Explaining the Electoral Performance of Populist Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe (2000-2010): A Qualitative Comparative Analysis

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Abstract

Employing fsQCA research technique, this paper examines 21 national elections in total that were held in seven Central and East European countries from 2000 to 2010 inclusive to account for the PRR parties’ electoral successes on the basis of five conditions. The paper concludes that 1) albeit influential, the presence of successful minority party is not a necessary condition for PRR parties’ electoral success; 2) in the impact of presence of illiberal mainstream party varies depending on the presence / absence of successful minority party in election; 3) High levels of unemployment positively affect only when it combines with high levels of corruption, and the presence of successful minority party; 4) the absence of Eurosceptic mainstream party and high levels of corruption can contribute to PRR parties’ electoral success in all CEE countries.

1. Introduction

The populist radical right parties have begun to be electorally successful in many West European countries from the mid-1980s onwards. Along with the earlier emergence of the New Left parties, the growing importance of the PRR parties in elections raised doubts about Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) frozen party-system theory. Moreover, the PRR parties’ electoral successes are not confined to some West European countries. They have been seen also in some post-communist countries. All these developments were enough to revitalize the academic interests in accounting for PRR parties’ electoral successes.

Earlier country specific examinations have not only underlined the fact that the PRR parties are quite distinct from the traditional nationalist parties but also provided the scholars with clues in the search of factors that are likely to be responsible for PRR parties’ electoral success. Albeit few in numbers, the comparative studies have contributed substantially to our understanding of the reasons for the PRR parties’ electoral success through systematically analyzing not only sociological factors (demand side) but also institutional factors (supply
side). When it comes to Central and East European countries (CEECs), the literature is not as developed as it is in the context of West Europe. Very few cross regional comparative studies include the CEE countries but they were criticized not to consider the factors that are unique to CEECs sufficiently (Kitschelt, 2007: 1197, 1198). The researches that study the CEECs have begun to increase in numbers, yet they do not adequately pay attention on the supply side factors. Keeping the mentioned problems in mind, this study is aimed at accounting for the PRR parties’ electoral success in national elections held in seven CEECs –Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia- from 2000 to 2010 inclusive. 21 national elections in total will be examined by employing fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) research strategy on the basis of five conditions.

The first part defines the concept of PRR parties and presents which political parties in CEECs belong to this group. The second part makes a review of the academic studies accounting for the PRR parties’ electoral successes. The third part briefly explains fsQCA research technique, defines the related concepts (outcome and conditions), and presents the hypotheses about the impacts of the conditions on the outcome. The last part presents and discusses configurations that lead to PRR parties’ electoral success.

2. Defining the Populist Radical Parties:

The electoral successes that the far-right parties have had in various European countries -if not in all- from the mid-1980s onwards have revitalized the academic interest on the subject.¹ One of the prime questions the early

¹The term ‘far-right’ in the sentence refers to positions of nativist parties on the cultural dimension of party competition.
academic studies raised was whether the successful far-right parties were marking the resurgence of the inter war fascism. Most academic studies indicates a general consensus on the conclusion that the new far right parties differ from those of the inter-war years on account of their ideology and strategy (Beyme 1988; Ignazi and Ysmal, 1992; Ignazi 1992; Karapin 1998; Minkenberg 2000; Cole 2005; Rydgren 2005).²

This differentiation propelled scholars into a search for proper terms – or set of terms – to label the new type of far-right parties. A host of terms have been suggested in the literature particularly during the 1990s, causing the problem of term inflation.³ Nevertheless, a general review of the literature developed in the last two decades reveals that three of the proposed terms have been mostly adopted: extreme right wing; radical right wing; and populist radical right wing.

All three terms represent different group of political parties forming the subsets of the set of party family of which the common denominator is nativism (Swank and Betz, 2003; Forum, 2007: 477; Mudde, 2007: 18).⁴ On account of nativism, they promote ethnocentric definition of the citizenship, which exclude “the others within the society” whose cultural background (e.g. ethnicity, religion) is different, and thereby reserving any citizenship rights for 'native

