Explaining Democratic Models in the Swiss Global Justice Movement: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Marco GIUGNI and Alessandro NAI
University of Geneva

Abstract:

The democratic practices implemented by the global justice movement in internal decision-making processes vary sensibly from one movement organization to another as well as from one country to another. Some organizations defend an assembleary democratic model (characterized by a weak search for consensus and a decision-making mode that aims to include all the participants), others put forward an associational model (weak search for consensus and strong delegation of power in the hands of a restricted committee), still others stress a deliberative representative model (strong search for consensus and strong delegation of power), and, finally, certain organizations follow a deliberative participative model (strong search for consensus and weak delegation of power). This paper focuses on the possible explanations of these differences in the case of the Swiss global justice movement. In particular, the impact of the structural characteristics of the organizations, the ideological cleavage upon which rests their political mobilization, the tradition of contention in which they are embedded, and the historical period in which they became active will be tested by means of an original dataset gathered in a current research project (DEMOS, Democracy in Europe and the Mobilization of Society, 6th EU FP) which includes 35 Swiss organizations that participate to the mobilization of the global justice movement. These data include standardized information on decision-making rules of these organizations. Given the limited number of cases, the empirical tests will be carried using Qualitative Comparative Analyses (QCA), which are particularly suited for the study of small samples. Moreover, a particular procedure will be proposed for the resolution of conflicting cases.
Introduction

One of the features that distinguish social movements from simple protest behavior is the fact that the latter lacks the collective project that cements the latter and allows them, among other things, to sustain their challenges over time. A certain vision of democracy is undoubtedly a major project that participants in social movements can share. Indeed, having a certain view of democracy is, implicitly or explicitly, crucial for a social movement as it reflects the very reality it is challenging. What many call today the global justice movement (e.g. della Porta 2007) has this explicitly. By emphasizing participative and deliberative democracy, this movement makes of the challenge to traditional ways of viewing and practicing (representative) democracy one of its main battlegrounds. In other words, the criticism of globalization “from above” is paralleled by a critique of representative forms of democracy which implies a redrawing of the boundaries of politics in a participatory direction (della Porta et al. 2006).

Yet, this characterization of the global justice movement as stressing participative and deliberative democracy against a more traditional view of representative democracy is overly simplistic. Instead of such a black-and-white picture, it is much more realistic to think of different sectors of the movement as having different views. Although, even more than for other social movements, its contours are far from being clearly defined, the global justice movement is composed of a variety of organizations ranging from traditional environmental groups to organizations more typically addressing global justice issues, from trade unions to loosely structured anti-imperialist groups, and so forth. In spite of sharing a same general criticism of existing power relations, all these groups and organizations do not have the very same vision of democracy. For example, while some emphasize the participation of the largest number of people as possible and the search for consensus as supreme democratic values and norms, others lean more towards a more traditional style of decision making which includes doses of majority rule and delegation of power.

In particular, as we will show below, the democratic practices implemented by the global justice movement in internal decision-making processes vary sensibly from one movement organization to another. Some organizations defend an assembleary democratic model (characterized by a weak search for consensus and a decision-making mode that aims to include all the participants), other put forward an associational model (weak search for
consensus and strong delegation of power in the hands of a restricted committee), still others stress a deliberative representative model (strong search for consensus and strong delegation of power), and, finally, certain organizations follow a deliberative participative model (strong search for consensus and weak delegation of power).

The question, though, is not simply to observe different democratic models and to describe them. The most interesting part of the picture resides in explaining such differences. This paper examines some of the possible explanations of variations in the prevailing vision of democracy across organizations active in the Swiss global justice movement. We focus on two types of factors: structural and cultural. In particular, the impact of the characteristics of the organizations, their ideological position, the tradition of contention in which they are embedded, and the historical period in which they became active will be tested by means of an original dataset gathered in a current research project (DEMOS, Democracy in Europe and the Mobilization of Society, 6th EU FP) which includes 35 Swiss organizations that participate in the mobilization of the global justice movement. These data include standardized information on decision-making rules of these organizations. Given the limited number of cases, the empirical tests be carried using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), which is particularly suited for the study of small samples.

In the next section we discuss in more detail four basic models of democracy which are found within the global justice movement, but which are at the same time more general views of how collective decisions should be taken. Then we present the main explanatory factors upon which we focus our analysis and suggest a number of tentative hypotheses relating these factors to different democratic models. The remainder of the paper will be devoted to the presentation and discussion of our empirical analysis.

**Democratic models in the GJM**

The most basic distinction one can find in the literature concerning democratic models is perhaps that between representative and participative democracy (Pateman 1970). While in the former collective decisions are taken by a small group of people on behalf of a larger constituency who delegates power to elites, the latter foresees the direct involvement of the constituency in decision making. Simply put, representative democracy is based on delegation of power, whereas in participative democracy the end-users of the public good resulting from
decision making intervene directly in the decisional process, without the transmission belt represented by the small group of elites.  

