NGOs and Governance States: The Impact of Transnational Environmental Management Networks in Madagascar

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This paper will examine the politics of global environmental governance through an investigation of donor involvement in Madagascar. In particular, it will investigate how transnational networks of governance have transformed environmental politics in the developing world. The increasing importance of environmental issues in global politics has generated new and powerful interest groups keen to manage natural resources in particular ways. Since environmental problems are often transboundary, they have become an important arena for the development of transnational networks to manage them. Environmental issues and policy making in the developing world has become intimately intertwined with global actors, and this is producing a new kind of global politics. In particular, national governments in the developing world have become inextricably linked with networks of transnational actors. Harrison (2004: 23-26) refers to this as the ‘governance state’, where global networks of governance (including NGOs, private companies, donors, International Financial Institutions) have become indivisible from nation-states, which in turn creates an entirely new phenomenon (also see Chandler 2002, Clapham, 1996; Duffield 2001). Governance states are defined by a high degree of external influence from a range of global actors. This influence is extended through a politics of ‘post conditionality’ characterised by terminology such as participation and partnership with local communities and organisations, rather than through the formal conditionalities that accompanied loans and aid in the 1980s and 1990s (Harrison, 2004: 71).

This paper will examine how far Madagascar fits with Harrison’s (2004) idea of the governance state. In order to do this, this paper will examine the impact of international environmental non governmental organisations (NGOs) on environmental policy making in Madagascar, and how local organisations have responded to this process. Firstly, it will outline the debates on what global governance is and how it relates to the concept of governance states; secondly, it will provide an analysis of the specific features of the Malagasy case which has made it a key site of global environmental governance; this paper will then examine the nature of donor activity in Madagascar, especially in terms of debt for nature swaps, their role in running National Parks, involvement in community conservation initiatives and finally their importance in lobbying the Malagasy Government through the Donor

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Consortium. Finally, this paper will provide an analysis of the responses of local NGOs and other interest groups to the activities of donors, and especially how they adopt and adapt donor language in order to resist new forms of conditionality.

**Global Governance and Governance States**

The increasing interest in global governance in debates about the nature of international relations, development and environmental management can be regarded as part of a fundamental shift away from thinking about states as the most important political actors in the global system. However, there is some lack of clarity about what global governance means and its definition is highly contested. This section will provide an analysis of the debates about global governance, and then it will turn to the concept of governance states as a potential framework for understanding Malagasy environmental politics.

One of the most commonly referred to definitions of global governance was provided in 1995 by the Commission on Global Governance; it defined governance as formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as the informal arrangements that people or institutions have agreed or perceive to be in their interest (Commission on Global Governance, 1995: 4). In line with this definition, global governance highlights a shift in the location of authority in political, economic and social realms and indicates a move away from the state-centric view of global politics (Hewson and Sinclair, 1999: 5-11). In the global arena the state-centric system now co-exists within an equally powerful, decentralised multicentric form of organisation (Rosenau 1990: 10-12; and McGrew, 1992: 13).

However, within the literature on global governance there are subtle differences in the ways it is understood (Selby, 2003: 3-7). Post-structuralists such as Hardt and Negri have argued that it is a decentralised and deterritorialised regime of power which they call ‘empire’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 22). In contrast, realists suggest that global governance merely constitutes a further extension of the power of states in the global system (despite the proliferation of non state actors such as NGOs and international organisations). Other scholars view global governance as a replacement for the term ‘multilateralism’, to indicate types of organisations which may be proliferating, but which are not controlled or supported by any centralised, sovereign authority, so they cannot be referred to as a world ‘government’ (Diehl, (ed) 2001; Paolini, Jarvis and Reus-Schmidt, 1998; Wilkinson and Hughes, 2002; Young, 1997).

Still, even amongst these different ways of analysing global governance, there is some agreement about its core meaning. Selby argues it is a definitively liberal idea, indicating a pluralistic and post-ideological conception of the global system. In its essence global governance is normatively about dispersing power away from hegemonic centres of power, especially states, about extending and overcoming resistance to liberal democratic values and procedures, and about ordering people and things through recourse to reason, knowledge and expertise. In this way global governance is very clearly a project for rationalising global social relations (Selby, 2003: 6). For the purposes of this paper, global governance is defined as a set of neoliberal ideas that have been translated into similarly neoliberal programmes and policies. These policies aim to govern people, resources and activities through complex networks of actors, rather than through a single source of power and authority, such as a state.

