

**WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT – A MATTER OF NUMBERS?
A Comparative Study of Ambassadors' Appointments and Status**

Birgitta Niklasson and Ann Towns

Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
birgitta.niklasson@pol.gu.se

This study takes its starting point in three assumptions regarding the relationship between the share of women in an organization and the empowerment of those women. We explore the relevance of these assumptions in a cross-sectional (100 countries) and a longitudinal (Sweden, Denmark, the UK, and the US between 1970 and 2016) study of how ambassador appointments are distributed between women and men and the status of these appointments. The results indicate that the status of women's postings may increase as the share of female ambassadors do so, but that this relationship might be different depending on where in the international hierarchy the sending country is placed.

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A note to the reader

This paper is not so much a paper as a presentation of an idea to a future paper. We are fully aware of the fact that the theoretical argument here is severely underdeveloped and that it needs to be grounded in previous research and theory to a much greater extent. The data also needs to be improved. We have not been able to collect all the information necessary in order to enable more advanced statistical analyses, but we have decided to put off further data collection until we have a clearer idea of the direction in which we should take the paper. We hope that this paper proposal will inspire a discussion on how women's careers and empowerment can be studied in a fruitful manner. We are very much looking forward to your comments!

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between women's marginalization in numbers and their empowerment. In one professional field after another, women gain entry and grow in numbers. We have seen this in politics as well as in the public service. Organizations and agencies map the share of women in their workforce carefully, since this is often perceived as an indicator of gender equality, but the question is to what extent the patriarchal structure is disrupted just because more women enter the stage. Do the growing number of women also mean that women become more empowered in those organizations?

We will try to shed more light on this question by mapping ambassador appointments. The focus on ambassador appointments is motivated by the fact that they constitute the highest status positions in one of the most exclusive and prestigious parts of the public administration in many countries, namely the Ministries for Foreign Affairs (MFAs). As representatives of their country, ambassadors have an important role to play in the relationship between states. Women's aspirations to pursue diplomatic careers have thus long been considered inappropriate. Today, women still only make up 15 percent of the richest countries' ambassadors and even when they are appointed, they are less likely to be placed at high status postings (Towns and Niklasson 2016). The question is if this is a pattern that is equally prominent in all countries, or if there are differences based on how great a share of the group of ambassadors women make up.

The Relationship between Number and Empowerment

This study is inspired by the assumption related to the critical mass theory, namely that women's empowerment is positively related to their share of the workforce in a specific field (see e.g. Kanter 1977; Dahlerup 2006). The term "critical mass" comes from nuclear physics and "refers to the quantity needed to start a chain reaction, an *irreversible turning point*" (Dahlerup 2006, p.512). The idea is that when the share of women passes a certain threshold, for example, when they hold 30 percent of the leading positions in an organisation, they will experience less resistance. At this point, they no longer constitute a new phenomenon in the organisation—always questioned and under scrutiny—but they are able to work under the same conditions as their male colleagues.

There are researchers, however, who have pointed out that the resistance from the environment does not necessarily decrease linearly to the share of women on leading positions. On the contrary, there are reasons to believe that the resistance may in fact increase when women start entering an organisation in greater numbers (Blalock 1967; Yoder 1991; Towns 2003). Janice D. Yoder (1991) claims that this kind of sudden change may be perceived as intrusive and threatening and may therefore create a counter reaction from the dominant group. According to this scenario, we should not expect women in a specific organization to become more empowered just because they increasingly constitute a larger share of its staff. They may even become less so. The relationship between the share of women in an organization and the level of women's empowerment within the same organization may thus be negative, or non-existent.

These two scenarios, the critical mass development and the increasing resistance development, are not mutually exclusive; they can be combined within the critical mass framework. Kanter (1977) speaks of two development stages before the share of women reaches 30 percent. The first one occurs when there are still very few women in the organization (0-14 percent), which Kanter refers to as a tilted gender composition. At this stage, women serve as tokens, which means that they are seen as representatives of women as a group rather than as individuals. Tokens are perceived as an asset to the organization. They can be put on display in order to signal that the organization embraces values that are supported by the surrounding society, for example gender equality. As tokens, individual women can thus reach highly influential positions without being perceived as a threat to their

male colleagues in general. Tokens are just a few exceptional cases within a still dominant patriarchal structure.

