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Evaluations of patriotism across countries, groups, and policy domains

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ABSTRACT
Numerous studies have examined the level of patriotism across countries, the factors that shape patriotic feelings, and the ways in which diverse dimensions of patriotism are related to a broad set of attitudes and behaviours. Citizen evaluation of patriotism, in particular in the context of majorities and minorities, has seldom been investigated, however. Exploring this issue, this paper discusses the ways in which majorities and minorities view the consequences of patriotism and whether their attitudes are affected by inclusive state policies. Analysing public views of patriotism across countries, it found that (a) patriotism is viewed more positively than negatively in nearly all the countries included in the survey; (b) on average, majorities hold more positive views of patriotism than minorities; (c) minorities in countries governed by more exclusive policies tend to regard patriotism more negatively than those in countries governed by more inclusive policies; and (d) the more inclusive the policy, the more negatively majorities perceive patriotism. These findings are discussed in light of the normative debate regarding patriotism.

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Patriotism; minorities; inclusive policies

Introduction
The notion of patriotism has been the subject of much debate by political theorists and empirical studies. Normatively, some contend that, functioning as a form of ‘cement’ holding diverse societies together, patriotism reduces social conflict, increases cooperation and strivings towards social justice, and fosters a committed and engaged citizenry (Viroli 1995; Taylor 2002; Brubaker 2004; Müller 2007; Soutphommasane 2012). Some argue that patriotism is crucial for minority integration and social cohesion in the face of increasing diversity. Others argue that patriotism fuels bigotry, chauvinism, and conflict (Nussbaum 2002; Kateb 2006), serving as a tool to marginalise and exclude minorities from the ‘circle of we’. Patriotism is thus viewed in both negative and positive terms.

Empirically, while the positive and negative consequences of patriotism and its various aspects have been extensively examined, the findings are inconsistent and therefore inconclusive. While higher levels of patriotism appear to be related to citizen support for paying taxes (Gangl, Torgler, and Kirchler 2016), political participation (Huddy and Khatib 2007), and solidarity (de Rooij, Reeskens, and Wright 2011), they are also linked with
less egalitarian attitudes and income equality (Solt 2011). Those who score highly on the patriotism scale are also less likely to participate in unconventional forms of political activity (de Rooij, Reeskens, and Wright 2011) or tolerate minorities (Blank and Schmidt 2003). These conflicting normative and empirical interpretations of patriotism are not surprising in the light of its multidimensional character and the fact that ‘research on patriotism has been marred by a confusing array of terms, definitions and expected consequences’ (Huddy and Khatib 2007, 63). To date, most of the normative discussions of patriotism that have highlighted the positive or the negative aspects of patriotism have been empirical studies. These have customarily employed a predetermined definition of patriotism (e.g. national pride) or distinguished between its diverse aspects (e.g. constructive patriotism vs. nationalism) (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999; Blank and Schmidt 2003; de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Raijman et al. 2008; Miller and Ali 2014). Patriotism’s multidimensional nature is also reflected in the diverse interpretations of patriotism across different contexts even when one specific aspect of patriotism – namely, national pride – is under examination. A recent study investigating public perceptions of ‘national pride’ in Germany, the U.S., Mexico, Spain, and the U.K. evinces a significant variation between and across countries. This undermines the ability to understand national pride as a proxy for patriotism across countries (Meitinger 2016). Overall, the multiple dimensions of patriotism have been clearly demonstrated.

The question of how people themselves evaluate patriotism has largely been overlooked, however. Is it regarded as a positive or negative phenomenon? Even less is known about how diverse groups view patriotism. Is patriotism endorsed differently by different groups in a country? If differences exist between groups, what factors explain the variation? Are these perceptions related to inclusive state policies towards different groups?

Addressing these questions, this present study analyses (a) to what extent people across countries view patriotism as a negative or positive phenomenon; (b) whether systematic divergences in perception exist between different groups; and (c) whether inclusive state policies affect perceptions of patriotism in general and those held by minority groups in particular. Rather than based on a predetermined definition of patriotism, this paper takes a novel approach by assessing citizen evaluation of patriotic feelings.

The cross-national data, covering 29 countries, were drawn from the Third National Identity Module (2013) of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). While the first two National Identity Modules (1995 and 2003) contribute to our understating of patriotism, this is the first to explicitly examine perceptions of patriotism. It thus includes questions designed to evaluate whether respondents believe ‘strong patriotic feelings’ to be positive (helping the country to remain united and strengthening its world status) or negative (fuelling intolerance and negative attitudes towards immigrants). These questions enable people’s perceptions of patriotism to be identified and cross-national differences evaluated.

The first section focuses on the differences in group members’ perceptions of patriotism, conjecturing that majority group members will tend to evaluate patriotism more positively than minorities. The framework of the distinction between the relevance of patriotism to different groups in this section is based on Mylonas’ (2012) distinction between ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ groups that will be elaborated in this section. The second addresses the issue of state policies towards non-core groups, suggesting that inclusive policies will be associated with more positive views of patriotism among non-core groups.
The empirical section presents the rationale for distinguishing between core and non-core groups across the 29 countries and clarifies the measures used in the analysis. A description of the core and non-core group members’ perceptions of positive and negative patriotism is then provided. The question of whether inclusive policies are associated with diverse cross-national perceptions, accounting for core/non-core group perceptual differences, is examined via multilevel analyses. The final section discusses the findings and limitations of the research design.

