State Policies, Political Discourse and ‘White’ Public Opinion on Ethnic Relations and Immigration in Britain: Pushing The Borders of ‘Extremity’?

Workshop: Democracy and the New Extremist Challenge in Europe
Directors: Roger Eatwell and Cas Mudde

Joint Sessions of Workshops
European Consortium for Political Research
Genoble, 6th April to 11th April, 2001

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--First draft of manuscript--
1. Introduction

Considering the large number of studies in the social sciences on people’s voting preferences and attitudes, one might think that we would fully understand ‘public opinion’. Indeed we do have considerable knowledge about the end product – the contents of public opinion – but on some topics, such as racist sentiments and the holding of extreme right opinions, it is difficult even to reach a position on this, as people are often unwilling to express morally sanctionable ‘extremist’ opinions in response to survey questionnaires. This may be one reason why when extreme right parties gain a significant number of votes in a particular area, this event is experienced by the mass media and social scientists alike as a ‘shock’ or ‘breakthough’, and subsequently becomes interpreted as a new potential rise of neo-fascism and threat to democracy. More generally, it is clear that social science has advanced less in understanding another aspect of ‘public opinion’, namely, regarding what issues mean to people, and how they reach their understandings of public problems (Gamson 1992).

Public opinion is a construct: it is significant not only quantitatively in an aggregate sense, but also qualitatively in the range of opinions that are available in the social world with reference to specific problems. There are contextual factors which affect the way in which publics view the world and interpret events, and which thereby influence individual and collective action. Mass mediated information that appears in political discourse – itself a product of the news selection and framing of public affairs – is filtered through an interpretative screen that is shaped by personal and cultural experiences. It is therefore important to understand along which ideological cleavages public opinion varies, and the range of public opinion which may be held by people in a specific social environment.

As it is difficult to gain information on the contents of public opinion, especially regarding the potential for holding racist sentiments and extreme right values, one important inroad is to attempt to understand how ordinary ‘white’ people form opinions on issues of immigration and ethnic relations. By comparing the variance of ‘white’ public opinions in relation to different political issues in this field and in relations to different categorisations of ethnic minorities and migrants, it is possible to identify in relation to which topics and in relation to which groups, people express racist or ‘extreme’ sentiments. In this sense, racist or extreme opinions are considered as a psychological phenomenon that may be widespread or even normal in specific social settings. Our aim is not to deal with people who transgress the limits of ‘normal’ racist or extreme sentiments expressed on topics of ethnic relations and immigration, i.e. individual pathological cases, or members of racist organisations. Instead the aim is to inquire into the process by which the boundaries and normative limits of expressed sentiments on these highly contentious topics are constructed, and become culturally accepted in specific social settings. In order to analyse public perceptions of ethnic relations and immigration politics and minorities/migrants, we have used an original experimental method for peer group discussions, that is inspired largely by the classical tradition for the focussed interview (Merton and Kendall 1946) and subsequent advances pioneered by David Morrison and colleagues (1998, MacGregor and Morrison 1995), and the ‘peer group conversations’ framing approach drawn from social movement research used by Gamson in ‘Talking Politics’ (1992).

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1 The data for this research was collected with the assistance of a grant awards from the British Economic and Social Research Council (R000236558) (R000239221) which are gratefully acknowledged.
Although the principal focus of this paper is how opinions are constructed by ethnic majority peer groups on problems relating to ethnic relations and immigration, it would be wrong to assume that perceptions of public problems are transferred directly from their policy or legal definitions into individual perceptions or private collective worlds. People’s understandings of political issues are mediated. According to this perspective, the salience of issues in the public domain will have an important affect in shaping how political issues become understood when they are cognitively transferred to the private worlds of peer groups, though salience itself will not necessarily directly condition the level of intensity or orientation of public attitudes. It is therefore important to reach an understanding of the structure of the field of ‘contentious politics’—both its ideological contents, and the positions of different state and civil society actors— that is visible and resonant in the public domain, as this will be an important cognitive resource for ordinary people to form opinions and take positions. In a large international project MERCI, we have gathered a large data-base on acts of political claims-making over ethnic relations and immigration in the public. By political claims-making we refer not only to conventional forms of protest and collective mobilisation that have been the focus of many social movement studies, but also to speech acts and more conventional action forms, which make demands visible in the public domain. In this paper, I shall use the British data-set, so that we have base-line information on the macro-level structure of the contentious politics of immigration and ethnic relations, and thus we are in a position to gauge the opinion formation of our peer groups both in relation to public policy positions, and in relations to the dominant and minority opinions expressed in the public domain. Before proceeding to the method, analysis and findings, first a few brief comments will be made on how this paper fits into the overall perspective that is advanced by the research project.

2. Political Opportunities, ‘Citizenship’ and Political Socialisation

In the recent literature, many authors have pointed to the ways that national policies and laws governing citizenship and naturalisation can impact upon the integration of minorities and shape the patterns of migration and ethnic relations politics (e.g., Brubaker 1992, Castles 1995). Some such as Patrick Ireland (1994), have described these institutional frameworks as a ‘political opportunity structure’, where variables of citizenship laws, naturalisation procedures, and social and political rights, including social welfare, are seen to shape the patterns of the collective organisation by minorities and migrants. Others such as Adrian Favell (1998), have pointed out that such institutional variables have a public discursive dimension— as ‘public philosophies of integration’— which are embedded in a nationally specific set of language and symbols, and through which they achieve legitimacy. In general, however, one might claim that the application of opportunity approaches in this field is still in its infancy.

Social movements scholars (e.g., Tarrow 1989, 1998) have long used the concept of ‘political opportunities’ for studying protest and collective mobilization, and it is also well established

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2 Such an approach is shared by both the agenda-setting tradition in communications research (e.g. McCombs and Shaw, Neuman, Just and Crigler) and the political discourse and framing tradition in social movement research tradition (e.g. Gamson).

3 The MERCI (Mobilisation on Ethnic Relations Citizenship and Immigration) project group includes the author and Ruud Koopmans at the WZB Berlin, Marco Giugni and Florence Passy at the University of Geneva, and Thom Duyvene de Wit from the University of Amsterdam.
that political opportunities have both institutional and discursive dimensions (see the contributions to McAdam, McCarthy and Zald eds. 1996). In the international comparative project MERCI, a systematic attempt is made to apply a political opportunity approach for comparing ‘claims-making’ by collective actors in the field of migration and ethnic relations politics. The different national institutional forms and discourses about ‘citizenship’ have been identified as a key variable for defining the structure of political opportunities which confronts claims-makers. Following the findings of the citizenship literature mentioned above, the determinants for the degree and form of inclusiveness/exclusiveness of a national politics for incorporating migrants/minorities can be defined along two broad dimensions of citizenship: first, the criteria for formal access to citizenship, and secondly, the cultural obligations that this access to citizenship entails. It should also be made explicit here that when we refer to ‘citizenship’, we are not just referring to the ‘narrow’ meaning of citizenship in formal legal statutes, but to citizenship as a field where political and social rights, and cultural obligations, are contested by collective action (see Tilly 1997).

In the earlier research (see e.g. Statham 1999, Statham 2001, Koopmans and Statham 1999a, Koopmans and Statham b, Koopmans and Statham 2000), we focused on the attribution of citizenship rights by a nation-state as a key defining element for the ‘political opportunity structure’ which shaped the mobilisation of ethnic minorities and migrants, as well as other collective actors (state, civil society and extreme right) making contentious claims in the public domain. The primary focus of this paper, however, is not to link a state’s policies to the contested field of mobilisation in the public sphere. Instead it inquires into the next link of the chain, namely, how the publicly mediated information on contentious politics is used by groups of ordinary people when they construct their understandings of these problems. In this research, the aim is to analyse to what extent the different ways in which a state’s policy approach treats migrants and minorities --through attributing citizenship rights-- becomes ‘internalised’ and shapes the collective understandings of groups of ordinary people on minorities/migrants. In short, to what extent do the ‘official’ political norms that define the relationship of ethnic minorities and migrants within the national political community, affect the way in which groups of ordinary people from the ethnic majority define their own relationship to minorities and migrants in peer group discourse?

Political socialisation is the process by which ideas held by individuals become norms in the sense of collective understandings about appropriate behaviour in relation to a public problem. Much of the classic social science literature on socialisation has emphasised the importance of peer group and social group interaction as the key environment for the internalisation of political norms. For example, Dawson and Prewitt (1969) argue that political socialisation ‘molds and shapes the citizen’s relation to the political community’. In this instance, the way that ‘white’ peer groups construct their positions on the relationship of minorities and migrants within the national community, gives us important information on how they view their own relationships to minorities and migrants, and the way in which they construct boundary markers (self/other definitions) which demarcate the degree of inclusiveness which they are prepared to extend to minorities and migrants as part of a common shared community. On the basis of comparing the positions of ‘white’ groups across different issue-fields and in relation to different minority and migrant groups, it is possible to arrive at a grounded understanding of what factors lead to racist or ‘extreme’ public opinions.

