Comparing far right and far left parties in contemporary Europe:
A set-theoretic approach

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Introduction

In recent years, parties deemed radical or extreme have emerged victorious in a range of European democracies. To the right on the conventional left–right-heuristic, the far right – successful in places (e.g. in Austria, France, and Slovakia) already in the late 20th century – has prospered in new countries, collecting triumphs in, for example, the Hungarian (2010 and 2014), and Swedish (2010 and 2014) national elections. At the other end of the distinction, the far left is, slowly but steadily, beginning to recover from the fall of communism, with old and new parties achieving victories in, for example, the Greek (2012 and 2015), Czech (2013), Slovenian (2014), and Spanish (2015 and 2016) national elections. Overall, the appeal of radical politics thus seems to be on the increase (cf. March 2012b; Mudde 2007), leading scholars to characterize the (early) 21st century not only as an age of populism (Mudde 2004: 542), but also as an era of political radicalism (Mudde 2005: 104).

Within academia, the major interest has been directed towards the far right. The research on this party family is voluminous, to say the least, with thousands of articles and books focusing on the policies (e.g. Betz and Johnsen 2004; Carter 2005; Minkenberg 2000; Mudde 2007; Pirro 2015; Rovny 2013; Zaslove 2004), electoral support and success (e.g. Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Carter 2005; Givens 2005; Golder 2003; Jesuit et al. 2009; Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002; Mudde 2007; Norris 2005; Pirro 2015; Rydgren 2008; Swank and Betz 2003; van der Brug et al. 2005; Zhirkov 2014), and impact (e.g. Akkerman 2012; Akkerman and de Lange 2012; Bale 2003; Bale et al. 2010; Minkenberg 2001; Mudde 2007; Pirro 2015; van Spanje 2010) of far right parties. Compared to this wealth, the research on the contemporary far left is still rather modest. Nonetheless, it is clear that the interest in left-wing radicalism and extremism is on the increase, as shown by the growing number of comparative contributions on far left policies (e.g. Backes and Moreau 2008; Charalambous 2011; Fagerholm 2016b; Gomez et al. 2016; March 2012b; March and Mudde 2005), far left support and success (e.g. Gomez et al. 2016; Mannewitz 2010; March 2012b; March and Rommerkirchen 2015; Ramiro 2016), and far left impact (Bale and Dunphy 2011; Dunphy and Bale 2011; March 2012b; Olsen et al. 2010).

Previous efforts seeking to understand European radical and extreme parties in general are, however, less frequent. The few available studies have focused on a limited number of issues and parties, and most notably on the occurrence of Euroskepticism and populism within (typically West) European actors (see, however, also Abedi 2004). Thus, de Vries and Edwards (2009) claim that Euroskeptic cues can be found at both ends of the political spectrum, but that the reasons for opposing European integration are different: the far right opposes European integration because of its threat to national identity, while the far left is Euroskeptic because of the neo-liberal character of the current integration process. This view is partly contested by Halikiopoulou et al. (2012), who argue that both right-and left-wing Euroskepticism has its roots in a nationalist ideology. Rooduijn and Akkerman (2015), finally, highlight the role of populism and claim that parties at both ends
of the left–right-distinction are inclined to employ populist discourses.

The scant research on radical and extreme parties in general is somewhat surprising, not least in view of the fairly strong theoretical arguments suggesting that the far right and the far left families stand, at least in some respects, pretty close to each other. One of the most well-worded and well-known claims in this vein is provided by Bobbio (1996), who, in his examination of the contemporary significance of the left–right-distinction, argues that the right and left outposts share, among other things, ‘a rejection of democracy’ and ‘a catastrophic vision’ of history. ‘The extremes meet’, he thus contends, but ‘not because of their position[s] on the political spectrum, but because they occupy the two extreme points of that spectrum’ (Bobbio 1996: 21–22).

In light of this, the present paper aims at making a twofold, largely conceptual, contribution to our still rather meagre understanding of the ideological differences and possible connections between far right and far left parties in contemporary Europe. In the first section, I review existent discussions of the nature of far right and far left parties, respectively, and summarize these discussions using a min–max strategy. Following Goertz’ (2006b) terminology, I, hence, illustrate the (ontological) relationship between the basic level concepts ‘far right’ and ‘far left’ and their respective secondary level dimensions and, on the basis of this examination, present a number of expectations regarding the main differences and similarities between the ideologies of the two families. In the second section of the paper I move down to the third level, termed as the indicator/data level by Goertz. Here, I use existing data on party policies in order to provide empirical illustrations of the expectations introduced in the first section of the paper. The third and final section summarizes and suggests openings for future research.

Defining far right and far left parties

Parties can, of course, be defined and classified according to several different criteria: in some studies, the focus is on party behavior and party strategy, some other center on the nature of the party organization or on the party’s origins and electoral appeals, and some focus on a combination of different measures. Most commonly, however, parties are characterized on the basis of their core ideological and political features. Social democratic parties, for example, thus tend to be (minimally) defined as parties that commit themselves to ‘welfarism and egalitarianism’, while conservative parties are said to highlight ‘the need to support private enterprise’, encourage ‘fiscal austerity’, and emphasize ‘government efficiency [...] as well as law and order’ (Gallagher et al. 2011: 243, 261). In a similar vein, the classification of parties is also guided by ideology, with ideologically akin parties usually being grouped together into the same family (cf. Mair and Mudde 1998).

Consequently, ideological features are at the centre also in this study, where the far right and far left families are defined on the basis of the ideas and principles that are at the core of their respective ideologies.¹ To define these two families,
I follow a strategy proposed by Gerring and Barresi (2003) and identify minimal and maximal definitions. Here, the minimal definition disentangles the attributes that all non-idiosyncratic uses of the term have in common, while the maximal (or ideal-type) definition identifies all (non-idiosyncratic) characteristics that define the term in its purest or most archetypic form. Minimal definitions thus have few attributes but many referents, while maximal definitions have many attributes but few (if any) referents (Gerring and Barresi 2003: 205–209).2

In the following subsections, I define the far right and far left party families. After a brief note on terminology, I collect and arrange a sample of comparative studies dealing with the ideologies of contemporary far right and far left parties, respectively, and suggest minimal and maximal definitions of the two families. The fourth subsection then brings these definitions together in order to facilitate the identification of possible common denominators as well as major points of conflict.

A terminological note

Despite (or perhaps because of) the vast literature on the far right party family, there is no broad agreement on terminological issues. In a comprehensive but non-exhaustive review, Mudde (2007: 11–12) identified more than 20 different designations, ranging from relatively specific labels such as ‘xenophobic populism’, ‘post-fascism’, and ‘reactionary tribalism’ to broader spatial terms such as ‘far right’, ‘extreme right’, and ‘radical right’. The research on the far left is less extensive, but also here a number of different terms has been employed, including, for example, ‘transformative left’, ‘hard left’, ‘far left’, ‘extreme left’, and ‘radical left’ (see March 2012b: 9).

Today, it seems that most scholars prefer broad symmetric labels and hence talk about the ‘far’, the ‘extreme’, or the ‘radical’ right, and, likewise, about the ‘far’, the ‘extreme’, or the ‘radical’ left. Here, the terms ‘right’ and ‘left’ simply indicate the alleged (socioeconomic, sociocultural, or both) left–right-position of the families.3 The terms ‘extreme’ and ‘radical’, moreover, are – though still used interchangeably4 – increasingly utilized in order to distinguish between democratic (constitutional) and anti-democratic (unconstitutional) parties; while extreme parties – situated at the ends (lat. extrema) of the left–right-heuristic – tend to be flatly anti-democratic, radical parties usually respect basic democratic norms but oppose existing liberal democracy and, as a consequence, seek a root (lat. radix) and branch transformation of society (Mudde 2005: 87–89).5 As is evident, this study prefers to use the terms ‘far right’ and ‘far left’, respectively, as generic terms that include non-democratic extremist parties as well as radical, but predominantly democratic, parties.6

A min-max definition of the far right party family

The minimal and maximal definitions of the far right party family are based on a reading of 31 influential studies (see table A1 in the appendix) on far right ideology. The studies included were selected according to three criteria: they have all
their primary focus on the third phase (1980–) of the European far right (cf. von Beyme 1988), they are all comparative in scope (explicitly or implicitly), and they all contain in-depth treatments of ideology, either in the form of detailed conceptual discussions or by means of (qualitative, quantitative, or mixed-method) empirical examinations. (Hence, studies that define the family only in passing or echo definitions introduced by other scholars are not included.) The proposed attributes of the minimal and maximal definitions, respectively, are listed (in approximate order of centrality) in table 1 below.

**Minimal attributes**

The only attribute that appears to be included (explicitly or, at least, implicitly) in all of the definitions and usages consulted is *nativism*. The key role of nativism is emphasized especially by Mudde (1995, 1996, 2000, 2007), who holds that this is virtually the only attribute shared by all far right parties. In his major work *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, he thus argues that previous anthropological and historical definitions of nativism can be combined into a generic definition that ‘closely resembles the combination of xenophobia and nationalism’ and hence sees nativism as ‘an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state’ (Mudde 2007: 18–19). The term nativism is, in Mudde’s view, more suitable than near-synonyms such as ‘nationalism’, ‘racism’, or ‘anti-immigrant’ because it excludes liberal forms of nationalism, allows also for nonracist exclusion, and sees parties as something more than single-issue actors with an exclusive focus on anti-immigration (Mudde 2007: 19). The last-mentioned virtue is particularly important for broad comparative purposes since it enables the concept to travel neatly also to (central and eastern European) countries with a limited history of mass immigration but, nevertheless, with prominent racist or xenophobic elements.