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² The new right party differs from the tradition nationalist parties by defining itself outside the party system through anti-political establishment rhetoric, rejecting any connection with inter-war fascism, and appealing to all social strata (Beyme, 1988; Ignazi, 1992: 5; Betz, 1993: 419; Griffin 2000: 173-174; Minkenberg, 2000 174-175).
⁴ For that reason, this party family should be named ‘nativist.’ Nativism is defined as “an intense opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreign connection.” (Higham 1955: 4)
citizens’ (Husbands, 1992: 268; Betz and Johnson, 2004: 313; Mudde 2007: 19). The populist radical right, radical right and the extreme right parties differ from each other in terms of their attitudes towards the democratic regime and their claims for being the real representative of the *vox populi*. Whereas the populist radical right and the radical right parties, even reluctantly, consent to respect the democratic regime the extreme right wing parties are aimed at dissolving. The radical parties have an elitist view, whereas the populist radical right parties define itself as the real representative of *vox populi* through anti-political establishment rhetoric (Karapin, 1998; Griffin, 2000; Minkenberg, 2000; Betz and Johnson, 2004 Zaslove, 2004; Cole, 2005; Mudde, 2007).

Drawing on the given explanations, the set of populist radical right parties is one of the subsets of nativist political parties. They are right wing for emphasizing traditions, religious beliefs, law and order; they are radical for defining citizenship narrowly and opposing the principles, including the minority rights; and they are populist for considering themselves as the sole representative of the *vox populi* and defining politicians as self-seeking actors through anti-political establishment rhetoric.

Under the guidance of this definition the following political parties, which contested at least in one national election from 2000 to 2010 inclusive, are the members in the set of populist radical right parties: Bulgarian National Movement and National Union of Attack (Bulgaria); Republican Party of

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5 The populist radical right and radical right parties respect democratic regimes in terms of elections, not in terms of guaranteeing minority rights. By doing so, they respect a type of democratic regime that is labeled “electoral democracy.” In electoral democracy regular elections are held more or less in compliance with the principles of free election but the principles including rule of law, respect for and protection of national minority and human rights are seriously violated (Collier, 1997)
Czechoslovakia, National Party, and Workers Party (Czech Republic); Justice and Life Party, and JOBBIK (Hungary); League of Polish Families (Poland); Greater Romania Party (Romania); Slovak National Party (Slovakia); and Slovenian National Party (Slovenia).

3. Explaining the PRR parties’ Electoral Success

The factors that are thought to have affected the electoral performance of the PRR parties have been analyzed in two groups. The first group -demand-side factors- includes the sociological and economic developments. The second group -supply side factors – refers to institutional arrangements (e.g. electoral system, party system) either restricting or permitting the PRR parties to be relevant actor in the party system. The three demand side factors that are unemployment, immigrant (also minority problems), and public trust in established system; and two supply side factors that are electoral systems and party system mechanics (the mutual interaction of political parties in the party system) have been analyzed by various studies.

The earlier studies derived hypothesis from the deprivation theory, broadly suggesting that the economic scarcity predisposes some voters towards the radical formations, including the PRR parties. As an indicator of the economic insecurity, the impact of the high level of unemployment has been examined in many academic studies. Contrary to expectations, most academic studies have concluded that the unemployment problem, as an independent factor, does not significantly contribute the PRR parties’ electoral successes. (Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al, 2002: 371; Arzheimer and Carter 2006: 435; Coffe et al, 2007: 152-
Interestingly enough, some studies detected a reverse relationship bringing a competing hypothesis about the impact of unemployment suggesting the electorates are more likely to vote for the political parties with experience of governance at the time of economic crisis (Lubbers et al, 2002: 371; Carter, 2006: 435).

It is important to note that the above-mentioned studies have treated the unemployment problem as the independent variable. Under the guidance of the ethnic competition thesis, other studies have conducted multivariate analysis testing whether together presence of culturally different people in the society (e.g. immigrants, national minorities) and unemployment problem contributes the PRR parties’ electoral success. Some studies confirm the hypothesis (Knigge, 1998; Swank and Betz, 2003: 238, 239; Golder, 2003; Jesuit et al, 2009).

Even though the ethnic competition thesis includes convincing explanations, other findings raised doubts about its validity through suggesting that it is the level of crime rates, social unrest rather than that of unemployment that trigger some voters’ passionate hatred of immigrants, thereby proposing them towards the PRR parties (Lubbers et al, 2002; Coffe at el, 2007; Rydgren 2008). In addition, these studies suggest that where are the immigrants from originally (European or non-European) is also a matter as the PRR parties are more influential in persuading the voters to support them in constituencies where non-European immigrants reside (Lubbers et al, 2002; Coffe at el, 2007).

