Public Policies for Participatory Management in Brazil:
Comparing Elitist and Participatory theories of Democracy

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In the Brazilian post-democratization period, new policies for the openness of popular participation and deliberation have been proposed as a way to overcome the limits of representation and the consequent formation of ruling elites in organizations. Participatory management policies, such as Councils, Conferences and participatory budget, are currently the most studied public policies that have the purpose of generating popular participation in political decisions. The political participation in these new arrangements is supported by their inclusive potential and therefore, in its push for the democratic consolidation in Brazil. However, it is important to question whether, as currently designed, these policies can overcome the challenges of bureaucracy and oligarchy in popular organizations, such as mentioned by elitists.

Thus, this paper proposes a scenario that is currently going through the process of institutionalization of participation. Its central objective is to counter the discourse that made participatory management policies enter the government's agenda together with the institutional engineering that made them. The aim is to show the degree of correspondence between the phases of "agenda setting" and formulation, evidencing that the theoretical discussion has direct relevance for the practice assessment.

1 - Introduction
Participatory management policies, such as Councils, Conferences and participatory budget are currently the most studied public policies that work as growth generating mechanisms of popular participation in political decisions, in Brazil. They are supported by the belief of their inclusive potential and, therefore, in their push for democratic consolidation in Brazil. These policies are seen as the realization of the ideals theorized by advocates of participatory democracy, since they provide the possibility for direct participation of the population in the decision making process.

According to Pateman (1992), the essence of participatory democracy is achieved through the participation of individuals in the decision making process of issues that affect the communities they integrate. Such participation can occur in various spheres, which can relate to the government sphere, but is not limited to it. We use the participatory theory to understand the policies conquest of space in the agenda and how they are formulated. The agenda is the visible and formal facet of a policy, these policies seek to include the population's views in order to define the use of public resources and create new policies, a decision that was previously monopolized by traditional political institutions. Therefore, these mechanisms attempt to bring together political institutions and individuals beyond the voting process.

According to the participatory theory, the great effect of the opportunity created for participation and deliberation is the political education, however, only if it enables the individual to practice democracy; in other words, "...if those who have just arrived to the political arena had been educated for it, their participation does not represent any danger to the stability of the system ... "(Pateman, 1992). Before Pateman, Moisei Ostrogorski (1970) long ago discoursed on the importance of political education for the individual, which is a result of their participation in decision-making and vice versa. (Balão, 2001)

Therefore, what is noted after the adhesion of participatory / deliberative policies by the government agenda, is that they, by their normative discourse, would be effective in making people capable of dealing with collective issues; of taking into account not only their private interests, but also their public interests; as well as contributing to the democratic skill development of people and familiarizing them with democratic procedures. Until the time when elections are no longer the only legal instrument for governmental punishment or reward, recognizing the fact that it does not allow a real-time control but only a retrospective one (MANIN, PRZEWORSKI and STOKES,
2006), after the damage has been done, it is necessary to rethink and reevaluate how these new decision making instances will be formulated. However, what we intend to discuss in this study is that there may be a big difference between what is intended with the accession to a certain policy type, ie, to "buy" a speech that makes an issue enter the government agenda, and its next stage: its formulation.

According to Robert Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy", "it is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators" (MICHELS, S / D: 238). It should then be asked: To what extent can problems predicted by the elitist theory, such as the oligarchy process and bureaucratization of popular organizations, be identified in the policy formulation of participative management?

How about the issues derived from it, such as: How can two opposing theories of democracy, such as the elitist and participatory, be identified simultaneously in a single formulation of public policy? Or even discuss how two theories as close as participatory and deliberative can distance themselves in the institutional design of a policy. Would the public taking part of these new centers of power be just an amorphous mass waiting to be shaped by the values of a ruling elite (Pareto, 1968), protected by the government against the supremacy of indiscipline in the society, or is the idea of popular participation and deliberation present in an institutionalized way in order to overcome the challenges mentioned by the Elitist Theory?

2- Proposal

Observing the limits of representation and the consequent formation of ruling elites in organizations, placed by Michels and other elitist authors, new proposals for policy openness to popular participation exist and deliberation can now be made in respect to issues that before could only be decided by selected political groups. Thus, new practices appear, such as the Participatory Budget, Councils and Conferences, which start from the assumption that a truly democratic government is organized by it's institutions, that are built by a collective process of public discussion and deliberation among citizens (LÜCHMANN, 2007). The question left unanswered is whether those policies, and the way they were formulated, can overcome the challenges mentioned by the elitists
The central idea of this paper is to show that the theoretical discussion has a direct relevance in the reflection and evaluation of practices. More specifically, it intends to oppose the discourse that made the participatory management policy enter the government agenda together with the institutional engineering that accompanies its implementation.

