Abstract
The increasing support for radical right populist parties (RRPP) across Europe have often come to be interpreted as a crisis of democracy in the public debate. In this paper we set out to explore the link between overall satisfaction with the way democracy works (SWD) and the growth of RRPPs in Europe. In prior research, support for RRPPs has mostly been depicted as a consequence of democratic discontent rather than the other way around. However, recently it has been suggested that RRPPs not only thrive on, but also fuel, democratic discontent, which implies that levels of SWD will decline as RRPPs win over a growing proportion of a country’s electorate. This is, however, not a trend that is supported in aggregated trend data from the Eurobarometer or the European Social Survey. According to these surveys there a few signs pointing towards a democratic legitimacy crisis. Instead it appears as that SWD actually is increasing in countries where the RRPPs has been most successful. In this paper we reconcile these seemingly contradictory findings by exploring empirically whether voters’ responses to RRPPs’ electoral successes, in terms of SWD, depend on whether established parties respond to the successes by including or excluding the RRPPs. Our results show that levels and trends in SWD varies across Europe but that there seems to occur a convergence in SWD among nativists and non-nativists when RRPPs are included in the policy process. What appears is that nativists, who are systematically less satisfied with the way democracy works on average, are increasing in their support for democracy when RRPPs are included in government cooperation (at least temporarily). At the same time, non-nativist voters become less satisfied with the way democracy works but at the same magnitude as the former becomes satisfied. This general trend is confirmed in a more stringent test on panel data in the Netherlands. These findings highlight the dilemma faced by mainstream parties. Strategies of inclusion increase the legitimacy of the system among nativist voters. At the same time, it somewhat decreases SWD among non-nativist voters. Both results are normatively problematic for the health of democracies.
Democratic support and the rise of the nativists

The shockwaves that “Brexit” and the subsequent election of Donald Trump sent to the political world are only the tip of the iceberg. Underneath the water surface, for quite some time a continuous political transformation process has been taking place. During the last decades, much of the scholarly and political debate has been devoted to the signs of a gradual erosion of public confidence in core institutions of representative democracy in many advanced democracies (e.g. Dalton 2004; Pharr & Putnam 2000; Foa & Mounk 2016; 2017; Norris 2017). Simultaneous, Radical Right Populist Parties (henceforth: RRPPs) have persistently gained strength and achieved electoral successes in most European countries. This process has culminated with populists winning (USA) or closely competing for the presidential office (Austria and France), and RRPPs and nationalist parties joining governments as coalition partners (e.g. Hungary, Finland, and Norway) or as supporters of government (e.g. Denmark). The success wave of RRPPs has motivated many commentators within and outside of academia to argue that contemporary liberal democracy faces a severe legitimacy crisis. We indeed seem to live in a time of populism, or a populist ‘Zeitgeist’ (Mudde 2004). From a broader perspective, the aim of this paper is to investigate how the dynamics generated by the growth of radical right populism affect citizens’ perceptions of the functioning of the democratic system, and in the end the legitimacy of European democracy.

While previous research mainly has focused on democratic discontent and declining institutional confidence as a cause of the success of RRPPs (Lubbers et al. 2002; Belanger & Aarts 2006), it has recently been suggested that RRPPs not only thrive on, but also fuel, democratic discontent. This because their voters pick up the anti-elite rhetoric of these parties (e.g. Rooduijn et al 2016; Harteveld et al 2017; Hooghe & Dassonneville 2016), which implies that levels of satisfaction with democracy will decline as RRPPs win over a growing proportion of a country’s electorate. However, quite surprisingly, trend-data from the Eurobarometer demonstrate that aggregate satisfaction with democracy has in fact increased in many established European democracies during the last decades (Linde & Dahlberg 2016). Even more surprisingly, this increase has in fact been most prominent in countries where RRPPs have enjoyed some of their most spectacular electoral success, such as in Austria, Denmark, and Finland.

