Transnational Networks and Limits of Effectiveness: EU Enlargement and Social Policy in Poland and Hungary

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Abstract:

Recent debates on transnationalism credit networks of nonstate, state, and intergovernmental actors with the ability to increase the political leverage of nonstate actors at home. The assumption is that the greater the number of ties among intergovernmental, state, and nonstate organizations, the greater is the likelihood that domestic nonstate actors are able to influence policy in their country. However, the focus on positive cases may have led analysts to overly optimistic assessments of the effects of transnational networks. Reference to “networks” in metaphorical rather than empirically measurable terms may also have obscured the presumed causal relationship between transnational ties and domestic leverage.

My analysis of the network around European Union social policy and enlargement shows that even in a most likely case, trade unions and employers’ associations have not obtained greater domestic influence through their dense set of transnational connections. The paper presents network data on 32 actors that are theoretically relevant to the transfer of EU social policy to Poland and Hungary and shows that domestic nonstate actors are on the whole well-connected to EU institutions, European confederations, and state actors. But qualitative data show that these extensive transnational ties have not led to an increase in the political leverage of Polish or Hungarian trade unions or employers’ organizations via regular consultation with the government. The paper has two aims: (1) On the level of theory, the paper presents an exploratory method for specifying mechanisms of diffusion. (2) on the empirical level, the paper

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develops actual measurements of a transnational network instead of assuming their existence or absence in metaphorical terms.
Introduction

This paper examines the structures of communication surrounding the transnational diffusion of European Union (EU) social policy. It forms part of a dissertation on the processes and preliminary outcomes of diffusing laws and policies made by an intergovernmental organizations in two transformation countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland and Hungary. The broader research project pursues three questions: First, how effective is the ability of intergovernmental organizations to enforce norms on nation-states, notably in situations of power asymmetry between the intergovernmental organization and the states that are the targets of such enforcement efforts? Second, in a setting characterized by multiple levels of governance and decision-making, what is the relative importance of intergovernmental relations versus transnational policy networks that include nonstate actors in the diffusion process? Third, to what extent are domestic nonstate actors able to influence outcomes of cross-national institutional diffusion?

Here, I focus primarily on the second of these questions by analyzing the positions of EU, state, and nonstate actors in a network of regular interaction among thirty-two organizations involved in EU enlargement or social policy in Poland, Hungary and at the European level. Analyzing structures of interorganizational communication serves to draw inferences about diffusion mechanisms likely to be at work. I briefly contrast the network evidence of horizontal interactions with qualitative findings of nonstate actors’ political marginality in the accession process, casting a skeptical light on the ability of transnational networks to affect the position of nonstate actors in the domestic political process. This is primarily a descriptive exercise, matching network characteristics with propositions derived from the two competing models. In light of abundant metaphorical references to networks in studies of transnational activism or of EU policy-making and enforcement, there is a need for developing tools that allow us to empirically assess transnational network structures rather than simply assert their existence.²

By diffusion, I mean the flow of a practice from a source to a target through communication and possibly influence.\(^3\) Practices that can constitute the content of diffusion include knowledge, behavior, strategies, beliefs, technologies, and structures.\(^4\) Mechanisms of diffusion range from unintended spillovers, imitation, social learning, and deliberate propagation all the way to coercion.\(^5\) Note that this definition distinguishes processes and outcomes of the flow: Diffusion may but need not result in social change. Furthermore, the practices undergoing diffusion are likely to change in the process: Actors at both the source and the target of diffusion may modify practices through theoretical and practical appropriation.\(^6\)

Institutions, the content of diffusion in this study, consist of formal rules and standard operating procedures\(^7\) but also unwritten practices that complement formal rules.\(^8\) The focus here is primarily on regulative institutions in the political and economic sphere that derive their legitimacy from legal sanctions and rely at least partially on coercive mechanisms. Actors comply with regulative institutions according to a “logic of consequentiality” based on preferences and expectations about outcomes.\(^9\) Underneath regulative institutions, however, are constitutive and normative rules.\(^10\) Constitutive rules operate at the cognitive level; they structure experience and organize the understanding of reality. Through frameworks of perception, they give rise to social actors.\(^11\) Normative institutions are rules that identify goals and assign means for their attainment but generally rely on considerations of appropriateness.

\(^3\) This definition draws heavily on D. Strang and S. Soule, “Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements: From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998): 265-290 (“a flow or movement from a source to an adopter, paradigmatically via communication and influence”, p. 266), but seeks to remain neutral on the question of outcomes, while Strang and Soule’s use of the term “adopter” suggests a bias towards positive outcomes.

\(^4\) Strang and Soule, “Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements,” p. 266.

\(^5\) Strang and Soule, “Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements,” p. 266.


rather than consequentiality. That is, they induce actors to behave according to “the obligations of a role in a situation.”

Networks, the concept I employ to get at processes of diffusion, are often seen as the vehicles of diffusion or as the structure that underlies communication flows. Rather than inherent actor attributes, the network concept emphasizes the links among actors, i.e. the patterns of interaction and exchange that present actors with constraints and opportunities. The notion of ‘policy networks’ is based on the idea that where policy making and implementation are widely dispersed, state and nonstate actors cannot be clearly separated and organized interests tend to permeate state institutions. Policy networks are fluid and encompass a wide array of organizational actors, both state and nonstate. In principle, they are seen as horizontal and relatively open, combining formal and informal arrangements of consultation and exchange and conflict as well as cooperation. Transnational policy networks include intergovernmental organizations, state agencies, and national as well as international nonstate organizations representing societal and industry interests. They are likely to arise in settings of multilevel governance that are characterized by high issue complexity and dispersed decision-making. The EU is precisely such a setting in which a variety of nonstate as well as state actors contribute expertise, information, and political support to policy formation and implementation, in exchange for access to decision-making through various formal and informal channels.

My investigation is motivated by several debates in sociology and political science: First, sociological institutionalism asserts increasing institutional convergence among states and other organizations with respect to their purposes, forms, and activities. But its research program of large-n diffusion studies across multiple decades neglects the micro-processes involved in diffusion, i.e. actors’ choices to promote, adopt, alter, and/or reject the institutions subject to

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12 March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: 160.
diffusion. Questions of agency have been emphasized by political scientists’ accounts of diffusion, as evident in their general preference for the phrase “institutional transfer” – with the result that their research agenda has neglected structures and processes of diffusion in favor of outcomes. Another relevant theme is the respective role of intergovernmental, state, and nonstate actors in producing policy outcomes. I assess arguments about the rise of nonstate actors in transnational politics by studying the diffusion of EU social policy as a sector that grants an unusually strong position to nonstate actors. Although most theoretical work on EU integration focuses on policy-making rather than implementation or diffusion, a finding that nonstate actors contribute to outcomes of spreading EU policy in candidate countries would contradict standard assumptions about the intergovernmental nature of EU enlargement.

The paper proceeds as follows: A brief section summarizes conditions of EU enlargement and the content of EU social policy to provide the necessary background. Next, I develop two competing models of institutional diffusion and derive three hypotheses for each. The bulk of this paper consists of an empirical assessment of the hypothesis relating to structures and processes of institutional diffusion, followed by a brief assessment of the political role of labor and employer organizations in Poland and Hungary’s accession preparations. I will conclude with conjectures about the mechanisms likely to be at work in the empirical network.

