Senegal, Mauritania, Morocco. Citizenship’s ruptures and mutations.

Clandestine transit migration and Média.

Jolivel Audrey, Autonome University of Madrid and Political Sciences Institue (Sciences-Po) of Bordeaux.

The migratory phenomenon can be interpreted and defined as a social relationship system which includes moreover a part of ideas, thoughts and representations. This explains why analysing the media treatment of clandestine transit immigration\(^1\) in Senegal, Morocco and Mauritania is a difficult exercise. It means analyse citizenship through a whole of dynamics which links migratory space, media role, identity(ies), discourses and political practices. It is an attempt of highlighting breaks and mutations of citizenship in these three countries. To this purpose, I will take into account the double perspective of Emigration/ Immigration and the fact that in any comparison there are both disparities and similarities and some kind of unique model.

On the one hand, I think that using a comparative method can be useful to transcend the dialectic state versus transnational movements. Indeed, it permits to consider the State as well as a national actor than interacting in a geopolitical space and it permits to consider movements as transnational but within the framework of the state. On the other hand, I think that focusing on media roles (production, broadcasting, messages and interpretation) is very interesting to understand political discourses and practices on migration. Finally, it is necessary to specify that the sense of “transit” in transit migration is not the only way to interpret this notion. Indeed, migrants usually prefer the notion of “migratory map”\(^2\). This concept refers to spaces (cities, streets, markets, districts…) more than countries where migrants find opportunities, ideas, money, jobs, that is to say spaces where strategies can be develop in order to follow their migratory project.

First, it is important to underline elements of similarities and differences between the three cases. I mean indicators which could allow a comparison of transit migration in these three

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\(^1\) Clandestine immigration is illegal immigration, the stay without authorisation, the exercise of a professional activity without authorisation.

countries. To this purpose, I’ve chosen the time (history and connections to human movements, chronology of transit migrations), the space (insertion and position of the country in its mobility area), the statistic and demographic component and migrants’ profiles.

In the second part, I will analyse political discourses and practices conveyed by media in Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal. I have chosen to base my analysis on the supports below: national and local press, radio, television and internet (forums and blogs). My purpose is to study gaps between discourses and practices, their meanings and consequences for citizenship.

Finally, in the last part of the article, I will analyse breaks and changes observed in citizenship and revealed by media as well as media impacts on citizenship. I notify that the subject here isn’t migration or emigration but transit immigration in Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal, even if it is sometimes dangerous and complicate to separate them.

I. **Elements of comparison: the time, the space, statistic constructions, demographic and socio-economic transit migrants’ profiles.**

The over-mediatisation of clandestine sub-Saharan immigration compared to the other forms of migrations is a fact. Media have facility to separate and homogenize transit migrations from the complex migratory field. Causes of these practices are based on a real loss of intelligibility of the migratory phenomena but it also reveals specific relations that each country maintains with migration. Besides, over-mediatisation does not signify the same level of politisation or the same intensity in the debate in each country.

Morocco is a country of emigration (3 million of Moroccans are outside their country) and belongs to the Maghreb circulatory space (where the circulation is seven times less important than in the West Africa migratory space (1.3 million people are in movement)). Its bonds with sub-Saharan Africa go up far in the history but at the beginning of the 1990’s, flows of sub-Saharan migrants started to be consequent³.

³ «In one of his speeches, Hassan II told that « Morocco is a tree with its branches in Europe and its roots in Africa »(...) Conquests North-South (notably saadians) or South-North (Almoravides, originating from Mauritania), trade routes such as slave trade weaved closed links between Morocco and the sub-Saharan
Mauritania and especially Senegal are two countries in the heart of inter and intra-regional circulation (7.5 million people in movement). Mauritania is a country of emigration and immigration\(^4\) which has known three waves of immigration. A first one is called “traditional” and is characterized by cultural, religious and linguistics links. A second wave of immigration is the arrival of refugees (1990’s) and finally, more recently and strongly mediatised, transit migration (from 2003 but with more intensity from 2005). This last wave constitutes the majority of the under group of the irregular ones.

