Moderation of Islamist Movements. A Comparative Analysis of Moroccan PJD and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood∗

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Abstract

The analysis of Moroccan Islamist party PJD and Egyptian Islamist movement Muslim Brotherhood aims to achieve two separate but interconnected goals. First, the comparative method enables us to highlight varieties concerning the level of their behavioural and ideological moderation and the factors that brought them about, such as institutional design of the regimes and their ideological framework as well as the level of institutionalization of Islamists’ organizations. Second, it enables us to empirically test the basic assumptions of the theory of participation and moderation that came to dominate the academic discourse on Islamist movements in the last decade.

Keywords: Elections, Institutions, Islam, Party Manifestos, Political Participation, Political Parties

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1 Introduction

In almost every country of the Muslim world nowadays, non-violent Islamists constitute the most viable political actors. I use the term Islamists/ Islamist party when analysing political groups and parties which formulate their agenda and ideology based on Islamic frame of reference. (Asseburg, 2007: 9) Their success lies within their attempt at ideologizing Islamic religion. This ideology contains set of political and social statements and ideas which come about as a reaction to social and political malaise and thus provide an alternative to the status quo. (Daadaoui, 2011: 99) Their general popularity stems from a vast array of social, religious and economic activities, mainly operated within concrete communities or constituencies. Populism combined with their large-scale mobilization potential makes them the most effective counterbalance to authoritarian regimes in place. This branch of Islamism so called *Ikhwan* is currently best represented by the movements and parties claiming their ideological roots from Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, such as Islamic Action Front in Jordan, Party of Justice and Development in Morocco, An-Nahda in Tunisia, Iraqi Islamic Party, Hamas in Palestine, Al-Islah in Yemen, Minbar in Bahrain, Movement for Society and Peace in Algeria and National Islamic Front in Sudan. These parties could be characterised as reformist, willing to participate, advocating social conservatism and political reformism on religious grounds and largely concentrated of national politics, unlike the transnational Islamist movements. (Hesová, 2012: 7) Despite their common ideological roots they display different levels of tolerance of opposing views and different level of flexibility concerning their ideological views.

Main objective of the paper thus will be to compare two of these movements- Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, within the framework of participation-moderation theory (Schwedler, 2006; Tezcur, 2010). This theory is becoming more and more embedded in the field of analysis of Islamist parties and movements, even though its theoretical assumptions do not originate from unified criteria for operationalization and therefore often reach different conclusions. It is however still a problem that needs to be tackled, especially due to the potential of Islamists to govern in the future. Whether particular party or movement is moderate also has deep repercussions for future parameters of transformation in the countries of Middle East and thus can serve as a model for analysis of other movements in the region, which has been going through the process of changes since 2011. Causality of inclusion and moderation is amended in the paper by intervening variable- institutionalization of Islamist parties and movements, which provides more adequate link between assumptions and conclusions of the theory. Moderation
of Islamist opposition can generally be divided into two dimensions—behavioural moderation (which denotes change in Islamists’ behaviour in terms of adaptation to the regime’s overall rules of the game) and ideological moderation (which denotes substantive change in ideological stances). Working definition of moderation applied in the paper originates from Schwedler (2006), who defines it as a “movement from a relatively closed and rigid worldview to one more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives”. Most of the current research on religious movements has an underlying secularization thesis, therefore we should be susceptible to an outright rejection of Islamists as undemocratic force per se. However, we can still effectively place different Islamist movements on a continuum of plurality acceptance and their ability to accommodate sharia to modern demands.

2 Theoretical background

The issue of moderation of Islamist movements and parties has come to the forefront since the outbreak of Arab Spring in which the Islamists became the sole beneficiaries of democratic openings in spite of their earlier reluctance to join the protests whole-heartedly. The theory of participation and moderation was pioneered by Samuel Huntington (1991) in Third wave of democracy, where he first proposed that parties generally sacrifice ideological platforms for the sake of political legality and success in the elections. Radicals thus become moderate actors based on strategic choice. The reality in the Arab countries clearly shows that participation has been enlarged to include previously anti-systemic Islamists as well. Nevertheless the participation alone is not the sole condition of moderation, as numerous radical and violent Islamist groups can be found to participate in politics, resisting any meaningful change in their beliefs. (Ashour, 2009: 18) Even the reversed logic of causality of repression and radicalization fails empirically (Hafez, 2003), an exception being the case of Algeria in 1989. Cancellation of first democratic elections as the Islamic Salvation Front was clearly poised to win the national vote, escalated into violent civil war between the regime and Islamists. (Dalacoura, 2006: 517) Other than that, Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt, for instance, faced harsh repressions throughout the 90s, but never took up arms against the regime. Mainly because they understood that violent confrontation with the regime would most probably lead to the dissolution of their organizations. (Ghobashy, 2005: 391) Accordingly, even concerning the moderation of AKP in Turkey, it remains disputable whether it was a result of its participation or a result of concerted pressure by the judiciary and military to behave according to general rules of the game. (Dalacoura, 2006: 522)
The most moderate of Islamist parties nowadays, claim to represent a current that according to their self-evaluation is similar to Christian democratic parties in Europe. This analogy is often refuted as over-ambitious and misleading. However, as Brown (2012: 34-58) correctly notes, the experience of Christian democrats since their onset as anti-systemic, dogmatic and illiberal forces, tamed by the context of emerging democratic participation, is often forgotten. The concept of institutionalization employed in the paper thus bears similarity to politicization, a concept which assumes that participation offers Islamists meaningful gains as well as substantial risks for other strategies. (ibid: 44) The stability and legitimacy of particular political systems—be it democratic or authoritarian, therefore has a strong explanatory potential for analysing moderation of Islamists. I thus amended the participation-moderation theory by intervening variable of institutionalization of Islamists, which is not conditioned merely by participation but mostly by its quality. In the paper participation constitutes active involvement of Islamist parties and movements within parliamentary elections, universities, local political structures, and professional syndicates.

Besides the precise definition of participation and its relation to moderation, another puzzle of the theory is its lack of general consensus on what constitutes moderation. Is it a process or an outcome? Generally speaking, the lowest common denominator of moderation concepts is the moderation as a willingness to participate and a rejection of violent pursuit of Islamists’ agenda. (Asseburg, 2007) Nevertheless, these aspects cannot explain the nuances in behaviour and ideology of non-violent movements and thus have relatively low explanatory potential for comparative political science. Different conclusions reached by studying the same subject point to the rather comparative potential of the theory and to the necessity of crafting a generally agreed on definition of moderation accompanied by a set of indicators to study. To illustrate this point, consider different conclusions reached by studying the same movement IAF in Jordan. Janine Clark concluded that IAF’s moderation in simply selective and limited, based on its unwillingness to compromise beyond the red line issues (such as honour killings, quotas for women, or divorce rights thereof). (Clark, 2006: 555) On the other hand, Schwedler (2006) argues that IAF has moved further towards the agreement on basic democratic principles than Islamic party Islah (Reform) in Yemen.

When defining moderation one must bear in mind that is not merely an analytic category, but it often reflects bias of various scholars. Moreover, critics object that so far, there has not been enough resolve on the side of Islamists to normative change in favour of democratization and liberalization. (Tibi, 2008; Baran, 2008) They warn of fixed principles of Islamists’ identity such as the long-term preference for imposition of sharia law, gender segregation, limits to freedom of speech and expression and their anti-Semitic stances. Furthermore, most Islamists
do not unconditionally condemn political violence and themselves participate in assaults and harassment targeting secular intellectuals. (Schwedler, 2006: 9) Finally the issue of comprehensive Islamists’ moderation cannot be inconclusively verified as long as one cannot see what is in the minds and hearts of political actors. As such, even the most moderate Islamist movement- AKP in Turkey, which serves as an example for Ikwani movements across the Arab world- seems to be following logic of democracy and limited liberalism selectively. (Gurses, 2012: 1) Strategic logic of moderation cannot be ruled out as the recent democratization platform of Islamists seems to be in line with their objectives of enlarging their room to manoeuvre and to spread their agenda. (Wickham, 2013: 9) Short-term maximization of gains by Islamists (for example by sophisticating their approach to sharia) thus does not necessarily mean they left aside their long-term objectives of comprehensive Islamization.

