Introduction
As with most aspects of contemporary political activity, environmental activism is increasingly analysed from the conceptual perspective of globalisation [Held et al, 1999; Lipschutz, 1996; Wapner, 1995; Rootes, 1999]. The globalisation hypothesis conjures an image of environmental organisations across the world, through increased contact and co-operation and in response to the dynamics of global capitalism, converging towards similar organisational logic and repertoires of action [Princen and Finger, 1994; Lipschutz, 1996]. In some accounts, differences in political context, resource availability and the individual strategies of activists are eclipsed by the apparent emergence of a "world civic politics" of which environmental activism forms a key part [Wapner, 1995, 1996]. It is argued that the transboundary nature of environmental protection particularly lends itself to such global transformation; the Internet and the increasingly global nature of economic and political activity is propelling national EMOs along a continuum towards increased homogeneity with regard to strategies, organisational structure and an increasing "global" issue focus [Lipschutz, 1996]. Yet a less deterministic interpretation of globalisation that acknowledges the uncertainties of the global impact, the asymmetries of political and economic power, and the importance of the national context in terms of resource availability and political opportunity structures, does offer insight into why certain EMOs in transitional states with established international links have developed quite differently from their less ‘global’ counterparts [Held et al, 1999].

The objective of this paper is to consider the variation in EMO development within the Czech environmental movement during the past decade. The empirical focus is on two EMOs: Hnuti Duha (Rainbow Movement) and Jihoceske matky (South Bohemian Mothers). Whilst they both campaign on the same policy issue - the nuclear power plant Temelin - and have each travelled some distance along the ‘professionalisation’ path, they represent quite different dimensions of the Czech environmental movement in terms of political efficacy, strategy, and response to the evolving political climate. What our study demonstrates is that whilst global links can enhance political efficacy at the national level and propel an organisation towards ‘professionalism’ and the adoption of ‘western-style’ organisational structures and repertoires of action, in the context of new democracies, such links can also weaken the capacity of the EMO to establish a foothold within the domestic political system and impede the process of the organisation establishing a stable membership base.

What we conclude from this, albeit limited, study is that whilst international links are clearly important, the specific national context is decisive in determining how individual EMOs will develop. In addition to well-documented factors such as availability of resources and the political opportunity structure as determinants of EMO efficacy, our study emphasises the significance of political culture and social attitudes, ideological
position vis-à-vis the hegemonic discourse, and the particular geographic location from which the EMO operates in the country (i.e. capital city or locality). On a theoretical level we take issue here with the implicit suggestion of the hyperglobalist camp, that EMO activity is on a continuum towards convergence and increased uniformity in response to global transformation, and that the significance of the national context is declining. Our reservations about this hypothesis are based not just on evidence of asymmetries of the Czech environmental movement, but also on the strength of evident heterogeneity in repertoires of action and organisational strategy amongst western EMOs [Diani and Donati, 1999].

Theorising EMO activity in the Czech Republic
The evolution of west European and US environmental movements from radical participatory ‘new’ social movements, to networks of professionalised mass membership organisations has influenced both the theory and practice of environmental politics in the Czech Republic. The perception of the environmental movement as being on a continuum from submerged oppositional social movement in the months prior to the velvet revolution, towards increased institutionalisation and professionalism remains the dominant discourse and underscores much of the existing analysis of the Czech environmental movement, as well as environmental politics in ECE generally [Pickvance, 1998; Jancar Webster, 1998]. At a most basic level, the appropriacy of western experience is tied to the fact that the entire political and economic reform process since 1989 has been based on emulating western institutional forms and procedures so as to ensure, particularly in the Czech case, a ‘return to Europe’. With regard to the development of environmental movements in ECE generally, many of the larger prominent EMOs are part of, or have links with, western EMOs and through assistance packages and the transfer of know how, have styled their organisations on their western counterparts.

Analysing the evolution of the Czech environmental movement over the past decade from the perspective of the western developmental model provides a typology of EMOs as well as an agenda for analysing their activities based on levels of institutionalisation, bureaucratisation, repertoires of action (direct action and radicalism versus lobbying and reform), internal organisational structure (centralisation), involvement of membership (active participants or passive fee-payers). It also offers a basis on which to monitor changes and progression as defined, in many cases, by the EMOs themselves. Moreover, evidence of ‘westernisation’ is clearly discernible, with a move towards an increased degree of professionalism, the demise of radicalism, and more cohesive internal organisational structures characterising the recent history of the larger Czech EMOs. Yet whilst such a typology is certainly of analytical value for the Czech case, there is a danger that a too deterministic application of western experience can obscure the specific context of developments within the Czech environmental movement. As our analysis will demonstrate, many of the constraints on Czech EMOs are highly particular and relate specifically to the context of developing civil society in a post-authoritarian state. Even when a trend towards westernisation is clearly discernible (as in the case of Hnuti Duha), the specific political context as well as dependency on external funding impose a unique developmental constraint that may not simply be temporary or transitional, but an endemic long-term feature of EMO activity.
It is also important to move beyond zero-sum conceptions of a dichotomy between mass mobilisation versus elite focus, or direct action versus lobbying, or the more deterministic depiction of contemporary environmental activism as part of a cyclic continuum from radicalism to institutionalisation [Lowe and Goyder, 1982; Offe, 1990]. Such rigid analysis fails to capture the dynamics of contemporary western EMO activity which combines conventional as well as non-conventional strategies [Rootes, 1999]. In sum, the application of an analytical framework based on the western developmental model to the Czech environmental movement must be sufficiently flexible and non-deterministic to capture the impact of situative context on Czech EMO activity. It must also reflect more recent trends in western movements which challenge earlier rigid dichotomies between movements and professionalism.

Such a framework is provided by Diani and Donati [1999], whose theoretical typology of SMOs captures the transformation of western EMOs that has resulted in a breadth of organisational forms which challenges the rigid dichotomy between professionalism versus grass-roots action that divided earlier research [Jordan and Maloney, 1997]. The model identifies four broad organisational types (public interest lobby, participatory protest organisation, professional protest organisation and the participatory pressure group) and is based on two dichotomies: professionalism versus participation; and disruptive versus conventional forms of activism [Diani and Donati, 1999]. Organisational forms are determined by the mix of strategies selected by particular EMOs in response to resource mobilisation and political efficacy. Insofar as the model allows for a combination of professionalism (lobbying and policy-process focus) with more radical grass roots protest, the framework is more inclusive in terms of theorising contemporary EMO activity across western Europe. Indeed, by applying their model to environmental movements across Europe, Diani and Donati conclude that rather than there being a dichotomy between movement organisation versus interest group, and a trend away from participatory mobilisation towards institutionalisation, that what is evident is a combination of trends: increased professionalism as well as protest and participation at the grass roots [1999: 24-25].