Representation vs. participation, however, is only one aspect of the more general distinction of different democratic models. Participative democracy is often associated with deliberative democracy, which stresses the quality of communication in addition to the need for broad participation. In the social movement literature, deliberation only recently has begun to be discussed, perhaps spurred by the rise of the global justice movement, which emphasizes precisely those characteristics that has made of participation and deliberation a central theme, both internally in discussions about organizational structures and practices and externally in experiments of citizens’ involvement in decision-making processes. This is not the place to discuss in detail a concept that, in contrast, has attracted much attention from political theorists (see Dryzek 2000, Elster 1998, and Fishkin and Lasslet 2003 for reviews) and has been brought to the fore in social theory by the seminal work of Habermas (1984, 1987, 1996), but we need to at least sketch an operational definition allowing us to study the relationship between democratic models and certain organizational characteristics of the movement.

Deliberative democracy can be defined through the following characteristics (della Porta 2005: 74): preference transformation, orientation to the public good, rational argument, consensus, equality, inclusiveness, and transparency. Thus, “we have deliberative democracy when, under conditions of equality, inclusiveness, and transparency, a communicative process based on reasons (the strength of the argument) transforms individual preferences into consensual decision making oriented to the public good” (della Porta 2005: 74-75). As appears from this definition, the search for consensus is the main feature of deliberation, as it represents the desired effect, while the other characteristics can be seen as either conditions or means to reach consensus.

Thus, democratic models in the global justice movement can be defined along two main dimensions: a first dimension concerns the degree to which delegation of power is admitted in the decision-making body and a second dimension relating to the search of consensus as a decision-making method. If we combine these two dimensions we obtain four ideal-typical democratic models. The first model characterizes by a low degree of delegation of power and a similarly low degree of consensus. As such, it reflects more an assembleary view of decision
making than a deliberative one. Decisions are to be taken following an inclusive principle aiming at involving larger a constituency as possible (therefore, little delegation of power is required), but following a majority rule rather than a consensual one. The second model shares with the first one the low priority given to consensus, but, in addition to that, it also foresees a strong delegation of power. This is the most typical associational mode of decision making. The third and fourth models differ from the first two insofar as they both rely on a high degree of consensus and therefore of deliberation. However, while the deliberative representative model is largely based on delegation of power in the hands of a decision-making body, the deliberative participative one aims to be as inclusive as possible. The four democratic models are shown in figure 1.

Figure 1 about here

What democratic model do the organizations of the global justice movement have? Table 1 allows us to answer this question, by showing the distribution of the 35 organizations selected for this study in Switzerland (see below for information about the data). It also compares this distribution to the one obtained through a content analyses of documents produced by these organizations as well as to the full sample included in the DEMOS project and bearing, in addition to Switzerland, on France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK, and a sample of transnational organizations.

Table 1 about here

As we can see in the table (second column), nearly half of the organizations follow the deliberative representative model. If to that we add the share of organizations adopting the deliberative participative model, we obtain a picture of the Swiss global justice movement being strongly oriented towards the search for consensus in internal decision making, whereby deliberation plays very important role. The two models that can be considered as the two most extreme ones with regard to participation and deliberation - the associational model and the deliberative participative models – are equally present within the movement. The assembleary model, in contrast, is by far the less frequently used one, with a single organization (Mouvement pour le Socialisme) having adopted it.
The distribution found among the Swiss organizations does not differ very much with those observed in the full sample (third column). The share of organizations following one or the other of the four democratic models does not vary fundamentally. However, the associational model is underrepresented and the deliberative representative model more frequent among Swiss organizations. Generally speaking, in Switzerland more organizations have a deliberative decision-making method based on the search for consensus, especially when combined with delegation of power (i.e. when deliberation is searched within a small group of leaders). This might be stem in part from the consensual character of the Swiss political system in general, which reflects on the internal functioning of the organizations of the GJM. In interpreting these findings, however, we should take into account the relatively high number of organizations that we could not classify due to lack of information and which are therefore missing, in both the Swiss and the full samples.

The most striking comparison, however, is that between the findings obtained through the analysis of written documents with those based on the questionnaire submitted to the selected organizations (first column). The differences between the two samples are very important. The only model that does not change much is the assemblerey one, which remains by and large the less frequent one. All three other models show totally different distributions in the sample based on documents: the associational model is by far the dominant one, the deliberative representative model is much less central, and the deliberative participative model totally disappears. Thus, deliberation and consensus appears to be much less spread within the movement when we look at written documents than when we ask organizational leaders about their decision-making body and method.

The fact that more organizations declared a consensual decision-making method and in part also a lower delegation of power in the decision-making body in the interviews than it appears from the written documents may be explained in several ways. On one hand, it could be simply an artifact. For example, the respondents might tend to exaggerate the consensual and participatory character of their internal decision-making procedures because they want to provide a more “open” and democratic picture of their organization. Also, the written documents might understate consensus and participation, for example because the functioning of the organizations has changed and they have not been updated. Yet, on the other hand, the difference might well be real and could be interpreted as the result of a process of accommodation by certain organizations, most notably those displaying an associational
model in their written documents and a more consensual model (either participative or representative) in practice, as they realize that the latter is an effective mode of decision making.

Finally, we can compare the organizational level with the conceptions of democracy as they are expressed by individual participants and activists of the movement (fourth column). Again, we observe a different distribution. At the individual level, the most common democratic models are the assembleary and deliberative participative ones. The deliberative representative model is much less popular than among organizations (but only based on the questionnaire), while the associational model displays a similar share (but only with respect to the documents). In the whole, participants and activists put a stronger emphasis on participation and are therefore more critical of the delegation of power, which is quite understandable given that they aim to be as much involved as possible in decision making and to strengthen de “democracy from below.”