Senegal is an immigration country recently became country of emigration (1980’s). It experiences since 2003 transit migration in its territory. We could date those flows at 2003 if it is considered that the phenomenon goes hand in hand with the externalization of European migratory policies.

Finally, we have Morocco, country of emigration; Mauritania with a nomadic tradition, defined as a “circulatory territory” [A. Tarrius, 2002] and a hinge country (70% are Moors and approximately 15% are “négro-Mauritanian”). At last we have Senegal, country of immigration and recently of Emigration, which is in the heart of the intense circulatory West Africa system. Moreover Senegalese constitute a large group of the transit migration.

These three countries experience transit migration according to the logic of “glissement de la faille migratoire”\(^5\) towards the south that is to say according to the externalisation process of migratory policies of the European Union. Thus, the hardening and the toughening of media discourses has to be understood according to the beginning (age) of transit migration and to the beginning of the externalisation process. For instance, the media treatment of the question of transit migrations in Morocco (which knows transit migration for more than twenty years) is very similar to the media treatment existing in the European countries. Indeed media oscillate between an alarmist vision and a dramatic one. The alarmist vision is generally the fact of the media of the power and tends to legitimate extreme and repressive measures. It is a

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\(^1\)region. It has been at the origin of an interbreeding of the Moroccan population. The colonial period mainly reduced this mobility to the presence of the Senegalese Goums in Morocco. After Africans independencies, mobility remained limited to cooperation in different areas: students and trainees took advantage of training in various university and academic institutions ». KHACHANI Mohamed, La migration clandestine au Maroc, CARIM 2008, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced studies.

\(^4\) According to to the Ministère de l’intérieur of Mauritania, 15143 national and strangers left the territory in 2007 while 17564 national and strangers entered the territory (Data relatives to migratory flows collected in frontiers posts in 2007)

way to obtain public approval on Morocco’s alignment on European migratory policies. Besides, if flows of transit are slowing down since 2006, the migratory question in Morocco is still hardening (based on terrorism (since the attacks in 2003) and on its dramatic aspects).

The second indicator to be taken into account is the statistic indicator. Construction and figures processing by media reveal the perceptions and relationship a membership has with the other, whether these figures are built, imaginary or lived. If in the specific case of clandestine transit migrations, the figures appraisal has to be studied with precaution (according to methods, means and statistical tools used by each country), media still not give a real account of statistical “realities”. Consequences of a lack of reliable data are the facilities to structure a social “threat”.

From the three countries, Morocco is the one which uses more the approximation and amplification as a communication tool and very often to the benefit of governmental policies. As an example I will quote the daily newspaper *El bayane*, near to the *Parti du progrès et du socialisme* (PPS, ex-Communist party) which has published an article relating to the conference on migratory issues organized on December 18th in 2006 at the University Mohammed I of Oujda in collaboration with the Red Crescent. The article evokes a “plague” and a “massive flow of clandestine”.

Nevertheless, the foreign population of sub-Saharan origin is evaluated at less than 0.5 per thousand of the Moroccan population including 10,000 sub-Saharan clandestine migrants (for a population of 30 million inhabitants). Considering a migrant as a “threat” is not new but the social representations constructed and broadcasting by media are and they take a heavy responsibility for it. “A partir du moment où on lui reconnaît la capacité de s’organiser, de se regrouper pour transgresser les frontières, la victime se transforme en ennemi public. Le migrant entre dans la catégorie criminalisée” (Palidda, 1999). For instance, if we analyse the way the fight against traffics and smuggling is constructed by media, we understand that the information is based on an abusive use of figures.

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6 Article from the daily newspaper *Al Bayane* titled « Colloque international face à l’immigration des Subsahariens », January 10th, 2007.

In Mauritania, if we take into account the number of clandestine people taken back at the frontier in 2006, they are 11637 and 6624 in 2007, that is to say approximately 0.35% of the population. Initially Media were not really interested by the migratory question and were oscillating between tolerance and ignorance. Concerning the data processing, there are very few legal and statistics tools would make possible a real analysis of the situation. First of all there is a lack of means and a sclerosis of the legal system, secondly it exists bilateral agreements with the adjoining countries. That situation explains for example the absence of procedures of regulation. However, gradually a debate takes place supporting by figures. Recent political and popular discourses reveal that the presence of clandestine transit migrants is becoming source of tensions. The debate is gradually focusing on fight against traffics and smuggling and on the readmission of migrants.

