Electoral support for Islamic parties in the Southern Mediterranean

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Abstract
The regions of North Africa and the Middle East are often regarded as the areas where democracy finds it most difficult to stabilise. In the last set of elections held in the region, Islamic-orientated political parties that were perceived to be anti-democratic obtained important electoral victories, which reinforces this idea. This article analyses the support for these Islamic-orientated political parties in North Africa and the Middle East in an attempt to discern whether this support is related to a preference for anti-democratic forms of government. The research takes the form of a quantitative analysis using survey data. Results indicate that this electoral advance of Islamic political parties is in fact related to an opposition to the present state configuration and a demand or need for religion to exert a greater influence on the state.
Introduction

Throughout the world religious fundamentalism has become a major socio-political force. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Islamic parties have made electoral advances that, coupled with events in countries such as Algeria, where a civil war with religious undertones left thousands dead, should not be underestimated.

This growth in support for Islamic-orientated parties in the southern Mediterranean may be perceived on its northern shores and beyond as a threat, especially after the attacks on the United States of America on 11 September 2001. For critics, Islamic fundamentalism represents a dangerous rejection of the Western world’s liberal values. Moreover, they fear that this rise of Islamic forces threatens the very core of democratic government. In contrast, for its advocates Islamic radicalisation provides a moral shelter representing the purest form of Islam. The question that arises, however, is whether this wave of support for Islamic-oriented parties is intrinsically connected to an anti-democratic disposition. In this article we explore this vexing question by way of an analysis of the electoral support for Islamic parties amongst southern Mediterranean citizens. We therefore wish to discern whether the electoral support for Islamic political parties in the region can be considered a real threat to democratic forms of government.

The Muslim world has generally not been open to survey research, but this situation is changing. In this article we make extensive use of the World Values Surveys covering North Africa and the Middle East. This allows us to cover a selection of countries in this region.

Our argument is that the existence of a repressive state is a major factor propelling support for Islamic parties. Rather than limiting the rise of Islamic political parties, the existence of coercive states in the region seems to be nurturing the support for Islamic parties. In this study we firstly analyse levels of democratic commitment in the Southern Mediterranean, followed by a brief description of the spread of Islamic political parties throughout the region, with special emphasis on the countries included in the analysis. For comparison we have also included Turkey, which is a non-Arab country, but which has a Muslim majority and Islamist parties which have performed well in the elections. Next, the data and methods adopted are explained and, finally, the results are analysed and the conclusions presented.
A note of clarification is necessary. It is not the intention of this article to analyse the very complex causes of Islamic fundamentalism\(^2\), nor to analyse the support for outlawed organisations that operate illegally, but rather to survey the basis of electoral support for political parties that operate within the law, but still pursue the Islamisation of their societies, thereby making important electoral advances in the region. We therefore aim to reach some important conclusions regarding the potential danger, if any, of this support for democratic stability in the region.

**Democratic commitment in Islamic societies**

The debate as to whether Islam is inherently hostile to democracy is not new, but has attracted special scholarly attention since the events of September 11th. In its 2002 report the Freedom House (2002: 7; see also Karatnycky, 2000) includes a special section on “freedom and the Islamic world: the democracy gap” in which it is stated that “a non-Islamic state is nearly three times more likely to be democratic than an Islamic state”. As Freedom House (2002; Karatnycky, 2004) points out, not one of the 16 Arabic states in the Middle East and North Africa is an electoral democracy. Thus, while over the last two decades the so-called ‘third wave’ of democracy has swept the non-Islamic world, in the Islamic world the number of countries considered ‘not free’ has increased significantly. In fact, Karatnycky (2002: 99) observes that the 2001 Freedom House survey\(^3\) already showed that there is a significant “gap in the state of freedom and democracy between majority-Muslim countries – particularly the Arab states” and other countries of the world. One could therefore assume that, if political Islam influences Islamic parties, their electoral support should be steered by Islamic principles, and if these principles are not democratic, their followers might be seeking, with their electoral support, a form of government which is not democratic.

