A Systematic Review of Semi-Presidential Studies:
Struggling to Move beyond Linz

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Paper for presentation at the ECPR General Conference, Prague, 7-10/9, 2016

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Abstract

Since the early 2000s, studies of semi-presidentialism have come to gradually consolidate into a sub-field of research in its own right. With Elgie’s (1999) definition there are currently more than 50 countries around the world with semi-presidential constitutions. By a systematic recap of the main achievements and shortcomings in the field of semi-presidentialism, our purpose of this paper is to identify and suggest fruitful ways to go from here in advancing the research on semi-presidentialism. First, we aim to map the general lines and trends of semi-presidential studies with regards to theoretical foundations, main focus and method approaches. Second, we aim to identify current research gaps and to provide some recommendations for future studies. We have used a review strategy including a general screening of 327 publications covering the period 1970-2015. Out of this sample we have conducted a close reading of 65 selected publications. Our findings suggest that the inconsistent use of regime type classifications and deviating case samples have affected negatively the possibilities for generalizations, but also that the field is gradually moving away from the long-standing debate about how to define semi-presidentialism. Our study also shows a predominance of single cases studies, as well as a regional bias in favor of European and especially post-communist cases of semi-presidentialism. In terms of gaps, we suggest more studies beyond Europe, and we believe that the field would benefit from broadening the dominant theoretical frames to include perspectives from e.g. historical and normative New Institutionalism. In addition, we argue in favor of more studies on public administration and the bureaucracy relevant to the functioning of semi-presidential government.
Introduction

In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the number of countries with a semi-presidential form of government rose sharply. There are currently more than 50 such countries, spread across western and eastern Europe as well as Asia and Africa.¹ Found in many transitional countries and nascent democracies, semi-presidentialism has drawn interest among scholars, particularly in connection with the prospects for democracy’s consolidation and duration (Elgie, 1999, 2016; Zaznaev, 2014b).

Although the term semi-presidentialism appeared in the 1970’s,² the debate over its definition is not yet resolved. In the late 1990’s, Robert Elgie defined semi-presidentialism as a system with a popularly elected president and a prime minister whose government is accountable to a parliament (Elgie, 1999). Based upon a series of formal and institutional measures, Elgie’s definition yields a clear-cut sample of semi-presidential countries, and it quickly gained prominence in the field (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009).

While it is prominent, however, Elgie’s definition has a decisive drawback: it yields a very diverse set of semi-presidential countries, particularly where degree of presidential power is concerned. Parallel with Elgie’s definition, therefore, a sub-categorization of semi-presidential systems – focused on the degree of presidential power in dismissing a cabinet – gained acceptance as well (Shugart & Carey, 1992). This subcategorization divides semi-presidential systems into either premier-presidential or president-parliamentary regimes. Due to differing definitions of semi-presidentialism, lists of semi-presidential countries have varied considerably from one study to another (Elgie, 2004; 2016).

Shifting research topics can be added to the differing use of definitions. The varied definitions have been carefully illuminated in three review articles (Elgie, 2016; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009; Zaznaev, 2014b). Elgie (2016) describes the development as one characterized by three waves, whereby the main research focus has gradually shifted from definitional debates to aspects of democratic survival, and from there to the influence and role of the president.

Notwithstanding these variations, the influence of a few seminal articles – e.g., Duverger (1980), Linz (1990), Linz & Valenzuela (1994), and Shugart & Carey (1992) – has afforded a degree of commonality within the field (Elgie, 2016; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009). Linz’s argument, to the effect that both presidentialism and semi-presidentialism contain inherent

¹ There is also one semi-presidential country in Latin America: Peru.
² The concept is introduced by Duverger in his book from 1970: “Institutions politiques et Droit constitutionnel”.

2
institutional perils, has “established the terms of the debate” (Elgie, 1999: 9). Several scholars have added to his line of argument with studies of the dangers associated with semi-presidential constitutions (Fabbrini, 1995; Lijphart, 2004; Stepan & Skach, 1993). Others have challenged Linz (Elgie, 2011; Moestrup, 2007; Roper, 2002; Shugart & Carey, 1992), stressing the mixed performance of semi-presidential countries as well as the potential for power-sharing and flexible executive relations afforded by this form of government, especially in its premier-presidential variant.

Semi-presidential studies feature differing definitions, varying country samples, and shifting research topics. Yet the field has evolved, from having first been dominated by a set of ideas largely anchored in Linz’s argument for parliamentarism and against presidentialism. Petra Schleiter & Edward Morgan-Jones (2009) argue that the last decade has seen “a rapid broadening of the research agenda beyond Linz’s concern with the adverse effects of presidents on democratic stability” (891). In this paper, however, we question whether the field has actually shifted its theoretical lens and moved away from Linz in this regard. Gradual change does not necessarily imply a “move beyond” the theoretical lens established.

Through a systematic recap of the main achievements and shortcomings of the field of semi-presidentialism, we seek in this study to identify fruitful ways to go from here in advancing research in the field. First, we map the general trends in semi-presidential studies with regard to theoretical foundations, major foci, and methodological approaches. Second, we attempt to identify gaps in current research and to provide recommendations for future studies.

We ask:

1. What are the main research themes and basic theories in the field? Which definitions and case samples are used? How are these related, and how do the choices made frame our knowledge about semi-presidential systems?

2. To what extent does the evolution observed within the field regarding research themes and basic theories amount to a move beyond Linz’s “perils of presidentialism”?

3. Which relevant research themes are still under-explored, and what are the implications of current findings for future studies on semi-presidentialism?

Review method and materials

For our structured review, we used an inductive method. We traced the main semantic varieties of semi-presidentialism, collecting in total 690 publications. From these, in turn, we selected
327 peer-reviewed items which either include semi-presidentialism as a term or which mention some institutional aspect of a particular semi-presidential country/-ies.