Before the analysis, it is first necessary to give a few brief details on method, and principally on focussed peer group discussions, as this may be an unfamiliar approach to some readers.
3. Claims-making and Focussed Peer Group Discussions: A Brief Note on Method

Political information is filtered through an interpretative screen that is shaped by personal and collective experiences in a shared social environment, e.g. common background, age, gender etc.. A survey would be unsuitable for our purposes of empirically gauging this aspect of public opinion, as it lacks the sensitivity which is necessary for ‘unpacking’ how groups speak and form opinions on a topic, on which they may be unwilling to speak directly about. To investigate public understandings of immigration and ethnic relations, moderated focussed group discussions have the advantage of making the participants feel comfortable in a more ‘natural’ setting. Also the group interview has an advantage over individual interviews, in allowing insight into how groups collectively form opinions, negotiate their differences, and take up positions by framing issues in relation to their own experiences. This approach is therefore ideally suited for:

a) mapping the cognitive terrain and cultural cleavages through which different sections of the public (men/women; old/young) interpret issues
b) gauging how closely public opinion matches that of received ‘official’ political information and norms, and the extent to which public opinion has a potential to shift when confronted by alternative viewpoints

Specifically we aim to gain information on:

1. Immigration and Ethnic Relations as a Public Problem: How groups define the public problem. What ‘interpretative frames’ do they use (Snow and Benford 1986, Gamson 1992), and along what axis of ideological cleavage, and to what extent, do their opinions vary in relation to the official political norm?

2. Group ‘self’ and ‘other’ perceptions and collective identities: How do the groups construct ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’ symbolic boundary markers that define the relationship of minorities/migrants to the national political community? On what basis are these distinctions made (e.g., nationality, ethnicity, civic culture, race, religious difference)?

In this paper, public opinion is studied using a variant of the ‘focussed peer discussion group’ method. This is derived from classical ‘focus group’ methods (Merton and Kendall 1946) and the ‘editing group’ method (Morrison 1998, MacGregor and Morrison 1995) which extends this approach analytically, and also draws inspiration from the frame analysis tradition in social movement research (Gamson 1992, Snow and Benford 1986). In focussed peer group discussions, the groups are stimulated by audio-visual and textual materials which have been selected to focus their attention on specific problems in the political issue-field. Groups are made to question their judgements on actual cases by confronting them with different visual/textual accounts representing a range of alternative opinions. The specific issues selected for discussion are selected strategically, and in this case were selected to be compatible with the claims-making data set on immigration and ethnic relations. The actual ‘focussing’ technique has the advantage of reducing dependence on abstract linguistic accounts that occur if the group is just left to talk about a topic. In addition, the peer group can be asked to give their collective ‘preferred readings’ of specific news stories or relevant political events, and the resultant discussion gives empirical insight into their process of deliberation, and the normative limits within which their range of opinions may cluster. Each

Note that a brief description of the method for political claims-making analysis is included in the section discussion the field. It is detailed more fully in a published article on methods (Koopmans and Statham 1999).
group is video-recorded (with the group’s permission and after assurances of anonymity) and their discussions transcribed and subject to frame analysis (see details in analysis below). The empirical data outputs are the group’s framing of collective positions on immigration and ethnic relations, and the qualitative detail derived from the group’s collective process of deliberation and categorisation (e.g. self/other boundaries in relation to minorities/migrants) in the discussions by which they reach decisions.

Our ‘White’ peer groups were varied by age, gender, and locality, and to guard against an unrepresentative composition of groups a professional recruitment agency was used. The two localities used, were Bradford and Catford. Both are inner-urban areas, where populations are roughly 50/50% mixed between the majority and minority population. Bradford is in the North of England and has a high proportion of Asian minorities of mainly Pakistani background, who are Muslims, whereas Catford is in SE London and the minority population is largely African-Caribbean.

‘White’ peer group composition:
Six groups: 3 male, 3 female; 2 of each age cohort 16-24, 24-45, 45+ years; 3 Bradford, 3 Catford; between 8 and 11 participants in each group.

4. The Political Context: Ethnic Relations and Immigration Politics in Britain

Before presenting the findings, it is first necessary to give a few basic details on the contours of British race relations and immigration politics and the principles on which they are founded, as it is around such official norms that the variance of the groups will be constructed. Secondly, it is necessary to demonstrate how we broke the whole ethnic relations and immigration issue-field down into distinct sub-issue fields, so that we could tease out differences in the collective positions of the groups across a range of specific issues in the overall field.

A first important distinction to investigate in the ethnic relations and immigration field relates to the difference between minorities who are formal citizens and non-citizens. Clearly, minorities with full national citizenship rights have greater opportunities for access to institutional politics - e.g., through voting, party representation of interests - and social welfare rights, and are conferred a greater legitimacy in the public domain, than either foreign migrants, refugees, ‘illegal immigrants’ or asylum-seekers. Since the 1971 Immigration and 1981 British Nationality Acts, foreign migrants’ interests are defined externally to the national common good, and defended by the British state principally in response only to post-colonial and international obligations. Whereas British ethnic minorities are clearly defined within the national political community, foreign migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers are not bound up in the system of rights, obligations and duties that are part of national citizenship, and are legally and symbolically defined outside this community.

Regarding ethnic minorities within Britain, there are three distinct sub-fields that we wish to compare in the ethnic relations field. In shorthand, they may be seen as the three pillars that were defined by Roy Jenkins’ famous formula for establishing British Race Relations politics a quarter of a century ago ‘equal opportunity and cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’: integration and anti-discrimination politics; cultural pluralism and group rights; and anti-racism and xenophobia.
The 1976 Race Relations Act and subsequent legislation recognised the principle of ‘racial equality’ for individuals, and introduced measures for redress against discrimination on the basis of ‘race, colour or national origins’ and ‘equal opportunities’, especially in the labour market. In addition, the Commission for Racial Equality was set up as a national watchdog to encourage fair and equal treatment, but with limited advisory powers. By focusing on ‘integration and anti-discrimination’ politics, the aim is to see the distinctions which operate in relating to the extension of social and political rights to British ethnic minorities. These have thus far been attributed by Race Relations policies, and applied through the concepts of ‘racial equality’ and ‘equality of opportunity’ for the individual in particular at the point of access to social welfare and the labour market.

Turning to Jenkins’ second pillar ‘cultural diversity’, this refers to the cultural obligations which the state places on defining access to citizenship. These may range from assimilationist to cultural pluralist approaches, which differ in the degree of cultural homogeneity a state demands in attributing full rights to minorities. Assimilationism is the more demanding variant, requiring the minority to undergo full conversion to the dominant national culture as the single and unitary focus of identity and belonging within the national political community. In contrast, cultural pluralism is the more accepting variant, where the state recognises the right of the minority to retain a degree of ethnic or religious difference as part of the deal for full inclusion in the national political community. Of course, much depends on the specific categorisation of cultural diversity which a state chooses to recognise as legitimate within its strategy for incorporating minorities within the framework of the national community. These official forms of categorisation for minority groups are important symbolic markers for inclusion in the national community. The British ‘racial’ form of ethnic relations politics is a hybrid between the extremes of assimilationism and cultural pluralism. It recognises one form of cultural diversity -race- as the basis for requiring redress to the discrimination, which prevents full access to social and political equality for minorities. However, this official state sponsorship for ‘racial equality’ represents only a minimalist cultural pluralism, where other types of cultural diversity, such as religious identification, are relegated to the status of individual private concerns. British ‘race relations’ policy has been famously restrictive in acknowledging the group demands of religious groups to qualify as minorities: Jews and Sikhs qualify by default being included as racial and ethnic groups, whereas Muslims are not covered by ‘racial equality’ against acts of discrimination. By focusing on ‘cultural pluralism and group rights’, the aim is to examine the distinctions which operate in relating to the extension of cultural and group rights to British ethnic minorities.

Lastly, we sought to examine issues relating to the third component of Jenkins’ formula ‘an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ by defining the sub-field of ‘anti-racism and xenophobia’. Here the starting point is the sanctions and implementation by the state of policies to protect minorities against acts of racism in the public domain, and repression of the activities of groups from the ethnic majority who perpetrate and promote racism and xenophobia. By focusing on ‘anti-racism and xenophobia’, the aim is to examine the distinctions which operate in relating to the extension of preventive rights against groups from the ethnic majority who undertake public acts of racism and xenophobia against British ethnic minorities.

These four sub-fields of ethnic relations and immigration politics are summarised in table 1. Table 1 outlines the four sets of contested rights for defining minorities/migrants in relation to the national community that we wanted to examine, along with the relevant beneficiary
groups of these demands, and the topics that were used for focussing the attention of the peer
group discussions (see below).

-Table one about here-

5. The Contentious Politics of British Ethnic Relations and Immigration Politics –
Claims-making in the Public Domain

5.1. The Overall Field of Political Claims-making in the Public Domain

For this paper, we start from the premise that a state’s stance on attributing citizenship and
recognising cultural pluralism within its definition of the political community --the famous
British Race Relations approach—importantly shapes the field of political contention about
such issues in the public domain. We therefore restrict the analysis of our data on political
claims-making to briefly describing how the four sub-issue-fields under consideration appear
empirically as contested fields in the public domain. This overview of the contours of the four
contested issue-fields is an important baseline for interpreting the viewpoints expressed by
our groups, as it will show to what extent their opinions vary from or follow the dominant
opinions which are mobilised by collective actors in the public domain.