In this paper we aim to reconcile these seemingly contradictory findings by exploring empirically whether voters’ responses to RRPPs’ electoral successes, in terms of satisfaction with democracy, depend on whether established parties respond to the successes by including or excluding the RRPPs. In doing so, we go beyond the narrow focus on RRPP-voters, which has characterized the previous research, and additionally study how satisfaction with democracy among voters of other parties and not only nativist voters are affected by the interplay between RRPP success and established parties’ responses to that success. This question is gaining importance with every new electoral success scored by RRPPs.
Democratic support among radical right voters

The success of RRPPs is often interpreted as a sign that public support for representative democracy is declining in established democracies, thus triggering a severe legitimacy crisis of representative democracy (e.g. Foa & Mounk 2017). According to this perspective, the electoral success of RRPPs is only a symptom of a greater democratic malaise, where voters have become increasingly discontent with established parties and the functioning of democracy, and express this by voting for RRPPs (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995; Mudde & Van Holsteyn 2000). The idea that RRPP-supporters are protest voters, who voice their discontent, is seemingly supported by plenty of empirical evidence: RRPP-voters are less trusting of politics and less satisfied with the way democracy works than other voters (Lubbers et al. 2002, Hooghe et al. 2011, Söderlund & Kestia-Kekkonen 2009; Dahlberg and Linde 2016). Several researchers have, however, criticized the conclusion that RRPP-supporters are protest voters. Most prominently, it has been shown that issue proximity is as important for RRPP-voters as for other voters when deciding which party to vote for (van der Brug et al. 2000). In other words, the primary reason people vote for RRPPs is that they agree with the parties’ policy stances (and in particular their immigration policies) – and not that they are generally discontent with politics.

Still, the fact remains that RRPP-voters are more discontent with the way democracy works than are other voters. Recently, scholars have suggested that this association can be explained by the fact that causality works in a direction opposite to the protest hypothesis, i.e. that RRPP-voters become discontent with the way democracy works only after they have started to vote for RRPPs (Rooduijn et. al. 2016; Hooghe & Dassonneville 2016). This argument’s point of departure is the fact that people’s views on societal issues are not exogenous to their political preferences (Lenz 2009; Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart 2009) and that people, as a consequence, often “take cues from political elites, including party leaders, and adjust their views to be more in line with those elites” (Steenbergen et al. 2007: 17).

According to this perspective, it is natural to assume that RRPP-voters will pick up parts of their party’s rhetoric and adapt their political views to be in line with that rhetoric. Indeed, anti-elite rhetoric is a fundamental part – close to a defining characteristic – of RRPP ideology (Müller 2016, p. 7-41). These parties constantly feed their voters the message that the “corrupt elite” is not trustworthy, and accordingly does not act in the interest of the “good people” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). Although voters might originally vote for RRPPs because they agree with the anti-immigrant stances of the parties (i.e. because of issue proximity; see van der Brug 2003), they may therefore subsequently become less trusting and less satisfied with democracy, thus having adopted their preferred party’s rhetoric (e.g. Rooduijn et al. 2016). Research from the Netherlands indeed shows that voters become increasingly discontent with politics after they have started to vote for the PVV, and that the effect of voting for the PVV on satisfaction is stronger than the small effect in the opposite direction – i.e. from discontent to voting for the PVV (Rooduijn et al. 2016).

The idea that RRPPs do not only thrive on – but themselves fuel – democratic discontent among their voters suggests that public satisfaction with democracy will decline as RRPPs win over a
growing proportion of the electorate, and more voters start to take account of their anti-elite rhetoric. However, the empirical evidence at the aggregate level does not readily confirm this prediction. Time-series data from the Eurobarometer demonstrate that aggregate satisfaction with democracy has in fact increased in most established European democracies during the last decades, and most prominently so in countries where RRPPs have enjoyed some of their most spectacular electoral success, such as in Austria, Denmark, and Finland (Linde & Dahlberg 2016). The electoral success of RRPPs can thus obviously go together with a high, and sometimes even increasing, level of satisfaction with democracy.

**Theoretical point of departure**

In this paper we aim at exploring the hypothesis that RRPPs’ electoral success affects voters’ satisfaction with democracy in different ways depending on how established political parties’ respond to the success.