The situation is different in Senegal. Indeed it belongs to the CEDEAO. Thus, clandestine transit migrations cannot be separate from regular and legal migration and from emigration. According to the general censuses, the foreign population is estimated at 2% of the resident population, according to the frontier statistics (terrestrial) at 15% and according to the penal statistics at 9% of the incarcerated population. The quasi totality of immigrants comes from Sub-Saharan countries (Mauritania, Mali, and Nigeria). The statistical processing of immigration in the media is non-existent because it is part of the debate on emigration. Issues and questionings concerning transit immigrants in Senegal are included in the same discourses and the same representations than for Senegalese clandestine emigration. The debate on immigration is absorbed by the one on emigration.

I will end the first part comparing and analysing the way media product and broadcast information on demographic and socio-economic migrants’ profiles. This comparison is essential because it points out the diversity of the transit migrations in each country. There is not only one transit migration. The geographical, economical, political, cultural and social context of a country does not attract the same migrations. Moreover the confusion between the various types of sub-Saharan migrants involves the amalgam between the various rights they have or can claim. The silence about migrants’ profiles is equivalent of a denial of rights and justice.

8 Ministère de l’Intérieur, Mauritania.

9http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/IDM/workshops/Data_Collection_08090903/pre_robin_FR.pdf
Supporting me on a study of Moroccan newspaper *La gazette du Sahara* and *Le matin du Sahara* (pro-governmental)\(^{10}\), we can observe that information on the profile of the sub-Saharan migrants is collected primarily and generally through a rapid presentation before testimonies (which relate the way they are treated and the question of their repatriation). The Moroccan press is not interested in migrants’ sociological characteristics. Articles retranscribe more political issues than migrants’ profile. Rare testimonies are mainly used to evoke the treatment received by authorities and the conditions of their survival in Morocco. The treatment of the question is factual, serving a “miserabilist” vision of the migrant and focused on political and diplomatic aspects, serving this time a “securitary” vision of migration.

The case of Mauritania is particular. The socio-economic and demographic migrants’ profiles treatment is deeply linked to the question of Mauritania’s identity and is part of the national debate on “arabity” and “africanity”. Thus, migrants’ profiles are popularized according to the dyads Arab / Africa; “white”/“black”. We could say that this question is politically anchored to North Africa (Maghreb) but demographically and culturally anchored to the Sahel. Moreover Mauritania is getting close to the euro-Mediterranean process through a security prism but risks to accentuate and awake fractures within its membership.

\(^{10}\) Notably:

L. BOUZBOUZ, « *Le Maroc, passage obligé vers l’Europe* », La Gazette du Maroc, 03/02/03, http://www.lagazettedumaroc.com/art...  

« *En attendant le passage vers l’Europe : Des clandestins subsahariens survivent* », Le Matin du Sahara, 30/09/05, http://www.lematin.ma/mailing/artic...  

« *129 immigrés clandestins camerounais rapatriés à partir de Guelmim* », Aujourd’hui Le Maroc, 17/10/05, http://www.aujourdhui.ma/nation-dep...  

K RIDOUANE, « *Le rêve perdu de la terre promise* », Le Matin du Sahara, 09/10/05, http://www.lematin.ma/mailing/artic...  


« *90% des immigrés clandestins viennent d’Algérie* », Le Matin du Sahara, 13/10/05, http://www.lematin.ma/mailing/artic...
Finally, migrant’s profile transcribed by Senegalese media is that of a young person or rather of a youth without alternative. The subject is the youth, the young people. It highlights an important movement of the young people.

In the three cases, the analysis of media reveals silences. Silences about women and children in transit, silences about a real analysis of countries of origin and silences about a serious and thorough analysis of migrants’ profiles (only established with testimonies). However, if they were carried out, it would reveal that the structure and issues of the clandestine transit migrations differ from one country to another.