The importance of nationalism and xenophobia is emphasized also in other influential works on the contemporary far right. Hainsworth (1992: 10), for example, claims that nation, national identity, and ethnocentrism are at the core of the far right ideology, Ignazi (1992: 10, 25) that the ‘old’ far right is nationalist, ethnocentrist, and racist while ‘new’ far right parties hold ‘strong xenophobic stances’, and Betz (1993: 413, 1994: 4) that far right parties oppose ‘the social integration of marginalized groups’ and appeal to ‘xenophobia, if not overt racism’. Likewise, Kitschelt (1995: 47) highlights the role of cultural homogeneity, while Taggart (1995: 35), Fennema (1997: 483), and Minkenberg (1998: 33) stress the importance of (exclusionary) nationalism, ethnic nationalism, and ultranationalism, respectively. Similar conclusions are to be found also in later works, both in conceptual and theoretical discussions (see Betz and Johnson 2004: 320–321; Carter 2005: 18; Eatwell 2000: 412; Hainsworth 2000: 12, 2008: 70; Ignazi 2003: 31, 33; Minkenberg 2000: 174, 2015: 28; Moreau 2012: 140; Ramet 1999: 4; Rydgren 2007: 242; Zaslove 2004: 74–75) and in empirical inquiries (see e.g. de Lange 2007; Harrison and Bruter 2011;
Maximal attributes

A maximal, or ideal-typical, definition of the far right includes eight additional attributes. A certain degree of anti-systemness, to begin with, is an important feature. Following Sartori (1976: 133), an anti-system party ‘undermines the legitimacy of the regime it opposes’, either by alienating itself from it (i.e., by being extreme) or by protesting against it (i.e., by being radical). In a later conceptual reassessment, Capoccia (2002) distinguishes between relational and ideological anti-systemness; relational anti-systemness implies a high distance to conventional parties, while ideological anti-systemness is expressed as incompatibility with democratic norms. Most research on the far right in western liberal democracies define the parties as clearly, but only mildly, anti-system; they are distal to conventional parties and they are – although rarely being against democracy per se (see, however, Carter 2005: 17; Fennema 1997: 484–485) – critical towards liberal democracy (e.g. Betz 1994: 3–4; Betz and Johnson 2004: 323; Ignazi 1992: 12–13, 2003: 33; Minkenberg 1998: 33, 2000: 174–175; Rydgren 2007: 243). The picture is somewhat different in democracies with prominent plebiscitary elements where far right parties are considered as (more or less) pro-system (cf. Mudde 2007; Pirro 2014) or, alternatively, as ideologically (but not relationally) anti-system (cf. Minkenberg 2015).

Populism, secondly, is also a recurring attribute in existing definitions of the far right party family. Following a popular characterization by Mudde (2004: 543), populism can be seen as a thin-centered ideology that ‘considers society to be separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’. In line with this, far right parties are commonly (cf., however, Minkenberg 2000: 173; Widfeldt 2015: 12) defined as populist actors, favoring an extensive use of referendums and seeking to represent the neglected interests and worries of the ‘common man’ (Betz 1993: 413, 1994: 4), the ‘mainstream of society’ (Taggart 1995: 43), the ‘ordinary people’ (Betz and Johnson 2004: 322), or, simply, the ‘people’ (Mudde 2007: 151; Pirro 2014: 617).

A third attribute that is included in a number of definitions is authoritarianism, understood as ‘a belief in a strictly ordered society […] in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely’ (Mudde 2007: 23). Accordingly, many authors underline that the far right emphasizes social order, compliance, and authority, supports a strong state, and assumes a tough stance against criminality (see e.g. de Lange 2007: 429; Harrison and Bruter 2011: 104–105; Kitschelt 1995: 47; Mudde 2000: 173, 2007: 145). Fourthly, and relatedly, far right parties are also occasionally defined as preachers of traditional ethics, i.e. as supporters of the nucleus family, of religious values, and of a traditional conception of morality. Mudde (2000: 175), for example, contends that ‘all [far right] parties hold a traditional view on ethical values’, Minkenberg (2001: 174) define far right parties as an anti-individualistic actors who support a ‘return to traditional roles and status of the individual’, and
Pirro (2014: 613) claims that ‘the role of religion and the intertwining of Church and state feature prominently’ in the discourse of the (central and eastern European) far right.

In terms of their socioeconomic left–right positions, fifthly, far right parties are increasingly defined as centrist. Early scholars claiming that a pro-market, or even neo-liberal, orientation is a core element of the far right’s ‘winning formula’ (see e.g. Betz 1993, 1994; Kitschelt 1995) have thus largely been repudiated: socioeconomics is not at the core of the far right ideology, and most parties hold rather centrist positions, combining protectionism and welfare chauvinism with demands for privatizations and deregulations (see e.g. de Lange 2007: 429; Hainsworth 2008: 86–87; Mudde 2000: 174–175, 2007: 136–137; Rovny 2013: 12–14). Sixthly, the far right is also occasionally defined as anti-leftist. Early definitions claim that a strident, virulent, propagandist, uncompromising, and consuming anti-communism is an essential feature of far right ideology (Hainsworth 1992: 12) while later writings highlight anti-leftism, anti-Marxism, and anti-(second-wave)feminism as important elements (Mudde 2007: 66–67, 94).

European integration, seventhly, is regarded as an issue of increasing importance for the far right. Several authors also claim that the family has become more and more skeptical towards European integration and, in particular, towards the European Union. More specifically, it is suggested that the vast majority of the members of the far right family has ‘given up on the EU’ (Mudde 2007: 181), which is now seen as an encroaching, bureaucratic, and elitist system that ‘serves to undermine constructs and values’ such as, for example, the nation-state, national identity, state sovereignty, and national belonging (Hainsworth 2008: 82, cf. also Moreau 2012: 141; Pirro 2014: 621). In addition to being defined as Euroskeptic, the far right is, lastly, occasionally also characterized as being against globalization. Zaslove (2004: 70) thus claims that the radical right oppose globalization because it ‘destroys the fabric of the domestic economy’ and ‘places too much economic power in the hands of economic and political elites’, while Mudde (2007: 196) argues that economic, cultural, and political globalization ‘are feared and rejected on the basis of nativist beliefs’.

Discussion

In the examination above I have argued that a minimal definition of the European far right party family can be composed of the single attribute of nativism, which, indeed, is the only attribute that (explicitly or implicitly) seems to be included in all (non-idiosyncratic) definitions of the family. Hence, nativism \((nat)\) – an essential feature of the right pole on a sociocultural left–right-distinction – can be seen as a necessary ideological attribute of the far right \((R)\); \(nat\) should, in other words, always be present (and never absent) in the ideology of \(R\).\(^7\) This minimal definition conforms with established definitions, is parsimonious and able to travel across European borders, and allows for variation in the style of the core party message, ranging from xenophobic nationalism to overt racism. Although the
minimal definition seems to be enough also to separate a broad far right family from other recognized party families, it is, however, less suitable if we want to enforce a clear distinction between radical and extreme right parties. If and when such a distinction is necessary, one should focus on the degree of anti-systemness: is the party anti-democratic (i.e., anti-constitutional) or not?

The min–max analysis above also suggests a maximal definition, containing eight additional attributes. According to this maximal, or ideal-typical, definition, far right parties are nationalist and xenophobic actors that are critical towards current liberal democratic and elitist structures, believe in law and order and traditional ethics, adhere to welfare chauvinism and anti-leftism, and criticize the European Union as well as the current globalization process. To be sure, the extension of this ideal type is very small, or even zero: although most radical right parties probably meet several of the eight additional requirements, it is likely to be a difficult or even impossible task to find parties that meet all of them.

**[Table 1]**

**A min-max definition of the far left party family**

The minimal and maximal definitions of the far left party family are based on a reading of 18 studies dealing with far left parties (see table A1 in the appendix). The studies included were selected according to the same criteria as in the analysis of the far right; they focus on the contemporary, or ‘new’ (1990–), far left (cf. Hudson 2000), they are comparative in scope, and they all contain (more or less) in-depth treatments of party ideology. The proposed definitional attributes are listed (again in approximate order of centrality) in table 2 below.

**Minimal attributes**

The core defining attribute of the far left, explicitly or implicitly included in all broad definitions of the family, is *anti-capitalist socialism*. Following an authoritative definition first introduced by March and Mudde (2005: 25) and further elaborated by March (2008, 2012a, 2012b; cf. also Charalambous 2011; Fagerholm 2016a; Gomez et al. 2016), far left parties identify – typically on Marxist grounds – ‘economic inequity as the basis of existing political and social arrangements’ and take efforts to bring about ‘a major redistribution of resources’ and to enhance ‘collective economic and social rights’. Put differently, the socialism at the core of the far left ideology can be said to consist of the two interlinked components ‘social ownership’ (the ‘mean’) and ‘economic equality’ (the ‘end’); in order to achieve social and economic equality, the deeply harmful and unequal capitalist economic system should, in the view of the far left, be superseded by an arrangement were various forms of social ownership are at the core.