What concerns most observers seems to be the fact that these groups have made such major electoral advances in the region, resulting in an alarming rise in power. This was the case in Algeria in 1991, where the Islamic Salvation Front obtained an overwhelming victory, and in Turkey, where, albeit the country is not part of the Arab world, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has roots in Islam, obtained 80% of the seats in parliament in 2002 with only 34% of the vote\(^4\). This massive victory by an Islamic-orientated party, and similar advances by Islamic-orientated parties in Morocco in 2002, immediately conjured up visions of a move towards non-democratic
practices by these governments in the eyes of Western observers. While countries all over the world began to democratise during the so-called “third wave of democracy”, for many observers the route to democracy has deviated extensively in the region under study. Furthermore, the so-called democratisation processes which have occurred in this region have not been considered complete. Brumberg (2002a:56), for instance, refers to the regimes of Egypt, Morocco and Algeria as liberalised autocracies (not democracies), where “guided pluralism, controlled elections and selective repression” are basic characteristics of their political landscapes, thereby indicating that the area seems to be fertile soil for autocratic forms of government. It was therefore not unexpected that the recent increase in Islamic political party support in the area has fuelled the revival of this debate.

However, in the many studies conducted on the same topic controversial and divergent results have emerged. Stepan and Robertson argue (2003: 39) that “we should be more cautious and nuanced than Western social scientists and public commentators have tended to be in ascribing the electoral gap of Muslim countries to the nature of Islam. ... Islam can not itself explain the exceptionally low performance [of democracy in Muslim-Arab countries]”.

On the other hand, some researchers, such as Talbi (2000: 58-59), have noted that democracy is spreading all over the world, “even in Serbia and China. Everywhere except in the Arab world. This calls for reflection and at least an attempt at explanation”. Talbi (2000:58-59) indicates that there is a “huge gap between theory and practice” and maintains that, while all the trappings of democracy are present in some Arab countries, in practice an elaborate political farce is revealed. Pakistan, a country outside the region under discussion, also recently experienced important electoral advances by Islamic parties. But Tanwir (2003) is of the opinion that this is not necessarily due to a radicalisation of politics in Pakistan. It should rather be understood as a sign of dissatisfaction with the traditional political parties.

Following this line of argumentation, Brumberg (2002a: 58) considers that for Arab autocracies to survive, they have to allow some room for Islamic opposition, since the option of banning these opposition parties does not appear to be an effective response. The tendency to repress opposition within Arab states has produced a shrinkage of civil society, which has negative effects on democratic development.
Moreover, Sivan (2000:77) feels that “giving excluded groups and social strata a share, however modest, in the system would arguably be a long-term investment in stabilising the polity. Given the importance of radical Islamic movements, the question of whether, and to what extent, they might be included in the political process is crucial for the fate of democratisation”. Taking this into consideration, the recent electoral gains may not be perceived as an anti-democratic threat. Tessler (2003: 2) supports this view when he indicates that there is some potential for democratisation in countries such as Morocco, Jordan or Kuwait. In his research he did not find any inherently anti-democratic tendencies in the Islamic political culture.

To reiterate, it could be argued that, if Islam is inherently hostile to democracy as some researchers argue, then electoral support for Islamic political parties should be based on a rejection of democratic principles. On the other hand, if democracy and Islam are not necessarily mutually antagonistic concepts, electoral support for Islamic parties is not necessarily based on a rejection of democratic principles. There is also a possibility that supporters may not be refusing democratic forms of government as such; they may simply be supporting Islamic political parties in demanding such a deep transformation of the polity in terms of religion or gender status that the result may be inoperative in democratic terms. However, this may not in itself mean that democracy is rejected out of hand.

It is also important to note that elections in countries in the region are not necessarily held in the same context of fairness and freedom as in their European counterparts. Winners generally run for office without real rivals and the election turnout is generally very low. However, in the southern Mediterranean region the alternation of power is not exactly as undemocratic as Talbi (2000: 58) claims. He states that the classic “scenario in Arab countries today, [is] not of alternation in power but of succession through violent death or, in the best cases, death by natural causes”. However, “[m]any observers regarded 1999 as a year of progress for democracy in the Arab world” (Sivan, 2000: 69). For instance, in Morocco the advance of Islamic political parties has not generated any turmoil. Similarly, in Turkey, not an Arab country but one with an Islamic majority, the AKP won the elections and alternation in office did not lead to bloodshed, with the AKP still remaining in office. It is also necessary to remark, however, that the elections in the region under discussion took place mainly under the tight control of the army (Algeria) or under institutionalised
political power structures not supportive of full democracy (Morocco\textsuperscript{8}, Egypt or Tunisia).

