Workshop: no 15” Structures of political competition in post-communist democracies:
If not cleavages, then what?”

The „Third revolution“ and the formation of cleavages in Central and Eastern Europe: Some conceptual and theoretical innovations.

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Abstract

The current theoretical paper seeks to put forward new ideas and novel concepts concerning the cleavages formation and their nature in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), since there have been little theoretical innovations in the field since the end of 1990s. It introduces the concept “Third revolution”. While according to classical Lipset-Rokkan theory the cleavage formation in Western Europe was basing on two fundamental revolutions/critical junctures (the nation building and industrialization), the cleavage formation in CEE could be mainly understood by the new challenges brought by transition in 1989. The cleavages formation in CEE could be described through the elegant model of “triple transition” (borrowed from C. Offe), in which each layer of transition challenges produced or re-vitalized specific sets of cleavages. The paper points out several discrepancies between the Lipset-Rokkan revolutions and the “Third revolution”, which help to explain the special nature of cleavages in CEE and to answer to more fundamental question why the patterns of cleavage formation in CEE have been so different from the West. The cleavage formation according to “triple transition” model is illustrated by the relevant empirical examples drawn from the various countries in the region. In conjunction with these two new concepts the third novel concept, the “cleavage leap”, is brought in while the full theoretical model has been outlined for the end of article. The novelty of the contribution lays primarily in the conceptual innovations but also in the fact that the proposed theoretical models help to reconceptualise many previous ideas in the field and to integrate them into a more comprehensive and elegant framework.

Keywords: political parties, cleavages, transition, Central and Eastern Europe.

1. Introduction

Although there has been many academic debates and empirical studies on cleavages and their nature in Central and Eastern Europe¹ (CEE) (e.g. Berglund, Deegan-Krause, & Ekman, 2013; Evans & Whitefield, 1998; Lawson, Römmele, & Karasimeonov, 1999; Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2009), there have been less theoretical innovations in the field since the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, while probably the most prominent theoretical contributions were put forward (e.g. Berglund, Hellén, & Aarebrot, 1998; Evans & Whitefield, 2000; Karasimeonov, 1999; Kitschelt, 1995; Kitschelt, 1999; Whitefield, 2002). Since then there has been less theorization about the formation and roots of cleavages in CEE

¹ In the context of the current study the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is defined as a group of countries which are the new member states of the EU but share the common post-communist background: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. Croatia, as a very new member state, will be included into the project in future.
and the systematic conceptual analysis why the patterns of cleavages have been so remarkably different from Western Europe. However, these questions are still relevant and far from being answered. Many specific transition cleavages (e.g. the communist-anti-communist cleavage) tend to persist and the class cleavage has not gained the prominence like some scholars have expected (Kitschelt, 1992; Letki, 2013; Mateju, Rehakova, & Evans, 1999). Rather identity- and value-based (or cultural) cleavages are still dominant in CEE (Nieuwbeerta & Grotenbreg, 2000; Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2009). Thus there is still a space for further theoretical and conceptual elaboration of various ideas in order to explain why the nature and evolution of cleavages in CEE have been relatively idiosyncratic and the cleavage patterns being observed in Western Europe, would not appear in near future.

There is also probably a need for more elegant theoretical models explaining the cleavage formation and patterns in CEE, because the models which were put forward by Kitschelt, Karasimeonov, Whitefield, etc. were still somewhat confusing and mapped the configurations of cleavages in the 1990s. Now we can take a longer time perspective.

The article will put forward some theoretical and conceptual innovations. First, it will introduce the concept “the Third revolution”. The idea is inspired by Lipset and Rokkan theory in which two critical junctures or revolutions played a critical role in the cleavage formation in the Western European societies: (1) industrialisation and (2) the nation (and the state) building. Even if these processes have been relevant for CEE as well (at the pre-communist time), we have to add the third critical juncture in order to understand the cleavage formation in CEE to full extent: the post-communist transition, which will be called as the “Third revolution” (coming after two Lipset-Rokkan revolutions). It produced the new challenges and confrontations and so it was providing the building material for new specific cleavages.

The concept “Third revolution” enables us to carry out a more systematic analysis in what way the evolution of cleavages in CEE has been different from the cleavages appeared from the Lipset-Rokkan critical junctures in the West. The article also proposes a more specific model on cleavage formation under the “Third revolution” while getting inspiration from Offe’s (1991) wildly acclaimed idea of “triple transition”. The idea of “triple transition” has been largely ignored by the researchers focused on cleavages. Still it as a huge theoretical potential in the field and all the major cleavages identified for CEE would fit neatly into the framework. The principal argument is that each of three layers of major transition challenges (democratization, marketisation, the nation/state building) produced their own particular sets of cleavages. The cleavage formation according to “triple transition” model will be explored
in a more profound way, while the theoretical arguments will be supported by the empirical examples drawn from various CEE countries.

While the author is going to present the full theoretical model of cleavage formation in CEE, the third novel concept will be introduced: the “cleavage leap”. The “cleavage leap” could be defined as a special “leap” in which CEE countries leaped from the incomplete (or still poorly developed) Lipset-Rokkan cleavage patterns, over the communist period, directly to the era of post-communist cleavage formations and to the cleavage constellations anticipating the globalized post-industrial societies.

While taking into account that the cleavage formation in CEE occurs in the context of late-industrial (or even post-industrial) societies, the author also suggests to adjust the definition of cleavages and the appropriate research methodologies accordingly: the manifestation of cleavages in the media discourses has to be considered as a significant element both in the updated cleavage definition and the relevant research methodologies applied. So far the scholars have paid too little attention to representation of cleavages in the media, while forgetting that contemporary CEE societies are living in a media age. Moreover, because the elite agency has played a relatively substantial role in cleavage formation in CEE (see e.g. Enyedi, 2005), the elites interviews/surveys have to be also considered alongside the media research. Both methods are intended to supplement the methodological space, which has been exclusively dominated by the quantitative surveys until now.

The structure of the paper will be as follows: first, we will provide a critical assessment on some previous prominent theories on cleavages in CEE and point out some shortcomings of them (in that context Kitschelt, Karasimeonov, Evans & Whitefield and Berglund, et. al. will be paid more attention to). Second, we will introduce the novel concept “the Third revolution” and explore its different dimensions, while demonstrating how it would help to answer some fundamental questions concerning the differences between the West and East. Third we will explain how the cleavage formation under “the Third Revolution” really looked like, while applying to “triple transition” framework and supporting the major theoretical arguments with some relevant empirical examples. Fourth, we will put forward a complete theoretical model of cleavage formation in CEE, while introducing the concept of “cleavage leap” and discussing the methodological issues (media research, elite interviews). For concluding the article we will further discuss the merits and deficiencies of the new concepts proposed and theoretical innovations made.
2. The previous prominent theoretical contributions on cleavages in CEE

In this section we will focus on previous theoretical contributions in the field and demonstrate their strengths and weaknesses, in order to demonstrate why some novel conceptual ideas are needed. Four prominent and the most widely cited authors were selected out for further examination: Kitschelt, Evans and Whitefield, Karasimeonov, Berglund and his colleagues.

Probably the most widely cited authors on cleavage formation and party systems in CEE have been H. Kitschelt and his colleagues (Kitschelt, 1992, 1995; Kitschelt, Mansfeldová, Markowski, & Tóka, 1999). Kitschelt is not talking about the cleavages, but argues that, we must call them as divisions or divides. Kitschelt (1999) notes: “Because social and political environment in CEE is still in a flux, we don’t know, which of these divisions finally qualify as durable cleavages”. However, Kitschelt still puts forward an impressive theory in which he demonstrates how the different types of communist legacies have shaped the cleavage (divides) constellations, party systems and institutional choices in CEE.

Kitschelt (1999) pointed out five different divides for the post-communist societies:

- **Political regime divide** – supporters of the regime change vs. retainers of the old communist order.
- **Economic-distributive divide** – losers of the transition and supporters of social-protectionism vs. winners of transitions and supporters of market reforms.
- **Socio-cultural divide** – supporters of libertarian ideas in politics, society and economy vs. supporters of authoritarian and protectionist ideas.
- **National-cosmopolitan divide** – self-centred nationalism vs. cosmopolitan outlook.
- **Ethnic divide**.