**Does patriotism privilege different groups?**

Historically, national sentiment has formed a crucial element in legitimising the authority wielded by the modern nation state, enhancing state taxation capacities, fostering obedience to the law, blunting dissent, and mobilising citizens for combat. Many governing elites have sought to achieve political and national unity by constructing a common national identity and encouraging national sentiments among diverse groups (Mylonas 2012). The very emergence of the modern nation state is frequently understood as a homogenisation process dissolving class, ethnic, linguistic, and religious disparities (Tilly 1992). In the face of threats to territorial integrity, governing elites have frequently sought to mass-school uneducated populations into a coherent shared national identity that supersedes ethnic, family, and kinship ties to ensure resistance to alien rule (Darden and Mylonas 2016).

Commonly serving as a tool for uniting societies, diversionary theory holds that patriotism is frequently invoked to counteract economic inequality between heterogeneous segments (Solt 2011). Enabling citizens to form a sense of solidarity irrespective of the unequal conditions they may experience and discouraging them from challenging state institutions that benefit the few, patriotic sentiments tend to be promoted by political elites seeking to mask discriminatory governance.

Nation building has frequently been predicated upon an elite ethnic group that establishes itself as constitutive of the nation. When this new national entity joins forces with other ethnic, linguistic, and religious sectors, a nation is created (Wimmer 2013). National identity thus constitutes the most central form of identity in the modern world (Greenfeld and Eastwood 2007). Various strategies have been adopted to foster common identity, with diverse outcomes. In France, for example, heterogeneous groups have been assimilated into the national core. In Spain, in contrast, some groups have preserved their unique nature and status. Traditionally homogeneous countries (e.g. Germany) are now becoming highly diverse due to the influx of migrants and refugees into Europe. While France has historically succeeded in ‘making peasants into Frenchman’, the recent waves of immigrations have created new social and political divisions. Countries are thus characterised by diverse types of minorities – territorial, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and immigrant.

Mylonas argues that groups can be classified as core and non-core. The former refers to ‘all the inhabitants of a country who share a common national type’ (2012, 24) via national historiography, official or state religion, common cultural costumes, race, and so on. Non-core groups do not share one or more of these markers, thereby exhibiting a clear and distinct social identity. They are defined as ‘any aggregation of individuals that is perceived as an unassimilated ethnic group (on a linguistic, religious, physical, or ideological basis) by
the ruling political elites of a country’ (26). In Germany, for example, the core group was defined officially as whites of German ancestry whose native language is German, while immigrants are non-Westerners whose native language is not German. The principal distinction between core and non-core in Germany is thus a function of immigration. In other countries, the distinction may be determined by the nation-building process and the way in which the country’s borders were shaped. In Estonia, for example, Estonians form the core group and Russians speakers who migrate there during soviet time, the non-core group. In Israel, Jews constitute the core group and Arabs, the non-core group.

It is important to note that not each minority is a non-core group, as there are some minorities who have not developed distinct social and political identity (Mylonas 2012). Yet, the distinction between core and non-core groups helps to understand how different groups are expected to view patriotism differently. Non-core groups often find it more difficult to identify with the nation in fragmented societies than the majority. This is particularly true when the state is controlled by a core group whose ethnic, religious, and/or linguistic concepts and standards shape the national culture. This majority/minority divide may also be reflected in divergent levels of patriotism. Known as ‘ethnic asymmetry’, this disparity reflects the different levels to which the majorities and minorities exhibit attachment to the state (Staerklé et al. 2010). Thus, for example, the riots over the controversial relocation of the Bronze Soldier war memorial in Tallinn, Estonia, revolved around divergent interpretations of Estonian and Russian national identity and the forces shaping patriotism (Kattago 2009).

Empirical studies have found evidence for ethnic asymmetry across various countries and dissimilar majority/minority settings. A study of Turkish-Dutch Muslims indicates that this group exhibits a negative correlation between ethnic and religious identification and the feeling of being Dutch (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). People in Catalonia and the Basque region are similarly less proud of Spain than those living in other parts of the country (Muñoz 2009). In Germany, Turkish and Polish immigrants’ identification with the receiving society changes over time (Diehl, Fischer-Neumann, and Mühlau 2016). These differences are explained by psychological theories of social identity and group attachment. Ethnic identification impacts patriotism and nationalism in analogous ways in countries as dissimilar as the U.S. and Israel (Sidanius et al. 1997).