**Structural and cultural determinants of democratic models**

The comparison of the democratic models adopted by the selected organizations as they arise from the interviews (both in the Swiss and the full samples) with those stemming from the analysis of documents produced by the organizations as well as those pertaining to participants in the ESF allows us to put into a broader perspective the data on which the following analysis is based. Yet, our aim is not simply to describe the democratic models adopted in decision-making within the Swiss global justice movement, but above all to explain them. We look at both structural and cultural determinants of consensus and participation – which, combined, reflect what we have called the deliberative participative model of democracy – in our sample of organizations. Specifically, we examine the impact of the internal structuration of the organizations (degree of professionalization, size, territorial scope) and of the main ideological cleavage upon which rests their political mobilization. In addition, we include in our analysis the founding year of the organizations, which allows us to test for the impact of the historical period in which the organizations were created.

The first two aspects refer to the internal structuration of the organizations. This, of course, are aspects that have been placed at center stage in the study of social movements in particular by resources mobilization theory (see Edwards and McCarthy 2004 for a review). In this
perspective, the level of endogenous resources and the degree of internal resources of social movements have been seen as main explanatory factors of movement emergence and protest activities. The organizations’ internal structuration is also related to their development over time. For example, Kriesi (1996) proposes four parameters for the analysis of organizational development: organizational growth and decline, internal structuration, external structuration, and goal orientations and action repertoires. Here we focus on the second aspect, namely internal structuration. Specifically, we look at the impact of two indicators of internal structuration: the degree of professionalization (paid staff) of the organization and their size (members).  

The question is whether the organizations’ internal structuration (as measured through their degree of professionalization and their size) can plausibly be linked to the democratic model they follow in decision-making. One hypothesis in this respect could be that more professionalized organizations should tend to delegate the most important decisions to a small group of leader. After all, this is what professionalization is all about: having a small, professional committed that take decisions and implement them. Therefore, professionalized organizations would prefer representation to deliberation. In addition, we can expect the degree of professionalization to be associated to a majority rather than a consensual rule of decision making, as this reflect better the routines of a professional leading committee. Thus, if we combine the two dimensions, organizations that have a strong degree of internal structuration in terms of professionalization are likely to adopt an associational model of democracy.

A similar hypothesis can be made with regard to organizational size. Again, larger organizations can be expected to be more favorable to a delegation of power in the decision-making body and less favorable to consensus as a decision-making method. Participation and deliberation are more difficult to reach in larger groups. Therefore, we expect larger organization to follow the associational democratic model.

Degree of professionalization and size are internal characteristics of the organizations *strictu sensu*. A third aspects studied here can also be considered as contributing to the organizations’ internal structuration, namely the territorial scope. However, this aspect differs from the previous ones to the extent that it is not an indicator of the organizations’ resources. Concerning the territorial level, we distinguish between organizations that have an
international chapter and those that are confined within the national borders (local of national chapters only). Although is more difficult for this aspect to formulate plausible hypotheses, one may argue that organizations that are international in scope are more likely to function on the associational model. International organizations are more complex and therefore they necessitate more effective decision-making procedures, which only a strong degree of delegation and a majority rule can provide. In contrast, nationally based organizations can afford to be more open to participation and deliberation. Yet, the opposite hypothesis is plausible as well. Therefore, we abstain from formulating a clear-cut prediction with regard to this explanatory factor.

While the first three factors are all structural determinants of the democratic models adopted by organizations, the fourth and fifth ones can be see as cultural determinants. We first take into account the ideological cleavage upon which rests the mobilization of the organization. European scholars have stressed the role of social and cultural cleavages for the emergence and mobilization of social movements (e.g. Kriesi et al. 1995). In particular, many have pointed to the different cultural underpinnings of the new social movements with respect to “older” movements, mainly the labor movement (see Buechler 1995 and Pichardo 1997 for reviews). Others have looked at the social basis of the new social movements, arguing that they reflect a division within the new middle class and that their mobilization potential is largely based on this line of conflict (e.g. Kriesi 1989). In this perspective, the new social movements are ultimately rooted in structural and cultural transformation that have characterized the European countries in the post-war period.

Here we follow this line of reasoning to inquire into the impact of the ideological cleavage upon which rests the organizations studied on their propensity to follow a given democratic model. More precisely, we look at the organizations’ ideological position as resulting from its underlying cultural cleavage. An hypothesis that we can make in this regard is that the organizations created during the period in which the news social movements emerged and mobilized strongly should tend be have an ideological position that make them more inclined to adopt a participative and deliberative mode of decision making. The new social movements have been characterized as promoting participation by civil society actors and more open ways to take collective decisions. As a result, we may expect them to be more likely to accept the idea that decision making should be obtained through a lower degree of delegation, although perhaps not necessarily through the search for consensus, therefore stressing an
assembleary model of democracy if not a deliberative participative one. Other organizations, in contrast, should be more oriented toward delegation and also majority rule in decision making, as they are mostly leftist organizations such as parties and unions, which tend to privilege representation rather than participation and are also less prone to look for consensus.