How does Diani and Donati’s theorisation and research help in analysing developments within the Czech environmental movement over the past decade? By moving away from the somewhat deterministic idea that western environmental movements have all moved towards professionalism and institutionalisation, and acknowledging the existence of combined strategies and hybrid and distinct forms of EMO activity (e.g. The Women’s Environmental Network in the UK), it is immediately easier to locate the Czech movement within a contemporary European context: rather than viewing less professionalised EMOs as being transient forms, such variation can be analysed as being symptomatic of the national specific context. Diani and Donati’s distinction also enables more detailed analysis: by separating professionalism from the choice of action strategies it is possible to analyse the impact of factors such as resource mobilisation, changes within the political opportunity structure, alteration in the dominant political discourse, and global linkage on action strategies. This enables us to identify why certain EMOs within the Czech movement have developed differently in terms of action strategies and organisational structure, rather than basing analysis solely on their (lack of) professionalism.
A Brief History of the Development of the Czech Environmental Movement in the 1990s

The ‘enthusiastic’ period1 - 1989-91

In the months prior to the velvet revolution, the number of environmental organisations increased dramatically. By early 1990 estimates placed the number of groups in existence to be somewhere in the region of 800 [Silhanova et al, 1994, 1996]. The new EMOs consisted typically of young students who had been drawn to the environmental issue during the months prior to the velvet revolution via state organisations such as the Czechoslovak Union of Nature Conservationists (Cesky svaz ochrancu prirody - CSOP), which had been established in 1979, or Brontosaurus, the conservation branch of the Socialist Youth organisation [Tickle and Vavrousek, 1998: 125; Waller, 1989]. The new EMOs were small amorphous organisations that lacked cohesive internal structures. There was also a great deal of overlap between groups in terms of the campaign issues and the activists involved. EMOs were offered practical and financial assistance from a variety of external agencies including the Swedish environmental organisation Acid Rain, philanthropic foundations such as USAID, the German Marshall Fund (committed to economic restructuring in eastern Europe), the British Know How Fund, and (later) EU funding via the Phare Programme. NGOs received virtually no money from Czech citizens, nor did they seek to establish a fee-paying membership, preferring a handful of active members than passive supporters. It is not surprising therefore that they became almost entirely dependent on external funding and transfers of cash from international parent EMOs [Salek, 1994].

Despite a global ideological focus and a stated reluctance to embrace ‘formal’ politics, the larger Prague-based EMOs enjoyed close links with the newly established environmental agencies and their opinions on policy were widely canvassed. This can be attributed largely to the attitude of the new dissident-based political elite. The first post-communist Czech environmental minister, Bedrich Moldan, and the new federal minister, Josef Vavrousek, had both been active in the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences ecological section before 1989 and had been critical of government policy [Waller and Millard, 1992: 170]. In their new governmental roles they sought close cooperation with the EMOs and activists who they had campaigned alongside months before. This sentiment of co-operation and consensus found its most blatant institutional expression in the formation of the Green Parliament in early 1990. The objective of the Parliament was to create a discursive forum in which a wide array of environmental NGOs and officials could co-operate in the formation of a programme for environmental regeneration. The role and function of the Green Parliament were outlined in a document drawn up by the Czech Ministry of the Environment in 1990. The Parliament was described as 'an assembly of NGO representatives, to whom all the Ministry's significant plans shall be submitted for consultation and opinions' [Moldan, 1990: 22]. The Parliament was to meet regularly at the Czech Ministry of the Environment in Prague, and although its recommendations were not prescribed as binding on the Ministry, there was a sense in which the new officials, lacking experience in

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1 The use of the term ‘enthusiastic’ to describe this period was first employed by Jehlicka and Kara (1994)
policy-making and administration, were keen to consult interested parties. In the early months of the Green Parliament, the larger Prague-based groups such as Greenpeace, Deti Zeme (Children of the Earth), Hnuti Duha (Rainbow Movement) benefited most from the Green Parliament and through it enjoyed close access to the policy process. However, the seemingly ideal relationship between the various strands of the environmental sector concealed a number of underlying tensions. The greatest problem that was to distract the environmental movement until the mid-1990s was that the false unity of the environmental movement during the final months of communism had been fractured by the collapse of the old regime in November 1989. Activists had now to confront ideological differences and degrees of ‘greenness’ that had previously been eclipsed by their unifying opposition to Soviet-style communism. In addition, the environmental movement lost a number of key activists as a result of political change. Many key activists at the time of the velvet revolution were now either engaged in government or on the fringes of formal political power (for example, Bedrich Moldan, Josef Vavrousek and Ivan Dejmal who had been key figures within the movement were now part of the new state environmental agencies). Although co-operation between the new elite and EMOs was close, their involvement and expertise within the protest movement was difficult to replace. Other former activists had retreated back into academia, science or conservation; others simply left the political arena for the newly reclaimed private sphere.

Though certain environmental EMOs did exert a degree of influence on the new policy process through the Green Parliament and close personal links with officials, the climate of co-operation and consensus was hindered by the legacy of communism and by the fact that the EMOs needed to adjust to the changed political circumstances. Environmental protest had emerged as illegal or semi-legal clandestine opposition movements under authoritarian rule, enmeshed within a submerged and highly politicised ‘parallel society’. The environmental NGOs were now required to enter the formal political sphere and co-operate and negotiate with the new democratic regime. They were being invited to sit round a table and help draw up a concrete policy framework; they needed to deal in facts and realistic strategies in order to help ameliorate the ecological degradation of the preceding decades. The only political experience the environmentalists had was clandestine opposition within submerged amorphous structures or within the state conservation groups in the late 1980s. That the nascent EMOs lacked internal structures, cohesive ideological platforms on domestic issues, and appeared to shun the formal political process in favour of remaining enmeshed within a nascent civil society was a reflection of the circumstances in which they had emerged and operated during the final months of communist rule. There was something unusual in the fact that during the eighteen month period after the revolution the new ministers and state officials were, on many levels, more radical and were moving far faster than the NGOs who were distracted by internal ideological disputes and reformation. Despite the ambitions of the Green Parliament, the rapidly constructed framework of environmental legislation was established by those within the new agencies with the help of certain activists. Reluctant to work with each other, to widen their support base, or contemplate more mundane issues, the NGOs became increasingly detached from the policy process. In this sense the spirit of co-operation of

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2 The term ‘parallel society’ or ‘polis’ was used by Havel in his essay The Power of the Powerless to describe dissident activity in the pre-revolutionary period. Activists ranging from musicians, poets, playwrights and environmentalists occupied a submerged clandestine sphere from whence they opposed the formal party-state system with its heavily controlled ‘society’.
the new political elite had come too early for NGOs who could not take advantage of the political climate. What was missing at this time was a sphere of environmental NGOs with the aptitude and expertise to co-operate at elite-level and to take advantage of the political climate of consensus. There was a sense in which the political elite were waiting for environmental NGOs to adapt and take up positions around the negotiating table. Unfortunately political change at elite level ended this spirit of consensus and by the time the NGOs had adapted and reformed their involvement was no longer sought.