Our idea is simple, but yet overlooked in the previous research on the association between RRPPs electoral success and voters’ democratic discontent. Within a representative democratic system, feelings of ideological underrepresentation among a substantial share of citizens should be channeled by either a policy shift from an established party or by the emergence of a new party that politicizes the issue at stake. The elections thus function as a vehicle for preference aggregation and democratic responsiveness. However, if preferences are consistently not translated into policies (or at least attention), then – directly or indirectly – the political system will be perceived as unresponsive by the group of policy excluded citizens, who will accordingly become more dissatisfied and distrusting (Stecker and Tausenpfund 2016). Indirect evidence for this mechanism is provided by studies showing that citizens become more satisfied with democracy when their favored parties win more votes, more legislative seats, and more cabinet seats (Blais et al. 2017; Singh 2014). More direct evidence is provided by studies showing that distance between citizens and governing parties on the left-right dimension fuel discontent with democracy (Dahlberg & Holmberg 2014; Ezrow & Xezonakis 2011). In short, if citizens do not feel represented they are more likely to become discontent with the way democracy works in their country (Dahlberg et al. 2016).

Recently, scholars have suggested that this is exactly what has happened in relation to citizens’ concerns over immigration in Europe. It is a well-known fact that there exists a negative relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and political trust among European publics (McLaren 2012a, 2012b, Citrin et al 2014; McLaren 2016). Lauren McLaren explains this with the fact that citizens who are concerned about immigration feel that the political system “has sold out the public by failing to protect the national community from the potentially disruptive and divisive force of immigration” (2012b: 205) if politicians do not listen to their concerns and reduce immigration. In support of this hypothesis, she finds that the association is stronger in countries with a long history of immigration, where immigration skeptics are likely to feel more let down by the political system (McLaren 2012b). Similarly, other research (Citrin et al 2014; McLaren 2016) show that the negative relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and
trust in politics is stronger in countries that have implemented multicultural integration policies than in countries that have stuck with assimilatory integration policies. In both cases, the unwillingness of political parties to meet the immigration critics’ wishes for stricter immigration and integration policies is argued to have resulted in lower political satisfaction and trust among immigration critics.

The research on the association between immigrant attitudes and political trust strongly suggests that satisfaction with democracy among RRPP-voters – who are primarily driven by concerns over immigration – is not only a function of what their own parties say and do, but also a function of what other parties say and do. Building on this insight, we hypothesize that established parties’ reactions to RRPPs electoral successes are crucial for both nativists as well as for RRPP-voters’ satisfaction with democracy because the reactions are seen as cues to whether or not the “system” listens to their concerns. If established parties respond by isolating the RRPPs and refuse to alter their policy on immigration, RRPP-supporters will likely feel let down by the system and respond by becoming less satisfied with democracy. The reaction may even be stronger than it would have been if the RRPPs had not been successful, as individual voters can take the success as evidence that they are not alone in their concerns over immigration. In such a scenario, initial euphoria for the electoral success turn into bitterness and resentment with the established parties as they respond to the electoral success of RRPPs by isolating the parties. In addition to becoming disappointed with the established parties’ reactions in such, RRPP-voters will also be more easily convinced by their own parties’ rhetoric that “the elites” cannot be trusted.

We thus propose a model in which RRPP-supporters become less satisfied with democracy in countries where the established parties isolate, and refuse to adapt their policies to, RRPPs, and more satisfied – or at least not less – in countries where established parties collaborate with, and adapt their policies to, RRPPs. If correct, our theory could explain why satisfaction with democracy has increased in countries such as Denmark and Norway in recent years after established parties have invited RRPPs as coalition partners.

Hence, our first hypothesis states that if (at least some of) the established parties respond to the success of a RRPP by collaborating with the party and/or changing their immigration policies to become stricter, voters holding nativist views will likely not become less – and perhaps even more – satisfied with the way democracy works, as they will feel that the political system is actually responsive to their concerns.