When the share of women reaches 15 percent and continues to grow, they can no longer be discarded as exceptions, however (Kanter 1977). This is a skewed gender composition. The critical mass scenario and the increasing resistance scenario may agree on the same development during this middle stage. As women become more visible in the organization, they are also perceived as more disruptive to how the organization used to be and function, something that increases the resistance to a further empowerment of women. Men start realizing that the competition to promotion may become steeper than they had expected.

The question is how long this resistance lasts, if it occurs at all. According to the critical mass theory, it should cease once the share of women reaches around 30 percent. Yonder (1991) does not think that numbers will necessarily change a lot, but a combination of the two scenarios could suggest a U-shaped relationship between the share of women and women's empowerment; when there are few women, individual women can reach powerful positions. Similarly, when there is a large share of women, women as a group can be empowered, but during the middle stage when the number of women is growing from a small minority to a substantial share of the organization, women face the hardest resistance and are less likely to be reach top positions.

This kind of U-shaped relationship can also be explained in other ways, however. Such a pattern is not necessarily an indication of a growing resistance against women's empowerment; it may simply be a matter of supply. When only a few women are recruited as leaders, it is easy to find highly competent women who can be placed on the most prestigious positions. As the number of appointed women grows, perhaps rapidly so, it may become harder to find women with sufficient experience for these kinds of top positions. Those women who are selected may first have to be tested on lower positions, which may lead to a decrease in the status of women's positions in the organization overall. Only when there has been a large number of female careerists for a longer time, there may be a sufficiently large pool of female candidates with the required experience for entering the very top positions in the organization. Unfortunately, in the descriptive analysis we present in this paper, we will not be able to say anything about what causes to the patterns we see.

There are thus at least three different ways in which the share of women and women's empowerment may be related:

1. Positive and curve linear, which is the critical mass hypothesis. Not much changes until the share of women reaches the threshold level of 30 percent.
2. Negative, which is the increasing resistance hypothesis. The more women, the harder the resistance and the less empowered women are.
3. U-shaped, which is a combination of the two previous hypotheses.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relevance of these three hypotheses in the case of ambassador appointments.

What does this mean in a diplomatic context?

We will explore the relevance of these three hypotheses by focusing on the share of women on the top positions in a particular kind of organization, the MFA. The purpose is to study how the share of female ambassadors is related to the empowerment of women in those organizations. Being appointed ambassador can, of course, be considered a kind of empowerment in itself, since the ambassador title is associated with great prestige. We have, however chosen to define the empowerment of women narrower, namely to the kind of ambassador postings that women are sent to. We interpret the sending of women to countries of less economic importance as a limitation of women's empowerment. Women in diplomacy are thus considered empowered when they are appointed to ambassador positions that entail the same level of status as those of men's.

If the critical mass theory is correct, the pattern that we have found previously regarding the lower status of female ambassadors' positions should be the most striking in countries where only a few women have become ambassadors. In countries where women make up a fairly high share of the ambassadors, however, the pattern should be less prominent, or even disappear entirely.

If the increasing resistance hypothesis is correct, female ambassadors from countries with a low share of female ambassadors enjoy higher status postings than their female colleagues from countries that appoint a greater share of female ambassadors. A low status country where gender equality is low may, for example, attempt to improve its relationship with a high status and more gender equal country by sending a female ambassador. By doing so, the sending country signals that it embraces the same values that receiving country,

without enterprising the overall patriarchal structure, as these female ambassadors are exceptional cases.

If the combined hypothesis is correct, female ambassadors will enjoy the highest status in those countries with the lowest and highest share of women on these positions.

Data

The study is composed of two parts: one cross-sectional part that compares all the ambassador appointments of the 50 richest and the 50 poorest countries in the world in 2014, according to GDP, and one longitudinal part that follows the ambassador appointments from 1970 until 2016 in Sweden, Denmark, the US and the UK.

The cross-sectional data is limited to 100 countries simply because we have not had the capacity to collect information from all the countries in the world. We started out by gathering data for the 50 richest countries (Townsend and Niklasson 2016), since they have the financial means to send out a substantial number of ambassadors. This data was later complemented through the assistance of Ani Dimitrova (2018), who collected the same data for the 50 poorest countries. The average number of appointments made by the states vary substantially between China (166) and Kiribati (3).