The potential for challenges by collective actors to achieve framing successes –i.e. binding
the interests of their beneficiary within a common public good– is dependent on the overall
political context and discursive opportunities which confront them. Table 2 represents the
discursive political spaces confronting challengers in British ethnic relations and immigration
politics. An original data set is used on acts of collective claims-making in British ethnic
relations and immigration politics, 1990-6. Collective claims-making takes the form of public
statements, interviews, press conferences or other speech acts, but also includes protest forms
such as demonstrations or violence. The data set is derived from a content analysis of instances
of claims-making –by all kinds of collective actors, not just movements and civil society actors–
reported in the national media. 5

Thematically, ‘immigration and asylum’ covers all claims referring to the relationship
between foreign migrants and the British nation-state, including border control, policies,
social provision and migrants’ rights. Conversely, ‘Integration’, ‘Cultural pluralism’ and
‘Antiracism/Xenophobia’ politics all relate to the relationship between the ethnic majority

5 For this study, the core data source was The Guardian, a national broadsheet with a reputation for a consistent
and detailed coverage of the topic. Reports on the topic were collected from the news sections of the newspaper,
omitting editorial and commentary sections, for three editions (Monday, Wednesday and Friday) each week.
Journalistic opinion and commentary on the reported events is excluded from the analysis, as the media’s own
opinion is not the topic of investigation. The research strategy is to use the newspaper source as a public record
of significant political events. This follows in the methodological tradition of protest event analysis from social
movement research (see especially, Rucht et al. eds. 1998), and not that of many media contents analyses which
take the article as the unit of analysis. The unit of analysis for ‘claims-making’ is the reported act. All acts
within the ethnic, racist/extreme right, and anti-racist mobilisation fields are coded, plus all acts by all actors in
the issue-fields of asylum/immigration, ethnic relations, anti-racism/xenophobia relevant to Britain. Important
variables refer to: actor types; collective identities; action forms; the size, target and intensity of protest
mobilisation (where present); and the institutional or civil society actor on whom demands are made
(addresssee). Regarding the ideological content of claims, these are coded for their political aims, using a large
and detailed category system, and the language of the actual claim is stored in the data-base to enable frame
analysis. The resultant database has a high level of flexibility. It is suitable for macro-level analyses of general
issue-fields, but at the same time it can give detailed information on a particular actor and its strategic location
within an issue-field.
and minorities who are full British citizens, including issues of state policies and implementation, institutional discrimination, demands for group rights, acts of public racism and prejudice, and extreme right mobilisation. Table 2 shows the proportion of claim-making by different broad categories of collective actors—All Actors; State; Civil Society; Ethnic minority/migrant/pro-minority/migrant/anti-racist; and extreme right and racist organisations—in the four sub-issue fields. In addition, an average valence score is given, ranging from –1 for an anti-minority/anti-migrant/xenophobic position to a +1 pro-minority/pro-migrant position/anti-racist position. This valence was calculated by coding each claim for whether it was anti-migrant or anti-minority/racist (-1), pro-migrant or pro-minority/anti-racist (1), or neutral or ambivalent (0), and then calculating the average valence positions for specific actors, and issue-fields.

A first general point is that the three ‘ethnic relations’ sub-fields, are more pro-minority/migrant (ethnic relations +0.54: integration +0.60, cultural diversity +0.41, and anti-racism/xenophobia +0.52) than immigration (+0.32). This shows that actors are more likely to take positions that are favourable to ethnic minorities than they are toward migrants, and that political contentions over ethnic relations take place on an axis which is more pro-beneficiary, than those over foreign migrants. Another difference concerns the split between institutional and civil society actors. Immigration controversies are dominated by state institutional actors who account for two thirds of claims-making (63.9 percent) with an overall anti-migrant position (+0.03 compared to mean +0.32). In contrast, significantly more than half of claims-making in the ‘ethnic relations’ sub-fields (ethnic relations 56.6%; integration 54.1%; cultural diversity 66.4%; anti-racism/xenophobia politics 55.5%) is by civil society actors. Ethnic relations is thus predominantly a conflict within civil society, whereas the state’s actors play a dominant role in immigration conflicts. Regarding the split between state and civil society actors, there is much less polarization between state and civil society actors in the three fields of ethnic relations (distance between valences of state and civil society actors: integration 0.26; cultural diversity 0.46; and anti-racism/xenophobia 0.17), than for immigration politics (state actors +0.03; civil society actors +0.76: distance 0.73). Importantly, this shorter discursive distance between civil society and state actors in the fields of ethnic relations politics indicates a much more favourable set of discursive opportunities and a greater potential for framing attempts to travel from the public domain to political decision-makers.

These differences between the ethnic relations fields and immigration politics can be traced back to the position of the British state on minorities and migrants. The state defines ethnic minorities’ interests as part of the common public good, by officially recognising that racism and discrimination are detrimental to the whole of British society. Under the 1976 Race Relations Act, enforced by the Commission for Racial Equality, the state upholds the principle of ‘racial equality’, and undertakes to redress the inequality suffered by individual citizens that is caused by direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of ‘race, colour or national origins’. In contrast, since the 1971 Immigration and 1981 British Nationality Acts, foreign migrants’ interests are defined externally to the national common good, and defended by the British state principally in response to post-colonial and international obligations. These differences in the British state’s definition for extending rights and obligations to migrants and minorities strongly influence the differential sets of opportunities which are available for pro-migrant and pro-minority claims-making. Whereas opposition to the inequality caused by racism and discrimination is formally embedded in state legislation and
political practices, extending rights and recognition to ethnic minorities within British politics, foreign migrants have high restrictions placed on their rights of access and residence, and are defined as ‘outsiders’ to the national political community. In general, it is much easier for collective actors in the British public domain to support minorities than migrants, because the institutionally embedded state position provides greater incentives of material and symbolic resources for claims-making on behalf of a beneficiary whose well-being is officially part of the common good.

Turning to the differences within the ethnic relations sub-fields, the first point to make concerns the position of the state and civil society actors on cultural diversity and group rights, who take a strikingly more anti-minority position (state –0.15; civil society +0.31) than they do for integration/anti-discrimination (state +0.44; civil society +0.70) and anti-racism/xenophobia (state +0.48; civil society +0.65) issues. This means that actors making claims for cultural group rights face a less receptive political discourse and have greater difficulty making their demands visible, resonant and legitimate in the British public domain, than those mobilising on behalf of minorities for equal social and political rights, and protection against acts of racism. This difference can be traced back to the British state’s Race Relations approach, whereby ‘race’ is the only recognised form of cultural pluralism for including minorities within a system of equal rights. Thus demands for an extension or defence of existing integration policies –equal opportunities, race equality and race relations-or against racism receive support and are more easily legitimated in the public domain. On the contrary, demands for the recognition of non-racial cultural diversity, for example, for equal rights for Muslim or Rastafarian religious groups, are not included in the British state’s concept for belonging to the British political community, and have fewer potential allies in the public domain. Indeed it is noteworthy that all most half (45.7%) of cultural rights demands came from the minority movement sector itself, and were strongly pro-minority (+0.88). This indicates the demands for cultural group rights are very much a bottom-up demand made by minorities and their closest allies within the framework of British ethnic relations politics.

A final point to make concerns the field of antiracism/xenophobia in the ethnic relations field. This is the only field where there is a significant counter-movement to the minority movement sector. Here the extreme right and racist organisations account for 8.3% of claims-making, but are a very long discursive distance from both state and civil society actors (-1 compared to state +0.48 and civil society +0.65). This demonstrates the pariah status of the extreme right and such organisations in British ethnic relations politics, and this is also demonstrated by the fact that the claims-making of such organisations has virtually no presence in the other issue-fields. In Britain, such organisations are largely restricted to making xenophobic statements and protesting against repression.

5.2. Group ‘Labelling’ by Claims-making in the Public Domain

A second important form of ‘representations’ in the public domain, that may be carried over into the cognition of peer groups in relation to ethnic relations and immigration issues, is the way that groups are labelled as collective identities. The collective identities which groups use to refer to other groups in their political claims-making are part of a process of ‘self’ and ‘other’ categorisation. In ethnic relations and immigration politics, the symbolic boundary that is being demarcated through ‘self’ and ‘other’ categorisation is the relationship of ethnic minorities/migrants to the national political community. Hence the collective identities which one ethnic group uses to signify another when entering the public domain, constitutes a
strategic dimension of claims-making. For example, a collective actor making claims about minorities from a Pakistani background in Britain may refer to them as ‘Pakistanis’, ‘Asians’, ‘Muslims’, or as ‘Black’. The specific label for a collective identity which is used is important because as we have seen British ethnic relations politics recognises the legitimacy of demands made for racial minorities, ‘Black’ or ‘Asian’, and not religious identities, such as ‘Muslim’.

In Table 3, we have taken four categories of collective identities that represent specific types of group within a sub-field of immigration and ethnic relations politics: racial groups ‘Black’; religious groups ‘Muslim’; migrant groups ‘Asylum-seekers’; and racist groups ‘Extreme Right’ and other named ‘Racist organisations’. Table 3 shows the average valence of political claims-making by collective actors which explicitly used these signifying collective identities in their claims. This operates once more on a scale of –1 for anti-minority/anti-migrant/xenophobic to +1 for pro-minority/pro-migrant/anti-racist, and what it shows is how specifically named groups appear in the public domain when they are explicitly referred to. The findings once more follow an interpretation similar to that in comparing the different sub-issue fields. The official racialised label for British minorities ‘Black’ has a much more pro-beneficiary valence (+0.52) in minority politics, than ‘Asylum-seeker’ (+0.09) —a much used label for refugees and foreign migrants— does in immigration and asylum politics. This can be traced once more to the differential sets of citizenship rights between British minorities who are defined within the political community, and refugees, migrants and asylum-seekers who are defined externally, and whose status is often represented in a stigmatising way in the public domain.