**Political marginalisation: 1992-96**

The nature and dimensions of environmental protest and the role of environmental NGOs within post-communist politics had begun to change during the second half of 1991, largely as a result of the break-up of Civic Forum and the political demise of the dissident-based elite. However, it was the election of Vaclav Klaus and the centre-right coalition in June 1992 that led to the political marginalisation of environmental NGOs. As a broad-based movement Civic Forum had established a political climate of consensus that was poignantly reflected in the Green Parliament initiative. Its fragmentation in 1991 led to the emergence of western-style adversarial politics which altered the political framework in which environmental NGOs were to operate. The environmental issue became engulfed in the emerging ideological rift between forces on the political right advocating neo-liberal shock-therapy, rapid wealth creation and a de-regulated society, and the non-communist centre-left who emphasised a more gradualist approach, civic rights and environmental protection [Jehlicka and Kara, 1994: 159].

Public concern over the environment had already begun to decline as the impact of economic restructuring took hold. The victory of Vaclav Klaus and his right-of-centre coalition in the June 1992 election signified the end of consensus politics and ushered in a climate of hedonistic individualism in which concern for the environment was suddenly politically unfashionable. The political and economic reforms of the Klaus era impacted on environmental protest in a number of ways.

The immediate response of the larger more-recently established EMOs to the changed political climate after the 1992 election was to pursue a more radical agenda. By 1992 the relationship between EMOs and the state administration had changed dramatically from close co-operation to open hostility (for a full discussion of this period see Fagin and Jehlicka, 1998) In response, some groups, most notably Hnuti Duha and later also Greenpeace (established in Czechoslovakia in March 1992), began to employ a repertoire of activities that fell in a broad category of 'civil disobedience'. As this was a time of growing influence of western EMOs on their Central and Eastern European counterparts, Czech environmental groups felt confident in restructuring their activities towards campaigns based on direct action. However, this strategy alienated a conservative public (increasingly preoccupied by the effects of economic restructuring) and provoked a reactionary response amongst EMOs towards direct action. What followed was a reactionary response to the new political climate whereby radical protest and ideology of the immediate post-revolutionary period practically vanished and, although a core of more moderate state-focused professional EMOs began to emerge, they were not co-opted within the political process. In fact they were politically ostracised and castigated throughout much of the 1990s. Such antipathy towards the environmental sector reached a nadir in early 1995 when four leading environmental NGOs were included on a security services’ list of
'subversive organisations’ who were to be the target of surveillance. That the four environmental associations included on this list were committed to non-violent protest and to working within the democratic process, plus the fact that the other groups on the list were far-right neo-fascist organisations provoked political outrage. President Havel intervened as did a number of journalists and prominent figures in Czech society. As a result, three out of the four groups were eventually removed from the list. [Fagin and Jehlicka, 1998].

If during the early period the environmental movement consisted of too many radical organisations and lacked more conventional groups willing to lobby parliament and focus on domestic issues, the legacy of the 1992-96 period was precisely the reverse. By the end of 1995 EMOs that had survived had responded to the financial crisis and political exclusion by jettisoning radical strategies and ideological platforms. In fear of public reaction and government recrimination, none of the main NGOs was willing to contemplate any degree of direct action.

1996 onwards
The loss of an overall majority for Klaus’s ODS-led coalition in the 1996 election marked the tentative first steps towards a new era for the environmental movement. The crisis which finally engulfed Klaus’s embattled coalition towards the end of 1997 resulted in the formation of a caretaker government prior to elections to be held in June 1998. Under the brief tenure of Martin Bursik as environmental minister EMOs enjoyed an unprecedented degree of influence and were granted unrestricted access to the process of beginning to draft and update existing environmental legislation. Since the election in June 1998 of a Social Democratic government, the political prominence of EMOs has been maintained. There are clearly parallels with the early post-revolutionary period in the sense that a network of pro-environment politicians, lawyers and environmental activists has emerged within which there is once again an overlap between EMOs and state agencies. The Green Parliament has been re-established as a forum for consultation between the Ministry and EMOs and the first meeting (November 1998) was well-attended. There has also been formed a Legislative Group of EMOs who receive draft copies of new laws and are asked to produce comments and suggestions.

In terms of repertoires of action, there seems to be a re-emergence of direct action campaigns directed at the public after a period during which even the mildest campaign of civil disobedience was rejected. In 1997 a campaign organised by Greenpeace against the Syntesia chemical plant in Pardubice introduced a new dimension of ironic humiliation that was successful in winning public support. This changed strategy may well be a response to apparent changes in the attitude of the public towards the

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3 In terms of actual new legislation this period produced very little. This is largely because Bursik’s four month tenure made it impossible for him to draft new laws and get them through parliament - indeed, his first day in office was the last opportunity for the submission of draft legislation to parliament. However, the foundations of a new policy agenda were laid during this brief period.

4 The Society for Sustainable Living, of which Kuzwart is a member, is perhaps the most influential and was recently able to halt the proposed amendments to the Waste Law which were deemed to be incompatible with the EU directive and open to manipulation by those intent on importing waste from abroad. Hnuti Duha and Deti Zeme are also doing well and work closely with the ministry over new legislative amendments on waste, the EIA process, and water.
environment. When asked about environmental organisations in a national opinion poll survey towards the end of 1996, 87% of respondents said they were useful and important.\(^5\) In recent months there are clearly signs that the public are willing to offer financial support to NGOs. On a recent fund-raising campaign, Greenpeace more than tripled its donations from the public.