Therefore, its main objective is to reflect on existing internal dissonance in the Public Policy Cycle, seeking the improvement of participatory management policies through the recovery and identification of ideas from elitist and participatory theories of democracy, in these specific public policies. As specific objectives, the process of oligarchy process incurred on the popular deliberation process proposed by participative management policies, through the analysis of the internal Regiments that regulate these policies, opposing the idea that made these policies have space in the government agenda in the shape of a formulated proposal, due to its institutional design.

Therefore the following questions are made: In what way can elitist theories and deliberative and participatory democracy help one think of the great political event of Participative Management, represented by the Participatory Budget Councils and Conferences, implemented throughout the country after the 1988's Constitution, taking into account the comparison between discourse and policy formulation? And to what extent can the oligarchy process and bureaucratization of popular organizations be identified in the policy formulation of participative management?

However, the issue that raises questions about the way these policies are formulated is directly related to the institutional boundaries of popular deliberation, identified in its institutional engineering. In theory, it is assumed that the participatory deliberation, citizens together with representatives discover and agree on solutions to collective problems appearing on the agenda of government. Is this what the bylaws predict? I assume that the ideals of participatory theory are present in public policy analysis, however, as a transformer of the political education (the "approximation culture" of the population in public decisions). The ways that are disputed, however, are the ways in which these policies are designed, which can limit the deliberative action.

Using the base of Michels elitist theory to justify the hypothesis that the resolution may be limited, I examine the organizational structure established to manage and monitor participation and deliberation foreseen in participative management policies. Composed of delegates elected by the participative population and councilors elected from amongst these delegates, a managing council or other similar types of
hierarchies are formed within the framework of these policies to make decisions, sometimes isolated from the pressure of popular participation.

For Michels the self-government of the masses, which is based on deliberate decisions made in meetings is undoubtedly a more participatory form of organization, but does not prevent the formation of an oligarchic government. Michels's theory assumes that the organization of the population, in fact, would create a tendency towards oligarchy, because, inevitably, different individual skills eventually generate specializations, therefore generating hierarchies, principals and commanded, directing ruling minorities and ruled majorities.

At this point we approach the subject of the present study: participatory management policies, despite the decision to propose popular assemblies, are immune or confirm the emergence of elites from their institutional engineering? Or, according to Michels, is there, still in those participatory politics, the establishment of oligarchies by the specialized and hierarchical work and by political leaders and counselors that concentrate decision-making power by taking it from the public?

The answer to this question may lie also in the following definition of Michels, when he says: "The inclusion of delegates able to represent the mass is a way of ensuring the fulfillment of their wishes..." (MICHELS, 1982). It can be suggested, therefore, that there is the possibility of oligarchy within the analyzed participatory politics, since the choice for a formula with representation and delegation can support the construction of a professional politician who does not pursue a mere role as representative of the mass, but the position of a head coach that holds the power of decision.

Systematizing, the main hypothesis that I will try to validate with the development of this research is that institutional engineering used in the formulation of public policy of participatory management, demonstrated by its Bylaws, reproduce, albeit on a smaller scale, the same problems of representative democracy, ie the institutional engineering used in these policies is presented, always, overly representative, as an oligarchy and bureaucratized in a kind of public policies that affirm the weakness of civil society led by the strong and protagonist state that should think, run and evaluate the popular participation and deliberation. Both the availability of delegates and advisers to discuss the popular deliberations along with the local government, and the prerogatives of the executive agreements may allow inappropriate
deals and patronage, which would eventually erode the principles of participation and deliberation of these public policies.

From these hypotheses we seek innovative ways of thinking about public policy formulation that meet the interests of the majority of the population, going beyond the involvement of a pedagogical nature, but that allows civil society to deliberate on matters of public interest, *de facto* and not only *de jure*.