However, turning to ‘ethnic groups’ there are also significant differences in the valences among British minorities. The officially sponsored racial category ‘Black’ receives a much more pro-minority representation (+0.52) in the political discourse, than the non-recognised religious category ‘Muslim’ (+0.13). Several authors have referred to a rise of an ideology of ‘Islamophobia’ in Britain, which they see as a specific cultural discourse and type of ‘new racism’ (see e.g., Brown 2000). The perspective defended here, gives evidence of the stigmatisation of Muslims, but argues that rather than being ‘new’ types of ideology emerging autonomously as cultural discourses, the negative representations of Muslims can be traced back to the specific political context and the fact that the British state does not confer a legitimate status on religious groups. There is little space to develop this point further here (see below in relation to this research, and Koopmans and Statham 2000, Statham 2001 for the political opportunity perspective on claims-making), but the main point is that discursive battles over collective identities are not simply competitions between free floating ideologies or cultural symbols, but are embedded in conflicts at the level of social relationships which are strongly shaped by the political environment.

---Table 3 about here---

---Further, it should be pointed out that Jews and Sikhs are included as ‘races’ in British legal understandings and political norms of racial equality. This means that Anti-semitism is akin to Racism in the British political context. In contrast, Anti-muslim sentiments are easier to express in the public domain as they do not have the

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6 ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ definitions are commonly used in sociology as the symbolic boundary constructions of identity and belonging through which groups define ‘otherness’, in particular through national identity (see e.g. Smith) and ethnic identity constructions (see e.g. Wallman, Husbands). Such a perspective on in-group/out-group definition has its roots in Weber’s chapter on ‘Ethnic Community Sociation’ in Economy and Society (1972). For perspectives which related collective identity construction to political action, see the social movements research by Melucci (1989) and Eder (1993).

7 Further, it should be pointed out that Jews and Sikhs are included as ‘races’ in British legal understandings and political norms of racial equality. This means that Anti-semitism is akin to Racism in the British political context. In contrast, Anti-muslim sentiments are easier to express in the public domain as they do not have the
from the claims-making data, is that political claims referring to named ‘Extreme right and racist organisations’ gave a strongly pro-minority/anti-racist valence (+0.68). This shows the strong criticism against and pariah status of extreme right and racist organisations in the British political discourse. There are relatively low costs involved for collective actors who take up a position against organisations whose activities are either explicitly racist and outlawed, or associated with ideological positions, i.e. racism, and that directly contradict the state’s stance for racial equality.


After briefly examining the structure of contested issue fields and the representation of specific groups in the mainstream political discourse, we now turn our attention to assessing how this political information becomes transferred into the cognition of peer groups, and how they construct their shared understandings of such problems in relation to their own experiential knowledge of the social world. In this instance we will be dealing with six ‘White’ peer groups, and the symbolic boundary constructions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ that we wish to examine, will give important information on their perceived preferences on the relationship between minorities/migrants and the national community.

6.1. Framing Problems in Ethnic Relations and Immigration Politics

The concept of framing has been widely used in social movement research as the analytic category for ideological constructs and arguments (see e.g., Snow and Benford 1986, Gamson and Modigliani 1989). Frames are the conceptual tools which actors use to convey, interpret and evaluate information. Often the concept of framing has been used in social movement research to show how ideas flow from movements to potential constituencies and galvanise participation as a prerequisite for collective mobilisation, or alternatively how they transport the movement’s demands into the wider public domain, and introduce ‘frame alignment processes’ which challenge and modify the dominant viewpoint in the political discourse. However, the concept of framing has also been used analytically to study how peer groups of ordinary people view contentious topics that appear in political discourse, in order to examine their potential for being mobilised or getting involved in collective action (Gamson 1992). Here we shall use the concept of framing for studying the way in which the opinion formation of peer groups of ordinary people varies across specific topics in the ethnic relations and immigration field. Unlike Gamson, we are not searching for candidates for collective mobilisation, though like him, we do use frame analysis as a way of comparing the different ways in which people understand and are motivated by public problems.

In part inspired by the important research on framing by Snow and Benford (1988, 200-204), we distinguished between four types of framing, through which our peer groups could express their interpretations of the contentious public problems, when focussing on topics: moral appeals, diagnostic, prognostic and motivational.

**Moral appeals** (0) are claims which refer to a normative image of the ‘beneficiary’ or are expressions of values, e.g. depictions of asylum-seekers as “victims,” or alternatively self-
depictions by white people of themselves as ‘sympathetic’ or as ‘good people’ in their dealings with minorities and migrants.\(^8\)

**Diagnostic framing** (1) is when claims identify, specify and define a public problem by attributing blame or causality.

**Prognostic framing** (2) occurs when claims go a step beyond problem specification and blaming, and they define strategies, tactics and targets about “what is to be done.”

**Motivational framing** (3) are claims which constitute a “call to arms” and rationale for change that is strongly normative.

These four types of framing constitute a hierarchy of contentious claims or positions, ranging from moral appeals which are the least contentious way of framing a public problem to motivational framing which is the most contentious. A moral appeal simply depicts the public problem in a value-laden setting. Both diagnostic and prognostic framing use factual rather than normative reasoning: diagnostic framing points out ‘causes and effects’ and culprits in relation to public problems, whereas prognostic framing sets out how to do something about changing these identified factors. Lastly, motivational framing adds a moralizing dimension to the specification of problems, culprits and strategies, and produces cognitively “hot” arguments that demand changes to redress perceived injustices.\(^9\)

To compare the positions reached by peer groups on different topics in the ethnic relations and immigration politics field, and their degree of variance in relation to the official state position and the dominant viewpoint in the political discourse, we defined a scale to measure their ‘collective position’. We arrived at this ‘collective position’ for each group on each topic, firstly, by analyzing of the type of framing (moral appeal, diagnostic, prognostic, motivational) used by the group in relation to the public problem under discussion, and secondly, by gauging whether this framing of the problem was either pro-minority/pro-migrant/anti-racist (+) or anti-minority/anti-migrant/xenophobic (-).

For moral appeals, or in cases when the peer group stated that they did not know anything about the topic, we gave a score of zero, as this type of framing indicates a passivity, indifference or quiescence with the official representation of the public problem. The public problem is not opposed sufficiently enough to provoke responses that significantly attribute additional meaning or give an alternative interpretation to it. Following a similar logic, we attributed a score of 1 for diagnostic framing, where groups are sufficiently motivated to engage in factually reasoned problem-specification, and then 2 for prognostic framing, which is when the peer group’s interpretation goes further by attributing blame and offering causal solutions to the discussed problem. Lastly, a score of 3 was given for motivational framing, which is when the peer group makes highly emotive cognitively ‘hot’ demands for change in their interpretation of the specific problem. Thus the higher the score (ranging from 0 to 3), the more contentious and engaged the claims-making of the peer group, and their ‘collective position’ is more distant from and conflicts with the official norm for that specific problem.

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\(^8\) Snow and Benford did not have ‘moral appeals’ as a distinct type of frame. However, it is clear that there are normative claims that do not directly function to define or specify a public problem, and which are not motivational. It was therefore considered necessary to add this type of framing, whereas the definitions of the other three types are derived from Snow and Benford’s distinctions.

\(^9\) Gamson’s (1992) ‘collective action frames’ are similar in many ways to ‘motivational’ framing in particular in that they emphasise the ‘injustice’ component.
The dynamics of collective discourse stimulated by focussed peer group discussions are designed to facilitate precisely the occurrence whereby different opinions are expressed within a group. This means that processes disagreement and deliberation occur within the group discussion, that sometimes leads to a consensus being formed, but at others, results in the unresolved expression of competing majority and minority group positions, or equal support for two different positions.\textsuperscript{10} The ‘collective position’ that we scored was evaluated from the final standpoint of the group. In cases where there was internal disagreement within the group, an aggregate was taken between the different positions expressed after the focussed discussion had run its course. To account for this and make the range of possible scores more sensitive, we therefore made it possible to score half points between 0, 1, 2 and 3.

The second important framing component for determining the collective position of peer group on a topic, was the consequences (positive or negative) that their preferred interpretation of the problem held for either minorities or migrants. This was operationalised in a simple way: anti-racist and pro-minority/migrant positions were scored with a plus (+), and xenophobic and anti-minority/migrant positions were scored with a minus (-). In some cases, and often in motivational framing, peer groups directly elaborated on their perceived characteristics of minorities or migrants, either stigmatising them or extolling their virtues. Such clear-cut cases of ‘self’ and ‘other’ identity constructions were clearly identifiable as either negative or positive representations of minorities and migrants. However, in other cases, and in examples of diagnostic framing, the interpretations of the peer groups remained less elaborated and more context bound in factually defining the problem. In such cases, it was necessary to evaluate what the outcomes of their proposed demands (extension or restriction of rights) would be for either migrants or minorities. Overall then, the collective positions of peer groups were able to vary on a scale from –3 to +3, where positions closer to 0 axis indicate quiescence with and passive acceptance of the official norm. In contrast, at one pole –3 constitutes a highly motivated oppositional framing to the official political norm calling for a more anti-minority/migrant or xenophobic shift, whereas +3 is a highly motivated oppositional framing calling for a shift in the official norm that is beneficial to minorities or migrants, or anti-racist.