Similar definitions can also be found in other comparative texts on the contemporary far left. Early studies and reviews by Bull (1994: 213–221), Lazar (1998:
593–595), and Botella and Ramiro (2003: 247–253) thus seem to suggest that opposing capitalism and promoting (some form of) socialist society are features that unite the fragmented far left family in western Europe, while Ziblatt and Biziouras (2002: 292–294) observe that far left parties in post-communist central Europe reject free markets and argue for state control and nationalization. In an early study of the pan-European far left, Hudson (2000: 15–16) claims that ‘the emergence of a new European left in western Europe’ and ‘the mass electoral support for former communist parties in eastern Europe’ are both signs of criticism of the ‘anti-welfare face of capitalism’. Despite diverging theoretical foundations and normative commitments, the more recent studies by Dunphy (2004: vii), Backes and Moreau (2008: 554), De Waele and Vieira (2012: 55), Hudson (2012: 2), Escalona and Vieira (2013: 8), and Amini (2015: 12) largely endorse this general assessment: the far left is (more or less) critical towards capitalism and in favor of (some form of) socialism.

Maximal attributes

My ideal-typical definition of the far left includes ten additional attributes. Ecologism, firstly, is an essential element of far left ideology, and most of the existing definitions suggest that ideas concerning ecological diversity, sustainability, and the limits to economic growth (cf. Carter 2007: xix) are of increasing importance for far left parties. While early studies tended to link ecologism or ‘red-green’ politics mainly or exclusively to the democratic socialist subfamily (e.g. Botella and Ramiro 2003: 251; Bull 1994: 219; Lazar 1998: 596), more recent research sees ecologism as an important feature also for other (western European) far left parties. March (2008: 3, cf. also March 2012a, 2012b) hence claims that also reform communists ‘have adopted, or at least [...] paid lip service to’, ecological issues, while Fagerholm (2016b: 13) observes that ‘issues related to the environment [...] are increasingly important’ for the contemporary far left family.

A second new left issue of increasing importance is feminism, here broadly defined as a theory that characterizes the relationship between the sexes as one of inequality, subordination, or oppression and considers this relationship as a problem of political power (cf. Bryson 2003: 1). Like ecologism, feminism was previously mainly associated with democratic socialist parties. More recently, however, feminism has been described as an important raison d’être of the (western) European far left as a whole (e.g. Amini 2015: 12; Escalona and Vieira 2013: 8; March 2008: 18, 2012a: 318–319, 2012b: 18–19). Multiculturalism, thirdly, is also sometimes seen as an important element of far left ideology, and especially democratic socialist parties in the west are described as supporters of ethnic minorities (March 2008: 3) and of the rights of immigrants (Escalona and Vieira 2013: 8). These same parties are also, fourthly, occasionally defined as loud defenders of liberal ethics; they ‘support [...] alternative lifestyles’ (March 2012b: 19) and promote ‘the rights of sexual minorities’ (Escalona and Vieira 2013: 8).

Fifthly, far left parties are also frequently defined as being anti-imperialist, i.e. as being against (western) exploitation of underdeveloped states and, instead, in
support of international solidarity and peace. Lazar (1998: 594; cf. also Backes and Moreau 2008: 554) thus claims that anti-imperialism is one of four ‘anti-concepts’ that legitimize the existence of communist parties, while March and Mudde (2005: 25) assert that the internationalist profile of the far left implies that imperialism is seen as one of the main causes of ‘national and regional socio-political issues’. Although anti-imperialism is mainly associated with conservative communist parties (Gomez et al. 2016: 359; March 2012a: 318), it is a distinguishing feature also of other far left parties (Fagerholm 2016b: 16). Another ‘anti-concept’ associated with the far left is, sixthly, anti-fascism; Lazar (1998: 594) claims that anti-fascism is a core feature of communist parties, while Backes and Moreau (2008: 554) hold that all subfamilies of the far left family are anti-fascist in nature.

Seventhly, far left parties are also authoritatively defined as (relational and ideological) anti-system parties that are critical towards liberal democracy or, in some cases, even contest the very idea of democracy (e.g. Dunphy 2004; March and Mudde 2005; March 2008, 2012a, 2012b). Following March (2012b: 10–11), the anti-system nature of the far left is not exclusively expressed in the above-mentioned rejection of the contemporary economic system (i.e. capitalism) but, rather, appears as a demand for an in-depth transformation of the entire (liberal) democratic system. Eighthly, and relatedly, far left parties are also sometimes defined as populist parties. According to March (2012b: 121), the ‘populist temptation has become increasingly attractive to the left’, and far left parties of ‘divergent ideological dispositions have increasingly adopted populist appeals, focussing on anti-establishment themes in order to articulate the concerns of a “a people” broader than the traditional blue-collar proletariat’.

The Euroskeptic nature of the far right, ninthly, is underlined by some authors. Although the responses to European integration may vary (cf. Dunphy 2004; Hudson 2012), recent empirical studies show that no far left party is decidedly pro-EU and that opposition to the ‘really existing EU’ is a consolidating factor for the family (Charalambous 2011: 311; March 2012b: 202). Finally, far left parties are sometimes also associated with the goals of the ‘anti-globalization’ or, put differently, the ‘global justice’ movement: even if they do not oppose globalization per se, they reject global neo-liberalism (March 2012b: 173) and are critical of multinational military and economic associations such as, for example, IMF and NATO (Amini 2015: 12).

**Discussion**

Above, I have argued that anti-capitalist socialism (soc) is the only attribute that can be included in a minimal definition of the European far left party family. This attribute – which is closely related to the left end of the socioeconomic left–right distinction – is thus a necessary, but perhaps not a sufficient (cf. endnote 7), ideological attribute of the far left (L). Put differently, soc should always be present (and never absent) in the ideology of L. Like the minimal definition of the far right family introduced in the previous subsection, this definition conforms with
established usage, is parsimonious and able to travel across Europe, and allows for variation in the style of the core party message. The definition is also enough in order to separate a broad and diverse far left family from families of the right and, in addition, from the social democratic centre-left family where socialism tend to be of a reformist rather than an anti-capitalist character. Like the minimal definition of the far right, it is, however, less suitable when there is a need to separate between radical and extreme parties. In such situations, the degree of anti-systemness must be investigated.

The maximal definition, in contrast, contains eleven attributes. According to this definition, far left parties seek to replace capitalism with socialism, are critical towards liberal democracy and the establishment, adhere to ecologism, feminism, and liberal ethics, hold on to multiculturalism, anti-fascism, and anti-imperialism, and criticize the European Union as well as the current globalization process. Most far left parties are believed to meet more than one of these requirements, but it is implausible that there are parties that meet all of them to the full.

|Table 2|

**Is there a common ground?**

As the minimal definitions reveal, there is probably nothing that unite all far right and far left parties: previous definitions view the core ideologies of the two families as truly different, revealing the diverging theoretical premises and the different historical legacies of the two families. More specifically, the nativism at the core of the far right ideology implies a position in the sociocultural right, while anti-capitalist socialism places the far left in the socioeconomic left. The sociocultural and, less distinctively, socioeconomic differences between the far right (R) and far left (L) families are further underlined in the proposed maximal, or ideal-typical, definitions. An ideal-typical far right party is, hence, located in the sociocultural right pole through its emphasis on nativism (nat), authoritarianism (aut), and traditional ethics (con) and, additionally, in the socioeconomic centre (cen) through its acceptance of both free markets and economic interventionism. Together with the more general ‘anti-attribute’ anti-leftism (ale), these attributes are distinctive for ideal-typical far right parties only. In set-theoretic terms, they constitute the relative complement of L in R: R\L = {nat, aut, con, cen, ale}. An ideal-typical far left party, by contrast, is located in the socioeconomic left pole through its emphasis on anti-capitalist socialism (soc) and in the sociocultural left pole through its emphasis on ecologism (eco), feminism (fem), liberal ethics (lib), and multiculturalism (mul). Together with the two ‘anti-attributes’ anti-imperialism (aim) and anti-fascism (afa), these attributes characterize ideal-typical far left parties only and, hence, constitute the relative complement of R in L: L\R = {soc, eco, fem, lib, mul, aim, afa}. The remaining four (of the in total 16) attributes – Euroskepticism (eur), ‘globophobia’ (glo), anti-systemness (asy), and populism (pop) – are shared by both families. They are, in other words, in the intersection of R and L:
$R \cap L = \{eur, glo, asy, pop\}$. Although the underlying causes to these similarities may vary, the definitional analysis hence suggests that ideal-typical far right and far left parties are united by a hesitance towards the current European integration and globalization processes and a critical view on (liberal) democracy and elite structures.