In order to accomplish these objectives, the methodology of this work is presented in three parts. The first two phases are composed of a theoretical revision that 1 - summarizes and compares the elitist, participatory and deliberative democracy theories, and 2 - reports briefly the reasons for the appearance, adhesion, and growth of participatory management policies in the country. In this section, we will seek to explain the different conceptions of Democracy outlined by its classic authors in order to, secondly, be able to identify the principles on the grounds which led to the adhesion of these policies and, subsequently, in their formulation. The theoretical research will then be based on developments in the study of democracy, as well as in the current discussion on participatory and deliberative tools. The utility of a proposal cannot be purely understood as an inductive exercise, that communicates with empirical facts and that makes contrast with other alternative hypothesis. Therefore, this research must also be located inside a broad theoretical structure, and not only focus on one hypothesis tested in isolation without giving the due attention to its theoretical construction.

Considering that there are several theories that seek understanding and defend the democratic form of government as well as its nature, it is appropriate to analyze the signifier "democracy" and its various meanings in an approach centered on the relation between theory and practice of these contemporary politics. This is mainly justified by the need to provide evaluations of a significant theoretical capacity, linking them to the empirical reality. Accordingly, the proposed approach, of multiple views, will emerge as one of the key methodological tools for the improvement of participatory politics.

According to the literature, the popular protests of the 70s and 80s, the politics of financial transfers to municipalities and the PT – PARTIDOS DOS TRABALHADORES, together have been building a political speech that endows the participatory management to the point of entering the government agenda. Revisiting the produced literature of the subject, this dissertation will seek to treat these three themes, weaving them together, in order to justify the inclusion of the participatory
management policy in the government agenda. The third part of this paper examines the formulation of these policies, being the Internal Regulations the object of the study, for which the presented analysis of institutional engineering helps guide the aim of the real possibility of achieving the expected goals as well as their limitations.

The main novelty of this paper is the focus on the relationship agenda setting/formulation, which are confronted by recurring to antagonistic theories of democracy. It is not intended here to deal with sectoral issues, such as evolutions and specific achievements in areas of health and education, nor with the redistribution of incomes and evaluative cleavages of these policies, which could be a limit to this work. However, those issues have already been extensively addressed by the academy in the last years.

This study is also useful to monitor the formulation of these new centers of popular empowerment as well as of policies that are characterized by the participatory and deliberative role of the population. From the moment that the government opens a window of opportunity for people to directly interfere in subjects previously monopolized by them selves, by means of a participatory and deliberative policy, it becomes necessary to rethink and reevaluate how the new instances of empowerment are created. The study of these instruments of power that are institutionally assigned to the civil society (even though they are under the protection of the state) are of great importance in a country where the policy is traditionally made from top to bottom, with plans that are implemented in a centralized manner.

By observing the way the policies of Participatory Management are offered, we notice that they predict the reversal of roles in the process of decision making. According to Bartholo, there is a redefinition of roles, not only of the State, which becomes more consultative, but also of the population, which becomes more active and is not limited by the process of electoral choice. (Bartholo et al., 2003). However, it is not clear to which extent their institutional engineering is democratic and whether they allow a participatory, deliberative and popular space. Furthermore, it is difficult to ensure that the identified participatory theory will not be used as a facade for elitist purposes.

At this point, it is worthwhile to say that even in environments with popular participation and deliberation, there is room for the proliferation of patronage, patrimonialism and construction of new elites, which use these new spaces due to the fragility of the institution or due to the institutional engineering intention. Since it is a
public participation policy, Gurza Lavalle, Houtzager and Castello (2006a) clearly state that the actors of the civil society follow some logics that are not necessarily compatible with the democratic expansion. (Gurza Lavalle, Houtzager and Castello, 2006a). Having observed this, it is extremely important to examine the new means of representation in a society that is undergoing a process of reconfiguration of its instances of access to the State.

3 - Theoretical Foundation and Literature review.

Literature review will be conducted in three parts: the first addressing representative democracy, the second focusing on theories of participatory democracy, deliberative democracy and elitism, and the third and final analysis will focus on the agenda-setting and formulation of participative management policies.

3.1- Representative Democracy: Room for participation and Elitism

Before dealing with participatory democracy we will work on issues of political representation. Multiple definitions and perspectives suggest that political representation is a form of organization that can provide a structure to democracies by legitimizing the interference of people in the political life, whether through the role of a "voter" in the process of choosing representatives or other forms of participation on specific policies. Therefore, in a broadening process of people's decision-making on policies creates new mechanisms of empowerment, using the political representation mechanism, such as participatory management policies. Ultimately, political representation is defined as the mechanism by which power is exercised directly by the people, but through representatives who are legitimized to take decisions.