**Sub-Saharan migrants’ Profiles in Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal.**
(Morocco: 76% of the sub-Saharan interviewed are irregular, 21’5% seeks asylum and 2% obtained the refugee status).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transit Countries</th>
<th>Morocco (2007)</th>
<th>Mauritania</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationality of origin</td>
<td>Nigeria (16%), Mali et Senegal (13%), Ivory Cost (9%)</td>
<td>Senegalese (52,4%) Maliens (20,4%) Gambians (4,4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure by sex</td>
<td>20,3% women/ 79,7% men</td>
<td>88% men 12% women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Study based on data of a survey carried out in 2007 in Morocco in the 5 cities of Rabat, Casablanca, Oujda, Tanger, Lâyoune next to 1000 individuals.

12 **La migration irrégulière en Mauritanie**, Sidna Ndah Mohamed-Saleh, CARIM 2008/52, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.

13 Data in irregular immigration in Senegal are scarce and old. Objectives of the Observatoire des Migrations Ouest Africaines are elaborate data on a statistic basis.

14 **Clandestine migration calculated by the reconductions at the frontiers, January-April 2007**, Ministère de l’Intérieur, Mauritanie.

15 « This numerical imbalance in favour of men can be explained on the one hand by the inequality of women and men in front of the irregular migration and on the other hand, by the difficulties we have to approach the sub-Saharan migrant women during the investigation. Indeed, although more and more women try the adventure, under the same difficult conditions than men, it seems that women, are often under the supervision of men and consequently difficult to reach by the investigators. It is true that the structure by sex of the surveyed sub-Saharan migrants show a clear prevalence of men, but the proportion of women shows a remarkable change of structure compared to the last decades. Taking into account the nationality of origin, Women from Nigeria constitute the numerous feminine membership with 39,9%, followed by Women from Congo (14,3%), from Mali (8,9%), from Cameroun...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure by age</th>
<th>Between 15-47 years old but 95.4% less than 36 years old</th>
<th>Between 15-59 years old</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>82.2% celibacy</td>
<td>50% celibacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.8% married</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School level</td>
<td>48.5% Superior to primary level</td>
<td>57% Superior to primary level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.4% secondary</td>
<td>27% secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.1% superior level</td>
<td>3% superior level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.7% without school level</td>
<td>43% without school level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional training</td>
<td>20.3% has a professional training</td>
<td>61% had a job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16% without a job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrance gate</td>
<td>86.6% by land</td>
<td>89% by land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.2% by air</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>73.5% by Algeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.7% by Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of the “transit”</td>
<td>2.5 years old</td>
<td>66% between one and 6 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19% one month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15% superior to 6 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of departure</td>
<td>Most of them between 2003, 2004, 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of crossed countries</td>
<td>14.3% directly</td>
<td>63% directly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.3% one country</td>
<td>37% crossed another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28.3% two countries</td>
<td>country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of emigration attempt</td>
<td>Rate of further offence(^{17}) : 9.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of the trip</td>
<td>52% between 1000 and 2000 Euros</td>
<td>Between 500 and 1000 Euros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses paid to the smugglers</td>
<td>13% didn’t have to deal with a smuggler</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.5% (the higher rate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>between 201 and 500 Euros</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing</td>
<td>47%. Had the financing before the trip</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53%. Had to look for financing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>59.4% no income</td>
<td>88% regular job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.8% Begging</td>
<td>(56% service, 36% agriculture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.5% occasional jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3% regular job</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.9% Charitable organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>72.6% To carry out their</td>
<td>41% want to stay less than</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{17}\) The rate of further offence refers to the proportion of Migrants who attempted more than one time to clandestinely emigrate before this one and failed in Morocco or anywhere else.
We realize then that Morocco does not have a great proportion of clandestine migrants in its population but the period of “transit” is long and the migration is constituted by migrants from francophone countries (about 1/3). Besides, the migratory main route is the one from Algeria and not the one by the Western side and it is a transnational migration rather than a trans-border one. A priori, Morocco dos not attract migrant to live, phenomenon which can be explained partly by the great difficulty that have the sub-Saharan migrants to durably integrate the labour market. Indeed the labour legislation and the provisions of the national law 02-03 relating « à l’entrée et au séjour des étrangers au Royaume du Maroc ” prohibit to the people entered or established irregularly in Morocco to reach the labour market. It is then difficult to argue than sub-Saharan clandestine migrants are “competing” with the Moroccan population for jobs.