Wickham (2004) understands moderation as a value change of Islamist leaders, which depends on such factors as strategic calculations, political learning and interactions with secular opposition. However, value change is rather abstract concept, which tells us little about the causes of such change. (Ashour, 2009: 24). Moreover, political learning is also a vague concept, as each Islamist movement has been confronted with different lesson. While Egyptian Islamists were confronted with large-scale repression, Moroccan Islamists were not. Schwedler (2006) specifies moderation as „a movement from a relatively closed and rigid worldview to one more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives“. The author considers internal debate within the Islamist movement or party to be the key factor which later enables Islamists to justify previously unthinkable changes. In her view, ideological moderation is not solely a result of reformist or charismatic leadership, but a process of collective engagement in the debate on basic ideological principles. (Schwedler, 2011: 359) Internal debate of majority of Islamist movements and parties is indeed influenced by the dynamics between reformist and conservative fractions, for instance in matters of measure of application of sharia law. Internal dynamic is thus decisive in understanding the moderation, which in turn is influenced by the external forces of the context. (Ottaway – Hamzawy, 2008: 9) However, it is debatable whether one can generalize the emergence of liberal-minded fraction to the whole movement, as the decision-making may still rest within the hands of a single and narrow group of conservative elites, which is the case of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Ashour (2009) understands moderation as a positive stance towards democracy and political pluralism. It is two-dimensional concept- behavioural moderation denotes usage of electoral strategies available, searching for compromise with other actors and resolving political differences in a peaceful manner. Ideological moderation, on the other hand, denotes respect
towards sovereignty of people (instead of God), political plurality and limited government. (Tezcur, 2010; Ashour, 2009; Wickham, 2004) While behavioural moderation of religious parties is characteristic by dealing with questions of whether and how political parties agree with the rules of the political game, ideological moderation tells us whether they accept legitimacy of secular institutions (institutions of state) and political claims of other actors, mainly ethnic, religious minorities and women. (Tepe, 2012: 468) Behavioural moderation may not always spill-over to ideological dimension. It may simply serve as a strategy to consolidate the party’s position within the political system. This shows that there is no mutual causal relationship between the two dimensions and thus they flow from separate but intertwined causes.

3 Institutional context of participation

Institutional context affects moderation in many ways. Generally, the more „normal“ the conditions of participation in a particular country, the more probable it is that moderate members can get to the forefront of the organization and the party or movement becomes more institutionalized, more flexible and open to compromises. In more open context, Islamists can concentrate on their work in parliament and the creation of concrete agenda. Normal conditions exist if a party does not face excessive repressions, and if their popularity is translated into representation in parliament. (Ottaway – Hamzawy, 2008: 13) From this perspective, „normal“ conditions can be found for instance in Algeria, Kuwait and Morocco, while Egypt does not fit in this category. This has had a major impact on the different trajectories of both movements, despite similar starting position.

Character of participation in Morocco

Moroccan monarchy established unofficial alliance with Islamists already in the 1970s, as part of an effort to counter nationalistic and socialist forces in the country. In this context the King relied on the movement Shabiba al-Islamiya (Islamic Youth), founded in 1969 and lead by Abdelkarim Mouti. Predecessor of PJD party was in the initial years after its establishment overly concerned with moral reform of Moroccan society. (Howe, 2005: 127) The tolerance of the regime towards Shabiba reached its tipping point in the year 1975, when the movement had been implicated in the assassination of socialist leader of USFP party Omar Benjelloun. (Pruzan-Jørgensen, 2010: 11) As a result of this assassination, Mouti was forced to exile, where he resumed his quest to fight the regime by supporting jihadi fighters in Morocco. From the point of political development, the departure of Mouti enabled creation of separate,
more liberal wing under the auspices of Abdelilah Benkirane, which attempted several times to obtain status of an official political party. As he later observed: „..we did not stand a chance outside the system...we had to choose the path of support and reform from within“. (Zeghal, 2008: 167) These efforts paid off in 1996, when the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR, Harakat at-Tawhid wal-Islah) was legalized and became an umbrella for almost 200 different Islamic associations. Later they joined forces with already existing party MPDC of Abdelkrim al-Khatib, which had been inactive since 1965. In 1998 Islamists absorbed the party and renamed it Party of Justice and Development (PJD, Hizb al-Ádalah wa at-Tanmiyah).

Unconventional alliance between the prominent secularist Khatib, who has been a long-time ally of King, indicates the monarchy’s effort to contain and control Islamists from within. Especially as Khatib conditioned this alliance by acceptance of monarchy’s legitimacy. (Mekouar, 2010: 7) Thus since 1998 Islamist party PJD operates in Morocco as a standard political party.

King Hasan II decided to integrate non-violent Islamists due to several reasons. Firstly, the grave economic situation required deepening of the previous social contract (the same happened with socialists in previous years) (Mekouar, 2010: 8). Secondly, mobilization potential of Islamists was undoubted and since the protests against the Gulf War it has been constantly on the rise. Thirdly, the events in Algeria clearly demonstrated to the regime that any possible integration of Islamists must be accompanied by prior deliberations and deals. Co-optation of PJD thus logically resulted in their interest in maintaining the status quo, which in turn affected their adaptability. This adaptability proved to be crucial especially in the moment of eruption of protests associated with Arab Spring in Morocco. Co-optation, however, bears an implicit risk to Islamists of being seen as allies to non-democratic regime, as well as it may result in internal schism regarding such a loyal participation.

Election rules can also significantly affect the moderation of Islamists. (Tepe, 2012: 474) They generate basic rules of the game, which consequently influence internal unity, discipline and character of Islamists’ campaigns. Morocco first used majoritarian election system, which was later replaced by proportional representation system with 3 per cent threshold. In the absence of formal regime party, both systems generated the need to form coalitions, which are easily manageable for the King. (Lust-Okar – Jamal, 2002) In practice this resulted in a situation, where in 2002 elections the winning party obtained only 15 per cent of the national vote and 16 out of 22 parties reached 5 or less per cent. This situation was repeated in 2007 and with a slightly higher margin also in the last election of 2011. (Mauck, 2008: 26) Besides, prior to elections monarchy also extensively uses gerrymandering in favour of rural districts which include comparatively fewer registered voters than the coastal areas and major
cities. The aim of such strategy is to counter the success of PJD, which is dominant in the major cities. (ibid: 27) This resulted in PJD’s position as one of many political parties in Morocco, instead of a dominant one.

**Character of participation in Egypt**

Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 in Ismailia by Hassan al-Banna with the objective of gradual restoration of Islamic caliphate and reform of Egyptian society through implementation of Islamic *sharia*. Brotherhood constituted a threat to every regime since its emergence, which lead at various times to repression of their leaders, individual members and supporters. In 1954, after the assassination attempt on president Nasser, MB was designated as an illegal organization, which remained in effect until the outburst of Egyptian revolution, only to be applied again after the coup in July 2013. Following the attempt numerous members and associates of MB were imprisoned. (Kassem, 2004: 140) Later in 1965, after Nasser revealed MB’s conspiracy to overthrow the regime, the movement faced another phase of violent repressions, during which the most prominent ideologist of Brotherhood Sayyd Qutb was executed. (Blaydes, 2011: 149) Legacy of his radical ideology of *qutbism* later inspired many Islamist terrorist movements in Egypt, such as Takfir wal-Hijra, Gama’a al-Islamiya and Islamic Jihad, who battled the regime until 1997. Muslim Brotherhood, however, succeeded in pacifying its radical wing—*Nizam al-Khas*. In 1969 newly elected MB’s General Guide Hassan al-Hudaybi published manifesto entitled “Preachers not judges”, as a refutation of violent ideology of Sayyd Qutb. (Dalacoura, 2011:132) Concurrently, by the end of 1960s and beginning of 1970s a strong autonomous Islamic movement emerged in the university circles in Egypt. President Sadat utilized this opportunity to get rid of what remained of Nasser-inspired leftist movements in the country and to counter the militant extremists. (Kassem, 2004: 141) Sadat stylized himself as a “believer president” and legitimized himself by religion.

