999: 133-134).21 In this manner sanctions derived from past actions were removed, hence important opportunity costs that could cause them to persist were avoided. This policy could produce, moreover, other three delayed effects: (a) an interruption of active recruitment by this faction; (b) a modification, among “military” ETA members, of the perception of their opportunities structure; and (c) a lower probability of new recruits, owing to an effect of reduction of the critical mass of armed collective action. The regression analysis gives consistency to this hypothesis. For each reintegration, there seems to be a victim less six years later (Model 5).22 The standardised effect is also comparable to that of ordinary arrests. However, the killing by ETA of a reinserted prominent former leader (“Yoyes”) in 1986 seems to be the main motive to terminate this policy (Domínguez Iribarren 1999: 226).

Nonetheless, during the democratic period, assassinations of alleged ETA members or their sympathisers were carried out from the structures of the state too. The so-called “dirty war” almost always took place in the French Basque Country and was aimed at eliminating ETA’s refuge there. Two periods can be distinguished. From 1978 to 1980, while the centre-right Unión del Centro Democrático was in office seemingly uncontrolled members of the security forces who gave themselves the names of Batallón Vasco Español (BVE) and Triple A committed ten murders. From 1983 to 1987, under social-democratic
rule, the newly arrived Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL) added 28 homicides more. These later caused several policemen and politicians to be imprisoned, including one former Minister of the Interior (Domínguez Iribarren 1999). On this issue two competing hypotheses exist: on the one hand, the responsible policemen and politicians could have thought that the illegal violent campaign would restrain ETA, forcing it to be much more cautious in its French refuge. On the other hand, it has been argued that this actually provided new arguments to ETA when its social legitimacy was in crisis (Unzueta 1994; Reinares 1996). The statistical analysis (Model 5) seems to agree with the latter, since every BVE, Triple A or GAL murder seems to produce, two years later, one ETA murder more than could have been expected without the intervention of this factor.

Another hypothetical factor consists of attempts of communication with ETA to negotiate reintegration of its members, a reduction of their sentences, or the attenuation of other consequences (particularly, transferring convicts to prisons near their social milieu), in exchange for a renunciation to violence. The most important meeting between government and ETA representatives occurred in Algiers in 1989, while holding a truce that stood three months. However, though the number of victims that year was relatively low, this seems to be also connected to a period of insurgent weakness, since there was an equal number of victims in 1988 and the statistical effect of those talks is not significant (Models 1 and 2). Furthermore, at about the end of 1998 and until the middle of 1999, ETA proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire, represented as inspired by the Ulster agreement and driven by a will to negotiate. Although the trend could suggest another period of operative weakness, its coefficient (Model 5) predicts six and eighteen victims less than could be expected without the truce in 1998 and 1999, respectively (24.54 * .25 and 24.54 * .75).

As seen above, various repressive interventions account for a good deal of variation in the number of victims. Even so, it is also possible to concede plausibility to other factors located in a political frame both structural and cultural. In this sense, an impact of Basque autonomy and democratisation should occur. Their clearest beneficent effect could be the above-mentioned self-dissolution of the “political-military” ETA. Along with the facilities for reintegration of their activists, the realisation of a substantial part of their political goals, as much as an induction of incentives for putting into practice confrontational forms far less costly, could contribute to explaining the political integration of these activists and the social segment that supported them. Their subsequent
devotion to the party Euskadiko Ezkerra seems to speak for this hypothesis. For this reason, a (dummy) variable considering the Constitution and the Autonomy Law of 1979 (vis-à-vis the dictatorship and the centralised state) has also been included in the regression models. Actually, this factor seems to account for a change in level of thirty-four victims from two years later onwards (Model 5), with one of the strongest effects (see standardised betas). This is consistent with the hypothesis that responsiveness reduces the levels of ethnic violence.²⁶