Based on the discussions above, a number of propositions can be suggested. First, I expect that the two minimal definitional attributes are necessary elements; members of the far right family are expected to be nativist (exp. 1a), while members of the far left family are expected to adhere to anti-capitalist socialism (exp. 1b). The maximal definitions, in turn, generate a number of expectations regarding possible differences and similarities between the (ideal-typical versions of the) two families. As pointed out above, the main difference between the ideal-types is supposed to be their diverging sociocultural left–right positions: far right parties tend to populate the sociocultural right pole while far left parties do not (exp. 2a, 2b); conversely, far left parties are generally members of the sociocultural left pole while far right parties are not (exp. 2c, 2d). The polarization between the families is expected to be less distinct with regards to the socioeconomic left–right-distinction. Here, far right parties are, in contrast to far left parties, believed to be predominantly centrist (exp. 3a, 3b) while far left parties are, in contrast to the centrist far right parties, expected to locate themselves to the left (exp. 3c, 3d). The similarities between the two families are, as noted above, expected to be found in their views on European integration and globalization, in their attitudes towards the political system, and in their populist sentiments. As a consequence, this study expects that both far right and far left parties tend to be members of the Euroskeptic pole on an European integration dimension (exp. 4) and, moreover, hold critical rather than favorable views on the current political system (exp. 5). Similarities can be expected also with regard to the somewhat more elusive elements populism and ‘globaphobia’. Due to lack of adequate data, positions towards these elements can, however, not be systematically examined in this study.

**Studying far right and far left parties**

In recent years, comparative social scientists have become increasingly interested in the possibilities of set-theoretic techniques for concept formation (e.g. Goertz 2006b), typologization (e.g. George and Bennett 2005), and causal analysis (e.g. Schneider and Wagemann 2012). A particular interest has been directed towards fuzzy sets, i.e. sets where elements are allowed to take values in the interval between the endpoints of full non-membership (0) and full membership (1). According to Smithson and Verkuilen (2006: 1–2; cf. also Ragin 2008), fuzzy set theory is a viable tool for the social sciences because of its ability to handle vagueness in a systematic way, because it rigorously combines set-wise thinking with continuous variables, and because many constructs in social science research have a categorical (qualitative) as well as a dimensional (quantitative) character. In the field of party politics, fuzzy
sets appear as a valuable tool when examining the ideological positions of parties and party families. In many cases, parties cannot be unambiguously and statically classified as, for example, either ‘fully liberal’ or ‘not liberal at all’, or as either ‘totally in favor of privatization’ or ‘totally against privatization’. Instead, parties tend to take positions that are ‘fuzzy’; they are more or less liberal or more or less illiberal, and they are more or less in favor of privatization or more or less against privatization. Hence, the following empirical illustration of far right and far left parties will be conducted using tools provided by fuzzy set theory.

The data used in the empirical illustrations is the Manifesto Project Data (MPD), currently distributed by MARPOR (Manifesto Research on Political Representation) and previously associated with the Manifesto Research Group and the Comparative Manifestos Project, respectively (see Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2013). By means of manual content analysis, this long-standing project analyzes electoral manifestos by assigning the ‘quasi-sentences’ in the manifesto into one of 56 predefined issue categories, thus producing cross-sectional time-series data on how much space (expressed as a percentage of the total number of ‘quasi-sentences’) is devoted to different policy issues. As of yet, more than 4,000 manifestos from nearly 60 countries have been analyzed. Despite some substantial criticism (see Gemenis 2013 for a review), the MPD is, when used with care and reflection, a valid and reliable data source (see e.g. Volkens et al. 2013). In addition to its unrivaled coverage in time and space, a main advantage of the MPD is that it – in contrast to other comprehensive datasets containing estimates of party positions (i.e. the Chapel Hill expert survey data, see Bakker et al. 2015) – explicitly focus on the policies addressed in key party literature. Since ‘only the party can truly represent itself’ and, moreover, does so ‘through official party literature’ (Mudde 2007: 38; cf. also March 2012b: 15–16), this is an important virtue. It is also the key reason for using this data set in the present study.

The first subsection studies the necessity of nativism and anti-capitalist socialism for the far right and the far left, respectively. To examine the salience of nativist (i.e., nationalist and xenophobic) ideas, I focus on MPD categories capturing positive mentions of nationalism and patriotism (601) and negative mentions of multiculturalism (608). The salience of anti-capitalist socialism, in turn, is examined using MPD categories that include positive mentions of Marxist analysis (415) and positive mentions of economic planning (404), controlled economy (412), and nationalization (413), respectively.10 The second subsection focuses on maximal attributes. To examine the differences between the families, I use two left–right policy scales. The proposed sociocultural scale focuses on MPD categories related to (in)nationalism (107, 109, 601, 602), culture (502, 607, 608), morals and ethics (602, 603), and law and order (605), while the socioeconomic scale focuses on categories capturing attitudes towards public versus private ownership (401–404, 412–414), protectionism (406 and 407), and the welfare state (505).11 The similarities between the families in terms of their positions towards European integration and constitutionalism are examined by focusing on party locations on the more limited
Euroskepticism (108, 110) and anti-systemness (203, 204) scales. More detailed information about the four policy scales of relevance is given in table A2.

**Examining necessary conditions**

Is nativism, as exp. 1a suggests, a necessary attribute of the contemporary European far right, and is anti-capitalist socialism, as suggested in exp. 1b, a necessary attribute of the contemporary European far left? To empirically examine these propositions, I use data from European elections held from January 1990 onwards \( (N = 1,976) \). The focus is, as noted above, on the salience of the six (two plus four) categories that express nativist and anti-capitalist socialist views. As a first step, these categories, or base variables, need to be calibrated into set membership scores. This is done using the transformational assignment method (cf. Verkuilen 2005) by which set membership scores are calculated from a combination of theoretical and empirical information. Since, for all six base variables, set membership scores should increase as the values of the base variable increase, the indicators can be characterized as positive end-point concepts (cf. Thiem and Duşa 2013). This means that the researcher must provide the thresholds for full inclusion \( (\tau_{in1}; \text{i.e. when set membership } = 1) \) and full exclusion \( (\tau_{ex1}; \text{i.e. when set membership } = 0) \) as well as the crossover point of maximal ambiguity \( (\tau_{cr1}; \text{i.e. when set membership } = 0.5) \). Put differently: the researcher needs to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant variation by specifying what it takes to be a full member and a full non-member of the set in question, and, in addition, discover a threshold for when a case is neither in nor out of the set.

Five of the six base variables \( (x_i) \) are thinly populated, with well over 50 percent of the manifestos scoring 0. In these cases, the thresholds for full exclusion \( (\tau_{ex1}) \) appear to be rather evident: manifestos where \( x_i = 0.00 \) can be regarded as fully out of the set in question. The remaining base variable, National Way of Life (+), is more populated, supposedly because of its broader scope. Since most of the manifestos (nearly 70 percent) devote at least some space to nationalism it seems reasonable to consider also cases with low values on the base variable as fully out of the set (of nationalist parties). The thresholds for full inclusion \( (\tau_{in1}) \) vary between 0.50 and 2.00 for the five less populated and more narrowly and promptly defined categories. Hence, one or a few ‘quasi-sentences’ in a comparatively short manifesto or, alternatively, a few more ‘quasi-sentences’ in a comparatively long manifesto is deemed to be ‘enough’ for full membership. For the considerably more populated and less distinct category National Way of Life (+), full membership requires a stronger presence. The relevant exclusion, inclusion, and crossover thresholds are all listed in table A3 in the appendix.

After the calibration of the base variables, union, intersection, and aggregation scores are calculated. Table 3 reports the necessity inclusion (or consistency) scores \( (\text{Incl}_N) \) for single indicators as well as for the different operations, thus providing estimates of the degree to which the relevant (combination of) condition(s) really is necessary for the outcome or, in other words, the degree to which the out-
come constitute a subset of the relevant (combination of) condition(s). Following Ragin (2008: 136; cf. also Schneider and Wagemann 2010), scores below 0.75 are taken as signs of ‘substantial inconsistency’ and are hence not discussed further. In cases when the necessity inclusion score is above 0.75, I have also examined in more detail whether the condition is a relevant or trivial necessary condition. Here, several measures have been proposed. Ragin’s (2006) measure of coverage (Cov_N) assess the difference in size between the condition and the outcome. Low scores indicate that there are many more members in the condition than in the outcome, while higher scores reflect a more equal distribution. The coverage measure captures, however, only one of the two sources of trivialness: it assess the relation in size between the condition and the outcome, but is insensitive to the relation in size between the condition and its negation, that is, to whether the condition is a constant or not (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 233–234). In order to take both sources of trivialness into account, Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 235–237) have proposed a new formula for the calculation of the relevance of necessity (Rel_N).

The following discussion reports both the coverage and the relevance scores.

Regarding the necessity of nativism, I note that the second level concept nativism has been defined and operationalized as the combination of the two indicators nationalism (nat1) and xenophobia (nat2). Hence, a (conservative) expectation would hold that a high membership in the intersection of nat1 and nat2 is a necessary attribute of the contemporary far right. Looking at the scores in Table 3, this is obviously not the case: all manifestos produced by parties classified as members of the far right family in MPD are, hence, not both nationalist and xenophobic. The union of nat1 and nat2, by contrast, appears to pass at least the most liberal boundaries of necessity; the score is a low 0.76 when all cases are considered and a moderate 0.83 when only western European countries are included. Hence, either nationalism or xenophobia is present in most (but by no means in all) manifestos produced by the far right (in western Europe). The coverage scores are low (> 0.5), indicating that the set of parties that are either nationalist or xenophobic is considerably greater than the set of far right parties. The relevance scores are 0.63 (all cases) and 0.66 (western Europe), indicating that the condition is of at least some relevance: although there are many parties outside the far right family that express either nationalist or xenophobic ideas in their manifestos, the condition is not a constant, that is, nationalism or xenophobia is by no means included in all manifestos and is, hence, not a trivial necessary condition.