We only count each ambassador once in the analyses, although it is common that one ambassador serves as the country's representative in several other countries. In those cases, we have only considered the ambassador's highest ranked GDP position. Ambassadors posted in the home MFA have been excluded, primarily because it has not been possible to find information about all ambassadors posted in the sending states' home MFAs. In total, the data set contains information about 5398 ambassadors.

In the longitudinal data, we have not been able to select the most important position of the ambassadors based on the GDP of their postings. We have instead included the posting where the ambassador is actually placed. Often, this is also in the country with the highest GDP, but not always. 5074 ambassadors have been coded: 818 for Sweden, 1012 for Denmark, 1846 for the US, and 1398 for the UK. These countries are primarily chosen based on their share of female ambassadors and cultural contexts. The USA and the UK are both Anglo-Saxon countries, but the USA appoints 30 percent female ambassadors, whereas the UK only appoints 18. Similarly, Sweden and Denmark are both Nordic countries, but Sweden appoints 39 percent female ambassadors and Denmark only 22. By comparing these countries,

we will be able to analyse how the share of female ambassadors and the status level of their postings vary over time within the same country context, as well as between similar contexts and different contexts. It is possible, for example that one of the hypotheses receives support in one of the contexts, but not in others. This research design thus allows us to study if we can see the same relationship between the share of female ambassadors and the status of their postings in all four countries, or perhaps only in some of them (e.g. in the Nordic countries, or in the Anglo-Saxon countries), or in none of them.

Initially, we tried to collect data from every year, but we soon realized that we had to limit ourselves to every fifth year. Our ambition has therefore been to cover 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015 for all countries. Unfortunately, this has not been possible due to problems associated with accessing the sources required for these years in all cases. We have, for example, not been able to cover 1995 and 2015 for Denmark, but we have tried to make this up by coding 1994, 1996, and 2014 (information imported from the cross-sectional dataset). 1990 has not been coded for Denmark at all for time reasons, but this defect will of course be remedied as soon as possible.

The information about who the ambassadors are has been collected in similar ways for both datasets. For the longitudinal dataset, we have primarily consulted yearly official publications including information about MFA staff (e.g. *Sveriges Statskalender*, *Utrikesdepartementets kalender*, and *Kongelig dansk hof- og statskalender*), and official webpages (e.g. The US State Department's webpage "Principal Officers and Chiefs of Mission Chronological Listing", and the Foreign Commonwealths Office's webpage containing "A Directory of British Diplomats"). For the cross-sectional dataset, we have primarily consulted the official webpages of the different embassies, but we have also looked at the lists of foreign envoys that most countries compile and, in some cases, we have asked the embassies for the required information directly via email.

Measuring empowerment

As already mentioned, we use GDP of the receiving country as a measure of women's empowerment in the organization. We understand that this is a very crude measure that does not capture other important aspects that are often associated with women's empowerment, or lack thereof, such as the occurrence of sexual harassment, isolation, and role encapsulation (Yoder 1991).

In the cross-sectional study, we use GDP rank, since we do not have information about all the receiving countries' actual GDP yet. This means that a lower number signifies a more prestigious position, since the richest country is ranked number one, the second richest number two, etc. When calculating the difference in average status between women's and men's ambassador postings, we simply subtract the male average from the female average.

In the longitudinal study, we use the GDP in current US dollars. Since it is harder to understand what a difference in dollars actually mean we calculate the difference in average status between women's and men's ambassador postings by dividing the female average with the male average. This tells us how many percent of the men's average position women's average corresponds to.

Results

The Cross-Sectional Study

- The average share of female ambassadors in all countries is 16 percent (Table 1). Those countries that appoint the highest share of female ambassadors are Kiribati (100 percent), Monaco (58 percent), Lesotho (50 percent), Saint Lucia (50 percent), and Finland, the Seychelles and Saint Kitts and Nevis (43 percent). On the other end of the spectrum, there are those that do not appoint any women at all: Benin, Iran, Kazakhstan, Qatar, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Tuvalu.
- The average GDP rank of women's posts is almost exactly the same as for men's (58,8 compared to 58,7). However, the GDP rank of women's postings tend to be lower the greater the share of female ambassadors their country appoints (Diagram 1-2 and Table 2-3). The correlation (-0.281) is only significant (at the 0.01 level, 2-tailed) though when the two outliers, Kiribati and Marshall Islands, are excluded from the analysis. When there is a large share of women, they also appear to become more empowered. Thus, the first hypothesis receives some support, even though the change appears to occur consistently and not suddenly when the share of women exceeds 30 percent.
- Diagram 2 indicates that there may be a difference between rich and poor senders. Very few of the countries below the predicted line are among the fifty richest ones in