However, in the final years of his presidency, Sadat came into conflict with Islamist movement. In 1979 he signed a peace treaty with Israel, which was considered illegitimate and anti-Islamic move by the Islamists. The conflict again resulted into imprisonment of hundreds of MB members. Despite the fall-out with regime, the electoral path remained the key strategy Islamists employed to spread their ideology. (Hafez, 2003: 49) After Mubarak assumed power in 1981, he freed most of imprisoned MB members. In 1995, however, he backtracked on the process of appeasement with Islamists and entered a phase of deliberation. Nevertheless, Egyptian regime has never attempted to crush down Brotherhood completely. They tolerated MB without having to grant them legal status. Illegality of the movement thus
enabled the regime to take measures against them, if they became too powerful (as evidenced by the regime’s shut-down of professional syndicates, which became hotbed of Brotherhood political activity). On the other hand, MB understood this as a signal to deepen their activities within society and backdoor politics. (Rashwan, 2009: 11) Preference for stability and extra-parliamentary activities served Brotherhood’s long-term agenda. They conceived that before the regime crumbles, Muslim Brotherhood must create strong alternative socio-political network for the potential power take-over. (Blaydes, 2011: 153) At the same time, however, their hegemonic character curtailed their adaptation ability.

Egyptian electoral system also had an impact on Muslim Brotherhood’s evolution. In 1987 Egyptian elections settled on majoritarian electoral system with almost unattainable 8 per cent threshold, which deterred any chances for smaller parties to win seats to the rubber-stamp parliament. Design of the Egyptian electoral law and its implementation reflects the basic dilemma of authoritarian presidents- their dependence on gaining at least two-thirds of parliamentary seats in order to be re-elected. (Lust-Okar – Jamal, 2002: 354) Besides the highly skewed and fraudulent elections, Egyptian government also used other formal instruments of control to contain threats, such as for example Political parties law no. 40/1977, which established strict ban on formation of parties based on social, sectarian, geographic, racial or religious affiliation. (Gohar, 2008: 172) This clause was clearly used to prevent Muslim Brotherhood from gaining an official status. Following Supreme court decision to allow individual candidacy, MB made use of their social legitimacy and subsequently won over majority of opposition votes in parliamentary elections. It was a result of electoral system which empowered movements and parties that had firm footing on the country-wide level, especially as MB was able to compete with the regime by providing social and financial services in the impoverished areas. (Lust-Okar, 2006: 465) Moreover, constant repressions and the necessity to organize as local underground cells, reinforced MB’s conservatism and unwillingness to revise the functioning formula of combing rather conflicting activities of social and political movement.

4 Institutionalization

Institutionalization of Islamist parties and movements acts as an intervening variable for the purpose of analysing their behavioural moderation. It does not have an independent causal value, but enables the realization thereof. Party organizations originate as „systems of solidarity“. In the initial phase they are characterized by homogeneity and equality of its members, while realization of common ideology is its unifying principle. However,
organizational development in latter phases brings about internal diversification and inequality, which challenges the original system of internal participation. The party thus becomes a system of interests and the strength of ideology diminishes, therefore making the survival of organization the sole principle. Organizational survival can only be secured by process of adaptation. (Panebianco, 1988: 19) Revolutionary ideology becomes obsolete and leaders will try to avoid socially costly actions and risky agendas. (Michels, 1959) This development is an ideal type, while the extent of its implementation depends on several factors. Institutionalization encompasses formalization of means of communication and decision-making procedures. (Wegner, 2004: 6) Open participation enables parties to create decentralized structures, without the fear for their survival, to strengthen the role of grassroots members and to create transparent by-laws, rules of conduct and structures. The more formalized an organization, the more institutionalized it is. In this case, PJD fits the description, while Muslim Brotherhood’s institutionalization is fairly lower.

Institutionalization of PJD

PJD currently has legislative and executive bodies, so called secretariats, elected on three levels. The country-wide General Secretariat has the most powers. National Shura Council is a body represented mainly by middle cadres. Finally, key issues are usually discussed on nation-wide Congress of the party. (Wegner, 2004: 9) Resulting from gradual separation between the social movement in place and political party as such, there have been significant changes introduced to the Charter of PJD, which curtailed the powers vested in General Secretariat and established more transparent competences for all the bodies. Moreover, the procedure for selecting candidates to elections has become more standardized as well. (Wegner, 2011: 38) Financially, PJD depends almost exclusively on its membership and MPs, which facilitated more responsive rules of internal participation within the decentralized structures of the party. (Boubekeur – Amghar, 2006) All members thus have a share in the survival of the party, which in turn influences its institutionalization. Furthermore, the Moroccan laws compelled PJD to succumb to transparency in its internal matters. For example, the Parties law forces all parties to disclose detailed agendas, information on leaders and membership base and all of its financial operations. This enforced dependency resulted in PJD being free of external interests and favoured their generic development, unlike in the case of MB in Egypt.

Open participation generally inspires plurality and internal differentiation as well as debate and conflict-resolution based on internal procedures. Within the nation-wide Congress of PJD the representation of grassroots members has been constantly on the rise (currently on one-
third of the body), which hints at the open possibilities for lower and middle cadres to assert themselves in decision-making bodies of the party. PJD also created specific structures such as youth council, women organization and Development Forum, which trains MPs and cooperates with professionals on agenda-setting. Unique feature of PJD is also their degree of representation by the youth. Currently there are almost 40 per cent of all candidates in elections who are 40 years and younger. (Wegner, 2004: 52) Owing to the condition that PJD abides by the Moroccan Parties law, they had to appropriate representation of women as well. In Morocco the official quota for women membership is 15 per cent and according to Lahcen Daoudi, member of PJD, there are around 15 – 20 per cent of women in the party. Bassima Hakkaoui, current Minister of Solidarity, Women, Family and Social Development in PJD’s cabinet, argues that women should engage more in public debates, not just those that concern women issues. (Rapp, 2008) She even criticized her colleagues for nominating only one woman to governmental position, as in the previous government there were seven women. (Errazzouki, 2012) Despite Hakkaoui’s strong position, there are a few women in executive positions in the party. Nevertheless, the sole fact that there are some, is what distinguishes PJD from MB in Egypt.

After the latest victories of PJD in the Moroccan elections, the party became a channel through which ambitious elites can rise to power. Material benefits and individual interests play an important role for the newly accepted members. In the last couple of years many MPs have broken the imperative mandate of PJD and protested against the mandatory allocation of their shares of income on the behalf of party budget. (Wegner, 2004: 16) PJD’s electorate has also diversified in the recent years. While the core of their supporters comprises ideological voters who prefer more Islamic values in politics, second most distinctive group of voters are those who value PJD’s transparency, integrity or simply the fact that they are new to the government game. Furthermore, with the weakening of traditional parties, perceived as corrupted, PJD has taken up their voters as well. (Wegner, 2011: 108) Current internal composition of PJD copies plurality of views of the Moroccan society. These ideological differences are a result of how the party emerged, as a mosaic structure allying cadres from hundreds of Islamic associations. This also has repercussions on the internal-conflict management, where so far no fraction has been able to secure firm control in decision-making. (Zeghal, 2008: 175) For instance, the leaders diverge in terms of support for the monarchy. While political radicals reject narrow cooperation with the monarchy they find illegitimate, moderates support it. (Wegner, 2011: 97) Nevertheless, internal differences are open and visible even for outside observers, but mostly they are successfully addressed on the
level of internal procedures. (El-Sherif, 2011: 176) All these factors hint at a degree of institutionalization of PJD in the recent years.