Despite the return of direct action as a strategy, the bulk of EMO activity in the second half of the 1990s typically involves the preparation of reports by hired experts, lobbying in parliament, close co-operation with sympathetic journalists and is indicative of the shift towards professionalism that began in the mid-1990s. Against a more favourable political background, this change towards greater professionalism has gradually started to deliver results. EMOs and their activities now enjoy much more positive coverage in the media and some leading activists have become popular participants in TV and radio debates. There is also a small but growing circle of young politicians who are sympathetic to the environmental movement. The two major national EMOs, *Hnuti Duha* (now the Czech branch of Friends of the Earth) and *Deti Zeme* have transformed themselves into well organised and relatively effective organizations. Though with some variation between EMOs, it is possible to identify three shifts within the Czech environmental movement (Jancar-Webster 1998):

- a shift to democratic institutions;
- a shift from protest to policy-making;
- a shift to professionalism and expert knowledge.

In addition, two further shifts are discernible:

- a shift to diversification and specialisation within the environmental movement accompanied by increased communication and mutual support;
- a shift towards a more global perception of environmental problems and their complex nature embedded in social, economic and political practices.

In contrast to Hungary (or until recently Slovakia), there are groups in the Czech Republic that operate at the national level (*Deti Zeme* and *Hnuti Duha*), that combine what used to be called in the past "big" and "small ecology". Within these national EMOs there is a division of labour between the centre usually focusing on political lobbying, co-operation with experts including lawyers, publication of newsletters and magazines as well as with their foreign counterparts, and a network of local branches (that usually enjoy a large degree of autonomy) that deal with locally or regionally significant environmental issues. Greenpeace also operates at the national level, but does not fit the same category of EMO as it does not have local chapters. All three organisations (*Hnuti Duha*, *Deti Zeme* and Greenpeace) lead long-term and quite sophisticated campaigns on specific issues, such as energy, forestry, protection of landscape, quarrying of minerals and the like. The campaigning skills and ability of Czech environmental movement to exert significant influence was best documented in 1999 by the largest campaign to date that focused on the question of the continuation or halting of the construction of Temelin nuclear power plant. Although environmentalists lost this battle, very few people expected the advocates of the plant within the government to win by such a very narrow margin. The government's vote was 11 in

\(^5\) Interview with Hana Pernicova, July 1997
favour of continuation of the construction against 8 who opposed it (for more details see Axelrod 1999).

There are other groups that are present in certain regions and lead regionally campaigns focused on all sorts of regionally significant issues. Typical examples of this type of organizations are Friends of Nature (Pratele prirody) in Usti nad Labem who concentrate on protection of the Labe river valley, and Old Protectors of the Jizerske Mountains (Stari ochranci Jizerskych hor) in Liberec whose main concern is the replacement of the spruce monoculture in the mountains with a biologically more diverse forest. Another NGO of this type is South Bohemian Mothers (Jihoceske matky) who have been relentlessly fighting the construction of the nuclear power plant Temelin throughout the 1990s.

However, there is also a growing number of EMOs specialising in education. These groups run "houses of eco-education". They provide teaching for school classes or other groups of children. At least one example of an "ecological institute" exists in the Czech Republic. This is Veronica in Brno, which is formally still part of the CSOP but developed in a unique establishment that could be described as the institute of applied ecology. Veronica publishes a periodical aimed at nature conservation, carries out applied research centred on landscape ecology and provides consultancy on household ecology to the general public. The Society for Sustainable Living (Spolecnost pro trvane uhzetiny zivot, STUZ), with its privileged access to state environmental institutions despite its quite radical views, is a rather unusual environmental group. What has remained unchanged though, despite the quite significant changes that have occurred within the movement, is the continued dependence of EMOs on foreign sources of funding. It is only relatively recently that EMOs realised and addressed the fact that they have to look for a more sustainable indigenous source of funding, not least because most Western foundations that have provided finance for EMOs during the past decade have considerably reduced the amount of funding or completely withdrawn from the region. Most EMOs have recently launched campaigns aimed at recruiting a greater number of regular fee-paying subscribers. Greenpeace claims to have tripled the number of their supporters over a year period so that is now between 4,000 and 5,000, whereas Hnuti Duha estimates the size of its fee-paying membership at 500 and the number of supporters of Deti Zeme slightly exceeds 300.

However, while the major mainstream EMOs have become increasingly content with their higher status and degree of recognition in society, a more radical current of activism mixing environmental, social and political issues under the banner of a movement against globalisation, has emerged outside the established circles of semi-institutionalised EMOs. Two major manifestations of this more radical movement were Global and Local Street Parties that took place in Prague in the past two years and that attracted far more young people than anybody had expected.

**First case study: Jihoceske matky - South Bohemian Mothers**

Apart from Prague Mothers, South Bohemian Mothers is the only Czech women's environmental organisation that at least to some extent combines environmental with feminist concerns. Its headquarters is in Ceske Budejovice, the capital of the peripheral Budejovice Region in southern Bohemia, some 40 kilometres from the Austrian border. Apart from being a regional capital, Ceske Budejovice is also an important research and university centre in the Czech Republic with a concentration of research and educational institutions in the field of biological and ecological disciplines. For instance, the city is
the home to the Institute of Biology of the Czech Academy of Sciences and Biological Faculty of South Bohemian University.

The combination of the fact that SBM is a women's group operating in a peripheral region of the country with the highly technical nature of the major issue they address, i.e. the Temelin nuclear power plant, puts SBM in a particularly difficult position as the public discourse on almost all aspects of social life, that applies even more to nuclear energy, is dominated by technocratically oriented men. This is further magnified by the fact that most leading SBM activists are women educated in humanities. For example, the chairwoman is a secondary school teacher of foreign languages and freelance translator. SBM are often accused by their opponents of being incompetent in the highly technical field of nuclear energy.

The formation of SBM
According to respondents' accounts, South Bohemian Mothers (SBM) began to operate as an informal group of former school friends in 1990. Its roots date back to the period before November 1989. The first anti-nuclear activity that later led to the origin of SBM was started by a woman from a little town near Ceske Budejovice who was pregnant during the period following the Chernobyl disaster and gave birth to a disabled child. She ascribed her child's disability to the fallout from Chernobyl. Alarmed by the prospect of a new power plant of Soviet design being put in to operation in the vicinity of her home-town in a few years, she started to systematically collect information and materials on nuclear energy. As nuclear energy was a non-issue at that time, and hence no information of domestic origin was available, most of the materials that she disseminated were of Austrian origin and acquired through their Austrian friends. She translated and distributed this information in the form of leaflets around Ceske Budejovice. Several female school friends of hers joined her in this activity. However, 1990 was still a year of high hopes associated with the recent demise of the undemocratic regime and the election of the new democratic government. The small circle of people who were concerned with one particular legacy of the communist period, Temelin, were confident that the new government would immediately call a halt to the completion of the plant. By 1991 it became apparent that the idea of discontinuing the project had a little support in the new government and activists in Ceske Budejovice realised that they could no longer rely on politicians and decided to take action.