After defining the guiding principles of political representation, how would it be possible to understand the representative democracy and, more specifically, to understand the representation established in participatory policies? One of the central ideas that became explicit in the classical founders of representative government is that, for structural reasons, mainly due to viability, representation would be a system that governs the political community indirectly through elected representatives. Would this be the principle that explains the representative form adopted in the implementation of public policies that were studied? Thus, Schmitt defines political representation as a
relation that assumes the characteristic of "inidentidade," which means "minimal operational definition that distinguishes elected from voters" (Schmitt, 2000) and creates two separate bodies: the representatives and the represented, both with different functions.

Bringing such debate to the present time, the concept of representative democracy corresponds to a system of government that maintains the characteristics outlined by the founders of such model, but adding new elements, rights and values, reshaping the democratic principles.

According to some authors, including Manin (1996) and Balão (2001), representative democracy "remains what it was since its foundation: a government of elites, distinct from all the citizens" (Manin, 1996). This means that we are only seeing the replacement of those mentioned elites in new models of government. Therefore, just like the basic definition of political representation, we have three possible models of relations between representatives and represented: imperative and fiduciary, proposed by Bobbio (1982), the procedural and competitive conception of Schumpeter (1984), and the dynamics of the autonomous representative process of Urbinati (2006). Since the participative management policies utilizes delegates in the deliberation process, according to Bobbio's imperative model, they would only have to execute the popular will, without autonomy to alter proposals.

3.2 Theories of democracy: Proceduralism, Participation, Deliberation and the danger of Elitism.

We begin the discussion of democratic theory by recurring to the literature written by Joseph Schumpeter (1984). Schumpeterian thinking explains the dynamics surrounding the process of choosing representatives, which is determined by the competition among collective actors whose purpose is to retain or to acquire positions of power. In this way, only a small and selected number of citizens should be involved in keeping the government working properly. This political body would be the only one to have the minimum conditions that are needed to do so, and the voters would be in charge of accepting or rejecting the potential leaderships by means of choosing one of them. It would be an inherited characteristic of democracy the legitimacy of the voters through voting, and an a posteriori evaluation regarding the performance of politicians, being the non-reelection used as a punishment. Thus, the popular participation in the
political process would be characterized by the limitation of discussions and the occasional vote.

The Schumpeterian theory presents democracy as something restricted to the sphere of politics, being just a device (minimum, procedural and competitive) for the election of representatives, which provides the basis for the characterization of the election process as either democratic or undemocratic, but without having any educational purpose. Popular participation in this representative system is limited to the act of voting that is done by the citizens, which is an existing, effective, and popular participation.

Schumpeter (1984) criticizes the classical doctrine of democracy in the eighteenth century, refuting the assumptions that are the foundations of this doctrine. The classical doctrine is based on the idea that democracy is a process by which the will of the people is served by seeking the common good of society. In order to have this classical doctrine accepted, it is necessary to accept that there is a common good and, consequently, a desire that is shared by all individuals. Schumpeter refutes this idea by presenting the argument that there is no common good, nor a common will, as people are different and therefore they have different behaviors.

The Schumpeterian theory of democracy breaks down these principles of classical doctrine and makes the definition of democracy a procedure that is not susceptible to the subjectivity in the definitions of good and common will. According to Schumpeter "democracy is an institutional arrangement for policy decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide upon a competitive struggle for the votes of the voter." (Schumpeter, 1984).

One of the main criticisms of Schumpeter's theory was formulated by Carole Pateman, a renowned researcher of the participatory democracy theory. Pateman (1992) presents a theory regarding democracy that differs it from the orthodox theory, especially in the aspect concerning the political participation. The Schumpeterian theory states that popular participation in political decisions endangers democracy, as ordinary citizens are not well prepared to influence the public sphere. On the other hand, the participatory democracy that is proposed by Pateman has an educative purpose, and differently from the Schumpeterian theory it is not restricted to the political sphere, but propagates the concept of democracy to the social, economic and cultural fields. Therefore, participatory democracy is presented not only as a democratic method, but
brings the definition of a democratic society in which popular participation is not limited to the government subjects.

By analyzing the classical theorists of democracy, Carole Pateman (1992) shows the positive view that is implicit in these theories, in opposition to contemporary theorists who think that the participation is a threat to the stability of political systems. Contrary to orthodox theorists, Pateman supports democratic participation as a way of protecting the people from the action of diffuse interests in the public sphere, and characterizes the people as "the only group that is able to act as an obstacle to the realization of 'diffuse' interests by the government" (Pateman, 1992). Participatory democracy is more concerned with the propagation of the education for voting (social vote) than with the mere election of representatives, which therefore makes it different from the approach taken by the Schumpeterian theory of democracy.