**Institutionalization of MB**

The basic organizational unit of Muslim Brotherhood is so called *usra* (cell), which is composed of four or five members. Its competencies are given by the sector it oversees and it is supervised by MB’s regional administration. The leadership or regional administration is, unlike in the case of other Egyptian parties, elected. At the tip of the pyramid, the most important body is Guidance Bureau (*maktab al-irshad*), presided by General Guide. General Guide is the leader of Muslim Brotherhood, who sets the general frame of movement’s activities, presides over the *Shura* council and worldwide organization of Muslim Brotherhood. In the 1990s Brotherhood drafted its first official charter, which specified internal procedures. However, this charter is not accessible to wider membership and there is currently no discussion about its revision.\(^1\) The election of Guidance Bureau is organized on the level of *Shura* council, where only the prominent members are elected, thus creating system in which the most powerful members have the upper hand. *Shura* council is formally elected on regular bases, however state repressions have usually thwarted its meetings. (Ghobashy, 2005: 377) This strictly hierarchical structure has been able to deliver effective execution of MB’s policies all the while maintaining the movement’s unity. This deliberate design has ensured centralization of decision-making and decentralization of implementation, much like the Leninist-type of parties practicing democratic centralism. (El-Sherif, 2011: 290).

Inability to participate for the grassroots has been replaced by strong sense of common cause and loyalty to the organization. This aspect is strengthened by the recruitment procedure, where aspiring members undertake 5-8 years of socialization and indoctrination, going through several phases before becoming an active member, much like in any other clandestine movement. (Trager, 2012) Moreover, the unity of leadership is ensured through a degree of nepotism, when most of the Bureau is connected through the bonds of family relations or regional affiliation. According to one member of MB, the movement estimates around 700 000 grassroots members and around 3 million sympathizers, included within the movement’s network of social services.\(^2\) Besides the membership fees, the MB receives sponsoring from businesses connected with MB and its charitable organizations, as well as remittances especially from workers in Saudi Arabia. (Antar, 2006: 15)

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1 Author’s interview with prof. Ashraf El-Sherif, American University in Cairo, Nov 2012
2 Author’s interview with prominent member of MB, Cairo, Nov 2012
Brotherhood is generally divided along two lines—generational and participational. The older generation, which presides in upper echelons of the movement is generally highly conservative and suspicious to political activism. On the other hand, middle and young generation is very active, socialized in an atmosphere of Islamist university activism. (Altman, 2006: 2) Lastly, the youngest generations, largely in their 30s, is a complex one. Before the revolution, MB’s liberal bloggers and highly educated youth were very visible. However, even before their departure from the movement after the revolution, reformist youth was estimated to make up only around 15 per cent of the third generation, while the rest were proponents of Salafism. The ascendance of Salafism can be contributed to the repression against MB and lack of quality education. Therefore, Salafism attracts youth as its message is simpler and less sophisticated and complex than the approach of reformists. (Lynch, 2007: 30) Regarding the issue of participation, Brotherhood is divided into conservatives, who perceive the organization as an aim in itself and therefore support the exclusivist vision of a movement as a way of life, rather than political notion. These neo-traditionalists are nowadays dominant inside the movement, represented by the likes of Ezzat, Ghozlan, Shater, Morsy and the current General Guide Badie. The second group—reformists, perceives the movement as a means to an end and is against the rigid structure of Brotherhood. However, the reformists have never been formalized into powerful or coherent fraction, rather they were represented by few liberal-minded individuals. Majority of reformists left the movement after the revolution in 2011 and established their own political projects. Even in the past, the reformists were often disqualified from the movement based on an internal judiciary procedure, which does not have codified rules and frequently served as political instrument of those in power. (Salah, 2012)

While participation within PJD party in Morocco gives its members room to pursue career advancement, inside the Muslim Brotherhood it is ideological motivations that generally prevail. Limited participation opportunities inside MB are exemplified by its youth, which makes up around 50 per cent of the whole membership, yet does not have any decision-making powers. (Martini – Kaye – York, 2012: 9) From the point of representation of women, MB gives them highest priority inside the Muslim Sisters structure. These women are crucial in recruiting new female voters from conservative families as only other women are allowed to stay in contact with them. However, their significance beyond the campaigning, as candidates in the elections or members of executive bodies, is extremely limited or usually non-existent. (Abdel-Latif, 2008) Besides the conservative tendency of MB, another reason

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3 Author’s interview with prof. Ashraf El-Sherif, American University in Cairo, Nov 2012
for the limited role of women inside the movement is that Brotherhood did not have to conform to quotas for representation set by the regime. This again demonstrates the formative character of official participation and legalisation on an organisational development of Islamists. Weak internal diversification of MB therefore lowers the necessity to change its overall character and the conservative ideology thus remains the only element bridging their membership base. MB thus does not entirely fall into category of institutionalized entity, despite its huge organizational complexity. Systematic repression pushed Brotherhood to detach themselves organizationally and ideologically from external influences. Furthermore, the need to protect the sole survival of the organization markedly affected measures of intra-movement debate and freedom of speech and behaviour of individual members. Internal debate and plurality ossified in favour of keeping the organization intact and united against the possible emergence of different fractions. (Pioppi, 2011: 51) Prominent ex-member of MB Aboul-Fotouh asserted that „the climate of repression and exclusion has aborted the conduct of internal elections within the Brotherhood and strengthened the hand of those who reject the growth of democracy within group“ (Wickham, 2013: 102)

4. 1 Model for an analysis of moderation of Islamist movements and parties

4 Behavioural moderation

The paper presents behavioural moderation as a movement from a relatively closed and rigid worldview to one more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives, which is based on the respect towards the rules of the game and the Islamists’ adaptability. In practice this can be
observed on a set of proxies, such as separation from original social movement (which represents conservatism and ideological exclusivism), engagement predominantly in the parliamentarian sphere of political activity and the cooperation with secular actors within the political system.

**Dilemma of creating independent political party**

Working separation between the social movement and Islamist party in place is a necessary component of behavioural moderation. As long as the political party is institutionally, financially, ideologically, on the level of legitimacy and human resources dependent on the movement, their priorities will be interlinked, vague and too complex. (Wegner, 2011: xxxviii)

PJД has had a clear stance of the functional separation early after its establishment. There have been numerous thinkers and leaders within the party and the movement who considered separation of missionary and political activities as an effective mechanism. These ideas were reflected in the institutional sphere as well as, therefore the impulse for separation was not exclusively driven by the regime’s conditions, but internal choices as well.⁴ In 2004 PJД’s social movement MUR organized meeting of consultative assembly during which it has been decided that activities of movement and party shall be differentiated, yet subject to cooperation (sharaka). (Perekli, 2012: 98) Formal separation was finalized in the document „Political participation and the relationship between the movement [MUR] and the party [PJД]“ published in 2006. Document was inspired by the teachings of Mohamed Yatim, deputy chairman of MUR and member of PJД secretariat. He considered the movement to be just a part of plural society, not the sole alternative. (Tamam, 2007: 102) Movement and party thus currently complement each other in terms of agenda, but are functionally separate. PJД has an actual autonomy in leadership, finances, and their selection procedures for the top ranking positions within the party. While candidates for the membership in the MUR are usually scrutinized on moral grounds, PJД is relatively flexible in choosing prospective candidates. In spite of this development, still almost 80 per cent of members of PJД are also members of MUR, which makes up around 30 per cent of the whole movement. There is also an overlap in highest leadership of both organization. (Hamzawy, 2008: 16) MUR movement also still functions as an important symbolic instrument for gaining support for PJД within the local communities. During elections PJД, for example, used MUR’s mouthpiece newspaper *at-Tajdid* in which they produced many articles on PJД’s candidates, published their profiles