Kitschelt links the rise of the above-mentioned divisions with the legacies of former communist regimes. He distinguishes between: (1) bureaucratic-authoritarian communist regime, what did raise in relatively modernized societies, was characterized by powerful hierarchical communist party, which was led by bureaucratic professionals and was following the orthodox communist ideology and was mercilessly eradicating any reform movements inside the party or in the society (e.g. Czechoslovakia, East Germany); (2) national-accommodative communism was led by more flexible reform-communists and appeared in less modernized societies (which still had an urbanized middle class), there was still a notable resistance to communist rule what forced the local Communist Parties to make some concessions and national accommodations (e.g. Hungary and to some extent Poland), (3)
patrimonial communism, what was characterized by personality cult, patronage, clientelist networks, was installed in the least modernized backward agrarian societies, where communists could act as the main modernizers of the country (e.g. Bulgaria, Romania).

Countries representing bureaucratic-authoritarian type were much more industrialized and had a much stronger worker movements even before communism. Socio-economic cleavages became usually dominant in these countries after the transition and the programmic political parties emerged while further strengthening the class-cleavage-based party competition. In countries with the national-accommodative communism legacy rather socio-cultural divide became essential (conflict between religious-national-authoritarian camp on one hand and secular-cosmopolitan-libertarian camp on another hand) and rather programmic or semi-programmic parties appeared. In the case of the patrimonial communism legacy multiple divides turned out to be the main mobilizing factors, while cross-cutting each other: the regime-divide, the socio-cultural divide and the ethnic divisions. In these countries rather patronage-based or charismatic leader-centred parties were established and the cleavage-based party politics was hardly emerging at all.

Even if the Kitschelt’s theoretical contribution is still the most elaborated and acknowledged in the field, it has several shortcomings. First, the theory was proposed more than 15 years ago and many divides have changed their nature, or have got more institutionalized than just temporary divisions (the regime divide has been institutionalized as the communist-anti-communist divide/cleavage, economic-distributive divide could be called as the socio-economic divide/cleavage nowadays, etc.). Socio-cultural divide seems to be too vague and even too encompassing in the Kitschelt’s framework. The state-church and urban-rural cleavages/divides are missing altogether, although many scholars have reported about their occurrence in the post-communist societies (Jurkynas, 2004; McAllister & White, 2007). Thus, the Kitschelt’s list of cleavages/divides is to some extent outdated and do not reflect the contemporary realities in CEE. Second, Kitschelt is mostly concerned how the legacies of communist regime types (and even pre-communist period) have shaped the party system and cleavages configurations, but he does not pay sufficiently attention to transition challenges emerged in the early 1990s, which have been equally significant (or even more significant) in shaping the divides or cleavages in the region. Thus the Kitschelt’s theory still do not provide a satisfactory answer why even 15 years later rather identity- and value-based cleavages are dominant in the region and it is a case even for the countries which regime legacy allowed the socio-economic cleavage to play more prominent role (e.g. countries with
national-accommodative regime legacy). Third, Kitschelt do not devote much space on the systematic comparison between the Western and Eastern Europe. He was only pointed out that the cleavage formation in CEE would be different because the region’s specific history, due to fact that the post-communist party systems were still in flux and the structure of the societies and identities were not yet fully settled and institutionalized. All these features make CEE countries distinct from Western Europe and do not allow the fully cleavage-based party competition to emerge (at least not immediately after the transition). However, today that kind of conclusions sounds hardly novel and theoretically innovative. Fourth, Kitschelt’s and his colleagues’ study was only focused on four CEE countries (Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Czech-Republic), which limits its applicability to the rest of the region and some serious errors could be identified for some less examined cases (see e.g. Saarts, forthcoming-a).

The theoretical contribution by Evans and Whitefield (2000) and by Whitefield (2002) have been also widely cited. Both authors have supplemented their theoretical contribution with empirical research (Evans, 2006; Evans & Whitefield, 1995, 1998). They have skilfully aggregated many theoretical ideas in the field, while adding their own theoretical innovations. Both authors oppose to so called “tabula rasa” hypothesis which major argument has been, that communism as an egalitarian ideology eradicated social stratification in CEE societies and flattened all substantial social cleavages, thus there is no substantial social differentiation on which parties can build a stable base of support (Caramani & Biezen, 2007; Klingemann & Wessel, 1994). But Evans and Whitefield see the various cleavages to emerge in CEE and report about the remarkable diversity in the region. They distinguish between the ideological divisions which are more value-based (economic liberalism vs. state intervention; social and political liberalism vs. traditionalist and authoritarian tendencies, etc) and social divisions, deriving from class, occupation or cultural differences (religion, language and ethnicity) (Whitefield, 2002). They are not agree with Kitschelt who sees rather one-dimensional features to emerge (e.g. liberals vs. anti-liberals) and puts too much emphasis on the economic factors, overlooking the religious and ethnic aspects of cleavage formations. They argue that the classical Western theories (e.g. Lipset-Rokkan) are not fully applicable to the region and rather sui generis approach has to be developed (Whitefield, 2002). Whitefield sees the roots of contemporary cleavages both in the pre-communist period (which contributed to the persistence of religious and ethnic cleavages) and communist times (legacies of communist regime types – mostly relying on Kitschelt’s theory). He also proposes not to use too rigid definitions of cleavages for CEE and observers reasonable stability of the cleavage
configurations, regardless the fact, that party systems, elite formations and identities have been quite unstable in the region. Both authors predicted that cleavages and divisions formed in an early stage of transition would persist for a long time. In their more theoretical article (2000) they argue, that what makes the societies in CEE distinct from Western Europe, is the “missing middle” – an advanced civil society what is able to aggregate various interests within the society and therefore makes the cleavage formation more efficient and structured. The “missing middle” in CEE would strengthen the position of elites and enhance the structuring power of the institutional factors (e.g. electoral systems) in the cleavage formation process. Nevertheless, they abandon the idea of strong elite agency and rather support the bottom-up approach in which the post-communists electorates are seen to be sufficiently well-informed about their interests and preferences in order to make electoral choices and therefore playing a crucial role in cleavage formation.

They claim, that in the post-communist societies a remarkable social diversity is manifested (in terms of ethnicity, class, religion, etc) what makes it no different from older democracies and provide an fairly adequate base for cleavage formation, which are sometimes relatively well accentuated, although slightly different from older democracies (Evans, 2006). The absence of strong civil society has not to be seen as a serious obstacle for cleavage formation in CEE, because the electorate gets information about the party positions via media and some identities and values are already relatively well accentuated and there is no need for further assistance by civic organizations (Evans & Whitefield, 2000).

The author agrees with many points in Evans and Whitefield works and will rely on their contributions while constructing his own theoretical models. However, he would like to point out some deficiencies. First, the theoretical contribution by Evans and Whitefield has been very fragmented – scattered between many, partly theoretical, party empirical, articles. They have never put forward an aggregated and more or less complete theoretical model explaining the cleavages and cleavage formation in CEE. Second, although they advocate the “bottom-up” model in cleavage formation, they never demonstrate it in a convincing way (neither theoretically nor empirically), why we have to abandon the “top-down” more elite-centred explanations. For example, the analyses by Enyedi (2005) and Enyedi and Deegan-Krause (2001) have presented quite compelling empirical evidences and theoretical justifications in favour of top-down model of cleavage formation. Third, Evans and Whitefield tend to battle too much with “tabula rasa hypothesis” and therefore focus rather on cleavages with the socio-demographic roots (religion, ethnicity, class), while paying less attention to formation
of other more value-based cleavages (e.g. communist-anti-communist cleavage). Neither had they put forward any explicit model which shows the roots of contemporary cleavages in post-communist societies (except referring back to the historical legacies, but rather in a broad and vague manner).

Karasimeonov’s (1999) theoretical contribution has been also widely acclaimed in the field of cleavage research. Karasimeonov, while relying predominately on the Bulgarian case, proposed an influential typology of cleavages for post-communist countries. He distinguished between: (1) residual (historical) cleavages inherited from pre-communist period, but still manifested in the party politics today, (2) transitional cleavages, which determined the political divisions in an early stages of transition and were expected to disappear thereafter, (3) actual cleavages - the real conflicts in the post-communist societies resulting from the economic and political reforms, (3) potential cleavages - the major issues in the post-communist societies which might turn into actual cleavages in future (e.g. materialist vs. post-materialist cleavage). Karasimeonov argues that actual or transitional cleavages would play more important role in the post-communist party politics and historical cleavages are less pronounced, because the communist rule rather levelled down the major social divisions in the post-communist societies or transformed them in a profound way.