By means of participation, citizens start to be familiarized with the issues of democracy as well as intellectually developed for dealing with them. Moreover, they are able to support a direct relationship between participation and political education, so that the stability of democracy is not compromised but gradually benefited.

In this scenario, the expectation that is generated by popular participation is that, at some point, citizens will be interested in national issues in the same way they deal with local issues, having a better evaluation of the connection between public and private spheres. As a consequence, the meaning of the vote is modified, because the individual starts to understand the influence that his or her participation has in the electoral process.

Another criticism against the Schumpeterian theory was formulated by theorists of deliberative democracy, among which stands out Amy Gutmann. Gutmann (1995) calls Schumpeter's theory of democracy as a populist democracy. The populist democracy emphasizes the government of the majority, where the requirements are competitive elections, universal suffrage, and political freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of press, freedom of association and freedom of organization of opposition parties (which cannot be persecuted in case they have an ideology that is opposite to the ruling party). The only reservation that populist democracy imposes on collective decisions is the procedural constraint, in other words, all decisions are made according to the majority rule, satisfying the procedure in which the deliberations must correspond to the will of the whole.
Given the problems of populist democracy and negative liberalism, Gutmann (1995) supports the deliberative democracy. The central idea of deliberative democracy is to promote individual autonomy ("right of self-governing" - Ferreira, Aurelio Buarque de Holanda in: "Miniaurélio" - 6. Ed. Rev., Pg. 155). Autonomy requires not only information to support discussions about public issues, but also well-thought out judgments and solid decisions that are based on well-founded judgments.

Contrary to Schumpeter (1984) which states that the mass does not have capacity to choose and therefore should not stick to it, Gutmann (1995) believes in education for autonomy and that everyone should believe in the ability of voters, because policy is not anymore about power or the rule of the strongest, and that the exchange of arguments should be the way for reaching a consensus, looking for the one which best fits the reality.

According to Gutmann (1995), the direct participation of the individual in the decision-making process is not necessary. With investment of politicians, states and citizens, autonomy must be strengthened by institutions and the political culture, through debates and election campaigns, as well as the government accountability, because these types of information call the attention for discussion and education of the individual in order to participate. It is possible to delegate representation without losing autonomy, as long as representatives are required to show accountability reports and are penalized in case they do not act correctly, without the need for a twenty-four hours per day engagement. It is therefore possible to unite representation with the deliberative process while having popular participation and controlled representation.

By emphasizing different ideas, the participatory and deliberative theories of democracy explore the limits of the procedural representative democracy, whose greatest representative is Joseph Schumpeter (1984). However, another school of democratic thought – the elitist theory, represented here by Robert Michels – points out limits and potential dangers of the concrete experiences of participatory and deliberative democracy.

Concisely, Michels (1982) theory points to several factors (technical, intellectual, strategic and psychological) that act within organizations and that bring out a minority leadership. According to the author, the so-called self-government of the masses, which is based on decisions that are deliberated at public meetings, is undoubtedly a more participatory form of organization, but it does not prevent the formation of an oligarchic government. Michels's theory supposes that the organization
of the population would actually create a tendency towards oligarchy, because different individual skills inevitably result in generating specializations, hierarchies, commanders and commanded, ruling minorities and majorities.

As supported by Michels (1982), the technical factor is the main cause for the rise of the oligarchy of chiefs within the institutions, as it becomes more necessary due to the growth of the institution and increase of participants. According to the author, it is such factor that causes division and specialization of labor with the aim of enabling the implementation of many complex tasks that are acquired by large institutions. Furthermore, an important consequence on the organization of institutions is that, as time goes on and organizations grow, the direct participation becomes a structural problem and thus a delegate starts to play the main role. In addition, according to the idea of increasing the complexity of tasks to be performed, even by delegates, there is a need for having certain technical skills, i.e., the expertise that is need to perform the duties of a chief. Therefore, the growth of organizations, the increase of complexity and of the number of participants, and the employment of delegates, start the process of technical specialization, transforming these representatives into professional politicians who are able to take more qualified decisions, without needing to consult the population, characterizing the oligarchy process. Thus, Michels is quite skeptical in relation to representation, and states its definition as an oligarchy lying on a democratic basis.

