Comparing the Governance Models of Gender Mainstreaming in Taiwan and Sweden

Shu-Ling Hwang
Center for General Education
National Defense Medical Center, Taiwan
Shwang@ndmctsgh.edu.tw

Lenita Freidenvall
Department of Political Science
Stockholm University, Sweden
Lenita.Freidenvall@statsvet.su.se

The 4th European Conference on Politics and Gender
2015 June 11-13 Uppsala, Sweden
Abstract

This paper seeks to respond to the arguments about gender mainstreaming (GM) in theory and practice, by examining the experiences of Sweden and Taiwan. It examines three facets of the current status of GM in two countries, namely, the design of national gender equality machinery, the participation of experts and NGOs, and the methods of GM promotion, policy output and the institutional obstacles. GM implementation by the Swedish government has the following characteristics: (1) A relatively low level of central machinery but with a strong capacity for coordination; femocrats of gender expertise; diversifying relations between the women’s movement and the State; (2) Strong emphasis given to GM as a specialization, with gender experts-femocrats in charge of planning and execution, leaving little room for civil involvement; (3) An encompassing-integrated model aiming to realize national gender equality objectives in all policy domains via a combination of different approaches. Although supported by a high level of expertise, Sweden still experiences the tension between GM theory and practice. GM in Taiwan is characterized by the following: (1) Institutionalization of GM under the powerful direction of feminist activists in the national machinery, shielding it from political interference; (2) A participative-democratic model over-reliance on the guidance of external experts from academia and civil society; (3) The formalization of GM as a result of forcing its comprehensive implementation throughout the central administration. The Taiwanese model has suffered from the lack of full-time gender experts in the bureaucracy and practical knowledge in all policy domains. Our findings suggest that, although there are similarities as well as differences in the problems faced by Sweden and Taiwan, both experiences demonstrate the necessity for feminism to continue engaging with the
State and enforcing improvements to its implementation methods so that GM can produce real benefits. We conclude that the quality and quantity of new gender equality policies generating from GM implementation is the more important indicator for evaluating the effectiveness of GM, whereas arguments based on the integrationist versus agenda-setting binary can have little benefit for either the practical promotion or theoretical discussion of GM.
Introduction

Many governments around the world began promoting gender mainstreaming (GM) from 1995, but there have been great divergences in GM's definition, implementation and evaluation (Walby 2011). Verloo (2005) suggested that lack of definition of the goal of gender equality has made GM like a chameleon, changing color with every social and political context. Daly (2005: 448) attributed the variation to GM's "fuzzy" and "contingent" nature. Walby (2011) maintained that GM is an endeavor of feminism's continued engagement with power, and the polar opposite views regarding GM implementation, e.g. integration versus agenda-setting (Jahan 1996; Lombardo 2005; Rees 2005; Squires 2007; Verloo 2005), participative-democratic versus expert-bureaucratic (Beveridge et al. 2000; Donaghy 2004b) or diverse equality versus gender equality (Squires 2007), could be considered the consequence of variances in definition, interpretation and context. As a result, there is the need to find alternative or hybridized approaches.

Researchers have advocated the participative-democratic approach as the more likely to accomplish agenda-setting goals (Beveridge et al. 2000), and questioned the expert-bureaucratic approach for focusing on GM's practical capacity for improving policy quality without placing enough emphasis on the political issue of gender inequality, thus inevitably becoming too similar to the integrationist approach (Squires 2007; Verloo 2005). Donaghy (2004b) described "the third way" to policy governance created by Northern Ireland's participative-democratic model, where the contribution of expertise by several groups is better than that by one person or one set of bureaucrats or experts. However, Squires (2007) pointed out that there is an issue with which groups to accredit and proposed the alternative of deliberative democracy.
Walby (2011) believed in the equal importance of democracy and expertise for GM, as it involves an alliance of actors from legislation, gender equality policy mechanism, women's movement and academia, with the choice between participative democracy and expert bureaucracy depending on context. From their study of GM in Australia, Osborn et al. (2011) concluded that it is inappropriate to set the two models of expert bureaucracy and participative democracy as opposites, because the distinction is much more dynamic in reality.

Sweden's model for GM is considered the most promising, and Sainsbury and Bergqvist (2009) have used the country's experience to respond to the above binary-based arguments. They rejected the integrationist versus agenda-setting binary as well as the notion that only the latter has transformative potential, since Sweden's was not a case of "either or" but both. At the same time, they stressed that to evaluate GM results, it is essential to conduct longitudinal studies and look at the sociopolitical variables of the different countries.

According to the European Commission (2006), Sweden's integrated model is made possible by the following conditions: the implementation of GM by gender equality experts, consensus among the different political parties and effective coordination by the national gender equality machinery. Comparing the experiences of Sweden and Ireland, McGauran (2009) added Sweden's policy implementation regime to that list of conditions, naming the high degree of cooperation among Sweden's public departments and a strong tradition of analysis and evaluation for policy development as some of the manifestations. Nevertheless, Sainsbury and Bergqvist (2009) and Åseskog (2003) considered it difficult to reproduce Sweden's success elsewhere, because Sweden had already begun to create many gender equality policies and develop GM tools in as early as the 1970s. Moreover, improvements to the
methods of GM implementation have continued ever since, with a focus on analyzing the gender hierarchy in the 1980s and the installation of a scheme of gender experts in the bureaucracy in the 1990s.

This paper also seeks to respond to the above-mentioned arguments about GM in theory and practice, by examining the experiences of Sweden and Taiwan. However, instead of comparing how the two countries' GM achievements are affected by macro- and meso-factors, we intend to discuss the differences in the national gender equality machinery for GM implementation, the involvement of women's movement, the substance and achievement of GM work and the institutional obstacles. We chose to compare Taiwan and Sweden because while Taiwan is considered a successful newcomer to GM and Sweden the global exemplar, they have adopted distinctly different governance strategies. Our findings suggest that, although there are similarities as well as differences in the problems faced by the two countries, both experiences demonstrate the necessity for feminism to continue engaging with the State and enforcing improvements to its implementation methods so that GM can produce real benefits. Moreover, the experiences of both countries indicate that feminist activists need to be more aware of the technocratic nature of GM and to counter it by considering what is practicable in a particular country's circumstances and adopting more efficient implementation strategies.

Research Method

For this study, Taiwan's data include documentations and in-depth interviews of over 40 officials, civil servants and NGO representatives on the Committee of Women's Rights Promotion (CWRP) and its successor the Gender Equality Committee, conducted between August 2010 and March 2015. In addition, the first
author was a member of the CWRP from 2005 to 2009 and has been involved since 2006 in the gender equality projects of various government organizations, such as the Financial Supervisory Commission, Department of Health, Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Ministry of Education, National Communications Commission, and Directorate-General of Personnel Administration.