Our structured review is divided into two main parts. In the first, we identify each study’s main lines of research and trends of inquiry, in terms of research theme, definition, theory, and case sample.

To map out themes, definitions, theories, and case samples, we read article abstracts, summaries, and tables of content in selected books. Granted, the structure of summaries and tables of content may not be as consistently organized as that of article abstracts; nevertheless, we judge the contributions to the field contained within books to be too valuable to be disregarded (Petticrew & Roberts, 2012).

Using an inductive strategy, we added new themes, cases, etc. as we encountered them in the reading process. Due to the empirical character of the field, we classified research themes as being either part of the independent variable or part of the dependent variable. We labelled themes occurring in more than 20 publications as major topics, and themes found in fewer than 8 as gaps. We then used the major themes to ascertain the main achievements of the field, and the gaps to identify what is yet to be studied. The first part of our review, then, involved taking a mapping approach. Our object was to clarify the main achievements and trends in the research field, and to identify such themes as were absent within it (Booth, Papaioannou, & Sutton, 2012).

In the second part of the review, we did a close reading of the 20 per cent of publications (65 in all) that were cited most often. Here, however, we needed to minimize selection bias relating to time of publication. (Older publications have had more time to be cited.) We therefore divided the 327 items into four age groups, based on year of publication. We then weighted the items in such a way as to make sure that the number of times a given young publication was cited related properly to the number of times that other young publications were cited. In this way, we gave younger publications a fair chance of figuring among the final 65 items.

Our close reading during the second part of the review enabled us to assess the contributions made within each major theme (Booth, Papaioannou, & Sutton, 2012). We analysed the main findings, debates, and theoretical elaborations within the field. We furthermore coded not just the main research theme in each of the 65 studies, but other occurring

3 Year of study, number of cases/case method, democratic character, case region, main theme, source of publication, and actual country cases for case-methods of 1-9 number of cases.
sub-themes too. In this way, we could rest assured that the gaps identified in the first part of our review do in fact represent lacunae within the field.

Table 1. Number of selected publications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected items</th>
<th>Number of items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Items yielded by initial database search</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items selected for general analysis of abstracts</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items selected for full-text analysis/close reading</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We took these books and articles (English only) from two main databases: the Web of Science and the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences. These findings were complemented by the most relevant publications found using Google Scholar. We furthermore added books and articles from the webpage “The semi-presidential one” by Robert Elgie, and from the references listed in the three existing literature reviews (Elgie, 2015; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009; Zaznaev, 2014b).

Implications of choice of method
The choice of methods has implications. While we weighted the items to avoid a serious bias in favour of older publications, the items in the second sample are nonetheless slightly older than those in the first one. The median year of publication is 2008 in the first, and 2005 in the second. Furthermore, as seen in Table 2 and Table 3, the method of selection favours statistically oriented large-N studies and publications that cover more than one region.

Table 2. Regions in empirical semi-presidential studies, 327- and 65-item-selection compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>327-items</th>
<th>65-items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent (no. of cases)</td>
<td>Per cent (no. of cases)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European cases</td>
<td>53 (172)</td>
<td>29 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mix of regions</td>
<td>20 (65)</td>
<td>39 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other regions</td>
<td>12 (40)</td>
<td>9 (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 The 500 most relevant publications.
6 A number of key terms were used to capture items of interest to the semi-presidential field as distinct from studies with country-specific content: Cohabitation*, Constitution*, Executive*, Reform*, Institution*, Transition*, Compare*, Democratization*, “Political structure”, Consolidation*, “Political design”, “Political system”, Semi-president*. 
Table 3. Case methods of semi-presidential studies, 327-selection and 65-selection compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case method</th>
<th>327-selection</th>
<th>65-selection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent (no. of cases)</td>
<td>Per cent (no. of cases)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single case-studies</td>
<td>38 (124)</td>
<td>17 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 cases</td>
<td>13 (43)</td>
<td>9 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-9 cases</td>
<td>6 (18)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-N studies</td>
<td>26 (86)</td>
<td>50 (32)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Theoretical framework

Linz’s original claim – that presidentialism is perilous – has played a key role in shaping the field of semi-presidential studies (Elgie 2016; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010). Linz argues that presidential regimes suffer from inherently contradictory principles and assumptions. They assume the need for a stable and legitimate executive, while at the same time dreading the influence of personalized power (Linz, 1990; Linz & Valenzuela, 1994). Although noting the role of the military on the many occasions that a presidential democracy in Latin America has collapsed, Linz specifically targets the institutional content of presidential regimes as critical for explaining the region’s democratic difficulties (Linz & Valenzuela 1994).

Linz fastens particularly on the role of the popularly elected president (Linz, 1990; Linz & Valenzuela, 1994). First, he points out, presidential regimes use dual elections, for both the presidency and the legislature. These dual elections give voters direct influence over both parliament and executive, but at the risk of setting their parliamentary and executive representatives at odds with each other due to the competing mandates they have received. Second, and in particular reference to elections for the executive, the elected president is the only winner of the game. Losing presidential candidates receive no mandate corresponding to that enjoyed by the leader of the opposition in a parliamentary system. The result is a leadership style that tends to lack cooperative traits. Adding the president’s fixed term in office into the mix, moreover, we have a regime which faces the risk of permanent conflict. On account of their basic institutional features, therefore, presidential regimes are prone to conflict, even as crucial tools of conflict resolution are unavailable to them. These features lead to democratic difficulties for presidential regimes (Linz, 1990; Linz & Valenzuela, 1994).
With its differentiation between presidential and parliamentary regimes and its focus on the effects of regime type on government and democratic performance, Linz’s contribution forms part of the empirical strand of New Institutionalism (Peters, 2012). However, while his account spurs useful debate and provides a theoretical framework for studying institutional effects, Linz tends to treat institutions as a matter of fact, without elaborating upon their origins or development. The influence of institutions is furthermore treated as “unidirectional; the behavior of individuals is assumed to be largely determined by their participation in the institutions” (Peters, 2012:109). Linz’s work in the field has had the virtue, then, of spurring debate on semi-presidentialism, but his understanding of institutions is in this sense rather simplistic.