What about the necessity of anti-capitalist socialism for far left parties? Following a conservative conception, we might, again, expect that a high membership in the intersection of soc1 (economic planning), soc2 (controlled economy), soc3 (nationalization), and soc4 (Marxist rhetoric) is a necessary attribute of the contemporary far left. This expectation is, however, clearly not supported (see Table 3): a combination of these four indicators is by no means endorsed by all manifestos produced by parties classified as members of the far left family in MPD. The union of soc1, soc2, soc3 and soc4, by contrast, pass liberal boundaries of necessity; the
score is 0.77 when all cases are considered and 0.87 when only western European countries are included. Thus, at least one of the four indicators is present in many manifestos produced by the (West European) far left. The coverage scores are again low (> 0.5), while the relevance scores are somewhat higher (0.57 in both cases). This indicates that at least one of the four indicators is present also in many (but not in all) of the parties outside the far left family.

To further validate the main observations, I take a brief look at cases violating full consistency (i.e. cases with high set membership scores on the outcome and low scores on the condition) and full relevance (i.e. cases with high set membership scores on the condition and low scores on the outcome), respectively. The conditions of interest are the two fuzzy unions reported in table 3. Focusing first on (alleged) members of the far right and far left families that score low on the relevant unions, it is clear that the majority of the cases that violate full consistency can be found among central and eastern European parties in the nineties. This intelligible finding probably illustrates, on the one hand, the disillusionment and ongoing ideological reorientation among many formerly hegemonic far left parties and, on the other hand, the embryonic nature of the fragmented far right. Regarding the far right family, there is also reason to question the appropriateness of the coding in a few instances; parties such as the Cypriot Dimokratikós Sinagenrmos or the Croatian Hrvatska demokratska zajednica are, despite the presence of nationalist elements in their ideologies, perhaps better classified as Cristian democratic or conservative parties. It is also worth noting that while no single manifesto produced by the core (e.g. Austrian, Danish, or French) far right parties violate consistency, occasional manifestos produced by core members of the far left family (such as the Danish Socialistisk Folkeparti, the Greek Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas, or the Czech Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy) are inconsistent with the outcome. Regarding non-far right and non-far left parties scoring high on the conditions of interest, a few general notes are in order. First, I observe that nationalist or xenophobic ideas are popular among non-far right parties mainly in central and eastern European countries and in Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Some of the manifestos are also produced by borderline far right parties such as the Finnish Perussuomalaiset (classified as agrarian in MPD), the Norwegian Fremskrittspar- tiet (special issue), and the Swiss Schweizerische Volkspartei (agrarian). Second, I note that non-far left parties advocating some aspect of anti-capitalist socialism can be found both in western and in central and Eastern Europe. In western Europe, social democratic parties are somewhat overrepresented, suggesting that the indicators may not be fully capable of separating far left and social democratic parties from each other.

Taken together, we might conclude that the most stringent expectations regarding the necessity of nativism and anti-capitalist socialism clearly do not hold: a combination of nationalism and xenophobia is, in light of this study, not a necessary element of the far right ideology, and a combination of Marxism, economic planning, controlled economy, and nationalization is apparently not a necessary el-
ement of the far left ideology. This being said, it appears that at least one of these indicators is present in most cases, especially in a western European setting: most (western European) far right parties emphasize either nationalism or xenophobia, and most (western European) far left parties emphasize at least one of the four indicators Marxism, economic planning, controlled economy, and nationalization. The necessity of these conditions also seem to be increasing over time and, moreover, non-trivial in nature: although the are many other parties that endorse nativist and, in particular, anti-capitalist socialist issues, the indicators are not constants or, in other words, trivial valence issues that all parties agree on.\footnote{18}

\begin{table}[h!]
\centering
\caption{Examining differences and similarities}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline
In the previous section, I have suggested that far right parties generally are members of the sociocultural right pole while far left parties tend to be members of the sociocultural left pole (exp. 2a–2d), and that far right parties tend to be socioeconomic centrists while far left parties generally are socioeconomic leftists (exp. 3a–3d). By contrast, both far right and far left parties are expected to locate themselves at the Euroskeptic pole on an European integration dimension (exp. 4) and, moreover, hold critical rather than favorable views on the current political system (exp. 5). In what follows, I examine these general propositions using data on far right ($N = 205$) and far left ($N = 244$) parties competing in European elections held from January 1990 onwards.\footnote{19} The first thing that needs to be discussed is the appropriate scaling procedure. The most used strategy here is the ‘standard’ technique where the share of ‘left’-coded sentences (cf. table A2) is subtracted from the share of ‘right’-coded sentences. The main constraint with this technique is that the estimated positions are affected also by the share of sentences not included in ‘left’ and ‘right’. To address this problem, Kim and Fording (1998) proposed a scaling technique where the difference between ‘left’- and ‘right’-coded sentences is divided by the sum of ‘left’- and ‘right’-coded sentences. This correction do fix the problem with excluded sentences affecting the estimates, but tend to move party positions towards the extremes. Lowe et al. (2011), finally, apply a logarithmic transformation to the ‘left’ and ‘right’ poles of the scale.\footnote{20} Like the scale proposed by Kim and Fording, the log ratio scale considers only sentences assigned to either left or right, however without causing an accumulation of scores around the extreme points. Its main limitation, by contrast, is the lack of both a substantial zero point and predefined end points.

Since I want the positions on each respective scale to depend only on the ‘right’ and ‘left’ poles of that scale, I do not consider the standard scaling technique further. The ratio ($r$) and the log ratio ($l$) scaling techniques are – also after the missing values caused by division by zero have been recoded as 0 – closely related (with $N = 1,976$, $\rho_P$ ranges between 0.88 and 0.96 for the four scales), which means that the calibration process will, \textit{ceteris paribus}, generate more or less similar results.
For the sake of robustness, I calibrate both the ratio and the log ratio versions of the sociocultural (Socult), socioeconomic (Soecon), Euroskepticism (Eur), and anti-systemness (Asy) scales, however using slightly different calibration strategies. As in the previous subsection, I use the transformational assignment method. For exp. 2a and 2b, I expect set membership scores to increase as the values of the base variable increase. Here, the underlying concept is, hence, a positive end-point concept (PEC), and the calibration is performed accordingly (see endnote 13). For exp. 2c and 2d, exp. 3c and 3d, exp. 4, and exp. 5, set membership scores should increase as the values of the base variable decrease. Consequently, the underlying concepts are negative end-point concepts (NECs). For exp. 3a and 3b, finally, set membership scores are expected to first increase, and then decrease as the values of the base variable increase. Here, the underlying concept type is a positive mid-point concept (PMC).

For the ratio versions of the end-point scales, I use 0 as a natural crossover point. The thresholds for full inclusion are set at 0.80 (for the PEC) and –0.80 (for all NECs), while the thresholds for full exclusion are set at –0.80 (for the PEC) and 0.80 (for all NECs). For the ratio version of the PMC scale, the two crossover points are set at ±0.50, the inclusion thresholds at ±0.20, and the exclusion thresholds at ±0.80. The log ratio versions of the scales are calibrated using a more inductive approach. Here, the thresholds for full inclusion are set at the 90th (for the PEC) and 10th (for all NECs) percentiles, the crossover point at the 50th percentile, and the threshold for full exclusion at the 10th (for the PEC) and 90th (for the NECs) percentiles. For the log ratio version of the PMC scale, I set the inclusion thresholds at the 40th and 60th percentiles, the crossover points at the 25th and 75th percentiles, and the exclusion thresholds at the 10th and 90th percentiles. The relevant exclusion, inclusion, and crossover thresholds are all listed in table A3 in the appendix.

Regarding party positions along the sociocultural dimension (Socult(r)), the expectations (2a–2d) hold well. As shown by the rather strong point-biserial correlation coefficient in table 4, far right manifestos tend to be members of the set of sociocultural rightism (mean m_S = 0.80) while far left manifestos generally are non-members (mean m_S = 0.38) and, hence, members of the set of sociocultural leftism. Table 4 also shows that the polarization along the sociocultural dimension is considerably stronger in western Europe than in eastern and central Europe, and also somewhat stronger in the 2000s than in the 1990s and 2010s. Table 5a provides further illustrations of the differences between the sociocultural positions of the far right and the far left. Here, the gray-shaded cells in the upper left and lower right corner are, as expected, clearly the most populous; 65 per cent of far left manifestos are more or less out of the set of sociocultural rightism, and 88 per cent of far right manifestos are more or less in the set. The comparatively large number of cases in the upper right cell of table 5a is largely explained by the presence of a number of (mostly central and eastern European) far left parties that tend to produce manifestos that are closer to the sociocultural right pole, such as, most promi-
nently, the Greek Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas (mean $m_S = 0.76$), the Russian Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossii (0.88), and the Ukrainian Komunistychna Partiya Ukrayiny (0.71). Far right manifestos, by contrast, are only rarely out of the set of sociocultural right parties. Among the most prominent exceptions here are the manifestos produced by parties whose far right nature is highly questionable, such as the already mentioned Cypriot Dimokratíkós Sinagermós and the Croatian Hrvatska demokratska zajednica. Finally, I note that these conclusions remain the same when interpreting the membership scores generated by the log ratio scale ($\text{Socult}^{(l)}$).