In this respect we expect two mechanism to be present. Firstly, we suggest that collaboration between one or several established parties will affect SWD positively among voters holding nativist views in general as a function of policy responsiveness. Secondly, as pointed out by prior research, RRPPs not only thrive on but also fuel discontent through the anti-elite rhetoric whilst voters are cue takers. However, when they are part of the government it is likely that RRPPs de-emphasize their anti-elite rhetoric and hence stops fueling system discontent, which should increase SWD among their core supporters.
It should be pointed out that since we are not only interested in the effect of political inclusion of RRPPs among voters who support these parties but also among those who oppose them, we are expanding our analysis to focus on nativists and non-nativist voters. Voters holding nativist views are here understood as citizens that are critical towards immigration in general and hence are potential supporters of the RRPPs.

However, the RRPP-voters are only one side of the coin. Aggregate patterns of satisfaction with democracy are also affected by how opponents to RRPPs react to RRPPs’ electoral successes. And the mechanisms we have proposed that they will respond in the opposite way to how nativists and RRPP voters respond to RRPPs successes, i.e. that they will become less satisfied with democracy when established parties collaborate with, and adapt their policies to, RRPPs and that they will become more satisfied – or not change their satisfaction – when established parties isolate RRPPs. The shock and the emotional reactions that followed in the wake of the election of Trump suggest strong effects on political support. Similar reactions have been seen in the wake of Brexit and the electoral successes of RRPPs around Europe. When democracy produces election results and governments that seemingly threaten core liberal values, such as minority rights, gender equality, the right to seek asylum, HBTQ-rights, and free trade, citizens may feel that the democratic system does not function satisfactorily (in its current form). Given the values at stake, they will probably respond by becoming more discontent with democracy than if they had lost the elections to a “normal” party in such circumstances, and the response will likely be accentuated if (some) established parties choose to collaborate with the RRPPs instead of firmly opposing the parties. Anecdotal evidence for the mechanism can be found in op-eds such as “After Trump, I’m losing faith in Democracy” (Parris 2016).

The possibility that opponents of RRPPs may become discontent if established parties collaborate with RRPPs suggests a dilemma where actions that increase SWD among RRPP-voters will lower SWD among other voters and vice versa. The effects among other voters may not have been as evident as those among RRPP-voters until recently, given the limited successes that RRPP-parties have had in finding willing partners among established parties. However, with the growing success of RRPPs it is likely to become more important in the future. Therefore, it is a pity that the previous research has focused solely on RRPP-voters. We aim to amend this deficiency by also, as mentioned, include non-nativists and mainstream citizens in the equation.

We expect that the model we propose can help us understand not only variations in historical patterns of satisfaction with democracy and political trust, but also what the future of political support will look like if RRPPs continue to gain ground. Furthermore, by investigating whether and how mainstream parties’ responses to far-right pressure affect perceptions of enfranchisement or discouragement among RRPP- and mainstream voters, we aim to shed light on the consequences of such strategies for democratic legitimacy.
Data and operationalizations

Our key dependent variable is “satisfaction with the way democracy works” (or SWD). The item has been included in the Eurobarometer since the early 1970s and in all waves of the European Social Survey, and is probably the most frequently used indicator of political support. Although the meaning and measure of the SWD item have been debated in the literature (cf. Canache et al. 2001; Linde & Ekman 2003), there is a broad consensus that the item captures public perceptions of the general performance of the democratic political system (Linde & Ekman 2003; Norris 2011; Peffley & Rohrschneider 2014; Hernández 2016; Ferrín 2016).

We use two types of datasets. Firstly, for the broader picture we rely on aggregated numbers from the European Social Surveys (ESS) between the time-span of 2002-2014. We focus on 12 countries in which populist parties are present: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. This gives us ample variation in strategies and policies by mainstream parties. Secondly, for testing which mechanism that are at hand, we use a citizen panel dataset from Netherlands, LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences). The LISS panel data is collected and hosted by CentERdata at Tilburg University in the Netherlands. The panel consists of Dutch citizens who participate in monthly Internet surveys. The panel is based on a probability sample of households drawn from the population register. A longitudinal survey is fielded in the panel every year, covering a large variety of domains including work, education, income, housing, time use, political views, values and personality.