The Austrian anti-nuclear movement, including Greenpeace Austria, was mobilised by the prospect of the (then still) Czechoslovak project to complete a sizeable nuclear power plant of Soviet design not far from the border of the two countries. The fall of the Communist regime provided the opponents of the project with an opportunity to launch an anti-Temelin campaign that had at least a theoretical chance of success. However, initially, it was almost exclusively various groups from the Austrian anti-nuclear movement that were campaigning against Temelin. When one of these groups called a press conference on Temelin in 1991, apart from a number of Austrian and German anti-nuclear organisations, several Czech EMOs took part including the nascent South Bohemian Mothers. However, they were neither officially registered, nor as yet had they

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6Some information presented in this paper was gathered by Petr Jehlicka for the Open University sponsored research project on Czech and Slovak ENGOs conducted in 1998 and 1999.
assumed the name of the organisation. When a representative of this women's group was asked by journalists whom she represented, she replied: South Bohemian Mothers (Interview, SBM 20/1/99). The inspiration for the name came from Prague Mothers, an initiative of young mothers who established their group in winter 1988/89 in Prague to protest at the effects of environmental pollution on the health of their children. Although the SBM's database contains 2,000 names, at present the group has about 150 members who pay 100 CZK (3 Euro) annual membership fee. Most of the members are passive supporters. Members are women of all ages from 20 to 65. Most of them have secondary level education or are university graduates. The active core consists of 10-15 members. As a consequence of the severe reduction in their financial means, the group has recently had to cut back on the number of employees. At present five employees are working for SBM, three of whom work on a part-time basis.

Financial insecurity
Not long after their formation, SBM were approached by the Upper Austrian Anti-nuclear Platform (UAANP) with an offer of funding for SBM's activities against Temelin. A period that members of SBM describe as a 'happy period' followed. The money enabled SBM to rent spacious offices and, in co-operation with the Foundation Against Nuclear Danger, to open an information centre 'Energie' in Ceske Budejovice. The centre promoted energy alternatives to nuclear energy and disseminated information on the risks associated with the use of nuclear energy. For several years SBM was not constrained by financial constraints and expanded the range of their activities beyond the anti-nuclear campaign. They took part in a series of public inquiries concerning all sorts of environmentally damaging projects throughout the South Bohemian region. However, these activities were funded by the funding received from their Austrian donors earmarked essentially for the anti-Temelin campaign.

As a result of the curtailment of financial support from UAANP in 1997, SBM ran into serious difficulties that threatened the continued existence of the organisation. Though the situation in which SBM now found itself was not dissimilar from that faced by other Czech EMOs, the organisation’s outright opposition to nuclear energy and the Temelin plant meant that they found it much harder to secure the support of foreign foundations, many of whom endorsed nuclear energy as an alternative to brown-coal mining. Similarly, there was no prospect of the organisation receiving any domestic funding from government sponsored sources whilst they vehemently opposed Temelin. Whilst UAANP have continued to provide some money for SBM, though on a much reduced scale and strictly on a project basis. Rather than develop their fee-paying membership base, SBM concentrated on securing further external funding and as a result, 90 per cent of their funding still comes from abroad. The sources are quite diverse. Apart from UAANP, the Dutch foundation Milieukontakt OostEuropa provides certain proportion of the overall SBM's funding, as well as a Swiss association of Christian women and an ornithological society from Germany. The Czech foundation Partnerstvi that however has its sources abroad, has recently granted 150, 000 Czech crowns for SBM's participation in public inquiries (Interview, SBM, 23/3/99).

Range of Activities and Changes of Methods
SBM are essentially involved in two types of environmental conflicts. The first is related to the nuclear issue. Besides their long-term effort to stop the construction of the Temelin nuclear plant mainly by using legal means, such as demanding that EIA procedure is applied at least to the changes to the original project (the whole plant has never been subjected to EIA assessment), they have also taken part in public inquiries on the location of radioactive waste storage in which they question the safety of the proposed alternatives. They also organise exhibitions on energy alternatives, give lectures at schools, call press conferences and publish articles mainly in the regional press. As an activist of SBM commented:

‘It became impossible to do just Temelin. It is impossible to fight one great evil and at the same time ignore other evils. We had to do something as well against felling oaks or building an incinerator’ (Interview, SBM, 23/3/99).

The second type of environmental issues SBM address in their activities is various threats to the present quality of the South Bohemian landscape arising mainly from private initiatives. These plans are usually backed by local governments and mayors as they offer jobs to local people. In the mid 1990s SBM took on the project of an incinerator in Mydlovary, a Dutch-sponsored project to convert a vast area of natural beauty into a recreational and leisure park that would attract Dutch and Austrian tourists. They also campaigned against German-sponsored projects for large-capacity poultry farms, which would take advantage of much more lenient Czech regulation of poultry farming than elsewhere in the EU.

It is particularly important in the Czech context that apart from being an environmental group, SBM are also actively striving to strengthen women's participation in Czech politics and in public life in general. For example they are trying to strengthen confidence of women who want to return to work after maternity leave and who face harsh discrimination from the side of employers. In an interview, the chairwoman of SBM was also eager to point out that the group started from scratch 10 years ago and that they have now learnt all the skills they need for running their long-term campaigns.

Especially at the beginning SBM activists experienced gross insults from their opponents simply because they were women; they were accused of being lay people meddling in the highly technical issue of nuclear energy, and of employing irrational and emotionally laden arguments.

