The Presidentialization of Greek Politics

Zoe Lefkofridi
Zoe.Lefkofridi@univie.ac.at

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Introduction

The presidentialization thesis suggests that, irrespective of their formal constitutional structure contemporary regimes tend to become more presidential: leadership power resources within party organizations and the political executive increase and electoral processes become more leadership-centered (Poguntke and Webb 2005). Defacto presidentialization of politics comprises interrelated developments, which manifest themselves in what Poguntke and Webb (2005: 5) call the “executive face”, the “party face” and the “electoral face” of the presidentialization process. Related case-studies provide evidence that such a process is indeed taking place across countries with different formal constitutional structures (presidential, e.g. Clift 2005; semi-presidential, e.g. Lobo 2005; and parliamentary, e.g. Aylott 2005), different models of democracy (majoritarian, e.g. Heffernan and Webb 2005 e.g. and consensus, e.g. Fiers and Krouwel 2005) and different state structures (federal, e.g. Poguntke 2005 and unitary, e.g. Calise 2005).

The issue is important for democratic politics for two reasons: firstly, the more control individual leaders can exert on the party organizations and the cabinets they preside, the more power concentrates in the hands of a single person and her/his surrounding elites. According to Poguntke and Webb (2005) this phenomenon is fostered by the demand for strategic coordination from the center due to the internationalization of political decision-making (esp. within the EU) and the growth and complexity of the state. Secondly, the greater leaders’ preponderance in elections, the more politics moves away from collective, partisan conflicts towards personalized contests. In Europe, there is fertile ground for such a developments given the declining ability of social cleavages to structure individual voting choice (Franklin 1992) and increasing volatility in elections, combined with decreasing rates of partisan attachment (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000) and party membership (Katz et al 1992; Mair and van Biezen 2001). Moreover, technological achievements in the field of telecommunications have led to a considerable growth of the political role played by the media in electoral campaigns (see Pasquino 2001), on whose coverage leaders figure more prominently (see Mughan 2000). As Webb and Poguntke (2005: 349) explain, the relationship between the changing structure of mass

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communication and the personalization of politics/presidentialization of electoral campaigns operates as “a two-way process”: “the media focus on personality factors partly in order to reduce the complexity of policy issues, while politicians respond by concentrating on personal image in order to cater for the media’s approach”. The danger for democracy is that while some voters evaluate candidates “for well-reasoned principles”, others may be drawn by “superficial media campaigns and oversimplified electioneering” and/or by populism and demagogic rhetoric (Dalton 2002: 208).

Against this background, King (2003: 220) asserts that “the personalities of leaders and candidates matter a lot less, and a lot less often, in elections than it is usually supposed. Curtice and Hunjan (2006) highlight the difference that varied institutional rules make regarding the extent to which leadership evaluations can affect vote choice; what is more, they find no evidence that parliamentary elections have come to resemble presidential contests. Among parliamentary regimes, however, leaders tend to be more influential in countries with a majoritarian electoral system and/or a two-party competition for the cabinet (Curtice and Holmberg 2005). What is more, leaders are more likely to effect vote choice in the absence of strong party identifiers and powerful cleavages (Curtice and Hunjan 2006). In addition, Lobo (2008) investigates whether leaders may matter more for some electors than for others by looking at the importance of leadership evaluations across different types of parties. Her work demonstrates that “electors of mass-based parties are less sensitive to leaders than electors of catch-all parties at the ballot box” (Lobo 2008: 295).

In light of the aforementioned contributions, we would expect that in Greece, a majoritarian parliamentary democracy lacking strong divisive class or religious cleavages, where two catch-all parties compete for the cabinet, leaders are in strong control of their parties’ appeals. Moreover, Greece is a member of the European Union (EU). Office-seeking parties within the EU are pushed towards conformity with the status quo established at the EU level: because office-holders function as representatives of their member state at the EU level, their policy positions have to abide with the EU acquis. As Mair (2007) points out, despite variation in the way different countries interpret the demands for convergence, within country variation – ‘at least across the mainstream’ – is absent. Through the harmonization of policies, the delegation of
decision-making authority to non-majoritarian institutions (e.g. European Central Bank) and regulatory agencies (e.g. Europol), Europe reduces the policy instruments and the policy repertoire at the disposal of national parties (Mair, 2000; 2007). Relevant empirical research shows that European integration has led to the convergence of national parties’ programs (Dorussen and Nanou 2006). We would thus expect that particularly when programmatic differences between competing parties are hard to discern (see Lobo 2005), the role of leadership in parties’ pursuit of electoral success becomes all the more crucial.