An analysis of the differences between core and non-core group members across countries yields great variation in patriotism levels. Elkins and Sides (2007) employed data from the World Values Survey to capture core and non-core group members’ patriotism across 51 countries, examining religious (e.g. Egyptian Copts), ethnic (e.g. Turkish Kurds), and linguistic (e.g. Canadian Quebecois) divides. By and large, minorities generally demonstrate lower levels of national pride and attachment than majorities. Thus, while 61% of the majorities reported being ‘very proud’ of their country, only 42% of the minorities did so. Levels of national pride and attachment to the country or ethnic group also diverge significantly across countries, however. In some cases – such as Egypt and Venezuela – no disparity at all was evident. In others, however – such as Macedonia and Israel – huge disparities obtained. Another study, based on the ISSP National Identity II, also found cross-national variation. Despite the fact that the groups were classified based on divergent criteria (U.S.: Blacks, Latinos, and Asians; Norway: non-Europeans) and different sets of countries were included, the majority only exhibited higher levels of national identification in 17 countries (Staerklé et al. 2010). A study
focusing solely on immigrants vs. non-immigrants across 29 European nations found that immigrants tended to be less proud of their host country, favouring sub- or trans-national identification over national identity (Reeskens and Wright 2014).

The findings to date indicate that, by and large, core and non-core groups exhibit different levels of national sentiment. This suggests that perceptions of patriotism will follow the same trend. Less inclined to be attached to their chosen country of residence, non-core members may be presumed to regard patriotism in more negative terms than the majority. H1 thus predicts that: Core group members will tend to evaluate patriotism more positively than non-core members. The findings also portend cross-national variation with respect to this factor; however, institutional context might account for the disparity.

State policies and their implications for patriotic sentiments

State attempts to foster national sentiments among diverse populations go back to the earliest stages of nation building. Although they are also evident in current efforts to achieve social cohesion in the face of increasing immigration (Mylonas 2012) nation-building policies vary greatly from country to country and from group to group. One policy direction focuses on the political sphere (e.g. elections and government power distribution). Here, proportional representation and federalism constitute key methods for including minorities in the political process (Lijphart 1999). Seeking broader principles of integration, another approach espouses multicultural policies that recognise that minority groups are entitled to special rights. Reflecting public recognition of and support for the expression of distinct identities and practices beyond basic rights, these policies seek to assimilate immigrants within the economic and social mainstream effectively. By and large, the countries that have followed this route have also tended to adopt less coercive approaches towards integration – and vice versa (Banting and Kymlicka 2015). Overall, inclusive policies towards immigrants/minorities go hand in hand with a more open and broad-based conception of national identity. Various states nonetheless adopt divergent policies towards minorities.

While some empirical evidence demonstrates a link between minority policies and attitudes, the findings are not conclusive. Several studies indicate that inclusive policies are associated with a broad conception of national identity (Wright 2011), host members being less anti-immigrants (Weldon 2006; Just and Anderson 2014; Schluter, Meuleman, and Davidov 2013; Hooghe and de Vroome 2015). Non-core groups in such countries do not evince higher levels of national pride (Reeskens and Wright 2014), however. The most comprehensive attempt to date to explore the link between policy and attitudes (Elkins and Sides 2007) – based on a cross-national analysis of 51 countries – followed Lijphart’s (1999) theory that power-sharing institutions serve as a mechanism for governing deeply divided societies. Comparing attachment to the state, this study found that proportional representation and federalism exert no systematic effect on non-core groups’ feelings. In other words, power-sharing institutions – the mechanism employed to ensure inclusion in the political sphere – have no impact on cross-national differences between core and non-core group attachment to the state.

Despite the divergence in policies, political institutions and policies are routinely regarded as a means whereby political elites can dictate social norms and attitudes. While in this sense they represent public sentiment, they also reflect variant conceptions
of national identity. Inclusive policies view the latter in terms of ‘becoming’ rather than ‘being’ (Papademetriou and Kober 2012). In traditionally immigrant countries such as the U.S., national identity is predicated upon the successful assimilation of minorities (Schildkraut 2011). In such settings, where patriotism is not held to be responsible for exclusionary attitudes, non-core groups are more likely to regard it in a positive light. Exclusive policies, in contrast, are frequently based on a closed and rigid conception of national identity, non-core groups thus being far more inclined to disfavour it.

Are levels of inclusiveness or exclusiveness merely a manifestation of civic or ethnic conceptions of nationhood? Despite strong criticism of the ethnic/civic framework, state immigration policies can be classified along the ethnic and civic continuum (Koning 2011). While the civic and ethnic framework has been utilised in order to describe different strategies of state building across history, immigration policies are shaped by other factors than national identity or mere path-dependent nation building in accordance with ethnic or civic principles (Bauböck 2010). As several studies have evinced, the civic/ethnic frame is also reflected in the complex relations between policies and divergent conceptions of the nation. Wright (2011), for example, found that the effect of multiculturalism on conceptions of national identity was inconsistent, citizens of more multicultural countries adopting a more restrictive (‘ascriptive’) conception of nationhood over time. This suggests a backlash against multicultural policies. Even when the impact of elite rhetoric on conceptions of the nation is taken into consideration, evidence exists that while exclusive elite rhetoric is related to an exclusive conception of the nation, the same does not hold true of inclusive mobilisation (Helbling, Reeskens, and Wright 2016). It is thus misleading to assume that inclusive policies will automatically be associated with a more positive evaluation of patriotism among core group members.