In addition, to evaluating the collective position of each peer group on each issue on this linear pro-minority/migrant/antiracist to anti-minority/migrant/xenophobic scale, it was also necessary to examine the qualitative detail of how peer groups constructed their distance from the official norm. Such detail gives important information on how groups construct the ‘otherness’ of migrants and minorities through their understandings of specific topics. This requires looking at how peer groups draw on legitimating discourses –counternorms and counterfactual evidence- to justify their positions and distance from the official norm, and how they depict minority and migrant groups – the ideological contents of frames. Such analysis gives important detail on the nature of the ideological cleavages in the different fields of ethnic relations and immigration politics, and the axes of contention around which

\textsuperscript{10} It should be made clear that we are not attempting here to apply a Habermasian inspired normative model of an ideal speech situation here, whereby rationality and consensus inevitably prevails in the public domain. On the contrary, our research on political discourse is empirically oriented and shows precisely that competing rationalities exist in the public domain that are backed up by different cultural logics. Such an approach is closer to the perspective of constructivist cultural theorists on the public sphere, and especially Klaus Eder (1993) and Mary Douglas (**). According to this perspective political norms are constructed by collective action in the public domain.
such political differences are built (e.g. civic versus ethnic conceptions of national belonging; assimilationist versus cultural pluralist conceptions of inclusion in the national community).

6.2. General ‘Collective Positions’ of ‘White’ Peer Groups on Ethnic Relations and Immigration Politics

Table 4 shows the collective positions of the six different ‘White’ peer groups, that were derived from their focussed discussions on selected topics from four issue sub-fields: asylum/immigration, integration/anti-discrimination, cultural diversity and group rights, and antiracism/xenophobia politics. A first general point to draw from their overall average collective positions on the four issue sub-fields, is that the pattern of variance (+/-) on the scale --which indicates their support for/opposition to minorities and migrants as beneficiaries of rights-- follows a strikingly similar pattern to the positions in the political discourse given in Tables 2 and 3. In political discourse, immigration and asylum politics had a more anti-beneficiary valence position than the fields of ethnic relations politics (+0.32 compared to +0.54, see Table 2), and of the named groups referred to in the discourse, ‘asylum-seekers’ were the group with the most anti-beneficiary position (+0.09, compared to +0.52 for the official racial category ‘Black’, see Table 3). Here again, Table 4 shows that immigration and asylum topics are the ones viewed through the most anti-minority/migrant lens by our peer groups (collective position -2), when compared to ethnic relations (overall ethnic relations field –0.70: integration –1.6; cultural diversity -1.9; antiracism/xenophobia +1.4). Just as the state’s differential attribution of citizenship rights to foreign migrants and British minorities shapes the field of political contention about these issues (Tables 2 and 3), our findings here indicate that similar categorisations operate when ordinary people make judgements about migrants and minorities when discussing immigration and ethnic relations issues. This general finding supports the hypothesis –derived from the Political Opportunity Perspective, see Koopmans and Statham 2000-- that collective positions formed by peer groups on problems relating to migrants and minorities are not random, or wholly contingent on individual psychological traits, but have contours that are strongly shaped by the national political discourse.

Turning to ethnic relations politics, once more the general pattern of variance of the overall collective positions of the peer groups (Table 4) follows a similar pattern to the average valence positions of the named ‘groups’ who were the beneficiary/target of the demand made in that sub-field in the political discourse (Table 3). In the same way that the political discourse was more anti-‘Extreme Right’ (+0.68) in antiracism, than pro-‘Black’ (+0.52) and pro-‘Muslim’ (+0.13) in minority politics, so our peer groups found it much easier to support protective rights for minorities in the anti-racism field (+1.50), than social and political rights in the integration field (-1.67), and cultural group rights in the diversity field (-1.92). Regarding the political discourse (Table 2), the overall pattern is similar, in that the integration and antiracism fields are significantly higher than cultural diversity (+0.60 and +0.52 compared to +0.41, see Table 2) which is also true for the overall collective positions of our peer groups (-1.67 and +1.50 compared to –1.92, see Table 4). However, there is also an important difference between the overall position of the political discourse and the way in which the peer group evaluate integration politics and anti-racism/xenophobia politics. Whereas the political discourse has a pro-minority position on integration (+0.60) and antiracism/xenophobia (+0.52), our peer groups found it much easier to support the preventive rights to protect minorities against harm from racists in the antiracism/xenophobia
field (scoring a high pro-minority collective position +1.50) than to support social and political rights for minorities in the integration field (scoring an anti-minority –1.67). In order to arrive at an understanding of their collective positions, it is necessary to look at how the white peer groups distanced themselves from the official norms.

6.3. ‘White’ Peer Groups’ Framing of Problems and ‘Others’ in Ethnic Relations and Immigration Politics

6.3.1 Integration and Antidiscrimination Politics

As stated above, British integration policies have been framed around the concept of ‘racial equality’, and the state’s extension of rights to resident minorities was basically conceived as ensuring a full equality of access to social citizenship by combating racial discrimination against individuals especially in the labour market and in access to the welfare state (see e.g., Joppke 1999). The topics used to stimulate discussions referred to the integration of minorities in institutional settings: employment and workplace experiences; the implementation of race relations policies; police (state) treatment of minorities; distribution of housing/social welfare. Our objective in getting the white peer groups to focus their discussion on integration politics, was to analyse how they evaluated the relationship of British minorities in the national community, when viewing it through their experiences of a context where the state has had a clear policy for more than 25 years for combating disadvantages suffered by minorities because of racial discrimination.

On integration politics all the white peer groups took up an anti-minority position, but mostly these were based on diagnostic and prognostic framing, reasoning out the causes and effects, and blaming the ‘race relations lobby’ for what they perceived as the extension of social and political rights to minorities going ‘too far’. What is interesting it that only in one group did the discussion move beyond this type of reasoned opposition focussing on the problem context and become a motivational frame that stigmatised and blamed minorities themselves:

‘They seem to have this chip on their shoulder and they’re pushing it into your face all the time about being downtrodden. I’m so tired and fed up of hearing it.’…
‘I think you have it shoved in your face so much that at the end of the day, the bottom line is that the coloureds are naturally aggressive towards the whites. I think they would like to turn this country into another India and until they get that they won’t be satisfied.’…
Female Bradford 45-60 years

This motivational framing of the problem, seeing inherent racial differences as the cause was exceptional. On the contrary, the vast majority of the framing by the peer groups avoided this openly racial stigmatisation of minorities, and instead the perceived injustices remained more strongly focussed on civic interpretations of the problem, namely that the extension of social and political rights to ethnic groups had gone too far and was challenging ‘equality’. Our groups were not against racial equality, but blamed the British state for the perceived injustices which they saw as a consequence of the ‘race relations’ mantra. It is important to note that the groups were not demanding ‘rights for whites’ —a position that would have placed them close to the extreme right— but a restriction of what they saw as ‘political correctness’ that prevented true equality of rights. The groups complained of too much emphasis on race relations and minorities in employment, that the police and other state institutions are prevented from operating fairly due to fears of being accused of racism, the power of the race relations lobby, and fears of ‘reverse discrimination’:
‘I was a childminder for 15 years and when I first started childminding there wasn’t any problem with race at all but towards the end too much emphasis was being placed on race relations and ethnic minorities – what you were and weren’t doing. It was one of the reasons I came out of childminding..’

Female Catford 25-44 years

The anti-minority position in the integration field should therefore be understood as context bound. The white groups were not opposed to equality to minorities, but felt put under pressure by the changes that they had experienced through the implementation of race relations policies by state institutions and in the labour market and saw this as a threat to equality within the British political community. The majority position was a reasoned call for more civic republican approach by the state, and focussed on the problems. It did not challenge the right of access of minorities to social and political equality.

6.3.2 Antiracism and Xenophobic Politics

Turning to the anti-racism/xenophobia field, the issues addressed were the prevention of racial attacks and public acts of racism, and whether public activities/platforms should be allowed for the extreme right. Here the white groups took up a clear high pro-minority position (+1.50) based --largely on prognostic and motivational framing-- that was adamant that action should be taken to prevent the harm to minorities caused by public acts of racism. Only one group took up an anti-minority position: some young males from Catford complained of being threatened and attacked by black youths, and said that they would defend themselves, and they also were fed up at being called ‘fascists’ for having a Union Jack sticker on a car bumper. However, this position was challenged in the group. In relation to the extreme right, this group linked the BNP to racial attacks, and they were opposed ‘nutcases stirring up racial hatred’ and ‘people who are patriotic bordering on racist’, but said that every country had a far right and so it was normal. All the other groups were unequivocal in their assertion of the need to enforce civic rights to prevent racism, and distinguished themselves sharply from the extreme right, who they strongly opposed and in most cases felt should be banned outright (a position more pro-minority than that of state policy).

(on Stephen Lawrence murder:) ‘I know it was a terrible thing to happen but actually seeing all those people there outside the courts standing together side by side, black and white, some good should come of it. They were all talking to each other. They were all there for the same cause and that was to get justice. His friend summed it up – he said a crime had been committed – it doesn’t matter what colour the people were, they should be brought to justice’.

Female Catford 25-45 years

(on racial attacks:) ‘I don’t condone that – that is really racist. I don’t agree with that. That is sick. We say that’s sick and when we see it we say that the police or the politicians should do something about it.’

Female Bradford 45-60 years

(on National Front) ‘I think as long as politicians and the police allow idiots like National Front people to congregate and thrive you’ll never feel safe – when you have people calling Asians ‘black bastards’ and all that sort of thing.’