Sweden's data include government documentations, studies and reports, training manuals and academic literature. Also, 30 interviews were conducted during April to December 2013 and June 2014 with scholars, feminist activists, gender equality experts and civil servants implementing GM in the central, regional and local government administrations.

**Gender Mainstreaming in Taiwan**

GM in Taiwan is characterized by the following: (1) The institutionalization of GM under the powerful direction of civil society especially feminist scholars and women’s groups in the national machinery, shielding it from political interference; (2) A participant-democratic model that is over-reliant on the guidance of external scholars and experts due to the lack of gender experts within the bureaucracy; (3) The formalization of GM as a result of forcing its comprehensive implementation throughout the entire central administration before prioritizing issues.

**Feminists Empowering the National Machinery and the Institutionalization of GM**

GM in Taiwan has depended solely on the efforts of feminist activists who exploited political opportunity structures provided by the change of government to
enter the national machinery for promoting women's rights and gender equality. In the short space of a few years, they managed to establish many institutional GM initiatives, including new gender governance machinery.

In the 1980s, the feverish wave of democratization sweeping across Taiwan eventually led to the lifting of decades of Martial Law in 1987 and the founding of many new political parties. Feminist and other social movements also emerged and flourished during this time. In 1994, the status quo one-party rule in Taiwan was symbolically ended when Kuomintang (KMT) lost Taipei City to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the elections and Chen Shui-bian became mayor of the capital. To fulfill his campaign promise, Chen established the Taipei City Commission on the Promotion of Women's Rights in 1996, with himself as convener and members consisting of department heads within the municipal administration as well as NGO representatives (leading feminists, scholars and members of women's rights groups). Adopting a mixture of corporatism and participative democracy, the Commission enjoyed more than a mere advisory role in that the civilian members had the power to direct agendas for the civil servants to implement the decisions, and also functioned as a platform for the communication, coordination and integration of major policies related to women's issues. The interdepartmental setup and participation of NGO representatives fully realized Rai's conceptualization (2007) that GM is a process of gender democratization. However, Taiwan did not start using the term GM until after 2000, due to China's hindrance of its participation in the UN and connected affairs. From 2002, other counties and cities in Taiwan created similar commissions in order to obtain central social welfare funding, though none could compare with the Taipei commission in capacity.

Pressed by women's groups, the KMT central government established the
Committee of Women's Rights Promotion (CWRP) under the Executive Yuan in 1997, although it was small with limited powers. When Chen Shui-bian was elected president in 2000, the Executive Yuan recruited many feminist activists who were also DPP supporters to the CWRP and expanded it to include the premier, the vice premier, 11 heads of departments (later increased to 16) and 18 civilian representatives as members. The CWRP's five policy groups (later increased to six) were each co-convened by one civilian member and one government official and oversaw the implementation of over 100 key tasks by the administration.

The CWRP began implementing GM in 2006 and focus in the first phase (2006–2009) was on setting up fundamental tools like gender budgeting, gender statistics, gender analysis, GIA, gender awareness and empowerment of civil servants, and the gender equality steering committee. In addition, rewards were created to encourage the promotion of women in central and local administrations, along with a stipulation that every gender should have at least one-third representation in each of the 500 or so committees under the Executive Yuan.

During this period, the CWRP established many interdepartmental and intradepartmental supervisory mechanisms to ensure the proper implementation of GM in the bureaucracy, such as the designation of gender focus points. Every department was asked to submit a four-year action plan and make annual reports on implementation results for assessment by its gender equality steering committee and the CWRP. The Research, Development and Evaluation Commission, the National Science Council and the Council for Economic Planning and Development were tasked with conducting GIA for major policies and programs in social development, science and technology and economic development, respectively. The Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics trained its staff in gender statistics and
supervised the collection of relevant data by other departments. Apart from providing
civil servants nationwide with GM training and hosting exchanges among
departmental steering committees, the Directorate-General of Personnel
Administration also supervised the internal handling of similar tasks by departmental
personnel units. Every department was monitored in its GM implementation by a
gender equality steering committee, formed of the head of the department, scholars
and experts as well as members of the CWRP, with minister or the vice minister as
convener. Additionally, the Foundation for Women's Rights Promotion and
Development, funded by the Executive Yuan, hosted GM workshops and produced
manuals on GIA, gender statistics and gender budgeting.

Moreover, legislation of the national machinery prevented any future dissolution
or downscaling for political ends and further institutionalized GM to ensure its
sustainable implementation. Feminist activists joined forces with women legislators to
include a clause in the Organizational Act of the Executive Yuan that prohibits the
CWRP's dissolution, while demanding the installation of a dedicated staff agency. In
2012, the Executive Yuan created the Department of Gender Equality with a 40-strong
personnel, thus providing the CWRP with dedicated staff and a minister without
portfolio as the executive secretary to replace the original staff of eight drafted from
the Women's Affairs Section of the Welfares Department, Ministry of the Interior. At
the same time, the CWRP was renamed the Gender Equality Committee (GEC) with a
stated mission to "advise and deliberate on issues related to the strategic development,
policies and programs of gender mainstreaming." Figure 1 shows the national
machinery for GM in Taiwan.
Figure 1 National machinery for GM in Taiwan

Premier, Executive Yuan

National Development Council Gender Equality Section

Supervision and Evaluation

Gender Equality Committee
Premier, Vice Premier
16 Ministers & 18 Civil members
6 Task Groups (Coordinator)

International Participation
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Personal Safety
(Ministry of the Interior)

Health and Medical Care (Ministry of Health and Welfare)

Education, Media and Culture
(Ministry of Education)

Employment, Economy and Welfare (Ministry of Labor)

Environment, Energy and Technology
(Ministry of Science and Technology)

Department of Gender Equality
(Secretary and Staff)

Minister without Portfolio

Departmental Gender Equality Steering Committees and Gender Focus Points

Municipality County/City Government
During Chen's eight years in office from 2000, the CWRP passed through four terms, each with 18 members consisting of leading feminist activists from academia and NGOs. As a team working for women's rights, they showed tremendous political vigor and welded significant influence. For example, to force the ministers and department heads take up the responsibility of GM implementation, the members visited 11 ministries during 2006–2007 to demand progress reports and came to be feared throughout the bureaucracy for their uncompromising stance. While there was some backlash and resistance, the tasks were performed as directed, especially after GM became gradually institutionalized. In spite of the departure of many feminist activists from the CWRP when KMT regained power in 2008, it has remained powerful and the GM programs are continuing unabated into its third four-year phase (2014–2017).

According to Rai (2003), the success and efficacy of a national gender policy machinery can be gauged by five indicators: (1) whether it has the position to influence government decisions; (2) whether there is a legal basis for its mission and function; (3) whether it is closely associated with civil society; (4) whether it is supported by sufficient human resources and funding; (5) whether it has a system of accountability and supervision. In Taiwan, the CWRP under the Executive Yuan seems to tick all boxes. So has Taiwan been successful in GM implementation? If not, what might be the causes? But firstly, how is success defined?