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21 I am referring to debates between intergovernmentalism, multi-level governance, and supranationalism. For an overview, see B. Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).
Background: EU Enlargement and Social Policy

Ten Central and Eastern European countries are currently candidates for entry into the European Union. As former state socialist countries, all of them have been undergoing extensive economic and political transformation over the past decade. Their preparations for EU accession therefore coincide with a period of internal fluidity that is likely, all else being equal, to make them unusually receptive to outside influence attempts. Vast differences in socioeconomic development among the candidate countries, as well as a significant gap even between the poorest EU member states and the wealthiest candidate countries, suggest the enormous challenges involved in eastward enlargement. The EU has set up an extensive apparatus for dealing with the accession of multiple countries in a standardized and synchronized fashion. While the negotiations are conducted with each country individually, the criteria and procedures, as well as financial instruments, are the same for all current accession candidates in Central and Eastern Europe. The process is guided by three (rather vague) conditions formulated by the EU in 1993: (1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights, and respect for an protection of minorities; (2) existence of a functioning market economy and capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union; and (3) ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.\(^{22}\) The last criterion calls for the adoption of the approximately 70,000 pages of EU legislation currently in force.\(^{23}\) Between 1998 and 2000, the European Commission and the candidate countries engaged in a process of detailed screening of national law and its compatibility with EU law, thereby pointing out needs for harmonization and adjustment by the candidate countries. Legal harmonization is still in progress and presents an enormous burden on national legislatures, with the consequence that the quality of law is likely to suffer. An irony resulting from the conditionality of accession is that the EU can impose more stringent obligations on candidate countries than on current member states. Whereas enforcement mechanisms vis-à-vis member states are differentiated and specific, accession candidates face one categorical threat: indefinite delay of entry. Even worse, lagging accession preparations in one country may affect the speed of accession of other countries as well.

\(^{22}\) Copenhagen European Council, *Conclusions of the Presidency*, June 1993.

For studying institutional diffusion, EU social policy is particularly interesting because it is the only EU policy area that grants nonstate actors a specific role in law-making and implementation. The legal basis of EU social policy consists of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. Treaty-based social and employment provisions relate to the free movement of workers, employment policy, social policy, the promotion of economic and social cohesion, and the protection of health. There are three main components of EU social policy: “hard” law, policies requiring member state coordination, and European social dialogue. First, treaty law serves as the basis for secondary EU legislation, in particular directives that require transposition into national law and implementation by member states. There are currently sixty-three directives in social and employment affairs. Second, Community employment guidelines require the coordination of member state policies around annual guidelines set jointly by the member states. Finally, European social dialogue is a procedure for peak-level consultations between European-level employers’ and labor organizations with the option of concluding agreements that will lead to Community legislation. This legislation may then be implemented by labor and employers’ organizations at member state level or through transposition into member state law. The social dialogue is a Community-level procedure but does implicitly require functioning structures of economic interest.

31. Figure according to European Commission Secretariat General, “Situation of the Notification of National Measures Implementing the Directives,” 4 October 2001 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgb/droit_com/index_en.htm#transpositions). These directives cover labor law, equality of men and women in the workplace, occupational health and safety, public health, and free movement of workers.
33. The Social Dialogue was established through the Agreement on Social Policy of 1992 and incorporated in the Treaty on European Union via the Amsterdam Treaty (Art. 139 TEU).
representation at the national level. But there is no single model of industrial relations and consultation between the state and economic interest groups in the member states of the EU. Member states thus retain nationally specific structures of interest representation and industrial relations. The absence of explicit member state responsibilities in this area creates a conundrum for the European Commission. On the one hand, the social dialogue is clearly part of EU social law; on the other, the Commission cannot rely on legal texts specifying member state responsibilities and is thus limited to expressions of approval or disapproval vis-à-vis national practices.

**Two Competing Models of Diffusion**

The three questions that frame the larger investigation on which this paper is based allow us to develop two competing models of EU social policy diffusion in Poland and Hungary. To recap, the first question addresses the effectiveness of rule enforcement by the EU in candidate countries and thus the depth of diffusion outcomes. The second question revolves around two different structures of communication flows and thus deals with processes of diffusing EU social policy in candidate countries. The third question tackles the extent to which relevant nonstate actors (trade unions and employers’ organizations) influence the outcomes of EU social policy diffusion in Poland and Hungary. Based on four criteria (the content of diffusion, the structure of communication flows, the mechanisms of diffusion, and preliminary outcomes), I distinguish vertical from horizontal diffusion and show how these two models provide divergent answers to the three questions posed here. Note that the two modes of diffusion serve as ideal types. In reality, we should expect to find a mix of both.

In a *vertical mode of diffusion*, the content of diffusion is limited mostly to written law and formal procedures, i.e. Community regulations, directives and case law as well as formal procedures for the coordination of employment policy (cf. Appendix 5, Figure 1). Some functional but unwritten requirements emerging from the European-level social dialogue may also be subject to diffusion flows. Communication goes primarily through channels of intergovernmental relations, i.e. interactions between the European Commission and the governments of candidate countries, with some potential input from member states. Coercion *qua* EU rule enforcement is the main mechanism driving the spread of Community social law in the candidate countries. Additionally, the European Commission and member states may
transmit normative expectations concerning the regular consultation of socioeconomic interest organizations at the national level.

I expect the outcome of vertical diffusion to be superficial compliance without in-depth implementation, for which the participation of stakeholders, i.e. organized interests, would be necessary. Candidate countries will fulfill the three main components of social policy very unevenly: EU directives will be transposed under close EU monitoring, but will most likely experience a lag before the formulation of implementing measures. With a focus on formal legal harmonization, I would expect little resistance from stakeholders. Similarly, the candidate country government is likely to follow formal procedures for coordinating employment policies along EU guidelines. But the government is unlikely to solicit substantive input from organized interests, thus making the compliance with EU employment policy superficial and ineffective. Finally, I would expect not to see a deepening of the social dialogue in the candidate country: In this area, the European Commission’s enforcement ability relies on normative pressure rather than explicit law, and candidate country governments are likely to resent specific EU directions about the conduct of consultation with domestic interest organizations as undue interference with their sovereignty.

The vertical mode of diffusion yields the following hypotheses in response to our three questions: (1) The EU’s ability of rule enforcement in candidate countries will be limited to legal harmonization and unlikely to produce implementing measures. (2) The prevailing structure of communication flows will be intergovernmental relations between the EU and candidate country governments, with little or no interaction between state and nonstate actors. (3) Domestic nonstate actors do not participate in the absorption of social policy diffusion, neither through cooperation nor contestation.

By contrast, in a horizontal mode of diffusion, the content of diffusion will reach considerably beyond the written law and procedures of EU social policy (cf. Appendix 5, Figure 2). Thus, it will include explicit expectations about government consultation with nonstate actors representing socioeconomic interests, but also more fundamental understandings concerning the nature of different types of social actors thought to be legitimate participants in social policy. This last element is perhaps the most interesting but least tangible aspect of EU social policy, consisting of generally unstated assumptions about the identity of societal actors whose input in
social policy is seen as necessary and valid – actors to whom EU discourse often refers as “social partners.”

Various EU, state, and nonstate actors will participate in the communication network around EU social policy and enlargement, thereby forming a transnational policy network. Thus, interactions between the European Commission and candidate country governments will be supplemented by interactions among organized interests at the national and European level, notably employers’ organizations and trade unions (as the stakeholders whom the EU has explicitly identified as legitimate participants in the formulation and implementation of European social policy). Most importantly, of course, not only will employers and labor interact with each other, but they will also give their input to the European Commission and candidate country governments, developing impact assessments and specific recommendations for the implementation of EU directives and seeking to adapt employment policy to country- and sector-specific needs. Note that communication in this transnational network need not be limited to cooperation but may well include confrontation among various network participants.

Multiple mechanisms are at work in horizontal policy diffusion: (1) normative pressure by diverse actors to comply with what is often termed the “European social model” and includes regular consultation with employers’ and labor interests by national governments; (2) cognitive socialization concerning categories and identities of legitimate participants in social policy formation and implementation; and (3) rule enforcement by the EU, though this mechanism is less important here than in vertical diffusion.

Through this transnational process, the consultation of socioeconomic interest organizations by governments is likely to be strengthened at the national level, including, but going beyond, the adoption of EU social policy. Nonstate actors representing socioeconomic interests will configure or consolidate their organizational identity to fit more closely the models prevalent among EU member states.\(^{34}\) They may use the transnational network as a resource to increase their domestic leverage and enhance their role in policy-making. In contrast to vertical diffusion, legal harmonization is likely to progress at a slower pace because it will be subject to the input of multiple actors. On the other hand, implementing measures will follow formal legal

\(^{34}\) The features of this model include strong sectoral organizations; a clear distinction between professional and business associations, on the one hand, and employers’ organizations, on the other; a separation between the functions of political parties and those of socioeconomic interest organizations; and clear limits on the fragmentation and polarization among organizations of management and labor.
harmonization and give it practical relevance. Similarly, the coordination of national with EU employment policy may proceed slowly, but benefit from the substantive input of sectoral interests.