**Islamic parties and elections in North Africa and the Middle East**

Scholars have generally gathered knowledge on electoral behaviour from studies conducted mainly in Europe and North America, leaving other areas of the world, especially the North of Africa and Middle East, under-explored. The lack of free and fair elections in the region, and the absence of the necessary political stability and quantitative data, among other reasons, may account for this. However, this dearth of quantitative data is being addressed by studies such as the World Values Survey, which includes various Arab countries as well as Turkey.

There are many theories that aim to explain voting behaviour, including, amongst many others, the classic structural approach developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), by which structural cleavages determine voters’ choices\textsuperscript{9}; the so-called Michigan school, which based their arguments on the party identification approach (Campbell \textit{et al.} 1960, 1966); and the Essex model (Sanders, 1993, 1995), which focused the analysis on the economic expectations of the respondents. The validity of these theories in analysing the electorate of Islamic-orientated parties and the underlying causes propelling their vote has still not been ascertained in the MENA region. In fact, the important question that arises, as Norris and Mattes (2003: 1) well noted, is whether factors or variables outside those employed in the well-known models exert an influence on party support or voter choice in non-Western societies.

The electoral advances and victories of Islamic-orientated political parties during the last decade or so in Algeria in 1991, in Turkey in the elections of 1995 and 2002, in Jordan in their first ever elections in 1989\textsuperscript{10}, and in Morocco in the 2002 elections (Mortimer, 1996; Secor, 2001; Mecham, 2004; Vermeren 2003) have prompted scholars to assume that factors linked to the fundamentalist orientation should be taken into account in explaining voting trends. In the MENA region these variables surface in debates surrounding the issues of whether or not Islam should be the source of law (Lombardi, 1998), whether the Western type of democracy is appropriate for the region (Kedourie, 1997), what the status of women should be (Fish, 2002), and the like.
For this quantitative analysis using World Values Survey data the following countries were selected: Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Turkey. Although only a selection of southern Mediterranean countries is included, we believe that the selection represents the underlying socio-political dynamics of the region under examination and allows the comparison of countries with both common and divergent characteristics. All four are MENA countries where Islamic parties have attained important electoral victories: three are Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Jordan), while one is a non-Arab country (Turkey); some are monarchies (Morocco and Jordan), whereas others are not (Turkey and Algeria). A brief description of the four countries and parties analysed in this study follows below.

**Algeria** became independent in 1962 and the National Liberation Front (FLN) served as the only political party until the local elections of 1990, which were won by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The first round of general elections in 1991 was also won by the FIS. This victory resulted in the army cancelling the elections and declaring a state of emergency. Soon after, FIS was banned and a civil confrontation broke out. In 1996 a new constitution was passed and, as a result, religious parties were banned. More than a hundred thousand deaths were reported until the peace agreement was signed in 1999 between the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), FIS and the government, headed by President Bouteflika. Although religiously-based parties – such as FIS – are prohibited in Algeria, Islam still remains a significant political force (Abdelaziz, 2002; Martínez, 2000). The political party selected for analysis is the Harakat Moushtama Issilm (HMI), the Movement of a Peaceful Society. It dates from the aftermath of the FIS electoral victory of the 1990s and pursues a policy of gradual Islamisation of society. In the National People’s Assembly elections of May 2002, the HMI was the fourth largest party, with around 7 percent of the vote (Bouandel, 2002; see also Kouini, 1990).

In **Morocco** the last general elections were held in September 2002 and resulted in an important advance for the Islamic party of Justice and Development (PJD), which we have selected for analysis. This party became the third most influential party and the only Islamic party in parliament. In the elections of 1997 PJD obtained 14 seats in Parliament and in the 2002 elections it increased its share of seats to 42 out of 325 (Vermeren, 2003; Pino, 2002). The most influential Islamic group in Morocco, Justice and Charity (JC), did not participate in the 2002 elections and advocated a stay-away. In Casablanca and in the north, however, where Justice and Charity has a stronger base,
the PJD performed best at the polls, which prompts some analysts to think that JC supporters decided to vote for PJD (see *El País*, 02-10-03).