After an initial stage in which SBM were a purely participatory protest group engaging in demonstrations in front of the Temelin gates, the organisation quickly became, in Diani and Donati's (1999) classification, an organisation close to the professional protest group type. This transformation was due largely to the arrival of a relatively generous funding from abroad. Whilst enjoying financial security in the mid-1990s, SBM employed a broad range of activities from classic lobbying in the Czech parliament to demonstrations. Apart from publishing their own newsletter "Ztuha", they ran seminars on renewable energy, including wood burning boilers and small hydropower plants. They also organised excursions for mayors to places where the use of renewable energy was already the reality, including several destinations in Austria. At the same time however, they were still organising demonstrations against Temelin in Ceske Budejovice or by the construction site. However, as SBM had became financially secure almost overnight, there was little pressure on them to expand their fee-paying membership base. In this respect, the moment of professionalisation apparently came a little prematurely.
Due to the close co-operation with several groups from the Austrian anti-nuclear movement in the early 1990s, SBM were able to adopt their know-how and thus speed up the learning process that was taking the majority of regionally based EMOs a great deal longer. Nevertheless, SBM's leading activists interviewed in 1999 still critically evaluated their ability to act as a fully professional organisation in the first half of the 1990s. They lacked not only organisational skills and the ability to effectively work with the media, but also scientific and technical expertise. While SBM now feel that they have themselves learnt how to get their materials in to the public sphere through the media, to resolve the problem of inadequate expertise, they have gradually built up a circle of experts to whom they can turn for technical and scientific advice.

With the advent of financial hardship though, SBM were forced, in the second half of the 1990s, to look for a more modest offices, and reduce the extent of their activities based on addressing the general public. They had to close down the "Energie" centre and to discontinue their newsletter. They have maintained the core activities directed against Temelin such as lodging complaints to the district office for failing to force the investor - Czech Energy Company (CEZ) - to subject substantial change in the project to the EIA procedure, taking the district office and the company to the court for the same reason.

The case of SBM demonstrates that the measure of success of an environmental group is determined by a number of factors. First, the content of the main policy issue they address, i.e. the construction of a nuclear power plant combined with the character of the group, i.e. a women's group puts them in a disadvantaged position in this political conflict. Second, during the whole decade in which they have been campaigning against Temelin, they have not expanded their operations beyond the South Bohemian region. SBM have adopted lobbying as a major method of their campaign, but political lobbying in the highly centralised Czech state is effective only if it is systematically employed in Prague. This seems a fundamental strategic barrier for the success of SBM in the anti-Temelin campaign, given that all institutions that have a say in the decision making process on Temelin - CEZ, the Czech energy company, the regulator of the energy sector, the ministry of trade and industry and of course the government and parliament - are all based in Prague. As one SBM activist acknowledged:

‘We rarely manage to penetrate national newspapers because - and I would put it down to Prague-centrism - if you are not in Prague and do not know the right journalists, you won't simply make it to (Prague based) papers. You may send out a hundred faxes, we tried to hold a press conference in Prague, but if you don't have contacts that you cultivated for years, you have almost no chance (Interview, SBM, 23/3/99).

Third, SBM have always been active only in a peripheral region of Southern Bohemia, but they are engaged in a deep conflict with the local political elite, including the city hall in Ceske Budejovice. Large sections of this elite is in one way or another linked with Temelin. for instance, the mayor of Ceske Budejovice is a former employee at Temelin. This means that SBM encounter deeply rooted hostility even when campaign on matters other than Temelin. Local power holders do not miss any opportunity to close access for SBM and prevent them from participating in regional or local environmental conflicts, where SBM could have a higher degree of influence given the regional character of the organisation. The following quotation provides an example of this attitude:
A commission that is supposed to supervise the preparation of the plan of strategic development of South Bohemian region has recently been established. It is connected with the European Union’s structural funds and will affect the development of the whole region on a long-term basis. We as SBM wanted to be a member of the commission...but the reaction of the mayor of Ceske Budejovice was: from ecological groups anybody except South Bohemian mothers (Interview, SBM, 23/3/99)

Fourth, the ability of SBM to mobilise Czech domestic resources has remained limited throughout the whole 1990s. They have not managed, and probably have made a serious attempt either, to expand the size of membership of their organisation. They still have only about 150 fee-paying members. Similar to most Czech EMOs they have developed a dependence on foreign financial resources, which in the case of SBM were initially quite generous. However, SBM’s dependence on mostly Austrian sources of funding diminished their ability to integrate into the post-communist Czech polity. This is a fundamental obstacle to the further institutionalisation of SBM. Furthermore, while they were forced to co-operate with experts on nuclear energy due to the complicated nature of the issues, they apparently failed to tap local research potential in Ceske Budejovice on questions of nature conservation and land use planning, the issues on which SBM also launched a number of campaigns.

Second case study: Hnuti Duha

The formation of Hnuti Duha

Hnuti Duha (Rainbow Movement) is perhaps the most prominent and successful EMOs in the Czech Republic today. Compared to other EMOs that emerged on the eve of the revolution, Duha is somewhat unique in terms of the way it has developed, particularly with regard to changes in its internal organisation and action strategy. Duha’s ‘professionalism’ is in part due to its international links (it is officially the Czech branch of FoE) but also due to particular strategy choices made by activists in the organisation. What distinguishes HD from other Czech EMOs is their emphasis on linking the current ecological crisis with social crisis, as well as emphasising the ethical dimension of environmental degradation.

Yet despite the trappings of a western-style professional protest organisation, Duha’s action strategies and internal organisation still reflect the situative context in which it has emerged and in which it operates. The legacy of authoritarian rule and the circumstances of its collapse, the particular nuances of post-communist Czech political development (particularly the legacy of the Klaus era), the funding situation, plus the relationship between the indigenous environmental movement and international western-based EMOs have shaped Duha’s development.

Established in Brno, the second largest city in the Czech Republic, in summer of 1989 just prior to the velvet revolution, HD’s origins were typical of other environmental

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7 The information obtained on Hnuti Duha was obtained from several interviews during the period April 1993-May, 1999 by both authors.
organisations that came into being during this period: the organisation comprised a few young activists (secondary school students) who had previously been involved in party-sanctioned conservation organisations such as CSOP (Czech Union of Nature Conservation) or Brontosaurus (affiliated to the youth section of the communist party). In the months prior to the revolution these activists formed part of the growing chorus of discontent that surrounded the decomposition of the party’s political authority. What distinguished HD from the rest of the fledgling EMOs that emerged at this time, was their stated intention to address the causes and not just the consequences of unpropitious human actions. Though they were still some way from becoming a professional protest organisation, this immediately set the organisation on a distinctly political course.