**A Participative-Democratic Model: Issues of Expertise and Accountability**

This section discusses the reliance of the Executive Yuan bureaucracy on outside
experts for GM expertise, and the pros and cons of this participative-democratic model.

From 2006 to 2009, feminist activists in the CWRP demanded the creation of gender equality steering committees throughout the administration as part of GM promotion, thus establishing a national machinery of multiple level participative democracy in Taiwan. The civilian members of these committees, including scholars and representatives from women's groups, were considered experts who not only offered specialist advice but also assessed the various departments' GM action plans and implementation results. They and feminist activists in the CWRP contributed their time and effort voluntarily, and were remunerated only for meeting attendance (at a rate of 29 euros per hour). In addition, to ensure that GIA was conducted professionally, they demanded that all relevant plans and regulations were externally reviewed (reviewers were paid 18 euros per case). To equip GM trainers with proper gender expertise, they suggested the creation of a qualified personnel database, which was realized in 2013 under the Ministry of Education's "Key points to the Assessment of Gender Equality Trainers and Maintenance of the Human Resources Database." The database currently has about 350 trainers, as assessed by the Ministry's Gender Equality Education Committee, and is used by most of the administration for finding civilian members to their gender equality steering committees, GM trainers and GIA reviewers. Some departments even make use of the database strictly compulsory. For example, the Ministry of Health and Welfare stipulates that on-job education credits in gender issues obtained by medical personnel would only be valid if training was provided by someone listed in the database.

In spite of the above, the participative-democratic model with its heavy reliance on external experts is flawed from the start. In the earliest days, the tasks of drafting
GM plans, supervising their implementation and educating the civil servants were almost entirely handled by the 18 feminist activists of the CWRP, whose involvement in the government’s promotion of GM was totally voluntary. Among these feminist activists, ten were also feminist scholars with teaching positions in universities, but their understanding of GM is mostly based on information on UN and EU experiences gleaned online. As Meier and Celis (2011) pointed out, none of the definitions of GM proffered by the European Commission, the Beijing Platform for Action or the Council of Europe include clearly stated gender objectives, which are left completely to the decision of the policy actors. GM theory assumes that GM would be conducted by reasonable persons of intent, who would know to set gender objectives during policy making and implementation. However, it overlooks the possibility that those implementing GM might lack such expertise or indeed disapprove of GM. This was exactly the pitfall encountered by Taiwan’s feminist activists: unable to deliver precise directives for any concrete policies that GM can generate, they naively believed that the civil servants would be motivated by GM training to engage in related work and research on their own, never imagining that the civil servants simply did not have the time, ability or interest to do so. Some bureaucrats even questioned the specialism of the activists themselves, because they failed to explain the actual policy goals of GM, as one staff in the Ministry of Transportation and Communications said:

Those CWRP people were inadequate. They came from outside the administrative system to direct us and ought to be very convincing in theory. I can accept the legitimacy of what you’re trying to do, but then I also have to ask, what exactly are your measures? You’ve only told me
your ideals and goals but not how to achieve them!¹

These feminist activists share a background in social science and do have a firm grasp of social development policies, but their demand for comprehensive GM implementation throughout the entire administration presented a problem for many of the departments, because of the general lack of knowledge. In fact, to translate GM tools into gender policies in the various fields, the person in charge needs to have not only gender awareness but also knowledge of gender research pertinent to science, technology, engineering, medicine, national defense, economics, finance, commerce, labor affairs, communication, the environment, education and cultural affairs. However, since gender research has yet to produce sufficient empirical results and real data, it has been difficult to conduct high quality GIA and provide GM courses of good depth and practicability. One interviewee responsible for organizing the training revealed that, while many civil servants had already completed the basic training in gender awareness and GM concept after lengthy promotion, they had not been offered practical courses that are closely related to their actual business because no suitable trainers could be found.² This issue of expertise cannot be resolved by the external gender experts or by the internal bureaucrats. In the end, it is up to the government to encourage interdisciplinary applied gender research through funding, but the Taiwanese government has not done much in the matter.

Other limitations can also be attributed to the heavy reliance on external experts. Firstly, the fact that the external experts are not full-time employees and cannot devote completely to researching for empirical data or conducting rigorous analysis has negatively affected the quality of GM implementation. Secondly, of the 350 or so

¹ Interview of January 25, 2010.
² Interview of February 4, 2015.
trainers in the human resources database, very few are actually familiar with “dual knowledge” (Hankivsky 2013: 639), expertise in both GM and businesses of the various administrative departments. But for many of the departments, a gender equality expert with some understanding of their specific affairs is precisely the kind they want on their steering committee and to assist in their GIA. Indeed, without a suitable understanding of the workings of a department, a civilian committee member may suggest infeasible ideas; at the same time, without the specialized input of external experts, the results of GIA cannot serve as valuable reference.

This over-reliance on external experts has further inhibited the nurturing of femocrats and gender experts within the civil service. The attempt by feminists on the CWRP to include "gender expert" as a regular position within government organizations has not been a success, and most of the dedicated staff to the Department of Gender Equality, installed when it was created in 2012, have yet to develop into femocrats that meet the activists' expectations, remaining somewhat deficient in gender expertise. Moreover, civil servants in Taiwan are still mired in the belief that gender experts should be external experts, and fear giving themselves that title lest they attract unfriendly attention. For example, one gender equality liaison officer with a professional background in social work and solid gender knowledge said that he still believes it is important to have civilian members on the steering committee, as they can provide better expert advice.³ Lastly, GM implementation within each administrative department is divided by task, with different units responsible for different tools like gender statistics, gender awareness and empowerment, GIA, gender budgeting and the gender equality steering committee,

³ Interview of February 4, 2015.
and the person assigned the task only handles it "on the side." With the frequent rotation of assignments, these civil servants are given little chance to identify with gender equality work, let alone build up an expertise.

Rai (2003) maintained that, since the institutionalization of gender equality policies is a process of democratization, it should be conducted in close partnership with women's groups and with accountability. However, in reality, holding the CWRP and various gender equality steering committees accountable has proven difficult. Being involved on a voluntary basis, the civilian committee members are never questioned over their suitability and competence by either the government or women's groups; while having the power to make decisions, they do not need to shoulder any responsibility for the consequences of those decisions. As to the civil servants, because GM implementation is considered a side duty and does not count towards their overall performance evaluation, they are not motivated to improve their gender expertise.