Another approach which has been highly influential in the field is principal-agent theory (cf. Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009; Shugart & Carey, 1992). This approach requires that certain institutional, actor-related, and normative assumptions be included within the analysis. Parliamentary and presidential regimes have tended to develop differently, with parliamentary constitutions developing gradually and presidential ones being consciously engineered (Shugart & Carey, 1992). And since it was engineered, the presidential system in for example the US is expected to reflect, both in its institutions and in their effects, the aims and assumptions of the Framers. Scholars such as David J. Samuels & Matthew S. Shugart (2010) agree with “Madison’s insight that institutions channel political ambition”, an assumption which forms the main link between institution and actor (Samuels & Shugart, 2010:25). Second, they agree also that such institutional influences arise because actors are predictably rational and self-interested: i.e., “elected officials will be influenced by the self-interested motive of re-election” (2010:14). Third, the US presidential regime was engineered with the particular aim of preserving liberty (Shugart & Carey, 1992). To summarize, the analytical focus of principal-agent studies is on the way in which institutional incentives affect rational and self-interested actors, which in turn has an effect on the prospects for liberty or – in the vocabulary of current research – on representative democracy and its principal-agent chains of representation and accountability (cf. Samuels, 2003; Shugart, 2005).

Parliamentary and presidential systems not only differs when it comes to the inherent normative assumptions, they also differ in terms of voter-executive relations. Under parliamentarism, executive authority and legislative authority are fused (Shugart, 2005:325). Under presidentialism, in accordance with the aims of the Framers, “the diversity of interests … gain representation and … [are] pitted against one another” (Samuels & Shugart, 2010:22). Presidentialism thus incorporates dual elections, thereby institutionalizing a “separation of
origin” between legislature and executive. It also excludes any executive power to dissolve the legislature or any parliamentary prerogative to terminate the government, thus institutionalizing a “separation of survival” (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Presidentialism, then, incorporates both a separation of origin and a separation of survival, and in consequence a separation of powers. Semi-presidential regimes, on the other hand, have dual elections and thus a separation of origin, but at the same time they make the survival of the prime minister and the government dependent on the maintenance of a parliamentary majority (Shugart, 2005). As principal-agent studies have shown, the semi-presidential regime type is unique, because it “entails the possibility that both agents of the electorate – the president and the assembly – can exercise some, although often asymmetrical, authority over the government” (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009:891).

Although distinct from their presidential and parliamentary counterparts, semi-presidential regimes encompass vast differences. The “precise relationship of the president to the prime minister (and cabinet), and of the latter to the assembly vary widely…” (Shugart, 2005:324). Within the principal-agent framework, semi-presidential regimes are accordingly divided into the two subtypes of premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. In premier-presidentialism, the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to the legislature. In president-parliamentarism, the prime minister and cabinet are responsible to both legislature and president (Shugart & Carey, 1992). As illustrated in Figure 1, this analysis yields four unique regime types.
The variations in regime type with regard to principal-agent relations are likely to affect the performance of the different regime types. Under premier-presidentialism, the survival of the government is founded on the support of the parliament only; thus the parliament is expected to be more influential under this regime type (Elgie, 1999, 2011, 2012; Elgie & McMenamin, 2011; Sedelius, 2015; Sedelius & Ekman, 2010). Moreover, basing the survival of the government solely on parliamentary approval – and not on the president's as well – implies a more stable basis for the government under this regime type (Elgie, 2011: 175).

To conclude, the principal-agent perspective elaborate and specify its institutional, rational, and normative assumptions. Forming part of the analytical framework of rational-choice institutionalism and contrasting with the empirical institutionalism of Linz, it “specif[i]es clearly the behavioral and causal assumptions that drove their theories” (Peters, 2012:92). It makes the assumptions more transparent and the empirical analysis more focused. However, while it has contributed to the field of semi-presidential studies, the principal-agent approach nonetheless resembles empirical institutionalism in treating institutions as static entities, and expecting the causal arrows to run from institutions to actors and not the other way around (Peters, 2012).
Main findings

*Trends and case approaches in semi-presidential research*

Research on semi-presidentialism reached its peak around the year 2010 (Figure 1). The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the emergence of many new semi-presidential countries during the 1990’s, marked the start of an increasing research focus on semi-presidentialism.

*Figure 2. Trends in semi-presidential studies 1970–2015 (327 items)*

Of the 327 publications, just 29 aim at theory development, and only 5 at methodological development. 224 publications incorporates an empirical aim. This suggests that the field is first and foremost empirical in character. Of course, we cannot exclude the possibility that theoretical and methodological advancement does not form part of the empirical studies.

Where the case samples in semi-presidential studies are concerned, we see in Table 4 that post-communist countries account for 25 per cent of all studies. Studies focused on post-communist countries are followed by those on Western democracies, making studies of European countries the dominant sample basis. Other world regions, particularly Africa, are represented but sparsely.