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6 Having examined 103 elections between 1973 and 1990 in 16 West European countries, Jakman and Volpert (1996) suggested the unemployment problem benefit the PRR parties. It is important to remind the reader in the course of the period the authors examined there were only few examples of the contemporary PRR parties whose electoral successes was limited compared to from 1990 onwards.

7 This conclusion is very important for two reasons. First, it promotes the argument that the contemporary PRR parties are based on French Nouvelle Droite (New Right) idea, which broadly
Given their policies aiming at excluding the others from the society, PRR parties could become a possible option to people who feel threatened by “the others” owing to either material or non-material concerns. The presence of “the others” within the society, however, does not seem to be the sole source of the demand for the PRR parties. The mainstream parties’ failure at dealing with the general problems of the society (mostly socio-economic problems), and event the hint of scandals (e.g. financial, political, sexual) the politicians are involved in (normally who must be in a position of trust) severely damage public trust. Appealing to voters who have a deep distrust of established parties through anti-political establishment rhetoric, the PRR parties could benefit from growing public discontent. Thus, drawing on the protest voting approach, also the growing public distrust of the established political parties contributes to PRR parties’ electoral success owing to their populist stance (Perrineau and Mayer, 1992; Betz, 1993: 419; 1994: 37, 38; Knigge, 1998: 272; Norris, 2005: 149).

The demand side factors contributes substatinally to our understanding the reasons for the growing demand for the PRR parties. Nevertheless, they are inadequate to explain under which circumstances the demand for the PRR parties turns into actual electoral support. Indeed, although the statistics on the suggest that the groups that are culturally different cannot live together (Rydgren, 2005: 426, 427). Second, it seems to give some validity to definitions suggesting that PRR are the opposite of New Left politics and primarily deals with non-material new right issues and gives secondary importance to economic issues at best (Flanagan, 1987; Ignazi and YSmal: 1992, 111; Mudde, 1995; 2007; Minkenberg, 2000; Almeida, 2010).

While examining to what extent widespread political discontent affect the electoral support given for PRR parties, a clear distinction between policy driven support and protest driven support has to be made. The former refers to voters who thoroughly approve of what the PRR party commits, whereas the latter involves the voters supporting the PRR party with the aim of punishing the established parties (Karapin , 1998: 227; Van der Brug, and Fennema, 2003: 58). Both electorates are detected among each PRR parties, but the ratio of the former (policy driven) to the latter (protest voting) tends to be higher when the PRR party is able to be relevant actor in the party system (Van der Brug and Fennema, 2003).
demand side factors are more or less similar, the electoral performances of the PRR parties have varied widely from country to country. This warrants the examination of supply side factors as well to account for the PRR parties' electoral success.

The hypothesis about the impacts of the electoral system goes back to Duverger Law. Inspired by tactical voting approach, the small parties, like the PRR, have a better chance of being a relevant actor in the party systems in the proportional representation system (particularly when electoral threshold is also low) compared to their chances in majoritarian system. The academic studies testing the hypothesis have come up with conflicting findings. Whereas some academic studies have suggested that there has been a negative correlation between the electoral threshold and the electoral success of the PRR parties (Jackman and Volpert, 1996: 516; Betz and Swank, 2003; Golder, 2003; Veugelers and Magnan, 2005:842, 843), others have suggested that the electoral systems seem to have no effect (Carter, 2004: 89; 2006: 432; Brug, et al, 2005: 568).

The issue of how the party system mechanics affect the electoral performance of the PRR parties is another supply-side factor on which academic studies have come to different conclusions.\(^9\) The earlier studies examining the party system mechanics’ effect suggested that the center right parties’ indifference to issues that the PRR party ideology strongly emphasizes increases the likelihood of the PRR parties’ electoral success (Beyme, 1988; Ignazi, 1992; Kitschelt, 1995: 48). The findings of more recent studies have

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\(^9\) The party system mechanics refers to interaction of relevant parties with one another in terms of their positions on the issues (Mair, 2000: 29-30).
reaffirmed the hypothesis (Rydgren 2002; Brug and Fennema, 2003: 70; Brug, Fennema, and Tille, 2005: 568). Veugeler and Magnan (2005: 855), however, concluded that the convergence of the mainstream party is not a part of configurations leading to PRR parties’ electoral success. This requires to pay attention to the other side of the coin, suggesting should the center right parties’ interests in the issues that are the primary subjects in the PRR agenda, the saliency of the issues and the legitimacy of the PRR parties increases (Bale, 2003: 71; Meguid 2005: 349).