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⁴ Author’s interview with prof. Ashraf El-Sherif, American University in Cairo, Nov 2012
and programme as well as interviews and articles on their work in parliament. (Wegner, 2011: 62)

As was shown earlier, Muslim Brotherhood have remained an illegal entity since 1954. In 1986 they first attempted to form a political party under the name *Shura* (Council) and later Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh took the initiative in 1995 under the name *Islah* (Reform). Both initiatives failed, not merely due to regime’s unwillingness to legalize them, but also due to unwillingness of the leadership of MB to support both projects. (Stacher, 2002: 420) In 1996 Abu al-Ala Madi, prominent liberal-minded member of MB and his associates, proposed a similar initiative under the name *Wasat* (Middle). As a result, hundreds of members were disqualified from the movement. Internal debate within MB shows that in case of legalization, the majority of leaders prefer the potential political party to function only as a political wing of the MB movement. (Rashwan, 2009: 13) This is a key aspect that distinguishes Brotherhood in Egypt from PJD in Morocco, and all the while inhibits institutionalization and consequential adaptation. Several factors account for such an unusual organizational resistance to legalization. First, the MB understands it would have to conform to a different time frame. An official party usually conforms to election cycle, which could potentially limit overall long-term aims of the movement. Second, most probably an autonomous circle of elites would have emerged from the party, thus challenging the movement’s power structure. Parties also need to devise strategies to deal with political opponents on regular bases, to bridge different interests and to attempt to gain sympathizers outside their traditional electorate by becoming more pragmatic. (Hamzawy – Brown, 2010: 8) Furthermore, political parties in Egypt are banned from combining social and political activities in one structure. (Harnisch – Mecham, 2009: 201) Finally, the laws in Egypt forbid parties to maintain foreign branches, therefore it would not be able to keep its international Muslim Brotherhood platform. (Rashwan, 2009: 13)

Arab Spring has shown relevance of this dilemma, when internal differences in MB resulted in the departure of hundreds of members and creation of new political subjects. In April 2011 Muslim Brotherhood finally created its political party—Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). The party reached around 9,000 members of which 80 per cent came straight from the movement. Owing to the effect of Law on political parties, FJP was able to secure around thousand female members. Additionally, in order to signal their consensuality, FJP nominated Coptic Christian Rafik Habib to the position of deputy chairman. (Wickham, 2013: 174) The party, however, was only nominally independent from the mother movement. All leaders—Katatni, Morsy and Erian—come from the Guidance Bureau of MB. Movement was also fully in charge of drafting the party’s charter and by-laws. Reformist members of MB for instance,
criticized obligation of all its members to vote strictly for FJP and argued that it is a violation of freedom of expression. (Trager, 2012) This is in sharp contrast to MUR and PJD dynamic, where such an obligation does not exist, at least not officially.

**The extent of participation dilemma**

This dilemma has to do with the strategic choice of Islamists which arenas they invest human resources in. If, for instance, party or movement nominates limited number of candidates in an election, it signals that it does not wish to hegemonise political system and thus threaten the *status quo*. (Ottaway - Hamzawy, 2008: 6) The more the party is institutionalized, the higher its adaptation ability to the official rules of the game within autocratic regime. It also has a higher propensity to reject risky strategies that may endanger its survival. Example of such a strategy is extra-parliamentary hegemonization of political context.

Moroccan party PJD since its inception traded its security for compliance with the regime. The party, as I have shown earlier, seeks a reform from within, through legal means. Nonetheless the official participation in Morocco is conditioned by the respect of the superior role of the King, his circle of elites and his religious legitimacy in exchange for the regime refraining from repression. (Zeghal, 2008) The PJD party currently stands on the frontline between two extremes- monarchical *makhzen* (King and his inner circle) and challenging Islamist movement *al-Adl wal-Ihsan* (Justice and Benevolence). *Al-Adl wal-Ihsan* has long presented itself as a sharp contender of monarchical authoritarianism, even going as far as declaring the monarchy illegitimate. The main strategy of PJD was thus maintaining presence in parliament and avoiding challenging the regime. To illustrate the extent of its support to monarchy, prominent leaders such as anti-monarchist Mustapha Ramid and Ahmed Raysouni, were both forced to withdraw their candidacies to top internal positions due to their radical views. (Mekouar, 2010: 7) Former Secretary-General of PJD Uthmani (2004 – 2008) even asserted that despite the need for extensive reforms of Moroccan system, King’s concentration of powers has a positive effect on political system. (Sater, 2009: 390) This „constructive behaviour“ can be further illustrated by PJD’s decision to participate in elections based on qualitative rather than quantitative criteria as it feared being too successful in elections. (Wegner, 2007: 80) In 2002 elections they nominated candidates only for 55 out of 91 districts, even though, it was an increase from 43 per cent to 61 per cent when compared with the previous elections in 1997. Nonetheless, other even smaller parties usually nominated full slates. Thus in the initial phase, PJD was unwilling to project an image of hegemonic party. (Willis, 2004: 60)
Their self-censorship was influenced by the worst case scenario from neighbouring Algeria, where the supremacy of Islamist FIS party in first democratic elections triggered civil war. PJD, much like majority of other *Ikhwani* Islamists in the Arab world, has developed into a professional superstructure with strong voters’ identification and linkage with society. Yet, their monopolization of social and political sphere was less successful and all-encompassing than that of Egyptian MB. Firstly, the King, with his inner circle, oversees the whole political process, which enables him to counter such a possibility. Secondly, due to the impact of institutional setting in Morocco, where most of the relevant political parties, none of which is dominant, create their own social movements, women organizations, trade unions and university clubs, the politically segmented market reflects in extra-parliamentary sphere as well and acts as a break on the ambitions of Islamist PJD\(^5\).

Likewise the PJD, Muslim Brotherhood also showed limited self-restrain during the elections. Even in the year 2005 when it received record gains for an opposition party in Egypt, it nominated only 161 candidates out of 444. Even if all the candidates had won their seats, the ruling NDP would have retained its two-thirds majority in the parliament. Limits on candidacy had, however, more to do with MB’s general fear of repressions than with society-wide reactions. (Hamzawy – Brown, 2010: 7) In case of Muslim Brotherhood, one cannot speak of substantial co-optation, as in the case of PJD, the reason being that Muslim Brotherhood faced fewer constraints on its actions from the wider environment, except for the repression by the regime. Alongside the welfare and Islamic activism, it rapidly spread its activities to every possible venue of participation. This pro-active approach can be traced back to the prevalence of younger, eager generation in the last decades and leadership of General Guide Mehdi Akef. It is precisely in line with the ascending appeal of MB that Mubarak’s regime reversed the liberalization of state and from 1995 onwards targeted MB. Even though Brotherhood abstained from violence completely it threatened the state by encroaching all its relevant structures, from *Al-Azhar* university (formerly state-controlled Islamic institution), to most professional syndicates, where it gained majority, as well as most relevant university clubs and campuses. Alongside these, Muslim Brotherhood has created sections within the movement for Sports, Muslim sisters, Economy, History and Foreign affairs committee, as well as dozens of others. (Awadi, 2009: 219) It shows the concerted efforts to monopolize political system through different channels. This highly professional organizational structure emerged paradoxically as a result of a closed political regime and decades operating underground. Without such a discipline, the repressive regime in Egypt

\(^5\) Author’s interview with prof. Khalid Chegraoui, Rabat, July 2013
would have crushed the movement a long time ago. Brotherhood is behaviourally moderated, considering acceptance of rules of the regime game. This is, however, limited by their expansion in all spheres of Egyptian life and their self-appointed role of vanguard for complex reform of politics and society in line with Islamic religion.