**Turkey** has been a secular state for over 70 years, notwithstanding the fact that there have been – and still are – religious forces playing an important role in Turkey’s politics. As early as 1995 the Islamic Welfare Party emerged as the largest party after the elections. Its leader became Prime Minister until 1997, when he was forced to resign. The Welfare Party was banned in 1998 precisely for violating the constitutional obligation to respect secularism, a founding principle of modern Turkey. The Fazilet Party (Virtue Party) led by Necmettin Erbakan succeeded the Welfare Party, but was subsequently accused of being a continuation of the Welfare Party. In June 2001 the Constitutional Court banned the Fazilet Party, with a judgement that they promoted Islamic fundamentalism. The place of the Virtue Party was filled by two parties: the AKP (the Justice and Development party) led by Tayip Erdogan¹¹ and the Prosperity Party (SP). In the elections of November 2002 the AKP obtained a stunning electoral victory, obtaining more than two thirds of the seats in Parliament. However, in 2000, when the survey used in this study was conducted, the AKP did not exist and its support cannot be analysed. Instead we use the support for the Fazilet (Virtue Party), its predecessor (see Angrist, 2004; Mecham, 2004; Önis & Keynam, 2003; Özel, 2003).

In **Jordan** political parties were illegal after the establishment of martial law in 1967. The first time that the people of Jordan could again participate in legislative elections was in 1989, although political parties were not fully legal until 1992, when the “Political Parties Law” was passed, which marked Jordan’s return to multiparty politics (Freij and Robinson, 1996; Amawi, 1994). The most recent elections in Jordan took place on 17 June 2003. In these elections the most overtly religious party, the Islamic Action Front, won only 20 seats (out of 110 possible seats), the lowest number in its political history (in 1989 it was the largest group with 23 out of 80 seats). The party selected for the purposes of this study is the Islamic Action Front, founded in 1992. The Islamic Action Front co-operated with the king of Jordan, until the signing of the peace accord with Israel in 1994, when it distanced itself from the government (Ghadbian, 1997: esp. Chapter 6).
Research Design

As the surveys only included legal parties, no banned party could be analysed. This impedes the analysis of organisations in several countries, such as the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, for example. For technical reasons only parties with a relatively high N could be analysed. The analysis endeavours to cover the entire region, stretching from Morocco to Jordan.

The technique used is a binary logistical regression. The vote intention/party support variable has been recoded in every survey into a dichotomous variable, where 1 represents the party selected for analysis and 0 represents the other parties. The data are composed of four data sets, one per country. The surveys were conducted between 2000 and 2002.

The independent variables have been included in different models in an attempt to analyse not only the effect of independent variables on the dependent one, but also the possible underlying effects between the independent variables themselves. Essentially, the analysis commences by introducing support for religious office holders in the first model and it is expected that a relationship will become evident. In successive models variables measuring regime and institutional support, and gender and economic issues are introduced.

Analysis of results

In order to obtain a general view of the support for fundamentalist parties, the level of support for Islamic-orientated parties is presented in Table 1. In the case of Morocco the survey contains two waves, the first conducted before the September 11 attacks on the United States and the second after the attack. As a result, for this country there are two columns, one measuring the support for the selected party before the attack and another for the support after the attack. For the Algerian case there are two figures, one indicating the support of HMI and a second indicating the support for HMI and ENNAHDA (Islamic Renaissance Movement) combined. We selected HMI for the analysis due to a higher N in the data set, but as NAHDA is a party with similar political views, we offer the figure of combined support to show that the support for Islamic-orientated political parties in Algeria is higher than the support for HMI.
exclusively. In the Moroccan, Turkish and Jordanian data there was only one strong Islamic-orientated party.