4. Methodology

4.1. Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)

The review of the findings in the previous part underlines two methodological issues. First, both demand side and supply side factors must be examined together. This means that the outcome is seen as a result of conjunctural causation, meaning that different factors should combine to produce the outcome. Second, one factor that seems to positively contribute to PRR parties’ electoral success does not operate in the same way (or totally irrelevant) in another country. As a corollary of this, many conflicting hypotheses about the same condition have been suggested. This invokes the notion of equifinality, meaning different paths might lead to the same outcome. Allowing researcher to find out different configurations that produce the outcome, thus also respecting the notions of conjunctural causation and equifinality, through comparing medium-n cases (10 to 50), fsQCA is a proper research technique to account for the PRR parties’ electoral success (Ragin, 1987: 19, 24-25; 2008: 3; George and Bennett, 2005: 161; Ragin and Rihoux, 2009: 8). In addition, allowing researcher to calibrate the raw data scores on the conditions and the outcome
into continuous fuzzy-set membership scores ranging from 0 to 1, fsQCA reveals not only the different qualitative aspects of a condition or an outcome (present versus absent) but also the quantitative differences between qualitatively same aspects (to what extent a condition or an outcome is present).

Considering mentioned the methodological issues and its virtues in addressing them, this paper employs the fsQCA to account for the PRR parties' electoral successes in CEE countries. 21 national elections in total that were held in seven CEE countries from 2000 to 2010 inclusive will be analyzed on the basis of five different conditions. Following the traditional structure of the QCA studies the next part gives defines of outcome and conditions, explains the criteria for the calibration of raw data scores. In addition, also the hypothesis (and competing hypotheses, if any) about the impact of each condition will be presented.

4.2. Defining the Outcome and Causal Conditions

4.2.1 Outcome: Defining the PRR Parties’ Electoral Success (S)

The electoral performance of a PRR party is measured by the percentage of the electoral support that the party gained in elections. Some studies set the three percent of electoral support, which makes a political party relevant actor in party systems to distinguish between electorally successful and unsuccessful political parties (Norris, 2005; Veugelers and Magnan, 2005). Nevertheless, based on the assumption that the political parties in the parliaments more effective actors in national politics than those outside the parliament, this study opts to take the official electoral thresholds into account whilst deciding which PRR parties are electorally successful. In five of the seven countries, the electoral threshold had been five percent during the period under examination. It was 4
percent only in Bulgaria and Slovenia. For the sake of consistency, this study sets the five percent as the cross over point to distinguish electorally successful and unsuccessful PRR parties. Following the previous applications in the literature this study sets the 10 percent of electoral support to be “fully in the set of electoral success” and 1 percent to be “fully out from the set of electoral success” (Karapin, 1998; Norris, 2005; Veugelers and Magnan, 2005). Appendix 1 displays the electoral support given for the PRR parties in seven countries.

4.2.2 Conditions:

The factors that have been taken into account in the academic studies accounting for the PRR parties’ electoral successes in West Europe can be employed also for the Central and East Europe, but to a certain extent. The main reason for this statement is that some of the factors West Europe includes are either in different forms or irrelevant in the context of the CEE countries, and vice versa. Hence, not only some of the hypotheses that have been constructed in the context of West Europe should be adjusted but also the new hypotheses about the impacts of factors that CEE includes should be developed. Following this reasoning, this paper adjusts the hypothesis about the impact of immigration problem and suggests new hypothesis about the condition of corruption, and the period of Europeanization. The hypotheses about the impacts of unemployment, and party system mechanics are taken largely as they have been developed in the context of West Europe.

This paper examines the impacts of five conditions. Two of them are demand side conditions, which are named “high levels of unemployment,” and “high levels of corruption.” The rest are supply side conditions that are labeled
“successful minority party,” “illiberal mainstream party,” and “Eurosceptic mainstream party.”

4.2.2.1 Demand side conditions

High Levels of Unemployment (U)

This study suggests three hypotheses about the impact of unemployment. The first hypothesis suggests that at the time of the high levels of unemployment, more voters are likely to be dissatisfied with the mainstream parties. Their dissatisfaction with the mainstream parties predisposes them towards the political parties with anti-political establishment attitudes. Thus, the PRR parties are likely to become successful electorally when the unemployment level is high.