However, a number of independent variables in the analysed series do not include observations for the autocratic period, disabling us to analyse the murders series with the multivariate design. Yet the peak during the period 1978-80 needs to be explained. We can seek do so with an interpretative approach. Actually, the single account that can be envisaged is that the period of democratic transition opened a window of opportunity for terrorism. As a matter of fact, the period going from 1976 up to 1981 was a period of terrorist effervescence for Spain, of Basque nationalist sign as much as extreme right and extreme left sign. To explain this, several complementary explanations have been advanced. First, the period of transition attracted the interest of extremists to either keep autocratic structures or too press for a revolutionary scenario, in which Basque secession was perceived as a reachable objective. Second, the foreseeable costs of engaging in political violence were perceived as much lower than within the autocratic frame. Third, during the transition to democracy, the commanders of the Guardia Civil supporting dictatorship had not much interest in fighting terrorism (see Reinares 1996; Domínguez Iribarren 1999; Jaime-Jiménez and Reinares 1999; Jaime-Jiménez 2002). This calls into question the hypothesis that young democracies tend to have less protest and rebellion than old democracies.

On the other hand, the “military” ETA cease-fire is the single variable able to account for the decrease in 1999. Police pressure and massive mobilisation in favour of peace occurring by the end of 1998 must be regarded at the background of that decision, but also some factors of a political nature.²⁷ Immediately after the cease-fire announcement, important agreements of institutional collaboration between EH, PNV and EA were reached, including the investiture of the President of the Basque government (Pact of Lizarra). The persistence of the truce for almost a year seems, to a large extent, to be due to that rapprochement. Even if, for this investiture agreement in 2000, other
reasons could have played an important part, the result of an advance in integration would not have differed greatly.

Finally, there are a couple of theoretically exogenous factors. Firstly, during the process of identification of this model I observed a pronounced temporary reduction in 1981. My ex post interpretation is that this could be due to the failed coup d’état attempt of that year. The leadership of “military” ETA precisely sought polarisation, the coup being the most unequivocal expression at that time of its apparent success, and also an occasion for having a rest. At the same time, many activists, especially those of the “political-military” ETA faction, could take stock of the situation and ask themselves whether a return to dictatorship was what they actually wanted. In any event, this factor accounts for a decrease of thirteen victims that year. Secondly, during the second half of 1991 and January 1992 ETA carried out a huge campaign of attacks aimed at achieving negotiations with the government within the horizon of the Olympic games (Domínguez Iribarren 1999: 80-84). This implies fourteen murders more than could have been expected in 1992.

To summarise this section, the number of ETA victims has decreased dramatically since the beginning of the 1980s, putting forward an unequivocal decreasing tendency. According to the statistical multivariate model, this development is the result of a combination of responsive and repressive approaches: police efficacy (ordinary arrests, and above all, the intervention in Bidart), the twofold political change in establishing democracy and the Basque Autonomous Community – a responsive policy entailing a very substantial restructuring of the political system – and the reintegration of combatants – a flexible but persevering public-order policy. Another factor is ETA’s cease-fire, which can either be considered as a consequence of political factors or – in a tautological but plausible manner – as a consequence of those very police actions. In turn, state terrorism seems to have produced more ETA homicides. The failed coup d’état in 1981 (as a theoretically exogenous variable) and the campaign of attacks before the Olympics add to these factors.

Table 3. Variables utilised in modelling Basque exclusivism
Development of Rejection towards Spain

The several policies in the face of extremism should also have an effect on the systems of belief from which behaviour then flows. I shall consider an indicator of the rejection towards Spain within the personal feelings of belonging, observed over more than twenty years and closely correlated to extremism, as said above. As summarised in Table 3, it was initially previewed that contemporary arrests could foster the refusal towards Spain, while social reintegration of fighters and the establishing of Basque autonomy and democracy could reduce it. The effect of violence has also been considered, leaving it as an open question. Moreover, the proportions of immigrants and autochthons’ children are also included, a necessary control due to the fact that the family geographical origin is the most discriminating variable at the individual level (Martínez-Herrera 2002). Nevertheless, the analysis will only account for variations since 1979, due to the lack of prior information about most factors.

Regarding the results of Models 1 and 3 (Table 4), institutional change (“Constitution”) leads to a decrease in the average of ten percentage points with a delay of
five years while reinsertions and amnesties policies implemented between 1982 and 1990 show the predicted impact with a year’s delay.\textsuperscript{30} As yielded by the standardised betas, both factors are among the most influential in mitigating rejection to Spain. By contrast, the detentions in Spain show an insignificant effect (Model 1).