Still according to Michels, the more the institution organizes itself, with more bureaucratic and hierarchical functions, the less democratic it becomes. It is exactly at this point that the representation is criticized by Michels (1982), as we shall see further in this paper. The author points to the existence of an "iron law of oligarchy" in human organizations, and says that there is no social order without a dominant minority, precisely because the rising of this political class is intrinsic to the growth of organizations, and generates the needed representation that gradually becomes more indispensable, either because of their intellectual superiority and technical expertise, and the ability of organizing the decision making (even though in a "less" democratic way), or simply due to their representative position and being in charge of solving certain problems. Therefore, the author suggests that the mass would nullify the individual and, as a result, the government would not be truly democratic. The representation, the delegation and the organization, which generates oligarchies, would cause the undemocratization of the system.
"The accumulation of power in the hands of some relatively few people in number, as happens in the labor movement, inevitably leads to many abuses. The 'representative', with the strength of knowing itself as indispensable, easily goes from server to lord of the people. The chiefs who were at first trustees of their subordinates, turn out to be its constituents " (Michels 1982).

At this point, we get closer to the subject of this paper: Although the participatory management policies propose the popular deliberation at assemblies, can we affirm that these policies are immune from elites that results from an oligarchical structure? Or, as supported by Michels, does the implementation of oligarchies by hierarchic, specialized employees and political chiefs concentrate the decision-making power away from the public?

The answer to this question may lie also in the following definition given by Michels: "The inclusion of delegates that are able to represent the mass is a way of ensuring the fulfillment of their wishes..." (MICHELS, 1982). It can be suggested, therefore, that there is the possibility of oligarchy within the analyzed participatory politics, because the option of implementing them using representation and delegation can support the construction of a professional politician who does not play only the role of a representative of the mass, but actually he or she is the technical chief who holds the power of decision. As we shall see in this paper, the way how these policies were implemented counts with the creation of delegates, represented actors and representatives of the population, and the local government with the power to veto based on technical criteria.

In order to close the issues addressed by the elitist and orthodox theories of democracy, we must clarify that these theories show that the level of participation and actual representation in representative models of democracy are not satisfactory and, in addition, they make it possible that ruling elite representatives use the public power to benefit themselves and, as a result, they can favor their private interests instead of the general interests of the population. Therefore, there is the need of widening the popular participation in government decisions apart from voting, so that the minorities can also be listened to in a process that was previously defined by the tyrant majority, in which only the interests of majority groups were taken into account in the government agenda.

Starting from this point and by observing the limits of representation and the consequent formation of ruling elites in organizations, as supported by Michels and elitists, new public policies are proposed with the aim of opening the popular
participation and deliberation regarding the issues that were restricted only to selected political groups. As a result, new practices are developed, such as the Participatory Budget, the Councils and the Conferences, in which it is assumed that a truly democratic government is the one that is organized by institutions that are built through a process of public discussion and deliberation involving all citizens (LÜCHMANN, 2007). However, it is still not surely known whether these policies can overcome the challenges that are mentioned by elitists, in the way that they were formulated and implemented.

3.3 About Participative Management Policies.

According to Souza (2001) three factors are fundamental to understand the success of participatory politics in Brazil. The first one is bound to the experiences of popular participation occurred during the ‘70 and ‘80 after the opening process done by the military regime. Political programs such as "All power emanates from the people" implemented by Bernardo de Souza, who invited the civil society to deliberatively participate in important governmental decisions, including drafting of the state budget – a practice that was pioneer at least in Rio Grande do Sul (Brazilian state), and that is an example of popular participation in building municipal budget – and later adopted by PB in Porto Alegre.

The second factor can be represented by the transfer of federal funds to municipalities, after the 1988 Constitution promulgation. Based on the principles of mini-public, written by Archon Fung, most participatory management policies were carried out by Municipal Initiatives. Here it is also possible to use the term created by John Kingdon and say that there was a "window of opportunity", since participatory policies were made possible by tax reforms in municipalities, leading to a significant increase in investment by local governments, especially in small cities. Nevertheless, dependence on federal distribution for small municipalities is still obvious. The financial capacity of municipalities is crucial to reach success on participatory politics. Ultimately, municipalities need a certain amount of money to accomplish what is proposed by the population.

The third and last factor is related to municipal elections and to the "Partido dos Trabalhadores–PT". With the increase in the number of municipalities ruled by the PT
and its allied parties, the Participatory Budget became, over the years, the basis of party politics and a kind of action characteristic of their governments.