Dilemma of cooperation with secular parties

The problematic experience of cooperation between secularists and PJD in Morocco clearly shows, that great part of leftist political spectrum and women organizations fears the instrumental character of PJD’s moderation. (Howe, 2005: 334) Distrust between the two sides escalated after deadly terrorist attacks in Casablanca in May 2003. These attacks offered secularists legitimacy and political language to express their protest against Islamists. They even started lobbying for the dissolution of PJD. (Hamzawy, 2008: 11) They argued that anti-Western and anti-Israeli sentiment of PJD facilitated diffusion of radical ideas in Morocco. However, the disagreement between both camps seems to have surfaced mainly before the elections, which implies that inability to create a common platform stems primarily from power struggle, not necessarily from ideological divergence. For instance, the relations between PJD and socialist party USFP deteriorated right before the beginning of elections in 2002 as PJD pulled back their support for government. (Willis, 2004: 64) After the 2007 elections the coalition of Istiqlal and USFP did not even invite PJD to the negotiating table on coalition-building after elections. Paradoxically, Istiqlal has ideologically more in common with PJD than other parties, as they represent conservative and Islamic values. Both parties finally participated in a coalition government after 2011 elections. This “marriage of inconvenience” was, however, shortly lived and ended with the departure of Istiqlal from coalition. Inability of PJD to form effective alliances with secular parties shows more political than ideological motives. Nevertheless in the local elections they were able to forge alliances and accommodate their secular counterparts of all ideological sides. (Buehler, 2013: 146) To conclude, while the relatively competitive multi-party system in Morocco does not induce creation of wider coalitions and thus results in rather severe political competition and suspicion between both- Islamists and secularists, this individualism is less obvious in local politics where politicians from PJD were able to communicate effectively with their secular opponents.

Islamists and secularists in Egypt began their cooperation already in 1980s, it was, however, strictly confined to election cycle. In stark contrast to Morocco, the Egyptian regime was hegemonic, offering only slim chances for opposition parties to gain seats in the parliament. Thus, cooperation was the sole option for MB and parties such as New Wafd and Liberal
Party or Labour Party, to enhance their chances for reaching the parliament. (Abed-Kotob, 1995: 328) As Muslim Brotherhood gradually gained unprecedented support in professional syndicates and during elections, the cooperation came to a halt. The only successful opposition coordination was an election boycott in 1990. Between 2000 – 2005 the cooperation was limited to foreign policy dimension, where both camps joined forces to support Palestinian Intifada and protest the war in Iraq. (Shehata, 2009: 312) Before 2005 elections National Front for Change was created and in 2007 coalition against the novelization of constitution. This cooperation, however, never grew beyond wide single-issue fronts. There are several reasons to that. Ideologically, secularists consistently accused MB of religious fundamentalism. Organizationally, Brotherhood constantly demonstrated that they are aware of their organizational power, popularity of their ideology and size of their membership base. (Shehata, 2009: 320) Owing to this asymmetrical relation, many MB’s members showed reluctance to cooperate with a weak opposition, even though MB’s motto was „participation, not domination“.

Moreover, they feared the reaction of regime following successful coordination with opposition parties. Activists from Kefaya and April 6th Youth Movement, who coordinated minor protests in Egypt since 2005 and cooperated with Muslim Brotherhood’s elites, assumed, that even though some of its reformist members share progressive views, they tended to convey official positions of Guidance Bureau. Activists ascribe this to the closed mentality and indoctrination, which dominates the movement. (Wickham, 2013: 116) On the other hand, MB’s members ascribe polarization between Islamists and secularists to political groups that instigate political conflict because they lack substantial social and electoral support. Decades of animosity between MB and Wafd and Tagammu parties forced secularists to accede to regime’s strategy of opposition polarization. The repression of regime towards MB also helped to weaken cooperation and alliance-building, as contacts with Brotherhood became too risky for secular parties. (Shehata, 2009: 321) Finally, the problem of coordination is not merely characteristic to the relationship between secularists and Islamists, but to all the Egyptian parties.

6 Ideological moderation

Brumberg (2001) defines ideological context of Islamist movements and parties as a space that defines the relationship between the state and religion. Ideological context thus points to the reasons for the different ideological development and moderation of the compared

6 Author’s interview with prominent member of MB, Cairo, Nov 2012
movements stemming from similar original value-system. Besides the institutional design, the social dimension is critical in inducing change of political actors, especially related to ideological development. However, value-systems and ideas do not influence actors directly. Rather they create room for manoeuvre, within which they facilitate or limit certain types of actions. (Tezcur, 2010: 73) Absence of clearly defined parameters of Islamist discourse therefore results in lower motivation to limit the influence of ideological dogmas in political thinking and thus lowers the potential for ideological moderation. Cultural aspects of political participation, such as norms and symbols they reproduce are as important as institutional characteristics of the system. (Sewell, 1992)

Moroccan religious sphere is to a great extent pluralistic, but at the same time highly centralized and institutionalized, unlike the fragmented sphere in Egypt. (El-Sherif, 2011: 153) The basic component of Islam à la marocaine is not state secularism, as in other countries of Arab world, but an Islamic state, where the only acceptable form of Islam is the official one, and where the religion is separated from politics in line with modernist image of the monarchy. (Parmentier, 1999: 349) The fact that King has the role of „Commander of the faithful“, does not mean Morocco is a theocratic state. In the practice it means that he is the sole actor, who has the prerogative, given by the constitution, to combine political and religious powers. (El-Katiri, 2012: 3) It is connected, for example, with his authority over nomination of minister of religious affairs and provincial Islamic councils. King does not lead prayers or issues fatwas, rather he deals with strategic issues in the context of religious policy. Relatively weaker mobilizational ability of Islamists in Morocco, when compared to Egypt, is thus a result of several factors. First, they are divided into many organizations and ideological trends. Second, they are divided over their approach towards the regime. Third, the religious authority and symbolism of monarchy covers large amount of their ideological platforms. Fourth, their room to agitate for Islamist ideology is limited by the „red lines“ set by the regime, which controls and directs this discourse. This is another point of divergence with Egyptian case, where Egyptian regime, long dominated by secular ideologies, has inspired Islamist movements to launch protest against the loss of authentic socio-political order through their often aggressive indoctrination.

The rise of Islamism and individual piety in Egypt is a result of multiple factors, such as confrontation with western influence, modernity, ineffective leadership and massive social and economic problems of the country (Zeidan, 1999: 2) Egyptian „passive revolution“, as described by Asef Bayat (2007: 138), was a consequence of the growth of Islamism without

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7 Author’s interview with prof. Khalid Chegraoui, Rabat, July 2013
Islamic state and resulted in unprecedented intellectual and religious stagnation. Until 2000 the percentage of women wearing conservative headscarf rose to 80 per cent of the whole population. (ibid: 147) This growth of personal piety has been reflected also within Christian communities as a defence mechanism against advancement of islamisation, which intensified sectarian conflict. Under the slogan „Islam is the solution“ (al-islam huwa al-hall) Islamists won elections to university clubs, professional syndicates and later through Muslim Brotherhood they became relatively successful in nation-wide elections. During the office of president Mubarak Islamist discourse appeared gradually more powerful, chaotic and fragmented. This fragmentation was caused by the lack of central authority, such as that of Moroccan King, which could mediate conflicts, define the roles of all religious actors and create framework for debate about the role of religion in the country. (El-Sherif, 2011: 252)

The influx of religion also transpired into general public opinion. Neo-Salafists actively use the means of modern mass communication, mainly satellite TV channels, radio transmission, press and most recently social media as well. Islamic sheikhs became the most popular authorities forming public opinion. (El-Sherif, 2011: 258) Furthermore, even the Salafists who rose to prominence after elections in 2011, gained their popularity thanks to the Mubarak regime. Regime did not repress Salafists as they were unwilling to participate in politics and thus did not threaten the regime, unlike Muslim Brotherhood (ibid: 260) This uncontrolled expansion of religiosity and Islamist discourse suited MB, because they could claim that they are the only viable representative of political Islam. On the other hand, this often led to their self-evaluation as the only true representative of Islam possessing universal truth and solutions to all the social and political ills of the country, thus linking support for the organization with support for Islam as such.