Horizontal diffusion yields three counter-hypotheses concerning our questions: (1) The EU’s ability of rule enforcement in candidate countries will extend beyond legal harmonization to implementing measures and consultation procedures. Concomitant socializing pressures will help constitute and strengthen domestic nonstate actors. (2) Communication about Community social policy and enlargement will flow through a wide transnational network in which EU, state, and nonstate actors interact freely. (3) Domestic nonstate actors participate in the absorption of social policy diffusion, either through cooperation or contestation or possibly both.

EU instruments for social policy transfer and the causal mechanisms on which they are likely to rely are summarized in the table below. The discussion that follows investigates empirical evidence concerning Hypotheses 2 and 3 of both models. It evaluates the structure of transnational communication as measured in terms of the interactions among a set of 32 organizations that are a priori relevant for EU enlargement and/or social policy transfer. The network analysis, which reveals direct or indirect links that enable nonstate actors to access EU institutions or national governments, will be followed by a brief discussion of qualitative evidence concerning nonstate actors’ political marginality in both countries.

Table 1: Tools and Mechanisms of Diffusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diffusion Mechanism</th>
<th>Rule enforcement</th>
<th>Normative pressure</th>
<th>Cognitive socialization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accession Partnerships</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Reports</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Programs for the Adoption of the Acquis</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial assistance</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-binding documents (Commission, EP, etc.)</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Network of EC Social Policy Transfer to Poland and Hungary

In order to investigate diffusion mechanisms for EC social policy transfer to Poland and Hungary, this study maps out patterns of regular contact among EU, state, and nonstate actors with stakes in EU enlargement and social policy (notably trade unions and employers’ organizations and their respective peak associations at the European level). I look at social networks as vehicles of communication, diffusion, and exchange about policy decisions among multiple organizations. Network analysis allows us to trace where actors turn in order to exchange information and material resources and advance their goals. Similarly, it offers tools for determining the centrality of distinct actors in the network. Note that the available network data alone cannot tell us anything about the extent to which all actors are in fact dealing directly with EU enlargement and social policy transfer. For example, a trade union in Poland may interact frequently with its European-level umbrella organization, but the content of this interaction need not be directly related to transposing or implementing the social acquis.

Constructing the Database

The actors in the network studied here were selected for their presumptive relevance and their activities in social policy and/or EU enlargement. Of the 32 actors included in the

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38 The purpose of this paper is descriptive; it does not include an analysis of possible causal relations between actor attributes (e.g. size of an organization, resources, etc.) and network characteristics.

39 Thus combining a nominalist approach to drawing network boundaries with a focus on actor attributes. The goal is to investigate whether actors who theoretically should participate in the transfer of EU social policy to Poland and...
network, four are EU institutions, two belong to the Polish government and four to the Hungarian government, four are Polish nonstate actors (employers’ organizations and trade unions) and twelve are Hungarian nonstate actors (also employers’ organizations and trade unions), three represent Europe-wide nonstate actors, and three belong to other categories (see Appendix 1 for a complete list of organizations and their abbreviations).

Difficulties in network data collection required a reduction of the initial network of approximately 90 actors. Eliminated were political parties, parliamentary committees at national and European level, sectoral peak-level confederations, bilateral and multilateral forums lacking an organizational existence of their own, and organizations that were not named by other actors as sources or recipients of contacts. More problematic was the elimination of actors named by others as contact points but which did not supply survey data of their own. The imbalance in the number of Polish versus Hungarian actors is primarily due to the extreme organizational fragmentation among labor and employers in Hungary: Although Hungary’s population is only one-fourth that of Poland, there are six trade union confederations and nine employers’ confederations (plus one confederation that represents eight of the nine in international affiliations). In Poland, by contrast, there are two main trade union confederations and employers’ organizations, respectively.

Network ties were measured via a survey questionnaire that asked respondents to indicate with which of the 32 actors in the network they initiated regular contact, which of the 32 actors in turn initiated regular contact with them, and in which organizations they were members. “Regular contact” is of course a very broad category and could imply anything from daily consultation to one or two phone calls per year. The substance of such contact tended to be information exchange and joint deliberation, though in some cases it could also imply flows of material resources. Each relation was registered as a dichotomous (rather than valued) variable.

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40 These problems included low response rates, respondent fatigue, and reluctance to disclose certain links (e.g. with political parties).
41 E.g. the Association Councils for Poland and Hungary, the Association Committees for PL and HU, and various tripartite consultative bodies at national level.
42 E.g. the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the IMF.
43 This includes the EU Delegations in PL and HU, the Economic and Social Committee, the Polish Prime Minister’s Office, Poland’s Office of the EU Integration Committee, the Polish Foreign Ministry, the World Bank’s office in Poland, the OECD, as well as certain employers’ and labor organizations in Hungary (STRATOSZ, KISOSZ, ESZT, and SZEF).
The survey was administered between February 2000 and May 2001 through face-to-face interviews in 23 cases and per E-mail in 9 cases. It relies on self-reporting of ties by one representative of each organization. Among employers’ organizations and trade unions, this was usually the international affairs secretary or the person assigned to European integration issues. In the case of ministries, the informant tended to be a representative of the EU Integration Department of that ministry. Among EU institutions and Europe-wide nongovernmental organizations, the informant was generally the person in charge of enlargement affairs.

Reliance on self-reporting of ties entails a number of difficulties. First, there is evidence that respondents tend to have poor recall of single events. But studies also show that respondents are better at recalling regular, long-term relationships. Given that the relations measured in this survey are regular contacts and affiliation, we can assume that respondents will have a good sense of who their organization’s regular interlocutors are. A second problem concerns tendencies to exaggerate or downplay ties: Despite attempts by the interviewer to administer the survey in a consistent manner across all organizations, it was evident that some respondents sought to indicate a larger number of ties than they probably sustain in practice. In particular, NGO respondents seemed to want to emphasize their organization’s connectedness. By contrast, government and EU officials appeared reluctant to reveal the full range of regular ties they maintain. Finally, there were some problems in administering a standardized questionnaire to elite respondents, who often seemed to prefer in-depth qualitative questions.

In order to improve the reliability of the network data, information for each node was gathered separately in order to cross-check mutual actor perceptions of a given directional tie. Thus, each actor was asked whether it was the source as well as the target of regular contacts.

46 An additional difficulty in the postcommunist context is that network survey questions may bear a certain resemblance to the kind of information formerly gathered by the secret service (albeit more on an individual than on an interorganizational level), suggesting that respondents may be reluctant to reveal the full extent of their regular contacts. Note, however, recent research on elite networks in postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe: J. Higley, J. Pakulski, W. Wesolowski, eds., Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); H. Iglìè, A. Rus, “From Elite Reproduction to Elite Adaptation: The Dynamics of Change in Personal Networks of Slovenian Elites,” DR (? ) 16 (2000), pp. 181-197; H. Iglìè, A. Rus, “Democratic Transition and Elite Integration in Slovenia from 1988 to 1995,” DR 16 (2000), pp. 198-222.
with every other actor. The information from the three directional relations (“we initiate regular contact,” “they initiate regular contact,” and “we are members in”) was compacted into a matrix with $32 \times 31 = 992$ observations (ignoring self-ties because these are meaningless here). This matrix (“reports any tie with”) registers any tie an organization reported with another actor. It is thus based on directed ties, but leaves open whether the organization in question is the source or the recipient of contacts or membership affiliations. In order to increase reliability, I symmetrized this matrix by counting only those ties on whose existence source and target agreed. Thus, only reciprocal ties are registered. The resulting matrix (“confirmed ties”) is a conservative estimate of regular contact and affiliations within the network and serves as the basis of the analysis presented here. It has a density of .268, which means that 26.8 percent of all possible ties are actually present in the network.

Analyzing the Network of Confirmed Ties Between Organizations

In order to assess the network’s empirical properties and their resemblance to either of the two ideal types, I use four different network concepts: actor centrality, cliques, structural equivalence, and structural holes. I derive propositions about the network characteristics of a vertical versus a horizontal diffusion network and compare the evidence with these expectations.