**Table one around here**

It is necessary to bear in mind that the percentages presented in Table 1 indicate direct support expressed during an interview. This is especially relevant with regards to interviews conducted after the September 2001 attacks, where respondents would most probably have been more reluctant to make public their support for an Islamic political party, as this support could have been considered as an endorsement of the September 2001 attacks. Consequently the figures should be interpreted with care. For all countries the percentages remain low, with the highest in Algeria, followed by Turkey, where the current governing party emerged as a continuation of the party analysed below, namely the Fazilet Party, a party rooted in Islam. Interestingly, higher support for an Islamic party is found in Turkey (the only secular country) than in countries such as Jordan or Morocco.

Results presented in Table 1 reflect only manifested direct support for Islamic-orientated political parties and assist in forming an idea of the cross-national support for Islamic parties in North Africa and the Middle East. But in an attempt to move beyond this and understand the causes that propel this support, it is necessary to utilise inferential statistics. The following tables present the results of regressing Islamic party support on a battery of socio-demographic, political, economic and cultural indicators in an attempt to detect the driving forces of such support.

Following the geographical distribution of the countries from the west to the east, the analysis begins with Morocco, followed by Algeria, Jordan and Turkey. Results for Morocco and Algeria are presented in Table 2.

**Table two around here**

Data from Table 2 indicate that the only force driving support for the Justice and Development Party in Morocco is the willingness to incorporate religious office holders into state institutions. The important effect of this variable remains noticeable throughout the entire analysis, model after model. It is important to note that democratic
support does not seem to affect party support, which may well indicate that the Justice and Development party supporters do not constitute a threat to political stability.

Another important factor explaining the data pattern is that the state in Morocco is not under threat. A lack of confidence in the state is therefore not driving Islamic support. Of course, what may also account for this is the fact that Morocco’s new King, Mohamed VI\textsuperscript{17}, has not only relaxed the restrictions\textsuperscript{18} on the press (and the media in general) that originated during his father’s rule shortly before he took over, but he is also currently struggling to improve the status of women in Morocco. In addition, Morocco has already experienced alternation in office and the replacement of former interior minister Driss Basri and his “reign of terror” (Sivan, 2000: 70), which makes the country a more moderate state than other southern Mediterranean countries. Interestingly, neither economic nor gender factors seem to affect the support for the JDP in Morocco, although it was in the poorer areas that the JDP performed best in the elections. Furthermore, neither satisfaction with the economic situation of the household nor the employment situation seems to affect Islamic party support.

The patterns in Algeria seem to yield more interesting results – they are also presented in Table 2. In the first model, when the variable that measures support for “more people with strong religious beliefs in public office” is introduced, it appears to be a driving force and remains significant when a second set of variables (related to democratic support) is introduced in the second model. However, in the third model, when confidence in religious institutions and in the state are introduced, these two variables emerge as affecting variables \textit{and} the effect of “more people with strong religious beliefs in public office” is diluted. This should be interpreted as the demand for “more people with strong religious beliefs in public office” being affected by the rejection of state institutions and confidence in religious ones. No other variables related to democracy, gender or the economy seem to play an overtly important role in the analysis. In others words, in Algeria HMI support is related to the incorporation of more religion into the state structure, because the current state\textsuperscript{19} is not trusted. This simply reflects the reality of Algerian politics. Already in October 1988 the economic crisis and social discontent gave rise to riots and protests that were severely repressed by the police. Four years later, after the national elections were cancelled because of the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front, a civil confrontation broke out (Kepel, 2000: 259-287).
The results of the other two countries, Jordan and Turkey, are presented in Table 3.

Table 3 around here

In the case of Turkey, as with Morocco and Algeria, the demand for “more people with strong religious beliefs in public office” emerges as a factor affecting Virtue Party support and this variable remains significant model after model. In the second model support for democracy has no effect on Virtue Party support. In the third model confidence in the state is included and also proves to be an influencing variable. As with the previous countries, no economic, regime or gender-related variables seem to have any effect on Islamic party support. Again the combination of religion and confidence in the state came to the fore as an important ingredient in the support pattern for an Islamic-orientated party. It is important to remember that in Turkey the army forced the Prime Minister to resign in 1997 and the state has banned Islamic parties several times. These events may account for the statistical results, which point towards a certain rejection of the secular state in which individuals seem to have lost confidence.

The case of Jordan is somewhat similar as the demand for more “religious people in office” also drives Islamic Party support and its effect remains evident model after model. In addition, in Jordan, support for the Islamic Action Front is also related to democracy. In this case the capabilities of state institutions are not called into question.