A different logic may be expected among non-core group members, however. Rather than leading to a backlash, inclusive policies may serve as a type of ‘signal’ that they, or other minorities – such as immigrants – are not being excluded from the nation by national elites. Patriotism may therefore be viewed in a less negative light. Policy inclusiveness or exclusiveness should thus be reflected in divergent interpretations of patriotism among non-core groups. H2 consequently states that: Inclusive policies will be associated with more positive views of patriotism among non-core group members. The analysis will address the question of whether the same phenomenon occurs within the core group.

Data

The individual-level data were drawn from the latest National Identity Module of the (ISSP National Identity III (2013), whose data were collected in 2013 and 2014 (ISSP Research Group 2015). The ISSP is an ongoing cross-national collaboration that explores diverse social and political issues annually. The National Identity Modules have been employed by numerous studies examining various dimensions of national identity (Smith and Schapiro 2015). This version has three advantages. Firstly, while numerous questions in previous versions addressed the respondents’ own patriotism, this also contains four items explicitly relating to their evaluation of patriotic sentiments. Secondly, it covers deeply divided countries such as Turkey and India not included in the previous
modules. Thirdly, it provides measures that facilitate the better identification of members of different groups not included in previous modules. Despite these advantages, it is important to note that the countries included in the ISSP were not selected randomly. As in most cross-national surveys, the focus lies primarily on developed and democratic countries. The generalisability of the findings is therefore limited.

**Identification of the majority and minority groups**

The ISSP data are drawn from a representative sample of the adult population in each country, thus including respondents from both core (e.g. Slovaks in Slovakia) and non-core (e.g. Hungarians in Slovakia) groups. While the sampling is not designed to provide robust representations of specific minorities in each country by oversampling, previous studies have used this and similar cross-national surveys to create distinctions between minorities and majorities across countries (Elkins and Sides 2007; Staerklé et al. 2010; Simonsen 2016). Staerklé and her colleagues, for example, employed the first two rounds of the ISSP National Identity Modules to classify majorities and minorities across 33 countries. Following Horowitz (2000), they loosely define ethnicity as ‘membership in any meaningful, ascribed group defined with racial, linguistic, national, or religious criteria’ (2010, 497). Simonsen (2016) combined the six rounds of the European Social Survey to construct a sample of 19,500 immigrants in 18 West European countries based on the respondents’ birthplace and that of their parents.

The first step in creating group categories is to determine inclusion criteria (Marquardt and Herrera 2015). Seeking to examine groups exhibiting the highest divergences in each country, the classification was based on a clear distinction between the core and minority groups sufficiently represented in the sample. The majority and minority groups were categorised in each country on the basis of the respondents’ ethnic identification, religiosity, citizenship, parent citizenship at birth, country of birth, and parent country of birth.

The ‘core national group’ was defined as respondents belonging to the core ethnic/religious group in the country (e.g. Estonians in Estonia/Christians in the Philippines), both of whose parents were born in the country and who held citizenship in it from birth. Minorities were self-identified as members of a single group (e.g. Russians in Estonia/Muslims in the Philippines) with no other ethnic or religious identification. Those who did not fall into either of these two clear categories were excluded from the analysis. The identification of the non-core group was based on the clearest cleavage in a given country – e.g. Hindus (all castes) vs. Muslims in India or country of origin (e.g. non-Western immigrants in Sweden). Of the 33 countries included in the National Identity III, the sample only contained sufficient minority representation in 29. These were thus the only ones analysed. Table 1 presents the group samples.

**Measures**

The principal variable of interest was measured by four questions included for the first time in the National Identity Modules relating to the respondents’ perceptions of patriotism:
How much do you agree (strongly = 1) or disagree (strongly = 5) that strong patriotic feeling in [country]:

- Strengthens [country’s] place in the world.
- Is necessary for [country] to remain united.
- Leads to intolerance in [country].
- Leads to negative attitudes towards immigrants in [country].