Male Bradford 25-44 years

(on BNP) ‘I think they have a lot to answer for. My Dad knows a lot of people who are BNP –they’re the same as the National Front – and they have no intention of ever having a good relationship between black and white. They’re like Hitler was- they don’t think black and white should even mix together’

Female Bradford 16-24 years

What is clear from these comments is that there is a clear defence of the civic rights of all British citizens to be free from attacks and violence. The white peer groups express solidarity
with black people against the perceived injustices of racism, and take a clear stance against
the extreme right on the grounds that they are advocates of ethnic segregationism which is an
ideology that is not considered acceptable. It appears that ‘whites’ have been sufficiently
politically socialized into the norms of Race Relations politics to find it abhorrent that more
is not done to prevent minority citizens being harmed by public acts of racism, but at the
same time within the institutional domain, their positions on integration politics show
concerns that race relations might prevent the overall distribution of equality.

6.3.3 Cultural Pluralism and Group Rights

Turning to cultural pluralism and group rights, we are dealing here with a field of politics,
where --as discussed earlier-- the state has an anti-minority valence position in the political
discourse (-0.15, Table 2), and the pro-minority reading of the issue in the public domain is
strongly promoted by minorities themselves and their closest allies (+0.88, 45.7%, see Table
2). Over the last decade, the British state has resisted extending the group rights that are
conferred to racial minorities by Race Relations policies to religious minorities, despite
campaigns principally by Muslim groups. Although recently some incremental steps have
been made toward extending group rights to Muslims, by, for example, this year, for the first
time giving state funding to Muslim schools on the same basis as for C of E, Catholic and
Jewish schools, British racialised cultural pluralism has in general been strongly resistant to
recognising non racially defined categories and demands for group-based rather than
individual rights. As such this contentious issue particularly refers to the integration of Asian
minorities of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin in the British context (see, Modood, Statham
1999). The topics used to stimulate discussion were the provision for the Muslim religion in
schooling, which allowed for discussion both on religious provision within British state
schooling, and the possibility of separate Muslim schools.

Our ‘white’ groups have been politically socialised into understanding cultural pluralism
British style, it was therefore interesting to chart their positions on an issue field where the
official norms are against an extension of cultural group rights. With an strongly anti-
minority overall score of −1.92, it is clear that the ‘white’ peer groups were motivated by the
issue and followed the state by being strongly against extending the existing British definition
of cultural pluralism to include group rights for Muslims. Most groups used prognostic and
motivational framing that was strongly assimilationist, arguing that Muslim schools would
prevent integration and produce potentially parallel societies. Although some motivational
framing did drift into blaming the groups for not wanting to mix into British society, or for
being unpatriotic, this anti-minority discourse remained largely context-bound, and only on
one occasion did it become an open stigmatisation of characteristics of Asian Muslim groups.
More typical were the following:

(On demands by Asians for Muslim schools) ‘That’s not integrating is it!..’
Moderator: ‘Well what about Catholic schools?’
‘I’ve lived in lots of different countries and I’ve had to blend in with their culture, so I find it quite strange that
cultures think they can exist in a bubble..’
Male Catford 45-60

(On demands by Asians for Muslim schools) ‘No way. We’re living in London. It might be that they need in a
specific area to know more about their history but really they should be learning about all types of history’
Moderator: But you get Catholic schools for example..
‘Yes but they’re entirely different…’
‘Catholic schools have mixed races in them anyway. As long as you go to a Catholic church on Sunday you’ll
get into a Catholic school no matter what race you are..’
Female Catford 25-44

Moderator: ‘Sometimes certain sections of the Asian Community make demands for things like single sex schools, what do you think about that?’
‘I find it very insulting to be honest. They come to this country and have all the benefits that this country offers and yet they don’t want to integrate properly’…

Moderator: ‘We’ve had Roman Catholic schools in Britain for a long time – what difference is there between that and a Muslim school?’
The way I see the difference is that they are being taught to carry on their traditions that are holding them apart from the rest of society’

Male Bradford 25-44

What is interesting here is that although the groups are against an extension of the cultural pluralism within the British community for Muslim group rights, they nonetheless defend the position of British racialised cultural pluralism, for example by arguing that Catholic schools allow different races. This position was also clearly expressed by the young male group who were the only group who achieved a positive score on this issue by using diagnostic framing to argue that white people should be educated to understand the cultures of Muslim groups, and expressing the concern that Muslim schools would prevent a ‘multi-racial’ society and alienate the group.

(Asian demands for single sex and Muslim schools) ‘Muslims are a lot stricter and have to pray at certain times of the day.’
‘I think it would alienate them because they’re not going to grow up in a multi-racial society.’
‘I think schools should be sensitive to their needs to an extent but if you want to integrate into society then you have to join in. I don’t think its good for anyone to separate themselves.’…
‘I think it’s a good idea to learn about different religions in RE, you get to understand them a lot better.’

Moderator: Do you all think it’s a good idea that they’re doing that?
‘Yes, because you can understand why they dress like they do.’

Male, Catford, 16-24

It is clear that our peer groups have been socialised in the British racialised concept of cultural pluralism, and just as it is for the state, this position or norm is the defining limit for pluralism, and civic assimilationist arguments are used to justify this approach against its hypothetical alternative of ethnic segregation and alienated groups in Britain. What this shows is that the way people view the world is strongly shaped by the dominant political discourses that categorise people and define the limits of pluralism. Given the civic attachment of our groups to the concept of multi-racial society, sponsored by the official position, it would be wrong to attribute their position on cultural group rights for Muslims as a product of pure ‘Islamophobia’. Rather than reacting to the presence of alien cultures by inventing ‘new’ cultural discourses based on identity constructions arguing that they are ‘others’ and apart from society, the claim is that Asians are part of British multi-racial society and that those are the normative criteria for full civic participation in British society. Our peer groups have learnt their lessons on the limits of cultural pluralism from state policies on

On the Islamophobia thesis that hostility to Muslims is a new form of cultural racism in Britain, see e.g. Brown (2000), and also the discussion by Modood (***). Arising from partly from cultural studies, and the obsession within British-centric academic discussions on ethnic relations for endless debates on ‘race’ and the ideological basis of ‘racism’, or ‘racisms’, this perspective often reifies the identity constructions that it finds into both the explanation and what is to be explained. Rather than using a wide range of topics that would enable the analyst to evaluate perceptions on Islam in relation to other issues in the ethnic relations field, one is usually treated to a method of asking a few people what they think about Muslims, and then explaining less than positive responses as a ‘new’ racist identity sweeping across the whole of society which is being constructed against Muslims. Such an important topic deserves more rigorous sociological analysis, so that it becomes possible to see in relation to what problems or in which contexts anti-Muslim sentiments become expressed. Only then can explanation of what the reasons and causes of any discovered anti-Muslim sentiment begin.
integration, and they have learnt them well. It would be wrong therefore to simply take the issue of Muslims in Britain in isolation, and argue that there is a particular hostility and new form of cultural racism against them – as much of the Islamophobia perspective does. If there is blame to be attached at a perceived lack of cultural recognition for some groups within British cultural pluralism, it should be laid firmly at the door of the state and the political elites who have remained stringently attached to the dogma of race relations, even when society has moved on and rendered this image of ‘one nation multi-racialism’ somewhat of an empirical anachronism. If the elite position and legislation on group rights changes, as it has started to already in some instances – e.g. the recent state funding for denominational Muslim schools-- then whatever the initial reaction follows, our research on the peer groups suggests that over time the official norm will become the defining feature in the way that people perceive the issue and take a position regarding their preferences for political change.

6.3.4 Immigration and Asylum Politics

The final boundary of problem perception that we sought to examine with our groups dealt with foreign migrants, who are not included in the British political community as citizens. As has been discussed above, the British state takes a strong anti-immigration policy stance and this was also reflected in the way that the peer groups viewed the issue taking a strongly anti-migrant position (-2). The topics selected for focussing the attention of the peer groups were: refugees and asylum as a new form of migration, social welfare provision for refugees/asylum-seekers; media representation of asylum-seekers. It should be noted that the material on asylum dealt with groups from an ethnic background (Peruvian) different from those (Black and Asian) that had dominated the discussions of ethnic relations politics.

By looking at the discourse on asylum, we wished to examine whether the normative limits of tolerance of the peer groups would change in any way when discussing groups who are not officially part of the British community, compared to their views on ethnic relations and those who are. The first point to make is that two thirds of the groups used motivational framing to take up highly anti-migrant positions. For these groups, asylum-seekers were depicted as ‘outsiders’ to the British community, who saw ‘England’ as an easy country to come to, and who became a social burden on limited resources, and stigmatisation of the character traits of the groups were also present:

‘America has so much space and surplus food compared to England’
‘There’s that place in Camden which is for refugees and asylum-seekers. Every week they have someone come in to teach them English and as soon as they can understand English they are supposed to go and get a job. I work for a firm of decorators and we go up there to interview them, but only about 3 or 4 out of about 70 want to know. They get free meals and money to go out and spend and they don’t want to know.’
Moderator: ‘So you think we’re a soft touch then?’
Yes. Just before Christmas it was refugee week and there was a big party for all the refugees, free drink, free food and everything and there was a big fight there, they were all fighting over the food and drink.’
Male, Catford, 16-24.