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7 According to Elgie’s list, there were 19 semi-presidential countries in Africa as of 2015.
Table 4. Regions covered in studies on semi-presidentialism: percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Per cent (no. of cases)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-communist countries</td>
<td>25 (80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western democracies</td>
<td>21 (69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mix of regions</td>
<td>20 (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>7 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>6 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East, including Turkey</td>
<td>3 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studies without explicit cases</td>
<td>11 (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region unknown from abstract</td>
<td>5 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (327)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where the size of case samples is concerned, Table 5 reports that single-case studies make up 38 per cent of all publications, followed by large-N studies and then small-N studies (2–9 cases). For the post-communist region, single-case studies make up almost 60 per cent of all studies.

Table 5. Number of cases in semi-presidential studies; percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case design</th>
<th>Per cent (no. of cases)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single-case studies</td>
<td>38 (124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-N/Focused comparisons (2–3 cases)</td>
<td>13 (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-N/Focused comparisons (4–9 cases)</td>
<td>6 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-N studies</td>
<td>26 (86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed case methods</td>
<td>3 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studies not using a case basis</td>
<td>11 (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case basis not known from abstract</td>
<td>3 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (327)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the number of large-N studies has increased since the 1990’s, the apparent bias in favour of single-case studies and European and post-communist cases calls into question our ability to analyse and understand semi-presidentialism, as well as our prospects for making tenable generalizations (Elgie, 2016).

Combinations and trends

Assessing the field of semi-presidentialism in terms of the dependent variable (Table 6), we find that democratization and democratic survival are by far the most common theme. Studies focused on the popularly elected president and the powers attached to the presidency are the second largest area of research. Studies of executive-legislative and intra-executive relations, including periods of cohabitation, are also quite common, followed by publications covering the debate over different definitions of semi-presidentialism.
Empirical studies on democratization and democratic survival (64) consist mainly of European and post-communist cases (31).\textsuperscript{8} By contrast, only 2 publications explicitly study African cases.

Moving instead to the side of the independent variables, Table 8 illuminate the field as part of New Institutionalism in that the regime type as such (presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential) is clearly the most common one (92). Studies focusing on the president (22) and the relations between the key actors (21) also form a considerable part of what is considered to be crucially important independent variables in semi-presidential studies.

\textbf{Table 8. Main independent themes of semi-presidential research, percentages (327 items)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Per cent (no. of cases)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime type</td>
<td>28 (92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential powers and presidentialization</td>
<td>7 (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-executive/executive-legislative relations (including cohabitation and divided government)</td>
<td>6 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other themes</td>
<td>59 (192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (327)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Thematic trends}

Elgie (2015) described the development of semi-presidential studies as of three different but overlapping waves. The first wave occupied by the definitional debate, the second wave by democratization studies, and the third wave, finally, by issues of “parties, power, and parliaments” (2016:10). Considering the themes of the independent variable, as reported in Table 9 and 10, our data supports Elgie’s framing of the research field into three different waves. However, our analysis further illuminates the way presidential powers and presidentialization form a current trend among semi-presidential studies. Among the themes of the independent variable; studies of regime type effects tend to be left for studies focusing on the effects of other variables.

\textsuperscript{8} 23 studies used a mixed-regional approach.
Table 9: Trends of the dependent variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field as a whole</td>
<td>2005.5</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratization and democratic survival</td>
<td>2004.6</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential powers and presidentialization</td>
<td>2006.6</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations (including cohabitation, intra-executive and executive-legislative relations)</td>
<td>2006.1</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitional debate</td>
<td>2003.7</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Trends of the independent variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field as a whole</td>
<td>2005.5</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime type</td>
<td>2005.9</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential powers and presidentialization</td>
<td>2007.8</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations (including cohabitation, intra-executive and executive-legislative relations)</td>
<td>2007.4</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Beyond Linz or remaining Linzian?**

To what extent has the field left Linz behind? The answer depends on how we interpret the question. Referring to Linz or founding studies upon the theoretical argumentation of Linz seem to be declining. Between 1991 and 2009, 77 per cent of the publications include references to Linz, while only 57 per cent from 2010 and onwards. Articles theoretically anchored in Linz’ arguments are correspondingly older (median year 2001) than the ones relying on the main competing alternative; principal-agent theory (median year 2006).

Whether the field is actually moving towards “a rapid broadening of the research agenda beyond Linz’s concern with the adverse effects of presidents on democratic stability” is, however, a slightly different question (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009:891). Judging from the changing research themes, we spot a tendency to move away from studies debating the semi-presidential definition and the empirical studies of effects upon democratic survival. The trend of studies focusing on the president, on the other hand, seems to become even stronger. Since effects of the presidential elections and the leadership style produced in the presidential regime formed a major part of Linz’ theoretical elaboration (1990, Linz & Valenzuela, 1994), the influence of Linz thus seem to be changing rather than disappearing. Studies still tend to focus on the variables which Linz illuminated as influential.
Democratization, regime survival or break-down

Semi-presidential studies focusing democratization and democratic survival (Cf. Table 7) suggest that some regime-types are more conducive to democratic survival than others although it is still difficult to find support for a clear-cut ranking between all four regime types. Though “the method of inquiry is fairly straightforward”; “to determine the statistical correlation between particular regime types” (Elgie, 2004:319), it seems evident that the use of different definitions and case selections do thwart attempts to fully compare results between different studies.

Comparing results on democratic survival forming part of our second set of publications, demonstrates the difficulties related to deviating case samples. Stepan & Skach (1993) find parliamentary regimes to be ‘democratic overachievers’ compared to presidential ones. While actually arguing that presidential regimes incorporate opportunities for coalition-formation, Cheibub, Przeworski & Saiegh (2004), correspondingly find that the average life expectancy of a presidential democracy is a mere 24 years, as compared to 74 years of a parliamentary democracy. Shugart & Carey (1992), on the other hand, illuminate the different democratic records of different types of presidential regimes, separating between presidentialism and the two semi-presidential subtypes. Elgie (2011), finally, finds the likelihood of democratic survival to be higher among premier-presidential regimes than among president-parliamentary ones.