In Mauritania, it is a true trans-border transit migration. Moreover, Migrants can easily reach the informal labour market. The transit migration concerns above all the adjoining countries (Mali, Senegal) and partly merges with the regular migration whose conditions have been established within the framework of bilateral agreements. Besides migrants can easily be assimilate with the resident populations. Migrants can be assimilate either with “négro-mauritanians” or with south Mauritania’s population also present in Mali and Senegal and with regular immigration such as the Senegalese membership.

Two surveys carried out in 2008 and 2009 put in prospect dangers and consequences of a non treatment of profiles. A first survey is entitled “Perceptions, attitudes and behaviours of Moroccans regard to sub-Saharan migrants” (2009) and another “How the sub-Saharan migrants live in Morocco.” Here are some extracts of the first survey: “Generally speaking, Moroccans and Moroccan women think that sub-Saharan people are numerous in their

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18 Results are not published yet. Nevertheless, there is an interview of one of the investigators. [http://www.lematin.ma/Actualite/Journal/Article.asp?idr=110&id=110379](http://www.lematin.ma/Actualite/Journal/Article.asp?idr=110&id=110379)

19 Survey made by the Association Marocaine d'Etudes et de Recherches sur les Migrations (AMERM) on sub-Saharan migratory flows in 2007 next to 1000 individuals.
districts (44.9%), even too many (25.8%). Only 1/3 affirms that they are not numerous. But this judgment must be balanced by the fact that 3/4 consider their presence normal or acceptable. ” “Women and men massively consider the presence normal (respectively 52.1% and 55.9%). The rates of answers concerning the unbearable character of this presence are relatively weak. ” “active people and unemployed consider the presence of Sub-Saharan normal (54.0% and 52.2%), but the unemployed are more numerous to consider it unbearable (6.3% and 10.9%). As announced before, uncertainties related to the labour market could perhaps explain specific opinions to a socioprofessional category. ” “There are no fundamental reasons that could oppose sub-saharan and Moroccan to live together. Generally speaking, whatever the age, the school level, the marital status or the activity, most of people declare that they would agree to have sub-saharan as neighbours.”

The second survey shows that sub-Saharan feel rejected by the Moroccan membership (27.3% think that Moroccans perceive them negatively and inferior, 22% feel contempt, and 28.9% think that Moroccans perceive them as a threat for their safety). Sub-Saharan migrant don’t have the sensation to belong to a “community of destiny”. However 43.1% of them think that Moroccans are welcoming.

II. Analysis of political discourses and practices in Media.

In the second part of the article, I will analyze political discourses and practices on clandestine transit migration conveyed by media. Indeed, the migratory question is not mediatised neither politicized the same way in these three countries.

In Mauritania, immigration issues had been ignored during a long time because its effects were not considered acute. Besides, what is called “traditional migration” is facilitated by bilateral agreements with African neighbours in spite of Mauritania’s withdrawal of the CEDEAO in 1999. The legal arsenal includes the decree 64 - 169 of December 15th (1964) (simple transposition of the French colonial decrees. Penal sanctions are weak and not really applied) and since 2008, a preliminary law draft relating to the entry and the stay of immigrants, with a right of asylum (much more repressive). However, the legal arsenal remains flexible. There are no particular procedures of regularization and the labour
legislation only exists for national workers. In fact, the nomadic tradition of Mauritania20, its insertion in the western African migratory circulation, the relatively flexible application of its sovereignty, the weakness of its administrations and of the control of its territory as well as corruption freezed the legal framing. In spite of repression, expulsion, prohibition of stay, repatriation and renewal at borders, legal aspects of immigration issues do not create a true debate.