Finally, we look at the founding year of the organization. This is meant to measure the impact of the historical period in which the organizations emerged. We distinguish between organizations created before 1989 and those founded after 1989. This year was chosen in part arbitrarily, but at the same time it symbolically represent a watershed in the history of Europe and therefore also in the history of political contention. An hypothesis that we could make in this respect is that organizations created more recently (i.e. after 1989) should be more inclined to adopt a deliberative participative model of democracy. These are the organizations that emerged within the protest wave carried by the global justice movement. Since this movement emphasizes the need for more a open and inclusive democracy, we may expect the organization that form the backbone of this movement to implement such a view of democracy in their internal functioning as well.

Summing up, we expect a high degree of deliberation (high consensus and low delegation) when the SMO has a low level of professionalism, a small size, a local or national focus (this remaining theoretically unclear), a NSM ideological shape and/or a recent creation.

It is important to note that our tentative hypotheses are based on a linear logic. In other words, we have formulated a separate hypothesis concerning the impact of each of the five independent variables on the absence of delegation and the presence of consensus. However, the method we adopt in this paper is particularly suited to studying conjunctural multiple causation (Ragin 1987). Our analysis will therefore explore possible combinations of factors leading to the choice of a democratic model rather than another as well as different possible paths leading to a given model of democracy. It is to the description of the method used that we turn next.

Data and methods

The data have been collected by means of a structured questionnaire submitted to a sample of organizations active in the Swiss global justice movement. The initial sample of 35
organizations was generated according to certain criteria such as the importance of the organizations, their involvement in the issues raised by the movement, and their distribution on different types of organizations. Although we planned to include 35 organizations, we succeeded in interviewing only 28 of them. Furthermore, the present analysis is conducted on 21 organizations due to lack of data on key variables.

The interviews took place between February and June 2006. They were conducted by two different interviewers because of the language: French and German. Some were made face-to-face, some other by phone. It was relatively difficult to find an agreement from several organizations and we could not interview 7 of them (because they did not accept or because we could not reach them). The person interviewed was generally the one with the better knowledge of the organization and its characteristics, but the specific role (leader, spokesperson, responsible for communication, etc.) varied depending on the type and size of the organization (small and informal organization, larger and more formalized NGO, union, party).

Our main goal is to study a number of potential determinants of the four democratic models outlines earlier. However, instead of assessing each of the four models separately, for practical reasons we focus on the two main dimensions of the typology of democratic models (see figure 1): the degree of delegation of power in the decision-making body and the degree of consensus in the decision-making method. Since we are theoretically most interested in examining the deliberative participative model as the view of democracy brought to the fore by the global justice movement, our dependent variable will be represented, respectively, by the absence (or a weak degree) of delegation and by the presence (or a strong degree) of consensus. Each aspect will be analyzed separately by relating it to the five independent variables discussed earlier.

The independent variables have been operationalized as follows. First, the degree of professionalization was constructed as an additive scale by cumulating the scores obtained for each organization on three structural dummy indicators: number of paid staff members (0 to 20 vs. more than 20), budget (less than 10'000 CHF vs. more than 10'000 CHF) and the possibility of formalizing the individual membership with a member-card (no vs. yes). An organization having more than 20 members, an overall budget higher than 10'000 CHF, and the possibility of membership formalization (through a member card) obtains 3 points on the
additive scale. The latter has then been dichotomized (0 or 1 point indicating a low degree of professionalization, 2 or 3 points indicating a high degree of professionalization). Second, size is measured through the overall number of members and then dichotomized (less than 1000 vs. more than 1000 members). Third, territorial scope tries to capture the distinction between organizations that have an international chapter and those that have only local or national. Fourth, with the aim to create a dummy variable measuring the organization’s founding year, we distinguished between organizations created before and after 1989. Finally, our fifth independent factor distinguishes the organizations studied according to the main ideological cleavage upon which rests their mobilization (new social movements vs. other). Table 2 shows the 21 organizations included in the analysis and their position on these five variables.

Table 2 about here

We examine the structural and cultural determinants of the democratic model adopted by the organizations studied by means of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Ragin 1987). This method is particularly well suited to the analysis of a limited number of cases, such as small to medium-N samples, as our. Before we show the main results of our research, we discuss some key methodological points related to this particular approach.