Results

Given the centrality of nativism in our story, we start with a quick discussion of its appearance in European public opinion. After that, we describe patterns of satisfaction with democracy (SWD) among various subgroups of voters in 12 European democracies based on the European Social Survey. Finally, we zoom in on the case of the Netherlands to get a more detailed picture.

Nativism in Europe

Appendix I shows that the share of citizens who (strongly or somewhat) agree that immigrants undermine their national culture is very stable in European democracies. Also, the mean score on a scale composed of cultural, economic and general items about immigration and immigrants (Cronbach’s alpha = .88) is relatively stable within countries. Only Norway and Netherlands shows a decrease overtime but in both countries also an increase in recent years. On average the proportion of nativists in the 12 European democracies included in the data is about 30%. The lowest proportion of nativists is to be found in Sweden (approximately around 11 percent). However, according to recent studies the amount of nativists has been increasing in Sweden as well in the wake of the refugee crisis that culminated during the autumn 2015. According to a yearly survey among swedish citizens conducted by the Society, Media and Opinion institute at the University of Gothenburg, 40 percent of the Swedes agreed
on that it would be a good thing to allow fewer immigrants in 2015. From the 2016 survey, this proportion has increased to 52 percent. The fact that the last year covered in the ESS data is 2014 is thus a limitation. However, against this backdrop we find the proportion of nativists, at least in the twelve European countries in focus of this study, to be both stable and non-neglectable, which indicates that this group of voters very well may impact on aggregated satisfaction with the way democracy works.

**SWD among Europeans**

To get an overview of the key dependent variable, Figure 1 presents the trend in average SWD in the 12 countries. Obviously, levels of SWD are affected by many more factors than the interplay between RRPPs success and political reactions alone, and the differences between countries in both level and trend are large. One more general observation might be that in many countries, and most clearly in Southern Europe (France, Greece), SWD decreased after the economic crisis, but even this trend is far from universal. Also, no clear correlation with RRPP success is visible. This is not surprising, because we expect their effect on SWD to be different for different subgroups in society.

**Figure 1. Trend in SWD in 12 countries**

To see how SWD is related to anti-immigrant sentiment, Figure 2 presents the trend in the marginal effect of nativism on SWD in the same countries. This means that negative numbers indicate that more nativism is associated with lower SWD; positive numbers signal that nativists are more satisfied.
A first observation is that all time points are negative, and that more nativism is thus always associated with less rather than more SWD. However, important variation exists between and within countries, which appears to have at least some tentative association with the role played by RRPPs. First, and uniquely, the marginal effect reached almost zero in Austria in 2002, when FPÖ just started collaborating as a coalition partner in government. At this point, nativists were (almost) as satisfied with democracy as non-nativists in Austria. Another pattern appears in Denmark, where the period they supported the government between 2001 and 2011 has a relatively weak negative relation between nativism and SWD; after that, this association becomes clearly more negative.

In the Netherlands, the (short-lived) supporting role played by PVV in 2010 is associated with a weakening of the negative correlation, too, but to a lesser extent. That year, the effect returns to the level seen in 2006, which was the year PVV entered parliament for the first time. This already suggests that, for nativists, not only RRPP government inclusion or support matters, but that entrance in the political system as such can boost SWD. This might also explain the boost in Sweden in 2012: SD had entered parliament in 2010 already, but after the fieldwork period.

As expected, some of the patterns appear not directly, related to RRPPs’ electoral success or government inclusion, but indirect, due to the adoption of nativist stances by the mainstream right. For instance, the very strong boost in SWD among nativist in France in 2008 follows on (and thus possibly reflects) the election to the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, who had expressed tough stances on the integration of French with an immigration background.
Although - for the ease of the presentation - we have discussed these patterns from the point of view of a nativist voter, it is important to keep in mind that the reverse is expected to hold for non-nativists. However, it is an open question whether the ‘encouragement’ of nativists is as large as the ‘discouragement’ of non-nativists. Figure 3 therefore shows separate trends for ‘non-nativists’ (those who do not think immigrants undermine the national culture) and ‘nativists’ (those who think immigrants do undermine this culture).
The figure suggests that moments of convergence between nativists and non-nativists are more strongly driven by increasing SWD among nativists than by decreasing SWD among non-nativists. For instance, while SWD rose in Denmark after DF stopped supporting the government, the drop in SWD among nativists is relatively larger. In Netherlands we find an almost perfect convergence between nativists and non-nativists by the supporting role played by PVV in 2010. This is due to both a decrease among non-nativists as a increase among nativists.