The question of the informal labour market does not create media debate either. It is treated with tolerance. On the one hand, Mauritania’s economy depends on foreign labour and on the informal market and on the other hand as long as clandestine work is not perceived by the public opinion as a threat and as illegal, it is difficult to deal with it.

On the opposite, the question of the fight against traffics and smuggling and the question of migrant’s readmission are in the heart of media interests. Mauritania ratified the Convention of the United Nations on Organized Transnational Criminality (2000) and in July 2003, a national law against human trafficking is signed. However, there are still no provisions for victims and witnesses protection nor national structure or national plan of action.

In 2000 was signed the agreement of Cotonou. The article 13 stipulates that countries “accept the return and the readmission of its own nationals, illegally present on a territory”. In Seville, in June 2002, the European international cooperation and association is conditioned to a joint management of migrant’s flows and to migrant’s readmission. In 2006, the agency FRONTEX is operating. In fact, those two major concerns (traffics and migrant’s readmission) largely broadcasted are the two governmental major concerns and interests. It creates the image of a hinge country, a “bridge” between Maghreb and Sahel while media’s interests for relationships between Mauritania and Europe (externalisation21 and territorialisation of European policies22) strengthen the idea of the new position of the country in the euro-Mediterranean space.

At last, I will analyze gaps between political discourses and practices. I will take as an example the toughening of authorities’ discourses on clandestine transit migrations. While authorities denounce the situation, they are sometimes reconciling towards immigrants’ associations and speak to them because they give visibility to the phenomenon. Causes are the possibility of harder measures against Mauritanians expatriates and their own legislation (leaving the country irregularly does not constitute an infringement to the law).

20 Fixation of populations in the 1960’s.
21 Member of the group 5+5 (Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Italy, France, Portugal, Spain, Malta)
22 Creation of a centre for retention in Nouadhibou with the partnership of Spain.
As I previously underlined, media treatment of clandestine transit immigration in Senegal is non-existent because it is absorbed and integrated into the debate on emigration. The mediatisation of those dynamics reveals two main topics: the reconstruction of the political economy around clandestine migration (externalisation card, migratory income) and the personalization of the power. Media reveal the implementation of a large panel of measures (numerous projects, fight against traffics and ratification of international conventions…) and also reveal the dramatic human dimension (deaths…). There is a true engagement of media and State on the migratory question supported by rich, varied and contrasted information. Unlike Mauritania which only has migratory strategies, Senegal tries to set up a migratory policy of flows management. Besides, the migratory question gives a new role and a new stature to the President. We observe a recentralisation of the debate around his person. The President A. Wade is over-mediatised. He does not condemn clandestine migration and does not force young people to stay but intends to persuade them to remain in order to contribute to the future of Senegal. The speech is tinged with “responsibility” which speaks to young people and families. Media cannot firmly condemn clandestine transit immigration because it would mean condemn emigration and therefore an important fringe of the population. Moreover, migration is transforming social links, values, norms, recomposes families…Authorities and Media knows that emigration is a valve of safety for the State and gives diplomatic visibility to Senegal while reaffirming its reputation of a peaceful and democratic country. Besides it is a strong component of Senegal identity.

In Morocco, the question of clandestine transit migration is over-mediatised and has been primarily focused on two determining events. The first event is the attack of the barriers of Ceuta and Melilla in autumn 2005 and the second is the raids of Christmas 2006. The event of Ceuta y Melilla has marked a first rupture in the way media were dealing with immigration issues. Indeed, before 2005, the echo of immigration issues was quiet discrete even if it was possible to observe premises of evolution due to the terrorist attack of 2003. After 2005, the question of immigration in national Moroccan media began to monopolize media interests (partly because international media pressure). It is important to add that Moroccan media and associations enjoy a certain freedom. On the one hand, it participates to highlight transit
migration and on the other way, it has given birth to a true media sparring match\textsuperscript{23} opposing the press of the power (official discourses) and the press of the opposition (relaying associations reports and denunciations). Indeed, Moroccan associations are a strong counter-power. For instance, they made the Moroccan population aware of the situation in certain cities districts, publish their press release, denounce and can organize themselves.