QCA is often described as an empirical technique allowing the researcher to comparing wholes as configuration of parts (Ragin 1987: 84). Based on a simple Boolean algebra, QCA analyzes matrixes of binary data describing the occurrence or non-occurrence of traits (or outcomes) for a set of cases (Hicks 1994: 96). The main calculating principle of the Boolean algebra is that if two unique combinations of independent factors produce the same outcome and only differ on the value of one factor (presence or absence), then the value of this factor is not a cause of the outcome, and the two unique combinations can be reduced to a simpler causal condition (Harkreader and Imershein 1999: 169-170). In simpler terms, Abc combines with ABc to produce Ac (Ragin 1987: 94). This simplification takes the shape of a conjunctural equation, constructed on Boolean additions and multiplications. Addition is conceived on the basic idea that if, in a conjunctural equation, any of the terms (or causal paths) is present, then the outcome occurs. In Boolean algebra, addition is therefore equivalent to the logical operator or (Ragin 1987: 89). Consider the following example: A{1} + B{1} = C{1}. In a Boolean perspective, this signifies that if the variable A equals 1 or the variable B equals 1, then C equals 1. The outcome 1 for the variable A or B is therefore a
A sufficient condition for $C$ equals 1. Similarly, Boolean multiplication is constructed on the idea that if in a conjunctural equation two (or more) terms are present simultaneously, then the outcome will occur. In Boolean algebra multiplication indicates the logical operator *and* (Ragin 1987: 91-92). Consider a second example: $A\{1\}B\{1\} = C\{1\}$. In a Boolean perspective, this means simply that a score 1 for the variable $A$ is combined with a score 1 for $B$ to produce a score 1 for $C$: in other words, $C$ will be 1 if $A=1$ and $B=1$. In this case (characterised by an absence of additive terms), the score 1 for $A$ and $B$ is a necessary condition for $C$ equals 1.

QCA has important logical and methodological advantages, especially for small to medium-sized N studies as ours (Harkreader and Imershein 1999: 170). First, the method is based on an easy-accessible logic, constructed on simple algebraic bases (the Boolean logic). The variables are entered in the model in the simpler possible form: the binary form. Furthermore, QCA results are presented in a parsimonious yet comprehensive way, by discriminating between sufficient and necessary conditions for the presence of a given outcome. This allows a direct and immediate understanding of the results. Second, QCA aims to integrate the complexity of the context into the core of the analysis. To do so, it integrates interaction effects among causal or contextual variables. As noted by Scharpf (1997), this method, by focusing on combinations of variables, not only stresses multicausality, but also does not need to assume that variables are independent. Moreover, QCA integrates in his own logic an equifinal or functional equivalent view, meaning that different configurations of the context can produce the same outcome (Scharpf 1997: 27; Hall 2003: 387; Mahoney and Goertz 2006: 10-12). In a nutshell, QCA allows simple and conjunctural analyses, even with small-N datasets.

This method, however, has also a number of weaknesses. Following the literature on the subject, we acknowledge in the standard (i.e. not "fuzzy-setted") QCA approach three major limitations. First, while it is particularly well adapted for small to medium-sized N, it has serious problems with larger datasets. A large number of cases increases the frequency of contradictory configurations (i.e. identical configurations leading to opposite outcomes). Since the resolution of contradictions is a central (but quite complex and potentially very problematic) task in the basic QCA procedure, a large-N increases the risk of failing to reach any deterministic solution (Hicks 1994: 97). Second, a too high number of independent variables increases exponentially the number of (potential) combinations of factors, again
increasing the risk that no deterministic solution will be found (Scharpf 1997: 27). Third, recent works have criticized the core values and construct of QCA. According to such a criticism, this method is overly deterministic, postulating a direct link between a specific configuration of factors (independent variables) and a given outcome (dependent variable). However, even if this has the advantage of presenting the results in a straightforward way, a fully deterministic perspective is probably not desirable in the social sciences (Bochsler 2006: 8; Nai 2006).

Our analysis tries to avoid the two first problems. By analyzing a causal model composed of two dependent variables (consensus and delegation) and only five independent factors, and by applying it to a relatively small dataset (21 cases), we have good chances to circumvent the risk of finding no deterministic solution. In addition, concerning the resolution of contradictions, we propose a particular (and pioneering) statistical procedure, based on probabilistic inclusion, capable of strongly reducing the importance of the third and more radical criticism (Nai 2006). The principle of probabilistic inclusion follows a very simple logic (Nai 2006). In a nutshell, we calculate two empirical measures for each minimized assumption produced by QCA: (1) a likelihood score (LS), presenting the probability that such assumption effectively leads to the outcome at hand; and (2) an occurrence ratio (OR), indicating the importance of the path in terms of relative presence. We then use the score resulting from a multiplication between these two measures as a standardized coefficient measuring, in some way, the overall interest (OI) of each minimized assumption produced.8 We consider a minimized assumption having an OI ≥ 0.2 as sufficiently important for determining the outcome.9 If the overall interest of the path is lower than this (arbitrary) threshold, this would probably indicate a problem with the related path: either a low probability of leading to the outcome or a low relative presence (or both). In other words, if the overall interest (OI) is low, this path cannot be fully trusted as effectively producing the outcome (given that we integrated the contradictions instead of resolving them).10

Findings

Before conducting the QCA, in a first step we looked for correlations among our two dependent variables (delegation and consensus), on one hand, and the five independent variables, on the other. These bivariate analyses show that only the territorial scope of the organization does have a significant effect on the presence of consensus: according to our
data, the likelihood of a high consensus increases if the organization has a local or national scope.\textsuperscript{11} Excepted for a quite significant effect (chi2=0.055) of the ideological position on the consensus level (higher for NSM), none the other independent factors is shown as influencing a consensual decision-making method. Similarly, no significant effect is shown for our exogenous factors on the degree of delegation in the decision-making body.