To conclude, under the direction of feminist activists, Taiwan's government chose to implement GM via a participative-democratic model so as to support the administrative departments with the necessary expertise. The activists reasoned that, since there were no gender experts in the bureaucracy, it was essential to involve external experts to prevent any straying from feminist ideals in the process. After nine years of implementation, the model has successfully ensured the continued presence of women's groups in the national machinery, notwithstanding the inconsistent performance of the different civilian committee members recruited when a different political party came into power.

However, there is a significant flaw with the model in relation to the level of commitment of the external experts, which has resulted in loosely devised GM action
plans and poorly supervised implementation. At the same time, the activists were thwarted in their attempt to persuade the government to install regular gender experts in the administrative setup, and the effort to train civil servants in charge of GM into femocrats has progressed but slowly. In terms of the actual implementation, the failure to first prioritize some issues and policies and then conduct relevant research during the process meant that the GM policy objectives could not be described in concrete terms, let alone achieved. In the end, no one is ever held accountable for GM implementation, from the officials and external experts making the decisions to the internal civil servants charged with carrying them out. In Taiwan's comprehensive implementation of GM via a participative-democratic model, the problem of expertise remains a slow one to solve due to the lack of full-time gender experts, sufficient practical information and a system of accountability.

A Comprehensive Model: Evaluating Achievements and Technocratization

Researches have shown that in many countries, a common result of GM implementation is the "technocratization" of GM (Daly 2005), where GM becomes simplified into only procedures and techniques, while analysis of gender inequality and the setting of gender equality policy objectives are overlooked. In this section, we aim to discuss the main causes of the technocratization of GM in Taiwan, after first presenting an overview of the achievements. According to Walby (2011), GM is a dynamic, developing process of feminism's engagement with power. Using this concept, we will evaluate the achievements of GM in Taiwan from the following three viewpoints: the continued engagement of feminism with the State allowed by the
national machinery, the utilization of encompassing gender equality strategies, and the accumulation of piecemeal gender equality policies generated as GM was implemented. In discussing the causes of technocratization, we will return to feminism to reflect on the flaws in GM theory and its implementation methods.

The implementation of GM by Taiwan's central administration began in 2006 and moved into the third four-year phase in 2014, following action plans designed by the civilian members on the CWRP. The first phase focused on the five main GM tools of gender statistics, gender analysis, gender awareness and empowerment, gender budgeting and GIA, without any clear stipulation regarding the proposal of concrete gender equality policy objectives by the administrative departments. As a result, the bureaucracy struggled badly with how to transform abstract gender equality goals into actual policies, especially in the area of GIA, and the problem of technocratization was severe in its myriad of forms. The second phase included many improvement measures targeting the above-mentioned problems, one of which was the creation of gender equality steering committees within each administrative department through which the knowledge of external experts could be utilized (this is considered the sixth GM tool). To improve the execution of GIA, it was pared down in scale and only conducted for major plans and bills; more training was offered to civil servants while a system of external reviews became established. In the third phase, to further minimize the problem of technocratization, the administrative departments were asked to strengthen their realization of the Executive Yuan's Gender Equality Policy Platform (created in 2011) and CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women) via the application of GM tools. 2015 saw the first implementation of a system of performance evaluation and reward for GM tasks. In the instance of the Ministry of National Defense (MND), GM implementation in 2014
resulted in 1,111 sessions of talks on gender awareness, application of gender statistics and analysis and GIA for submarine, hangar and military compound construction projects that focused on the equality, safety and privacy of spaces and common facilities. Apart from the realization of CEDAW, amendments to related orders and regulations and implementation of sexual harassment and sexual assault prevention tasks, the MND's GM policy objectives also included the following: committees of the MND and its subordinate agencies must meet the one-third gender representation rule; the percentage of female candidates in the military should be increased; women should be encouraged to apply for positions of armored officers and in naval vessels (including submarines); and parental leave for male military personnel should be supported. The four civilian members on the MND's gender equality steering committee were three feminist scholars and one women's group lawyer.

The first indicator we proposed for evaluating the achievements of GM in Taiwan is whether women's movement can continue to engage with the State to determine the direction of GM and whether GM has been institutionalized and can develop sustainably. In these respects, Taiwan has been fairly successful in the promotion of GM. The participative-democratic model adopted by Taiwan allowed civilian committee members to co-direct the national machinery for GM with high-level government officials, ensuring that women's rights activists can continue to participate in and supervise the country's implementation of GM. We could say that the national machinery itself is an achievement of GM. As Walby (2011) said, GM is the engagement of feminism with mainstream agendas and can be conducted via many strategies, producing various results. In some agendas, feminism was able change the mainstream, but in others, feminism and the bureaucracy changed each
other and ended up growing together. The comprehensive implementation of GM throughout Taiwan's central government can be considered feminism's simultaneous engagement with the entire administrative system. Understandably there was a significant discrepancy in achievement in different policy domains, with varying degrees of the problem of technocratization.

The second indicator for evaluating Taiwan's achievements in GM is whether the implementation has given birth to new gender equality policies, measures, programs or acts, or whether the introduction of GM actually compressed existing policies oriented towards positive action and equal opportunity. GM in Taiwan aimed to reform the gender hierarchy in the bureaucracy as well as promote the rights of the differently gendered and the disadvantaged (LGBT individuals, New Immigrants, aborigines, persons of low socioeconomic status, the elderly and the disabled). The former is generally referred to as institutional gender mainstreaming, and the latter operational gender mainstreaming (Ravindran and Kelkar-Khambete 2008), although in Sweden they are known as internal equality and external equality, respectively. In Taiwan, the various policies/measures/programs/acts generated as GM was implemented, with regard to both internal equality and external equality, all fulfill De Waal's criteria (2006) of gender parity, gender equality, gender equity, empowerment and transformation of traditional gender norms, with some also emphasizing diverse equalities. For example, these gender equality criteria were used in the GIA conducted for 439 major programs in the central government between 2012 and 2014, and in the above-mentioned GM implementation of the MND. Sainsbury and Bergqvist (2009) and Walby (2011) both argued that a country's definition of GM is closely associated with its approach to gender equality. According to Sainsbury and Bergqvist (2009), Sweden chose to conduct GM via an encompassing approach because its gender
equality policies already covered criteria like equal outcomes, equal opportunities, equal treatment and positive action, and the purpose of GM was mainly to expand their application into wider and wider policy domains. In contrast, GM in Taiwan was implemented not only comprehensively throughout the entire administration, but also relying on a variety of gender equality criteria and strategies.