Table 4. \textit{OLS regression of the percentage of Basque only identifiers}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>St. Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-34.90</td>
<td>-1.54</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Immigrants</td>
<td>2.08 **</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>2.19 ***</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>2.52 *** 6.36</td>
<td>0.882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Authocon Offspring</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
<td>-1.74</td>
<td>-0.81 **</td>
<td>-2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution(-5)</td>
<td>-10.42 ***</td>
<td>-3.40</td>
<td>-9.59 ***</td>
<td>-5.18</td>
<td>-10.37 *** 7.99</td>
<td>-0.783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrested in Spain (-1)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency of Arrests(-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims of ETA (-1)</td>
<td>-0.13 ***</td>
<td>-4.47</td>
<td>-0.13 ***</td>
<td>-3.99</td>
<td>-0.14 *** 5.23</td>
<td>-0.508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinserted(-1)</td>
<td>-0.37 ***</td>
<td>-5.54</td>
<td>-0.33 ***</td>
<td>-5.95</td>
<td>-0.36 *** 8.50</td>
<td>-0.554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAL-BVE(-2)</td>
<td>0.51 *</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>0.37 **</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>0.43 ** 2.72</td>
<td>0.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup d'Etat</td>
<td>4.35 **</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etzaintza1(-1)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etzaintza1(-2)</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etzaintza1(-3)</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etzaintza1(-4)</td>
<td>4.16 *</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sample(adjusted): 79-00  83-00  79-00
N 22  18  22
R² 0.98  0.91  0.97
Adj. R² 0.96  0.85  0.96

Sign.: *** .01; ** .05; *.10; other between brackets

With regard to detentions it has been argued that their indiscriminate character causes hostility among the population towards authorities (Hoffman and Morrison-Taw 1999; Reinares 1998: chap. 4). At least for this reason, it would be desirable to carry out arrests in a more selective manner, and sticking both to legality and what common people consider legitimate in their own social milieu. In turn, insurgent movements can, precisely because of this, try to increase support for their cause spurring on the state to apply its violence indiscriminately on the whole population. In the case of ETA, its doctrine of “action-reaction-action” is well known, and in fact, security agencies acted as aimed by ETA during the dictatorship and till the late 1980s. Part of the explanation rests on the bad organisation of the police information services at that time, so that interrogations were their main information source (see Domínguez Iribarren 1999; Jaime-Jiménez and
Reinares 1999; Jaime-Jiménez 2002). Here an annual ratio between the number of detentions and the numbers of those finally processed has been calculated. This indicates not so much police efficacy as its “efficiency”, in the sense of avoiding unintended de-legitimising effects. Figure 3 shows the improvement of security agencies’ precision in this task. From this the prospect of an improvement in the legitimacy of the Spanish political system would follow. However, substituting the number of arrests by their accuracy does not seem to have had an effect on Basque exclusivism (Model 2).  

Figure 3. Police “efficiency”

![Graph showing police efficiency over years]

Source: Author’s elaboration of data in Domínguez Iribarren (1999).

There are also expectations that the substitution of the Spanish security forces in most police tasks by another one called Ertzaintza, run from the Basque government, and mostly made up of (moderately nationalist) Basques, should reduce the social de-legitimising of Spain.  For this I have considered the several phases of the deployment of this agency, created in 1981 and completed in 1995. However, it does not seem to have had any significant effect (Model 1).

As for the “dirty war”, as it has been often argued, the killing of ETA members by security agents calling themselves BVE, Triple A or GAL supplied the extremist nationalist discourse with new legitimising arguments. The statistical analysis suggests
that these murders increased the rejection towards Spain, as expected by many authors (Unzueta 1994, Reinares 1996, 1998; Jaime-Jiménez & Reinares 1999; Tejerina 2001).