First, two measures are used here to gauge the centrality of different actors within the network. For nondirected ties, Freeman’s degree centrality measures the number of nodes (actors) that are directly adjacent to an actor. Normalized degree centrality is the number of direct ties of a node (in network parlance, its “degree”) divided by the maximum possible number of direct ties. Closeness centrality measures how quickly an actor can interact with every other actor.

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48 In the case of perfect reciprocity of perceptions of contacts, the Pearson correlation between the matrix “we initiate” and the transpose of matrix “they initiate” would be 1; by the same logic, the Pearson correlation between the matrix “they initiate” and the transpose of matrix “we initiate” would also be 1. In fact, the Pearson correlation is .44, indicating that only in 44 percent of all observations do both actors agree on the tie.

49 The matrix “we initiate regular contact” has a density of .3327, which means that 33.27 percent of all possible ties are actually present. Software used for analyzing the network data: S. Borgatti, M.G. Everett, L.C. Freeman, UCINET 5.0 Version 1.00 (Natick: Analytic Technologies).

50 The density of matrix “they initiate regular contact” is slightly lower, with 30.85 percent of possible ties actually present. The Pearson correlation between matrix “we initiate” and matrix “they initiate” is .77, suggesting a high level of reciprocity among actors in initiating regular contact (statistically significant at the .0005 level, SD=.051).

51 With only 1.61 percent of possible ties present, the matrix “we are members in” has by far the lowest density.

52 The Pearson correlation between “reports any tie with” and “confirmed ties” is .732 (statistically significant at the .0005 level, SD=.048).

other actors, without having to rely on third actors for doing so. The shorter the distance\textsuperscript{54} between an actor and all other actors, the greater is its centrality. Closeness centrality is the reciprocal of the sum distance of an actor to all other actors. Normalized closeness centrality is closeness centrality as a percentage of the minimum possible sum distance to all actors.\textsuperscript{55}

Hypothesis 2 of the vertical model of diffusion predicts that the prevailing structure of communication flows will be intergovernmental relations between the EU and candidate country governments, with little or no interaction between state and nonstate actors. The corresponding counter-hypothesis of the horizontal diffusion model, by contrast, predicts that communication about Community social policy and enlargement will flow through a wide transnational network in which EU, state, and nonstate actors interact freely. Based on these competing hypotheses, we can derive the following proposition about actor centrality in the network:

\textit{Proposition 1: In a vertical diffusion network, we would expect state and EU actors to have higher centrality scores than nonstate actors. In a horizontal diffusion network, we would expect no systematic differences in the centrality scores of EU, state, and nonstate actors.}

As Table 2 (Appendix) shows, there are no systematic differences between EU, state, and nonstate actors in centrality scores. One EU actor, the Commission’s DG Employment and Social Affairs\textsuperscript{56}, consistently scores highest, while another EU actor, the Commission’s DG Enlargement (section Hungary)\textsuperscript{57}, consistently ranks among the bottom actors on centrality scores. The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (HU-MFA) consistently scores one standard deviation or more above the mean, but so do two Hungarian nonstate actors, the trade union HU-MSZOSZ and the employers’ organization HU-CEHIC. One intergovernmental organization, the World Bank’s Hungary office\textsuperscript{58}, scores consistently low, while another one, the International Labor Organization’s Central and Eastern Europe Team\textsuperscript{59}, scores consistently high. Four state actors\textsuperscript{60} consistently score around the mean, but the same is true for four nonstate actors.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{54} Distance is defined as the length of the shortest path (i.e. the geodesic) between two actors. It is measured by the number of lines (connecting adjacent actors) that make up this path.

\textsuperscript{55} G. Sabidussi, “The Centrality Index of a Graph,” Psychometrika 31 (1966): 581-603;

\textsuperscript{56} K-DGES.

\textsuperscript{57} K-DGEEnl-HU.

\textsuperscript{58} WB-HU.

\textsuperscript{59} ILO-CEET.

\textsuperscript{60} PL-Mlab, PL-Del-BX, HU-PM, HU-MFSA.
Given the fragmentation among Hungarian nonstate actors, it is likely that their centrality scores are distorted by increased communication with other nonstate actors, rather than providing evidence of a wide and diverse set of contacts. The same centrality measures were therefore applied to a reduced network from which all but the most central Hungarian employers’ organizations and trade unions (HU-CEHIC and HU-MSZOSZ, respectively) were removed. The resulting network contains 22 (instead of 32) nodes. Table 3 (Appendix) presents the results. Indeed, nonstate actors no longer score consistently above average in this network, but rather cluster around the mean. Two intergovernmental actors (the ILO Central and Eastern Europe Team and Commission DG Employment and Social Affairs) continue to rank highest in centrality, as does one Hungarian state actor (Hungary’s Delegation to the EU). Among the actors scoring below average on both measures, we find an EU actor (Commission DG Enlargement, section on Hungary), an intergovernmental actor (the World Bank’s Hungary office), a European-level nonstate actor (the employers’ organization CEEP), a Polish nonstate actor (the employer organization PL-KPP), and a Hungarian state actor (HU-PM, the prime minister’s office). Of the ten actors clustering around the mean on both measures, three are state actors (the Polish Ministry of Labor, Poland’s Delegation to the EU, and Hungary’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs), whereas seven are nonstate actors. The reduced network shows that Hungarian nonstate actors achieve their high centrality scores primarily through interaction with other nonstate actors. But while nonstate actors are not represented among those actors scoring above average on both centrality measures, neither do they consistently score below average. While one EU and one state actor (along with the ILO) rank highest on centrality scores, two other EU actors join several nonstate actors and the World Bank (an intergovernmental actor) in scoring below average. Following Proposition 1, we can conclude that the absence of systematic differences in the centrality scores of EU, state, and nonstate actors points toward a horizontal diffusion network.

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61 PL-OPZZ, PL-MGYOSZ, HU-AMSZ, and UNICE.
62 K-DGES, an EU actor, and ILO-CEET.
63 HU-Del-BX.
64 K-DGEN-HU.
65 WB-HU.
66 Separate analysis of Polish-EU and Hungarian-EU ties within the reduced (22-actor) network confirms these results.
The possible network distortion resulting from the fragmentation of Hungarian nonstate actors implies that they may score high on a number of network measures even though their interactions focus predominantly on other nonstate actors. To establish the existence of a horizontal network of transnational diffusion, we need evidence of ties that link nonstate actors with EU and state actors. Tracing cohesive subgroups in the network allows us to compare within- and between-group interactions. The concept of ‘cliques’ denotes a subgroup of actors in the network, all of whose members have direct ties with each other and there is no other actor in the network who is also directly tied to all of the clique’s members.Cliques in a network may overlap, i.e. have members in common. By requiring maximum internal cohesion, the concept of cliques is the most restrictive of subgroup concepts. Despite the narrow definition, however, it turns out that numerous cliques of various sizes exist in the 32-actor network on EU enlargement and social policy. Cliques thus provide a useful tool for examining the ability of nonstate actors to communicate directly with EU and state agencies.

**Proposition 2a:** In a vertical diffusion network, we would expect state and EU actors to form cliques that do not contain nonstate actors. Similarly, we would expect nonstate actors to form cliques that do not contain state and EU actors. In a horizontal diffusion network, we would expect state, EU, and nonstate actors to form cliques containing actors of all three types.

**Proposition 2b:** In a vertical diffusion network, we would expect to find little overlap between the cliques of EU and state actors, on the one hand, and those of nonstate actors, on the other. In a horizontal diffusion network, we would expect to find overlap between cliques.

Imposing a minimum clique size of five members on the thirty-two actor network yields nineteen cliques (see Appendix 3: Cliques), of which only two do not contain Hungarian nonstate actors, indicating that organizational fragmentation accounts for a large amount of subgroup cohesion in the network. However, of the seventeen cliques containing Hungarian nonstate actors, twelve also contain at least one Hungarian state actor, six contain an EU actor,

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67 Wasserman and Faust: 254.
68 Nine of these contain at least one trade union and one employers’ organization.
and four contain an EU and at least one Hungarian state actor. There is only one clique (of the nineteen of size 5 or larger) that contains only EU and (Polish) state actors. Not a single clique contains only Hungarian nonstate actors. Only two cliques contain Polish actors, suggesting that a clique size of five members is too restrictive for the less fragmented organizational landscape of Poland.