The debate above can illustrate the effects of differing use of definitions and case samples. Stepan & Skach (1993) exclude OECD-countries. Their end-date, 1989, furthermore misses many of the newer semi-presidential countries. Shugart & Carey’s (1992) list of democratic failure, on the other hand, excludes democracies of less than two consecutive elections and thus diminish possible failures. They do include the West European but not the post-communist semi-presidential cases formed after 1991. Cheibub’s (2007) later end-date, 1999, allows for the inclusion of these countries, but uses the term “mixed” for semi-presidential regimes, a term not fitting neatly with the sub-types of Shugart & Carey\(^9\). Elgie (2011) focuses on the sub-types of premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes although not in comparison to parliamentary and presidential regimes.

In general, however, the results indicate that regime type is strongly correlated to democratic survival. Specifically, parliamentary democracies show better records on
democratic survival than presidential ones, and premier-presidential democracies last longer than president-parliamentary ones. To what extent the regime type as such causes this pattern is, however, debated and revolves around the question about how the regime type is related to other variables, such as the military. According to Cheibub (2007), presidential regimes have shorter life expectancy due to a historical coincidence; namely that presidential democracies are more often preceded by military regimes (2006).

The way presidential regimes suffers from inherent risks or risks related to circumstances such as economic malfunction or military past, is thus still a matter of disagreement. Democracies are not only ended by external actors, such as the military, but sometimes ended by the incumbent as well (Maeda, 2010). When democracy is ended by the incumbent, such an end is actually more common in presidential than in parliamentary regimes. Circumstances which indicate the influence of regime type related difficulties. Cases when democracy is ended by external actors are, on the other hand, often related to difficulties of economic development and growth (cf. Maeda, 2010; Schmidt, 2002; Svolik, 2008).

In addition, all presidential regimes are not the same. Regime type effects on democratic survival seem contingent on the strengths of both parliament and president. Stronger presidents correlate with worse records of democratic survival (Elgie 2004; 2005, Roper, 2002; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Siaroff, 2003) and so do weak parliaments and incoherent party systems (cf. Duverger, 1980; Bernhard, Nordstrom, & Reenock, 2001; Elgie, 2005; Fish, 2006; Skach, 2005). Accordingly, the combination of a weak and fragmented party system with a strong president, seem particularly dangerous (Schmidt, 2002). If we want to understand the democratic cogency of semi-presidentialism, we should thus consider the larger institutional context including the president and the party system (Elgie, 2004; Mainwaring, 1993).

We are, furthermore, advised to consider that regime type effects may be anchored in the preceding context of a particular country or region. Comparing parliamentary and presidential regimes, the countries opting for parliamentarism do generally show better democratic records already before the adoption of the new constitution (Metcalf, 2000). A new constitution may be considered the result of a pre-constitutional bargaining process (Frye, 1997) or power struggle of the leading actors (Shoesmith, 2003). In this sense a new constitution does not necessarily imply a definitive break with the past.

To conclude, semi-presidential studies have established a correlation between regime type and democratic survival; suggesting that parliamentary regimes fare better than presidential ones, and that premier-presidential regimes fare better than president-parliamentary ones. Thus far and fairly conducive to the arguments of Linz, studies have illuminated the
influence of the larger institutional setting, including powers of the president and the structure of the parliamentary party system. We still need more studies on the way regime type choices adhere to the historical-institutional context of particular countries.

*Legislative-executive and intra-executive conflict*

Corresponding to Linz’ argument that presidential regimes are prone to conflict and semi-presidential regimes to politicking and intriguing (Linz & Valenzuela, 1994), studies of intra-executive (the prime minister and cabinet relations to the president) and executive-legislative relations are among the most common variables of the research field. Though illuminating risks for conflict, empirical results moreover illuminate subtype deviations and reasons to question the democratic difficulties inferred by such conflicts.

In premier-presidential systems, the legislature is given the exclusive powers of prime minister dismissal, making the cabinet dependent upon parliamentary support (Shugart & Carey, 1992). The government’s political orientation is thus likely to be in the parliament’s rather than in the president’s favor. Theoretically, conflicts between legislature and executive should be less likely than conflicts between the president and the cabinet. Empirical findings tend to support such expectation, but furthermore that government formation, and intra-executive conflict relate to the level of presidential powers and to the party structure of the parliament (Protsyk, 2005; 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010). It is even related the presidential ambitions of the prime minister or the value that president and prime minister attach to the positions of government (Amorim Neto & Strom, 2006). The premier-presidential government thus seem prone to conflict, but in addition, to pre-term cabinet resignation (Sedelius & Ekman, 2010). Such effects, can be related to the party system and the complexity of the pre-government bargaining process (King et al, 1990). To summarize, regime type effects on intra-executive conflict and government stability seem to relate to the semi-presidential subtypes, but these to other variables such as the powers of the president and the parliamentary and party structure.

Intra-executive conflict further relates to ‘cohabitation’, a situation even labelled the Achilles heel of semi-presidentialism (cf. Elgie & McMenamin, 2011). Cohabitation is “where the president and prime minister are from opposing parties and where the president’s party is not represented in cabinet” (Elgie 2011: 12). Making intra-executive conflict more likely, cohabitation has been argued a threat to the stability of democracy, inducing irresolvable conflicts which invites the military to step in (Linz, 1990).
Comparing the two suptypes, cohabitation is more likely to manifest in premier-presidential regimes because a president facing an opposite parliamentary majority has only informal means to influence the selection of prime minister (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). The president in the president-parliamentary regimes, on the contrary, has the opportunity to appoint as well as to dismiss the government, and should generally be able to avoid the formation of an opposed government (Elgie & McMenamin, 2011).