Given the quite unsatisfactory results yielded by our bivariate analyses, we implement an alternative way to measure the impact on the democratic model (degree of consensus and delegation) of our set of exogenous factors through QCA, with an inclusive treatment of the conflicting cases.\textsuperscript{12} To read the QCA results, remember the following basic guidelines: (1) each modality of the dependent variable is expressed as a function of different causal paths; (2) each causal path (configuration of independent factors) forming the final equation is linked with the logical operator "or" (addition), indicating that each of them is an alternative but equivalent path to reach the outcome;\textsuperscript{13} (3), each causal path is potentially formed by a combination of independent factors, all independent factors in a causal path being linked with the logical operator "and" (multiplication), indicating that the conditions have to be present simultaneously\textsuperscript{14} (addition and multiplication can be combined to create complex causal equations); and (4) a numerical score (shown between brackets) is assigned to each causal path which represents the overall interest of the path, so as the higher the score, the greater the interest of the path in explaining the outcome (we chose 0.2 as an indicative threshold).

Let us turn to the main results of our analyses. As we said earlier, we look for the structural and cultural determinants of high consensus in the decision-making method and low delegation in the decision-making body. Together, these two elements yield a deliberative participative model of democracy. We therefore perform a separate QCA analysis for each one of these two expected outcomes. As a control, we also present the results for the two features of the associative model (low consensus and high delegation), which can be seen as the opposite democratic model. Remember that we expect a deliberative participative model when the organization has a low degree of professionalization, a small size, a local or national focus (although we advanced no clear-cut hypothesis for this aspect), its mobilization rests on the new social movements cleavage, and was recently created.
The results of QCA for high consensus are as follows:

\[(\text{consensus: high}) = (\text{ideological cleavage: NSM})^{[0.532]} + (\text{territorial scope: local/national})^{[0.7]}\]

The first causal equation shows the conjunctural configuration leading to a highly consensual decision-making method. Our results suggest that, following in part our expectations; high consensus exists when the organization is ideologically close to the new social movements or when its territorial scope is local or national. These two circumstances are, alone and independently, sufficient conditions for the existence of a highly consensual democratic model. Note that no conjunctural situation is determined by QCA, as the independent variables are presented individually (i.e. not submitted to a simultaneous occurrence). Note also that the importance score for both causal paths is quite high, indicating that we can assume that chances are good that they will actually lead to the desired outcome.

The results of QCA for low consensus are as follows:

\[(\text{consensus: low}) = (\text{territorial scope: international})^{[0.22]} + (\text{founding year: recent}) \ast (\text{ideological cleavage: other})^{[0.08]} + (\text{ideological cleavage: other}) \ast (\text{professionalization: high}) \ast (\text{size: large})^{[0.15]}\]

As a control, our results show that a low level of consensus is determined by a more complex conjunctural configuration of conditions. According to the QCA results, low consensus occurs following three causal paths: (1) the territorial scope is oriented towards the international level (as expected), (2) the organization has recently been created (contrary to expectations) and its mobilization rest upon an ideological cleavage other than the new social movements (as expected); and (3) the organization’s ideological position is not close to the new social movements and its degree of professionalization is high (as expected) and it has a large size (expected). Although these results are quite interesting, we shall note that the OI scores for each causal path are fairly weaker than the previous ones, as only the first causal path is beyond the 0.2 threshold. According to our proposed solution, this would mean that only the first causal path can be considered as producing the observed outcome (low consensus, in this case).
case) with acceptable chances. Therefore, we retain only the first path as a sufficiently robust explicative configuration.

We note that the territorial scope of the organization is a good (and sufficient) predictor of the degree of consensus. Confirming our expectation, if the organization has a local or national focus, the organization will search for consensus in decision making. Conversely, if the territorial scope is more oriented towards the international level, the consensual is lower.

The results of QCA for the low delegation are as follows:

\[
(\text{delegation: low}) = (\text{founding year: recent}) \times (\text{size: small}) \{0.21\} + (\text{ideological cleavage: other}) \times (\text{territorial scope: local/national}) \times (\text{professionalization: strong}) \times (\text{size: large}) \{0.02\} + (\text{ideological position: NSM}) \times (\text{professionalization: low}) \times (\text{size: small}) \{0.22\}
\]

The case of low delegation is even more complex. According to our QCA results, a lower degree of delegation can occur following three conjunctural combinations of factors: (1) when the organization has been recently created and it has a small size (confirming some of our expectations); (2) when the organization’s ideological position is not close to the new social movements and it has a local/national scope and a high degree of professionalization and a large size; and (3) when the organization is ideologically close to the new social movements and its degree of professionalization is low and its size is small. Again, this multiple causality supports our hypotheses. As before, these results (especially the second causal path) are not easy to interpret, given the strong multicausality. Again, however, the OI scores are quite weak for all the three causal paths. While the first and the last causal paths can still be retained, this can not be done for the second one (with an OI of only 0.02). We therefore exclude this specific causal path from our interpretation.