the world. This means that women in poorer countries are more likely to be appointed to high status positions, even when there is a relatively low share of female ambassadors from their country. How the relationship between the share of female ambassadors and the status of their positions works may thus depend on where a country is placed in the international hierarchy. This is something that we believe is worth analysing further, although the pattern may be caused by a floor effect. Poor countries cannot afford to send out ambassadors to all other countries, which means that they have to decide which diplomatic relations are the most important to them. If they prioritize sending their ambassadors to high status countries, the average GDP of these posts will be higher than it is for rich countries that have the resources to send out ambassadors to rich as well as to poor countries. Whether this is the case or not can be tested by including the status (GDP) of the sending country in the analysis, something that we have not been able to do yet.

- Diagram 2 shows that comparing our four countries in the longitudinal study may well be a first step towards that kind of analysis. All of these countries place themselves above the predicted line, but two of them, the US and Sweden, diverge more from the line than the two others. These are also the two countries with the highest share of female ambassadors. If we think of Denmark as the main point of comparison to Sweden and the UK as ditto to the US, this might indicate that the second hypothesis regarding the increasing resistance receives support in the more developed countries.

The Longitudinal Study

- The share of female ambassadors has increased over time in all four countries (Diagram 3). In all countries but Denmark, there appears to be a first increase in 1980, which is followed by a brief decline before a more consistent increase starts in the 1990s.
- The status of women's ambassador positions has not increased in the same systematic way as the share of female ambassadors (Diagram 4), although it is higher now than in 1970 in all countries. However, it is hard to discern a pattern in the relationship between the share of female ambassadors and the status of their positions just by looking at how these two factors have developed over time (Diagram 5-8).

Conclusion

Our results indicate that the critical mass hypothesis receives some support, although this may not be true in all kinds of countries. However, we need to run more individual based controls in order to see the actual effect of the share of women in the organization on the level of their empowerment. We should, for example, incorporate information regarding the individual ambassadors' experience in the analysis as well as more country variables, but that is data that we do not have available at present.

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TABLES

WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT – A MATTER OF NUMBERS? A Comparative Study of Ambassadors' Appointments and Status

Table 1. Share of female ambassadors appointed by different countries

| | | Women | Men | All |
|---------------------|---|--------|--------|---------|
| Algeria | N | 2 | 71 | 73 |
| | % | 2,70% | 97,30% | 100,00% |
| Antigua and Barbuda | N | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| | % | 25,00% | 75,00% | 100,00% |
| Argentina | N | 19 | 65 | 84 |
| | % | 22,60% | 77,40% | 100,00% |
| Australia | N | 20 | 58 | 78 |
| | % | 25,60% | 74,40% | 100,00% |
| Austria | N | 24 | 63 | 87 |
| | % | 27,60% | 72,40% | 100,00% |
| Bahamas | N | 2 | 6 | 8 |
| | % | 25,00% | 75,00% | 100,00% |
| Barbados | N | 3 | 5 | 8 |
| | % | 37,50% | 62,50% | 100,00% |
| Belgium | N | 9 | 86 | 95 |
| | % | 9,50% | 90,50% | 100,00% |
| Belize | N | 4 | 8 | 12 |
| | % | 33,30% | 66,70% | 100,00% |

| | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|--------|---------|---------|
| Benin | N | 0 | 17 | 17 |
| | % | 0,00% | 100,00% | 100,00% |
| Bhutan | N | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| | % | 40,00% | 60,00% | 100,00% |
| Brazil | N | 18 | 93 | 111 |
| | % | 16,20% | 83,80% | 100,00% |
| Burundi | N | 5 | 20 | 25 |
| | % | 20,00% | 80,00% | 100,00% |
| Cabo Verde | N | 5 | 10 | 15 |
| | % | 33,30% | 66,70% | 100,00% |
| Canada | N | 29 | 72 | 101 |
| | % | 28,70% | 71,30% | 100,00% |
| Central African Republic | N | 2 | 10 | 12 |
| | % | 16,70% | 83,30% | 100,00% |
| Chile | N | 6 | 65 | 71 |
| | % | 8,50% | 91,50% | 100,00% |
| China | N | 11 | 154 | 165 |
| | % | 6,70% | 93,30% | 100,00% |
| Colombia | N | 17 | 43 | 60 |
| | % | 28,30% | 71,70% | 100,00% |
| Comoros | N | 1 | 13 | 14 |
| | % | 7,10% | 92,90% | 100,00% |

| | | | | |
|----------|---|--------|---------|---------|
| Denmark | N | 17 | 61 | 78 |
| | % | 21,80% | 78,20% | 100,00% |
| Djibouti | N | 0 | 20 | 20 |
| | % | 0,00% | 100,00% | 100,00% |
| Dominica | N | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| | % | 33,30% | 66,70% | 100,00% |
| Egypt | N | 12 | 83 | 95 |
| | % | 12,60% | 87,40% | 100,00% |
| Eritrea | N | 1 | 17 | 18 |
| | % | 5,60% | 94,40% | 100,00% |
| Fiji | N | 3 | 12 | 15 |
| | % | 20,00% | 80,00% | 100,00% |
| Finland | N | 32 | 43 | 75 |
| | % | 42,70% | 57,30% | 100,00% |
| France | N | 28 | 128 | 156 |
| | % | 17,90% | 82,10% | 100,00% |
| Gambia | N | 3 | 15 | 18 |
| | % | 16,70% | 83,30% | 100,00% |
| Germany | N | 22 | 134 | 156 |
| | % | 14,10% | 85,90% | 100,00% |
| Greece | N | 17 | 70 | 87 |

| | | | | |
|---------------|---|--------|---------|---------|
| | % | 19,50% | 80,50% | 100,00% |
| Grenada | N | 1 | 7 | 8 |
| | % | 12,50% | 87,50% | 100,00% |
| Guinea | N | 3 | 32 | 35 |
| | % | 8,60% | 91,40% | 100,00% |
| Guinea-Bissau | N | 3 | 8 | 11 |
| | % | 27,30% | 72,70% | 100,00% |
| Guyana | N | 3 | 10 | 13 |
| | % | 23,10% | 76,90% | 100,00% |
| Haiti | N | 1 | 17 | 18 |
| | % | 5,60% | 94,40% | 100,00% |
| India | N | 13 | 101 | 114 |
| | % | 11,40% | 88,60% | 100,00% |
| Indonesia | N | 15 | 93 | 108 |
| | % | 13,90% | 86,10% | 100,00% |
| Iran | N | 0 | 62 | 62 |
| | % | 0,00% | 100,00% | 100,00% |
| Iraq | N | 2 | 67 | 69 |
| | % | 2,90% | 97,10% | 100,00% |
| Ireland | N | 14 | 52 | 66 |
| | % | 21,20% | 78,80% | 100,00% |

| | | | | |
|------------|---|---------|---------|---------|
| Israel | N | 15 | 67 | 82 |
| | % | 18,30% | 81,70% | 100,00% |
| Italy | N | 13 | 123 | 136 |
| | % | 9,60% | 90,40% | 100,00% |
| Japan | N | 4 | 134 | 138 |
| | % | 2,90% | 97,10% | 100,00% |
| Kazakhstan | N | 0 | 55 | 55 |
| | % | 0,00% | 100,00% | 100,00% |
| Kiribati | N | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| | % | 100,00% | 0,00% | 100,00% |
| Kosovo | N | 3 | 15 | 18 |
| | % | 16,70% | 83,30% | 100,00% |
| Kyrgyzstan | N | 4 | 22 | 26 |
| | % | 15,40% | 84,60% | 100,00% |
| Lesotho | N | 8 | 8 | 16 |
| | % | 50,00% | 50,00% | 100,00% |
| Liberia | N | 5 | 14 | 19 |
| | % | 26,30% | 73,70% | 100,00% |
| Malawi | N | 3 | 10 | 13 |
| | % | 23,10% | 76,90% | 100,00% |
| Malaysia | N | 12 | 64 | 76 |

| | | | | |
|------------------|---|--------|--------|---------|
| | % | 15,80% | 84,20% | 100,00% |
| Maldives | N | 5 | 7 | 12 |
| | % | 41,70% | 58,30% | 100,00% |
| Marshall Islands | N | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| | % | 40,00% | 60,00% | 100,00% |
| Mauritania | N | 2 | 22 | 24 |
| | % | 8,30% | 91,70% | 100,00% |
| Mexico | N | 9 | 70 | 79 |
| | % | 11,40% | 88,60% | 100,00% |
| Micronesia | N | 2 | 8 | 10 |
| | % | 20,00% | 80,00% | 100,00% |
| Moldova | N | 1 | 20 | 21 |
| | % | 4,80% | 95,20% | 100,00% |
| Monaco | N | 7 | 5 | 12 |
| | % | 58,30% | 41,70% | 100,00% |
| Montenegro | N | 4 | 23 | 27 |
| | % | 14,80% | 85,20% | 100,00% |
| Netherlands | N | 23 | 87 | 110 |
| | % | 20,90% | 79,10% | 100,00% |
| Niger | N | 6 | 15 | 21 |
| | % | 28,60% | 71,40% | 100,00% |
| Nigeria | N | 12 | 54 | 66 |


| | | | | |
|-------------|---|--------|---------|---------|
| | % | 18,20% | 81,80% | 100,00% |
| Norway | N | 30 | 60 | 90 |
| | % | 33,30% | 66,70% | 100,00% |
| Pakistan | N | 7 | 73 | 80 |
| | % | 8,80% | 91,30% | 100,00% |
| Palau | N | 1 | 8 | 9 |
| | % | 11,10% | 88,90% | 100,00% |
| Peru | N | 8 | 50 | 58 |
| | % | 13,80% | 86,20% | 100,00% |
| Philippines | N | 24 | 35 | 59 |
| | % | 40,70% | 59,30% | 100,00% |
| Poland | N | 9 | 79 | 88 |
| | % | 10,20% | 89,80% | 100,00% |
| Portugal | N | 6 | 67 | 73 |
| | % | 8,20% | 91,80% | 100,00% |
| Qatar | N | 0 | 91 | 91 |
| | % | 0,00% | 100,00% | 100,00% |
| Russia | N | 1 | 137 | 138 |
| | % | 0,70% | 99,30% | 100,00% |
| Rwanda | N | 6 | 11 | 17 |
| | % | 35,30% | 64,70% | 100,00% |
| Saint Lucia | N | 3 | 3 | 6 |

| | | | | |
|-----------------------|---|--------|---------|---------|
| | % | 50,00% | 50,00% | 100,00% |
| Samoa | N | 1 | 5 | 6 |
| | % | 16,70% | 83,30% | 100,00% |
| Sao Tome and Principe | N | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| | % | 0,00% | 100,00% | 100,00% |
| Saudi Arabia | N | 0 | 94 | 94 |
| | % | 0,00% | 100,00% | 100,00% |
| Seychelles | N | 3 | 4 | 7 |
| | % | 42,90% | 57,10% | 100,00% |
| Sierra Leone | N | 1 | 15 | 16 |
| | % | 6,30% | 93,80% | 100,00% |
| Singapore | N | 9 | 66 | 75 |
| | % | 12,00% | 88,00% | 100,00% |
| Solomon Islands | N | 2 | 9 | 11 |
| | % | 18,20% | 81,80% | 100,00% |
| South Africa | N | 27 | 71 | 98 |
| | % | 27,60% | 72,40% | 100,00% |
| South Korea | N | 1 | 116 | 117 |
| | % | 0,90% | 99,10% | 100,00% |
| Spain | N | 12 | 113 | 125 |
| | % | 9,60% | 90,40% | 100,00% |
| St. Kitts and | N | 3 | 4 | 7 |