The first two questions relate to patriotism’s positive aspects, the latter two its negative consequences. To support this interpretation, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted in each of the country samples. The (unreported) results evince that the respondents clearly distinguished between these two dimensions. In all the countries except France, Sweden, and Iceland, two clearly distinct factors emerged, accounting for an average of 77% of the variance – a very high rate across such diverse cross-national contexts. Two factors also demonstrated no clear correlation pattern, being either positive or insignificant in some countries and negative in others. Overall, the correlation between negative and positive patriotism factors across the pooled sample was $r = -.17$ – low in relation to the overall sample size ($N = 28,989$). This clearly supports analysing the two outcome variables (positive and negative) independently. The use of only two items for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (entire sample)</th>
<th>Majority group (N)</th>
<th>Minority classification (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (2202)</td>
<td>Belgians (881)</td>
<td>Islamic (religious affiliation) (152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan (1952)</td>
<td>Fukienese, Hakka of Taiwan and Mainlander (1637)</td>
<td>Aborigine/Southeast Asia ethnic definition (35)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia (1000)</td>
<td>Croat (773)</td>
<td>Other Eastern Europe ethnic groups (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic (1909)</td>
<td>Czech (1595)</td>
<td>Other Eastern Europe ethnic groups (97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (1325)</td>
<td>Denmark (1174)</td>
<td>Non-ethnic Dens and non-Western origin (63)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia (1009)</td>
<td>Estonians (618)</td>
<td>Russians (225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (1243)</td>
<td>Finish Speakers (1024)</td>
<td>Non-Finish Speakers (language) (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (2017)</td>
<td>Europe (1179)</td>
<td>Muslims with no European ethnic affiliation (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia (1498)</td>
<td>Georgian (1220)</td>
<td>Caucus ethnic groups (173)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany (1717)</td>
<td>German (1324)</td>
<td>Non-Western origin (64)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland (1082)</td>
<td>Self-definition of non-belonging to a minority (921)</td>
<td>Self-definition of belonging to minority (without classification) (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (1530)</td>
<td>Hindus (1056)</td>
<td>Muslims (religious affiliation) (174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (1215)</td>
<td>White Irish (964)</td>
<td>Non-Western origin (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel (1204)</td>
<td>Jews (185)</td>
<td>Muslims (religious affiliation) (112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia (1000)</td>
<td>Latvians (507)</td>
<td>Russians (253)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania (1194)</td>
<td>Lithuanians (976)</td>
<td>Polish/Russians (122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico (1062)</td>
<td>Self-definition of non-belonging to minority (951)</td>
<td>Self-definition of belonging to minority (without classification) (31)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway (1585)</td>
<td>Norwegian (1311)</td>
<td>Non-Western origin (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (1200)</td>
<td>Christians (1101)</td>
<td>Islamic (religious affiliation) (80)</td>
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<td>Russia (1516)</td>
<td>Russian (1229)</td>
<td>Non-Russian minorities (146)</td>
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<td>Slovaks (948)</td>
<td>Hungarians (101)</td>
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<td>Slovenia (1010)</td>
<td>Slovenians (796)</td>
<td>Other Eastern Europe ethnic groups (38)</td>
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<td>South Africa (2739)</td>
<td>Black African (1444)</td>
<td>Whites (293)</td>
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<td>White/Caucasian (1054)</td>
<td>Non-Western origin (41)</td>
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<td>People of Sweden (825)</td>
<td>Non-Western origin (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland (1237)</td>
<td>Christians (550)</td>
<td>Islamic (religious affiliation) (59)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Turkey (1666)</td>
<td>Turks (1188)</td>
<td>Kurds (106)</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.K. (904)</td>
<td>Whites (of any origin) (727)</td>
<td>Non-Western origin (68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A. (1274)</td>
<td>European origin (295)</td>
<td>Non-Western origin (395)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
latent factors undermined the effectiveness of Multiple Groups Confirmatory Factor Analysis for measuring cross-national invariance, however. The individual-level analysis also controlled for age, gender, and education.

**Contextual factors**

Institutional inclusiveness: Institutional inclusiveness of minorities/immigrants was measured by various scales (Helbling 2013). The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), a cross-national collaboration that inquiries into and compares cross-national integration policies, was used. Constructed by national experts and standardised by Migrant Integration Policy researchers, this covers more countries in our analysis than other indices (Koopmans 2013). Identifying and measuring integration outcomes and policies and other contextual factors with the potential to impact policy effectiveness in the domain of integration, it reflects the extent to which integration policies encourage cultural diversity (Hooghe and de Vroome 2015). Combining various indicators across several policy domains, it enables an overall evaluation of the inclusiveness of policies. In the sphere of education, for example, it covers options for learning about migrant pupils’ cultures. While no such opportunities exist in France, schools in the U.K. have long sought to build recognition of diverse cultures into the curriculum and non-curricular activities. In the sphere of anti-discrimination policies, it examines whether citizens are effectively protected against racial/ethnic, religious, and nationality discrimination in various areas of life, such as the job market. Correlating with other similar indices (Helbling 2013), it is also the most frequently used index of integration policies for comparative research (Callens 2015). It varied from as low as 25 in Turkey to as high as 78 in Sweden in the sample.

In addition to the MIPEX index (our primary focus), we controlled for group differences and ethnic diversity and globalisation effects likely to affect the overall evaluation of patriotism. While countries with higher levels of ethnic diversity should increase the salience of membership in subgroups, more homogenous countries may experience greater pressure towards assimilation. A previous study found that in more diverse countries, greater differences in national identification exist between majorities and minorities (Staerklé et al. 2010). Globalisation is also expected to be relevant to divergent perceptions of patriotism. On the one hand, it is frequently alleged to undermine feelings of and the relevance of national attachment (Guibernau 2001; Norris and Inglehart 2009), thus tending to reduce core and non-core disparities. On the other, it may increase the importance of sub-national groups by attaching greater significance to the ‘sense of belonging’ (Calhoun 2007). Sub-group membership may be more relevant in more global societies. Globalisation and ethnic diversity must therefore be controlled in order to accurately account for policy impact.