Overall, in our analysis there seem to be two prevalent factors dominating the Islamic party support patterns in the region. The first and more important one is that support for Islamic-orientated parties does not seem to imply a rejection of democratic forms of government. However, although support for democracy did not show any effect on support for Islamic-orientated parties (with the exception of Jordanian IAF), it is necessary to take into account that Western governments perhaps place too much emphasis on the democratisation process in the Arab or Muslim countries and not enough on the implications of secularisation within these societies. Significantly, this is related to the second main finding: the demand for more religion within the state and a lack of confidence in state institutions. This is especially evident in Algeria, where the demand for “more religious people in office” is specifically related to a lack of confidence in a repressive state. To a lesser extent the same also applies in Turkey.
These results correspond with those that indicate that the state plays an important role in controlling religion in Muslim countries by absorbing and repressing opposition (Brumberg, 2002b; see also Langohr, 2002). Consequently, it is worth noting Brumberg’s (2002a: 58, emphasis added; see also Kalyvas, 2000) argument: “Islam is a transcendent religion that can never be fully co-opted. Governments must cede some autonomy to state-supported religious institutions or elite, thereby raising the prospects that elements of religious establishments could defect to the Islamic opposition. To deter this and all other possible rebellions, total autocracies have ‘large and brutal security agencies’”. This notion is supported by the above analysis of citizen perceptions of the state in Islamic states such as Algeria or Morocco22. Again, repression by the state seems to be breeding support for Islamic parties instead of eroding their influence.

To reiterate, the attempts of Islamic groups to control and reform the state into becoming an Islamic state seem to be directly related to the existence of a coercive state apparatus. Sivan (2000:77), for instance, puts this notion as follows: “…the legacy of vengefulness and suspicion, especially among the top security establishments, left by years of violence, is partially to blame”. The results presented here indicate that this is exactly the existing dichotomy in the countries of the region where support for Islamic-oriented parties is higher: rejection of the current state and the demand for more religion within the state design. The manner in which this dichotomy is resolved may offer the key to the future of democracy in the region: perhaps “competitive authoritarianism” – a type of combination of democratic and authoritarian elements (Levitsky and Way, 2002; Diamond, 2002), allowing some room for the authority of religious political parties - may be the answer.

If the so-called “democratic gap” is due to “the longstanding tradition that merges rather than distinguishes between the religious and the political” as Karatnycky (2002: 105) argues, then, taking the above findings on support for Islamic-orientated political parties into consideration, it is to be understood that democracy will have difficulties stabilising in certain countries such as Algeria or even Turkey23, where Islamic party supporters demand the reconfiguration of the state structure and the incorporation of more doses of religion into the political process. If, as noted by Talbi (2000: 64), corruption opened the door to Islamism in countries such as Algeria, confidence in the state may continue to disintegrate. This may result in increased support for Islamic-
orientated opposition parties that demand the redesigning of state institutions into the form of a more religious state, and therefore, in this context perhaps, a less democratic state.

In essence, support for Islamic-orientated political parties in North Africa and the Middle East indicates two things: first, a rejection of a coercive state and, second, a demand for more religion within the state. Whether the resulting religious state may be compatible with democracy and whether the existence of a coercive state is a reaction against a demand for more religion, *vice versa* or neither of the two, are issues still to be investigated.

**Conclusions**

The rising tide of support for Islamic-orientated parties which is spreading through North Africa and the Middle East is becoming a political force that should be taken into account in the political arena. Islamic organisations are proliferating and competing with secular organisations for the people’s support to such an extent that certain states have reacted by prohibiting some of them. Is this growth in electoral support for Islamic parties a threat to democratic institutions in the region? In this article we argued that there is no straightforward answer to this question.