One can argue that Karasimeonov theoretical contribution remains somewhat sketchy and contradictory. It is difficult to classify the different cleavages according to his typology. For example, whether the class cleavage and the ethnic cleavage, which nature has somewhat changed in many post-communist societies compared with the pre-communist times, are the “actual cleavages” or “historic cleavages”? Karasimeonov do not put forward any elaborated theoretical model which explains how and why different types of cleavages emerge in various post-communist societies. Thus his conceptual and theoretical effort remains somewhat unfinished.

Berglund and his colleagues (Berglund, et al., 2013; Berglund, Ekman, & Aarebrot, 2004b; Berglund, et al., 1998) have also contributed to construction of typologies of cleavages in CEE while basing on extensive case studies published in the collaborative volumes edited by them. Although the case studies in these volumes have provided a valuable empirical material, the editor’s own original theoretical input remained rather modest. They identify a wide range of cleavages in CEE: some are more country-specific, some rather universal, some have historic roots, some are contemporary in their character, etc. They also argue, that some countries have a relatively simple cleavage structure (e.g. Czech Republic), while some have
a very complex one (e.g. Hungary). But they never put forward any elaborated explanations to these patterns. They note that one of the peculiarities of the CEE party politics has been the mysterious persistence of communist-anti-communist cleavage and the pronounced role played by identity politics (notably by ethnicity).

Nevertheless, Deegan-Krause (2013a) makes perhaps the most revolutionary and considerable theoretical contribution in the last volume edited by Berglund et. al. He concentrates on the question whether the cleavages in CEE could be considered as full cleavages or partial ones. Deegan-Krause’s research supports the last option and he puts forward a sophisticated typology of partial cleavages occurring (or might occur) in the CEE party politics. For the reason that the current article is more focused on the cleavage formation, than on their nature in that sense whether they could be considered as full or partial ones, we will not provide an extended overview on Deegan-Krause’s contribution.

Of course, these four theoretical contributions cited above are not the only theoretical innovations in the field. One can find various attempts of theorisation in many empirical articles and case studies. But the general problem seems to be, that there are indeed relatively few theoretical or predominately theoretical articles published. The theoretical ideas are rather scattered and not specially highlighted on the pages of predominately empirical articles. This is also a reason why perhaps a more comprehensive and purely theoretical contribution is needed, which aggregates previous ideas and adds some novel concepts.

While taking into account the previous theoretical inputs cited before (Kitschelt, Evans & Whitefield, Karasimeonov, Berglund et. al.), one can see that all these theories have some common shortcomings: (1) they are mostly constructed in the 1990s and so they reflect the situation of early phase of transition, but now 15 years onwards the party politics and cleavage constellations have become more stable and institutionalized and thus the theoretical contribution, which is taking into consideration a longer time perspective, is needed; (2) the authors cited before do not put forward any systematic conceptual analysis why the cleavage formation in CEE has been remarkably different from Western Europe, rather some random conclusions have been made on the subject; (3) although all the authors have been concentrated on the cleavage formation and have demonstrated how the contemporary cleavages have their historical roots (both in the communist or pre-communist times), there has been less effort to link the cleavages with the real transition challenges and

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2 Even if the party systems in CEE are still quite unconsolidated, the situation is not anymore so unstable like it was in the 1990s (see e.g. Lewis, 2006).
especially with challenges, which produced not temporary divisions, but prolonged conflicts (e.g. the question on “mysterious” persistence of communist-anti-communist cleavage and the prolonged predominance of the identity-based cleavages instead the class cleavage); (4) the theories cited are either too sketchy (Berglund, et al., Karasimeonov), fragmented (Evans & Whitefield) or too complex (Kitschelt). The latter-mentioned aspects might be a problem, because parsimony, rather than excessive complexity or fragmentation, is considered to be a merit in social sciences (Hay, 2002).

The theoretical contributions proposed in the current paper are intended to address all these major shortcomings.

3. “The Third Revolution” and the peculiarities of cleavage formation in CEE in comparison with Western Europe

Although the Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argument has been more complex, they argue that four major social cleavages (centre-periphery, church-state, rural-urban, owner-worker), which have shaped the modern party systems in Western Europe, have their roots in two principal grand socio-political processes or critical junctures (or revolutions): (1) the nation-building/the state-building, (2) the Industrial Revolution.

The centre-periphery cleavage which refers to conflict between the political and cultural centre areas of the emerging nation states and their peripheries (which had distinct culture and were keen to preserve their autonomy) is directly connected with the nation and the state building efforts. Same about the church-state cleavage which was basing on the confrontation between the church and the state builders, whose aspiration was to secularize the state, society, education system, social welfare, etc. That conflict was particularly accentuated in the Catholic societies. Both the worker-owner and rural-urban cleavage had its roots in the industrial revolution in which the new capitalist economy generated the conflict between the traditional rural interests and urban industrial interests, as well as between the owners of capital and the working class (the class cleavage).

The same two critical junctures affected the CEE and there is no doubt that to some extent the Lipset-Rokkan model was applicable to CEE countries at the beginning of the 20th century and in the interwar years (Berglund, Ekman, & Aarebrot, 2004a). The cleavages emerged were mostly similar to Western Europe, although the centre-periphery (ethnic cleavage) and rural-urban cleavage were considerably more pronounced than in the West (Berglund & Aarebrot, 1997). However, because the development of democratic institutions and party politics remained erratic and incomplete and some countries were so underdeveloped in the
socio-economic terms in order to support the modern cleavage configurations, the cleavage formation in general remained more or less unfinished (Lawson, et al., 1999). It was particularly true for the class cleavage, because some countries were barely industrialized and were considered to be as agrarian societies even prior to World War II (Kitschelt, et al., 1999).

Hence, the CEE countries experienced the same two critical junctures/revolutions (the nation/state building and the Industrial Revolution) like countries in Western Europe, but it did happen later, both revolutions often took place at the same time (in Western Europe the nation building usually started earlier than the full-scale industrialization) and usually did not produce complete cleavage constellations like in the West.

The communist period put an end to normal democratic (or semi-democratic) party politics, which was essential for any kind of cleavage formation. Although the communist rule modernized the societies in CEE and created a new educated middle-class, it did wipe out the traditional rural and urban middle-class constituencies and secularized the societies (Berglund, et al., 2004a). Thus the essence and nature of many old Lipset-Rokkan-style cleavages was profoundly altered and even if the church-state cleavage and the ethnic cleavage retained some of their essential features, the class cleavage and urban-rural cleavage couldn’t be the same under the communist economy. The author is not supporting the “*tabula rasa* hypothesis” about the completely “flattened societies” without any substantial social differentiation, but argues that the communism transformed the nature of many pre-war cleavages in the way that there couldn’t be just simple re-vitalisation of Lipset-Rokkan cleavage constellations after the fall of communism. Moreover, the transition process itself created completely new and very acute challenges/contradictions which couldn’t be contained within the Lipset-Rokkan framework at all (e.g. democratization, marketization, the assessment on the communist past, etc.).

Hence the principal argument is that the transition in 1989 could be considered as the third critical juncture or the “Third revolution”, which created its own conflicts, internal contradictions and while combining the new cleavages derived from the transition challenges with the older pre-communist cleavages (which nature was already changed because the communist rule), established a completely new landscape of cleavages for the post-communist societies. One can argue that the contemporary cleavages in Western Europe have transformed as well and are not essentially the same as in Lipset-Rokkan times (Deegan-Krause, 2007) (e.g. owner worker is rather regarded as socio-economic cleavage today and centre-periphery cleavage as an ethnic cleavage). However, the transformation of cleavages in
Western Europe has been rather evolutionary and gradual, but in CEE it has been more abrupt marked by the great socio-political shocks (the transition in 1989 and also the communist rule). This is a major reason why we talk about the “revolutions” in the CEE context, not about the gradual restoration of old Lipset-Rokkan classical cleavage constellations in a slightly modified format.

Therefore, without understanding the internal conflicts and challenges of transition and how profoundly they transformed the old pre-communist cleavages and generated the new ones, it is impossible to understand the cleavage formation in CEE. The essential theoretical ideas presented above are captured by Figure 1.

**Figure 1.** The cleavage formation in CEE and the “Third Revolution”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First two (Lipset-Rokkan) “revolutions” (19th century – 1940s)</th>
<th>The “Third Revolution”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization → Class cleavage</td>
<td>Communist rule (to some extent transformed the former cleavages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation building → State-church Centre-Periphery</td>
<td>Transition (1989) → New cleavages generated by transition challenges or combination with old ones</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

The idea of the “Third revolution” might not sound particularly novel or truly “revolutionary” for the scholars focused on cleavages and party politics in CEE. The basic ingredients of the theoretical model outlined here could be found in several previous publications (e.g. Evans & Whitefield, 1998; Kitschelt, et al., 1999). However, hardly anyone of these prominent authors has presented these ideas in such a concise and comprehensive theoretical model, while proposing some conceptual innovations concurrently.