‘It's an easy country to come to.’
‘We must seem a soft touch for some people.’
‘If you've ever tried to immigrate to Australia its virtually impossible. Unless you belong to a specific category that they want you don't stand a chance.’
Moderator: ‘What about the position of refugees, do you have any kind of sympathy with them?’
‘You can have sympathy with their position but you wonder why they come five or six thousand miles for refuge when there are other countries all around them.’
‘I think a lot of the problem is contraception as well. If an Asian chap is out of work it doesn't stop him having kids does it. Not many English families have more than three or four children yet Asians just seem to breed. It's
the same as these African countries, they have all these kids and then as soon as things start getting tough they come over to Britain.’

Moderator: ‘So you think it's a burden on the taxpayer?’

‘I think so, yes. The trouble is, there's no one to say no, you can't do that, whereas in Australia it's not like that’

‘Everybody in this room must have heard somebody say that they went down to the Post Office last week and there were two Asians stood in front of them and they come out of there with £300 or £400.’

Male Bradford 25-45

The first point to make is that when the British state takes up an anti-migrant position, sometimes using stigmatising discourses, then migrant groups lack official legitimacy, and there are not the same normative limits operating as for ethnic relations topics. This means that ordinary people find it easier to view the issue through their own difference to group, often blaming and stigmatising them, rather than viewing the issue through the problem. What is also important to note, is that the groups from Bradford felt themselves sufficiently liberated from the normative limits of acceptable expression to start stigmatising British Asian minorities. That they refrained from such discourses when focussing on ethnic relations topics --and even except in one case when discussing group rights for Muslims-- shows in fact the important role that a state’s way of attributing citizenship and cultural recognition has in legitimating a set of normative boundaries that become the parameters for people to understand and view an issue and the beneficiary minority group. On the issue of asylum and immigration the British political elites have not laid down the moral lessons through legislation and by example, that would delimit a terrain for debate that focussed on the justice within the problem-context rather than on the ‘people’. Until such a stance is taken, ignorance of the problem-context, and stereotyped ethnic categorisation of the foreign ‘others’ are the major signposts for public perception.

To the extent that opinions were expressed that did not take up this anti-migrant position, these were basically 'moral appeals' and expressions of sympathy to asylum seekers, that were made in the self-acknowledgement by a peer group of 16-24 girls that they felt they ‘did not know much’ about the issue. In addition, some groups used anti-antimigrant diagnostic framing stating that newspapers should not use openly stigmatising language, and that the UK was not open to the Jews prior to WW2, but voiced expressions of such counter-discourses were very limited.

6.4. Differences between group ‘collective positions’: locality, age and gender

Some final information to draw from the focussed peer group discussions, relates to the indicators that it gives us on the perceptions of different groups from the ethnic majority population. Table 5 breaks down the collective positions across the immigration and ethnic relations issue-fields, by locality, gender and age cohort. From a methodological perspective it should be emphasised that these cannot be interpreted as distributions of opinions across the ethnic majority population. As has been stated previously the value in this method is in evaluating the range of opinions of peer groups on different topics. However, following the approach of Merton (***) to focussed interviews, it is clear that they are useful for building hypotheses for which the distribution can be tested, for example, through surveys.

--Table 5 about here--

Starting from this caveat, the striking finding from Table 5 is that --with the one exception of the positions on anti-racism and xenophobia—anti-minority/anti-migrant/xenophobic positions increase as the groups become older. Age would therefore seem to be a factor which
shapes the framing of perceptions on issues of immigration and ethnic relations. Of course there could be a whole range of possible explanations for why this might be the case, but it is beyond our scope here to do more than scratch the surface of such issues. Gender on the other hand, at least according to this evidence does not seem to be a factor that shapes perception on these issues in a clear-cut way. Lastly, regarding locality it is worth noting that groups from Bradford, the city where the minority population is Asian, took up a more stronger anti-minority position on cultural group rights than those from Catford (SE London) where the minorities are African-Caribbean. This indicates that localised experiences of people with minority populations, are also a factor that go toward shaping their perceptions in this field.

7. Conclusions and Discussion

In this paper, an attempt has been made to link the way that ordinary people view problems relating to ethnic relations and immigration politics, with the way that the British state policies categorise problems and minorities/migrants in the field, and the way that collective actors fight over such issues in the public domain. By strategically selecting issue-fields and topics that are representative of a full range of ethnic relations and immigration politics, it was possible to trace the patterns of variance of pro- or anti-minority/migrant positions (Tables 2, 3) and the depictions of minorities/migrants as significant ‘others’ (Table 2, and qualitative analysis of focussed discussions), both in the contested public field of political claims-making, and in the shared understandings of our ‘White’ peer groups. In other words, it was possible to see to what extent opinions mobilised in the political discourse, and public opinions held by ordinary people in their social settings, deviate from the official norm and constitute an ‘extreme’ stance on minorities and migrants.

At the general level, the most striking finding is the remarkable overall similarity between the way that the British state’s policies categorise minorities/migrants, the way that issues relating to them are politically mobilised, and the way that ordinary white people understand the problems and their relationships with minorities and foreign migrants. Such a finding is important as it supports a ‘political opportunity’ interpretation for explaining why people hold certain views on immigration and ethnic relations, and it sees the political environment as decisive in shaping the way people behave and form opinions. According to this approach, the British state’s formula for attributing citizenship rights to minorities and migrants – i.e., that draws a sharp distinction between minorities with full formal rights and migrants with none, and between racial minorities who are sponsored within the national community and non-racial minorities who are not – is an important factor that decisively shapes collective mobilisation and public perception of these contentious issues.

At first glance, such claim may appear to be so obvious as to be self-evident, but there has been a long tradition in research on xenophobia for seeing supporters of extreme parties, and holders of right-wing values as reacting to a loss of prestige and status caused by processes of structural modernization and individualization. Extremism has often been explained by disaffection in response to a lack of social integration, and such a logic also underpins the ‘ethnic competition’ approach which explains inner-urban ethnic conflict by perceptions of relative deprivation among ‘white’ lower classes who are forced to compete with migrant labour (see e.g., Olzak 1992, Esser 1999). What is clear from our focussed discussions with white peer groups is that their opinions on issues are strongly shaped by the distinctions

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12 There is not space here to outline a political opportunity approach to immigration and ethnic relation politics, for a full exposition see Koopmans and Statham 2000.

13 For a recent example of the modernization thesis, see Betz 1994.
which operate in the political discourse, and which in turn are derived from the state policies in attributing rights to migrants and minorities. Whatever the individual psychological dispositions of extreme right voters may be, and whatever structural problems may be rife in poor inner-cities, the perspective defended here argues that a shift toward ‘extreme’ anti-minority or anti-migrant positions requires political sponsorship by a collective actor—most likely a political party—who is perceived as capable of success. Our findings indicate that people’s shared understandings of ethnic relations and immigration problems, demands for political change, and resultant behaviour are decisively channelled by their perceptions of the political environment for which the baseline axis is the official norms which are legitimated by the British state. These official ‘race relations and immigration’ norms guide not only the perceptions of public constituencies, but the potential scope for deviance away from the officially sponsored norm. When the state sponsors racial equality in its definition of the national community, it is extremely difficult for a political party to make its anti-minority claims appear legitimate and reasonable, and gain electoral support, which in part explains the pariah status of the British extreme right. However, when the state has an anti-immigration stance, it is easier for the public to hold ‘extreme’ anti-migrant opinions as such positions are not far from and are partly legitimated by the official norm. In this case, there is little hope for the extreme right as the major political parties hold anti-migrant terrain.

Too often in political science, public opinion is reduced to crossing ballot cards at elections once every five years, and too little emphasis is placed on how political opinion is formed. The participants in our peer group discussions do not start from a political position of _carte blanche_ when they formulate their understandings of problems. In understanding ethnic relations and immigration, they have grown up, worked and lived for many years in environments where the basic principles of the British political approach to race relations and immigrations politics has been operating. Our groups have been ‘political socialized’ in the British way for race relations and immigration politics, and internalised their premises. Even if they do not hold or agree with the official standpoint, the official position nonetheless forms the axis around which opinions are formed and behaviour is shaped. Thus the fact that asylum-seekers are excluded from formal access to social and political rights, and have their status stigmatised as ‘bogus’ by state actors, meant that when viewing the world through the lens of immigration politics, our peer groups felt themselves sufficiently legitimated to express anti-asylum-seeker sentiments, and even in some cases express racist sentiments about British Asians. Interestingly, such processes of stigmatisation of British ethnic minorities were virtually absent when groups discussed ethnic relations politics, even when specifically referring to British Asian Muslims on the topic of cultural group rights. Clearly the state’s position on British minorities defines a normative limit for the expression of extreme anti-migrant views, which our groups felt difficult to cross. In contrast to immigration, when discussing ethnic relations our ‘white’ peer groups’ perceptions tended to be more contextually grounded in the actual problem-definition and did not stigmatise the characteristic ‘otherness’ of ethnic groups. Even their clear opposition to aspects of minority integration politics was largely expressed as a civic republican plea for equality social and political rights, demanding corrections to their perceived over-extension of group rights for racial minorities. They did not demand a rolling back of ‘race relations’ per se, and demand ethnic ‘rights for whites’. Indeed, their negative positions on cultural pluralism and group rights for Muslims were expressed as a defence of the principle of a ‘multiracial’ society, a lesson and language that had been directly learnt from the state’s own pluralist race relations approach.
It is important to recognise that opinions and collective understandings of the public vary, but the degree and form of variance will be defined in relation to the official norm. Such an understanding goes against the trend within some recent cultural studies and discourse-based studies of race and ethnicity, where the analyst’s own perceptions of changes in racialised categories simply become reified into ‘new identities’ of ‘cultural racism(s)’ when dealing with the ethnic majority population --see e.g. the discussions on Islamophobia (Brown), ‘new nationalism’ (Billig), and ‘new racism’ (Barker)-- and ‘new ethnic identities’ when referring to minorities (see e.g. Back). Blinded by their own invented categories for understanding complex cultural discourses, such approaches tend often to forget that the identity constructions which they are studying are grounded in sets of social relationships within a political environment. The explanation for the emergence of these ‘new’ racist and ethnic identities is not to be found in the complexities of cultural discourse, but in a transformation of the political context about which public discourses elaborate meanings and positions.