Results presented here refute the thesis that Islamic-orientated parties pose a *direct* danger for poliarchical forms of government. An analysis of the data patterns indicates that these political parties gain their support from those who *distrust the coercive state* and *demand more religion within the state*. However, as has already been pointed out by other scholars, a new question for future research arises. Although democracy is not *directly* rejected, to what extent will these demands for a more religious state obstruct the transformation of autocracies into democracies in the region? The fact that in some countries (e.g. Jordan) Islamic party support is actually based on a demand for more democracy opens the door for further research: what type of democracy? Liberal democracy, Islamic democracy, or another type? The viability of an Islamic democracy is still to be investigated. On the surface it seems clear that it would be difficult to reconcile the restructuring of the state into a religious entity with the functioning of real and well-developed democratic institutions and practices. Arguably, secularisation of society and reform of the coercive state should rather be emphasised,
not simply democratisation processes that result, as has been customary in the region, in unfair and constrained elections, therefore leading to increased autocracy.

References


1 With regards to the use of this term, it should be noted that some people use “Islamist” and others “Islamic”. Some argue that they are interchangeable, while others say they are not (Boroumand & Boroumand, 2002: 5), as the former is meant to be related to a more radical way of constructing politics, whereas the second simply means ‘related to Islam’. We have opted to use the term “Islamic” exclusively, as sometimes even radical organisations call themselves “Islamic” – for instance, the Islamic Salvation Front. We refer to Islamic-orientated political parties that aim to implement Islamic states in the region.

2 For a fairly comprehensive debate on fundamentalism, see, among the very many commentaries, Bender, 1996; Hajjar, 1995; Rubin, 1990; Taylor & Hogan, 2001.

3 The 2003 survey yielded similar results, with only Yemen showing vague democratic advances in terms of political rights and civil liberties (Karatnycky, 2004: 86).

4 The electoral system stipulates a 10% cut-off point for parties to be represented in Parliament, with the result that 45% of the voters voted for parties that did not enter Parliament. On the 2002 elections in Turkey, see Onis & Keynam (2003).

5 On this see Fish (2002).

6 For instance, in the 2002 general elections in Algeria 46.2% of potential voters cast their ballots. In the 2002 general elections in Morocco 51.6% of people with the right to vote actually did so. These turnout figures contrast with those of other countries such as Tunisia, where Islamic political parties do not have the same strength as in Morocco or Algeria and participation rates are much higher (91.5% in the general elections of 1999). In the Egyptian elections of 1987 the turnout was closer to 25%, although officially established at around 50% of the electorate. In the 1995 general elections the turnout was also officially set at 49% of the electorate. On elections in the Arab world, see Dillman (2000) and Posusney (2002).

7 In 1995 the predecessor of the AKP, the Welfare Party, won the elections, but in 1997 the prime minister was forced to resign.

8 In the 2002 elections the most influential Islamic political party, Justice and Charity, did not compete in the elections, arguing that the elections were fraudulent. Although this argument may be valid, it is difficult to discern whether the real reason for their absence may have been pressure from the government, as a victory for Justice and Charity would have been difficult to assimilate by the monarchy and government.

9 For a general review see, Norris and Evans, (1999), especially Chapter 5.

10 In Jordan the Islamic parties performed very well in the 1989 elections. However, although they are still politically powerful, their support has decreased (Freij & Robinson, 1996; Ryan, 1999).

11 A former member of the Welfare Party and mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to 1998. He was convicted of quoting a nationalistic folk poem during a speech in south-east Turkey in 1999 and the Constitutional Court prohibited him from running for office. However, the AKP managed to amend the constitution to allow Erdogan to become prime minister.

12 This is the most commonly used technique, although it has not been without criticism (see Bartle, 1998: 502). We have decided to use Nagelkerke Pseudo R² (see Nagelkerke, 1991; Windmeijer, 1995; and Veall & Zimmermann, 1992).

13 The exact wording was: “If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? Just call out the number on this card. If don't know: Which party appeals to you most?” Consequently, this variable measures both voter intention and party support (when vote intention is ‘don’t know’). It is not the intention of this research to enter into the debate on the difference between vote intention and party support.

14 The data set is that of World Values Survey team. The questionnaire can be accessed through the World Values Survey website <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>. The 2000/2001 data were released in April 2004 for secondary analysis.