Nevertheless, the real significance of the concept of the “Third revolution” lay not in the fact that it enables us to describe some very general macro-processes associated with the cleavage formation in CEE, but in its deeper meaning and theoretical/empirical implications. The concept permits us to compare the cleavage formation in Western Europe (which predominately took place in the context of the Lipset-Rokkan critical junctures/revolutions) with cleavage formation in CEE under “the Third Revolution”. That kind of comparative analysis would provide many clues why the cleavage constellations in both regions of Europe
have been remarkably different and enables us to understand many peculiarities of CEE, which have puzzled scholars until now. The major argument is: the nature, the context and challenges produced by the “Third revolution” have been considerably different from the previous classical “Lipset-Rokkan” critical junctures/revolutions and therefore we cannot assume the same (or almost the same) cleavage constellations to emerge in CEE like in Western Europe. Shortly, the initial starting point (critical junctures/revolutions) has been quite different in its nature, so the results (cleavage constellations) have to be different as well; if we manage to map the crucial differences between these critical junctures/revolutions we can understand the major discrepancies between the cleavage configurations.

The basic divergences between the classical “Lipset-Rokkan revolutions” and the “Third revolution” are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Classical Lipset-Rokkan revolutions/critical junctures versus the post-communist „Third Revolution“ – implications to cleavage formation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Classical Lipset-Rokkan critical junctures or revolutions in Western Europe</th>
<th>The post-communist „Third Revolution“</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The principal roots of the cleavages</td>
<td>Social conflict produced by industrialization and nation building</td>
<td>Multiple transition challenges: democratization, marketization, nation- and the state-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The socio-cultural context for the cleavage formation</td>
<td>Industrial or pre-industrial societies</td>
<td>Late industrial or post-industrial societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominant cleavages</td>
<td>Class cleavage, the state-church cleavage</td>
<td>Various identity- and value-based cleavages (e.g. ethnic, clerical-anti-clerical, communist-post-communist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominant party type associated with the cleavages</td>
<td>Mass parties and cadre parties</td>
<td>Catch-all-parties and cartel parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The process of cleavage formation</td>
<td>Prolonged process</td>
<td>Rapid and contracted process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The principal model of cleavage formation</td>
<td>Predominately “bottom up”; strong input by the civil society</td>
<td>Mixed, but with significant “top-down” component; input by the civil society weak or absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The relationship between different cleavages</td>
<td>Rather singular cleavages, could be separated from each other</td>
<td>Rather merged cleavages, difficult to break up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of the cleavages</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Relatively stable, but more feeble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation of “the cleavage regimes”</td>
<td>Evolutionary and gradual change</td>
<td>Revolutionary change and the “cleavage leap” phenomenon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred research programme or methods</td>
<td>Surveys</td>
<td>Media research, elite interviews, surveys</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author
As it was noted earlier the cleavages in Western Europe have their roots in two critical junctures identified by Lipset-Rokkan (industrialization and the nation/state building). In CEE both Lipset-Rokkan critical junctures we playing role in the cleavage formation at pre-communist period, but the contemporary cleavages have rather grown out from multiple transition challenges in which three chief challenges were identified by C. Offe (1991): democratization, marketisation, nation- (and the state-) building. As I will be explained in the section 3, each of these challenges produced its own sets of particular cleavages. The old Lipset-Rokkan cleavages did not disappear completely, but their real meaning was usually transformed in a relatively profound way, first because the communist rule, and then by the new transition challenges. For example the essence of urban-rural cleavage in today’s post-communist societies is remarkably different than it was in the 1920s.

Lipset-Rokkan critical junctures happened in the industrial and or pre-industrial societies and that context supported the cleavage formation basing on well-established distinctive collective identities and subcultures (class, religious communities, farming communities, etc.), supplemented by clearly pronounced political ideologies and collective values (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). The class and the state-church cleavages became eventually dominant in that context (Gallagher, Laver, & Mair, 2005). Cleavage formation in CEE under “the Third Revolution” was taking place in a remarkably different socio-cultural context: in the late industrial societies, which were already heading towards the post-industrial societies. There has been a lot of discussion in Western Europe about the transformation of classical cleavage-based party politics and decline of traditional cleavages (notably the class cleavage), because the class structure, values and identities in the post- or late industrial societies are remarkable different (Clark & Lipset, 2001; Evans, 1999; Karvonen & Kuhnle, 2001; Knutsen, 2007). The hidden normative assumption, which has been presented in many articles about party politics in CEE, has been that CEE countries were expected to follow the classical Lipset-Rokkan model and full social cleavages (particularly the class cleavage) would soon (re)emerge in the region. The contemporary developments in Western Europe and the general socio-cultural milieu of the post- or late-industrial societies provide no solid ground for that kind of assumptions. Many researchers report, that even if the importance of class cleavage has not dramatically declined in the West, the new value-based cultural cleavages have gained more importance (Inglehart, 1977; Kriesi et al., 2012). Thus, if the value- and identity-based cleavages tend to dominate in CEE and they overshadow the full social cleavages (the class cleavage), it could be considered as a logical trend, largely characteristic for the late-industrial
or emerging post-industrial societies. Shortly, the socio-cultural and political context behind the Lipset-Rokkan revolutions on the one hand and the “Third revolution” on the other hand, has been considerably different, so we cannot assume very similar cleavage configurations to emerge.

Cleavages in Western Europe, when they appeared in the 19th century, were associated with cadre parties and newly emerged mass parties, while the cleavage formation in CEE after 1989 took place in the age of catch-all-parties and cartel parties (Kopecký, 2006; Sikk, 2003; Sitter, 2002). Both the latter mentioned party types have more feeble roots into society, their electorate tend to be more volatile and the ideological profiles of the parties are rather blur (Krouwel, 2006). That in turn do not encourage the full social cleavages and predominately cleavage-based party politics to emerge (and if they do emerge, it is not a quick and smooth process).

There has been a lot of discussion whether the cleavages in CEE could be considered as full cleavages or partial cleavages, or we have to call them even as divides or divisions (Deegan-Krause, 2013a; Kitschelt, et al., 1999; Lawson, et al., 1999). Of course the answer depends on definition of cleavages, but if we adopt the most widely used definition proposed by Bartolini & Mair (1990), most of the cleavages manifested in the party politics in CEE are not regarded as full cleavages, except the ethnic cleavage (and class cleavage in some countries like Czech Republic) (Berglund, et al., 2013; Evans & Whitefield, 1998). Thus we can argue that if former Lipset-Rokkan critical junctures were able to produce the full cleavages, the post-communist “Third revolution” was more likely to produce the partial cleavages. Party because the cleavage formation was taking place in the late-industrial societies which is probably not a very favourable environment for constructing full cleavages with very deep roots into society.

There are even more substantial differences in the cleavage formation. The Lipset-Rokkan critical junctures could be considered as very prolonged grand historical processes: the nation-(and the state-) building took a several centuries to be accomplished and quite same about the Industrial Revolution. In contrast, the post-communist “Third Revolution” and the transition itself happened quite rapidly, within a decade. So the time period which was very critical for the cleavage formation was extremely contracted, because particularly the first years of transition (the I half of the 1990s) were the most crucial time for the new confrontations and conflicts to emerge in the post-communist societies (Kitschelt, 1995). The contracted nature of the cleavage formation had two very important implications for CEE.
First, due to fact that the cleavage formation was relatively contracted process, it provided more opportunities for political elites to play a relatively prominent role in it, because the substantial part of the electorate was relatively disoriented in the beginning of transition, new identities and social structures were about to form, civil society was relatively weak in order to channel and formulate the interests of different social groups, etc. The author is not going to argue that the “top-down” model of cleavage formation was very prevalent and the “bottom-up” model was not relevant at all. Rather there was an interplay between those two models. On the one hand, the elite agency played a substantial role in shaping the discourses, symbols and values which were connected with the newly emerged cleavages and was able to combine different minor divides into more comprehensive cleavages. But on the other hand the elites were not able to impose completely new divisions on society, so they attempted to shape the emerging and already existing cleavages and to some extent adjust them to their needs. Enyedi (2005) is demonstrating it in a quite convincing way how the Fidesz party in Hungary was very skillful in combining different divides into larger cleavage packages and to shape the discourses and organizational structures accordingly. Little research is done on the elite agency in cleavage formation in CEE, but it seems to be different from the West in the context of Lipset-Rokkan critical junctures, in which the civil society (trade unions, church communities, etc.) was playing more vital role in shaping the cleavages and the elite influence was not considered to be a so important variable like the bottom-up processes.