While behavioural moderation has a less controversial character, ideological moderation is more difficult to grasp. In the paper I analyse it as an effect of ideological context in the country, which influences ideological moderation in several ways. Absence of higher religious authority, which filtrates religious discourse, can account for higher competition and shifts the limits of acceptable forms of Islamist ideology along the extremes. The growth of conservatism thus enables active role for Islamist parties and movements and limits their potential to ideological revision. Conversely, within the pluralistic and controlled context, where the authority of the leader is accepted from religious point as well, Islamist movements are forced to make certain concessions to their dogmas. I follow this assumption by analysing the character of discourse, official documents of Islamists and pronouncements of their leaders. Both entities analysed within the scope of the paper have moderated their behaviour.
(even if to a different degree). Nevertheless, there are still several problematic areas to discuss. In general, Islamists’ ideas about democracy are often instrumentalised to fit the ideology they promote. This is especially important in three interconnected areas—so called “grey areas”—such as preference for Islamic law *sharia*, their treatment of the concept of democracy and political pluralism, especially concerning the rights of women and minorities. (Brown – Hamzawy – Ottaway, 2006) I will analyse all these areas within the following subchapter.

**Ideological change of PJD**

Since 2002, PJD has been much less preoccupied with ideological and religious issues when communicating with public, unlike in the case of MB. In the last decade, they have been given more space to formulate concrete public policies. To illustrate this point, their election programme in 2007 offers a unique insight into PJD’s current political thinking. Instead of promoting *sharia* or Islamic frame of reference, the electoral platform mentions only protection of Moroccan Islamic identity. (Hamzawy, 2007: 3) Theologically PJD has come quite far from its former Salafi roots and currently presents more moderate version of political Islam than that of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which has recorded unprecedented rise of Salafism. For example, PJD does not operate with the traditional slogan „Islam is the solution“, which PJD’s leaders consider inappropriate for the Moroccan conditions. Instead they use less value-loaded slogan „authenticity, development and justice“. (Tamam, 2007: 104) *Sharia* is according to them subject to appropriation of the particular era and society in which it operates. Thus they reject literal interpretation of religious texts. (Daadaoui, 2011: 136) Prominent theoretician of MUR Ahmed Raysouni even argues that religious understanding is in the hands of the people and thus its interpretation cannot be inscribed in one written document as a law of the state. Moreover, he argues, interpretation must always be in line with the basic principle of *sharia*, which is *maslaha* (collective good). (Zeghal, 2008: 189) He also firmly rejected the calls for an Islamic state, which is in clear contradiction to democracy. (El-Sherif, 2011: 171)

As in the case of other Islamist movements, it is quite difficult to assess what are the real aims the party follows in the long-run. (Hamzawy, 2008: 9) From the short-term perspective, however, we have access to documents, pronouncements of the leaders and steps the party undertakes, which point to a change in their ideology. Majority of members share the views symbolized by PJD member Hamieddin, who understands democracy in the wider sense as a „...the right of people to choose who rules them, the right of people to hold their rulers accountable, and this choice and accountability have to be grounded in elections.“ (Khanani,
However, PJD similarly to An-Nahda in Tunisia, did not have to compete for votes with more conservative or radical Islamist movement, unlike Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Provided that Adl Wal-Ihsan or the mostly fragmented Salafis are legalized within few years, PJD will be forced to compete for the votes of their highly conservative electorate by moving their ideology further to the right. Previous Secretary-General of PJD Saad Eddin al-Uthmani rejected claims that the party attempts to adopt certain provisions from sharia, for instance, in matters such as the sale of alcohol or regulation of cohabitation of Moroccan youth. (Lav, 2007) However, prominent member of PJD and MUR, Editor-in-Chief of at-Tajdid, Bilal Talidi expressed that PJD is not solely a party, but also a project of da'wa (religious proselytization), which is currently in the process of consolidation within the political sphere. Antagonistic claims of its members and leaders are thus a result of on-going process of adaptation and creation of common platform. Finally, he argues, that the party does not wish to implement Islamic policies autocratically, but provided that their project of da'wa is successful in gaining support and social legitimacy for particular provisions of sharia, from the democratic standpoint it will be mandatory for [PJD] to endorse them. (ibid) In similar vein, Mustapha Ramid, leader of parliamentary group of PJD and current Minister of Justice, declared that from long-term perspective „we are for implementation of sharia, including amputations for the thieves“. Condemning reactions to his claims by prominent PJD leaders suggest ideological differences inside the movement, as well as the struggle to present PJD to the outside observers as a progressive and moderate party. (Willis, 2004: 66)

Family law is currently the only remaining legal instrument regulated by sharia and therefore has extremely mobilizational and controversial character, as it opens up the debate on role of Islam within the society. (Pruzan-Jørgensen, 2010: 273) Relatively liberal revision of Personal Status Code (moudawwana), which the King moved to a vote in parliament in 2004, was finally approved by PJD as well after internal party discussion. (El-Sherif, 2011: 182) Members of PJD argue, that one of the party’s priorities is gradual empowerment of women in the country. However, the party has so far engaged only in advocating laws against violence on women, laws advocating equality of women and men in the workplace and gradual ban on the work of underage women. Relative moderation in terms of women empowerment is evinced by Turiya Gherbal, PJD’s candidate in elections, who does not wear Islamic headscarf hijab. Current leader Benkirane, for instance, argued that „[PJD] had no intention of attacking those who drink alcohol or dictating to women what they should wear“. (Wickham, 2013: 245) Nevertheless, PJD’s female MPs often take up men’s roles, especially

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* Author’s interview with prominent member of PJD, Rabat, July 2013
regarding controversial identity-based laws\(^9\). As present analysis of discursive positions shows, there has been a gradual shift in PJD’s ideology. These changes, however significant, are nevertheless limited by its character as an Islamist party, which cannot move too far from the original doctrine. PJD can thus be characterized as ideologically relatively moderate, conservative political party.

**Ideological change of MB**

In contrast to the Moroccan PJD, the Brotherhood has neglected its contemporary theological and political thinking. Majority of crucial theoretical documents return to the works of the founder Hassan al-Banna and other members of the older generation of MB such as Abdul Qadir al-Awda, Mohamed al-Ghazali or Sayyd Sabiq. (Rashwan, 2009: 6) However, their thinking was extensively influenced by the repressions and MB’s functioning as a conspirational organization. Despite reformist course of MB in the latest decades, there is an element of unwillingness to leave the basic principles formulated by al-Banna in the 1920s. (Pargeter, 2013: 16) This aspect thus weakens MB’s flexibility in interpreting modern socio-political conditions. Their rigidity translates also into official documents. In 2004, MB came up with Reform initiative\(^{10}\) and in 2005 with Electoral platform\(^{11}\), both of which stressed the support for democratic parliamentary Egypt. Both documents mention respect for civil character of political power, respect to basic values and instruments of democracy, transfer of power through free elections and acceptance of principle of citizenship, and equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. However, these documents contain many contradictions, mainly its excessive accent on Islam as an instrument, which limits the extent of democratic reforms and thus stands in contrast with the declared freedoms, plurality, independence of legislature and respect to civil state. (Pargeter, 2013: 55) The demand for freedom of expression seems to fit MB rather instrumentally, as a freedom from interfering in their political strategies and not as a freedom for MB’s opponents to formulate their criticism.