As written by Avritzer (2003), this experience appears as a result of the connection between the three aforementioned elements: "increased participation in decisions about the distribution of budgetary resources, increased access to public resources and rights, an increase in capacity to decide and some ability to determine the rule of the deliberative process" (AVRITZER, 2003).

Aiming to establish some guidelines for the subsequent studies, Avritzer argues that promoting the expansion of democratic participation or repeating such phenomenon in different environments is no easy task to accomplish. Thus, the author sees in participatory politics a way to "rebalance the relationship between representative democracy and participatory democracy" (AVRITZER, 2003), based on four elements: 1) transfer of sovereignty by those in power to local representatives; 2) reintroduction of elements of local participation (regional assemblies, councils, etc.), containing methods of participatory democracy; 3) sovereign self-regulation, by definition of rules and procedures for participants; 4) priority rollback of local public resources in favor of the poorest populations.

Also according to this author, these policies always involve three major dimensions that confront political representation: the first concerns the definition of preferences, the second relates to the ability to transcribe these popular preferences for public policy and the third relates to the population's real ability to control the execution of works given as priority.

Avritzer (2003) separated into four categories the necessary elements for guaranteeing the existence of participatory politics. The same elements can, at the same time, represent risks to those policies: 1) political interests of the party in power; 2) degree of cohesion and organization of society or community; 3) elements of institutional design; 4) administrative and financial capacity to implement proposals.

4- Results and Conclusion

According to the analysis done here, it is possible to assert that one of the factors causing limits to participation and decision-making mentioned in the text is the institutional engineering used to implement policies. Clearly, either directly or indirectly, the Executive has strong mechanisms of influence throughout the decision
making process. This is possible through the appointment of board members to compose the departments, commissions and councils, or even by their own regiments, based on technical assessments, that allow the change of the popular deliberations held in the Assemblies, including the initial fact of being the Executive who proposes, formulates, implements and evaluates these opportunities for participation.

At this point we recall is one of the questions guiding this study: To what extent problems predicted by the elitist theory such as the oligarchization and bureaucratization of popular organizations may limit or even prevent the achievement of the expectations placed on the policies of Participative Management?

In order to elucidate the causes of the problems mentioned above, it was necessary to evaluate the intent of the programs and how they were implemented. Thus, we found in the use of participatory management policies some effects arising from the proposed integration of the opening of political participation and the traditional representative mold. Somehow they were limiting and prevented more significant and effective results from popular participation.

Thus, we can observe that the proposed form of implementation, through the copied institutional engineering used for the creation of committees, councils and departments, ultimately creates disadvantages for the direct democracy; it may drive popular deliberation and limit accountability. Therefore, in this process of creating hierarchy and oligarchy, of legitimize the government's willingness within an instrument of popular participation, we can clearly identify the premises of political patronage, either by identifying the policy as a channel created to address the demands of citizens; or as the subordination of the citizen participation program to strategies of visibility of political support, or through the alliance policy and coalition governments, which exchange seats and political favors, as shown by Marquetti, Campos and Smith (2008), Avritzer and Sánchez (2004).

We can not discount the fact that the regiment is clearly divergent from the initial formulator objective of direct democracy; the regiment establishes the guidelines for implementation, the means of popular participation, ensures assemblies, the voice and the vote to citizens, but also regulates forms of the elections to the popular representation in a second round of negotiations, where they form new instances of deliberation, between the elected representatives of the participating population and the representatives of local governments that, ultimately, are also representatives of the people. Therefore, the fact that should be explained here is the importance given to the
representation in relation to popular participation as an instrument for the implementation of participatory management. As distinct from the objectives mentioned, the structure, the institutional engineering does not allow direct democracy after popular participation in the choice of priorities. The action of political representation for negotiations with the public power is used to give way to politics, ie democracy and direct participation will close when representatives are chosen to act in deliberative structures formed by the Regiments.

We also consider that at one point, Amy Gutmann's theory in "The disharmony of democracy" (1995), in order to perform a critique of populist democracy, in which she presents the paradoxes that exist in populist democracy and the differences between this and deliberative democracy, can be identified in the Participatory Budget, in the Municipal Councils and in Conferences, in general.