The debates about global governance are especially useful for understanding emerging political processes in the developing world. In particular, they illuminate the
ways that states have become intimately intertwined with global actors, and how that
is producing a new kind of politics. Harrison (2004: 23-26) refers to this as the
‘governance state’, where global networks of governance have become indivisible
from nation-states, which in turn creates an entirely new phenomenon. Governance
states are characterised by a high degree of external influence from a range of global
actors. This influence is extended through a politics of ‘post conditionality’
characterised by terminology such as participation, stakeholders and partnership,
rather than through the formal conditionalities that accompanied loans and aid in the
1980s and 1990s (Harrison, 2004: 71). In line with this, the politics of global
environmental governance is indicated by the ways that states are increasingly
incorporated into networks of new power actors, including NGOs, international
financial institutions, international organisations, bilateral donors and private
the point that it may no longer be useful to examine the impact of specific external
actors such as the World Bank on African states. To do so would assume they
operated as some kind of neatly bounded black box that imposes its will across
sovereign boundaries. Instead it might be more fruitful to think of sovereignty as a
kind of space where different actors (national governments, international financial
institutions, NGOs and so on) operate and compete to define sovereignty in different
ways. In this view the sovereign frontier is formed by an interaction of forces therein
rather than by the delimitation of one space versus another; in this new form of
sovereignty its boundaries are turbulent, and they are neither wholly national nor
completely global. We then do not have to resolve the contradiction that international
actors undermine sovereignty as a boundary while simultaneously strengthening it
through reliance on states (Harrison, 2004; and see Walley 2004: 1-50). Turning to
Sub-Saharan Africa, this paper will now examine the concept of governance states in
relation NGO politics in the environmental sector in Madagascar.

Governance States and Madagascar
This section will examine the case of Madagascar in relation to debates about global
governance and the concept of governance states. It will provide an outline of the
ways Madagascar came to be an important arena of conditionality from the late 1980s,
and how this then produced a specific form of environmental politics. Madagascar
has become an important site of global environmental governance, and this is in part
is because of the specific features of Malagasy politics in the late 1980s; it is also
linked to the rise in different forms of conditionality from International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) and bilateral donors in the developing world.

During the 1980s and 1990s aid and loans to Sub-Saharan Africa were
increasingly tied to certain conditions, especially with regard to specific forms of
economic management and political organisation. Clapham (1996) argues that by the
mid 1990s African states were subject to high levels of external governance, mostly in
the form of economic and then political conditionality. Economic restructuring
through Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were implemented across Sub-
Saharan Africa because of increasing World Bank and IMF pressure to liberalise
economies as a means of producing economic development. This included reducing
public sector debt, economic diversification and development of exports, reducing
government spending and devaluation of currencies. Furthermore, in the 1990s the
increasing recognition that SAPs had not been as successful as was hoped led to a rise
in political conditionality. This is closely associated with the good governance
agenda, which promoted political liberalisation to produce the ‘right kind’ of
institutional environment for economic liberalisation to work. In particular, good governance has tended to mean democratisation, a commitment to transparency, and accountability, which includes liberalisation of the media and respect for human rights. Madagascar was not immune to the demands or conditionalities associated with aid and loan packages from the World Bank and bilateral donors. Donors have been very influential and were able to place greater levels of conditionality on Madagascar because in the late 1980s the Malagasy Government was in a debt crisis and was looking for debt relief and external aid. At the time, environmental protection was one of the newest and most important funding priorities for global donors. This means that in Madagascar there was an additional set of environmental conditionalities associated with new aid and loans. Following on from Harrison’s (2004) analysis, more recent forms of conditionality are not marked by formal conditions attached to aid and loans (as with SAPS and good governance), instead they are characterised by a politics of post conditionality. This form of conditionality is extended through networks of multiple actors and notions of participation where the recipient government is identified as a partner that willingly accepts economic and political liberalisation (and in this case environmental stipulations) as the most effective form of economic and political organisation.