The examination of party positions on the socioeconomic (Soecon($^r$)) left–right dimension yields mixed results. A first observation is that far right manifestos (mean $m_S = 0.49$) are not considerably more centrist that far left manifestos (mean $m_S = 0.45$); the correlation coefficients are close to zero (cf. row two of table 4), and the cases are horizontally rather equally distributed in the cells of table 5b. Instead, the correlation coefficients in row three of table 4 indicate that the families occupy the opposite poles not only on the sociocultural, but also on the socioeconomic left–right dimension: most far left manifestos are, hence, more or less in the set of socioeconomic leftism (mean $m_S = 0.64$) while most far right manifestos tend to be more or less out of the set (mean $m_S = 0.33$) – a relationship that is clearly stronger in western Europe than in the central and eastern parts of the continent. Table 5c provide further support for the socioeconomic polarization of far right and far left parties: 175 (72 per cent) far left manifestos are more or less in the set of socioeconomic leftism (upper right cell), and 139 (68 per cent) far right manifestos are more or less out of the set (lower left cell). More significantly, it seems that most of these manifestos also locate themselves closer to the poles than to the centre, with 114 far left manifestos being mostly in ($m_S \geq 0.75$) the set and 93 far right manifestos being mostly out ($m_S \leq 0.25$). A closer look at the cases in the upper left cell reveals that the far left parties with the most coherent right-wing socioeconomic outlooks are the Greek Dimokratiki Aristera (mean $m_S = 0.15$), the Icelandic Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð (0.40), the Irish Sinn Féin (0.24), the defunct Italian post-communist Partito Democratico della Sinistra (0.25), and a number of virtually social democratic parties on the Balkan. Far right parties with coherent left-wing socioeconomic outlooks (lower right cell) are the Austrian Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (mean $m_S = 0.81$), the Bulgarian Ataka (0.81), the Hungarian Jobbik Magyarországt Mozdal (0.74), the Romanian Partidul România Mare (0.76), and the Swiss Schweizer Demokraten (0.88). Taken together, the evidence provides no support for the expectation that far right manifestos, in contrast to far left manifestos, locate themselves predominantly in the socioeconomic centre (exp. 3a, 3b); although there surely are single far right parties that are predominantly centrist in socioeconomic terms, the most typical location is in the socioeconomic right. By contrast, far left manifestos tend – as expected (exp. 3c, 3d) – to be in the socioeconomic left. These general conclusions remain largely unchanged when interpreting values produced by the log ratio scaling technique ($\text{Soecon}^{(l)}$).
The expectations regarding the similarities between the two party families are only partly supported. Concerning attitudes towards European integration, firstly, the ratio scale \( (Eur^{(r)}) \) indicates that both far right (mean \( m_S = 0.49 \)) and far left (mean \( m_S = 0.45 \)) manifestos are, on average, slightly more out of than in the set of Euroskeptic parties. The log ratio scale \( (Eur^{(l)}) \), by contrast, suggests that both families produce manifestos that tend to be more or less in the set (mean \( m_S = 0.69 \) and 0.67, respectively). Hence, the two families seem, on the whole, to take rather similar positions, positions that, after all, not necessary are very Euroskeptic. As indicated by the correlations between family membership and \( Eur^{(r)} \) presented in table 4, there are, however, considerable differences between western Europe on the one hand, and central and eastern Europe on the other. While many western European far right (mean \( m_S = 0.60 \)) and far left (mean \( m_S = 0.59 \)) manifestos tend to be more or less in the set of Euroskepticism, the manifestos produced by far right (mean \( m_S = 0.41 \)) and far left (mean \( m_S = 0.26 \)) parties in central and eastern Europe are of a more diverse nature; some manifestos, especially those produced by far left successor parties, are predominantly positive to European integration, some other find the issue irrelevant or take a neutral position, and some are predominantly negative. Hence, the expectation that both far right and far left parties tend to hold critical rather than favorable views on European integration (exp. 4) is clearly supported in a western European context, but less so in central and Eastern Europe where especially far left manifestos tend to be positive or indifferent to European integration. This general conclusion holds also when interpreting the figures produced by the log ratio scale \( (Eur^{(l)}) \); western European far right and far left manifestos are more in the set of Euroskepticism that central and Eastern European far right and (especially) far left manifestos.

Concerning attitudes towards the political system, secondly, both the ratio scale \( (Asy^{(r)}) \) and the log ratio scale \( (Asy^{(l)}) \) indicate that far right (mean \( m_S = 0.41 \) and 0.46) as well as far left (mean \( m_S = 0.36 \) and 0.41) manifestos are, on average, more out of than in the set of anti-system parties. Again, the two families are rather similar, although far right manifestos tend to be somewhat less pro-system than far left manifestos in central and eastern Europe and in the 1990s and 2000s. Far left manifestos, by contrast, are less pro-system than far right manifestos in the 2010s (see table 4). Overall, however, anti-systemness is, in light of these data, not a distinguishing feature of either the far right or the far left; around 10 per cent of the manifestos are mostly in \( (m_S \geq 0.75) \) the set of anti-systemness, one third are mostly out \( (m_S \leq 0.25) \) and around half of the manifestos cluster in the middle. Hence, it may be concluded that the expectation that both far right and far left parties tend to hold critical rather than favorable views on the political system (exp. 5) is not supported.

[Table 4]

[Table 5a–c]
Conclusions and suggestions for further research

This study has its basis in the rather strange, and nearly total, lack of systematic research on the differences and possible similarities between far right and far left parties in contemporary Europe. To contribute to filling this lacuna and hence provide new insights regarding the nature of European radicalism and extremism in general, the paper makes a case for a research agenda where the outposts of the conventional left–right heuristic are treated simultaneously and comparatively. As a first step, this study summarizes previous research on far right and far left parties, propose minimal and maximal definitions of the two families, and, finally, carry out a first broad sweeping examination of their differences and possible similarities.

The minimal definitions, firstly, suggest that the cores of the ideologies of the far right and far left are clearly different from each other. Based on a review of previous definitions of the two families, it is suggested that nativism is a necessary element of the ideology of the far right and that anti-capitalist socialism is a necessary element of the ideology of the far left. These expectations are examined using existing data on party positions. Here, it appears that a combination of nationalism and xenophobia is not a necessary element of the far right ideology, and that a combination of Marxism, economic planning, controlled economy, and nationalization is not a necessary element of the far left ideology. However, at least one of these indicators is usually necessary, especially in western Europe. Thus, most manifestos produced by western European far right parties emphasize either nationalism or xenophobia, and most manifestos by western European far left parties emphasize at least one of the four indicators Marxism, economic planning, controlled economy, and nationalization. The necessity of these (non-trivial) conditions also seems to be increasing over time. Regarding the maximal definitions, secondly, the empirical examinations support the suggestion that the ideal-type versions of the families take diverging socioeconomic and, above all, sociocultural left–right positions. Hence, far right parties populate, most typically, the sociocultural right pole while most far left parties – and especially those in western Europe – are members of the sociocultural left pole. In a similar vein, far right parties tend to, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, be mainly, but not exclusively, on the socioeconomic right while far left parties locate themselves predominantly to the socioeconomic left. The expectation that both far right and far left parties tend to be members of the Euroskeptic pole on a European integration dimension is also supported. The expected similarities regarding their anti-system views are, however, largely rejected.

To sum up, it seems clear that this essentially conceptual paper needs to be supplemented with more theoretical and empirical research on the similarities and, above all, differences between the ideological supply of radical and extreme actors. This assumes the collection of more fine-grained comparative data on party standpoints regarding, most notably, populist and anti-globalization sentiments, but also regarding party positions towards Europe and the political system. Moreover, future scholarship on the points of contact between right and left wing radicalism (and extremism) needs to look also beyond ideological similarities. Here, three additional
tasks are of particular importance: to study the demand side of the electoral arena and, hence, examine what unites and what separates the supporters of far right and far left parties; to examine how far right and far left actors behave on the parliamentary arena, i.e. in parliamentary debates and in coalition governments; and, finally, to search for the main similarities and differences between the two families on the internal arena, i.e. in the parties’ organizational, membership, and leadership structures.

Notes

1 An ideology is (minimally) understood as a coherent set of ideas (Gerring 1997) or, more specifically, as a coherent set of biased ideas related to the organization of power and status in a society (Fagerholm 2016a).

2 For more on (‘positivist’) concept formation and analysis in the social sciences, see the classics by Sartori (1970, 1984) and Collier and Mahon Jr. (1993), and the general frameworks by Gerring (1999, 2012: ch. 5) and Goertz (2006b).

3 In this study, the left–right-distinction is understood as a ‘hopelessly multidimensional dimension’; as a ‘layman’s “index” of politics’ (Sartori 1976: 79) that summarize ‘citizens’ and parties’ positions on the issues of the day’ (Dalton et al. 2011: 82). The distinction is, hence, not understood as a purely socioeconomic dimension but as a dimension that also includes other prominent (e.g. sociocultural) issues (cf. Dalton et al. 2011: ch. 4–5).

4 Without dwelling too much into etymology, I note that ‘radical right’ was the preferred generic term for fascist-like groups during the early post-war era while the term ‘extreme right’ entered the scene in the 1960s. Although occasionally in use already in the early and mid-twentieth century Europe, ‘radical left’ and ‘extreme left’ gained widespread use after the fall of communism, when they gradually came to replace more specific ideological labels such as, for example, democratic socialism, communism, Marxism, and Marxism-Leninism. A more detailed conceptual history of political extremes is provided by Backes (2010).