But even among the thirty-two cliques with a minimum of four members, there are only five containing one Polish nonstate actor (and none containing more than one). This fact is significant, as it points toward the absence of cohesive ties and thus a greater polarization among Polish nonstate organizations compared to Hungary. Of the five cliques containing Polish nonstate actors, only one also contains a Polish state actor. Two of them contain an EU actor. All four of them also contain the ILO as an intergovernmental organization, as well as one European-level nonstate confederation (ETUC or UNICE). Six cliques exclude nonstate actors altogether. Twenty-one cliques of size 4 contain one or more Hungarian nonstate actors. Of these, fourteen also contain at least one Hungarian state actor and nine contain at least one EU actor. Not a single clique contains only Hungarian nonstate actors. Thus, while Hungary’s organizational fragmentation accounts for the large number of cohesive subgroups containing nonstate actors, the latter successfully reach out to Hungarian state actors as well as EU agencies and international nonstate actors. Only in one clique is there a Hungarian as well as a Polish nonstate actor. This means that cohesive subgroups link actors at the national and the EU level, but rarely manage to connect actors of two countries directly. Clique overlap is substantial: Of the sixteen cliques containing the most frequently represented EU actor, five also contain the most frequently represented Hungarian trade union and six the most frequently represented Hungarian employers’ organization. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry (HU-MFA) shares ten clique memberships with the most frequently represented Hungarian trade union and eight with the most frequently represented Hungarian employers’ organization.

In sum, three observations should be stressed: First, clique patterns differ significantly between Poland and Hungary. Hungary’s extreme organizational fragmentation generates a high

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69 Clique 4 contains an intergovernmental organization (ILO-CEET), though no state or EU actors.
70 Clique 4 contains EU and Polish state actors, whereas clique 12 contains one Polish nonstate actor.
71 Clique 2 contains EU and Polish state actors, whereas clique 12 contains one Polish nonstate actor.
72 Clique 8-11 and 18-19.
73 K-DGES.
74 HU-MSZOSZ.
75 HU-CEHIC.
number of cliques containing one or more nonstate actors. In Poland, by contrast, the fierce competition between two labor confederations and two employers’ organizations, respectively, reduces the occurrence of cohesive subgroups containing nonstate actors. Second, in both Poland and Hungary, cliques containing nonstate actors also tend to contain at least one state or one EU actor, or both, thus providing evidence of the existence of a horizontal network of transnational diffusion according to Proposition 2a. Nevertheless, the implications for the two countries diverge: In the case of Poland, clique co-membership of EU, state, and nonstate actors underlines the absence of close ties among nonstate actors. In the case of Hungary, by contrast, clique co-membership of EU, state, and nonstate actors demonstrates that organizational fragmentation precludes neither communication among nonstate actors nor with EU and state actors. Third, clique memberships overlap substantially among the most highly represented EU, state, and nonstate actors. Taken together, these characteristics indicate the presence of a horizontal diffusion network based on Propositions 2a and b.

The preceding discussion was based on the argument that in a horizontal diffusion network, cohesive subgroups should not cut off nonstate actors from state and EU actors. At a more general level, we can similarly argue that in a horizontal diffusion network the communication patterns of nonstate actors should not differ in principle from those of EU and state actors. “Structural equivalence” is a concept that captures similarities in the network positions of different actors. Actors are structurally equivalent “if they have identical ties to and from all other actors in the network”\textsuperscript{[76]} (with the exception of self-ties if, as in our case, self-ties are meaningless). Because actors in a network rarely are fully structurally equivalent, existing routines measure the extent to which the network positions of pairs of actors converge. For present purposes, I compare profile similarities based on matching ties.\textsuperscript{[77]}

**Proposition 3:** In a vertical diffusion network, we expect nonstate, state, and EU actors to form distinct clusters of structural equivalence. In a horizontal diffusion network, we expect equivalence clusters to contain actors of several types.

\textsuperscript{[76]} Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis: 356.

\textsuperscript{[77]} The measure produces scores between 0 and 1 for every tie, 1 representing perfect structural equivalence. The resulting matrix is too large to reproduce here; but see Appendix 4 for a summary.
The results of this procedure are summarized in the hierarchical clustering diagram and the list of clusters in Appendix 4. There are 22 different levels of clustering. Only at the fifteenth rank (.733) do we find a cluster that combines a state and a nonstate actor (both Hungarian). At the eighteenth rank \(^{78}\) (.674), we find a large cluster that contains nonstate actors along with EU and state actors. At the third rank (.889), there is a cluster that contains Hungarian employers’ organizations and the World Bank, all of which, as we have already seen, score extremely low on centrality measures.\(^ {79}\) At the eighth rank (.822), there is a cluster containing both EU and Polish state actors. At the twelfth rank (.8), the European Trade Union Confederation (nonstate actor) and the ILO (intergovernmental) share profile similarity. In sum, following Proposition 3, the patterns of structural equivalence point toward a vertical diffusion network by generating clusters in which EU and state actors remain largely separate from nonstate actors. This contradicts the findings on the previous two network measures, both of which suggested the presence of a horizontal network.

Finally, a set of network measures sensitive to power dynamics among actors derives from the concept of “structural holes” (i.e. disconnections or nonequivalencies between actors).\(^ {80}\) Being strategically situated between otherwise disconnected actors (or disconnected sets of actors) enhances one’s ability to control the network and secure privileged and timely access to information. The underlying argument is that in a competitive context, actors benefit from ties to other actors most if these contacts are nonredundant, a property Burt defines as follows: “Two contacts are redundant to the extent that they provide the same information benefits to the player.”\(^ {81}\) Clearly, not all actors in the EU social policy network compete with one another, seeing as they perform a variety of roles. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that interest groups compete among one other for contacts with government and EU institutions; that different state actors compete for influence within a policy area; and that EU institutions compete for access to information from both state and nonstate actors on the ground. In contrast to the other three network concepts used here, the measures describing structural holes are based on ego-centered networks rather than the total network. That is, structural holes measures treat each

\(^{78}\) In descending order of equivalence.

\(^{79}\) Thus their positions converge due to the absence rather than the presence of ties.


\(^{81}\) Burt, *Structural Holes*: 47.
node in turn as focal actor (‘ego’) and assess its existing ties to other actors (‘alters’) as well as the ties among alters. Effective size measures the number of nonredundant contacts an actor has by counting the number of alters minus the average degree (number of ties) of alters within the given ego network, not including ties to ego. Efficiency measures the extent of redundancy in ego’s network. It is calculated by dividing effective size by the number of alters in ego’s network (1 equals perfect nonredundancy, 0 equals perfect redundancy). Constraint provides a measure of the extent to which ego is invested in alters who in turn are invested in other alters of ego (maximum constraint being represented by 1). The rationale behind this measure is that close relationships among ego’s alters will constrain ego’s opportunities because they lead back to a single actor rather than to diverse sets of secondary actors. Hierarchy, finally, indicates the extent to which constraint on ego is concentrated in a single alter.

Proposition 4: In a vertical network, we would expect EU and state actors to be located in positions that provide more control and information than do those of nonstate actors. Concretely, we would expect EU and state actors a) to have ego-networks of larger effective size; b) to have more efficient ego-networks; c) to experience less constraint; and d) to experience lower hierarchy scores than nonstate actors. By contrast, in a horizontal diffusion network, we would expect to find no systematic differences among EU, state, and nonstate actors in their scores on structural-hole measures.

Tables 4 and 5 (Appendix 2) summarize the structural-hole measures for the 32-actor network, with actors appearing in the same column on at least three measures printed in bold. Concerning effective size, we find EU actors in four out of five columns and nonstate actors in all five columns, whereas state actors do not score below the mean. Similarly, concerning network efficiency, EU actors manifest no consistent trend, nonstate actors are represented in all columns, but state actors score around the mean or higher. Two EU actors and one intergovernmental actor score high on constraint, whereas the vast majority of actors is scattered around the mean or slightly below, displaying no systematic differences between state, EU, and nonstate actors. On hierarchy, we find Hungarian state actors on both extremes as well as around

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82 Burt, Structural Holes: 52-54.
83 Burt, Structural Holes: 55.
84 Burt, Structural Holes: 71.
the mean. Nonstate actors are represented in all five columns, whereas EU actors are represented in three columns but not at the upper extreme. In sum, on two measures we find some evidence that state actors are situated in more strategically advantageous positions than EU and nonstate actors. On the other two measures, no systematic differences emerge between EU, state, and nonstate actors. The evidence is thus ambiguous and does not permit conclusions in favor of a vertical diffusion network.