**Zooming in: the Netherlands**

We now turn to the Netherlands. To get a first idea of the trend in that country, Figure 4 shows the trend in mean SWD among two groups: the most and least nativist halves of the population (split across the median score on the nativism scale). In line with the patterns above, the inclusion of PVV as a support party in 2010 was accompanied by an increase in SWD among nativists. The cooperation continued in 2011, which was also the year of the eurozone crisis, which probably explains the drop in SWD among all voters. In (late) 2012, the support role by PVV had collapsed, which is associated with a recovery in SWD among non-nativists, but not among nativists. In 2013, the distance between the two groups remained fairly similar. The crucial point is that, while levels of SWD follow a similar general trend in both groups, they only converged during PVV inclusion, and ‘diverged back’ outside this period.
Of course, like the cross-national overview presented above, these numbers still reflect aggregate trends which might be subject to various confounders. The panel structure of the Dutch data allows us to track individual respondents over time, thus making it possible to draw stronger inferences about the effect of moments of inclusion on citizens. Table 1 in the Appendix shows the result of a panel regression in which SWD is regressed on Wilders’ inclusion in government, controlling for the lag in SWD. Crucially, the effect of Wilders’ government participation is interacted with (a) nativism and (b) support for Wilders. Figure 5 presents the results of these interactions.

The left graph confirms that inclusion increases SWD among nativists, while it decreases SWD among those low on nativism. The right graph shows that SWD strongly increases during inclusion for PVV voters, while it decreases for those who do not vote PVV.
The interesting result of this regression is that both interactions exists next to each other. In other words, the increase and decrease among respectively nativists and non-nativists is not confounded by the fact that they are PVV supporters who see their party in power (which would simply replicate findings about election winners and losers). Rather, it likely (also) reflects happiness or frustration about changes in policy.

As a last step, we tentatively zoom in on the possible mechanism behind nativists’ and RRPPs’ voters’ rise in SWD during times of inclusion. As discussed above, two mechanisms can possibly explain this. First, it might reflect that RRPPs (temporarily) seize or downplay their anti-establishment rhetoric. This would mean that the increase in SWD should primarily be visible among their specific voters (but possibly also among the broader group of nativists at large who might be sympathetic to their program and might adopt their anti-establishment message). Second, the increase (among nativists particularly) might be due to an increased feeling of being represented in the political sphere.

Our analyses show that the increase in SWD among nativists in times of inclusion is only slightly reduced after including a measure of external efficacy (“People like me have no influence on what the government does”), suggesting that mediation by such feelings is limited. However, an analysis in which external efficacy is predicted based on inclusion shows that its effect is somewhat negative for non-nativists, while it is clearly positive among nativists. So, the rise in SWD among nativist (and drop in SWD among non-nativists) is mirrored in a rise (drop) in external efficacy among nativists (non-nativists). Given, furthermore, that inclusion strategies interacted independently with PVV voter status and nativism, we therefore tentatively conclude that some evidence exists for both mechanisms.

**Summary and conclusions**

This paper set out to elaborate on the relationship between overall satisfaction with the way democracy works and the increasing success of RRPPs in Europe. While previous research mainly has focused on declining democratic discontent as a cause of the success of RRPPs, it has recently been suggested that RRPPs not only thrive on, but also fuel, democratic discontent. The reason is that voters often are cue takers who pick up the anti-elite rhetoric of these parties, which in turn implies that levels of satisfaction with democracy will decline as RRPPs win over a growing proportion of a country’s electorate.

However, quite surprisingly, trend-data from the *Eurobarometer* demonstrate that aggregate satisfaction with democracy has in fact *increased* in many established European democracies during the last decades. Even more surprisingly, this increase has in fact been most prominent in countries where RRPPs have enjoyed some of their most spectacular electoral success, such as in Austria, Denmark, and Finland.