5 The distinction between radicalism and extremism goes as far back as to 1973, when the (West) German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) distinguished between an unconstitutional (verfassungswidrig) extremism and a radicalism that ‘only’ opposes the principles of the constitution (verfassungsfrei) (see e.g. Mudde 2005). For similar distinctions in contemporary empirical research on far right and far left parties, see especially the works by Betz (1994: 3–4), March (2012b: 7–12), March and Mudde (2005: 24–25), Minkenberg (1998: 29–33), and Mudde (2007: 23–26).

6 For the sake of consistency, this paper uses the terms ‘far right’ and ‘far left’ also when discussing the work of scholars who prefer to use other labels.

7 Whether nat is also a sufficient condition is hard to determine outside a specific context, and Gerring and Barresi (2003) advice us to ignore sufficiency in min–max definitions. I note, however, that there is reason to suspect that sufficiency is violated in this case because there are probably parties which should perhaps not be classified as R although nat is present. (Think, for example, of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation or the Socialist Party of Serbia under Slobodan Milošević.)

8 The far left party family is usually divided into four subfamilies; conservative communist parties, reform communist parties, democratic socialist parties, and social populist parties (see March 2012b; cf. also Backes and Moreau 2008; Escalona and Vieira 2013).

9 More formally, and following the original definition and example provided by Zadeh (1965: 339–340), a fuzzy set \( S \) in the space of points \( X \) is characterized by the membership function \( m_S(x) \) by which each point in \( X \) is associated with a real number in the interval \([0,1]\). The grade of membership of \( x \) in \( S \) is then represented by the value of \( m_S(x) \). Hence, if \( X \) is the real line \( \mathbb{R} \) and \( S \) a fuzzy set of numbers much greater than 1 we might say that \( m_S(0) = 0, m_S(5) = 0.01, m_S(100) = 0.95, \) and \( m_S(500) = 1.0 \).
Category 503, capturing (positive) mentions of social justice and equality, is not included because of its broad scope; it includes mentions of a broad range of issues of which some are more sociocultural than socioeconomic in nature (e.g., mentions of the need to end racial or sexual discrimination).

The socioeconomic scale is created by Laver and Garry (2000), based on categories identified by Laver and Budge (1992). The sociocultural scale, in turn, resembles a scale proposed by McDonald and Mendes (2001) but replaces the ambiguous categories 606 (Social Harmony: Positive), 705 (Underprivileged Minority Groups: Positive), and 706 (Non-economic Demographic Groups: Positive) with the more clear-cut categories 107, 109, and 502. The main problem with using 606 as an expression of sociocultural rightism is that included features such as public spiritedness and condemnations of anti-social attitudes may also be associated with the sociocultural left.

The same conclusion is reached when intersecting the four indicators pairwise. All of the formulas return values between 0 and 1, with low (high) values indicating that the degree of membership in the fuzzy intersection ($\cap$) and dilation (Thiem and Duşa 2013).

Here $x$ is the base variable and $p$ and $q$ are parameters for controlling the degrees of concentration and dilation (Thiem and Duşa 2013).

Membership in the fuzzy union ($\cup$) of the sets $X$ and $Y$ is defined as the maximum degree of membership, and membership in the fuzzy intersection ($\cap$) of $X$ and $Y$ is the minimum degree of membership. Hence, $m_{X \cup Y} = \max(m_X, m_Y)$ and $m_{X \cap Y} = \min(m_X, m_Y)$. Fuzzy aggregation ($\Gamma$) of $X$ and $Y$ is here calculated simply by computing the arithmetic mean of the union and intersection:\[ m_{X \Gamma Y} = \frac{\max(m_X, m_Y) + \min(m_X, m_Y)}{2}. \]

The necessity inclusion ($\text{Incl}_N$) of the condition(s) $C$ is calculated as follows:  
\[ \text{Incl}_N(C) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} \min(c_i, o_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} o_i}. \]

The outcome ($o_i$) of interest is party family membership. When analyzing the necessity of nativism for the far right, $o_i = 1$ if the party is classified as ‘nationalist’ in the MPD. If it is coded into any other party family, $o_i = 0$. When analyzing the necessity of anti-capitalist socialism for the far left, $o_i = 1$ if the party is classified as ‘socialist’ in the MPD and 0 if it is not.

Ragin’s measure for necessity coverage ($\text{Cov}_N$) can be calculated as follows:
\[ \text{Cov}_N(C) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} \min(c_i, o_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} c_i}, \]

while Schneider and Wagemann – inspired by Ragin as well as by Goertz (2006a) – assess the relevance of a necessary condition ($\text{Rel}_N$) in the following way:
\[ \text{Rel}_N(C) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} (1 - c_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} (1 - \min(c_i, o_i))}. \]

All of the formulas return values between 0 and 1, with low (high) values indicating that the degree of inclusion/coverage/relevance is low (high).

The same conclusion is reached when intersecting the four indicators pairwise. This is also indicated by the rough cross-sectional ‘between consistency’ and longitudinal ‘within consistency’ scores (García-Castro and Ariño 2013) reported in columns 2–3 and 4–6 of table 3.
These overall conclusions hold also when applying a piecewise logistic function for the calibration of the base variables, and when lowering and raising the thresholds (±5 percentile points). When inclusion and relevance scores are calculated on the basis of concentrated ($\text{con}(m) = m^k$, where $k = 2$) and dilated ($\text{dil}(m) = m^{0.5}$ or $\sqrt{m}$ if $k = 2$) membership scores, the inclusion score of $\text{nat1} \cup \text{nat2}$ (all cases) falls slightly below the 0.75 threshold.

Despite some questionable categorizations, I have included all parties classified into the ‘socialist’ and ‘nationalist’ families in the MPD. In addition, I have also included 14 parties that, despite being classified into other party families, often are seen as far right or far left parties in the literature. These are the far right Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang (Belgium), Fremskridtspartiet (Denmark), Perussuomalaiset (Finland), Alternative für Deutschland (Germany), Partija tvarka ir teisingumas (Lithuania), Fremskrittspartiet (Norway), Liga Polskich Rodzin (Poland), Ny Demokrati (Sweden), Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz (Switzerland), Schweizerische Volkspartei (Switzerland), and UK Independence Party, and the far left Anorthotikό Kόmma Ergazόmenou Laosí (Cyprus), Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð (Iceland), and Sinn Féin (Ireland).

Their proposed logit scale, $\theta^{(l)}$, is calculated as follows:

$$\theta^{(l)} = \log \frac{R + o'}{L + o'} = \log(R + o') - \log(L + o'),$$

where $R$ is the share of ‘right’ sentences, $L$ the share of ‘left’ sentences, and $o' = 100\frac{5}{N} = \frac{10}{N}$ (with $N$ being the total number of sentences).

The (linear) calibration of NECs is performed as follows:

$$m_{G}(x, \tau_p, p, q) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \tau_{in1} \geq x_i, \\ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\tau_{in1} - x_i}{\tau_{cr1} - \tau_{in1}} \right)^q & \text{if } \tau_{in1} < x_i \leq \tau_{cr1}, \\ \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\tau_{ex1} - x_i}{\tau_{cr1} - \tau_{ex1}} \right)^p & \text{if } \tau_{cr1} < x_i \leq \tau_{ex1}, \\ 0 & \text{if } \tau_{ex1} < x_i, \end{cases}$$

while the calibration of PMCs is done in the following way:

$$m_{G}(x, \tau_p, p, q) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \tau_{ex1} \geq x_i, \\ \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\tau_{ex1} - x_i}{\tau_{cr1} - \tau_{ex1}} \right)^p & \text{if } \tau_{ex1} < x_i \leq \tau_{cr1}, \\ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\tau_{cr1} - x_i}{\tau_{in1} - \tau_{cr1}} \right)^q & \text{if } \tau_{cr1} < x_i \leq \tau_{in1}, \\ \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\tau_{in2} - x_i}{\tau_{in1} - \tau_{in2}} \right)^p & \text{if } \tau_{in1} \leq x_i \leq \tau_{in2}, \\ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\tau_{in2} - x_i}{\tau_{cr2} - \tau_{in2}} \right)^q & \text{if } \tau_{in2} < x_i \leq \tau_{cr2}, \\ \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\tau_{ex2} - x_i}{\tau_{cr2} - \tau_{ex2}} \right)^p & \text{if } \tau_{cr2} < x_i \leq \tau_{ex2}, \\ 0 & \text{if } \tau_{ex2} < x_i. \end{cases}$$

Again, $x$ is the base variable and $p$ and $q$ are parameters for controlling the degrees of concentration and dilation. For the calibration of positive mid-point concepts, $\tau_{ex1}$ is the left-hand threshold for full exclusion, $\tau_{cr1}$ the left-hand crossover point, and $\tau_{in1}$ the left-hand threshold for full inclusion. $\tau_{in2}$ is the right-hand threshold for full inclusion, $\tau_{cr2}$ the right-hand crossover point, and $\tau_{ex2}$ the right-hand threshold for full exclusion (Thiem and Duşa 2013).