In accordance with these expectations, empirical studies illuminate that periods of cohabitation are more common in premier-presidential regimes (Elgie, 2010, 2011) and that intra-executive conflict is more common during instances of cohabitation (Amorim Neto & Costa Lobo; Sedelius & Mashtaler, 2015). Not only an effect of regime type, nonconcurrent elections and a president of little power seem to make cohabitation more likely (cf. Amorim Neto & Strom, 2006; Elgie, 2011; Protsyk, 2005, 2006).

Cohabitation, however, seems less of a threat to democracy than previously expected. Based upon all available records of semi-presidential countries from 1989 and onwards, there is actually only one case10 of a semi-presidential electoral democracy breaking down during a period of cohabitation (Elgie, 2010). Instead, the premier-presidential regime type seem to grant the president a position from which he cannot threaten the position of an opposing cabinet. Nevertheless, cohabitation can still infer severe tension and challenge to the general performance Gherghina & Miscous, 2013; Shoesmith, 2003; Skach, 2005), especially when no clear constitutional provision guides the power distribution of the key actors (Skach, 2005) or when the democratic regime is young (Elgie, 2010).

Generally speaking, however, cohabitation seem to be a situation which mainly erupts in circumstances where it can be managed within the boundaries of democracy (Elgie, 2010). As found within the theme of democratic survival, intra-executive conflict, pre-term government resignation and cohabitation relate to regime (sub-) type (Elgie & McMenamin, 2011; Protsyk, 2005), but furthermore to the level of presidential powers and the characteristics of the parliamentary party structure. The latter, in turn, related to the electoral system.

The frequent empirical use of the subtype definitions and/or the measurements of presidential powers, both originating in the seminal article of Shugart & Carey (1992), we find that the contributions made through the their theoretical framework; within principal-agent studies, have provided an impressive contribution to our knowledge of the workings and difficulties of the semi-presidential regimes. Being historically anchored in the early ideas of

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10 Niger.
Madison and the US constitutional drafters, the United States of Madison had yet to experience the political influence of a functioning party system. The Neo-Madisonian and principal agent oriented studies like Shugart & Carey’s (1992) add the role of the parties to the theoretical framework (Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009; 2010), illuminating that by “virtue of the confidence relationship between government and assembly, all semi-presidential constitutions link parliament’s power over the government tightly to parliamentary elections” (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010:1421). In that way, the framework incorporates parties and electoral systems as part of, rather than a mere addition to, semi-presidential analysis.

Presidential powers and effects
Semi-presidential studies focusing the powers and the effects of the popularly elected president form our third theme of study. Within such theme, the studies of “presidentialization” are frequent. Presidentialization puts the president-party relations at the centre of attention; that presidential powers are anchored, not in the party, but in electoral success (Poguntke & Webb, 2005: 5). As such, presidentialization is perceived a risk in relation to democratic performance, making parties deaf to the demands of citizens (Samuels & Shugart, 2010).

Whether presidentialization is “constrained by the formal configuration of political institutions” (Poguntke & Webb, 2005: 6), or rather forms a long-term trend in all types of regimes (Cheibub, Elkins, & Ginsburg, 2011), is debated. The debate relates to the two concepts of ‘presidentialization’ and ‘personalization’. Samuels & Shugart (2010:16) specify that personalization; a candidate with a strong personality and reputation, can be found in every regime type whereas presidentialization is anchored in the dual elections and the separation of origin and survival (of the executive and legislature) which characterize presidential regimes. While parties in parliamentary regimes “organize to win legislative seats” (Samuels, 2002:462), parties in presidential regimes organize to win the executive branch. Compared to the relations between the party and its elected members of parliament, the party is given less opportunity to reveal the true incentives of the presidential candidates and to control the elected president. As a consequence, the president has little to fear from his party colleagues (Samuels & Shugart, 2010).

Relating to semi-presidential regimes, a constitutional move from parliamentarism to semi-presidentialism seem enough to spur presidentialization (Samuels, 2002). Both theoretical expectations and empirical results are divided according to subtype. The president-parliamentary regimes, where the president have stronger powers, tend to produce stronger
party incentives to seek the presidency than the premier-presidential ones (cf. Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Sedelius, 2015). Within premier-presidential regimes, instead, presidentialization mainly relates to informal factors; to instances of shared president-party ideological orientation and a president which act as the head of party (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). The extent to which the direct election of the president influence empirical outcomes is, however, still debated (cf. Elgie, 2016; Tavits, 2009). The way the dual elections affect party system formation is related, also, to the concurrence of elections, to the number of presidential candidates and to the power of the president (Hicken & Stoll, 2012; Passarelli, 2015).

Altogether, studies of presidentialization hence illuminate that regime type deviations “are not a function of regime-type per se but are a function of the ways in which political parties function under different democratic regimes” (Samuels & Shugart, 2010: 250).

As seen as part of our previously themes, the president and the powers of the president often forms a considerable part of regime type effects. Studies furthermore debate on how to measure the powers of the president. The early and often used measurement by Shugart & Carey (1992) has been followed by a number of other examples. While some use varieties of Shugart and Carey’s measure (Elgie & Doyle, 2015; Metcalf, 2000; Roper, 2002) others develop their own (e.g. Munkh-Erdene, 2010; Siaroff 2003; Zaznaev, 2014a). The debate has furthermore illuminated the general tendency to assume that different indicators of presidential powers are equally influential (Fortin, 2013; Zaznaev, 2014a). When tested, the strengths of the indicators not only vary but move in different directions and do not form a “common latent construct” (Fortin, 2013: 92). Doyle & Elgie (2016:4), however, argue that most social concepts “suffer from equivalent problems of construct validity”, choosing to focus, instead, on improving the reliability extending the number of countries and time period covered, focusing exclusively on constitutional aspects of presidential powers. Elgie (2015) seem to question the empirical value of the semi-presidential regime type, preferring, instead to study the influence of variations in presidential powers. Such a choice echoes the criticism of Siaroff (2003), arguing that “there is really no such thing as a semi-presidential system when viewed through the prism of presidential powers” (307). Cheibub, Elkins, & Ginsburg (2014) add that the constitutional provisions of the executive and legislature powers relate more to the time and place of the constitution-making than to the particular regime type. Their corresponding recommendation is to use “more precise categorizations based on particular attributes of legislative-executive relations that are believed to contribute to the outcome of interest” (2014:539).

Although Cheibub, Elkins, & Ginsburg (2014) illuminate the lack of correlation between regime type and presidential powers, such findings do not negate the findings of regime (sub-
type effects upon democratic survival, cohabitation, or presidentialization. Though presidential powers form a considerable part of such effects, so do the electoral system and the party structure of parliament. Variables whose influence is incorporated in the unifying framework of principal-agent analysis. So far, we agree with Schleiter & Morgan-Jones (2009) that the framework of principal-agent theory has added value and could be of more value for semi-presidential studies. An exclusive focus upon presidential powers on the contrary risk neglecting the larger institutional setting and the way the subtypes of semi-presidential regimes incorporate key dimensions of presidential powers; namely over cabinet survival. We would argue that combining the subtypes of semi-presidentialism with measures of, for example, presidential legislative powers, is a far better alternative than to abandon valuable theoretical frames and findings.

Research gaps
Being closely related to the theoretical framework and research focus of Linz, the main research themes illuminate the influence of Linz. Assessing the major research gaps; the themes of 8 or less studies, further illuminate the effects of such a dominating influence. Within our first sample, studies focusing on the elite actor level, the mass level, or the contextual effects of the historical or cultural setting, are indeed few. Moreover, studies beyond or beneath the national arena, are few. Though a field adhering to the analytical framework of empirical and rational choice institutionalism, studies addressing public administration and bureaucracy, or even the prime minister are also rare.

Table 1. Identified gaps of semi-presidential studies (327 items)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Number of publications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The European Union</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security, foreign policy</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative powers or the bureaucracy</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic performance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen focus</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political culture</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading individuals</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local or regional influence</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender perspective</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime minister’s role or powers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assessing the choices of sample size and case region illuminates the same focus on European cases (16/47) as seen within the major themes. Though possibly part of the studies of mixed cases (15), African (1) and Asian (4) cases are few indeed. Single case studies (18/47) are again identified as the typical sample-size, although a few large-N studies (11) and small-N studies (10) are identified as well.

As seen within the major themes of semi-presidential studies, many studies address issues surrounding the president. It is quite surprising, however, that studies explicitly addressing the prime minister’s position or powers are so rare. In our screening, we identified only 1 out of 327 publications where the main focus was on the side of the prime minister’s. In the full-text analyses, the picture becomes somewhat more nuanced, but we only identified 4 out of 65 publications tapping this issue as compared to 31 for presidential powers. Although powers such as on e.g. appointment and foreign policy are often shared between the prime minister and the president (Elgie & Griggs, 2013) and that the ambitions of the prime minister are known to affect the level of intra-executive conflict (Amorim Neto & Strom, 2006; Lazardeux, 2014), scholars seem to adhere to the original choice of focus; set on the president while treating the prime minister as a second order issue. Currently, we even seem to lack a proper structure for describing the various features and powers separating one prime minister from the other, which obstruct the ability of properly comparing changes in real use of such powers under e.g. cohabitation and non-cohabitation. Forming part of the executive and thus of the chain of democratic representation and accountability, the prime minister would be an expected the target of studies within the framework of principal-agent studies (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010).

Another gap concerns studies of the bureaucracy and executive administration. Only 1 out of all 327 studies and 2 out of our 65 full-text analyses include the bureaucracy/administration as its main or part focus. As to the prime minister, the bureaucracy does form part of the democratic chain of delegation and accountability (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010; Strom, 2000). The request for more and deeper studies of the bureaucracy is supported by Schleiter & Morgan-Jones (2010), emphasizing the theoretical opportunities provided by the principal agent framework. The executive and legislative administration furthermore forms part of the core powers of these key state organs. Again, such studies could be managed within the existing principal agent framework of analysis.

Since the choice of analytical frameworks point at certain research issues while excluding others (Peters, 2012), we should ask what we risk losing sight of, remaining within the analytical frame of Linz and even within the framework of principal-agent theory. As
illuminated above, Linz’s empirical institutionalism does not elaborate on institutional deviations, institutional change or the way institutions relate to individuals (Peters, 2012). It is founded, instead, on a few basic institutional features. The principal agent perspective forms part of rational choice institutionalism, an analytical framework which to a larger extent makes inherent assumptions and normative aims explicit and which further anchors its chosen focus in the institutional features of separation of powers, affecting the regime type chains of democratic representation and accountability. Such approaches have proven empirically valuable by the subtype definitions of semi-presidentialism, by the measurement of presidential powers, and by the way it formed a coherent theoretical framework including the larger institutional setting. Still, the use of more rational choice approaches, would further the ability to study institutional development, contextual influence upon institutional choice or application, and the way individuals influence institutions. (Peters, 2012).

The influence of contextual and individual influences are accordingly found as mere glimpses within semi-presidential studies. Among the chosen 65 publications in our review, 8 out of 11 items treat historical aspects as a minor part of the analyses. Political culture is part of as many as 25 of the 65 chosen studies and cannot be considered a neglected factor. But as many as 21 out of these 25 publications treat political culture as a minor part of the analysis. Although political culture is largely excluded from the dominant theoretical frameworks, there seem to be good reasons to argue that further contextual studies would add valuable knowledge. While the explanatory focus of Linz & Valenzuela (1994) excluded the larger political context, context was included within the general of their Latin American cases. Duverger (1980), on the other hand, emphasized the way semi-presidential constitutions could not explain variations in practice without taking the context into consideration. The constitutional provision for executive and legislative powers is related to the time and place of constitution-making (Cheibub, Elkins, & Ginsburg, 2014, Metcalf, 2000) and the democratic performance is furthermore related to the larger social-political context (Schmidt, 2002).

While adhering to the analytical focus of empirical or rational choice institutionalism, scholars tend to mention the possibility of contextual influence. While the frameworks above tend to view the choice of institutions as virtually free or mainly bound by rationally set motives, other strands of New Institutionalism do emphasize the importance of context and acknowledge that institutions are not static but evolving entities. On constitutional origin, historical institutionalism illuminate that” in most instances there are important constraints on the capacity to make such a choice” (Peters, 2012: 107). Normative institutionalism, in addition, emphasizes patterns of institutional change (Peters, 2012) and that constitutional
choice are not just outcomes of rational calculations but also related to the perception of legitimacy and the norms of the inherent actors (Campbell & Petersen, 2001).

Adding the historical and empirical institutional approaches would enable new types of studies and a broadened base for gaining knowledge. Some scholars have expressed concerns that inclusion of informal aspects means that “the study of semi-presidentialism risks being crowded out of the research agenda” (Elgie, 2015:57). Using a broader set of New Institutionalism approaches, however, do not denounce the importance institutional influence. Although the analysis of historical institutionalism commonly addresses the larger historical development rather than micro level incentives, studies within historical institutionalism can improve our understanding of the way context influences actor preferences (cf. Katznelson & Weingast, 2005). According to the seminal contribution of Duverger (1980) such contextual sensitivity is much needed.

Reasons to include the role of context; history and culture, into the analysis are strengthened by the apparent lack of single-case studies of non-European countries and particularly so when it comes to the gaps. Otherwise we would risk a remaining European bias, not only decreasing the general applicability of our empirical findings, but furthermore that our assumptions and theoretical models suffer from an in-built bias. Adding contextual factors to the formal and institutional ones might further the opportunities for critical assessment of knowledge already obtained.

Conclusions
Our structured review of semi-presidential studies has portrayed the field’s diversions in terms of definitions, case samples and research themes. Deviations relating both to the sudden growth of semi-presidential regimes, as well as to the inconsistent use of regime type definitions and the deviating choices of case samples. Assessing the dominant case selection strategies in semi-presidential studies illuminates an apparent bias towards European countries and single-case samples. That concluded, however, we have also found much commonality, both in the general adherence to the analytical framework of New Institutionalism and in particular to the two strains of empirical and rational choice institutionalism and in the theoretical argumentation choices of research focus stemming from a few seminal publications.

The common thematic orientation can be collapsed into four major issues forming the absolute bulk of semi-presidential research: Democratization and democratic survival, presidential powers, assumed and observed effects of the popularly elected president,
definitional debate, and intra-executive as well as executive-legislative relations. The trend of semi-presidential studies seem to gradually move away from studies debating definitions of semi-presidentialism, as well as from focusing on the direct effects of regime type on democratic survival, and instead move towards studies addressing the effects of the president and presidential powers. The thematic development suggests that although the use of Linz’ theoretical foundation is declining, there is a current trend of using research questions focusing on the president, a trend adhering to the original focus of Linz.

Anchored in the assumptions of neo-Madisonian theory, principal agent theory has specified the normative intentions built into presidential and semi-presidential regimes; e.g. that the president’s role was supposed to circumscribe the powers and ambitions of the self-centered actors in order to preserve liberty. Accordingly studying the separation of both power, incentives and intentions, the definition of semi-presidentialism was divided into the two subtypes of premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. Within the dominant research theme of democratic survival, intra-executive relations and cohabitation, as well as presidentialization of parties, the subtypes of semi-presidentialism have been of considerable theoretical and empirical value. Furthermore, the framework of principal agent analysis has served to merge regime type influence with the larger institutional setting including the powers of the president and the structure and powers of the party system into a coherent theoretical framework.

On the one hand, principal agent theory is well adapted, for approaching most of the identified gaps in the field, not least regarding studies on the bureaucracy and legislative and executive administration, and the prime minister in semi-presidential regimes. In this regard, semi-presidential research would gain from previous research on parliamentarism (e.g. Müller et al 2003) where the democratic chain of delegation and accountability in relation to the prime minister’s office and to the bureaucracy has been addressed.

On the other hand, the identified gaps demonstrate that studies of institutional effects are rarely related to the international, historical or cultural settings. Although a contextual influence on regime type effects was assumed within the seminal contributions of Duverger (1980), scholars seem to prefer the established frameworks of either empirical institutionalism, incorporating Linz’ theoretical framework, or rational choice institutionalism, including the principal agent theory. Those frameworks are not suitable to elaborate our understanding of institutional development, or how actor choices are influencing institutions, or for that matter, how previous institutions and contexts pose possible restrictions on constitutional choices. We argue that the analytical frameworks of both normative and historical institutionalism, could
serve such future advancements, however. The bias towards single-case studies of European and post-communist countries and the corresponding lack of single case studies of, in particular, African cases, further emphasize the need for further semi-presidential studies. Failing to go beyond European semi-presidentialism, risks the general applicability of findings and theoretical models in this field of research.

References