Second, the contractedness of the cleavage formation gave a way to another phenomenon which has astonished many researchers: the cleavages in many CEE countries seem to be merged and form relatively coherent packages or camps (Berglund, et al., 2013; Deegan-Krause, 2007). It is relatively common in the Visegrad countries but also in the Baltic States (notably in Lithuania) that on the one hand there is a right wing, rather church friendly, nationalist, anti-communist camp and on the other hand one can find a left-wing, anti-clerical, cosmopolitan (or less nationalist) camp, which has more neutral attitudes towards the communist past (Ramonaitė, 2006; Szczerbiak, 2006; Toka & Popa, 2013). Of course the researchers report about the crosscutting or overlapping cleavages in Western Europe as well (Gallagher, et al., 2005), but the cleavages in Western Europe are more often treated as singular entities (e.g. the class cleavage). It seems to be a distinctive feature of CEE that cleavages are fused and these specific combinations are difficult to break apart. But how it is connected with the contracted nature of cleavage formation? When the transition started, both the parties and the general public suddenly faced to multiple transition challenges: nation building, introduction of market economy, re-organization of the rural economy,
democratization, etc. We can hypnotize that these simultaneous challenges (later producing some significant cleavages) got somehow merged in the minds of the voters and politicians (e.g. the voters learnt to associate the anti-communism with the right-wing ideologies and in turn with the nationalism and pro-church attitudes). The limited time period for cleavage formation also allowed the political elites to some extent to shape the newly emerging “cleavage packages” while inventing the new discourses and symbols around them. It is still considered to be rather a hypothesis, because there are very few studies on the cleavage formation in an early period of transition, but the explanation offered seems to be more or less plausible.

There are also some differences regarding the overall stability of cleavage constellations. It appears to be an empirical fact, that the first decade of transition was a really critical time for the cleavage formation, because even if most of the scholars regard the post-communist party systems to be very unstable, they still acknowledge the relative stability of the cleavage or divide constellations which have not very much changed since the 1990s (Berglund, et al., 2013; Evans & Whitefield, 2000; Jungerstam-Mulders, 2006). Nevertheless, the cleavage configurations have not been so stable, like in Western Europe and some cleavages in CEE have lost their prominence (e.g. urban-rural cleavage) and new cleavage or cleavage-like structures have appeared (e.g. corruption divide), but the changes have not been very radical (Deegan-Krause, 2013a; Saarts, 2011).

Finally, if we analyse the general transformation of the prevalent cleavage configurations, which can be also called as “cleavage regimes”, one can argue that the transformations of the “cleavage regimes” has been more substantial and revolutionary in Eastern Europe. While the Lipset-Rokkan model is still relevant and fairly adequate in explaining the principal cleavage constellations in Western Europe, the situation in CEE has been very different: abrupt changes which were brought by communism and later by the post-communist transition have really transformed the whole cleavage structure in CEE and in a very profound way. Thus, it is one of our principal arguments, that without taking into account the “Third revolution” and other abrupt changes, it is impossible to understand the contemporary cleavages in CEE, because there has been neither a gradual transformation of classical Lipset-Rokkan cleavages nor their re-vitalization, but something new and idiosyncratic.

The features presented in Table 1 do not sound particularly novel for the scholars focused on CEE. However the comparative analysis between two types of critical junctures/revolutions and their implications has its own merits. It can provide an answer to many very substantial questions which have puzzled the researchers concerning the post-
communist party politics: Why the cleavages in CEE have so feeble roots into society and instead class cleavage rather value- or identity-based cleavages have gained prominence? Why cleavages in CEE tend to be partial cleavages, not full cleavages? Why they are rather merged? Why the cleavages constellations have been relatively stable, but not so stable like in the West?, etc. The systematic comparison between the Lipset-Rokkan critical junctures/revolutions and the post-communist “Third revolution”, would provide answers to many of these questions.

4. The model of cleavage formation in the context of the “Third Revolution”.

Like it was noted before, the scholars have proposed different empirical and theoretical models in order to explain the cleavage formation in CEE and to find the roots of the contemporary cleavages. However, most of the authors have rather made references to the pre-communist history and to legacies of the communist regime and have not really focused on the real transition challenges. Even if there have been some relevant theoretical explanations they have been rather erratic in their nature and the scholars have not put forward very elegant and comprehensive models.

C. Offe (2009) has argued that CEE was facing to three principal transition challenges in the early 1990s: democratization, marketization and the nation- and state-building. The model is known as a “triple transition” model and the principal argument was that these three fundamental challenges appeared simultaneously, which made the post-communist transition unique and especially challenging. One can even talk about the quadruple transition, while separating the state-building and the nation-building form each other, as interlinked, but still different challenges (C. Offe, 1997). The “triple transition” model has been largely unnoticed and ignored by the scholars focused on party politics and cleavages in CEE (maybe, because it sounds too sociological). However, the model has a huge theoretical potential in explaining the cleavage formation in CEE, because all three major transition challenges produced their own sets of cleavages and most of the major cleavages/divides, so far identified by the scholars, fit neatly into the model (see Figure 2)
Figure 2. The cleavage formation in the context of the “Third Revolution” according to “triple transition” model.

Source: Author

Of course, one can find some additional (and often country-specific) cleavages/divides which are not included into the theoretical model on Figure 2. The list here is a synthesis of
several relevant typologies (e.g. Berglund, et al., 2013; Berglund, et al., 2004b; Evans, 2006; Karasimeonov, 1999; Kitschelt, et al., 1999; Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2009) and rather the cleavages pointed out by several authors were included. It is maybe important to note that the cleavages listed above are not considered to be full cleavages according to classical definition by Bartolini and Mair (1990), but rather a more loose definition by Lawson (1999, p. 22) was used: “Cleavages are long-term structural conflicts that give rise to opposing political positions, which may or may not be represented by parties.”

The following sections will be dedicated on the “triple transition” model and several empirical examples will be drawn in order to explain the emergence of cleavages in various CEE countries.

The first and foremost challenge the CEE countries were facing to, was the democratization and to get rid of the remnants of the communist political order. Initially the democratization challenge generated the true “regime divide”: supporters of the regime change vs. retainers of the old communist order or its important elements (Kitschelt, et al., 1999). The divide was more pronounced in the societies in which the old communist elite managed to stay in power or established quite potent communist-successor parties (e.g. Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria) (Bozóki & Ishiyama, 2002; Enyedi, 2006a; Kitschelt, 1995). The nature of the cleavage changed as time progressed and the major question was raised how to assess the communist past: whether in neutral or in negative terms? Thus the communist-anti-communist cleavage became the cleavage of assessment of communist past and there was almost nothing to do with the re-introduction of the former communist order or real communist ideology. Nevertheless, in some countries the cleavage was rather manifested as a real divide between the democratic forces and authoritarian parties/leaders and did last almost for a decade – Slovakia is considered to be the most notable example (Deegan-Krause, 2006; Evans & Whitefield, 1998; Rybár 2006).

Most of the scholars predicted that the communist-anti-communist cleavage would gradually fade away (Jungerstam-Mulders, 2006; Karasimeonov, 1999), but it was not the case. The cleavage is still playing quite prominent role in many CEE countries party politics (Berglund, et al., 2013). Why? First, because it did became somewhat a cleavage which the new regime was using for legitimizing itself – it became a so called the “legitimizing cleavage”. Even if there was no real threat of re-turning back to communism, the negative references to communist past provided some justification to radical reforms. In general it is very difficult to build up and to legitimize a new political regime if there is no any kind of “opposition” at all, even imaginary one (Morlino, 2012). Second, the communist-anti-
Communist cleavage was already embedded into emerging cleavage constellations and often merged with other more prominent cleavages – thus as an integral part of a new cleavage configuration it couldn’t just evaporate.