In order to understand the influence of the donor community in environmental politics in Madagascar it is important to outline the main features of the donor community in Madagascar. What is striking is the high profile of global environmental NGOs as donors in Madagascar. The key donors are global environmental NGOs such as World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and Conservation International (CI), as well as IFIs, especially the World Bank, and Northern Governments through their aid and development departments (such as Cooperation Suisse and Cooperation Francaise). The high profile of international environmental NGOs as important donors in Madagascar is unusual, since in most developing states bilateral donors and IFIs are the most important ones. In the case of Madagascar the complex and often very close relationship between international NGOs and organisations such as the World Bank is very significant. This runs counter to what might be expected, that NGOs would be involved in campaigns against the activities of the World Bank or projects funded by bilateral donors. However, in Madagascar, international environmental NGOs, bilateral donors and IFIs are inextricably linked and often work together to implement specific forms of environmental management. As such they formulate a complex set of public-private networks that operate with the Malagasy Government as just one partner amongst a number of actors and it is not necessarily the most important actor in the network.

Madagascar has become a key site for global environmental governance partly because it contains very high levels of biodiversity, high rates of endemic species and is well known to have severe environmental problems. The idea of an environmental crisis in a highly biodiverse and extremely poor country means that Madagascar has been identified by bilateral donors, NGOs, IFIs and others as a place that demands global attention, and more importantly, global action. In many ways Madagascar can be regarded as an object of prestige for donors that want to be involved in supporting conservation projects and demonstrate their commitment to environmental sustainability. As a result, donors have been directly involved in running the state

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2 For further discussion of threats to biodiversity in Madagascar see [http://www.bbc.co.uk, ‘Madagascar Biodiversity Threatened’ (16.01.02). Accessed 08.02.02; and Financial Times, 15.05.01, ‘Madagascar’s jewels of nature under threat’].
owned National parks, in debt for nature swaps, funding for conservation projects and
lobbying the Malagasy Government to implement their vision of best conservation
practice. This section will investigate the extent to which the activities of donors in
the environmental sector can be thought of as producing a ‘governance state’,
characterised by the politics of post conditionality and where policy making is
produced through a complex network of actors which include transnational
environmental NGOs, IFIs, bilateral donors and the Malagasy Government.

Donors have been involved environmental governance in Madagascar in a
number of ways. One early example of increasing donor activity from the 1980s
onwards was when WWF and Conservation International arranged US$8 million
worth of debt for nature swaps, which released funding for conservation initiatives
such as training park rangers and conserving the Zahamena Natural Integrated
Reserve. The debt for nature swaps did not relieve debt per se, but instead the revenue
released by such schemes was specifically tagged for conservation activities (Tucker,
1994:62-68). This initiative developed against a broader backdrop of growing global
concern about environmental change, including rainforest destruction, the hole in the
ozone layer, threats to biodiversity, wildlife depletion and overfishing. These
concerns then translated into the sets of conditions attached to aid made available by a
range of actors including IFIs and bilateral donors, but especially by environmental
NGOs. Since the Malagasy government was facing a debt crisis, it was more than
willing to enter into relationships with donors to release funds in return for promises
of greater attention to environmental protection. As a result, Kull argues that donors
have developed a much greater degree of influence on Malagasy environmental policy
than elsewhere (see Kull, 1996: 68-71).

In addition, donors and environmental NGOs have been involved in directly
running state owned national parks in Madagascar, which is again an unusual level of
involvement of in the state sector by external (and private) actors. In particular, the
national agency responsible for managing protected areas in Madagascar, ANGAP, is
run and funded by a group of donors and Malagasy state agencies. The complex
public-private nature of ANGAP is part of a wider process of liberalisation in the post
Cold War era in which many states have been encouraged through economic and
political conditionality to privatise state-owned concerns (also see Walley, 2004).
ANGAP is essentially a private organisation that runs a public utility, and has
received funding from Conservation International, the World Bank, WWF, USAID,
the German development agency (GTZ), and the French and British Governments.
The Board of Directors is drawn from government ministries, such as the Ministry of
Tourism and the Ministry of the Environment, but donors including the World Bank
and WWF also have seats on the board. Ordinarily, Parks Departments have been the
preserve of the state sector, but the semi private status of ANGAP reflects the
growing global pressure for privatising public utilities, especially in the developing
world.