Finally, we could evaluate GM in Taiwan from the viewpoint that the achievements are an accumulation of piecemeal new gender equality policies. In academia, the success of GM is commonly evaluated by the binary of integrationist versus agenda-setting approaches, with the thinking that the latter allows feminism's potential to transform the mainstream to be realized, whereas the former might be easily absorbed by the mainstream (Jahan 1996; Lomardo 2005; Rees 2005; Squires 2007; Verloo 2005). However, Sainsbury and Bergqvist (2009) have argued that this binary downplays the practical achievements of GM in many countries and in Sweden's experience at least, it was not a case of "either or" but both. The same is true of Taiwan's experience. Some issues were handled by setting the agenda anew, such as the stipulation that every gender should have at least one-third representation in each of the 500 or so committees under the Executive Yuan, and others by making amendments to existing policies, such as the stipulation to increase only a certain percentage of women candidates in the military instead of lifting the whole restriction.

Next, we will examine the "quality" of GM achievements in Taiwan by focusing on the problem of technocratization. In trying to understand the causes of technocratization, scholars have pointed to "internal" and "external" factors. Meier and Celis (2011) highlighted GM's "character flaw" as one of the internal factors. GM emphasizes the importance of gender equality awareness in policy making without clearly stating any gender policy objectives, leaving them completely to the decision
of the policy actors. The underlying assumption is that the objectives determined by the policy actors will also be duly fulfilled. However, within this assumption lies the very seed of technocratization. At the same time, the fuzziness of GM as concept (Daly 2005; Verloo 2005) can cause the average policy actor to depoliticize GM during implementation and end up operating only the tools like gender statistics, gender budgeting and GIA without actually examining and analyzing gender inequality.

External factors are the various obstacles to GM's effective implementation, the most central of which is the lack of political will and consequent scarcity of manpower and resources. Other obstacles include civil servants' resistance to GM tasks (Benschop and Verloo 2006; Donaghy 2004a; European Commission 2006; Hankivsky 2013; Lombardo and Mergaert 2013; Payne 2011; Schmidt 2005; Veitch 2005; Woodward 2008); the non-existence of a system of evaluation with reward and penalty that helps to enforce implementation (Bengtsson 2011; Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2009; Jacquot 2010; Payne 2011; Schmidt 2005); failure to involve feminist activists and broader civil society (Hankivsky 2013; McGauran 2009: Squires 2007; Verloo 2005); and insufficient information and research (Bengtsson 2011; Hankivsky 2013). In addition, a comparison of GM results in different countries shows that they are determined to an extent by the country's political, economic and cultural contexts, existing gender relations (Daly 2005; European Commission 2006; Donaghy 2004a; Outshoorn and Kantola 2007; Rai 2003; Verloo 2005; Walby 2005) and policy implementation regime and institutional context (McGauran 2009), which constitute another external factor.

The technocratization of GM in Taiwan also has its roots in the above external factors, although the internal factors should not be ignored. Reflecting on Taiwan's
GM experience from a feminist viewpoint, we recognize that the tools of GM are politically significant, that GM is a philosophy for analyzing the gender frame as well as a set of techniques for carrying out policies (Daly 2005). However, for the civil servants without feminist ideals or gender expertise, GM is difficult, obscure, even pointless, and as such, has made them question the necessity and specialization of gender issues. When Taiwan's feminist activists forcefully pushed the entire administration to implement GM without careful study and deliberate planning, they obviously failed to respect GM's highly specialized, political nature and so prevent its technocratization. This consequence and the needless waste of bureaucratic manpower associated with it have been a hard lesson for GM advocates. Daly (2005: 449) has called on GM researchers to "go beyond the fuzzy and technocratic nature of gender mainstreaming and work toward elaborating the concept and approach as part of a coherent intellectual and policy endeavor". We believe that it is also critical for feminist activists to be aware of the trap of formalization and to counter it by considering what is feasible in a particular country's circumstances and adopting more efficient implementation strategies.

GM in Taiwan has benefitted from the distinct advantages of comprehensive implementation in the central administration and feminists' involvement in the national machinery. However, it has also suffered from the lack of gender experts and practical knowledge in all policy domains caused by this comprehensive, participative-democratic approach. In the next phase of GM implementation, the focus should be on how to prioritize policies and correct the deficiency in expertise while continuing with the participative-democratic model of comprehensive implementation.
Gender Mainstreaming in Sweden

GM implementation by the Swedish government has the following characteristics: (1) A central machinery for gender equality directed by the Minister for Gender Equality; femocrats of gender expertise; diversifying relations between the women’s movement and the State. (2) Strong emphasis given to GM as a specialization, with gender experts-femocrats in charge of planning and execution. (3) An encompassing-integrated model with a stress on innovation and reform and the promotion of GM as a way of generating national gender equality policies via theoretical analysis of inequality in gender order.

Gender Equality Machinery

Rai (2003) suggested that a gender equality machinery's capacity for coordination is positively correlated to its administrative level, but this clearly does not apply to Sweden. In 1976, Sweden had already installed a Minister for Gender Equality although there was no ministry of gender equality. In 1982, based on the 1972 Delegation of Gender Equality Issues within the Prime Minister Office, the Division of Gender Equality was established to move with the Minister for Gender Equality (Bergqvist et al. 2007), and today belongs to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs overseen by the Minister for Children, the Elderly and Gender Equality. The main task of the Division is to assist the Minister to develop gender-equality policy, prepare gender-equality legislation, and coordinate this legislation with other ministers. The low level Division does not have many staff but has a relatively strong capacity for coordination because in Sweden, the preparation and consultation of bills are jointly handled by different ministries in adherence to the principle of the
collective responsibility of the government mandated by the constitution (Bergqvist et al. 2007; Larsson and Bäck 2008). In addition, the Division coordinates meetings with the Council of Gender Equality, an advisory board which is comprised of NGOs, political parties and social partners.

In 1994, femocrats in the Division proposed the concept of GM for a new bill (Åseskog 2003; Bergqvist et al. 2007) that was successfully pushed through in the government by women's activists and female politicians. In 1994 GM was adopted as the main strategy to achieve the national goals of gender equality at the national, regional and local levels in Sweden, and since then individuals both inside and outside the establishment have continued to collaborate for the promotion of GM, playing various roles in their respective arenas of the State, civil society, the market and academia. With the Division in charge of strengthening the national gender equality machinery, GM was facilitated by gender equality officers in regional governments (county administrative boards) and femocrats in both regional and local governments (county and municipal councils and administration), the content of national gender equality projects supervised by women's activists and the necessary evaluation and study conducted by feminist scholars and researchers. At the same time, gender experts from universities and grassroots organizations entered government departments to plan GM and partnered with scholars in feminism and former femocrats to form gender equality consulting firms and develop methods of implementation (Sainsbury and Bergqvist 2009).