Moreover, I will quote a significant example of the role the press of opposition can play: here is an extract of an article of the Moroccan newspaper \textit{Libération} entitled “\textit{Morocco: Oujda, asylum seekers take the way back to Rabat}”. The journalist criticizes police practices and notably observes: “\textit{Libé and other press agencies had warned against arbitrary expulsions of asylum seekers and refugees, even by revealing personal cases of people having documents enabling them to reside legally in Morocco}”.\textsuperscript{24} Concerning the press of the power, it relays authorities’ official discourses, in other words, the press deals with both security approaches and human right aspects of the question. I will notify that the way in which violence and security has become an everyday fact in media is a powerful tool for migratory policies.

When we observe practices and discourses conveyed by media on the raid issue (associative, journalistic, political or academic), it is obvious that the debate is focused on asylum seekers and refugees of the HCR. Therefore, the majority of migrants (those who do not seek asylum or were nonsuited) are deprived of arguments, values and rights. The debate on raids is essentially focused on legal aspects (which differ from Mauritania and Senegal). It deals with the non respect of the Geneva Convention of 1951 (ratified in 1956) and the status refugees (Art.33), the non respect of the Convention on the protection of migrant worker and their family and at last the non respect of the national law 02-03 relating to the entry and the stay of migrants in the Kingdom of Morocco. This national law prohibits the expulsion of pregnant women, children, refugees and asylum seekers (Article 26 and 29) and punishes everyone helps an illegal migrant. It explains why many lawyers hesitate to help them. Besides, authorities often argue that the non respect of such conventions and laws is due to the fact that migrants can have false documentation.


\textsuperscript{24} January 17th, 2007, Nouri Zyad
III. Media/ Citizenship/ Transit Migrations

In the last part of the article, I will analyze relationships between media/ Transit immigration and citizenship.

In Mauritania, media oscillate between a great tolerance (clandestine work) and an unquestionable hostility (criminalisation of the migrant) but in any case deal with integration or formal and effective human rights issues. Media were silent about arbitrary arrests denounced by International Amnesty\(^{25}\) (at the end of June 2008, facilities have been created for asylum seekers but they are not applied and there is no appeal). Collective expulsions towards Senegal and Mali are done without official procedures or appeal. However, recently, media have chosen to heighten public awareness of the problem (accidents, risks). Generally speaking, we cannot say that Mauritanian media evolved toward a security approach of migration issues but we can observe shifts of attitudes. One emanates from the “top” and is relayed by the national press. One emanates from the “bottom” and is mainly conveyed by the local press. In fact, migrants are gradually perceived as a source of insecurity because the migrant is seen as a desperate person ready to do everything to illegally leave the country. This situation fuels rumours and prejudices.

Besides, the local press tends to criminalize immigration by associating it with the development of delinquency and criminality in urban environment. Now, local press does not only produce discourses, it also relays new perceptions and concerns identifiable and observable on a local scale (clogging of public utilities, anarchistic installation of population...). The local scale is the place for sharper cleavages which go beyond the simple cleavage of native/non-native. Cleavages are done according to the insertion in the city, the status of migrant or refugee, the population in transit or installed, the religion...In fact territorial collectivities assume the main part of the population and therefore are the last rampart against social explosion risks. As for the national press, it produces “threats” much more than relay them partly because it reveals or amplifies general and global phenomena difficult to understand and perceive. For instance, the way media deal with the problem of the existence of a true « industry » of documentary fraud is significant. Medias give many examples, much information which tends to assimilate each migrant to a false “citizen”. It urges to reconsider the concept of citizenship and fellow-citizenship because it sows the doubt.

and suspicion not only on the whole of the “négro-Mauritanians” citizens but also on the foreign resident and regular populations. Citizens’ mobilizations make rampart and filter those new representations. These are religious spaces, associative structures, chairmen (communities intermediate), intra- and inter- communities solidarity as well as charitable organizations. Those last ones often have a moralizer and legalist speech accompanied by a practice of mutual aid.