Our results show that, as expected, a small size of the organization is a necessary condition for low delegation in the decision-making body, since both remaining paths contain this configuration. A small size of the organization determines low delegation when combined with a recent creation as well as when combined with an ideological cleavage close to the new social movements and a low degree of professionalization.
Finally, the results of QCA for high delegation are as follows:

\[(\text{delegation: high}) = (\text{founding year: old}) [0.54] + (\text{ideological cleavage: other}) [0.37] + (\text{size: large}) [0.46]\]

The forth causal equation produced by QCA shows that three sufficient conditions (and no conjunctural situation) determine the presence of a democratic model characterized by delegation. According to our data, high delegation occurs when the organization is old or its ideological position is not close to the new social movements or its has a large size. All three results were expected following our hypotheses. The latter condition is particularly interesting, as it appears that the size of the organization plays an important role in explaining the degree of delegation in the decision-making body. Delegation is low when the size of the organization is small (necessary condition) and high when the size is large (sufficient condition). Note also that the OI scores are quite high for each of the three causal paths leading to high delegation.

**Conclusion**

In this paper we explored some connections between a number of characteristics of organizations participating in the global justice movement in Switzerland and the democratic models implemented by these organizations in internal decision-making processes. We used a typology of democratic models crossing two main dimensions: the degree of delegation of power in the decision-making body and the degree of consensus in the decision-making body. The 21 organizations included in the analysis vary according to the model of democracy they tend to adopt. Our analysis has focused on the deliberative participative model, which is arguably the one put forward by the global justice movement in its criticism of traditional forms of democracy. In particular, we have examined a number of structural and cultural determinants of delegation and consensus: the degree of professionalization of the organizations, their size, their territorial scope, the ideological cleavage upon which rests their mobilization, and their founding year as a measure of the historical period in which they were created.
QCA was used to study empirical the relation between these five explanatory factors, on one hand, and the degree of delegation and consensus, on the other. The findings largely confirm our hypotheses concerning the structural and cultural determinants of the democratic models adopted by the organizations studied. The only counterintuitive result is the low consensus searched by more recently created organizations in decision making, but only when combined with an ideological cleavage other than the new social movements (which is contrary to our expectation). The remaining findings support our hypotheses and, moreover, they show some interesting conjunctural patterns.

Further analyses should include a wider range of organizations. In particular, given the cross-national variations that can be observed in the democratic models of the movement (della Porta and Mosca 2006), it would be interesting to see whether the explanatory factors of such models also vary across countries. Most importantly, in a next stage we should be able to advance hypotheses according to the multiple conjunctural causation which QCA is especially designed for, in addition to those following a linear logic suggests in the present study.
References


Figure 1: Models of democracy in the global justice movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision-making consensus</th>
<th>Decision-making body: delegation of power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision-making method:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Assembleary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Deliberative participative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deliberative representative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1: Distribution of the selected organization according to their democratic model (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic models</th>
<th>Organizations (documents)</th>
<th>Organizations (questionnaire)</th>
<th>Organizations (full sample)</th>
<th>Individuals (2006 ESF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assocational</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative representative</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembleary</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative participative</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The data comes from the DEMOS project (della Porta and Mosca 2006; della Porta and Reiter 2006; Giugni et al. 2007). Only valid cases are included. Missing cases are distributed as follows: Swiss organizations based on documents (9), Swiss organizations based on questionnaire (7), full sample (26), individuals (150).
Table 2: Main characteristics of the organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Degree of prof.</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Territorial scope</th>
<th>Founding year</th>
<th>Ideological cleavage</th>
<th>Delegation</th>
<th>Consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aktion Finanzplatz</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>&gt;1000</td>
<td>loc./nat.</td>
<td>before 1989</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Sud</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>&lt;1000</td>
<td>loc./nat.</td>
<td>before 1989</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augenauf Basel</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>&lt;1000</td>
<td>loc./nat.</td>
<td>after 1989</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bewegung für den Sozialismus</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>&lt;1000</td>
<td>loc./nat.</td>
<td>after 1989</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Europe Tiers Monde</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>&lt;1000</td>
<td>loc./nat.</td>
<td>before 1989</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Déclaration de Berne</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>&gt;1000</td>
<td>internat.</td>
<td>before 1989</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Social Suisse</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>&lt;1000</td>
<td>loc./nat.</td>
<td>after 1989</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupe pour une Suisse sans Armée (GSsA)</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>&gt;1000</td>
<td>internat.</td>
<td>before 1989</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeunesse Socialiste Suisse</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>&lt;1000</td>
<td>loc./nat.</td>
<td>before 1989</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Courrier</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>&gt;1000</td>
<td>loc./nat.</td>
<td>before 1989</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Communistes</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>&lt;1000</td>
<td>loc./nat.</td>
<td>after 1989</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Verts</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>&gt;1000</td>
<td>internat.</td>
<td>before 1989</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LoRa</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>&gt;1000</td>
<td>loc./nat.</td>
<td>before 1989</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti socialiste suisse - section genevoise</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>&lt;1000</td>
<td>internat.</td>
<td>before 1989</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Réalise</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>&lt;1000</td>
<td>loc./nat.</td>
<td>before 1989</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarité mit Chiapas</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>&lt;1000</td>
<td>loc./nat.</td>
<td>after 1989</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarité sans Frontières</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>&gt;1000</td>
<td>loc./nat.</td>
<td>after 1989</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syndicat de l'Industrie et du Bâtiment (UNIA)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>&gt;1000</td>
<td>internat.</td>
<td>after 1989</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syndicat des Services Publics (SSP-VPOD) - Section genevoise</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>&gt;1000</td>
<td>loc./nat.</td>
<td>before 1989</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syndicat Interprof. des travailleurs et travailleuses (SIT)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>&gt;1000</td>
<td>loc./nat.</td>
<td>before 1989</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes

1 Working version, comments welcome.
2 The same applies to individual participants. For example, participants in the 2006 ESF in Athens vary as to the degree to which they think participation and deliberation should be the main principles guiding decision making, both within the movement and in interaction with public authorities (Giugni et al. 2007; della Porta and Giugni 2007).
3 Direct democracy, which is particularly developed in Switzerland, represents the translation at the institutional level of the principles of participative democracy.
4 This information is based on documents produced by the selected organizations. Most of the documents consulted were found on the websites of the organizations, the others are those the organizations were willing to provide.
5 These data comes from a standardized questionnaire that we distributed at the 2006 ESF, which took place between the 4th and 8th of May in Athens. It should be noted that the organizational and the individual data are not strictly comparable, as the former concern the internal functioning of the organizations, while the latter have a more normative orientation insofar as respondents were asked to state their preferred mode of decision making. Furthermore, while the organizational data concerns only Switzerland, the individual data include respondents from various countries.
6 We do not include in our analysis the level of resources of the organization, but we can reasonably assume that it is strongly correlated with the amount of paid staff and also with the number of members.
7 The dichotomization of the variables is not a *sine qua non* condition. In a development of the basic QCA model, Ragin (2000) proposes a convincing and complementary solution to improve the explicative power of the indicators included in the model, basically through "fuzzy-sets" providing more fine-grained measures (2000: 6).
8 Let us take an example. Consider a situation where a contradictory configuration leads 9 times to the outcome 1 and 1 time to the outcome 0; with our specific data, imagine a situation in which the combination between big size and local scope produces 9 times a high consensus and 1 time a low consensus. In this kind of hypothetical situation, we shall certainly say that the combinatorial situation (in our example, big size and local scope) has 9 chances on 10 (or 90%) to produce the outcome 1 (high consensus); in other words, the combination has a 0.9 likelihood score to give 1 as outcome. We just consider here for each combination presenting a troublesome situation the probability that she will produce the given outcome. Starting from this simple assumption, when looking for the predictors to outcome 1, we only have to run the QCA on a database composed by all non-conflicting cases plus the conflicting combinations leading to 1 but considering their likelihood score (henceforth LS; it represents the probability that these combinations effectively give 0 as outcome). This allows us to propose a minimization process on databases free of conflicting configurations; we just have to take into account the LS scores for the (previously) conflicting configuration when the final result is produced. In our example, we include the 9 contradictory cases giving 1 as outcome in our sub-database 1; after the QCA analysis we have to consider that the results related to the cases are correct in a 90% level, *if no minimization has occurred*. If otherwise a minimization was made starting from more than one combination (which happens frequently), we have to introduce a weighting of the probabilities of each combination. Let us take another example: as before, a conflicting combination (say, AbCdE) composed by 9 cases leading to 1 and 1 case leading to 0 has a 90% probability to give 1 as outcome. If this combination is minimized with another combination (say, AbCde) composed by 7 cases leading to 1 without contradictions (i.e. with a 100% probability), we shall consider the resulting minimized assumption (AbCd) as probable in a \((9*0.9 + 7*1)/(9 + 7) = (15.1)/16 = 0.944 = 94\%\) level (likelihood score = 0.94). We simply calculate here the probability, in terms of percentages of likelihood, that a minimized assumption leads to the outcome selected. After calculating the likelihood score related to the minimized assumption, we also logically have to indicate the importance of the assumption on the overall sub-database (in terms of relative presence), in order to identify the causal paths only appearing a few times\(^5\). We simply calculate the ratio between the number of cases composing the assumption and the global number of cases in our sub-database. Let us return to our example: assuming that the database in which our minimized assumption AbCd has emerged is composed by 32 cases, this assumption will have an occurrence ratio of \(16/32 = 0.5\), where 16 is the number of cases on which the minimized assumption is generated (see example), and 32 is the overall number of cases in the database. Following the example, we shall note: \(1 = \text{AbCd}_{0.47}\), where 1 is the outcome, AbCd is the minimized assumption and (0.47) is the OI for the minimized assumption; 0.94 (LS) * 0.5 (OR) = 0.47 (OI).
9 We previously proposed a way more demanding threshold (0.4), but it turned to be too hard to achieve with social science data (Nai 2006).
10 We shall stress that our probabilistic approach is slightly different from Ragin et al.’s significance test (1984: 229-230). While Ragin et al.’s solution is based on a probabilistic decision concerning the outcome
assigned to all the cases in a conflicting configuration, our proposed solution integrates a probability score (LS) and an occurrence ratio (OR) with the aim to avoid the eviction of problematic cases.

QCA analyses made with Tosmana (Tool for Small-N Analysis), a specific and free software created and designed by Lasse Cronqvist (http://www.tosmana.net).

Example: (ideological position: new social movements) + (territorial scope: local/national) means that the outcome exists when the organization has an ideological position close to the new social movements or a local/national territorial scope.

Example: (founding year: recent) * (size: small) means that the outcome exists when the organization has been created recently and has a small size.