For more than two decades, Sweden's government has endeavored to improve the implementation efficacy of GM through investment in research, such as by establishing the Swedish Secretariat for Gender Research in 1998. JämStöd, a committee for Gender Mainstreaming Support, was set up in 2005 to develop methods
and manuals for furthering GM (Åseskog 2003; Sterner and Biller 2007), and JÅMI, a national commission for gender mainstreaming active from 2008 to 2010, investigated the facilitating and impeding factors to GM success. In 2009, the website IncludeGender (www.includegender.org) was created to propagate GM knowledge and share practical experiences. Research on different dilemmas in the implementation of GM in the public sector organizations has been published (i.e. Lindholm 2011a, Callerstig 2014). Research projects on gender, diverse equality and social innovation are encouraged in research institutes like the Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems. However, according to five of our interviewees, academic gender studies are often disconnected from the gender expertise required for GM, with few practical courses offered in universities.4

The fact that the institutionalization of Swedish gender equality machinery has progressed relatively unaffected by any changes of government since the 1980s is attributed to the continued engagement of women's movement with the State (Sainsbury and Bergqvist 2009). However, there have been some setbacks. In 2006, women's activists called on the government to strengthen the gender equality machinery by creating an administrative agency dedicated to GM implementation. This was supported by some political parties but vetoed by the newly elected central-right government (Sainsbury and Bergqvist 2009). In addition, the individual will of the Minister for Gender Equality can have an impact on GM. One activist we interviewed pointed out that from 2006 to 2012, during the tenure of Nyamko Sabuni

---

4 Interviews of October 22 (gender consultant); November 15 (femocrat); November 19 (feminist activist), November 26 (professor of gender studies); and December 3 (gender expert), 2013.
(who once declared herself not a feminist)⁵, there was significantly less funding for GM projects and relative passivity in the Division of Gender Equality's promotion of GM.⁶ However, this claim requires some clarifications, particularly because of the fact that during the period 2007-2014, almost 300 million Euros were invested in various state funded gender equality projects, out of which about ten percent, 30 million Euros were invested in GM. For instance, SALAR, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions, received approximately 25 million Euros within the framework of this state funded project, for leading local projects in the municipalities and regions on implementing GM in policy processes.

Nonetheless, research points out that there are problems in the proper implementation of GM in Sweden. The non-existence of a performance tracking evaluation system for GM, which leaves its success entirely dependent on the individual wills of the directors, has been pointed out as the main impeding factor to GM in Sweden (Bengtsson 2011). The government has not made GM compulsory in all agencies or set up a supervisory mechanism of reward and penalty, and has only encouraged its implementation in the form of voluntary subsidized projects. One study from 2010 reported that of the 182 central administrative agencies investigated, 37% had not implemented GM in full, 15% implemented it but without success and only 45% implemented it successfully (Stensöta 2010). Three of the interviewees stressed that there should be a better method for the long-term promotion of GM than individual projects, with a dedicated government agency set up that has the necessary

---


⁶ Interview of November 19, 2013.
regular personnel and budget to implement GM and gender equality policies. The 2011 report by JÄMI also proposes the creation of a central system of coordination, preferably installed in the prime minister's office or in departments that work closely with the Minister for Gender Equality.

Since 2011, several projects have been initiated to improve the implementation of GM. In addition to the large state funded project on GM in local and regional organizations, as mentioned above, several national projects on GM have been initiated. For instance, in 2013 the National Secretariat for Gender Studies was commissioned by the government to lead a ‘pilot project’ on GM in state authorities (JiM). The aim of the project was to support 18 state authorities in their work to implement GM during the period 2013-2014. More concretely, it has supported state authorities in their planning and implementation of GM, coordinated capacity building activities and arranged forums for the exchange of experience. The close connection of the Secretariat to research has been stressed as key. In 2015, the project period was prolonged, 2015-2018, and an additional 23 government agencies were added, totally encompassing 41 government agencies. A recent evaluation of JiM shows that in order for GM to be successful it must win acceptance among the leadership in organizations. It also shows that project with short term limits may focus on what is ‘doable’ rather than what is most important. Moreover, it stresses the connection between practical work on GM and research.

Given the increased role of the National Secretariat for Gender Studies as a

---

7 Interview of September 19, 2013 (activist); Interview of October 28, 2013 (former femocrat); Interview of November 19, 2013 (femocrat).
collaborator in state projects, particularly the support function in the implementation of GM in state authorities, one may argue that its role has increased over time, at the expense of the Division.

The Gender Expert-Femocrat Model: Expertise on Facilitating Normal Policy Actors

An emphasis on expertise can be noticed in many aspects of Sweden's GM implementation, from the gender equality machinery to the people involved and the methods applied. Walby (2011: 10) suggested that the most successful approach a GM expert can adopt is to maintain "a core of distinctive expertise and specialist politics while simultaneously dispersing such feminist expertise into all policy areas and into the work of normal policy actors." This is precisely how Sweden sought to incorporate gender experts in GM implementation, assigning them the two tasks of utilizing feminist expertise for the planning of GM projects and facilitating the normal policy actors in GM work. In addition, femocrats have played an important role in initiating GM. Although supported by a high level of expertise, this gender expert-femocrat model still experienced the tension between GM theory and practice.

In 1994, femocrats in the Division of Gender Equality established an expert scheme to help regional governments promote GM by installing one gender equality officer in each of the 21 county administrative boards (Åseskog 2003; Bergqvist et al. 2007). At present, these gender equality officers have the title of “gender equality strategist” or “gender equality developer” and work under the Sustainability Division or other units. In 2013–2014, the central administration commissioned a study (LUJ)
to investigate work predicaments faced by gender equality officers.\(^9\) According to two of the study's researchers, the central government did not provide the officers with any clearly stated missions, so they have had to discover what their duties might be for themselves while stumbling along in confusion and often felt isolated on the job; other difficulties they named include civil servants not knowing how to implement GM, indifferent superior officers, the problem of consolidating their work with follow-ups and the non-existence of an evaluation system of reward and penalty. The researchers found that the 21 gender equality officers all have a strong understanding of feminism.\(^10\) One officer who was an active feminist in her youth said that, because GM requires the cooperation of different departments, it is crucial that she does not come across as a condescending activist or draw too heavily from feminist ideas when engaging people in dialogue and discussion. She also pointed out that, many younger gender equality experts thought all they needed for the job was gender knowledge when in fact personality and strategic know-how are more important; and in any case, the power of gender equality officers in county administration boards has waned considerably.\(^11\) A strategic development generalist at a government agency interviewed for the study revealed that her co-workers were somewhat dismissive of gender equality as an expertise,\(^12\) and a university lecturer who served for a time as GM project researcher in the same agency also reported encountering this type of professional arrogance from engineers.\(^13\)

\(^9\) Equality for All County – Feasibility study on a development initiative to strengthen provincial offices gender mainstreaming in the counties (Jämställdhet i Alla Län).

\(^10\) Interview of June 13, 2014.

\(^11\) Interview of June 14, 2014.

\(^12\) Interview of November 26, 2013.