In Mauritania, the question of migrants’ insertion reflects the unsolved problem of the “national question”. The figure of the migrant incarnates intercommunity struggles which dominate the political and social scene as well as conflicts and needs of visibility of certain social groups. Besides it can led to violent confrontations. It is necessary to remind here that the birth of Mauritania has been established on a homogeneous project, “inviting” all forms of expression to dissolve in the Arab world, forcing identities and cultural expressions to reconversions. The figure of the transit migrant and the imaginaries and stigmatizations allotted weigh on the fragile balance of Mauritanians communities and could reactivate tensions. Moreover, with the economic and social crisis, population tends to be more receptive to extreme discourses.

In Senegal, the figure of the migrant, the adventurer is certainly exalted, carried out by all the internal changes operating into the Senegalese membership and especially the role media play by contributing to the emergence of a citizen consciousness. Indeed, the media liberalization has contributed to the elections alternative in 2000. It has played a main role in the emergence of a citizen consciousness and in the control of the regularity of the poll. It is especially true for private media (composed by young journalists in rupture with their membership). In fact, media have a special position in Senegalese society ultimately because they are part of the democratization process. They broadcast and relay plural and contradictory information and above all carry the messages of the “new figures of succeeds”. Those incarnate trajectories of rupture, individualization and emancipation. They call in question the “Senegalese contract” based on a series of intermediaries (marabouts’ orders of vote, marginalisation of the young people and the women…). Besides, media have broadened the individualization to the right to speak. Citizenship is in “construction”.

Nevertheless media just have propelled on the front of the scene processes already existing, accelerated and amplified by the social and economic crisis: loss of traditional references

(crumbling of family groups, urbanization, monetary sphere which governs a large part of relationship, family, friendship, god, divinity and ancestral spirits). Consequences are a maturation of certain segments of the population (especially the young people and women) which start individual and collective initiatives. The media coverage of the migratory phenomenon reflects structural changes and new citizenships (emancipation wishes, mistrust regards to intermediaries). What is changing is the citizenship defined by Mbembe\textsuperscript{27} (1994) « au point de vue de l’Etat africain post-colonial, ce qui tenait lieu de citoyenneté ne conférait pas de droits politiques en tant que tels, qu’il s’agisse de droit à la représentation individuelle, de droits sociaux ou de droit au travail. Entre l’Etat et l’individu veniaient s’intercaler la famille, le lignage, la parentèle voire la confrérie religieuse. Il ne revenait pas à l’Etat de lui assurer les protections élémentaires ». The « post-colonial » citizenship is crumbling away and recomposing itself on a more individual diagram.

Morocco does not have policies to integrate immigrants. Besides, there is a split into the migrants’ profile which goes hand in hand with media and authorities awareness of continuity of migration and migrants’ installation. There is the figure of the heroic migrant “Harraga” and the figure of the “paterist\textsuperscript{28}” (associated with sub-Saharan migrants and Moroccan who borrow the same ways of “travelling”). This split is conveyed by media. It creates a hierarchy inside transit migration while reflecting changes within the Moroccan membership (new status and values). The migrant has become a social figure. At the bottom is the figure of the “paterist”, partly product by media (representations and imaginaries). It mixes pity and fear and therefore acceptance of the criminalisation of migrants. In a certain way, it signifies the state failure which name rights and non-rights (one of the most powerful factor of social exclusion nowadays) and conditions of dignity. This “paterist” vision highlights the degradation of citizenship. On the contrary, the heroic vision of clandestine migration is a way to broaden citizenship adding in its components “recognition”. If the recognition is not formally obtained with rights then it will be socially obtained. However, the split means a rupture in the social order and in the system of values and creates a new level in the logic of discrimination and precariousness. It is the figure of the social contempt. We could compare to European societies but the difference here is that it concerns as well immigrants as their citizens.

\textsuperscript{27} « Déflation de l’Etat, civilité et citoyenneté en Afrique Noire », Achille Mbembe, 1994, éd. Khartala
\textsuperscript{28} Des « pateras » au transnationalisme, Michel PERALDI et Ahlame RAHMI, Hommes et Migrations, N°1266, Mars-Avril 2007.