Electoral platform of Muslim Brotherhood from 2007 attempted to clarify their political preferences which were generally considered too vague and inconcrete. This initiative thus served as an explanation of MB’s ideology and presented electoral platform of a virtual political party. (Harnisch – Mecham, 2009: 198) After its publishing, the reformist wing rejected illiberal articles directed at women and Copts. Gamal Hishmat, MB’s reformist, compared the monopolization of platform’s drafting process to the atmosphere of repression

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\(^{9}\) Author’s interview with prof. Mohsine El-Ahmady, Rabat, July 2013  
\(^{10}\) For more information see: <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=797>  
\(^{11}\) For more information see: <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=811>
in Egypt and stated that the movement has clearly set aside centrist trend inside the movement. (Hamzawy – Brown, 2008: 8) Platform argued that *sharia* provides firm arguments against the candidacy of women and Christians in presidential elections and other senior positions of state. Yet, this segment of society represents almost 60 per cent of all Egyptians. (Rashwan, 2009: 8) The latest electoral programme of post-revolutionary party FJP mirrors the same totalitarian, over-regulating character of the previous documents. This program incorporated most of the agenda from 2007 platform, except for the controversial issue of ban on candidacy for women and Copts. (Tadros, 2011)

Procedurally, Brotherhood considers democracy compatible with Islam, normatively, they do not accept certain democratic fundamentals. The basic problem of MB’s conceptualization of democracy is their priority of re-islamisation and cultural, material and moral formation of individual. (Rashwan, 2009: 5). The process of indoctrination and socialization therefore can only be achieved by firm control over the means of mass-communication, censorship of cultural production and by monopolizing educational system, mosques and Islamic centres. MB, for instance, agrees to the need for private TV stations, provided that they „are in harmony with values and principles of Egyptian society“, which in practice means Brotherhood’s own conceptualization of Islam. (Adly, 2007: 4) They even argued that they will push for a ban on political parties that promote negative values, which many interpreted as a sign of an attack on secular parties. (Harnisch – Mecham, 2009: 201) The most controversial point in 2007 platform undoubtedly was the creation of financially and administratively independent institution of religious commission, which would oversee accordance of legislation with *sharia*. This institutional element bears resemblance to Guardian council in theocratic Iran and thus inspired extensive wave of protests of secular Egyptians as well as reformist members of MB. Firstly, women and Christians cannot be nominated to this commission, which clearly violates the principle of equality of citizens. Secondly, it shows the unease of conservative leadership concerning full-range acceptance of principle of sovereignty of people and parliamentary method of drafting legislation. (ibid: 198) MB thus accepts democracy as long as it is a reflection of public opinion, which demands accordance with Islamic law. The possibility that people would reject such a move, is not accepted by Brotherhood as plausible. (Bayat, 2007: 177) Despite this, Hamzawy and Brown (2008: 5) argue, that majority of the document (this applies to 2011 electoral platform as well) is dedicated to social, economic issues at the expanse of ideological issues. However, the issues of identity, which sparked controversy, are extremely important as they pertain to national identity. MB has not been able to overcome its deeply entrenched dogmas, despite
the fact that it is in ideological issues that numerous segments of Egyptian society expected certain guarantees.

In general, MB supports the right of women to work, to be educated and to occupy public functions. Nevertheless, Muslim Brotherhood MPs, in contradiction to their more liberal rhetoric, proposed number of legal changes, none of which were ever adopted by the NDP-ruled legislature. For instance, they proposed changes in the Law of the Child by decreasing legal age of marriage from 18 to 16, because the previous law contradicted *sharia*. They also criticized the ban on female genital mutilation as a concession to West and a step directed against Egyptian customs and Islamic *sharia*. They also protested against the law that stipulated increase of quotas for women in the parliament. (Hamzawy – Brown, 2010: 27 – 28) Besides, in the educational sphere they proposed creation of different curricula for men and women, on the account of their „natural gender differences“. (Adly, 2007: 4) The 2007 platform also states, that women’s rights should be harmonized with the fundamental values of the society, thus conforming to their conservative perception of Islamic religion.

According to Muslim Brotherhood, *sharia* shall apply to all citizens regardless of their religious belief, with the exception of personal matters and freedom of practicing religion, implicating status of second-class citizen to Coptic Egyptians, who make up about 10 per cent of the population. Sectarian violence and distrust in Egypt rapidly worsened in the last decades. To a great extent it was a result of Mubarak’s policies, who exploited these conflicts to justify his harsh security measures. (El-Gindy, 2012: 93) But MB also has its share on this conflict. Former General Guide of MB Mustapha Mashour once argued that Copts are protected minority and should be obliged to pay the middle age religious tax (*jizya*). (Brown, 2012: 182) In one interview Essam al-Erian accused Copts of serving American agenda in Egypt. (Lynch, 2008: 8) This argument has reappeared repeatedly after revolution, as majority of Coptic Christians fear a government lead by Islamists and therefore support elites connected with previous regime, which only deepens the schism between both communities.

As was shown earlier, MB still understands rights of minorities and women through the lenses of Islamic law, and thus logically ascribes them the role of weaker partner. Ideological moderation of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, even though it became more tolerant and pragmatic, still remains questionable. Unlike PJD, Muslim Brotherhood behaves as a dogmatic Islamist movement, resistant towards more progressive revision of its own ideology, especially in terms of acceptance of full-fledged pluralism of the Egyptian society.
7 Discussion and concluding remarks

In sum, first aim of the study was to investigate how the institutional context of participation, understood as regime’s tolerance of Islamists, affects behavioural moderation. To that end, the paper offered a number of indicators. Main conclusion reached by the analysis is that restrictions of participation in Egypt precluded comprehensive behavioural moderation of Muslim Brotherhood, while more open participation induced more complex behavioural moderation of PJD in Morocco. These differences mainly flow from the existence of higher incentives to institutionalize, the degree of which in turn shapes adaptability of Islamists. Second aim was to find out how the regime’s ideological context affects the degree of ideological moderation (revision). The paper showed that pluralistic, but largely hierarchical context in Morocco, rewards ideological revision towards a more liberal form of Islamist ideology. In rather anarchic context of Egypt, which lacks central authority controlling the ideological outcomes of Islamists, owing to its conservative character such a moderation of Muslim Brotherhood is limited.

Internal reforms, professionalization and institutionalization of PJD thus lead to a more substantial behavioural moderation, while their ideological moderation was induced by the necessity to devise concrete measures of political action, instead of symbolic ones. Yet, as the Arab Spring in Morocco has not brought about profound democratization, it remains questionable whether its moderation is simply a result of monarchical design or deliberate change inside the party. Moreover, plurality and popularity of other Islamist actors in Morocco and the slim room for manoeuvre for Islamists in the government since 2011 may, in the long run, induce reversal of the process of moderation.

In Egypt, on the other hand, the restrictive nature of participation induced closure of Muslim Brotherhood movement towards the external environment and emergence of priority of the movement as a universal vehicle for change. It has also reinforced MB’s conservative character and universalistic character of its ideology. Negative perceptions of MB by its opponents, followed by the ouster of president Mohamed Morsy, were a result of Brotherhood’s controversial character as a radical, yet, conservative force in Egyptian politics. A simple fact that MB was not allowed to govern according to its mandate and was subsequently banned, will most probably work as a break on its further moderation.

Analytical model applied in the paper may thus serve as an outline for research of similar movements and parties in predominantly Muslim countries. For instance, Tunisian An-Nahda
was heavily repressed by Bin Ali’s regime and its executive organs were forced to exile. Its institutionalization was therefore effectively resumed after the revolution, yet within the more competitive and pluralistic framework and relatively secular ideological framework. Nowadays, therefore, An-Nahda behaves as an ideologically and behaviourally moderate Islamist party. Similarly, in the case of Algerian MSP, the Islamists were allowed to compete freely and even to participate in the government. Regime’s co-optation strategy and firm control over ideological context facilitated MSP’s moderation. Finally, Islamic Action Front in Jordan, although operating within relatively similar executive monarchy mechanism, has not reached the same degree of moderation as PJD in Morocco. Firstly, the party system in Jordan is underdeveloped, therefore IAF’s institutionalization was relatively weak. Secondly, ideological context, although controlled, shows constant signs of radicalization due to the presence of Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the kingdom, which in turn favours Islamists’ agenda. However, general academic consensus on the definition and precise characterization of moderation is instrumental for future research. It would further enhance analytical validity and the predictive power of participation-moderation theory.

References