Summarizing the discussion of network scores, the following points bear emphasis: First, centrality scores in the 32-actor network display no systematic differences between EU, state, and nonstate actors, much as we would expect in a horizontal network. But as the analysis of the 22-actor network suggested, the centrality of some Hungarian nonstate actors appears to be due to ties with other nonstate actors rather than to communication with state and EU actors. Second, analyzing clique patterns reveals both Hungarian and Polish nonstate actors to be closely connected with EU and state actors, consistent with expectations about a horizontal network. But the implications are different for the two countries: In the case of Hungary, clique co-membership patterns indicate that nonstate actors interact with their peers as well as with EU and state actors. In the case of Poland, by contrast, nonstate actors fail to interact closely with their peers and turn instead to EU and state actors for building cohesive ties. This reflects the highly polarized nature of employer and labor representation in Poland. Third, structural equivalence measures group EU, state, and nonstate actors in distinct clusters, showing that these actor categories diverge in their patterns of contacts with other actors. This is consistent with predictions about a vertical network of diffusion. Finally, evidence about structural holes is ambiguous, showing state actors to be in strategically more advantageous positions than EU and nonstate actors on two measures but no systematic differences on the other two measures. Since in a vertical network both EU and state actors would be expected to score higher on structural holes, the evidence does not permit us to conclude in favor of vertical network structures. While each of the three categories of actors appears to play a distinct role in the network (as evident from structural equivalence clusters), overall there are no sharp separations in the communication patterns between these categories. Within each category there are variations among actors in terms of centrality, clique membership, and structural-hole characteristics. We
can therefore conclude that in principle communication flows among all actor categories, with some actors in each category clearly being more successful at maintaining ties than others.

Nonstate Actors’ Marginal Role in the Accession Process

The previous section documented the considerable spread of transnational links that grant Polish and Hungarian labor and employer organizations access to Europe-wide confederations, EU institutions and national governments. Nevertheless, such links have so far had little impact on the position of socioeconomic interest organizations in the domestic political setting. In particular, transnational links appear to have done little to strengthen social dialogue, the EU-wide procedure that presupposes functioning structures of socioeconomic interest representation at the national level. EU social dialogue does not impose explicit obligations on member states, nor are there binding criteria for functioning structures of social partnership. But this has not kept the European Commission from voicing its disapproval of candidate country practices of nonstate-actor consultation, as I will discuss below.

Observers have noted the emergence of tripartite structures at the national level in most CEE transformation countries during the early 1990s, but disagree on the practical significance of these institutions. Some credit international financial institutions and the International Labor Organization with effectively promoting structures of consultation that helped absorb the shocks of transformation and prevent major political disruptions. But critics contend that tripartite institutions have failed to secure material improvements for workers and have yet to be filled with practical significance. In particular, as Héthy argues, tripartite structures suffer from government dominance and tend to be limited to the national, cross-sectoral level. Enterprise-level, sectoral, and regional social dialogue, by contrast, are poorly developed. Organizational weakness of labor and especially employer associations is a problem in many candidate countries

In Hungary, there are six labor confederations and nine employers’ confederations (plus one formed exclusively for the purpose of international relations). Such fragmentation renders coordinated responses to government policy exceedingly difficult. In Poland, by contrast, the problem has been extreme polarization between two labor and employer confederations, respectively, and poor separation between trade union functions and political party mobilization.

Hungarian tripartite institutions functioned reasonably well at the national level from 1988 to 1999, but have since been revamped in a pluralist vein by the current Orbán government. The restructuring disaggregated consultative functions into five new bodies and opened membership to the nonprofit sector and other economic actors besides employers and labor. Representatives of labor and employer organizations have criticized the new framework as serving only the dissemination of government information. The absence of horizontal links among consultative bodies inhibits an integrated approach to social and economic policy consultation. Polish tripartism has suffered from instrumentalization by government. From 1999 to the end of the Solidarity-affiliated government, the communist successor confederation OPZZ (Polish Trade Union Alliance) refused to participate in the Tripartite Commission in protest against the government’s failure to consult the social partners on the budget.

The European Commission has voiced criticism of social dialogue practices in Poland and Hungary in all of its regular reports on accession preparations since 1998. In Poland, the Commission noted the need for stronger employer organizations, the weakening of the Tripartite Commission due to OPZZ’s withdrawal, the need for bipartite consultation at sectoral and enterprise level - not least for the purpose of ensuring the implementation of EU law at the local level - and participation of social partners in accession preparations and future EU policy-making. Vis-à-vis Hungary, the Commission has criticized organizational fragmentation.

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88 See Héthy; F. Draus, Les organizations patronales dans les pays de l’Europe centrale et orientale (Pologne, République tchèque, Hongrie), report 64 (Brussels: European Trade Union Institute, 2000).
89 Interviews with the author, January – May 2000, Budapest.
expressed open disapproval concerning the 1998/1999 restructuring of consultative institutions and the perceived lack of effective social dialogue in Hungary at the national, sectoral, regional, and enterprise levels\(^\text{94}\), and called for greater research and administrative capacity and a heightened sense of initiative among the social partners.\(^\text{95}\)

It is striking that neither in Poland nor in Hungary have the social partners exploited such outside pressure to demand more meaningful consultation on general socioeconomic policy or accession preparations. The level of information on EU policy appears to be low among employers and labor organizations in both countries.\(^\text{96}\) Trade unions are particularly concerned with reducing the wage gap between current and future EU member states, a concern that EU social and employment policy does not address. Although EU legislation on health and safety in the workplace imposes potentially serious costs on enterprises, candidate country trade unions have not identified such costs as risks worthy of mobilization. EU insistence on lengthy transition periods for the free movement of persons from Central and Eastern European states, meanwhile, has produced labor resistance in the candidate countries, but for primarily symbolic rather than practical reasons (most expect labor mobility to remain low). EU social and employment policy, designed for advanced capitalist democracies, appears to be of little salience (positive or negative) to labor in the transformation countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

**Conclusion**

This paper has sought to fulfill two aims: first, to develop two competing theoretical models for the diffusion of EU social policy in Central and Eastern Europe, from which competing hypotheses were derived; second, to assess empirically the competing hypotheses that relate to the communication structures underlying diffusion. Using four concepts for measuring networks, the paper analyzed regular interaction patterns among thirty-two organizations with stakes in EU enlargement and social policy. The interaction patterns follow more closely the predictions about horizontal diffusion than those of vertical diffusion. In particular, rather than EU and state actors communicating with one another at the exclusion of nonstate actors, the


paper shows actors from all three categories to be active participants in transnational communication links. At the same time, though, the analysis also reveals important within-group variations in the degree to which actors are connected. The discussion shows that in principle there are no obstacles keeping nonstate actors from accessing state and EU actors to acquire information and resources and possibly make their preferences heard. But some nonstate actors are eminently more successful than others at maintaining contacts with state and EU actors. An interesting side note is that the most connected nonstate actors do not rely on the brokerage of European confederations to access EU and state actors. Concomitantly, among EU actors there are vast differences in accessibility vis-à-vis nonstate actors, with the EU Commission’s DG Employment and Social Affairs being well-connected among nonstate and state actors alike, while DG Enlargement operates largely on the basis of intergovernmental relations.