In order to illustrate the last point three scenarios or the “strange paths of the communist-anti-communist cleavage” could be observed in CEE:

- **Path 1 – disappearance or marginalization** – it did happen in the countries in which there were no powerful Communist successor-parties at least in the 1990s (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia), if they re-appeared the cleavage gained some prominence and to some extent got merged with socio-economic cleavage (Rybár & Deegan-Krause, 2008);

- **Path 2 – becoming a significant cleavage in its own** – that scenario was likely in the countries in which there was a well-established Communist-successor parties and the cleavage sometimes merged with other cleavages (e.g. with state-church, socio-economic divide) (Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania) (Crowther & Suciu, 2013; Enyedi, 2006b; Jasiewicz, 2009; Jurkynas, 2004; Karasimeonov & Lyubenov, 2013);

- **Path 3 – fusion with the ethnic cleavage** - a specific case of the Baltic States (Latvia and Estonia) in which no Communist-successor parties survived, but there was a numerous the Russian-speaking minority presented (Pettai, Auers, & Ramonaité, 2011; Saarts, 2011). The Russian-speaking minority itself and their interests became associated with the communist domination in the past and therefore two cleavages merged: parties which were considered to be “Russian-friendly” were assumed to have positive attitudes towards the communist past as well (Saarts, forthcoming-a).

Hence, the communist-anti-communist cleavage as a value-based cleavage did not disappear but was transformed and became rather as an integral part of the cleavage constellations as a regime legitimizing cleavage or as an important element of more comprehensive cleavage combinations.

The second major transition challenge was the introduction of the market economy – marketization. It produced two major cleavages: the socio-economic cleavage and urban-rural cleavage.

There has been a lot of discussion on the strength or nature of class cleavage (socio-economic cleavage) in CEE (Deegan-Krause, 2007; Kitschelt, 1992; Letki, 2013; McAllister & White, 2007; Nieuweerta & Grotenbreg, 2000; Ost, 2009). The prevailing consensus seems to be, that the class cleavage or socio-economic cleavage has been considerably less
accentuated in the party politics of CEE than in Western Europe and often overshadowed by the value- or identity-based cleavages. The scholars have pointed out different reasons for that: the post-communist transition did not allow well-defined social classes to emerge with clear ideological preferences (Lipset, 1995), the division between the transition “losers-winners” did not correspond to actual class structure in the societies (Mateju, 1996), the normal class-based discourses did not appear because the prevailing anti-communist ethos, dominance of neoliberalism and the working class got eventually more attracted by the identity politics (Ost, 1995, 2009). Nevertheless, very few researchers argue that socio-economic cleavage is irrelevant for CEE: even if it is not highlighted as the most important cleavage, it usually occupies the second or the third position in the country-based case studies (Berglund, et al., 2013; Evans, 2006; Zielinski, 2002). The class cleavage proves to be more accentuated in the countries which were more modernized even before the communist rule and had advanced class structure and rather a class-based party politics: notably the Czech Republic and Slovenia (Kitschelt, et al., 1999; Zajc & Boh, 2004). In other CEE countries the identity- and value-based cleavages (ethnic, communist-anti-communist, state-church cleavage) tend to overshadow the socioeconomic cleavage (Deegan-Krause, 2007; Enyedi, 2006a; Nieuwbeerta & Grotenbreg, 2000).

The urban-rural cleavage was another divide activated by marketization. It is important to note that the contemporary urban-rural cleavage is not anymore a classical Lispet-Rokkan cleavage between the traditional farmers and industrialists in the cities. Initially it was a divide between the political forces which supported the continuation of the Soviet-style agriculture and those who propagated more radical market solutions (Csáki & Nash, 1998). Nowadays the urban-rural cleavage has transformed to a geographical or regional cleavage, in which there is a conflict between the more advanced urbanized regions (often around the capital cities) and poorer rural regions dotted with small country towns. The cleavage was quite accentuated in the 1990s and several successful agrarian parties were established (Hloušek & Kopeček, 2010; Jungerstam-Mulders, 2006). The reason for that was, that the employment in the agriculture was decreasing dramatically – in many countries by more than half – and it was a big shock for the rural population (Berend, 2009). Rural-urban cleavage has been strongly interlinked with the socio-economic divide in CEE, because especially the rural population was considered to be one of the major losers of transition (Titma, Tuma, & Silver, 1998). Even today urban-rural cleavage is reported to be relatively significant in the countries which still have a sizeable employment in the agricultural sector or big regional differences (notably: Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) (Crowther &
Suciu, 2013; Duvold & Jurkynas, 2013; Karasimeonov & Lyubenov, 2013; Lagerspetz & Vogt, 2013; Smith-Sivertsen, 2004; Szczerbiak, 2006). Nevertheless since the middle of the 2000s the importance of the cleavage has declined in many countries and with it the heydays of the agrarian parties seem to be over (Hloušek & Kopeček, 2010; Saarts, forthcoming-b).

The third transition challenge, nation- and the state-building, generated a much larger variety of cleavages which have been proved to be even more substantial in CEE party politics than cleavages derived from democratization and marketization.

The ethnic cleavage has been often considered to be the only “full cleavage” in CEE, with a remarkable mobilizing power and noted because its ability to predict the patterns of party support in many multi-ethnic societies (Berglund, et al., 2013; Deegan-Krause, 2013a; Nieuwbeerta & Grotenbreg, 2000; Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2009). Obviously the ethnic cleavage has been more evident in the countries with considerable ethnic minorities and significant ethnic (or semi-ethnic) parties: Estonia and Latvia (the Russian minority), Slovakia and Romania (the Hungarian minority) and Bulgaria (the Turkish minority) (Auers, 2013; Deegan-Krause, 2004a, 2004b; Evans, 2006; Lagerspetz & Vogt, 2013). It is important to note that ethnic cleavage in contemporary CEE is not just a pure ethnic divide between the titular nationalities and the minorities, but also encompasses an important dimension how to treat and integrate the minorities and therefore it might become a cleavage which has a relevance within the majority population as well (Berglund, et al., 2013; Deegan-Krause, 2007; Smith-Sivertsen, 2004). It seems to be almost a rule than in countries in which the ethnic cleavage is playing an important role, it often tends to overshadow all other cleavages, which demonstrates that the nation-building efforts had highly mobilizing power in CEE and the process did not end with the Lipset-Rokkan critical junctures at the pre-communist period, but the second round of nation-building project was launched in 1989 (see e.g. Bunce, 2005). We will briefly discuss these matters at the end of the current chapter.

The second significant cleavage, which has been also proven to be more accentuated than the socio-economic cleavage, has been the state-church cleavage or clerical-anti-clerical divide (McAllister & White, 2007; Nieuwbeerta & Grotenbreg, 2000). The cleavage has been predominately manifested in the Catholic countries with more pronounced religious values, in which the Catholic Church has played an important role in the nation-building project even before the communism or was considered to be a symbolic centre of the anti-communist opposition (notably in Poland, but also in Hungary and Lithuania) (Krupavičius, 2005; Lawson, et al., 1999; Zarycki, 2000; Tóka, 2004). In more secular Catholic countries in which the church has not been so deeply involved into nation-building, the clerical-anti-clerical
divide has been played rather marginal role (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Slovenia) (Deegan-Krause, 2013b; Mansfeldová, 2013; Zajc, 2013). The same could be said about the Protestant countries: Estonia and Latvia (Saarts, 2011). Maybe Poland is the major outliner in the region because nowhere else the religious cleavage has gained such a prominence (Letki, 2013). It seems to be also one of the peculiarities of CEE that the state-church cleavage tends to be allied with communist-anti-communist cleavage, national-cosmopolitan cleavage (the Polish, Hungarian and Lithuanian cases).

The nation-building generated even more cleavages, which have not been so significant for the whole region like the major cleavages analysed before.

The EU accession, wider international cooperation and the growing impact of globalization has encouraged the national-cosmopolitan cleavage to emerge. On the one hand we can find the parties propagating the traditional nationalist values, even national seclusion and which are sceptical towards the further EU integration, and on the other hand there are parties which have a more cosmopolitan and the pro-EU outlook (Mudde, 2003). The cleavage has been more visible in the countries in which there are no sizable ethnic minorities (Poland, Hungary) - thus it somehow seems substitute the ethnic cleavage as an important manifestation the new nation-building project. Hungary is a particularly special case, because the cleavage also encompasses the issues associated with the Hungarian diasporas (Waterbury, 2006). The cleavage has been not very accentuated in the Baltic States, but it has been slightly more significant in the Western Balkan countries (Crowther & Suciu, 2013; Duvold & Jurkynas, 2013).

The geopolitical cleavage – the choice between the East (the prolonged Russian influence) and the West (the EU, NATO integration) – was perhaps only relevant for the Baltic States and has been somewhat merged with the ethnic cleavage (Auers, 2013; Mikkel, 2006).