The role of external agencies in running the protected areas and the agency
responsible for them has raised concerns and suspicions about donor intentions. Hery
Zo Rakotondrainbe of Office Nationale Pour L’Environnement (ONE) suggested that
there was a perception that donors had simply picked an area of Madagascar and
taken control over it to govern it for conservation purposes with little thought of the
impact on local people. It was felt that the donors were carving up the environment in
Madagascar between themselves, so that USAID selected a national park to be their

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3 Interview with Parfait Randriamampianina, Director of Parks, ANGAP, Antananarivo, 21.08.01.
own and WWF did just the same. For example, Ranomafana National Park was regarded as ‘the American place’ because of Stony Brook’s lemur conservation project, the Peregrine Fund’s programme and the large numbers of American students working in the park. These are excellent examples of global environmental governance in action: a multiplicity of donors decides what the Malagasy environmental problem is, then they decide to fund global and local initiatives that conform to what the donors define as the best way to tackle the problem.

The level of involvement by donors in the environmental sector in Madagascar has also defined the direction of conservation policy making. In particular, the importance of global NGOs such as Conservation International and Wildlife Conservation Society has led to a partial resurgence of the ‘fortress conservation’ narrative. Brockington argues that there is a specific vision of the African environment that has driven conservation. The premise is that people have harmed the environment, a view supported by scientific interpretations of environmental change, a romanticised view of a stunning wilderness and an aura of extraordinary biodiversity (Brockington, 2002: 3). Consequently, to many donors saving African environments means that they have to become people fee. While this narrative has been challenged by influential work on the need to integrate people and environments for conservation (see Hulme and Murphree, 2001), the vision of the human free African wilderness remains a powerful one. For example, in Madagascar USAID has been involved in developing biological corridor projects that aim to ensure that environments in between protected areas are used and managed in a sustainable way. Part of the biological corridors project is to ensure that human activities do not reduce biodiversity in the area, prevent the movement of wildlife populations or frustrate the expansion of ecosystems (such as forests or savannah) between protected areas. This means that areas that fall outside the boundaries of national parks are subjected to forms of governance that will generally place restrictions of the activities of companies, government organisations and more importantly local people.

However, the fortress conservation outlook has been significantly challenged by the community conservation approach, and this has forced some international NGOs to take account of the needs of local people in environmental policy making. For example, Conservation International also manages Andasibe-Mantadia National Park in western Madagascar. In Andasibe-Mantadia local communities are given priority for employment as guides and rangers, while local women make t-shirts, baskets and souvenirs for the gift shop. In addition Conservation International has set up buffer zones around the park where activities of the communities are restricted. The emphasis on community involvement and integrated conservation and development projects is clear amongst donors, local NGOs and local state agencies. This is in part a reflection of how the community conservation discourse has entered into the consciousness of donor and recipient alike. However, this community conservation narrative was very much at odds with other more preservationist environmental priorities. Organisations are clearly capable of simultaneously holding multiple and contradictory views of how best to conserve Madagascar’s natural resources. While individuals in each organisation may well favour one view over another it is clear that organisations have to speak to a number of different agendas at

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4 Interview with Hery Zo Rakotondrainbe, Office National Pour l’Environnement, Antananarivo, 29.08.01. Also see (Walsh, 2002).
5 Interview with Holisoa Rasamoelina, Chef de Service Suivi et Communication, Project d’Appui a la Gestion de l’Environnement (PAGE), Antananarivo, 28.08.01.
the same time. They must simultaneously attempt to satisfy multiple audiences that may favour preservation, economic development initiatives, poverty reduction, education, community-based conservation, sustainable use and many more. For many local organisations, they are aware that funding will not be forthcoming without at least some acknowledgement of the ‘local people’ factor.

This cross-cutting and contradictory discourse on preservation and community conservation is also interspersed with a clear commitment to neoliberal principles that equally suited donor agendas. As with many conservation programmes in protected areas, much of the discussion about saving the environment has been intimately tied up with the idea that eventually conservation would have to pay its own way. Again, a common argument put forward by donors, including environmental NGOs and local organisations alike is that once the environment is secured or ‘saved’ it will attract in global business in the form of ecotourism or adventure tourism. This fits neatly with the wider context of economic conditionalities that encourage liberalisation of economies and the development of comparative advantage. Madagascar has a unique environment, and in terms of recognition as a ‘brand’ in the global tourism market, it has the great benefit of the highly charismatic and instantly recognisable lemurs. The lemur factor in Madagascar means that it can compete with other African destinations on the basis of wildlife and the exotic habitats they live in. In fact, the Malagasy environment and wildlife tourism ‘product’ has no equivalent competition.

The framework of conditionalities in the economic, political and environmental arenas in the 1980 and 1990s also led to the creation of a series of national structures in Madagascar that conformed to the prescriptions of external donors. This set of structures then provided the ideal conditions for the development of a politics of post conditionalities, which are in turn a key feature of Harrison’s governance state. In 1991 the World Bank provided US$100 million for a National Environmental Action Plan and The Charter for the Environment. The Charter was expected to run for 15 years, divided into 5-year segments called Environmental Programme Phases I, II and III, to be implemented through the Office National Pour l’Environnement (ONE). Madagascar is currently in Phase III of the programme. ONE is the key organisation to oversee and implement the Charter and the National Environmental Action Plan, and its principal funder is WWF. It is clear that in the National Environmental Action Plan international environmental organisations such as WWF work through complex transnational networks of actors which include IFIs such as the World Bank, but also the national government. The close relationship between WWF and the World Bank in developing and implementing the Charter for the Environment is indicative of the complex networks of actors that are involved in producing a governance state in Madagascar. The operation of such transnational networks that can extend governance in the developing world is an important part of Harrison’s governance state.

The Charter for the Environment led to an expansion of the power of donors in environmental policy making by the Malagasy Government. In particular, the idea of

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7 Interview with Lala Randrianarivo, Chargee de Mission, Ministry of Tourism, Antananarivo, 21.08.01; and interview with Josette Rahantamalala, Conservation International, Antananarivo, 20.08.01.
8 Interview with Lala Randrianarivo, Chargee de Mission, Ministry of Tourism, Antananarivo, 21.08.01; interview with Jose Ravelonandro, Chef de Volet Ecotourisme, Isalo National Park, Ranohira, 29.08.01; and Guardian (UK) 27.08.02 Survey reveals risk to reefs.
9 Interview with Hery Zo Rakotondrainbe, Office National Pour l’Environnement, Antananarivo, 29.08.01.
the Donor Consortium developed in tandem with the creation of ONE and the Charter, and arose from the complex interactions between bilateral donors, IFIs, international NGOs and the Malagasy state. The Donor Consortium is comprised of USAID, the German Government (GTZ), the Japanese Government, the French Government (Cooperation Francaise); the Swiss Government (Cooperation Suisse), Conservation International, WWF, Wildlife Conservation Society (joined in 2004), but the key lynchpin of the Donor Consortium is the World Bank. The Donor Consortium meets monthly to review the progress made so far, to determine future funding priorities and policies for Madagascar. The discussions regularly centre on environmental policy and the ways donor and NGO funds can be used to produce specific environmental outcomes. However, the Donor Consortium is not solely concerned with environmental policy making, it directs all forms of national policy making in Madagascar. This again highlights the unique nature of politics in Madagascar. It is unique to have three global environmental organisations (and specifically wildlife oriented ones) directing national policy, including the new national poverty reduction strategy.

The Donor Consortium is one illustrative example of the development of a governance state in Madagascar. It can be regarded as an example of the politics of post conditionality because the Malagasy state is one actor amongst a wider network that is in broad agreement about the future development of environmental policy making in Madagascar. The power of NGOs is especially important in terms of understanding the ways that the Donor Consortium determines environmental policy making. In particular, it is useful to examine the ways a group of international NGOs (especially Wildlife Conservation Society and Conservation International) operated within the Donor Consortium to persuade the Malagasy Government to increase the number of protected areas. The result of lobbying by Conservation International and Wildlife Conservation Society was that in 2003 the new Malagasy President, Marc Ravalomanana, announced that Madagascar was to triple the area under protection within 6 years to create a 6 million hectare network of terrestrial and marine reserves. The commitment was named the ‘Durban Vision Initiative’, after the World Parks Congress in Durban, South Africa, where it was first announced. It led to the creation of the ‘Durban Vision Group’, which includes donors, NGOs and Malagasy government agencies, and the Group is tasked with implementing the vision within six years. WCS and CI argued strongly that the Initiative was agreed with full consultation and participation of the Malagasy Government, and that Malagasy organisations would be full partners or stakeholders in the Initiative. This can be

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10 Interview with Dr. Helen Crowley, Country Director, Madagascar Programme, Wildlife Conservation Society, Antananarivo 25.03.04; and interview with Bienvenu Rajohnson, Senior Environmental Policy, Adviser, World Bank, Antananarivo, 26.03.04. Also see http://wcs.org/sw-around_the_globe/Africa/Madagascar (Accessed 16.11.04)

11 Interview with Razarimahatrata, Tiana, CARE Madagascar, Antananarivo, 21.04.04.


13 Interview with Dr. Helen Crowley, Country Director, Madagascar Programme, Wildlife Conservation Society, Antananarivo 25.03.04; interview with Dr Joanna Durbin, Director of the Madagascar Programme, Durrell Wildlife Conservation Trust, Antananarivo, 31.03.04; and interview with Leon M. Rajaobelina, Senior Executive Director, Conservation International Madagascar, Antananarivo, 23.03.04; also see http://www.conervation.org/xp/CIWEB/regions/africa/madagascar/ (Accessed 17.11.04).

14 Interview with Dr. Helen Crowley, Country Director, Madagascar Programme, Wildlife Conservation Society, Antananarivo 25.03.04; interview with Dr Joanna Durbin, Director of the Madagascar Programme, Durrell Wildlife Conservation Trust, Antananarivo, 31.03.04; and interview
regarded as a key feature of Harrison’s (2004) governance state: the governments, organisations, interest groups in developing world are described as important partners and stakeholders who have been willingly engaged in participation with external actors, especially donors.

Furthermore, concerns were raised that the two environmental organisations had pressured the new Malagasy president into agreeing to the Durban Vision Initiative when they met him at the World Parks Congress in 2003. Since Marc Ravalomanana was a new president who was looking towards the US (in particular) to replace France as the major external donor, it was suggested that he had felt obliged to agree because of threats from the NGOs that they could lobby back home in Washington to reduce support to the new president. It is clear from the politics of the Donor Consortium and the Durban Vision Initiative that global environmental NGOs have a great deal of power in Malagasy politics. In particular, the activities of the Donor consortium can be seen as conforming to Harrison’s (2004) notion of governance states: where the politics of post conditionality is extended through the language of partnership and participation of national and local actors in determining and implementing global conservation priorities.

However, the case is more complex than a clear example of external actors ‘producing’ a policy commitment in consultation with partners in the developing world. The complexities of the Durban Vision Initiative provide a means of questioning the notions of governance states. While the Durban Vision Initiative could be regarded as a clear example of the power of global environmental NGOs and their role in producing a governance state, it can also be regarded as an example of its limitations. The newly set up Durban Vision Group (which included global and local NGOs, donor and state agencies) dealt with this policy announcement in a complicated way. The group rapidly redefined the meaning of ‘protected areas’ in order to create a policy that was globally and locally acceptable. Under the Durban Vision Initiative, the new protected areas will now include numerous types of multi-use areas rather than requiring the establishment of strict National Parks, which is costly in financial and social terms as well as being time consuming and extremely difficult. Within weeks of the Durban Vision announcement it was clear that the initial policy of tripling the number of protected areas was rapidly diluted so that it could become a practically implementable and socially acceptable project.

It is clear that Madagascar is subject to global environmental governance, but that it is not a perfectly and neatly implemented system of controls. Rather, it is more complex than at first appears. The Donor Consortium itself is not an organisation that entirely agrees on the directions of environmental policy in Madagascar. For example, a number of members of the consortium complained that the meetings were held within the World Bank offices, which they claimed gave the World Bank a kind of ‘power advantage’ over other members. As a result the World Bank has provided funds for the construction of a special building next to its own offices which will become the permanent home of the Donor Consortium. The assumption was that a

with Leon M. Rajaobelina, Senior Executive Director, Conservation International Madagascar, Antananarivo, 23.03.04.

15 Interview with Dr. Helen Crowley, Country Director, Madagascar Programme, Wildlife Conservation Society, Antananarivo 25.03.04; interview with Dr Joanna Durbin, Director of the Madagascar Programme, Durrell Wildlife Conservation Trust, Antananarivo, 31.03.04; and interview with Lantoniaina Antriamampianina, Director of the Terrestrial Programme, Wildlife Conservation Society, Antananarivo 24.03.04.

16 Anonymous interviewee.
new building would provide a more politically neutral space for meetings than the World Bank Offices. In addition, a number of the other donors were concerned at the growing levels of power of environmental organisations in the Donor Consortium. In particular, criticisms were levelled at WCS and CI as particularly problematic actors in the Consortium. Whilst WWF is a major donor in terms of funding projects and programmes in Madagascar, a criticism of WCS and CI is that they do not provide large amounts of actual funding to organisations and programmes in Madagascar. Rather their power comes from their ability to lobby in their home country, the US, and in particular their ability to influence two other donors, USAID and the World Bank. For instance, a number of smaller Malagasy environmental NGOs regarded the power of CI and WCS as derived from the fact that their headquarters were in Washington DC, like USAID and the World Bank. This demonstrates that while Madagascar might be regarded as a governance state, the actors involved in implementing environmental conditionality are far from a unified and coherent set of actors, instead they too have cross cutting and often competing agendas which means that they are often at odds with one another over how best to manage the Malagasy environment.

Similarly, NGOs which favoured community based conservation were also concerned at the resurgence of a ‘science based’ conservation narrative that was being increasingly used by CI and WCS as a justification for policies that effectively meant that the more community oriented view point was being squeezed out. CI and WCS claimed that their science-based view was politically neutral and based on pure scientific definitions of how best to conserve the Malagasy environment. One representative on the Donor Consortium argued that the commitment of WCS and CI to science based conservation and its use in pushing through the Durban Vision Initiative had already led to forced evictions of poor communities from planned protected areas. In particular there are concerns that the donor and NGO driven Durban Vision Initiative will send a message that wildlife and habitats are more important than peoples needs, and will mean separation of people and environments. It remains to be seen if the new network of protected areas is implemented in Madagascar. But it is clear that some donors which are critical of the influence of environmental NGOs in Madagascar hold a very negative view of them.

The role of Malagasy organisations is also an arena where the concept of governance states might be contested. Harrison’s (2004) argument that governance is extended through the politics of post conditionality, characterised by the language of participation, stakeholders and transparency certainly fits with the ways that Malagasy based NGOs justify and explain their politics. However, the use of this language by Malagasy organisations masks a sophisticated set of political relationships. Malagasy organisations have been extremely skilled in attracting as much money as possible from international donors. This can be regarded as a form of resistance to global governance in that attempts to appear to conform to donor agendas can in fact mask a much more sophisticated process where donor and recipient can collude in subverting the visible and transparent rules of the game. Donors may well be aware that local organisations intend to disburse their funds according to their own priorities, which may or may not coincide with donor objectives. Yet donors may accept this because in providing funds to Malagasy conservation agencies they have equally fulfilled their

17 Interview with Bienvenu Rajohnson, Senior Environmental Policy, Adviser, World Bank, Antananarivo, 26.03.04.
remit: they have given funds for projects that are defined as worthy of financial support.