In this paper we have aimed to reconcile these seemingly contradictory findings by exploring empirically whether voters’ responses to RRPPs’ electoral successes, in terms of satisfaction
with democracy, depend on whether established parties respond to the successes by including or excluding the RRPPs.

Levels of, and trends in, SWD in various European countries suggest that, indeed, a convergence occurs in times of inclusion of RRPPs between nativists and non-nativists in society. While the latter group is systematically less satisfied with democracy across the board, they gain in satisfaction during inclusion of RRPPs or (it seems) at the moment of their entry into parliament. The former, non-nativist group becomes less satisfied with democracy at these moments. This general trend is confirmed in a more stringent test on panel data in the Netherlands.

These findings highlight the dilemma faced by mainstream parties. Strategies of inclusion increase the legitimacy of the system among nativist voters. At the same time, it somewhat decreases SWD among non-nativist voters. Both results are normatively problematic for the health of democracies.

At the same time, our findings might also provide a starting point to explain the paradox mentioned at the beginning: the fact that SWD has risen clearly more in countries with strong RRPP presence and participation. This is likely to reflect that the encouragement felt by nativists appears of roughly equal size (but likely either smaller and larger in specific contexts) than the democratic discouragement experienced by non-nativists. The net result of these patterns will determine whether RRPP inclusion hurts or strengthens democratic legitimacy. Regardless of these net outcomes, the process will increase the politicization of SWD.

A major drawback with the current study is the limited amount of variability in our main independent variable of inclusiveness. Some points of departure for future research would thus be, beside opting for longer individual level time-series data, to aim for survey-embedded experiments. A such approach would allow for elaborating on the mechanisms in relation to different strategies of inclusiveness and its impact on political support. An alternative approach could also be to opt for data with regional variation in party collaborations although immigration issue mainly are discussed at the national level.
References


Appendix I

Mean nativism

ESS round

Share of nativist
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs

Does not want immigration

RECODE of essround (ESS round)

Culture is undermined by immigrants

share of allowing "no" or "a few" immigrants from other cultures
## Appendix II

### Table 1. Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Random-effects GLS regression</th>
<th>Number of obs  = 27,099</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of groups = 7,860</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-sq:</td>
<td>Obs per group:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within = 0.0062</td>
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<tr>
<td>between = 0.6628</td>
<td>avg = 3.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>overall = 0.110</td>
<td>max = 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wald chi2(7) = 3934.30</td>
<td>Prob &gt; chi2 = 0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Std. Err. adjusted for 7,860 clusters in id)

|         | Robust Coef. | Std. Err. | z     | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|---------|--------------|------------|-------|------|----------------------|
| democt  |              |            |       |      |                      |
| L1.     | .05266556    | .0056556   | 9.31  | 0.000| .0450708             | .0602633             |
| nativism|              |            |       |      |                      |
| L1.     | -.1400451    | .1056123   | -1.32 | 0.000| -.3497148            | -.029214             |
| Wildersgov|            |            |       |      |                      |
| PVVvote | -.4265094    | .0705894   | -6.02 | 0.000| -.5655196            | -.2876533            |
| c.Wildersgov*c.PVVvote| .2620482    | .0780274   | 3.36  | 0.001| .1092920             | .4150672             |
| Wildersgov| 0 (omitted) |            |       |      |                      |
| lnativism| 0 (omitted)  |            |       |      |                      |
| c.Wildersgov*c.lnativism| .6761001    | .1417012   | 4.77  | 0.000| .3983708             | .9538294             |
| panel   | -.022379     | .0063494   | -3.51 | 0.000| -.0350037            | -.0097552            |
| _cons   | 4.361478     | .0947321   | 46.04 | 0.000| 4.175807             | 4.54715              |

sigma_u  | .57497118   |            |       |      |                      |
| sigma_e  | 1.1684317   |            |       |      |                      |
| rho      | .1955656    |            |       |      | (fraction of variance due to u_i) |
| rho      | .19236243   |            |       |      | (fraction of variance due to u_i) |