15 The variables and wordings are: v202 (support for religious office holders): “It would be better for [the country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office”; v167 (democracy support) “Would you say it is a very good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system”, v164 “Would you say it is a very good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”; v147 (confidence in religious institutions) “Could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [church, mosque, etc.]”; Confidence in state institutions was measured through an index comprised of items indicating confidence in the several institutions that clustered together in a factor analysis. In the case of Algeria, the index comprised confidence in government; presidency; police and armed forces, and
in the cases of Morocco and Jordan, government, police and armed forces. In the case of Turkey, government, parliament and civil service. The indexes provide the following Alpha Cronbach results (Cronbach, 1951): Morocco 0.7694; Algeria 0.8725; Jordan 0.7859; Turkey 0.7245. Gender issues were measured with variables v118 “Can you tell me how much you agree with each? Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly? On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do” and v119 “Can you tell me how much you agree with each? Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly? A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl”. Economic issues included v80 “How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? If “1” means you are completely dissatisfied on this scale, and “10” means you are completely satisfied, where would you put your satisfaction with your household’s financial situation?” and v229 “Are you employed now or not?” Some variables were recoded, when necessary, to create higher values (i.e. 1 = low commitment to democracy, 5 = high commitment to democracy).

16 This is also a moderate Islamic political party that advocates the implementation of shar’ia and an Islamic state.

17 Unfortunately, confidence in the monarchy was not available as an item in the survey for it to be included in the analysis.

18 This does not mean that press freedom is a reality in Morocco. It simply means that there has been a degree of improvement in the situation. For instance, in 2003 Ali Lmrabet, a Moroccan journalist, was sentenced to three years in prison for offending the monarchy and attacking the country’s territorial integrity. The sentence was based on a series of articles and cartoons on the budget for the royal house and the opinions of a Moroccan republican activist reprinted from a Spanish newspaper. (On current Moroccan politics, see Maghraoui (2001) on the role of the King; Desrues & Moyano (2001) on political change; and Tessler (2002, 2003) for a comparative approach).

19 At this point it is important to recall that confidence in the state was an index, which was built with confidence in several institutions that clustered together in a factor analysis. Tellingly in all Muslim countries under analysis, the state is perceived as composed of police, military government, and, where available, presidency. In other words, the state is perceived as comprising repressive machinery: armed forces and the executive apparatus that controls them. The exception was Turkey, the only secular country, where confidence in parliament, government and civil service factored together.

20 We have not established what people understand by the concept democracy as it falls outside the scope of this analysis.

21 Tellingly, in both countries Algeria and Turkey, the state has banned religious parties.

22 Interestingly, the only country where the state was not perceived as repressive was the only non-Arab state, Turkey. Confidence in Arab states was composed of confidence in armed forces and the executive, whereas in Turkey, it was composed of confidence in the executive, parliament and civil service.

23 In Turkey however, there is no governmental movement in this direction. European Union membership would be impossible if this ever happens and this may account for this pattern. In addition, the current government may be more careful because the army forced the prime minister to resign in 1997 for not respecting aspects of a secular society.
Table 1. Support for Islamic political parties in MENA region (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>1088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- support for Moroccan JDP before 9/11 attacks
- support for JDP after 9/11 attacks
- support for Algerian HMI
- Support for HMI + NAHDA together
- support for Jordanian IAF
- support for Turkish Virtue Party

Table 2. Party Support (Morocco & Algeria)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.146***</td>
<td>-3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
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<tr>
<td>More religious people in office</td>
<td>.712*</td>
<td>.671*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy support</td>
<td>-.768</td>
<td>-.759</td>
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<tr>
<td>Having a strong leader</td>
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<td>-1.242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confidence in religious institutions</td>
<td>16.076</td>
<td>16.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in state</td>
<td>-.072</td>
<td>-.060</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<tr>
<td>Men better leaders</td>
<td>-.109</td>
<td>.044</td>
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<td>Education more important for a boy</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfaction financial situation household</td>
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<td>-.025</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed/unemployed</td>
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<td>.159</td>
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<td>-2 Log Likelihood</td>
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<td>1157.254</td>
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<td>% Correct Predictions</td>
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<td>85.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
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<td>.150</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey Model 1</td>
<td>Turkey Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>More religious people in office</td>
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<td>.777***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regime support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy support</td>
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<td>Confidence in religious institutions</td>
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<td>.066</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confidence in state</td>
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<td>-.080***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td>.221</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed/unemployed</td>
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