The corruption divide/cleavage which has gained importance especially in the 2000s seems to be an only cleavage having its roots directly into the state-building efforts. But to what extent it proves to be a real cleavage rather than a temporary issue divide, is still a matter of debate (Berglund, et al., 2013; Deegan-Krause, 2013a).

While basing on the previous relatively detailed analysis on the substantial cleavages in the CEE party politics, one can draw two principal conclusions: (1) the cleavages generated by the nation building challenge prove to be more significant than the cleavages having their roots in marketisation and democratization challenges; (2) the uni-/multidimensionality of the
cleavage constellations of a given country has been very much dependent on the complexity of the major challenges the country met during the transition. Both points will be explored in the following sections.

A remarkable feature of the cleavage structures in CEE seems to be a pre-eminence of the identity- and value based cleavages over the class cleavage. The most prominent identity- and value-based cleavages are having their roots into the nation-building challenge (ethnic cleavage, state-church and national-cosmopolitan cleavage).

We can even formulate the law of pre-eminence of the nation-building cleavages in CEE: “In the countries which faced to the considerable nation-building challenges during the transition, the identity- (and value-) based cleavages tend to overshadow the cleavages produced by other major transition challenges, notably the class-cleavage stemmed from marketization.”

It is a notable aspect, that the cleavages which are having their roots into the nation-building efforts have become very pronounced not only in the multi-ethnic societies (in the form of the ethnic cleavage), but also in more mono-ethnic societies while being manifested as the national-cosmopolitan divide or the state-church cleavage (Hungary, Poland).

Why so? The ethnicity and nation-building has been played more essential role in the political history of CEE during the 20th century than in Western Europe (Bunce, 2005; Jasiewicz, 2009; Kymlicka, 2000). The new challenges emerged with the transition while many countries were starting to re-assert their national identities or faced to large minority population. Because the ethnic identities had been already established and well-defined it was easier for parties to mobilize the voters along the ethnic lines and basing on other more comprehensive value-based divides (the state-church and national-cosmopolitan cleavage), than basing on the class cleavage, because the class structures were relatively blur and the new classes just started to form.

Furthermore, as it was noted earlier, it seems to be a remarkable feature for late- and post-industrial societies that rather identity- and value-based cleavages tend to gain more prominence than the class cleavage (which is also in decline in the West).

But probably more important conclusion could be made on the connection between the complexity of the transition challenges and the corresponding cleavage configurations. One can find three principal patterns:

1. **Simple transition challenges – uni-dimensional (class-cleavage-dominated) cleavage structure.** The countries which faced only to one major transition challenge, namely marketisation, developed a relatively simple and one-dimensional cleavage
configuration, in which socio-economic cleavage became dominant. The prime examples are Czech Republic and Slovenia. Both countries did not have a remarkable democratization challenge, because the communist successor parties were marginalized. Neither had they faced to the significant nation-building challenges, because both countries are homogenous nation states in the ethnic terms and also very secular societies in order to promote the state-church cleavage. Thus the simple and the “Western-like” cleavage structure of Czech Republic and Slovenia could not to be attributed to their inherit “Westerness”, but the reason is the lack of multiple transition challenges.

2. Medium-level transition challenges – uni-dimensional (ethnic-cleavage-dominated) cleavage structure. The countries belong to this group faced to two major transition challenges: marketisation and notably the nation-building. Latvia and Estonia are considered to be the prime examples. Due to very size of the ethnic minorities (the Russian speaking minority) and geopolitical vulnerability of the countries (the neighbourhood of Russia), the ethnic cleavage became the pre- eminent cleavage often overshadowing the cleavages produced by marketization (socio-economic cleavage, urban-rural cleavage). The democratization challenge was solved with the extinction of communist-successor parties and the communist-anti-communist cleavage became rather a sub-cleavage under the ethnic divide.

3. Complex transition challenges – complex cleavage structure. All other CEE countries (Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria) belong to this group. Of cause these countries considerably differ from each other, but they have some notable common features: all these countries faced to all three major transition challenges. The democratization challenge was either more explicit because the authoritarian tendencies of early post-transition regimes (Slovakia), or was manifested through the communist-anti-communist cleavage because the survival of the viable Communist successor-parties (Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania). All these countries faced to marketization, but the nation-building challenge proved to be more crucial in the cleavage formation. It did produce the relatively pronounced ethnic cleavages in more multi-ethnic societies (Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania), or was manifested by the clerical-anti-clerical and national-cosmopolitan divide in more religious but ethnically homogeneous societies (Poland, Hungary, to some extent Lithuania). Chiefly among the countries associated with a complex pattern of transition challenges, one can find the curious phenomenon of the CEE party politics – the merged cleavages. Maybe
there was something to do with the complexity of transition challenges and a big
variety of cleavages they generated. Perhaps the prime example here is Slovakia: all
major transition challenges have been present there and generated almost all
imaginable divides and cleavages (often merged) usually prominent in CEE (Deegan-
Krause, 2013b).

Three major patterns outlined above confirm also the law of pre-eminence of the nation-
building cleavages: Wherever the transition challenges associated with the nation-building
were presented, the corresponding identity (and value-) based cleavages became pre- eminent.

4. The full theoretical model of cleavage formation in CEE and its methodological
implications.

Hence, we have talked about all the major elements and novel concepts in order to propose
the full theoretical model of cleavage formation in CEE (Figure 3)

As it was described earlier, the cleavage formation started with the classical “Lipset-
Rokkan revolutions” or critical junctures (industrialization and the nation/state-building) in
the end of the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century in CEE. The cleavage
configurations emerged were broadly similar to Western Europe, but the biggest difference
was, that the cleavage formation remained more or less incomplete and the following
communist rule altered the meaning and manifestation of older cleavages to a very big extent.
Even if the older classical pre-communist cleavages started to re-emerge after the transition in
1989, their real nature had profoundly changed.

The post-communist transition could be considered as the “Third revolution” (or critical
juncture) which did contribute to cleavages formation in contemporary CEE the most. The
new cleavages were primarily generated by three major transition challenges
(democratization, marketization, nation- and the state-building) and because the socio-cultural
context of the “Third revolution” was completely different from older “Lipset-Rokkan
revolutions”, the nature of cleavages, the logic of their formation and their place in the party
system and in the society, turned out to be quite different from classical Lipset-Rokkan model
still relevant for Western Europe. Hence, there was no re-vitalization of classical Lipset-
Rokkan, but rather the new cleavages emerged generated by the “Third revolution”. 

Figure 3. The full model of cleavage formation in CEE.

The Lipset-Rokkan “revolutions” (19th century – 1940s)

Industrialization → Class cleavage
Urban-rural

Nation- and the state building → State-church
Centre-Periphery

Communist rule

The “Third Revolution”

Democratization → corresponding cleavages

Transition (1989) → Marketisation

Marketisation → corresponding cleavages

Transition (1989) → Nation and the state-building

Nationalism vs. cosmopolitanism

“Fourth revolution” - Globalization

Globalization

Further EU integration vs. national sovereignty

Neoliberalism vs. the state intervention

Source: Author

The cleavage leap
However, it seems that now even the “Fourth revolution” or critical juncture is on the way: namely globalization. Kriesi and his colleagues have argued the globalization would be considered as the next critical juncture in the politics of Western Europe and would induce its own sets of new cleavages (Kriesi, et al., 2012; Kriesi et al., 2008). In more specific terms the confrontation between the “winners” and “losers” of globalization generates cleavages manifested on two major axes:

- The economic cleavage – concerning mostly re-distribution and the state intervention in economy (interventionism vs. neoliberalism), so literally the old socio-economic cleavage, but some connotations related with the economic globalisation are brought in;
- The cultural cleavages – primarily associated with immigration (nationalism vs. multiculturalism) and the EU integration.

For the reason that the parties’ ability to shape the socio-economic policies has diminished in the globalizing world, the major cleavages become to be cultural.

Even if the above-mentioned theory has been proposed for explaining the recent trends in the Western European politics, it is still somewhat relevant for CEE as well. The EU integration has already generated a new divide in CEE party politics and has strengthened the national-cosmopolitan cleavage in various countries since 2000s (Berglund, et al., 2013; Mudde, 2003). Although the national-cosmopolitan cleavage in CEE is not connected with the immigration like in the West, the EU integration would change the meaning of the identity-based cleavages in the way that some parties start to confront “the EU imposed forced multiculturalism”, while other political forces see the cosmopolitan outlook as the manifestation of their “Europeanness”. The globalization would transform the socio-cultural cleavage as well, while adding some specific elements related with the economic globalization (e.g. protectionism vs. open markets).