The symmetrical calibration of the PEC and NEC versions of the sociocultural scale leads, naturally, to results that are exact mirror images of each other. Hence, I only report the results for the PEC scale (exp. 2a, 2b), noting that the conclusions are equally relevant also for the NEC scale (exp. 2c, 2d).
References


Gemenis, K. (2013). What to do (and not to do) with the Comparative Manifestos Project data. *Political Studies* 61(S1), 23–43.


Hainsworth, P. (2008). *The Extreme Right in Western Europe*. Abingdon, UK:


Tables and figures

Table 1: Min–max definitions of the far right

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute (abbreviation)</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nativism (nat)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-systemness (asy)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>populism (pop)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authoritarianism (aut)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traditional ethics (con)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>socioeconomic centrism (cen)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-leftism (ale)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroskepticism (eur)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘globaphobia’ (glo)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Min–max definitions of the far left

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute (abbreviation)</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>anti-capitalist socialism (soc)</td>
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<td>ᵃ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ecologism (eco)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feminism (fem)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liberal ethics (lib)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multiculturalism (mul)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-imperialism (aim)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-fascism (afa)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-systemness (asy)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>populism (pop)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroskepticism (eur)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘globaphobia’ (glo)</td>
<td>ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Table 3: Necessity inclusion scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incl&lt;sub&gt;N&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All cases</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>CEE + Turkey</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>2000s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nat1 (601)</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nat2 (608)</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nat1 ∩ nat2</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nat1 ∪ nat2</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nat1Γnat2</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soc1 (404)</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soc2 (412)</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soc3 (413)</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soc4 (415)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i=1 soc&lt;sub&gt;i&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i=1 soc&lt;sub&gt;i&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i=1 soc&lt;sub&gt;i&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,976</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 4: Correlations between party family and set membership scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>p&lt;sub&gt;pb&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All cases</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>CEE + Turkey</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>2000s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socult&lt;sup&gt;(r)&lt;/sup&gt; (PEC)</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soccon&lt;sup&gt;(r)&lt;/sup&gt; (PMC)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soccon&lt;sup&gt;(r)&lt;/sup&gt; (PEC)</td>
<td>−0.45</td>
<td>−0.61</td>
<td>−0.24</td>
<td>−0.45</td>
<td>−0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eur&lt;sup&gt;(r)&lt;/sup&gt; (NEC)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asy&lt;sup&gt;(r)&lt;/sup&gt; (NEC)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 5: Ideological locations of far right and far left manifestos

(a) sociocultural scale (PEC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>( S_{ocult}^{(r)} )</th>
<th>left</th>
<th>right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>far left</td>
<td></td>
<td>158</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>far right</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \( S_{ocult}^{(r)} = \) ‘left’ if \(< 0.50\), and ‘right’ if \(\geq 0.50\). Most cases are expected to fall in the gray-shaded cells.

(b) socioeconomic scale (PMC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>( S_{oecon}^{(r)} )</th>
<th>poles</th>
<th>centre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>far left</td>
<td></td>
<td>131</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>far right</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \( S_{oecon}^{(r)} = \) ‘poles’ if \(< 0.50\), and ‘centre’ if \(\geq 0.50\). Most cases are expected to fall in the gray-shaded cells.

(c) socioeconomic scale (NEC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>( S_{oecon}^{(r)} )</th>
<th>right</th>
<th>left</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>far left</td>
<td></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>far right</td>
<td></td>
<td>139</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \( S_{oecon}^{(r)} = \) ‘right’ if \(< 0.50\), and ‘left’ if \(\geq 0.50\). Most cases are expected to fall in the gray-shaded cells.
Appendix

Table A1: Sample of studies on far right and far left ideologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author name(s) and date of publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Far right</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Far left</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amini (2015); Backes and Moreau (2008); Botella and Ramiro (2003); Bull (1994); Charalambous (2011); De Waele and Vieira (2012); Dunphy (2004); Escalona and Vieira (2013); Fagerholm (2016b); Gomez et al. (2016); Hudson (2000, 2012); Lazar (1998); March (2008, 2012a, 2012b); March and Mudde (2005); Ziblatt and Biziouras (2002).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: For publication details, see the list of references.*

Table A2: Scales used in the empirical examination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>‘Right’ pole</th>
<th>‘Left’ pole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>601: National Way of Life (+)</td>
<td>502: Culture (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>603: Traditional Morality (+)</td>
<td>602: National Way of Life (–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>605: Law and Order (+)</td>
<td>604: Traditional Morality (–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>608: Multiculturalism (–)</td>
<td>607: Multiculturalism (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>socio-economic</td>
<td>401: Free Enterprise (+)</td>
<td>403: Market Regulation (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>402: Incentives (+)</td>
<td>404: Economic Planning (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>407: Protectionism (–)</td>
<td>406: Protectionism (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>414: Economic Orthodoxy (+)</td>
<td>412: Controlled Economy (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>505: Welfare State Limitation (+)</td>
<td>413: Nationalisation (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro-skepticism</td>
<td>108: European Integration (+)</td>
<td>110: European Integration (–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-systemness</td>
<td>203: Constitutionalism (+)</td>
<td>204: Constitutionalism (–)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: For more detailed definitions of the categories, see Klingemann et al. (2006: 186–190).*
| Base variable                      | Min  | Max  | Mean | SD  | $P_{20}$ | $P_{50}$ | $P_{80}$ | $\tau_{ex1}$ | $\tau_{cr1}$ | $\tau_{in1}$ | $\tau_{in2}$ | $\tau_{cr2}$ | $\tau_{ex2}$ |
|-----------------------------------|------|------|------|-----|----------|----------|----------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| 601: National Way of Life (+)     | 0.00 | 57.33| 2.67 | 5.01| 0.00     | 0.84     | 3.71     | 0.75          | 2.00          | 7.00          |               |               |               |
| 608: Multiculturalism (-)         | 0.00 | 21.05| 0.39 | 1.50| 0.00     | 0.00     | 0.15     | 0.00          | 0.20          | 1.00          |               |               |               |
| 404: Economic Planning (+)        | 0.00 | 15.38| 0.52 | 1.25| 0.00     | 0.00     | 0.71     | 0.00          | 0.30          | 1.50          |               |               |               |
| 412: Controlled Economy (+)       | 0.00 | 21.43| 0.68 | 1.65| 0.00     | 0.00     | 0.86     | 0.00          | 0.30          | 2.00          |               |               |               |
| 413: Nationalisation (+)          | 0.00 | 17.86| 0.36 | 1.06| 0.00     | 0.00     | 0.30     | 0.00          | 0.20          | 1.00          |               |               |               |
| 415: Marxist Analysis (+)         | 0.00 | 60.55| 0.28 | 2.35| 0.00     | 0.00     | 0.00     | 0.00          | 0.20          | 0.50          |               |               |               |
| $Socult^{(r)}$ (PEC, for exp. 2a, 2b) | −1.00| 1.00 | 0.04 | 0.57| −0.52    | 0.05     | 0.60     | −0.80         | 0.00          | 0.80          |               |               |               |
| $Socult^{(r)}$ (NEC, for exp. 2c, 2d) | “”  | “”  | “”  | “”  | “”       | “”       | “”       | “”            | “”            | “”            |               |               |               |
| $Soecon^{(r)}$ (PMC, for exp. 3a, 3b) | −1.00| 1.00 | 0.24 | 0.56| −0.26    | 0.28     | 0.83     | −0.80         | −0.50         | −0.20         | 0.20          | 0.50          | 0.80          |
| $Soecon^{(r)}$ (NEC, for exp. 3c, 3d) | “”  | “”  | “”  | “”  | “”       | “”       | “”       | “”            | 0.80          | “”            |               |               |               |
| $Eur^{(r)}$ (NEC, for exp. 4)    | −1.00| 1.00 | 0.49 | 0.64| 0.00     | 1.00     | 1.00     | 0.80          | 0.00          | −0.80         |               |               |               |
| $Asy^{(r)}$ (NEC, for exp. 5)    | −1.00| 1.00 | 0.30 | 0.63| 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00     | 0.80          | 0.00          | −0.80         |               |               |               |
| $Socult^{(l)}$ (PEC, for exp. 2a, 2b) | −6.25| 5.84 | 0.12 | 1.54| −1.10    | 0.11     | 1.27     | −1.81         | 0.11          | 1.95          |               |               |               |
| $Socult^{(l)}$ (NEC, for exp. 2c, 2d) | “”  | “”  | “”  | “”  | “”       | “”       | “”       | “”            | 1.95          | “”            | −1.81         |               |               |
| $Soecon^{(l)}$ (PMC, for exp. 3a, 3b) | −4.55| 6.08 | 0.63 | 1.53| −0.51    | 0.55     | 1.91     | −1.22         | −0.26         | 0.20          | 0.89          | 1.59          | 2.66          |
| $Soecon^{(l)}$ (NEC, for exp. 3c, 3d) | “”  | “”  | “”  | “”  | “”       | “”       | “”       | “”            | 2.66          | “”            | −1.22         |               |               |
| $Eur^{(l)}$ (NEC, for exp. 4)    | −5.07| 5.98 | 1.32 | 1.91| 0.00     | 1.17     | 2.98     | 3.85          | 1.17          | −0.94         |               |               |               |
| $Asy^{(l)}$ (NEC, for exp. 5)    | −4.96| 5.41 | 0.66 | 1.53| 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.95     | 2.71          | 0.00          | −0.91         |               |               |               |

*N = 1,976.*