This ability to appropriate and adapt donor language to secure external funds is clear from the ways that Madagascar-based conservation agencies in the public and private sectors define environmental management. One good example of this is the Project d’Appui à la Gestion de l’Environnement (PAGE), a local NGO which is funded by USAID and works with the Ministry of the Environment and the Office National Pour l’Environnement. As such it acts as the pivotal organisation in a public-private network that stretches from the US to Madagascar. PAGE is primarily concerned with developing green taxation, strategic environmental planning, assisting environmental impact assessments and helping the state parks agency (ANGAP) to monitor changes in biodiversity in protected areas. Its mission very clearly fits with wider commitments to liberalisation, favoured by external donors such as the World Bank and USAID, and it is also in keeping with notions of a governance state. However, it was clear that PAGE had adopted and adapted the donor discourse of governance and transparency. For example, forest governance was rapidly becoming a major area for PAGE. USAID had chosen to fund forest governance projects because of the rapid deforestation and related habitat loss as a result of slash and burn agricultural techniques. The aim was to work with the Ministry of Water and Forests to slow the rates of deforestation in areas that were identified and targeted as high risk. The mechanism for this was education projects to inform local communities, councils and other interest groups about environmental laws and appropriate uses of the forest. This was in turn defined as a community participation project that encouraged democratisation as a key element of forest governance. The appropriation of USAID discourse on governance, democratisation and community participation was clear in the ways that PAGE described and legitimised its conservation activities. The ways that local NGOs have taken the donor agenda and mimicked it in order to attract donor funding indicates that the governance state in Madagascar is very complex and is not a straight case of external actors producing a particular policy commitment. Yet, in line with concepts of a governance state, local NGOs are deemed to be partners who participate fully in decision making and then carry out donor or international environmental NGOs policies. However the ways that local organisations adopt and adapt donor language means that they can give the appearance of conforming to external agendas, while simultaneously carrying out their own activities according to the priorities and policies they prefer.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the concept of a governance state is a useful framework for understanding environmental politics in Madagascar. Harrison suggests that global networks and nation states have become indivisible, which allows external actors to have an extraordinary degree of influence in the national context. Certainly in Madagascar, complex public-private networks of actors have developed so that policy making, especially in the environmental arena, is carried out through multiple actors at the national and international levels. In particular networks of bilateral

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20 Interview with Holisoa Rasamoelina, Chef de Service Suivi et Communication, Project d’Appui à la Gestion de l’Environnement (PAGE), Antananarivo, 28.08.01; also interview with Hery Zo Rakotondrainbe, Office National Pour l’Environnement, Antananarivo, 29.08.01.
21 Interview with Holisoa Rasamoelina, Chef de Service Suivi et Communication, Project d’Appui à la Gestion de l’Environnement (PAGE), Antananarivo, 28.08.01; and interview with Fleurette Andriantslavo, Managing Director, Ministry of Water and Forests, Antananarivo, 30.08.01.
donors, IFIs and international environmental NGOs along with the Malagasy government have redefined sovereignty so that it is neither exclusively national nor wholly global. The importance of the Donor Consortium, and especially the unique role of international wildlife organisations in it, such as WWF, WCS and CI is particularly relevant to thinking of Madagascar as a governance state. It is clear that the numerous ways that environmental NGOs have been involved in directly running national parks, arranging debt for nature swaps and lobbying the national government for particular environmental policy directions, have had an important impact on the direction of conservation (and national politics) in Madagascar. In addition, the politics of post conditionality is also very clearly an important feature of environmental management in Madagascar. The ways that the Malagasy Government and some local NGOs have been redefined as willing partners in a globally driven agenda means that Madagascar also conforms to notions of a governance state.

However, it is important not to overstate the powers of these complex networks of actors. The differences within the Donor Consortium itself indicate that the organisations involved in it do not have an entirely unified view of how best to manage the Malagasy environment. Furthermore, local organisations may adopt and adapt donor language in order to attract external funds, but then operate in ways that suit their own local agendas instead. Nevertheless, the conceptual framework of governance states as argued by Harrison is a useful way of thinking about new forms of politics and policy making in Madagascar. An examination of environmental policy making especially through the Donor Consortium indicates that Madagascar is a governance state.

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