Based on characteristics of this communication network, we would expect that normative pressure and cognitive socialization would be able to operate alongside the rule enforcement that is the explicit content of intergovernmental relations in the enlargement preparations. Both Poland’s and Hungary’s unwillingness to systematically consult with nonstate actors has drawn repeated EU criticism, but thus far to no avail. Despite network structures that are presumably conducive to normative pressure and cognitive socialization, intergovernmental relations and EU rule enforcement have until now resulted only in legal harmonization. Even well-connected nonstate actors with important allies in EU institutions remain marginal in the actual adoption of EU social policy and show no signs of appropriating transnational support for the purpose of enhancing their influence at home. It seems, therefore, that network arguments alone, while benefiting from systematic empirical assessment, cannot tell us much about diffusion outcomes. Rather, we need to look to domestic politics which continues to filter transnational political influences.
APPENDIX

1. ACTORS INCLUDED IN THE NETWORK (ABBREVIATIONS IN PARENTHESES)

EU Institutions
- Commission Directorate General for Enlargement, Hungary Team (K-DGEnl-HU)
- Commission Directorate General for Enlargement, Poland Team (K-DGEnl-PL)
- Commission Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs (K-DGESA)
- Commission Directorate General for Enlargement, PHARE (PHARE)

Polish Government Institutions
- Polish Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (PL-Mlab)
- Poland’s Delegation to the EU (PL-Del-BX)

Hungarian Government Institutions
- Hungary – Office of the Prime Minister (HU-PM)
- Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (HU-MFA)
- Hungarian Ministry of Family and Social Affairs (HU-MFSA)
- Hungary’s Delegation to the EU (HU-Del-BX)

Hungarian Trade Unions
- Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions (HU-Liga)
- National Association of Hungarian Trade Unions (HU-MSZOSZ)
- Autonomous Trade Unions’ Confederation ASZSZ (HU-ASZSZ)
- National Alliance of Workers’ Councils (HU-MOSZ)

Polish Trade Unions
- NSZZ Solidarity (PL-NSZZ)
- All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (PL-OPZZ)

Hungarian Employers’ Organizations
- National Association of Entrepreneurs (HU-VOSZ)
- National Federation of Consumer Cooperatives (HU-AFEOSZ)
- Federation of Hungarian Manufacturers (HU-MGYOSZ)
- Hungarian Industrial Association (HU-OKISZ)
- Hungarian Association of Craftsmen’s Corporations (HU-IPOSZ)
- Confederation of Hungarian Employers’ Organizations for International Cooperation (HU-CEHIC)
- National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives and Producers (HU-MOSZ/E)
- Union of Agrarian Employers (HU-AMSZ)

Polish Employers’ Organizations
- Polish Confederation of Private Employers (PL-PKPP)
- Confederation of Polish Employers (PL-KPP)

European Peak-Level Organizations
- European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)
- Union of Industrial and Employers Confederations of Europe (UNICE)
- European Center of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Public Interest (CEEP)

Others
- ILO Central and Eastern Europe Team (ILO-CEET)
- World Bank – Hungary Office (WB-HU)
- Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES)
2. TABLES

Table 1: inserted in the text – see p. 10.

Table 2: Summary of Actor Centrality Measures (32-Actor Network)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centrality measure $^97$</th>
<th>x (mean − SD)</th>
<th>(mean − SD)</th>
<th>(mean − ½ SD)</th>
<th>(mean + ½ SD)</th>
<th>x &lt; (mean + SD)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Degree centrality</strong></td>
<td>K-DGEnl-HU</td>
<td>K-DGEnl-PL</td>
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<td>HU-MOSZ</td>
<td>K-DGESA</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>WB-HU</td>
<td>HU-VOSZ</td>
<td>PL-Del-BX</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>HU-IPOSZ</td>
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<td>HU-OKISZ</td>
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<td>HU-MOSZ/E</td>
<td>HU-ASZSZ</td>
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<td>PL-OPZZ</td>
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<td>PL-CEEP</td>
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<td><strong>Closeness centrality</strong></td>
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<td>K-DGEnl-PL</td>
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<td>HU-MOSZ</td>
<td>K-DGESA</td>
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<td>UNICE</td>
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</table>

$^97$ Actors that appear in the same category on both centrality measures are printed in bold. Degree and closeness centrality measures are highly correlated at .97.
Table 3: Summary of Actor Centrality Measures (22-Actor Network)\textsuperscript{98}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centrality measure\textsuperscript{99}</th>
<th>x (mean – SD)</th>
<th>(mean – SD) &lt; x &lt; (mean – (\frac{1}{2})SD)</th>
<th>(mean – (\frac{1}{2})SD) &lt; x &lt; (mean + (\frac{1}{2})SD)</th>
<th>(mean + (\frac{1}{2})SD) &lt; x &lt; (mean + SD)</th>
<th>x (mean + SD)</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Degree centrality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Closeness centrality</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network centralization = 50.41 %</td>
<td>K-DGE\textsuperscript{enl}-HU HU-PM PL-KPP WB-HU</td>
<td>CEEP</td>
<td>HU-MFA K-DGE\textsuperscript{enl}-PL PL-Mlab PL-Del-BX PL-NSZZ PL-OPZZ ETUC HU-CEEIC PL-PKPP UNICE FES</td>
<td>PHARE HU-MFA HU-Del-BX HU-CEEP HL-MSZOSZ</td>
<td>K-DGE\textsuperscript{esa} ILO-CEET</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{98} This 22-node network results from the removal of all but the most central trade unions and employers’ organizations in Hungary and offers a way to control for Hungary’s organizational fragmentation.

\textsuperscript{99} Correlation between normalized degree and normalized closeness centrality: .96.
Table 4: Structural Holes – 32-Actor Network (symconfirmed ties)

Note: Because HU-AFEOSZ scores 1 on all four measures, it was deleted for the purpose of calculating averages and standard deviations. The structural-hole measures are the same for the 31-actor network from which AFEOSZ has been deleted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Hole Measure</th>
<th>x (mean – SD)</th>
<th>(mean – SD)</th>
<th>(mean + SD)</th>
<th>x (mean + SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective Size</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt; x (mean – SD)</td>
<td>&lt; x (mean + SD)</td>
<td>x (mean + SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU-ASZSZ</td>
<td>K-DGePL</td>
<td>HU-okisz</td>
<td>HU-MOSZ</td>
<td>K-DGEPL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU-VOSZ</td>
<td>HU-ASZSZ</td>
<td>HU-IPOSZ</td>
<td>HU-MOSZ/E</td>
<td>HU-MFSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEP</td>
<td>K-DGEPL</td>
<td>HU-AMSZ</td>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>HU-AMSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB-HU</td>
<td>HU-DSZ-PL</td>
<td>HU-AMSZ</td>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>HU-AMSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt; x (mean – SD)</td>
<td>&lt; x (mean + SD)</td>
<td>x (mean + SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU-MOSZ</td>
<td>PL-DEl-BX</td>
<td>K-DGEPL</td>
<td>HU-okisz</td>
<td>HU-AMSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU-POSZ</td>
<td>HU-MFSA</td>
<td>HU-AMSZ</td>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>HU-MFSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt; x (mean + SD)</td>
<td>&lt; x (mean + SD)</td>
<td>x (mean + SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU-MOSZ</td>
<td>PL-Del-BX</td>
<td>K-DGEPL</td>
<td>HU-okisz</td>
<td>HU-AMSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU-POSZ</td>
<td>HU-MFSA</td>
<td>HU-AMSZ</td>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>HU-MFSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt; x (mean – SD)</td>
<td>&lt; x (mean + SD)</td>
<td>x (mean + SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU-MOSZ</td>
<td>PL-Mlab</td>
<td>K-DGEPL</td>
<td>HU-okisz</td>
<td>HU-AMSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU-VOSZ</td>
<td>HU-MFSA</td>
<td>HU-AMSZ</td>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>HU-MFSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEP</td>
<td>PL-Del-BX</td>
<td>K-DGEPL</td>
<td>HU-okisz</td>
<td>HU-AMSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB-HU</td>
<td>HU-MFSA</td>
<td>HU-AMSZ</td>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>HU-MFSA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Structural Holes – Constraint – Note reversal in presentation of columns!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x (mean + SD)</th>
<th>(mean + ½SD) &lt; x &lt; (mean + SD)</th>
<th>(mean – ½SD) &lt; x &lt; (mean)</th>
<th>(mean – SD) &lt; x &lt; (mean – ½SD)</th>
<th>x (mean – SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K-DGEnl-HU</td>
<td>K-DGEnl-PL</td>
<td>CEEP</td>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>K-DGESA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-DGEnl-PL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PL-Del-BX</td>
<td>HU-MFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB-HU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PL-Mlab</td>
<td>HU-Del-BX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HU-PM</td>
<td>HU-MSZOSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HU-MFSA</td>
<td>HU-CEHIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HU-Liga</td>
<td>ILO-CEET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HU-ASZSZ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HU-MOSZ</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PL-NSZZ</td>
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<td>PER</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ETUC</td>
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<td>HU-VOSZ</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HU-MGYOSZ</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HU-OKIZS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HU-MOSZ/E</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>HU-AMSZ</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HU-IPOSZ</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>PL-PKPP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PL-RPP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNICE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. CLIQUES (BASED ON THE 32-ACTOR NETWORK)

1. Minimum Set Size: 5

19 cliques found.