Finally, the impact of the number of victims of violence has been also examined. Paradoxically, this seems to strongly reduce exclusivism (with an annual lag, notice standardised effect), eroding the bases of the secessionist movement against ETA’s political strategy itself. This appears as consistent with the decline in social support of other terrorist organisations when they engage in increasingly socially unacceptable repertoires of action (Della Porta 1996). Since the mid 1990s ETA has included many elected politicians among its targets and in the last few years a growing part of the ETA’s social basis questioned the practice of assassination (Tejerina 2001). Non-violent methods might improve Basque national pride and the morale of this societal segment, thereby renewing their trust in secessionism, and vice versa.\(^\text{34}\)

To summarise, the rejection towards Spanish self-identification has been significantly reduced from the first half of the 1980s to the benefit of some sort of shared identification with Spain. In the light of the data managed here, the explanation seems to rest, above all, on responsive policies, namely, on the twofold process of democratisation of the Spanish political system and its political decentralisation which restructured substantially political structures providing the Basque national minority with considerable political and economic resources. Furthermore, from the domain of repressive policies, the social reintegration of fighters renouncing armed struggle stands out for its effects on the Basques’ national identification, while state terrorism became much more counterproductive. It is also worth underlining that the number of arrests since 1977, its “efficiency” since 1982, and the replacement of state-wide security agencies by others that are locally ruled and recruited, seem to be irrelevant in relation to the process of subjective integration of the Basques in Spain. In turn, the number of ETA victims seems to reduce the population’s attachment to the idea of rejecting Spain.

**Concluding remarks**

The addressing of Basque nationalist extremism has been based very substantially on responsiveness policies. By relying on available data with a multivariate statistical approach, much of the analysis has focused on the evolution of terrorist violence, and particularly on the efficacy of the struggle against it. The evidence is consistent with a combination of the perspectives of responsiveness and repression. The twofold establishment of a Spanish democracy and a Basque Autonomous Community, together
with a perseverant law-rulled but flexible repression policy, materialised in the detention and the reintegation of fighters, arise as the main causes of the mitigation of the Basque conflict. Contrarily, state terrorism seems to have caused even more ETA violence. Therefore, this communication backs a responsive policy that does not neglect repression in the sense of police efficacy, but allied with legitimacy and some flexibility.

Moreover, the refusal of self-identifying with Spain has significantly decreased over the last twenty years. Analysing the matter within the theoretical frame of this communication, the findings suggest that, above all, responsive policies of democratisation of the country and the instauration of the Basque autonomous community and of the flexible order policy of social reintegration of combatants have reduced that rejection. On the contrary, the so-called “dirty war” developed by the state and the failed coup d’état intensified it for a time. In turn ETA violence seems to reduce it as well, against the very objectives of the movement supporting violence.

Thus, the combination of the satisfaction of demands of the extremist movement’s social milieu with a relatively flexible repressive policy seems to explain the increase in subjective integration of the Basques in Spain and the decrease of violence. However, the impact of democracy is not like expected by the comparative literature on democratisation and ethnic conflict. Because, contrary to expected by many authors, democracy combined with a quasi-federal structure and a very substantial redistribution of power in favour of the Basque nationalist, has reduced conflict in the long run. And also unexpectedly, the honeymoon effect found in many other countries did not work in the Spanish case. Rather it was the opposite effect, with a substantial increase of terrorist acts during the democratic transition.

One of the last developments in the struggle against violence in the Basque Country has been a series of measures against the array of groups and associations that provide resources to terrorist organizations, groups and entities acting under the command of leaders from ETA. For instance, a few hundred Batasuna members have been sentenced in court for their proven implication as militants or collaborators of the terrorist organization. It is against this background that a major political decision on antiterrorist policy was adopted in the middle of 2002, when the Spanish parliament approved a new legislation on political parties, allowing the central executive, upon request from the Spanish parliament, to demand judicial procedures intended to outlaw political groups unwilling to condemn terrorism or maintaining links with a terrorist organization.
Even more, before the law was passed in Parliament, a judge investigating Batasuna links with ETA, namely judge Baltasar Garzón, had already suspended the former. But the central government asked in September 2002 the Supreme Court to make the political branch of ETA(m) illegal. Batasuna was finally outlawed by the Supreme Court in March 2003. All these initiatives have prompted some debate among both politicians and public opinion in general, specially in the Basque Country, and its outcomes on nationalist terrorism are an open question. Albeit the number of lethal terrorist actions has decreased throughout 2002 and 2003, the unknown concerns what will occur in the middle and long run. On the one hand, as it could be hypothesized, ETA might regain popular support upon the discourse that radical nationalism is oppressed, as it did already in the past. On the other, the dismantling of those satellite structures supporting ETA, together with the increase of formal sanctions towards violent activism, could as well further accelerate the decline of the terrorist organization, finding it even more difficult to sustain its recruitment, financing networks and societal basis. A public opinion study conducted in November 2003 found that, when compared to earlier surveys, the rejection of violence as a political means among Basque citizens is stronger than ever before (Euskobarómetro, November 2003).