\(^13\) Interview of October 2, 2013.
The job market for gender equality experts in Sweden is not big and competition is fierce. Opportunities mostly come in the form of projects subsidized by the Swedish government or the EU, with very few permanent positions available in government agencies. Employment can also be found with gender equality consulting firms, which serve government organizations as well as private service corporate clients, although the general demand is very low. According to one chief executive officer of a gender equality consultancy, the total number of gender equality consultants nationwide is about 250, most of whom work independently. Although the Swedish government has stipulated that corporations with a personnel of 25 or more should enact a scheme of gender equality, it is mostly considered a formality. Thus, pertaining to the private sector, gender equality consultancies promote their services by highlighting how gender equality can benefit a corporation's image, efficiency and profit. The above-mentioned CEO said that while she identifies with feminism, she does not discuss feminism or women's movement with corporate clients because those matters are not of concern. One of her younger colleagues even declared women's movement to be a relic of the past, and that her focus is solely on gender and not women's rights.\footnote{Interview of October 22, 2013.} More studies are needed to explore whether the ideologies of gender equality experts of different generations might be distinctively dissimilar, or the differences in promoting gender equality in the public vis-a-vis the private sector.

GM in Sweden also features the bottom-up facilitation of government GM implementation by femocrats, a good example of which is Eskilstuna Municipality, one of the few municipalities in Sweden where GM is comprehensively implemented across the administrative departments, the municipal council, schools, municipally run
businesses and social welfare institutions. Eskilstuna's aim was to top the whole of Sweden as a place, an establishment and an employer with the highest gender equality.\textsuperscript{15} The project's instigator, an activist in union and women's movement at an early age, believes that a successful facilitator of GM should be able to bring together the support of politicians and public departments through informal power, and have strong enough gender expertise to win the trust of superior officers.\textsuperscript{16}

What impact has Sweden's gender expert-femocrat model brought to the women's movement and academic gender studies? Sainsbury and Bergqvist (2009) found that the increased involvement of gender experts in Sweden's public administration has helped to further feminize the State. However, two of our interviewees, a university lecturer and a women's activist, maintained that the indifference to GM shown by women's groups to GM could partly explain the inactiveness of local governments in GM promotion.\textsuperscript{17} According to the gender equality consultancy CEO, making GM a corporate activity and providing more career opportunities to gender studies graduates may give academics wishing to keep their discipline better leverage in negotiating with the universities. Nevertheless, it has been noted that a significant gap exists at present between the gender studies courses offered at Sweden's universities and gender equality practice.

The Swedish femocrats and gender equality experts we interviewed mostly identify with feminism, however, in dealing with corporations and normal policy actors, many tend to emphasize the GM's pragmatic value of elevating policy quality and avoid topics of women's movement and feminism in their discourse. A similar

\textsuperscript{15} Action Plan 2011–2015: In Search of Gender Equality
\textsuperscript{16} Interview of June 14, 2014.
\textsuperscript{17} Interview of November 26, 2013; Interview of November 19, 2013.
phenomenon has been observed in studies of Swedish local politicians (Andersson and Hedlund 2011), fire department (Lindholm 2011b), schools and social welfare institutions in connection with GM (Callerstig 2011a, 2011b). The increased role played by the National Secretariat for Gender Studies as collaborators in state projects might serve as a welcome critical voice in a more proper implementation of GM. As some have argued that GM is part of the New Public Management philosophy and neo-liberal shifts in society, which focuses on increased efficiency, synergy effects and reduced costs rather than tackling gender inequalities. By focusing on numbers and indicators – what is countable – it avoids feminist questions that are charged with conflict between women and men (Rönnblom 2005; Squires 2007; Wittbom 2012).

However, to conclude that gender experts who adjust their rhetoric in order to facilitate GM have been incorporated into the mainstream might overlook the very fact that GM is inevitably and essentially a contested process (Wably 2011) in which feminists engage with the mainstream in continuous negotiation and persuasion.

**An Encompassing-Integrated Model: Mainstreaming Core**

**Businesses in Every Policy Domain**

Sweden implementation of GM aims to realize gender equality in all policy domains via a combination of different approaches, and the encompassing-integrated model, as we call it, has been widely extolled. The key to the model's success lies in discerning the core tasks of each organization and then targeting them for GM implementation. For example, ministries have concentrated their GM efforts on legislative bills, annual directives to the administrative agencies, EU affairs and government committees of inquiry. Another example is from 2014 to 2019 the armed
forces are focusing their GM action on the four core areas of policy documentation, training, control and materiel. To elaborate, GM actions related to materiel would examine whether weapons and protective equipment are designed with consideration to the needs of female personnel and persons of different physical shapes. Documentation and control would examine whether the principle of sexual/gender equality has been violated in the administrative regulations and the planning, execution and assessment of policies. Because the integrated approach requires different organizations to cooperate closely, the project’s gender equality experts have to coordinate with the various persons in charge and mediate studies and discussions.¹⁸

Sainsbury and Bergqvist (2009) considered a country's approach to GM to be a reflection of its approach to gender equality, and Sweden's encompassing approach to GM to an extent reflects its concept of equality where equal outcomes are regarded as just as important, if not more important, than equal opportunities and equal treatment. To that end, Sweden began pursuing policies directly aimed at women in the 1970s, hoping to promote equal economic status for women through measures such as improved parental leave and child caring support. The focus of equality concerns fell on male political dominance in the 1980s, and later on sexual violence, LGBT rights and women immigrants in the 1990s. This parallel implementation of GM and anti-discrimination and women-oriented measures is one of the main features of the encompassing approach. One other feature is manifested in the examination of all policies through gender budgeting, as this can offer insights into the inequality experienced by women and the intersecting inequalities experienced by others (Sainsbury and Bergqvist 2009).

¹⁸ From the interview with two gender equality experts involved in the project conducted on June 10, 2014.
The long-term goal of Sweden's encompassing approach to GM is for gender equality to expand into more and more policy domains and become realized in all aspects of life. As mentioned previously, the Swedish government has recently invested 26 million kronor in GM efforts, partly to subsidize 41 administrative agencies to enhance their GM implementation (from 2015 to 2018) and partly to support the National Secretariat for Gender Research in providing experts and expertise assistance. The agencies oversee a wide range of policy areas, from food safety to housing, employment, economy, pension, insurance, tax, education, arts, research and cultural development, public health, indigenous peoples, immigration, prison, public prosecution, national defense and international cooperation. Whether these agencies can succeed in GM will be a test of the gender equality experts' abilities in integration and innovation. But should they all do so and generate the many new and inventive policies for gender equality expected, the result will be an astonishing achievement as well as an invaluable contribution to GM theory and practice.