1: K-DGES A, HU-Liga, HU-MSZOSZ, HU-MOSZ, ETUC, ILO-CEET
2: K-DGES A, ETUC, UNICE, CEEP, ILO-CEET
3: K-DGES A, HU-Liga, HU-MSZOSZ, HU-CEHIC, ILO-CEET
4: K-DGEnl-PL, K-DGES A, PHARE, PL-Mlab, PL-Del BX
5: K-DGES A, HU-MFA, HU-Del-BX, HU-Liga, HU-MSZOSZ, HU-MOSZ
6: K-DGES A, HU-MFA, HU-Del-BX, HU-Liga, HU-MSZOSZ, HU-CEHIC
7: K-DGES A, HU-MFA, HU-Del-BX, HU-MSZOSZ, HU-CEHIC, HU-AMSZ
8: K-DGES A, HU-MFA, HU-MFSA, HU-Del-BX, HU-CEHIC
9: HU-PM, HU-MFA, HU-Del-BX, HU-Liga, HU-MOSZ
10: HU-Liga, HU-MSZOSZ, HU-ASZSZ, HU-MOSZ, ETUC, ILO-CEET, FES
11: HU-MFA, HU-Liga, HU-MSZOSZ, HU-ASZSZ, HU-MOSZ
12: HU-MSZOSZ, PL-OPZZ, ETUC, ILO-CEET, FES
13: HU-MFA, HU-Liga, HU-MSZOSZ, HU-MGYOSZ, HU-CEHIC
14: HU-MFA, HU-MSZOSZ, HU-MGYOSZ, HU-CEHIC, HU-AMSZ
15: HU-Liga, HU-MSZOSZ, HU-MGYOSZ, HU-CEHIC, ILO-CEET
16: HU-MFA, HU-Liga, HU-MSZOSZ, HU-MOSZ, HU-IPOSZ
17: HU-MFA, HU-Liga, HU-MSZOSZ, HU-IPOSZ, HU-CEHIC
18: HU-MFA, HU-Del-BX, HU-MSZOSZ, HU-CEHIC, HU-MOSZ(E), HU-AMSZ
19: HU-Del-BX, HU-Liga, HU-MSZOSZ, HU-MOSZ, FES

2. Minimum Set Size: 4

32 cliques found.

1: K-DGES A HU-Liga HU-MSZOSZ HU-MOSZ ETUC ILO-CEET
2: K-DGES A PL-NSZZ ETUC ILO-CEET
3: K-DGESA ETUC UNICE CEEP ILO-CEET
4: K-DGESA HU-MFSA HU-CEHIC ILO-CEET
5: K-DGESA HU-Liga HU-MSZOSZ HU-CEHIC ILO-CEET
6: K-DGESA HU-CEHIC UNICE ILO-CEET
7: K-DGESA PL-PKPP UNICE ILO-CEET
8: K-DGEnl-HU K-DGEnl-PL K-DGESAt PHARE
9: K-DGEnl-PL K-DGESAt PHARE PL Mlab PL Del BX
10: K-DGESAt PHARE PL Del BX HU-Del-BX
11: K-DGESAt PHARE HU-MFSA HU-Del-BX
12: K-DGESAt PL Mlab PL Del BX PL-PKPP
13: K-DGESAt HU-MFA HU-Del-BX HU-Liga HU-MSZOSZ HU-MOSZ
14: K-DGESAt HU-MFA HU-Del-BX HU-Liga HU-MSZOSZ HU-CEHIC
15: K-DGESAt HU-MFA HU-Del-BX HU-MSZOSZ HU-CEHIC HU-AMSZ
16: K-DGESAt HU-MFA HU-MFSA HU-Del-BX HU-CEHIC
17: HU-PM HU-MFA HU-Del-BX HU-Liga HU-MOSZ
18: HU-PM HU-MFA HU-MFSA HU-Del-BX
19: PHARE HU-PM HU-MFSA HU-Del-BX
20: HU-Liga HU-MSZOSZ HU-ASZSZ HU-MOSZ ETUC ILO-CEET FES
21: HU-MFA HU-Liga HU-MSZOSZ HU-ASZSZ HU-MOSZ
22: HU-MSZOSZ PL-OPZZ ETUC ILO-CEET FES
23: HU-MFA HU-MSZOSZ HU-VOSZ HU-CEHIC
24: HU-MSZOSZ HU-VOSZ HU-CEHIC ILO-CEET
25: HU-MFA HU-Liga HU-MSZOSZ HU-MGYOSZ HU-CEHIC
26: HU-MFA HU-MSZOSZ HU-MGYOSZ HU-CEHIC HU-AMSZ
27: HU-Liga HU-MSZOSZ HU-MGYOSZ HU-CEHIC ILO-CEET
28: HU-MFA HU-Liga HU-MSZOSZ HU-MOSZ HU-IPOSZ
29: HU-MFA HU-Liga HU-MSZOSZ HU-IPOSZ HU-CEHIC
30: HU-MFA HU-Del-BX HU-MSZOSZ HU-CEHIC HU-MOSZ(E) HU-AMSZ
31: PL-NSZZ ETUC ILO-CEET FES
32: HU-Del-BX HU-Liga HU-MSZOSZ HU-MOSZ FES
**Profile Structural Equivalence – Hierarchical Clustering Diagram Based on Matching Ties**

(32-Actor Network)

**Level 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Clusters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>(K-DGEnl-PL, K-DGEnl-HU); (HU-Liga, HU-MOSZ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** A “.” in column label j at level x means that actor j is not in any cluster at level x. An “x” indicates that actor j is in a cluster at this level together with those actors that can be traced across that row without encountering a space.

**Structural Equivalence – Summary List of Clusters** (*denotes a cluster that includes nonstate actors and either EU or state actors, or both*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Clusters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.933</td>
<td>(K-DGEnl-PL, K-DGEnl-HU); (HU-Liga, HU-MOSZ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

100 S. Borgatti, M.G. Everett, L.C. Freeman, *UCINET 5.0 Version 1.00* (Natick: Analytic Technologies).
all above plus K-DGESA*
### 5. Figures

#### Figure 1: Vertical Diffusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content of Diffusion</th>
<th>Structure of Communication</th>
<th>Mechanisms of Diffusion</th>
<th>Preliminary Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. EU directives, regulations, case law</td>
<td>Intergovernmental relations/vertical network structure</td>
<td>Coercion/rule enforcement</td>
<td>1. transposition of EU directives – but lag in implementation measures;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. formal coordinating procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td>Normative pressure</td>
<td>2. formal adoption of measures for coordinating employment policy – lag in implementation measures;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. functional requirements of social dialogue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. no deepening of social dialogue – policy consultation with nonstate actors remains formal rather than substantive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Figure 2: Horizontal Diffusion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content of Diffusion</th>
<th>Structure of Communication</th>
<th>Mechanisms of Diffusion</th>
<th>Preliminary Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flows</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Perceptions concerning the legitimacy of different types of actors in social policy
2. Expectations concerning government consultation with certain nonstate actors
3. EU directives, regulations, case law
4. Formal coordinating procedures
5. Functional requirements of social dialogue

- **Normative pressure**
- **Cognitive socialization**
- **Coercion/Rule enforcement**

1. Configuration or consolidation of domestic nonstate actors representing socioeconomic interests (employers’ organizations and trade unions)
2. Strengthened social dialogue: meaningful consultation between trade unions, employers’ associations, and government on social and economic policy, including enlargement
3. Transposition and implementation of directives with input from nonstate actors
4. Employment coordination with input from nonstate actors