The second hypothesis holds the view that voters are more likely to vote for political parties having the experience of governance when the levels of unemployment are high. Because the most PRR parties lack such an experience the high levels of unemployment does not contribute to electoral success of the PRR parties.

The third hypothesis predicts that the high levels of unemployment stir up hatred of “others” (i.e. national minority group) among the native population, leading more voters to support the nativist parties, such as the PRR parties. Thus, high levels of unemployment help the PRR parties to be electorally successful in heterogeneous societies (includes different ethnicities).

The data on unemployment rate are taken from the database of the International Labor Organization. Based on the idea that people may not feel the factor’s impact, either positive or negative, straightaway, the average of unemployment rates for three years (including the election year and those of subsequent two years before the election) is taken into account. Considering the
unemployment problems is felt psychologically much more stronger when the rate reaches to the double-digit numbers, the 10 percent is set as the cross over point. Based on the data at hand, when the unemployment rate reaches to 15.6 % the condition is considered as “fully in,” whereas the condition will be “fully out” if the unemployment rate is less than 6 percent.

**High Levels of Corruption (C)**

The widespread corruption problem is likely to increase the number of electorates who are dissatisfied with the established political parties. Inspired by their negative attitudes towards the established political system, the PRR parties could appeal to voters, who are dissatisfied with the established political system. Following this reasoning, it has been hypothesized that the PRR parties are like to be electorally successful in countries with high levels of corruption problem.

The raw data on corruption is taken from the database of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, which assessing the degree of perception of corruption among the citizens on a scale ranging from 1 (most corrupted) to 10 (most clean). Among the countries under examination, Slovenia has been considered as the most successful CEE countries in dealing with the problem, whereas Romania has been subjected to problem severely. Hence, the scores given for these countries guide this study in setting the criteria to decide when the condition is fully in and fully out. Based on the data at hand, if the score is 6 or above, the condition will be “fully out.” Should the score is 2.9 or below, the condition will be “fully in.” Using the log-based calibration method, the score 4.6 is set as the cross over point.
4.2.2.3 Supply side conditions

Electorally Successful Minority Party (M)

This study hypothesizes that the PRR parties are likely to be electorally successful in elections when there is also electorally successful minority party. The same procedure that is implemented in the calibration of the successful PRR parties is applied for this condition. According to this, the minority parties that are able to have 5 percent of electoral support are considered as the successful examples. Should the minority party have to 10 percent of electoral support the condition will be “fully in.” If the minority party’s electoral support is less than 1 percent or no minority party competed in the election, the condition will be considered as “fully out.”

Illiberal mainstream party (I)

This is one of the conditions in this study which is directly imported from the above mentioned studies examining how party mechanics affect the electoral performance of the PRR parties in West Europe. Considering the conflicting findings about the impact of this condition, this study suggests two hypotheses. The first hypothesis predicts that PRR parties are likely to be electorally successful in elections when the mainstream party moves towards the center. The second hypothesis suggests that the likelihood of PRR parties’ electoral success increases when the mainstream party moves toward far-right since this movement increases not only the saliency of the issues also the PRR parties emphasize but also the legitimacy of the PRR party. Considering the different understanding of “right politics” and “left politics” in some of the CEE countries
the list of mainstream parties that are considered as the potential competitor of the PRR parties is given in appendix 2.10

Given the importance of the non-material issues to PRR parties, this paper focus on the positions of the mainstream parties on the cultural dimension of party competition. The mainstream positions are determined on the basis of Chapel Hill expert surveys (2002, 2006, 2010). The survey locates the parties on a scale ranging from 1 (most libertarian) to 10 (most authoritarian). Based on the data at hand, the mainstream parties whose score are 5 (or less than 5) are considered as “fully out” condition, whereas the score 8.86 refers to fully in condition. Using the log-based calibration, the score 6.9 is considered as the cross over point.

**The Eurosceptic mainstream party (E)**

In the course of the Europeanization, which is defined as the impact of the EU conditionality on the candidate countries, some voters take up negative views about their countries membership in the EU either for economic reasons or cultural reasons.11 In addition, the recent study have shown that EU issue voting

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10 For a detailed discussion about how “the left” and “the right” is defined in post communist countries please see: Tavits M and Letki, N. 2009 “When Left is Right? Party Ideology and Policy in Post Communist Europe” in *American Political Science Review* Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 555-569.