| | | | | |
|--------------------------------|---|--------|---------|---------|
| Nevis | % | 42,90% | 57,10% | 100,00% |
| St. Vincent and the Grenadines | N | 3 | 5 | 8 |
| | % | 37,50% | 62,50% | 100,00% |
| Suriname | N | 1 | 6 | 7 |
| | % | 14,30% | 85,70% | 100,00% |
| Swaziland | N | 3 | 11 | 14 |
| | % | 21,40% | 78,60% | 100,00% |
| Sweden | N | 40 | 63 | 103 |
| | % | 38,80% | 61,20% | 100,00% |
| Switzerland | N | 16 | 81 | 97 |
| | % | 16,50% | 83,50% | 100,00% |
| Tajikistan | N | 0 | 28 | 28 |
| | % | 0,00% | 100,00% | 100,00% |
| Thailand | N | 5 | 56 | 61 |
| | % | 8,20% | 91,80% | 100,00% |
| Timor-Leste | N | 4 | 13 | 17 |
| | % | 23,50% | 76,50% | 100,00% |
| Togo | N | 1 | 11 | 12 |
| | % | 8,30% | 91,70% | 100,00% |
| Tonga | N | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| | % | 40,00% | 60,00% | 100,00% |
| Turkey | N | 15 | 105 | 120 |

| | | | | |
|----------------------|---|--------|---------|---------|
| | % | 12,50% | 87,50% | 100,00% |
| Tuvalu | N | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| | % | 0,00% | 100,00% | 100,00% |
| UK | N | 28 | 125 | 153 |
| | % | 18,30% | 81,70% | 100,00% |
| United Arab Emirates | N | 3 | 43 | 46 |
| | % | 6,50% | 93,50% | 100,00% |
| USA | N | 42 | 96 | 138 |
| | % | 30,40% | 69,60% | 100,00% |
| Vanuatu | N | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| | % | 0,00% | 100,00% | 100,00% |
| Venezuela | N | 12 | 54 | 66 |
| | % | 18,20% | 81,80% | 100,00% |
| Total | N | N | 4554 | 5398 |
| | % | % | 84,40% | 100,00% |

Diagram 1. The relationship between the share of female ambassadors and the average GDP rank of their positions



Note: Kiribati and Marshall Islands appear to be outliers. Kiribati is the only country that appoints 100 percent female ambassadors, which is very interesting, even though there are three of them. Marshall Islands appoints five ambassadors of which two are women. One of these is posted at the United Nations in New York, which means that she is not included in the scatterplot above, since international organizations do not have a GDP. The other woman is ambassador in Fiji. In Diagram 2 below, we have re-run the analysis without Kiribati and Marshall Islands.

Diagram 2. The relationship between the share of female ambassadors and the average GDP rank of their positions (excluding outliers)




Table 2. Average GDP of women's positions in different groups of sending countries

| | Mean | N | Std. Deviation | Median |
|-----------------------------------|---------|----|----------------|---------|
| Countries appointing 0-14% women | 50,6777 | 35 | 31,24135 | 58,7300 |
| Countries appointing 15-29% women | 48,4954 | 35 | 24,12009 | 49,2000 |
| Countries appointing 30%- women | 38,2381 | 21 | 37,15293 | 20,5000 |
| All | 46,9677 | 91 | 30,31974 | 45,1300 |

Table 3. Average GDP of women's positions in different groups of sending countries (excluding the outliers Kiribati and Marshall Islands)

| | Mean | N | Std. Deviation | Median |
|-----------------------------------|---------|----|----------------|---------|
| Countries appointing 0-14% women | 50,6777 | 35 | 31,24135 | 58,7300 |
| Countries appointing 15-29% women | 48,4954 | 35 | 24,12009 | 49,2000 |
| Countries appointing 30%- women | 31,1932 | 19 | 26,17426 | 17,0000 |
| All | 45,6599 | 89 | 28,29150 | 45,0000 |

Diagram 3. Share of female ambassadors over time (%)





Diagram 4. Average GDP of female ambassadors' posts as a share of that of male ambassadors'



Note: This diagram shows the average GDP of the female ambassadors' posts divided by the average GDP of the male ambassadors' posts. There were only two female Danish ambassadors in 2000, Anita Hugau (Brazil) and Birgit Madsen (India).

Diagram 5. The share of Swedish female ambassadors and the average GDP of Swedish female ambassadors' posts as a share of that of Swedish male ambassadors' (%)




Diagram 6. The share of Danish female ambassadors and the average GDP of Danish female ambassadors' posts as a share of that of Danish male ambassadors' (%)




Diagram 7. The share of American female ambassadors and the average GDP of American female ambassadors' posts as a share of that of American male ambassadors' (%)



Diagram 8. The share of British female ambassadors and the average GDP of British female ambassadors' posts as a share of that of British male ambassadors' (%)