Nevertheless, even if the impact of globalization becomes more pronounced in CEE, the new cleavages generated will be not the same like in Western Europe. The new globalization cleavages would combine with older cleavages derived from the transition challenges (the “Third Revolution”) and form more or less idiosyncratic cleavage constellations specific for the region.

While looking at the full model of cleavage formation in CEE (figure 3), one can notice that the whole process has not been an evolutionary one, marked with gradual transformations
and progression, but on contrary, there have been many disruptions and very limited continuity. The lack of continuity and revolutionary changes could be captured by the last novel concept we would like to introduce – the “cleavage leap”. The “cleavage leap” is a specific phenomenon for cleavage formation in CEE countries in which there was a “leap” from unfinished Lipset-Rokkan cleavage configurations into the era in which the completely new cleavages were generated by transition challenges and later by globalization, while the mode of fully-developed Lipset-Rokkan cleavage constellations was skipped altogether. Shortly: CEE countries missed the classical and fully evolved Lipset-Rokkan model and “jumped” directly into an era of new cleavage formations, generated primarily by transition and globalization, appeared.

The concept of “cleavage leap” enables us to explain why the cleavage formation in CEE has been considerably different from Western Europe, in addition to other features identified earlier. Therefore all normative expectations that CEE is going to follow the classical Lipset-Rokkan model are not very justified at all, because merely the general model of cleavage formation – evolutionary (in the West) vs. revolutionary (in the East) – would determine the very different outcomes.

Another important detail, often ignored by the scholars making a research on cleavages in CEE, has been the fact that the cleavage formation in CEE takes place in the late-industrial societies or even in the post-industrial societies. It would change the nature of contemporary cleavages studied but also the research methods applied.

The late-industrial and post-industrial societies are the media societies in which the political processes are very much affected by the media discourses and by various techniques of political communication (Kriesi et al., 2013; Norris, 2000). We can pose a hypothesis, that the media discourses are also shaping the manifestation and perception of cleavages in CEE like they do in the West. However, there has been almost no research how the cleavages have been manifested and constructed in the media discourses in CEE. So far the predominant data-collection method has been the quantitative surveys (the general surveys on wider public or the expert surveys) (see e.g. Deegan-Krause, 2013b; Letki, 2013; Mansfeldová, 2013). The survey is indeed an adequate method for studying cleavages, but in the case of value- and

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3 The concept “leap” is borrowed from Smith (1993), who was talking about “evolutionary leap” in the context of party organizations. According to Smith parties in new democracies would miss out earlier stages of party development, such as the mass party, and have leaped directly into the era of elite-dominated professional electoral parties. Thus the concept “cleavage leap” is very similar in its basic mechanics, but its focus is very different.
identity-based cleavages, which seem to be more dominant in CEE party politics, it cannot be regarded as an only conceivable research method. Value- and identity-based confrontations are often more explicitly manifested in the various media discourses (see e.g. Van Dijk, 2008) and not so easily captured by the questionnaires of surveys. Let’s take an example: communist-anti-communist cleavage is probably a cleavage which manifestation could be difficult to study by quantitative surveys, but not in media. If some political parties rise the discourse on the “old communists” from one election to another and try to make it as a major topic of the electoral campaigns and as an important value assessment for voting, we can probably talk about the cleavage-like divide.

Some pioneering work has already done on manifestation of cleavages in the media discourses in Western Europe (Dolezal, 2008; Dolezal, Hutter, & Wüest, 2012). For the latter-mentioned cases the more sophisticated “core sentence approach” was applied, but one can use a more simple form of quantitative (or qualitative) content analysis as well (see an example on qualitative content analysis - Saarts & Jakobson, forthcoming).

Beside the methodological issues one can also consider to update the definition of cleavage in order to make it more appropriate for late- or post-industrial societies. According to Bartolini and Mair (1990) a political divide must comprise three elements to constitute a cleavage: (1) A social-structural (empirical) element, such as class, religious denomination, status; (2) normative element - values and beliefs, what provides the sense of identity for a social group, and (3) organizational/behavioural element what sets individual behaviour (voting) or links it with political organizations (parties). The author proposes to add the fourth element: (4) discursive element – a long-term discursive manifestation of divide in the media in the context of electoral campaigns.

It is a matter of debate, whether the latter-mentioned element could be considered as a separate dimension of cleavage or it is possible to merge it with the normative element (values and beliefs). Or what it means: “a long-term discursive manifestation”? Whether it means that the given cleavage/divide has to be pronounced in the media discourses at least for two electoral cycles or even more? However, is still clear that it is more fruitful to study the discursive manifestation of cleavages in the context of electoral campaign than between them, because the campaign discourses are always more explicit, value-laden and could potentially affect the voting behaviour (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006).

Thus, in general, the author argues that media and media discourses are playing so important role in the late- and post-industrial societies that we cannot just ignore them while
studying cleavages/divides. A lot of work has to be done in order to bring the “media dimension” or the “discursive element” into the cleavage research, but the methodological and conceptual proposals made earlier are considered to be as a good starting point for further debates and theoretical/methodological innovations.

Considering the possible research methods the author has another suggestion: Beside media research and traditional surveys the elite surveys/interviews has to be applied. Why? As it was mentioned in the previous sections of the article, the elite agency had probably played a considerable role in the cleavage formation in CEE. Therefore it is highly justified to study how the elites themselves interpret the major cleavages, how they estimate their strength, how they connect them with different ideologies and parties, where they see the roots of these cleavages, etc.? It is still almost an unexplored area in CEE countries.

**Discussion and conclusion**

The novelty of the current theoretical contribution lays on the fact, that it has put forward many conceptual innovations: introduced the new concepts like the “Third revolution” and the “cleavage leap”, has brought the “triple transition” model into the cleavage research and demonstrated that all these new concepts and models have a considerable explanatory power while confronted to empirical data. The models and concepts suggested can also express some previous theoretical ideas in the field in a more concise and elegant manner.

Indeed, the systematic comparative analysis on the “Third Revolution” and the “Lipset-Rokkan revolutions” enable us to examine in what way the nature of cleavages and their formation in CEE has been considerably different from Western Europe and how that kind of conceptual comparative analysis can provide an explanation to many idiosyncratic features found in the post-communist countries. The “triple transition” model provided valuable new insights and empirical generalizations on cleavage formation in various CEE countries. The “strange pathways of communist-anti-communist cleavage”, “the law of pre-eminence of the nation-building cleavages” and particularly the connections identified between the complexity of transition challenges and the subsequent cleavage constellations are indeed the new empirical findings which prove that the “triple transition” model is not just an abstract theoretical construct, but it can applied to the real empirical cases. In general the “triple transition” model looks more elegant and comprehensive than any previous theoretical model
on cleavage formation in CEE and if the elegancy and parsimony is considered to be as a merit in social sciences, the model has some virtues in its own. Finally, the “cleavage leap” phenomenon demonstrated again how different has been the cleavage formation in the East and in the West, because the basic modes of development of cleavages have been so remarkably different (the evolutionary vs. revolutionary model). The suggestions made on the appropriate research methodology (media research and elite interviews) and a proposal to update the definition of cleavage in order to make it more suitable for post-industrial societies, need for further discussion and elaboration.

However, the author is fully aware of the limits and deficiencies of his theoretical contribution:

First, because the theoretical model proposed is very ambitious and comprehensive one it is impossible test it empirically – at least at the full scale. Furthermore, the article is basing primarily on the tertiary data sources (the various publications on cleavages in CEE) and therefore the empirical foundations of the theoretical models are largely dependent on the expertise of other scholars in the field. It might be a problem for some less explored cases and the theoretical and empirical conclusions drawn. Moreover, too excessive reliance on the tertiary sources reduces somewhat the genuine originality of the theoretical contribution.

Second, several ideas and concepts which were put forward in the current theoretical article, need for further specification and elaboration. For example: the concept “cleavage leap” needs for further elaboration and has to be more tightly connected with the rest of the article and its theoretical arguments; the causal explanations derived from the “triple transition” model have to be more sophisticated than just a linkage between the complexity of transition challenges and subsequent cleavage patterns, etc.

Third, there is an obvious problem in the current article - it is too overloaded: too many new ideas, novel concepts and interesting empirical generalizations. Maybe it is reasonable to cut down the ambitious attempts to update the cleavage definition and to omit the discussion on the methodological issues altogether.
References


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