Ethnic diversity was measured via the fractionalisation index (Alesina et al. 2003), according to which two randomly selected individuals from a single population are statistically likely to belong to disparate ethnic groups. The sample in the analysis varied from as low as 0.06 in Norway to as high as 0.59 in Latvia. Globalisation was measured by the KOF index of globalisation – the most common measurement of globalisation, widely employed across various disciplines (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008). This covers the economic, social, and political dimensions of globalisation, relating to diverse
aspects – cultural integration, personal contact with people living in foreign countries, and actual flow of trade and investment. Grading country-level globalisation on a 1–100 scale, it varied in this study from 92 in Ireland to 69 in Turkey.

Results

The descriptive results are presented first in order to provide an overview of between- and within-country differences with regard to positive and negative patriotism. A multilevel analysis was then conducted to examine the expectations.

An investigation of the aggregated levels of perceptions of positive and negative patriotism revealed three patterns (Figure 1). Firstly, the overall view of patriotism tended to be more positive than negative among core and non-core groups alike. Overall support for the more negative consequences of patriotism was only high in Sweden and Spain. By and large, people thus appear to view patriotism more positively than negatively. Secondly, perceptions of patriotism varied greatly across the countries. In Spain, for example, positive perception of patriotism was nearly 1.5 points lower than in India. Thirdly and most importantly, significant differences existed between core and non-core perceptions of patriotism, these also varying across the countries. In some (e.g. Turkey, Slovakia), the majority tended to evaluate patriotism far more positively than minorities. In others (e.g. the U.S.), no differences obtained between the groups, while in some (e.g. Ireland), minorities favoured patriotism more than the majority.

A hierarchical linear modelling approach was adopted in order to test the core/non-core disparity and explore whether the institutional context explains the cross-national variation. The respondents being nested within countries, this constituted a methodologically appropriate strategy, precluding erroneous interpretation of the coefficients of variables as significant and allowing for the simultaneous accounting of contextual and individual-level explanations. It also enabled calculation of the amount of variance in between-country differences (interclass correlation (ICC)). The ICC for perceptions of positive patriotism was 16.3%, only reaching 6.6% for perceptions of negative patriotism. This indicates a higher level of between-country variation in relation to the assessment of positive vs. negative aspects of patriotism.

The first section of the multilevel analysis sought to examine whether, despite the between-group variation, majorities and minorities perceived patriotism divergently. The analysis thus focused solely on the individual level, controlling for age, education, and gender across the 29 countries. The results of Models 1.1 and 2.1 evince that across the pooled sample, minorities tended to view patriotism less positively than majorities. Although modest, the differences are significant. In spite of the variation revealed in Figure 1, we may thus conclude that majorities tend to view patriotism more positively than minorities. This result supports the first hypothesis, according to which majorities evaluate patriotism more positively than minorities (Tables 2 and 3).

The second section of the analysis examined whether institutional policy is related to between-country variation in patriotism assessment. In other words, it analysed whether the cross-national disparities are associated with policy divergences (measured at the country level). Only 21 countries possessed sufficient country-level data (MIPEX score) for this analysis. In Model 1.2, institutional inclusion was found to be strongly negatively correlated (−.016 [.004])** with perceptions of positive patriotism, reducing 36% of
the country-level variance for positive patriotism. Figure 2 presents an informal illustration of the results of Model 1.2, plotting MIPEX on the aggregate means of positive patriotism evaluation. The less inclusive a country’s policy, the higher the levels of positive patriotism.
patriotism evaluation were. Sweden, the most inclusive country, exhibited far lower levels of positive patriotism evaluation than less inclusive countries such as Latvia and Turkey. Perceptions of negative patriotism (Model 2.2) demonstrated a similar pattern, more inclusive countries displaying higher levels of negativity towards patriotism than less inclusive ones.

The third section of the analysis addressed the question of whether institutional inclusion is related to disparities between majority/minority views of patriotism. Here, the interaction between minority group status and the MIPEX index revealed whether the divergences varied in line with institutional policy. As Model 1.2 demonstrates, the more inclusive the policy, the closer the correlation between minorities and positive patriotism evaluation. Figure 3 illustrates the results by plotting the MIPEX scores on the aggregate coefficients of country-by-country regressions (controlling for age, education, and gender) between minority status and positive patriotism evaluation. Minorities in countries with a more exclusive policy (e.g. Latvia and Turkey) tended to view patriotism
more negatively ($\beta \approx -0.4$) than those in countries such as Sweden, Norway, and Belgium ($\beta \approx 1$). Negative patriotism (Model 2.2) exhibits a similar pattern, the more inclusive the country, the more minorities tending to view patriotism less negatively.