**Internal organisation and strategies**
Initially *Duha* activists rejected a formal hierarchic organisational structure and the notion of non-active supporters, preferring activists to work independently on particular issues that were broadly defined by the ‘centre of operations’ in Brno. Although *Duha* has subsequently become the most politically prominent environmental lobbying organisation in the Czech Republic, in the early 1990s it rejected a ‘parliamentary’ strategy and a hierarchic internal organisational structure in favour of direct action based on a global agenda and an amorphous cell-like internal structure. However, what soon became a remarkably stable feature of HD was the development of its activities around two basic pillars - centres in Brno and Prague whose task is to coordinate nation-wide campaigns, plus a web of local groups and the magazine - that dates back to 1992.

The transformation of the organisation in the ensuing period is quite remarkable. Duha’s response to the demise of movement-based politics from mid-1991 and the adversarial political climate of the first Klaus administration was to adopt a strategy based around lobbying and to seek closer contacts with the political elite. Such a strategy was pursued despite the lack of an immediate political dividend. The amorphous internal structure was replaced by a more hierarchic structure based on a clearly defined division of labour and an agenda of policies and issues on which the organisation would focus. The national centre in Brno and the Prague office deal with political campaigns whilst local offices would develop links with the public as well as working within local political structures. Though local branches (of which there are about 15) retain a degree of autonomy over the campaigns they pursue, they operate within the confines of national campaigns and strategies. By 1999, Duha had 14 full-time employees, and advertises for its staff in the national dailies.

During the mid-1990s the focus of Duha’s campaigns became increasingly less esoteric and more focused on policy and regulation at the national level. For example, campaigns to save and protect forest land and nature reserves, opposition to gold processing and the activities of mining companies in Kasperske Hory; saving railways and opposing motorway construction were all responses to policy proposals or economic decisions. Reflecting their close involvement with FoE International, Duha have sought to relate ‘global’ campaigns such as ozone depletion to the specific ‘local’ context - the enactment of Czech legislation regulating the use of CFCs. Indeed, what has come to distinguish Duha from other Czech EMOs is their international contacts, largely with
other national branches of FoE (particularly FoE-UK) but also with Greenpeace Austria. Duha's carefully developed management of their campaigns is modelled on FoE-UK: Duha now has strategic plans that are subject to updating every three years, and which form the basis of their strategy. The strong influence on Duha of a particularly British type of environmentalism is clearly evidenced by regular features in Duha's monthly journal reprinted from the Ecologist.

In contrast to their approach in the early 1990s, which tended to focus almost entirely on national politics, Duha now identifies the appropriate strategies and targets for specific campaigns, alternating between lobbying at the national level over certain issues, the regional and local for others. A further change concerns the willingness of Duha to cooperate with other indigenous EMOs. In contrast to the early 1990s when there was a distinct unwillingness for the sharing of tasks, information and general co-operation, Duha activists all express the benefits of co-operation and an informal division of labour amongst EMOs and are also quite clear as to what their organisation does and does not get involved in. This change in attitude reflects Duha’s confidence in its own strengths and also its strong individual identity within the Czech environmental movement. It is no longer a ‘catch-all’ environmental movement searching for agendas and alliances.

Duha responded to the political hostility directed towards the environmental movement in the mid-1990s (for a full discussion of this see Fagin and Jehlicka, 1998) by jettisoning radicalism in favour of greater pragmatism and a strategy based around winning public support through carefully orchestrated campaigns that did not employ direct action. Apart from attending the annual Temelin blockade (which from the mid-1990s had ceased to be a radical direct action protest), Duha’s action strategy centres on lobbying and challenging environmentally-damaging actions through the publication of scientific reports and through participation in the EIA process. Indeed, Duha differs from the rest of Czech EMOs by its close links to social science academic circles, mainly in Brno. Most activists working in Duha's main office in Brno are past or current students of sociology, political science or law. Leading Czech academics working in the field of environmental studies within various disciplines of social sciences regularly publish articles in Duha's monthly journal. Duha even published in its publishing house two original texts by Brno sociology professors, one of which was based on empirical research on people leading an environmentally-friendly lifestyle in the Czech Republic, the second book was an analysis of environmental and social implications of globalising capitalism.

The tactics employed by the Prague office, which has developed substantial expertise in lobbying, reflects the generally less ideological and more pragmatic approach of the organisation: Duha have lobbied deputies from both the major party blocs. A further example of Duha’s effort to shed its image of radicalism and win the support of sympathetic groups amongst the Czech social elite is the inclusion within Duha's council of patrons of well-known artists, journalists and scholars, plus the internationally renowned Czech writer Ivan klíma, who recently publicly declared his support for Duha’s activities. Leading figures of Duha quite frequently discuss issues of radicalism and pragmatism in Duha’s monthly journal, whose change of name in 1998 reflects the concerted effort of the organisation to build for itself an image that would be more acceptable to the general public and the media and that would manifest the shift away from radicalism. The original title of the magazine "The Last Generation" (posledni generace) was replaced by the less controversial "The Seventh Generation" (sedma generace). In a recent article the former chairman and co-founder of Hnutí Duha Jakub Patocka addresses a long-term dilemma with which Duha has always been confronted:
whether to operate within or outside the system (Patocka, 1999). The dilemma resurfaced with an increased poignancy in the aftermath of the leak of the 1995 list of extremists that included Duha. The answer which Patocka gives is "to sit on the fence" and do both blockades of Temelin as well as lobbying parliament and publishing expert reports. Despite the growing wave of direct actions employed by EMOs elsewhere in Europe, Duha are still reluctant to organise such campaigns in the Czech Republic, though they will support direct actions initiated by other EMOs.

However, the departure of the majority of the core activists of the Brno group in 1997 to form their own "independent social-ecological movement" (nesehnuti), is evidence of a major crisis in Duha that broke out in connection with the discussion about radicalism of the organisation. The activists had become deeply dissatisfied with the lack of a radical edge within the organisation. Yet it would be wrong to suggest that Duha has totally lost its radical edge and ideological integrity. In 1998 Duha was the most vocal opponent amongst Czech EMOs to oppose the intention of partenrstvi foundation, one of the main source of funding for Czech EMOs to accept grants from the Monsanto. Duha launched a high-profile campaign accusing partnerstvi of betraying basic principles of the environmental movement. In a cash-stripped Czech environmental movement this was a particularly controversial conflict and Duha deserves credit for opening the debate on this topic.