References


E. Martínez-Herrera. Diverging outcomes in the Basque Country


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**Notes**

1 For an exception, see Gurr 1993.

2 In scenarios of *irredentism*, insurgent nationalism could have as its horizon incorporation into another already existing political system, which also implies a breaking up of the current polity.

3 Surveying nationalist extremism is typical of actors in favour of the status quo, as well as supporters of regression when faced with decentralising or self-determining processes. Cf. Reinares (1998) for a “insurgent vs. surveying” typology of terrorism that I generalise by analogy to two types of “nationalist extremism”, encompassing terrorist behaviour.

4 A good critical review of the literature focusing on the logic of what I call of “repression” can be found in the Fernando Reinares’ book *Terrorismo y antiterrorismo* (1998).

5 The term “responsiveness” is similar to Gurr’s (1993) term “accommodation”, but the latter should not be confused with Lijphart’s one.
See, for instance, the influential collection *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, directed by O’Donell and Schmitter (1986); a conspicuous exception is the production of Linz (especially 1978). It is remarkable how, having Spain being a favourite or ‘flagship case’ of those studies, the question of its national integration has been overlooked (in this vein, see also Skalnik Leff 1999).

Some authors count the frequency of terrorist activity (usually, attacks). By and large, however, mass psychological impact of a murder is much more intense than other actions within the terrorist repertoire.

Apart from that, any attempt at weighting qualitatively the murders could turn out controversial (cf. Sánchez-Cuenca 2001: 180-181). The data on victims draw from police sources.

According to former social-democrat Spanish minister Professor Ernest Lluch, the first homicide occurred in 1961, when a baby died in an explosion of a device placed at a train stop. ETA, who shows off the death of a torturer policeman in 1969, has not confirmed that information. Two policemen died in 1968 as a consequence of a skirmish unintended by ETA.

Subtle differences aside, the offered answer options and the essential meaning are constant. For example, “Which of the following sentences better express your feelings?: I feel Spanish only; More S. than Basque; As much S. as B.; More B. than S.; or Basque only”; DK; NA.

I have compiled and treated these data from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, collecting frequencies in an almost exhaustive way and, often, resorting directly to the original data matrices. In addition, while trying to avoid mixing data from different sources, I have checked in some cases surveys with too reduced samples, and completed the series during deficit periods. Then, in order to clarify the trends, where there is more than one survey per year, I have resumed the series by calculating a monthly and quarterly weighted average for that year. I have also interpolated for some gap periods up to two years long (Martínez-Herrera 2002).

The possibility for ecological fallacy is very much reduced. Firstly, immigrants entries practically ceased by the last 1970s. Secondly, the decreasing trends of exclusively Basque national identification are practically equal for all generational cohorts controlling by origin cohorts (Martínez-Herrera 2002). Thirdly, in the multivariate analysis below the proportions of immigrants and natives among interviewees are controlled.

I consider social reintegration within the public order dimension since it corresponds to the administration of force – however, in this case, a moderation of its use that could also be interpreted as a responsive policy. The data on detentions, imprisonments and social reintegration draw from Domínguez Iribarren (1999 and personal communication for updating), except for detentions in 2001, which are taken from the daily newspaper *El País*.

For those readers with a quantitative inclination, technical details of the analysis and a replication of the results with other techniques are supplied in Martínez-Herrera (2002: Appendix).