In the Gender Mainstreaming Manual published by the Swedish Gender Mainstreaming Support Committee (JämStöd) in 2007, a theory of GM implementation is proposed in which the objective of national gender equality policies, gender system theory, and GM methods form an interrelated triangle. According to the publication, this structure reflects Swedish feminism's understanding of why there is gender inequality in their society, what the goal of gender equality should be and how GM can be used as a strategy to achieve those objectives. The primary goal of national gender equality policies is that "Women and men should have the same power to shape society and influence their own lives," with the four objectives of even distribution of power and influence, economic gender equality, even distribution of unpaid housework and care work, and the ending of men's violence against women (Swedish
Government 2007:15). One interviewee on the Committee explained that this implementation theory is based on the experience of women's movement in Sweden, gender theories and careful study of Swedish society.19 The manual has become an essential guide for gender experts in their work, and every GM project has to answer through gender analysis the question of how it can accomplish the national gender equality goal in its particular policy domain. For example, the 2014 GM action plan of the armed forces specified that the objective of GM implementation in the military is to defend women's right to equal employment, participation in democracy and power to shape society, in keeping with the national goal of gender equality. Nevertheless, the theory remains too abstract and difficult to comprehend for normal policy actors (Callerstig, 2011a, 2011b; Lindholm 2011b). In a similar vein, an evaluation of JiM (GM in government agencies) reports that the implementation of GM in state authorities has suffered from problems in the operationalizing the national gender equality goals. In order to clarify the government agencies’ assignment and responsibility to integrate GM in its daily work, the goals must be broken down into specific political priorities.

As discussed previously, Sweden's government is heavily influenced by neoliberalist policies and New Public Management, and in recognizing the pragmatic value of GM for improving policy quality and promoting economic production (Rönnblom 2005; Sainsbury and Bergqvist 2009), it chose to give experts a prominent role in policy making and emphasize the importance of scientific evidence-based research (European Commission 2006; Bengtsson 2011). As a result, it could be said that the relationship between feminism and the State has moved into the stage of

19 Interview of November 19, 2013.
"market feminism" (Kantola and Squires 2012). At the same time, GM is to be
applied by bureaucrats in the daily work, with a marked distance to the political
epicenter. These characteristics are seen as proof of the depoliticization of the
integrationist model (Lombardo 2005; Squires 2007; Verloo 2005), but at the same
time, Sweden's GM model is considered the global exemplar (Daly 2005; European
Commission 2005), with apparently the greatest potential to displace or transform
gender relations. In fact, what Sweden's experience demonstrates is the
decontextualizing flaw of a binary evaluation GM's transformation potential and the
urgent need to advance a theory on GM and its relationship with the transformation of
gender relations.

Conclusion

Considering there is a ten-year gap between the implementation of GM in
Sweden and Taiwan, it would not serve the purpose of this paper to compare how the
two countries' achievements in GM are affected by the macro- or meso- factors of
political, gender and policy implementation regimes. Instead, we wish to focus on
three facets of the current status of GM in Sweden and Taiwan, namely, the design of
national gender equality machinery, the participation of experts and NGOs, and the
methods of GM promotion, policy output and institutional barriers. Our review of the
processes and results of GM promotion indicates that, for GM to serve as an effective
strategy for women's rights, it is crucial that feminists do not shun engaging with the
State, in other words, they must continue to pressure the State to improve the
governance model of GM. Moreover, the study has noted similar problems in the two
countries' implementation of GM, which mainly surround the issues of providing the
gender experts and gender research needed by the many policy domains, and making institutional changes that would raise the willingness of bureaucrats to perform the tasks. Regardless of what solutions might be found, the importance of maintaining political will cannot be overstated, hence the necessity for feminism to continue its engagement with the State. Although there are significant differences between Taiwan and Sweden in the duration and process of GM development and the achievements in GM up to now, their experiences have demonstrated that GM as a strategy deserves sustained effort from women's movement.

Swedish and Taiwanese feminists have adopted different approaches to engage with the State. In Taiwan, the national gender equality machinery CWRP (the Committee of Women's Rights Promotion) and its successor GEC (Gender Equality Committee) enjoy the highest administrative position, being organized under the Executive Yuan, and feminist activists were able to enter directly into the CWPR to determine independently the GM implementation plans and co-govern GM with high-level officials. This participative-democratic model has the advantage of bringing in the gender expertise and knowledge of external experts and civil society but also suffers from the inability of the external experts to commit fully to their tasks and inhibits the growth of gender experts and femocrats within the administrative departments. In Sweden, although the gender equality machinery is one unit under a ministry-level organization, it is given sufficient power and can effectively coordinate the GM implementation efforts of different government agencies. After 20 years of GM, the Swedish women's movement has developed diverse roles in its contribution to GM, sharing out the work and cooperating in civil society, the State, the market and academia. The expert-femocratic model adopted by government departments for GM planning and implementation offers little room for civil involvement, although
women's activists have continued to pressure the government to advance GM, and private gender equality consultancies are commissioned to provide training and research. As there are strengths and weaknesses to both models, a hybrid of the two could be considered for future GM implementations.

In terms of the different institutional obstacles encountered, we must criticize the way feminist activists in Taiwan directed the gender equality machinery to enforce comprehensive GM implementation throughout the central administration without an adequate evaluation of whether the relevant conditions were ripe. The resulting problem of technocratization has been severe and is only gradually being improved in recent years. Sweden's integrated model is the product of many years of improvement to GM implementation. However, the central government has not mandated that GM should be implemented comprehensively and only subsidize some departments and local governments to enhance GM promotion in the form of individual projects. Without a system of reward and penalty or a dedicated supervisory agency in place, this method has been criticized for being unsustainable, that nothing is left once the projects are over.

After two decades of practical GM experiments and continuous improvements, Sweden has certainly developed a mature framework of implementation. In contrast, GM in Taiwan is unsupported by analytical theories and scientific studies or sufficient expert human resources. Moreover, the comprehensive implementation of GM tools throughout the entire administration without first targeting the core business of each department or prioritizing the issues has inevitably resulted in Taiwan's GM being of much lower quality. The Taiwanese experience reminds us that GM advocates need to be alert to the fuzzy and technocratic nature of GM and to confront it by considering what is feasible in a particular country’s circumstances and adopting more efficient
implementation strategies.

Finally, in both Sweden and Taiwan, it could be seen that since the implementation of GM, an awareness of gender equality has been instilled in many policy domains, generating new gender equality policies that fulfill the criteria of gender parity, gender equality, gender equity, empowerment, transformation of traditional gender norms and diverse equalities. We believe that the quality and quantity of “piecemeal” policy outcomes is the more important indicator for evaluating the effectiveness of GM, whereas arguments based on the integrationist versus agenda-setting binary can have little benefit for either the practical promotion or theoretical discussion of GM.

REFERENCES


Sterner, Gunilla and Helene Biller. 2007. Progress, Obstacles and Experiences at Governmental Level Gender Mainstreaming in the EU Member States. Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, Sweden.