When contextual-factor effects on attitudes are analysed, overlap with alternative contextual explanations may exist. Sweden and Turkey, for example – the countries at opposite ends of the inclusion scale (see Figures 2 and 3) – also exhibited divergences in relation to other significant dimensions such as globalisation. Controlling for alternative explanations being crucial for robust conclusions regarding policy effects, the final section of the analysis controlled for two alternative contextual explanations – globalisation and ethnic diversity. Models 1.3 and 2.3 include measures of ethnic diversity and institutional policy. Ethnic diversity was correlated neither with overall views of patriotism nor with majority/minority disparities. The effects of inclusive policies thus appear to hold true even after controlling for levels of ethnic diversity. Models 1.4 and 2.4 include the globalisation measure. The results indicating that controlling for globalisation does not alter the general pattern of the findings, the effects of an inclusive policy on positive and negative patriotism evaluation remain rather similar. While the globalisation effect remains insignificant, the globalisation-index correlation with the MIPEX index is 0.65 – relatively

![Figure 2. Positive patriotism evaluation and inclusive policy. Source: ISSP 2013 and MIPEX.](image-url)
The robustness of the distinction between globalisation and inclusive policy is thus rather limited. Even after controlling for alternative explanations, however, some evidence supports the relevance of institutional-policy effect. Inclusive policy is associated with more overall negative views of patriotism, as well as a smaller disparity between majority/minority perceptions of patriotism.

Conclusions

Donald Trump’s 2017 inaugural speech championing patriotism, which echoes also in Marine Le Pen’s claim that ‘patriotism is the policy of the future’, has further fuelled the long-running debate about patriotism. Normatively, while some regard patriotism as a civic virtue, others argue that, as the ‘last refuge of the scoundrel’, it serves to marginalise minorities. Empirically, evidence exists for both the positive effects of patriotism (e.g. political participation and tax paying) and a correlation with negative attitudes towards minorities. Some inconsistencies between majorities and minorities also obtain in the expressions of patriotism. In some cases, minorities tend to hold less patriotic feelings than majorities. To date, numerous studies have measured levels of patriotism and its manifestations across numerous countries, the factors that shape patriotic feelings, and the ways in which various dimensions of patriotism are related to a broad set of attitudes and behaviours. These are based on predetermined definitions of patriotism, such as…

Figure 3. Plot for the relations between minorities’ coefficients on positive patriotism evaluation and inclusive policy (Model 2.2). Source: ISSP 2013 and MIPEX.
Note: coefficients from countries regression while controlling age, education and gender.
general national pride. The question of how people themselves view and evaluate patriotism has been relatively neglected, however.

This paper makes several contributions in this regard: (a) it examines the overall evaluation of patriotism’s consequences; (b) it analyses core vs. non-core group perceptions; and (c) it investigates whether inclusive policy impacts majorities and minorities in different ways. Employing the latest National Identity Module (2013) of the ISSP that includes questions that explicitly address the respondents’ views of patriotism, it scrutinised majority/minority groups across 29 countries. Combining cross-national survey data with country-level measures of inclusive policy towards immigrants in a multilevel model facilitated identification of the role this plays in explaining disparate between-country views of patriotism.

The analysis yielded four principal findings. Firstly, by and large, patriotism is viewed more positively than negatively by the public in nearly all the countries sampled. Secondly, majorities and minorities diverge greatly in their assessment of patriotism. On average, across the pooled sample, majorities held more positive views of patriotism than minorities. Significant between-country variations nonetheless obtained along the majority/minority divide. Thirdly, the majority/minority variation was directly associated with inclusive policies, non-core groups members in more exclusive countries tending to view patriotism more negatively than those in more inclusive countries. This held true even when alternative explanations of globalisation and ethnic diversity were controlled for. While the research design precludes any claims regarding the causal effect of the policy, it determines that in more inclusive-policy settings, a smaller disparity exists between majority and minority perceptions of patriotism. Fourthly, the overall between-country differences are also associated with state policy: the more inclusive the country, the more negatively patriotism is perceived.

These results must be interpreted within the framework of the study’s caveats. As noted in the discussion of the data, use of national representative samples not specifically designed to oversample minorities (e.g. Schildkraut 2011) undermines the representativeness of the findings. While previous studies (Elkins and Sides 2007; Staerklé et al. 2010; Simonsen 2016) employed such samples for majority/minority distinctions, the issue of inclusion criteria (Marquardt and Herrera 2015) in the data set itself is an open question, only studies especially designed to collect data from minorities being capable of answering it. Not just limiting sample representativeness or inclusion-boundary criteria, this also impairs the ability to examine differences between minorities and state policies towards diverse groups. It is also important to note that the ‘clearest cleavage’ majority/minority distinction simplifies the complex picture of diversity. The current research design thus cannot address the question of group-level variation and the possible differential impact of the policies employed with regard to specific minorities. It also precludes any determination of the causal role of institutional policy. Patriotism being understandable as either/both cause or/and effect in the models employed, the cross-sectional design cannot form the basis for firm theoretical conclusions. Finally, like all cross-national measures of complex concepts such as patriotism, the validity of the measure cannot be taken for granted. In particular, the comparability may be limited and affected by variant bias sources in the ISSP data (Heath, Martin, and Spreckelsen 2009). Only additional research in the countries sampled can ensure the validity of the positive and negative patriotism


measures. Additional research is also required to establish the generalisability of the findings beyond the countries included in the analysis.