11 In the literature two approaches suggest possible reasons to explain why citizens may take up anti-EU positions. These approaches are utilitarian and national identity (De Wries and Edwards, 2009: 7). The utilitarian approach stresses the role of individual economic expectations in provoking criticisms against the European integration. This approach argues that voters’ opinions on European integration are formed by their cost and benefit analysis regarding their material interests. Inspired by rational choice theory, the approach suggests that voters, who think they could not benefit from the integration process, are likely to be against EU integration (Hix, 2007: 133; De Vries and Edwards, 2009: 7). Unlike the utilitarian approach, the national identity approach emphasizes the importance of identity issues in suggesting possible reasons for voters’ opposition to European integration (Carey, 2002: 407; McLaren, 2002: 551; Hooghe and Marks, 2008: 4). Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2008: 11) argue that, “[t]he EU is more than a means to lower economic transaction costs. It is a part of a system of multi-level governance, which facilitates social interaction across national boundaries, increases immigration and undermines national sovereignty.” In the literature particularly stressed identity based issues are about the protection of national identity; the reduction of national control over certain issues; and fear that ‘others’ they might eclipse the nation-state. Widespread
is more influential in deciding the party preferences in CEE countries comparing its effect in West Europe (De Vries and Tillman, 2011). Given their nativist characteristics, PRR parties have the potential for appealing to voters who opposed their countries membership in the EU. Following up this, this study suggest the hypothesis predicting that the PRR parties are likely to be more successful electorally in countries elections in which no eurosceptic mainstream party compete.

The data on mainstream parties’ position on the European integration are taken from Chapel Hill expert survey series (2002, 2006, and 2010). The survey locates the parties on a scale ranging from 1 (strongest opposition) to 7 (strongest support). The score 4 stands for the neuter position on the issue. Following this, this paper also set the score 4 as the cross over point. Based on the data at hand, the score being equal to 7 means the condition is “fully in,” whereas the score 1 indicate the condition is “fully out.”

5. Discussions and Conclusion

21 national elections in total have been examined through fsQCA to account for PRR parties’ electoral successes (outcome) on the basis of five conditions. In the end, the fsQCA suggested four different paths leading PRR parties to be electorally successful. No condition emerged as necessary in producing the outcome. In fact, if there were any necessary condition it would appear in all four paths. This finding raises doubts about arguments suggesting the PRR parties can be electorally successful only in countries where a host of either immigrants or national minority resides.
Figure 1:

Membership in the combined set of pathways & PRR electoral success

Figure 2: Boolean expression of set of pathways

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<th>Case</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Raw Coverage</th>
<th>Unique Coverage</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) ~I * M * U</td>
<td>0.829</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0.058</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cases:</td>
<td>SLK2006 (0.99, 1); SLK2010 (0.81; 0.51); BUL 2005 (0.6, 0.81); BUL 2001* (0.53; 0.37)</td>
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<td>*Deviant Case: BUL2001</td>
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<th>Case</th>
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<tr>
<td>2) ~E * M * C</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases:</td>
<td>BUL2001* (0.74, 0.37); BUL2009 (0.74; 0.94); ROM2004 (0.68;1); BUL2005 (0.62, 0.81); ROM2000 (0.62, 1); ROM2008* (0.62, 0.33); SLK2002 (0.6, 0.7); SLK2010 (0.52, 0.51)</td>
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<td>* Deviant Cases: BUL2001 and ROM2008</td>
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The populist radical right parties were able to gain at least five percent of the total votes in 11 out of 21 national elections. The concentration of the 9 of the 11 PRR parties’ electoral success on the top-right (2nd zone) of the diagram (where both one of the paths and the outcome is present) in figure 1 demonstrates the considerable relevance of the paths to the outcome. In addition, the presence of no case on the top left (1st zone) of the diagram (where the paths are absent but the outcome is present) substantially strengthens the explanatory power of the configurations. Before discussing the role of each condition in the configurations, finally it is important to note that each path involves the combination of at least one demand side and two supply side factors, and vice versa. This means that one group of factors is as important as the other.