According to former social-democrat Spanish minister Professor Ernest Lluch, the first homicide occurred in 1961, when a baby died in an explosion of a device placed at a train stop. ETA, who shows off the death of a torturer policeman in 1969, has not confirmed that information. Two policemen died in 1968 as a consequence of a skirmish unintended by ETA.
Arrested = 90.51 + 6.35 * Victims; t-values = 1.22 and 3.20, respectively; $R^2 = .31$; Adjusted $R^2 = .28$; N = 25.

None of the attempted specifications with lag at the bivariant level has given a significant negative coefficient. Apparently, repression could be behind violence much more than being the cause of its reduction. However, non-apparent relations that require a proper control to emerge often exist. Moreover, if first differences of both variables are considered (isolating variations between successive periods in the long-term tendencies of both series), the result is more consistent with the hypothesis: VicDf = -3.90 – 0.04 * ArresDf (-2); t-values: –1.00 and –1.68. $R^2 = 0.14$; Adjusted $R^2 = 0.09$; N = 20.

The dummy Bidart scores 0 till 1990 and 1 since 1991, hence modelling an effect of the “abrupt-permanent” type (McClearly and Hay 1980: chap. 4).

The proper length of lags has been identified by means of the Cross Correlation Function (CCF). See McCleary and Hay (1980: chap. 5).

Correlation between arrests and imprisonments in France between 1988 and 2000 is 0.683. Taking their first differences, 0.677.

The handled data series on social reintegration considers 86 reinsertions, plus 10 amnesties conceded in 1990 (I do not have the data for when the remaining reinsertions and amnesties were produced). For an alternative view on the effect of reinsertions, cf. Sánchez-Cuenca (2001).

The statistical significance of this appears when considering other factors simultaneously. See fn. 19 for the identification of the lag.

However, Reinares (1996, 1998, with Jaime-Jiménez, 1999) has often suggested as well that the main goal of the GAL was indeed “pressing the French authorities to put an end to the sanctuary”, what actually happened after a few years of their activity.

Indeed, there were many contacts during 1987 and 1988 as well, but accompanied with both murders and arrests (Sánchez-Cuenca 2001). In addition, many murders of 1987 were done by means of car bombs. The dummy variable scores 1 in 1989.

The cease-fire in 1998 and 1999 has been operationalised with scores 0.25 and 0.75, respectively.

For the identification of the length of this lag, see fn. 19.

Peaceful mobilisation against terrorism tends to be useful in several ways. In some contexts, however, these actions can be useless, or even counterproductive. In a society divided into hermetic blocks, mobilisation of an opposed group can plausibly encourage insistence on and entrenchment of their own positions to counterbalance that mobilisation. Despite this, I agree that collective action increases the costs for those attracted to extremism, while helping to organise the collective action, both coordinative and cooperative, of those harmed by violence and its many other consequences.

These variables do not project co-linearity, because they are complemented with the ratio of autochthonous children of immigrants and mixed couples. Although this is not the right place to discuss this, the surprising finding that the more immigrants, and fewer autochtons’ children there are, the more frequent exclusivism is, seems to be consistent with theories of ethnic competence (see Díez Medrano 1994).

For the identification of the length of these lags, see fn. 19.

Police ‘efficiency’ is based on arrests. A statistically significant effect is lacking, either contemporaneous or with a yearly lag.

For the Ertzaintza members’ profile, see Jaime-Jiménez and Reinares (1999); for the expectancies, cf. Aja (1999) and Tejerina (2001).

It is a battery of dummies where the baseline is the period when autonomic police did not yet exist; the first dummy encompasses the period from its creation in 1981 onwards; the second, from 1986, when four phases of deployment had been produced and twelve police stations had been created, onwards; the third, from 1989, when this agency formally incorporated to the anti-terrorist struggle, onwards; the last one, from 1995, when the deployment was completed, onwards (Domínguez Iribarren 1999: 238–40).

I have also tried to observe the effect of the cease-fire in 1998/99. However, in 1999/2000 the CIS did not ask for details of national identity, hence the data for that period are an interpolation, which prevents me from observing a hypothetical immediate effect in the multivariate modelling. However, descriptive data series from Euskobarometro – though without controlling for other variables – do not show a significant increase in 1999.