Our findings support the view that changes within the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics to a large extent come politically and from the top-down. The best way for politicians to change public opinion on these contentious issues is by changing the officially used categories for attributing social and political rights and cultural recognition to groups of minorities and migrants. Thus if British Race Relations policies were tweaked to include Muslims within their definition of ‘racial equality’, in the same way as they already include Jews and Sikhs, one would expect this political change to shift the normative axis used by the British public over time toward a version of cultural pluralism that is more inclusive of Muslims. Similarly, if a Labour government with a massive electoral majority decided to take a more pro-migrant position on asylum politics, and emphasised Britain’s international obligations to asylum-seekers and the national need for new labour migrants, it is not the case that public opinion would automatically desert them for the sponsors of anti-asylum sentiments in the public domain. On the contrary, our findings suggest that giving more official legitimacy to pro-migrant norms, would open up more space for pro-migrant political claims, and that over time the way that the public view the issue is likely follow, or at the very least find it would be harder to take ‘extreme’ anti-migrant positions.

8. References (to be checked and completed):


Table 1: Issue Sub-fields and Selected Topics in Ethnic Relations and Immigration Politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue sub-field</th>
<th>Contested relationship</th>
<th>Target/beneficiary group</th>
<th>Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration and Asylum</td>
<td>Extension of rights to foreign migrants</td>
<td>Foreign migrants, Refugees, Asylum-seekers</td>
<td>Refugees; immigration; social welfare provision for refugees/asylum-seekers; media representation of asylum-seekers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration and anti-discrimination</td>
<td>Extension of social and political rights to racial minorities</td>
<td>Official racial categories of minorities, e.g. ‘Blacks’ and ‘Asians’</td>
<td>Race relations policies and their consequences: workplace, labour market, social service provision; police and minorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural pluralism and group rights</td>
<td>Extension of cultural rights and group rights to religious minorities</td>
<td>Religious minority groups outside official racial categorisations, e.g. Muslims and Rastafarians</td>
<td>Provision of religious instruction in schools; separate Muslim schools; cultural diversity: benefits and disadvantages;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiracism and Xenophobia</td>
<td>Extensions of preventive rights to defend minorities against acts of racism</td>
<td>Ethnic and racial minorities</td>
<td>Repression of extreme right; prevention of racial attacks and public acts of racism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Average Valence Positions of Collective Actors’ Claims-making in Ethnic Relations and Immigration Politics (British claims-making database 1990-May 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigration and Asylum Politics</th>
<th>Ethnic Relations (All)</th>
<th>Integration &amp; Antidiscrimination (social and political rights)</th>
<th>Cultural pluralism and group rights (cultural rights)</th>
<th>Antiracism and Xenophobia (preventive rights)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Av. valence % of claims in field</td>
<td>Av. valence % of claims in field</td>
<td>Av. valence % of claims in field</td>
<td>Av. valence % of claims in field</td>
<td>Av. valence % of claims in field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Actors</td>
<td>+0.32 100%</td>
<td>+0.54 100%</td>
<td>+0.60 100%</td>
<td>+0.41 100%</td>
<td>+0.52 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Actors</td>
<td>+0.03 63.9%</td>
<td>+0.39 43.4%</td>
<td>+0.44 45.9%</td>
<td>-0.15 33.6%</td>
<td>+0.48 44.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Actors*</td>
<td>+0.76 13.0%</td>
<td>+0.62 22.3%</td>
<td>+0.70 23.4%</td>
<td>+0.31 20.7%</td>
<td>+0.65 21.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority, migrant, pro- minority, pro-migrant and anti-racist orgs.</td>
<td>+0.94 22.6%</td>
<td>+0.86 30.8%</td>
<td>+0.77 30.4%</td>
<td>+0.88 45.7%</td>
<td>+0.97 25.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme right and racist orgs.</td>
<td>-1 00.5%</td>
<td>-1 3.5%</td>
<td>-1 00.3%</td>
<td>00.0%</td>
<td>-1 8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total claims in field (N)</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of all claims</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excludes beneficiaries, targets, movements and counter-movements: minorities, migrants, pro-minority/migrant groups, anti-racist and extreme right/racist organisation

Valence: -1 is pro-minority/pro-migrant/anti-racist; +1 is anti-minority/anti-migrant/xenophobic; 0 is neutral, non-specific.
Table 3: Average Valence of Claims in Political Discourse referring to Specified ‘Group’
(British claims-making database 1990-May 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collective Identity label of Actor referred to by political claim (as beneficiary or target)</th>
<th>‘Asylum-seekers’</th>
<th>‘Black’</th>
<th>‘Muslim’</th>
<th>‘Named Extreme Right and Racist Organisations’**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevant issue-field in which claim was made</td>
<td>Immigration and Asylum politics</td>
<td>Integration and cultural diversity politics</td>
<td>Integration and cultural diversity politics</td>
<td>Xenophobia and Antiracism politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall average valence of claims in political discourse referring to specified ‘group’ (range –1 to +1)*</td>
<td>+0.09</td>
<td>+0.52</td>
<td>+0.13</td>
<td>+0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases (N)</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* -1 is pro-minority/pro-migrant/anti-racist; +1 is anti-minority/anti-migrant/xenophobic; 0 is neutral, non-specific.
** e.g. ‘British National Party’, ‘Screwdriver’ etc.
Table 4: Collective Positions of Ethnic Majority ‘White’ Peer Groups on Ethnic Relations and Immigration in Focussed Discussions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Asylum and Immigration</th>
<th>Ethnic Relations All</th>
<th>Integration &amp; Anti-discriminaton</th>
<th>Cultural pluralism and group rights</th>
<th>Anti-Racism and Xenophobia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collective position</td>
<td>Collective position</td>
<td>Collective position</td>
<td>Collective position</td>
<td>Collective position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female 16-24 Bradford</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>+2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male 25-44 Bradford</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>+2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female 45-60 Bradford</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-1.17</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>+2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male 16-24 Catford</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>+1.0</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female 25-44 Catford</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>+2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male 45-60 Catford</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>+1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Average per issue-field (Overall mean is −1.02)</td>
<td>-2.00</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>-1.67</td>
<td>-1.92</td>
<td>+1.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Collective positions range from −3 which is a motivational frame with an anti-minority/anti-migrant/xenophobic position to +3 which is a motivational frame with a pro-minority/pro-migrant/antiracist position.
Table 5: Collective Positions of Ethnic Majority ‘White’ Peer Groups on Ethnic Relations and Immigration in Focussed Discussions, by Locality, Gender, and Age Cohort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Asylum and Immigration</th>
<th>Ethnic Relations All</th>
<th>Integration &amp; Anti-discriminatio</th>
<th>Cultural pluralism and group rights</th>
<th>Anti-Racism and Xenophobia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collective position</td>
<td>Collective position</td>
<td>Collective position</td>
<td>Collective position</td>
<td>Collective position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Average per issue-field (Overall mean is $-1.02$)</td>
<td>$-2.00$</td>
<td>$-0.70$</td>
<td>$-1.67$</td>
<td>$-1.92$</td>
<td>$+1.50$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford Average</td>
<td>$-1.83$</td>
<td>$-0.94$</td>
<td>$-2.17$</td>
<td>$-2.83$</td>
<td>$+2.17$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catford Average</td>
<td>$-2.17$</td>
<td>$-0.45$</td>
<td>$-1.17$</td>
<td>$-1.00$</td>
<td>$+0.83$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Average</td>
<td>$-2.67$</td>
<td>$-0.72$</td>
<td>$-1.50$</td>
<td>$-1.33$</td>
<td>$+0.67$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Average</td>
<td>$-1.33$</td>
<td>$-0.67$</td>
<td>$-1.83$</td>
<td>$-2.50$</td>
<td>$+2.33$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-24 Average</td>
<td>$-1.00$</td>
<td>$-0.50$</td>
<td>$-1.25$</td>
<td>$-0.75$</td>
<td>$+0.50$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44 Average</td>
<td>$-2.25$</td>
<td>$-0.59$</td>
<td>$-1.50$</td>
<td>$-2.50$</td>
<td>$+2.25$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-60 Average</td>
<td>$-2.75$</td>
<td>$-1.00$</td>
<td>$-2.25$</td>
<td>$-2.50$</td>
<td>$+1.75$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Collective positions range from $-3$ which is a motivational frame with an anti-minority/anti-migrant/xenophobic position to $+3$ which is a motivational frame with a pro-minority/pro-migrant/antiracist position.

Rank is from 1 to 6, with 1 being the group with the most pro-minority/pro-migrant/antiracist position, and 6 being the group with the most an anti-minority/anti-migrant/xenophobic position.