Rather than analysing Duha’s approach in terms of radicalism versus pragmatism and the weakening of ideology, it is perhaps better to stress the organisations adeptness in challenging decisions on an appropriate level, and targeting campaigns in ways that maximise public support. For example, though Duha remains resolutely opposed to the expansion of nuclear energy, during the mid-1990s they rejected a campaign of high-profile opposition to a more pragmatic stance of opposing the storage of nuclear waste through NIMBY-based campaigns in the areas likely to be affected. Similarly during 1999, when a critical decision regarding the future of the Temelin plant was to be taken, Duha’s high-profile campaign focused on the economic arguments against further state subsidies for the ill-fated plant and that there was no need for the extra energy capacity of Temelin. The pursuit of such an approach was justified on the basis that only moderate levels of public support for the anti-nuclear campaign exist - even in surrounding areas the completion of the Temelin plant was popular as it potentially offered job opportunities to local inhabitants - and a general lethargy amongst campaigners with regard to the issue. What is particularly revealing is that part of Duha’s campaign focused on the economic impact that the completion of Temelin would have on northern Bohemian mining communities in terms of job losses. This despite having previously mounted a campaign against the polluting effects of coal production.

What the Temelin case also revealed about Duha was just how successful the organisation had been in terms of its objective of gaining political access and proximity to the political elite. When President Havel decided to intervene openly in the debate surrounding Temelin, Duha activists from the Prague office provided him with information. They were also consulted widely in the media and their arguments formed part of the general discourse from within which the debate occurred.

Funding
Although Duha has not experienced the degree of financial uncertainty and crisis faced by other EMOs in the Czech Republic, it has nevertheless been affected by the absence of sufficient levels of indigenous funding. Typical of all Czech EMOs, Duha remains heavily dependent on external funding. Unlike other EMOs, Duha has always raised revenue from its professional activities and services and also from the sale of published material. Yet it is only recently that Duha has embarked upon establishing a fee-paying membership amongst Czech citizens and has begun to employ direct marketing techniques as practised by Greenpeace. With regard to explaining why it has taken Duha so long to establish a fee-paying membership, the organisation emphasises the specific context of the Czech case: low-levels of disposable income amongst sections of society (public sector professionals, middle classes) most likely to give donations, the absence of sufficient resources to invest in fund-raising and the lack of such expertise in the country.

**Comparative assessment of South Bohemian Mothers and Hnutí Duha**

The development of both Duha and SBM has depended heavily on external funding and links with western organisations. However, in both cases being dependent on external funding removed the incentive for these organisations to develop an indigenous membership suitably large to support their activities. Whilst recent drives to attract more members have been relatively successful, both organisations can rely on the support of only several hundred members.

At the same time they have both, albeit to different degrees, professionalised their administrative operations: given their small membership, both organisations have relatively large staff, a proportion of whom are full-time professionals. They have well-resourced offices and display a high degree of expertise with regard to dealing with media and public relations. Where they differ is with regard to their internal organisational structure: whilst Duha have adopted a more managerial style involving a clear division of labour between central offices in Prague and Brno, and a network of local branches, SBM retain a fluid internal structure and have not attempted to establish local branches, or indeed an office in Prague.

The most significant differences between the two organisations occur with regard to their political efficacy. Duha has succeeded in becoming a respected actor on the Czech political scene, regularly holding meetings with politicians, enjoying open access to the media. Leading figures of Duha regularly appear on TV discussion programmes, and generally the organisation receives sympathetic coverage in the leading national weekly *Respekt*, an opinion maker for a large section of the social and political elite. The co-founder and former chairman of Duha is now an editor-in-chief of *Literarní noviny*, a weekly of the Czech literary circle. They have also cultivated links in academic circles, in particular, the social science department of Brno University.

Benefiting from their membership of FoE-I, Duha has skilfully developed its lobbying technique and achieved some success in cases over which they can more easily gain popular support: for example, Duha has waged campaigns against the intention of several TNCs to mine gold in the Czech Republic. Although its anti-Temelin campaign has been a high profile campaign with which the organisation is closely associated, Duha has concurrently run several other campaigns and is not perceived as a single-issue group.
SBM on the other hand have always been associated exclusively with anti-Temelin protest despite the fact that they have launched other campaigns. They carry out the bulk of their activities in what amounts to a hostile political and social environment (South Bohemia), where the interests of those involved in the Temelin plant prevail. SBM have never made a systematic effort to become present in Prague, where all important decisions on Temelin are taken. They opened and financed a information centre in České Budejovice instead of Prague, and one is tempted to argue that SBM should have developed contacts with Prague based media and remained a regional group fighting a national problem. Instead, they have fought the Temelin issue entirely at the local level, through local politicians with no influence or power, and within a largely hostile local political network.

SBM have also failed to engage academic potential that they have on their doorstep in České Budejovice. Unlike Duha, whose many activists are students of Brno University, SBM have failed to enlist the help and support of students from the various faculties of the university of South Bohemia. The organisation has also been reluctant to widen its membership base and include other sections of society within its ranks.

**Conclusion**

Insofar as our study has been based on the experience of two EMOs, we offer observations to be tested further rather than firm conclusions regarding the factors shaping EMO activity in the Czech Republic.

A fundamental observation is that the specific national context - political opportunity structure, resource availability, hegemonic discourse - remains vital in determining and shaping EMO activity. This is particularly relevant in the case of post-communist eastern Europe, not least because the overriding theoretical emphasis on ‘westernisation’ and the integration of the region within global political and economic structures often obscures the path dependent nature of much social, political and economic activity therein [Stark, 1992; 1998]. Factors such as the centralising legacy of communist political organisation, in combination with conservative social values and an unfamiliarity with associational activity in general, are likely to constrain EMO activity as well as determine strategies and responses for a considerable time to come. There is also the specific problem of resourcing EMO activity in eastern Europe: whilst EMOs have clearly been slow in addressing the need to establish passive fee-paying members, rabid economic restructuring does not provide the perfect backdrop to successful fund-raising, particularly where there is no recent tradition of such activity.

We also make a tentative critique of the effects of global links on indigenous EMOs. Whilst such links clearly provide funds and the transfer of know how, they can also prevent EMOs from developing a basis within the new political regime and a solid membership base within the country to support its activities. It can also foster a culture of dependency which can serve to de-legitimise the activities of the organisation.

To return to the theme of globalisation, it is too simplistic to suggest that Czech EMOs are merely in transition and will catch-up with their western counterparts in terms of organisational forms, strategies and repertoires of action. Such a perspective underestimates the tenacity and importance of specific cultural and structural factors, as well as the asymmetrical nature of the effects of globalisation. Though the Czech environmental movement has clearly become more like its western counterparts in the past decade, the specific power relationship between global forces, the national
government, and domestic economic interests, plus the legacies of four decades of communist rule, remain formidable determinants of EMO activity.

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