Gutmann believes in education for autonomy and that all should believe in the capacity of the represented, because politics is no longer the power or the law of the strongest, and it is through the exchange of arguments that a consensus must be reached, seeking what best fits reality. That is, in the phase of dialogue, debate and participation, the education and the exercise of political culture promotes democracy. Deliberative democracy is the one who can resolve the tensions between liberalism and democracy. In this theoretical line, which is to prioritize autonomy as self-determination, ie, the ability of the individual to act and have influence on public and private courses that concerns them. This autonomy comes from the public deliberation, with people interacting and influencing each other. Although it only starts from the first round of deliberations, before the choice of delegates and councilors that, as representatives, shall take the lead of the deliberative process, we must take into account the pedagogical nature inherent in the participation, present in these participatory politics. It is through them that individuals can make rational choices about policies and then demand accountability.

The big difference for Gutmann, as well as for Benjamin Constant, who seems to be present in the Bylaws, is that for them it is not necessary to direct participation of individuals in the decision-making process: you can delegate representatives without losing autonomy, since they provide accounts and are held accountable if they don't act properly. This form of guaranteeing the autonomy of society over collective decisions, defended by Gutmann, can be identified in the figures of actors endowed with power of representation by the Regiments and the willingness of local government, as delegates
and advisors who, theoretically, should defend and represent the interests of the population against the local government. However, the mechanisms of accountability mentioned by Gutmann are not present, as there is no direct way of penalty for the 'direct representatives.

In this way, we see that the Gutmanns' arguments for the promotion of individual autonomy in the democratic system, in the way it was implemented, limited autonomy when delegating decision-making power without control. Also according to Gutmann, the disharmony is also present in a system that emphasizes individual autonomy, since, to achieve the fullness of its objectives the availability of perfect information is necessary. In Participatory Management policies, these issues are directly evidenced by the Regulations, since they can deal with technical criteria that can disapprove the peoples' proposed action, destabilizing the harmony of the individual values involved in the deliberations.

The symmetry of information, the accountability of representatives, accountability in itself, in many ways, are absent in the policy grounds which is here treated and they ultimately justify the actions of representatives, as well as the low participation, due to the dilemma of collective theory, since not all are similarly committed, and in a larger group, the "lift effect" is inevitable. According to Olson in "The logic of collective action" (1999), the rational choice of the individual to participate in collective actions for public goods tends to be, or not to participate, or to take little commitment, given the fact that the benefits are distributed to all regardless of individual effort, the rational would be not to participate, therefore receiving the public goods in question due to the "lift effect" in the collective action of others. It is the logic of individual reduced costs with aggregate collective benefits.

Participatory management policies show a tension between the principles of participatory democracy and representative democracy. In fact, popular participation and adherence, show their acceptance and the need for policies that strengthen democracy with universal rights of citizenship. However, to conclude this study, we realized that the way they are implemented, these policies become more of a negotiation process of demands and pre-determined by political factors of political party and electoral order. (BALÃO, OTTMANN, GORZ)

Gorz argues that the pedagogical process of participation flows very well, it configures a space that exchanges different life and learning experiences and that, indirectly, the training of delegates could even be passed to the other participants,
providing "living knowledge, acquired in everyday traffic and regains a key role in the current stage of the economy of knowledge and information technology. "(GORZ. 2005).

The conclusion is that, besides being a necessary space with demands and great expectations from the population, through out the years the acceptance to participatory policies has been broadening, receiving more marginalized sectors of the population, which shows the importance of this pondering space. However, since the implementation form is based on the choice of representatives and the final deliberation is made by means of technical evaluations. The participatory policies configure themselves as a funnel, in which even though the entry is large, and has been expanding over the years, the selection of demands that become public policies is much smaller and is based on representation, in political games and in patronage.

Participatory management policies are "sold" as if they were really participative policies of a direct democracy. However they are in a scenario of total administrative instability and are also highly disturbed by an electoral system that is filled of ethical and corruption problems, which generates the disbelief of the population that demanded participation and transparency of public actions in the first place. Throughout its implementation, we see the creation of oligarchy and bureaucratic structures, which are created by elected representatives and state actors that have the power to reshape the demands for technical criteria.

By examining the proposal of eliminating the criticized "traditional" political elements in order to build a "modern" policy that is based on rational criteria, transparency, ethics and on the construction of procedural rules, we have identified through the evaluation of the formulation and implementation of participatory management policies that they do not eradicate political practices such as clientelism and the patronage. Actually, what happened was the incorporation of their practices under the guise of participatory and deliberative theories. Authors such as Gorz and Ottmann say that practices such as populism, personalism, patronage and cronyism are still a force in political life, even in the context of participatory democracy experiments.

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