Two of the four paths include the condition of “successful minority party”. The condition seems to provide a latent support for the PRR parties, as it needs combining with one demand side and one supply side condition to exert its influence. In the first path, it must combine with the conditions of high levels of unemployment and the absence of illiberal mainstream party. This configuration
seems to give some validity to third hypothesis about the impacts of unemployment and to first hypothesis about the impact of party system mechanics. The second path suggests that the condition of “successful minority party” must combine with high levels of corruption and the absence of Eurosceptic mainstream party. The democratization process that is executed by the pro-EU mainstream parties and extending the minority rights in countries where corruption problem is also present substantially seems to predispose some voters towards the PRR parties.

The condition of “illiberal mainstream party” operates in different ways depending on whether the election includes “successful minority party.” As mentioned, the condition’s absence benefit the PRR parties in elections in which the successful minority party is present. This supports the first hypothesis about the impact of illiberal mainstream party. Contrary to this, the presence of the condition seems to benefit the PRR parties in elections where no successful minority party is present. This proves the second hypothesis about the impact of party system mechanics suggesting that the presence of an illiberal mainstream party not only increases the saliency of issues that the PRR parties strongly emphasize but also strengthen their legitimacy. The presence of illiberal mainstream party in elections when the successful minority party is absent, however, is not sufficient to produce the outcome. As the third path suggests the absence of unemployment and the absence of Eurosceptic mainstream party must accompany it. This supports the second hypothesis about the impact of the condition of “high levels of unemployment and hypothesis about the impact of the condition “the absence of Eurosceptic mainstream party.” In the fourth path, the presence of illiberal mainstream party combines with high levels of
corruption and high levels of unemployment. At first glance, the path seems to support the first hypothesis about the impact of the unemployment, suggesting the unemployment problem benefit the PRR parties, yet the presence of corruption problem that weaken the public trust in the established political parties raised doubts about the validity of the hypothesis about impact of unemployment. At best, this path seems to support the idea unemployment benefit the PRR party when it concurs with another condition, such as corruption, weakening the public trust in mainstream parties.

The results gives some validity to the hypothesis about the impact of Europeanization suggesting that in the absence of an Eurosceptic mainstream party, the PRR parties are likely to be successful in elections. As the second and third paths show the condition can be the part of configurations both with and without the presence of successful minority party. This suggests that Europeanization has contributed to PRR parties’ electoral success in all CEE countries that experienced the accession negotiation process. In addition, the condition “absence of Eurosceptic mainstream party” does never concur with the unemployment problem that is an economic indicator. For that reason suggesting national identity approach considering cultural concerns, not the economic ones, as the main reason for the growing of Eurosceptic opinions and for predisposing voters towards the PRR party. Like the condition “Eurosceptic mainstream party,” the high levels of corruption seem to contribute to PRR parties’ electoral success regardless of the presence of success minority party in configurations.

To summarize, this paper arrived at five conclusions about the conditions leading to PRR parties’ electoral success in CEE countries. First, the demand side
factors are as important as the supply side factors, and vice versa. Second, the presence of successful minority party positively affects the PRR parties’ electoral performance yet it is not a necessary condition. Third, in what way the presence of illiberal mainstream party contributes to PRR parties’ electoral performance depends on the presence or absence of a successful minority party in the election. Fourth, The condition of high levels of unemployment benefits the PRR parties’ electoral success only when it combines with a condition causing either deterioration of public trust in the established political system or increasing the native people’s hatred of others (minority groups). Otherwise, the high levels of unemployment do not contribute. Fifth, the absence of Eurosceptic mainstream party and the high levels of corruption positively affect the PRR parties’ electoral performance in all countries.

Finally, some cases gathered at the bottom right (4th zone) of the diagram in the figure 1, where the outcome is not present even though the one of the paths is present. This situation indicates that there is a missing condition that prevents the emergence of the outcome. This missing condition can be detected through the qualitative comparison of elections in which the particular path is present but the outcome does occur only in one of them.

Words: 6067
Appendix 1: The Electoral Support for PRR parties in CEE from 2000 to 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Electoral Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian National Movement</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Union of Attack</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>8.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Union of Attack</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party of Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.17 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers Party</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Life Party</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Life Party</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOBBIK</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>16.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Polish Families</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>7.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Polish Families</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>8.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Polish Families</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Romania Party</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>19.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Romania Party</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>13.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Romania Party</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak National Party</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7 % (with PSNS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak National Party</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>11.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak National Party</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian National Party</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian National Party</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>6.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian National Party</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5.4 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: List of Mainstream Parties that are potential competitor of PRR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bulgarian Socialist Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian Social Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References:


