1. Introduction

Through an analysis of a speech held by Finnish Minister of Defence Jyri Häkämies at CSIS\(^1\) in Washington 6.9.2007 we dare to question John Lennon’s famous words. It seems that the geopolitical imagination remains, despite the obvious and sometimes drastic changes in the texture of world politics, to some extent bound with actual territories and borders. This holds true at least to the Finnish geopolitical imagination. At the same time there seems to be a need to rethink the meaning of borders and nation states to international politics. Many of the concepts and practices of politics are, in a way, escaping from the nation state. Geopolitics, we argue, is no exception to the rule. The analysis of the speech of Minister Häkämies reveals, however, that the geopolitical texture of the modern (or even postmodern) cosmopolis is even more complex than “territories” and “borders” suggest.

Although he held the speech in Washington, the words of Minister Häkämies caused a stir in Finland. Of the lengthy speech\(^2\), Finnish media highlighted only half a sentence. It was the following sentence:

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\(^1\) CSIS is Center for Strategic & International Studies located at Washington D.C.

\(^2\) The whole speech, titled “Finland. Similar Yet Different”, is available on the pages of the Finnish Ministry of Defence: [http://www.defmin.fi/?663_m=3335&l=en&s=270](http://www.defmin.fi/?663_m=3335&l=en&s=270)
“the three main security challenges for Finland today are Russia, Russia and Russia.”

In the Finnish media, there was discussion whether this was “appropriate” or not. There were speculations (for some obviously hopeful) that perhaps this finally meant a turn in Finnish foreign politics, more or less dominated since the 80’s by Social Democrats as Presidents, Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Minister Häkämies, a member of the National Coalition party, was speculated to have boldly contested the aforementioned “Royal Flush” of the Social Democrats in foreign affairs. Another thread of the discussion was focused on the fact that perhaps this, for once spoken out loud, finally ended the era of Finlandsierung. Perhaps it was now possible to say what had always been a truism but had hitherto always remained unspoken because of diplomatic courtesy or fear of Russia’s reactions. What was not mentioned in the following media debate until Häkämies and his colleague, minister of foreign affairs Ilkka Kanerva, pointed it out was the fact that Häkämies did not speak about Russia as a threat to Finnish security, but as a challenge and even as an opportunity not only to Finland, but for all of “us”.

In this paper we analyse Häkämies’s speech through four different approaches. In the first part we describe the picture of the world and different “camps” of “us” and “them” Häkämies canvasses in his speech. The second part of our analysis focuses on Häkämies’s view of Finland as an actor in international politics. The third approach is focused on the kind of politics Häkämies is advancing in his speech. In the fourth part we conclude with some remarks on political theory that are relevant to the view of world politics we have distilled from the speech. In general we will analyse the geopolitical structure of the world, as it is presented in the speech.

2. The World according to Jyri Häkämies

The speech commences with arguments justifying the Finnish Sonderweg, i.e. the Finnish stubborn decision to remain aloof from military alliances like NATO. It is acknowledged that “most armed forces in the Western world are undergoing a process of profound, long-term transformation”.

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3 One aspect of the discussion around the speech in Finnish media was that the President’s Office had not done its job properly and had not read the speech although it was sent to them for checking (according to the constitution, Finnish foreign policy is lead by the President).

4 We must remember that Finland stayed also outside of the Warsaw Pact that existed 1955-1991. Finnish own special way to stay out of military alliances is more closely related to the case of Warsaw Pact. In fact the “possibility” to join to NATO has been part of reasonable discourse only after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991.
“abandoning the concept of territorial defence”, and instead are emphasizing “capabilities to conduct international peace-support operations in places far away from their borders”. According to Häkämies, “most countries are also discarding the great Napoleonic idea of raising mass armies by conscription and, instead, they are creating small all-professional armed forces”. Häkämies also says that NATO is an answer to the “defence prayers” of most western and central European countries. In sum Häkämies describes the fact that Finland is “still holding on to the concepts of territorial defence, general conscription, and staying outside of the military alliances, while for practically all other countries in the developed world these concepts are ideas from the past”. (Our italics.)

It is worth noticing that Häkämies’s rhetoric at the beginning of the speech is underlined by negations. He tries to single out Finland as a special case in western defence politics and to justify its own peculiar way of doing things. Reader/listener gets the idea that Finland is not a “post-modern” state that is committed to aforementioned changes or transformations – that have actually happened for most “developed” countries in the past. On the contrary, it seems that Finland is stuck with distinctively modern idea of an independent nation state that defends – and only defends – its own territory with its own soldiers. It seems that Finland is a very different (to emphasize the title of the speech) from other “armed forces in the western world” and from NATO countries of western and central Europe.

In this discussion, it is curious that he does not mention that there are other EU countries that remain outside military alliances as well. The Finnish solution is not so abnormal as the speech presents, although Finland is basically the only non-aligned EU country that is not geographically surrounded by NATO countries. Anyway, this seems not to be an issue to Minister Häkämies. It is also possible that Häkämies does not want to raise this question since in the later part of the speech he creates an image of Finland surrounded not by NATO, but by Russia. It is curious that he does not make full use of the Finnish “special case” but instead focuses on rather odd points and does not go into the ideological decisions behind these solutions. He is, to take an example, silent about the “philosophy” behind levée en masse as opposed to professional armies, although he returns to the issue later in the speech5. Likewise, he is silent about the idea that the long tradition of Finnish

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5 The fulcrum of mass conscription during the French revolutionary wars was the idea that the new political rights given to the French people also created new obligations to the state. As “the nation” was now understood as a community of all people, its defense was also assumed to have become a responsibility of all.
neutrality actually presupposes non-alignment in military affairs and to join NATO would mean that the whole policy in this respect should be changed.

To explain Finnish defence thinking and the choices Finland has in the world Hääkämies creates an image of three concentric circles. It might be useful to visualize the situation. The geopolitical structure of “Finnish defence thinking”, perhaps not so unified and monolithic as the rhetoric implies, would initially seem like this:

This tripartite circle is the central part of the geopolitical vision purported in the speech and thus the fulcrum of our analysis. Next we present and analyse these three circles starting from outer circle named as “common values”.

**2.2 The First Circle**

**2.2.1 Common Values**
The outer circle comprises common values. Finland is interested in promoting and defending such values, as is demonstrated by our support, and participation in, the United Nations’ peace-keeping and humanitarian operations.

The outer circle is something that could be characterized as a “western world” or something similar with this concept. Actors and institutions Häkämies relates to the defending of “common values” are such as United Nations, NATO, and the EU. It is also clear that “common values” are something that are shared with other Western European states and with USA, although USA is mentioned in the speech only once, when Häkämies speaks about Finnish air forces and other military procurement matters. But, we can interpret Häkämies’s speech in a way that the presence and meaning of USA is taken as a self-evident fact that does not need any specific articulation or rhetoric.

Although there is no clear list of countries that belong to the forces that defend “common values”, there is a more particular list of those countries and areas of the world that are in one way or another outside “common values” or reduced to objects of operations where common values are or have been defended. These are for example areas such as Sinai Peninsula, Balkans and Africa, and countries such as Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad – and Russia.

It is clear that while Finland is self-evidently understood as a part of the “us” (the Western World) behind “common values”, Russia is not a clear case in this matter. In fact, Russia is the only country that is characterized as volatile and uncertain. While other areas and countries in the world are treated with a rhetoric that makes clear the overpower of “us” that defend the common values over “them” that are the object of “our” operations, Russia is presented as an autonomous and strong actor, as a country that might defend its own interests that could be in some way different from “common values”. In Häkämies’s rhetoric the only really antagonist opposite for “us” could be Russia, since all the other countries and nations are treated as bare material or objects that do not have their own will.
But what are these “common values” that are defended by the Western “us”? Häkämies does not explicate these values but they become clear when he talks about the means that are needed for defending common values. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina the “security challenges” are for example “corruption, smuggling, and organized crime”. In the case of Afghanistan the challenges are instability and lack of democracy in the country that include the problems with security, good governance, rule of law and economic growth. So we can interpret that common values that are defended are something that do not include these negative phenomena. In the area where common values are in order, these negative phenomena are not tolerated.

In general – and we must notice that in very general level – Häkämies says that “Finland is interested in promoting and defending such values, as is demonstrated by our support, and participation in, the United Nations’ peace-keeping and humanitarian operations.” This is important rhetoric because operations that do not have United Nations mandate have been highly criticised in EU countries and in Finland also – especially by social democrats and other leftist parties. The war that the “coalition of the willing” has been fighting has been criticized because the operation started without the mandate of the UN Security Council. Finnish foreign policy is also pretty much based on the official United Nations views as regards international crises. However at the end of his speech Häkämies states very clearly that “we [Finland] are there to stand up to protect our common values, to produce security and stability”.

Finland, it is argued, is interested in promoting such values, but only United Nations’ peace-keeping and humanitarian operations are paraded as examples of this promotion. What is striking, and most likely totally intentional, is the absence of any clear mention of the “War on Terror”.

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6 At the end of the Finnish parliamentary election campaigns in 2003 Finnish politics was dominated by “Iraq-gate”. Central party’s candidate and future Prime Minister Anneli Jäätteenmäki claimed that acting Prime Minister, social democrat Paavo Lipponen, was secretly joining Finland to the coalition of the willing. This was perhaps one turning-point in the Central party’s winning campaign, but after Jäätteenmäki had formed a new government this scandal turned upside-down and finally Jäätteenmäki – the first and currently the last female Prime Minister of Finland - had to resign.

7 It is still not clear what kind of member of the “coalition of the willing” Finland was at the beginning of the Iraq war 20.3.2003. Officially Finland did not participate in the coalition, but it is possible that Finland was in someway tied to the coalition of 48 countries. Finland has very close relations to US and NATO military investigations, since Finland gets the same information that other countries of coalition are getting twice a week. This can’t be an accident even though there is some mess in the US and NATO informatics. The problem is that Centcom that delivers this information, allegedly “does not always remember” what countries are involved in what operations. One reason for this might be the presence of Finnish troops in Afghanistan (and the fact that other NATO operations affect the security situation there). However this means that Finland basically gets all the military intel it wants from NATO and the US. Minister Häkämies states also very clearly in the questions part of his speech that Finland is getting information from ISAF and OEF since Finland is a “partnership country”. So it seems that Finland is basically part of the “Coalition Camp” that showed their support for the US after 9/11, but refused to send any troops to Iraq. (Huhta 19.3.2008, Häkämies 2007b)
is one tiny hint to this kind of rhetoric and philosophy when Häkämies states in describing the case of Afghanistan that: “I do not see any other way but to have a strong and resolute presence of ISAF and OEF in Afghanistan as long as the basic stability is reached.” ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) is a NATO led project, but OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom) is more directly US lead project that is a part of US war on terror. However, also OEF Afghanistan is now under the NATO guidance. In recent years, Finland has had peacekeepers in Kosovo, Lebanon, Eritrea, Afghanistan and Chad. Most likely the common values refer to these kinds of operations, instead of a coalition of the willing etc. However it is clear that NATO is a major actor in the forces that defend “common values” and in Häkämies’s speech Finland takes NATO as a very important player in the field.

2.2.2 Tools

Now the tools for bringing common values to areas where they do not exist or need support to advance are following. First “tool” or “instrument” as Häkämies calls them are the military forces. They are in a way the primary means in the actualization of the ends that “us” advance: “The military instrument, however, often is the instrument we must use first to create a modicum of stability in the crisis area”. These means and tools bring this “basic stability” to the area and they can avoid escalation of “violent ethnic clashes or even massacres”. When the military operation has reached its aims, it can be replaced by a police operation. So the military instrument means a capability to go to “effective” war, when the police operation keeps inside things like boarder control, professional police forces, legal and prison systems and “better governance in general”. Military forces are something that is needed as long as basic stability is reached, so the military is fundamental for other operations.

The other instruments in the action of “us” in realizing the existence of common values in the world are such that can be used not by soldiers, but by “division of doctors, engineers, lawyers and school teachers.” These instruments – tied to the military rhetoric by “division” - can be aforementioned police operations and procedures of “good governance”, but also education and other “humanitarian” instruments. The aim is to gather a “combination” of different instruments (military, economic and development assistance) that operate under the general title of “comprehensive crisis management approach”.
From the common values and instruments that advance these common values we can move to the second circle where the actual and more concrete problems of creating and maintaining these common values through common instruments takes place. This circle or “sphere” is Europe.

2.3 The Second Circle

2.3.1 Europe

The second circle brings us closer to home, to Europe and to security threats affecting Europe. The more stable the European continent remains, the safer will Finland be. As a consequence, our forces continue to be involved in NATO-and EU-led operations, be it in the Balkans, Africa, or even in a far-away Afghanistan.

When we turn to look the second circle that comprises Europe we find two main points. First point Hākāmies states at the very beginning of his speech. He says that “for most western and central European countries NATO is the answer to their defence prayers.” This is in fact true, even though there might not be “prayers” in the old NATO countries. Prayers are a kind of rhetoric that points to the countries such as Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland etc. that were part of Warsaw Pact, but after the collapse of Soviet Union and their independence processes (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) rapidly wanted to join to NATO and EU. From the 27 EU countries 22 belong to NATO. Ones that are outside are Sweden, Finland, Austria, Ireland and Malta. In this case Hākāmies is emphasizing Finland’s special way in defence politics that was mentioned before.

The second point comes clear when Hākāmies criticizes quite heavily the state of military forces at Europe. He takes a back-up from the former NATO’s secretary general Lord Robertson who claimed EU to be an “economic giant but a military dwarf”. Hākāmies states that the problem for most EU countries is that they don’t have proper military equipments and capability to act and react rapidly. Vice versa most of European states have in this respect obsolete military equipment that are intended to be used for the defence of the territory of the nation state, such as “tanks, airplanes, ships, personnel.” What lacks is the “capacity to project force far beyond their borders.”
This brings us back to the case of common values and the tools that are needed to realize these common values. Häkämies says that in EU agenda there is a strong emphasis on “crisis management” tools that are not military tools (such as political and economical tools). However Häkämies’s view is that EU definitely needs more military crisis management tools to advance its “comprehensive crisis management” action. This is seen best actualized by organizing new kinds of “battle groups” concept (EUBG). Battle groups are “force packages” that comprise 1500-2000 soldiers that are ready to action in 5-10 days and can operate from 30 to 120 days. However, battle groups “are not meant for waging war”, but they are put in order to operate in “enhanced Petersberg tasks”. Häkämies says that Finland has been very active in supporting Battle Group concept. Battle groups are in line with Häkämies rhetoric that emphasizes “production of the peace” and “peace-keeping”, not any kind of “war”.

As we have noticed already, Häkämies rhetoric is based on the trendy word of challenge. In the case of EU crisis management there are also challenges. And like other challenges mentioned before, also these challenges “are not specific only to EU. They are no different from the challenges we all are facing, for example, in places like Afghanistan.” (Our italics) Häkämies constructs again this unclear, but strong, “we” or “us” in his speech. It comes clear that the real challenge is not some operation “in a far-away Afghanistan” or wherever, but the question is more over the compatibility of EU and NATO military forces.

This brings us to the first political core of Häkämies’s speech. After describing how active participant Finland is in NATO led peace support operations, Häkämies states that for Finland’s own interest - Finland that “has its presence in both camps”, although Finland does not belong to NATO as we remember – is to “get EU and NATO to work together and set sights on the same goal.” Key issue here is the compatibility of the EUBG (European Union Battle Group) and NRF (NATO Response Force). The “goal” that is set as the end of the action of “us” is not clarified, but instead there is strong emphasis on the means to get to that somehow indefinite goal.

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8 Petersberg tasks derive from the WEU declaration made in 1992. It comprises humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Petersberg tasks formed a part of the Treaty on European Union.
As Häkämies points out, for many EU countries that actually belong to NATO, forces to EUBG and NRF action are in fact the same forces. For this reason Häkämies wants to advance the harmonizing of EUBG and NRF. This happens in three levels. First, military capability standards and criteria should be same for both. Secondly training and education should be harmonized. Häkämies suggests that NRF training and exercise program is put in place also in EUBG. Thirdly assessment and certification should be harmonized by using NATO certification process. In short Häkämies is saying that EUBG should be harmonized to NRF by using NATO’s existing methods and standards. Häkämies ends this matter with following, somehow neoliberal statement;

_The task for both organizations is exactly the same: to get the right type of forces with the right kind of capabilities to a right place at the required state of readiness, and to do it efficiently, economically and rapidly without any unnecessary duplication. That is the reason Finland is here holier than the pope; the EU and NATO will just have to be able to find a way of working together better than they are doing so far._

In Häkämies’ speech the harmonization of EUBG and NRF is however motivated by special interest of Finland. Since Finland can afford only one set of forces, it would be useful for Finland if EU and NATO would practically be the same thing in military matters. We must also remember, that since Finland is not a member of NATO, we can perhaps interpret Häkämies message as declaring that Finland wants to be an active part of NATO’s operations, but for certain political reasons, it cannot do that yet. Häkämies’s speech, however, suggest that these political matters should not effect on Finnish military participation in NATO’s projects. From this we move to third circle, the inner circle of Finland.

### 2.4 Third Circle

_Finally, it is within the third circle where our national interest reigns supreme. Such core issues as national independence, security and well-being of the Finnish citizens, and, ultimately, even the very survival of the nation are at stake here. To defend the_
Finnish territory we need strong national defence. And since we are not a member of any military alliance, we have to build up our defence independently.

At the centre of Finnish national interest is the security and well-being of the Finnish citizens. The second circle comprises of Europe and of security threats affecting Europe, but there is no clear explication of these threats. The most interesting is the outmost circle, labelled as the circle of “common values” that is also tied to rhetoric of common security threats and challenges, but once again there is no explication of either. So far it seems that the stability of the second circle, Europe, is most crucial to Finland’s own security interest and it is also a reason why Finland is advancing harmonization of the co-operation between EU and NATO. The security of first (common values) and third (Finland) circles is best secured by establishing strong forces that comprise both EUBG and NRF. Nation states and their military forces are seen as bygone answer to military threats as regards the defence of common values.

The third circle (Finland) is however very revealing in regard to the idea of security challenges affecting “us” – the ones that are committed to common values. It is the Finnish singular position that opens up the real contingency at the world politics that is something that all of “us” have to take seriously. This something is “new Russia”.

2.4.1 Russia

In general, Finland is privileged to be located in one of the safest corners of the world. However, given our geographical location, the three main security challenges for Finland today are Russia, Russia and Russia. And not only for Finland, but for all of us.

The security challenge of Russia to all of us is constructed by drawing a picture of strengthening Russia that is waking from its “decade-long hibernation”. Through Häkämies’s speech it seems that Russia is actually circling Finland inside its newly established geopolitical and military interests. Firstly Häkämies describes how Russia is constructing security challenges near southern borderlines of Finland. First example are the conflicts with Estonia, where the so called “bronze-statue crisis”
took place in summer 2007. Häkämies states that net attacks towards Estonia were “foretaste of what could be done in situations where state-level actors would choose to use cyber attacks as a weapon.” Häkämies is careful to point out that Russia does not have a “smoking gun” in its hand in this matter, but his rhetoric points very clearly to Russia as an actor behind these attacks. Second example of southern security challenge is the fact that Russia suspended from the CFE Treaty because of NATO’s overpowers in Europe.

In the north there is also a lot of action going on. Kola Peninsula will awake Russia’s military interests as was said before, and the expedition to the North Pole is also a one good example of Russia’s new “Nordic dimension”. These Nordic matters affect also to western world and NATO countries, since in summer 2007 Russia started again, first time after the collapse of Soviet Union, the military flights around Norway, Iceland and northern Scotland. And last but not least, Russia is interested in Baltic Sea at south and shout-west of Finland as a primary route for its oil and gas exports. In this way Finland is surrounded by Russia’s new geopolitical interests and as Häkämies tries to show, this is also something that has an effect to all of “us”.

However, Häkämies is not saying that Russia would be a threat to Finland or any of “us”:

What does this all mean from the point of view of Finland’s national security? I think it would be a foolish – and mistaken – conclusion to draw that the new Russia will threaten Finland’s security. This is not the case. What it means, first and foremost, is that those who at the end of the Cold War were eager to proclaim that the era of geopolitics was over in the North of Europe were just plain wrong. Geopolitics is back, and it is back with force, and we who have the responsibility for Finland’s national defence must draw certain conclusions.

It is striking that Häkämies is mentioning this obscure matter in his speech as an example of security challenge in south. There is no official evidence to show that Russia was behind these attacks, but moreover it seems to be a particularly Estonian discourse to accuse Russia. For example the tourist guide called “Tallinn This Week” (this paper has hundreds of thousands of readers, mainly tourists) wrote that “Estonia became the first country to wage a cyberwar […] Since Estonia is an independent country, we were startled by our eastern neighbor reaction, who started a (cyber)attack against our country by firing gigantic cyberbombs at our most important state websites for weeks.” (Tallinn This Week, 5.) Of course it is possible that these attacks were orchestrated from Russia, but it is another thing to say that they were orchestrated by the Kreml. Moreover, is cyberspace really south of Finland?
Now we must ask, is Russia really a security challenge to Finland and for all of “us”, whoever that is? We should also try to figure what is this new geopolitics that is “back with force” – if it is not only a synonym for the Russia? The recent, and in some sense rather frequent, penetrations to Finnish air space by Russian airplanes have to some extent fuelled the old Finnish delusion that Russia is first and foremost interested in Finland. This attitude was rather common in Finland, especially immediately after the Second World War and during the Kekkonen presidency (1956-1982). It is the great Finnish national narrative that our politicians from decade to another victoriously fought diplomatically with a supreme enemy who was constantly trying to impose its own influence to Finland and therefore secured the independence for generations to come. It is only very recently that this image has been questioned, for example by pointing out that Finland was not, in fact, pressed very hard. There were never any real acts of threat from the Soviet Union, like for example gathering of forces near the Finnish border or something like that. The threats were more like the famous “Note crisis” of 1961, when Soviet Union sent a note to President Kekkonen, asking military consultation because of the threat posed by West Germany and its allies. It is nowadays largely discussed that perhaps President Kekkonen himself “ordered” the note to strengthen his own position in Finnish politics.

The importance Häkämies places on Russia may, on the global scale, be an exaggeration. But also in the Finnish case, it is very probable that Russia has other concerns besides watching over the doings of the Finns. Violations of the air space have taken place in Japan and the Baltic states also and it is always questionable whether they are intentional or not. The Japanese seem not to worry that they do not have a peace agreement with Russia to end the Second World War (because of the disagreement concerning the Kuril Islands) and the Baltic states share similar border controversies with Russia. For some reason, perhaps because of the non-alignment policy, Finnish foreign policy has always been much more careful and Finnish politicians have boldly presumed that Finland would be of some major interest to Russia. It is also telling that when Häkämies refers to Russia’s activities in its immediate neighbourhood, he means actually Finland’s immediate neighbourhood, not Russia’s. Russia has many other areas as its immediate neighbourhood and this is something Finnish politicians have seldom understood. Nevertheless, the point for our analysis seems to be that Russia is really the Other, the only actor powerful enough to challenge “us” if it chooses to do so.

But there is some truth in the observations of Häkämies. Russia is constantly trying to increase its say in world politics. It controls huge supplies of energy, the most probable source of future
conflicts, and it is constantly increasing its military power as Hækämies states. In Russia there is a military procurement program going on in 2006-2015 and as Hækämies says “it will mean a much stronger Russia in military terms by the middle of next decade.”

Now the real geopolitical challenge in here is not the fact that Russia is getting more powerful and that it tries to expand its power over its own borders. Even though Hækämies says that “according to Russian world view, military force is a key element in how it conducts its international relations” we should also remember that just earlier in his speech Hækämies had emphasized the capability of EU countries to “project force far beyond their borders”. It is clear and somehow geopolitical fact that strong economic powers such as EU, USA and Russia are trying to defend their own interest anywhere in the world. The real political problem is in fact that how to avoid the clash of these interest and military powers. To this political role Hækämies is offering Finland, and especially the politics of Helsinki. He says that:

At the same time, we see Russia as an opportunity, not only as a challenge. We should be smart about how we draw Russia in to be a responsible player and a partner in our part of the world. Perhaps easier said than done, but for us in Helsinki there really is no other choice.

Although we notice here again Hækämies’s neoliberal rhetoric (“no other choice”), there is a strong political message in this sentence. But before going to the analysis of Hækämies message and politics, let’s look shortly Finland’s particular military case.

2.4.2 Finland

Finland’s special case and place in the world and especially in Europe can be understood through three maps. First one is the map of EU countries:

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11 This program is very crucial to Russia, as former president Vladimir Putin proclaimed in the speech he held before last Duma elections in Russia 21.11.2007. See Putin 2007.
Second one is the map of NATO countries:
Third one is the map of Russia and Europe, where aforementioned Russia’s new (or old) geopolitical interest and “security challenges” are marked with black line:
From these maps, aforementioned discussion and Häkämies’s speech we can make a more explicit picture of the case Finland.
In his speech minister Häkämies is trying to show why Finland still holds to “old” or modern concepts of defence such as territorial defence and mass conscription. However there are “also Finnish transformations” taking place, and these will include reducing the number of the mass conscription army from 350,000 men to 250,000 men. There is also a shift from territorial defence, although Häkämies says that Finland has to “maintain the ability to defend national territory”. These lines in Finnish defence politics are also in favour of Finnish population, over 80 percent of the population supports them as Häkämies says.

These changes at the mode of territorial defence and mass conscription army are however not such transformations that would lead to a more drastic situation. Transformations that Häkämies is describing are very closely linked to technological and material reforms. First one is the “force multipliers” like NED (Network Enabled Defence) that make the defence of Finnish territory in future more efficient. Another one is the close partnership with USA in arms and other defence material matters. In fact this matter is very crucial since Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen pointed out that in the future there might be problems with the costs of arms bought from NATO countries if Finland is not NATO’s member. Another close example is the air defence system that is taking care of Helsinki’s airspace since this “old” system is going to be replaced with new one because old one is bought from Russia and it is possible that this system is vulnerable to satellite disturbance – mostly likely coming from Russia’s satellites.

Finally third “transformation” that Häkämies is talking about is “Finland’s strong commitment to participation in international peace support operation is there to stay.” This is not actually “transformation”, but more like continuity. However Häkämies says very clearly that “Finnish blue and white flag will continue to be there where well groomed and rigorously trained soldiers are need for international operations”.

These promises and explanations are not very special in the sense that Häkämies is talking about changes and transformations that are needed in “a world where new threats and challenges to stability and security are global, complex and multidimensional.” What Häkämies emphasizes is the practical and ready-for-anything attitude that is needed in contemporary world: “There are no set solutions that we can apply to these threats and challenges. There are different ways of facing the new threats, and there are different tools we can develop to use to defend ourselves when we are threatened.” Häkämies is emphasizing the “fact” that Finland is producing these “necessary tools” differently from other countries – that is differently, when compared to NATO countries. Anyway
the result is the same. Let’s cite one more time these lines: “we are there to stand up and to protect our common values, to produce security and stability, and to defend our national territory, whenever and wherever such threats emerge.” Häkämies answer to this “multidimensional” situation of assorted security challenges seems to be a collection of all possible military “tools”. Somehow this seems to lead to more militaristic line of defence that before.

In Häkämies’s speech there is no doubt that Finland is part of “us” – even though Finland is producing its necessary tools differently from others. So Finland is “similar yet different” as the title of the speech is claiming. But Finland is different from other EU countries also with its non-alliance to NATO. All the other EU countries that have common border with Russia, are NATO members. Finland is the only EU nation that stands “alone” close to the “waking” superpower. This is why Häkämies is emphasizing Finland’s special geopolitical situation surrounded by Russia’s military, economical and geopolitical interests (see map 3). However Finland is keen to act in NATO led operations to defend “common values” whenever and wherever. Same goes with EU and Finland wants to see EUBG and NRF harmonized so that Finland can join practically to NATO’s education and training even though it cannot yet be a full member of NATO. And finally Finland still wants to hold on its modern concepts of defence, mass conscription and territorial defence.

However, Finland seems to stand in very special geopolitical and political place in the somewhat unclear alliance of “us”. For this reason the “security challenges” – and opportunities - that Russia is offering now and in the future are something that has to be taken seriously not only in Finland, but also in the camp of “us”.

We now turn to analyse more in detail the message of Häkämies and his politics towards the camp of “us”.

3. The message and politics of the speech

It seems that there are at least four major political messages in Häkämies speech.

First one is the harmonization EUBG and NRF as we have already seen. This seems to be very important for the defence of common values, it is in fact the material basis for their defence.
Common values – whatever they are – are needed to construct and legitimate the compatible forces of EU and NATO. Häkämies wants to see Finnish troops as a part of these forces.

Another important political message is the new and powerful Russia. Russia’s behaviour is described as a “security challenge” for Finland and all of us. This “us” seems to mean very same EU / NATO countries and their common values. The geopolitical message is that Russia does not “hibernate” anymore, but instead acts intensively to show its power in different ways. The international political message that Häkämies is delivering is the one that Finland and especially Helsinki does not have “any other options” but to draw Russia to the “field” of western politics as a “responsible player and partner”. What is important is that Häkämies is someway offering Finland and Helsinki as a special area for doing politics with Russia. Finland is described as a link between western world of “us” and eastern world of Russia. Russia is not the same thing as countries like Afghanistan, which are simply seen as objects of EU / NATO actions. Instead, Russia is a known other (or perhaps a “significant other”), which is not so totally strange that it would be named as “them”. Russia is “known” to be eager for power and also unpredictable and contingent in its actions. This is why co-operation with Russia needs special kind of action where challenges are turned to opportunities.

Third political message is the one that concerns Finnish foreign politics and its Sonderweg. In Finland the big discussion in defence politics has for a long time been Finland’s stubborn decision to stay out of NATO. In general the right wing political forces are for Finland’s alliance with NATO and leftist groups are against (although there are pro Nato camps in Social Democrats as well). It is expected that contemporary rightwing government will do something to get Finland closer to NATO or even to start negotiations to join to NATO. This is perhaps somewhat in line with Sweden’s politics, but for what makes NATO a very difficult matter for Finland is the fact that Finland is a neighbour of Russia.

Traditionally Finland’s line with military politics has been the one that Finland stays out of both eastern and western coalitions. This has offered Finland a very special place in European politics and a possibility to develop a distinctive line of diplomacy and negotiations in foreign politics. For example in a speech president Kekkonen gave at the National Press Club in Washington 17.10.1961 he said that Finland’s solution to its security problem is to stay outside all military alliances and also out of the power politics of the superpowers. But however he underlined that this is in no way ideological matter - vice versa, for him Finland is committed to supporting “western” and liberal
values and its decision to stay neutral in military matters is not inconsistent with this. (See Kekkonen 1961)

In Häkämies’s speech we can read both lines. First Häkämies creates an image of Finland as a kind of link to Russia and Russia’s new geopolitical ambitions. Another picture is painted when Häkämies quite oddly opens at the end of his speech a door for NATO lobbyists to come in Finland. At least we can interpret his speech in this way since he says twice at the very end of his speech that the new Finnish government is now starting to make new Defence White Book. For this government has set a comity to study pros and cons of NATO membership. After Häkämies has stated this, he ends his speech by saying that: “Perhaps this is a good place to stop, now that I have wheatted your appetite on the question of ‘to be or not to be’.”

It is very strange that Häkämies says that his speech was after all a introduction to the question whether Finland is going or not to NATO. But this is in fact in line with the beginning of the speech where Häkämies places Finland outside of most European countries with his rhetorical tactics of negations. So for audience in CSIS and for everybody at international military field Häkämies’s speech was a part of the Finnish coalition party’s politics that aims to open up the NATO discussion in a new way to end it with the real Finnish transformation that would be the one that Finland joins to NATO. After all, Häkämies said months after his speech that the problem in Finland is still Finlandization. So the politics of Häkämies is very strongly against Finlandization and the only way to get out of this negative state of affairs is to join to NATO it seems. One might ask what kind of finlandization towards NATO and USA is this.

But what is perhaps the most important point in the geopolitical sense is the fact that Finnish territory is secured best by going to “peace-keeping” actions in places like “far-away Afghanistan” with EU and NATO. Noteworthy is the way Häkämies conflates both territorial and non-territorial elements. We are ready to protect our “national territory”, “wherever” it may require our presence. And this seems also to be the postmodern geopolitical doctrine for all the other countries that are defending the so-called common values. The security and well-being of Finland and the stability of its immediate neighbourhood is secured in places like Afghanistan and Kosovo. Therefore, the diagram drawn at the beginning must be corrected to something like:
Places like Afghanistan and Russia pervade all the three circles. Afghanistan is not a far-away place as Häkämies claims, for Finnish “territory” is defended there. Alternatively, we could draw these places outside the three circles, which would show that in fact these places work as Archimedean levers, with the capacity to hoist the whole tripartite structure out of place.

The common value circle has also many holes, leaks and discontinuities. It is not the same as the “War on Terror” coalition which actually to some extent unites the US and Russia, for example. The axis of evil does not exist for Häkämies. There are no terrorist networks in his scheme. The whole structure of the circles is not shaken by rogue states that allegedly hate the US or the West. In fact, the US is not mentioned in the speech as such. The absence of any mention of The United States as a strong player in world politics is a remarkable lacuna in the speech (keeping in mind that it was held in Washington). Another striking thing in this whole picture is the total absence of traditional “enemy”. There is only a camp of “us”, but not the camp of “them” that are “existentially other and strange” as Carl Schmitt would describe it. The absence of enemy is interesting in theoretical level and we will discuss this at the last part of this paper. Before going to this theoretical part we take a quick look to the tension between old concepts and new situation. If
security threats are multidimensional, international and complex, the concepts of old politics have to some extent become obsolete.

4. New Situation, Old Concepts

Even in geopolitics, it seems, it becomes necessary systematically to raise the question of a paradigmatic change, which is characterized by the conceptual opposition of methodological nationalism and methodological cosmopolitanism. It is especially Ulrich Beck who has argued in favour of something like this (without reference to geopolitics, though). Previously, Beck argues:

the national cosmos could be decomposed into a clear distinction between inside and outside. Between the two, the nation-state governed and order was established. In the inner experiential space, the central themes of work, politics, law, social inequality, justice, cultural identity were negotiated against the background of the nation, which was the guarantor of a collective unity of action. In the international realm, that is, in the outer experiential field, the corresponding concept of ‘multiculturalism’ developed. Multiculturalism, by delimiting and defining the foreign, mirrored and crystallized national self-image. Thus, the national/international distinction always represented more than a distinction, it actually functioned as a permanent self-affirming prophecy. (see Beck 2002)

For Beck, it is neither possible to distinguish clearly between the national and the international, nor, in a similar way, convincingly to contrast homogeneous units. National spaces have become de-nationalized, so that the national is no longer national, just as the international is no longer international. This entails that the foundations of the power of the nation-state are collapsing both from the inside and the outside, and that

new realities are arising, a new mapping of space and time, new coordinates for the social and the political, coordinates which have to be theoretically and empirically researched and elaborated. However, the paradigmatic opposition between (inter)nationalism and cosmopolitanism does not establish a logical or temporal exclusivity, but an ambivalent transitional coexistence, a new concurrence of non-concurrents (Beck 2002).
Beck’s “world risk society” and the modern geopolitics canvassed in the speech of Häkämies make heavy demands on social science. Social science must be re-established as a transnational science, suited to the reality of de-nationalization, transnationalization and ‘re-ethnification’, and most importantly in this respect, transterritorialization, in a global age – and this on the levels of concepts, theories and methodologies as well as organizationally. This entails that

the fundamental concepts of ‘modern society’ must be re-examined. Household, family, class, social inequality, democracy, power, state, commerce, public, community, justice, law, history, politics must be released from the fetters of methodological nationalism and must be reconceptualized and empirically established within the framework of a cosmopolitan social and political science which remains to be developed. So this is quite a list of understatements. Nevertheless, it has to be handled and managed if the social sciences are to avoid becoming a museum of antiquated ideas. (Beck 2002)

Beck is not alone in voicing similar concerns. The inside/outside problematic has always been central to political theory, although this is seldom acknowledged. It is only very recently that scholars like R. B. J. Walker (1993) have drawn our attention to this distinction. Importantly for geopolitical theorization, the camps of “us” and “them” cannot be clearly drawn on the map – occasionally they overlap and occasionally the clash in distant places. This was, of course, the case also during the Cold War. Domino Theory meant that the camps collided in distant corners of the Earth. But now, perhaps, there are holes and discontinuities close to the core and there are more than two camps to join.

5. Concluding Remarks on Political Theory: Imagining There’s No Countries

It is tempting to argue that something is missing from the mere relations between states or nations that ought not to be missing from a more authentic political community. In classical Antiquity, the democratic ethos of the Athenians was entirely dependent on the denigration of all outsiders. Curiously, then, the Athenians are nowadays censured for oppressing women, slaves and allies, and the state that was once reproached for being too democratic is now lambasted for not having been democratic enough (Roberts 1994, 12-13). For the Athenians, however, democracy did not mean
commitment to the rights of the individual when they might seem to conflict with the needs of the state, as is shown by the trial of Socrates. The failure of the insistence on his right to his own beliefs reveals that certain concord (*homonoia*) among citizens in civic and religious matters was indispensable to the community (ibid., 32). Therefore, no political “community” could exist between different peoples and cultures.

For politics to “function”, certain degree of concord is needed, and some sort of equality. Aristotle uses the adjective/noun *politikos*\(^\text{12}\) to denote a statesman who, in contrast to the master who exercises authority over slaves, does so over equals who are by nature free (Rubinstein 1987, 42). Aristotle’s critique is directed towards Plato who does not make any difference in essence (he makes one only in degree) between the master of a household, monarch, and a statesman. It is the Aristotelian meaning of politics that is the root of modern concept of politics. On the international scale, however, no such concord, nor equality, has ever existed. In the classical paradigm of politics, free and equal men debated about the proper course of action, but in the household relations were based on domination instead of rhetoric\(^\text{13}\) because the subjects (women, children, slaves) were not on the same level with the head of the household. It would be naïve to assume that states would have been equal in some respect on the arena of international relations. Rather, inequality prevails because of the difference in their size, military power, wealth and geopolitical position.

Yet there are, at least on a rhetorical level, shared goals. Democracy has come to be articulated as the ambition of people everywhere. This reminds of the cultural ethnocentrism of the Western world and the assurance that the realisation of power-relations and the development of the state should be considered as the *telos* of primitive societies.\(^\text{14}\) There are states that are democratic and states that are not yet democratic. Democracy, it seems, is understood as an achieved condition (rather than something that needs further development), and those who have not reached the level, are understood to be constantly striving towards it. But to form a democracy, there has to be *demos*, the people. The *demos* is not equivalent with population, although in a modern sense they have

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\(^{12}\) *Politikos* was also a spatial concept and it did not include inter-poleis relations.

\(^{13}\) Aristotle’s division of rhetoric to deliberative (political), forensic (juridical) and epideictic (the ceremonial oratory of display) sets as the subject of political oratory the following five headings: (1) ways and means, (2) war and peace, (3) national defence, (4) imports and exports, (5) legislation. Significantly, the parts where he speaks of war and peace and of national defence, regard only the inside of the community and the orator’s knowledge of the subject matter. There simply are no rhetorical devices by means of which a community (or its representative) would negotiate with other communities. The questions of alliances and federations clearly do not qualify as “political”.

\(^{14}\) As we remember, also Häkämies uses the concept of “developed countries” as self-evident and legitimate way of describing the defence situation in Europe and in World.
come to mean almost the same thing. It is important, however, to underline that for modern nation states the theory of the formation of demos is essential for their constitution. Without demos there is no political whole of any kind in the modern sense.

In classical political theory, in theories of Hobbes or Rousseau, sovereign democracy is something where the majority of citizens are committed to one sort of social contract. For Hobbes however the majority is not defined by the number of citizens, but more in a qualitative relationship towards the enemy, which is excluded from commonwealth. For Hobbes the birth of the sovereign power means at the same time the birth of the demos and the exclusion of multitude from the State. This way we understand that the borderline between democracy – or a sovereign commonwealth – is first of all a matter of qualitative exclusion. The border between inside and outside is not a line in the face of the Earth, but a matter between the friend and the enemy as Carl Schmitt put it in a Hobbesian spirit. It is friendship, common values and common paideia that form a political community - not borders. In the Aristotelian sense, setting a wall around the Peloponnesus would not create a polis; polis is something different, rooted in paideia and customs.

From this theoretical perspective we might find a way to analyze the new emergence of “geopolitics” in international politics. In this new “geopolitical” discourse the main point is not classical understanding of the spatial borders of a nation state, but more about transcending these borders. It seems that common values, such as the idea of democracy, human rights or good governance, are something that are related in international level to this new form of “geopolitics”.

The speech of Minister Häkämies shows clearly the “new” doctrine of geopolitics that is functioning at global, or even in cosmopolitical level. The “new situation” requires choosing friends and enemies that are not clearly defined in the classical geopolitical sense. Even in the traditional sense of protecting the borders etc., the geopolitical security of Finland is best protected through acting for the geopolitical security of the whole world, no matter where that might require our military presence, it is argued. But what sort of “communities” are there in the global arena? The current practices are in many ways outdistancing previous conceptions, also those of geopolitics. In the speech of minister Häkämies, many of the classical themes of political theory reappear, though in a new form. It is guided by geopolitical concerns, but the geopolitics it entails is rather different from the traditional way of thinking about it.
Hence, in addition to asking what is the geographical element in modern geopolitics it might be relevant to ask also what is the political element in it. The crucial question is: could there be politics between unequal agents who have received, so to say, a different paideia? And why is politics as such withering away from the relations between those who might actually form a political community in the classical sense (i.e. the West)? The social contract theorists such as Hobbes could construct an imaginary contract between individuals forming a state to protect themselves because their assumption from the natural conditions preceding the state made the agents equal in relation to each other. The logical question as to why there has not been a similar contract between states to end the bellum omnium contra omnes on the international scale may be answered with the acknowledgement of apparent inequality between states. When politics as a sphere was formed (see Palonen 2006, 44-46) it was associated with power, liberty, justice, order, community and similar concepts. The problem in international relations is that these concepts hardly describe the reality in international sphere. Even in the classical distinction between polis and oikos, international sphere would be more like oikos, since there is no equality, nor common language: rather, like oikos, it consists of heterogeneous entities that can be “managed” or dominated, not ruled politically.

As many historians and political scientists have noted, the word “state” should not be applied to medieval entities, mainly because they did not have the same composition and duties as the modern state. The regnums of medieval Europe did not take care of education, health care and poor relief, since these were more or less the duties of the church. More importantly, these entities did not have proper “external” relations because “all Europeans were, for many important purposes (for example those of education, or those of canon law), part of the same religious community” (Minogue 1975, 268). By the sixteenth century, however, the situation changed. Whereas the earlier assumptions of feudalism were that the ruler is part of a harmonious whole both domestically and externally, Machiavelli’s analysis spells out that “a prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers” (Il Principe, XIX). The harmony has been shattered and the ruler has to be afraid of his subjects as well as foreign powers. For Hobbes, the main duties of the sovereign are to ensure the security of its citizens from both internal and external threats. This Machiavellian-Hobbesian way is worlds apart from the

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15 It is ironical that the equality that is demanded from the people who make the contract disappears in society, since for Hobbes citizens are equal in their relations with the sovereign, but not in relation to each other.

16 Machiavelli’s universe was no longer that of the scholastics. With Machiavelli, it has lost the symmetrical and rational order that the scholastics had conferred upon it. His universe is no longer ordained by the will of Providence. If there is an organising power, it is the capricious Fortuna.
classical vision of men gathering together because of speech and reason to live in justice and good
government.

The realist school of international relations theory is often criticised for its limited attention to the
role of non-state actors. Historically, however, the “international community” is constructed in such
a way that it tolerates only states as actors. The sovereign state has indeed established its role as the
consummation of political experience and activity since the Renaissance so successfully that it is
difficult to discuss politics without mentioning the state. Even those thinkers like Arendt and
Schmitt who have tried to argue that the concept of the political precedes the concept of the state,
are more or less forced to return to the state (e.g. Schmitt, when he argues that it is the sovereign
who makes the ultimate political differentiation between friends and enemies). This unit of analysis
has absorbed most of the energy devoted to political theory after the Renaissance, as Martin Wight
(1966) has argued. Consequently, when international relations are studied, they are seen as the
playground of national interest (i.e. the state’s interest) or depicted as the system of balance of
power (i.e. the state’s power). This mode of thought celebrates its greatest triumph in recent
developments, when practical problems of international politics are ‘solved’ by constructing a
bigger and better state (like the European Union). Indeed, it might not be inaccurate to claim that
these projects are tempting because they absorb the “anarchy” or “unpredictability” of the
international relations inside the community and make the events and actions outside the original
community work in the same vocabulary. In short, they turn international relations into politics.
Something like this might be found also from the speech of Häkämies. The world of Häkämies is
like a global Leviathan, in which disorder in certain places is “managed” by the sovereign “us”.

What is clear from the speech of Häkämies is that we basically live in the fourth world (if Europe
means the Old World, America the New World, and developing countries the Third World) which
is one, interdependent and complex. It contains countries, but their territories are increasingly
obscure. In the future, if this is truly the case, the situation requires some conceptual changes in
world politics, in social sciences, and in geopolitics as well.
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