Taking these caveats into consideration, what are the theoretical implications of the findings? Overall, patriotism appears to benefit majorities and, to some extent, disfavour minorities. Their marginal status inclines minorities to be less convinced of patriotism’s potential for promoting unity and more likely to view it as fostering intolerance and discrimination. While this result may appear to militate against the claim that patriotism can act as a unifying agent in diverse societies, the majority/minority disparity is not a static, predetermined phenomenon. Meaningful divergences obtain when state policies differ, countries with more exclusive policies tending to perceive patriotism more negatively than those that adopt more inclusive policies.

This finding is in line with previous studies (Weldon 2006; Just and Anderson 2014; Schlüter, Meuleman, and Davidov 2013) that demonstrate a correlation between policy and majority attitudes towards immigration. While the results of earlier studies (Elkins and Sides 2007; Reeskes and Wright 2014) are not conclusive with respect to minority views, the indication that minorities in more inclusive countries are inclined to regard patriotism more positively suggests that policy plays an important role in this context. These results might support the claim that inclusive policies help reduce the gaps between majorities and minorities, patriotism merely acting as glue in diverse societies when the nation is predicated upon inclusion. In a recent review, Banting and Kymlicka note: ‘Given the intensity of this debate, there has been surprisingly little research done on the impact of either multiculturalism or civic integration policies on solidarity’ (2015, 22). Our findings provide some empirical support for the assertion that inclusive policies directly impact the majority/minority divide. Policies and institutional effects are nevertheless long-term factors, shaping political identity via lengthy processes such as socialisation. This is especially true for nation-building projects.

Some implications of the findings for policy can nonetheless be adduced. Non-core group in countries that hold more inclusive policies appear not to view patriotism in the same negative terms (as marginalising and exclusionary) as their counterparts in more exclusive countries. Figure 3 further emphasises this point. In inclusive Belgium, the Muslim sample tended to evaluate patriotism more positively than the core group. In exclusive Turkey, the Kurds viewed patriotism much less positively than the core group. Not only power-sharing institutions in the political spheres but also inclusive policies may thus be required to ease tensions in divided societies. While state inclusion policies are determined by many factors and have various implications (Colombo 2015; Gruber 2016), this study points to a specific aspect pertaining to group relations.

The findings also highlight the way in which the public views patriotism. While the multidimensional nature of patriotism is reflected in the fact that ‘Past research on patriotism and nationalism has spawned a variety of scales and concepts, drawn differing normative conclusions, and has been characterized by conflicting and contradictory terminology and measurement’ (Huddy 2016, 18), the public are clearly aware of the consequences of patriotism. In the 29 countries covered in this study, most regarded patriotism more positively than negatively. Despite the ambivalence towards patriotism in political theory and findings relating to the negative consequence of patriotism, the public thus tend to agree that strong patriotic feelings are necessary for national unification and status rather than leading to intolerance and xenophobia. This finding may imply
a gap between scholarly and public understandings of patriotism. In his reflections on nationalism and patriotism, Brubaker observes that: ‘For many scholars in the social sciences and humanities, “nation” is a suspect category. Few American scholars wave flags, and many of us are suspicious of those who do’ (2004, 118). Given the role of ‘strong patriotic feelings’ in recent events in Europe and the U.S., this disparity calls for taking public views of the ambivalent concept of patriotism into account.

Notes

1. According to Smith and Schapiro (2015), more than 500 papers based on the first two modules have been published.
2. Minority languages were also not systematically represented across all the countries. Thus, for example, while Arabic was used for Arab respondents in Israel, only the dominant language was employed in other places. This is likely to bias minority representation, only those fluent in the dominant language being likely to participate in the survey.
3. For example, 17% of the sample in Estonia and 0.1% in the Philippines were thus excluded from the analysis.
4. In South Korea, for example, while 3% of the population consists of foreign born, only 10 respondents in the sample were not identified as ethnic Koreans. This sample is too small to include in the analysis. The minority group in Hungary similarly self-identifying as Hungarians as their second ethnic identity, Hungary was also not included in the study. Minority groups with smaller samples can be included due to violation of multilevel analysis assumptions (Hox 2010).
5. In France, Sweden, and Iceland, however, where the EFA result was one factor, a Confirmatory Factor Analysis one-factor modal was far from acceptable (CFI < .83; REMSA > .3).
6. The Multiculturalism Policy Index, for example, was only available for 12 countries, thus undermining the ability to apply a multilevel analysis.
7. For further details concerning the research project, see http://www.mipex.eu/.
8. For further details regarding the index, see http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/.
9. Grand mean centring was used throughout the models, the estimation method adopted being restricted maximum likelihood.
10. ISSP weights were used throughout the analysis.
11. Given the small number of level-2 units, Figure 2 also enabled identification of possible outliers that might bias the results. Excluding Turkey from the analysis, for example, did not alter the results.
12. A significant effect on positive patriotism [.825(.336)*] and a marginally significant effect on negative patriotism was found in separate models only including ethnic diversity. Both positive and negative patriotism evinced a moderate effect [−1.131(.445)*]. The correlation between ethnic diversity and the MIPEX index was insignificant.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

References