So far, the limited works that investigated the importance of leadership in Greece have dealt with the impact of leadership on electoral behavior. Given that Greece lacks a National Election Study, apart from poll data collected by private market research companies, the only possibility to study leadership effects in Greece is by relying on the data of the Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP). The CNEP data explores Greek voters in 1996 and again in 2004 and the very few investigations of the topic rely mainly on this data source (Dinas 2008 for the limitations of this data). Earlier analyses (Gunter and Montero 2001) indeed show that leadership assessments are a potent factor impacting vote choice in Greece. However, Dinas’ (2008) analysis of leaders’ personal appeal in the 2004 Greek national election shows that the impact of leadership evaluations on the overall electoral outcome was only slight. Indeed, in 2004 the most popular leader (PASOK leader) lost from the most popular party (ND).

However, this paper argues that in the case of Greece leaders and parties go hand in hand. Following Curtice (2003: 16), leaders may “demonstrate their influence by being able to shape the image of the party they lead”. In this case, Curtice explains, leaders are important not in terms of their capacity to win votes independently of their parties on the basis of their personal appeal but “rather because they can have a decisive impact on voters’ evaluations of the parties they lead” (ibid.). Moreover, as Lobo (2008: 294) points out “the issue of the importance of leaders within parties is a complex one” and it also entails dimensions related to the parties’ organizational structure. Relatedly, the ability of leaders to control their parties’ strategies and shape their parties’ images varies across parties as it is influenced by specific party organizational properties. Drawing on Janda’s (1980) comparative work on political parties, leaders’ freedom of action is affected by the
degree of organizational complexity, namely the extent to which the organization is distinguished by structured patterns of interaction. Also, leaders are more or less powerful in determining their parties’ strategies depending upon the degree of ‘centralization of power’, which refers to the “location and distribution of power as the location and distribution of effective decision-making authority within the party” (Janda 1980). In addition, the degree of within party coherence/factionalism also conditions the ability of a single individual to change party strategy and/or modify the party’s ideological orientation. The lower the degree of organizational complexity and the higher the degrees of centralization of power and coherence within the party, the more parties’ images are likely to be leader-dependent. Party organizational parameters are pertinent to the study of the ‘electoral face of presidentialization’ because, if leaders are omnipotent in shaping their parties’ images, and if leaders alone can decide what the party stands for, then it becomes extremely difficult to disentangle party from leadership evaluations.

Therefore, the present paper seeks to complement findings of electoral behavior analyses on Greece, by approaching the issue of leaders’ control of their parties’ appeals from the perspective of party organizations. The paper thus conducts a case-study inquiring about New Democracy (ND) and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) since their foundation in 1974. As these two Greek parties are the only office-seekers and since consolidation of democracy (1981) together gather approx. 80% of the popular vote (see Appendix III), their study allows for assessing the interplay between different ‘faces’ of presidentialization (Poguntke and Webb 2005).

Therefore, to evaluate leadership control over the party’s image, I proceed in two steps: Firstly, I assess the degree of ND’s and PASOK’s organizational complexity, centralization of power and coherence, by relying on Janda (1980)’s operationalizations. Secondly, I inquire about the extent to which individual leaders of ND and PASOK were able to substantially alter their parties’ images and/or their parties’ strategies. The analysis draws on extant works and on primary data collected through qualitative interviews with thirteen party members (see Appendix I) carried out in spring 2006 (i.e. in-between two general elections). This data is supplemented by information retrieved from party statutes, as well as relevant secondary data (i.e. published speeches of party members).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the first section begins with a very brief introduction to the parties under study and then examines them in regard to organizational complexity, centralization of power and coherence. In the second section, I draw on interview data and extant works to investigate whether party organizational characteristics enabled/constrained PASOK and ND leaders to shape their parties’ strategies and appeals. The concluding section summarizes the findings and limitations of the present research.

**The party face of presidentialization in Greece**

In July 1974, Konstantinos Karamanlis, who had been involved in Greek politics since 1935 and had served as Prime Minister under in the pre-junta regime (1955-1963), was called to return from his self-imposed exile in Paris. Karamanlis’ “impeccably conservative” records “served to reassure the military that the process of ‘de-juntification’ [...] would be kept within bounds” (Clogg 1987: 59). In this context, Karamanlis founded New Democracy as “the system, through which the few and eponymous guide --instead of appealing to the prejudices and emotions of-- the populace, represent --instead of domineering, and in the final analysis serve-- the many and anonymous” (ND 1974). Pappas (1999: 33) refers to the democratic program of ND’s founder as “Karamanlism” and explains that this term does not refer to an ideology but to a pragmatic stance, “a particular style of governance and general management of political life”. The political personnel that would shoulder this pragmatist management program was by and large old, as ND incorporated the biggest part of the pre-junta rightist National Radical Union (ERE) party --be it nephews, children of ERE deputies or the deputies themselves (Diamantopoulos 1997: 264).

PASOK was founded in 1974 by Andreas Papandreou, who was the son of the Center Union’s leader, George Papandreou. Andreas Papandreou himself had served in the pre-junta EK government (1964-5). Both Andreas and George Papandreou had been arrested by the colonels; the former was imprisoned until he was allowed to flee the country, whereas the latter died under house arrest. During his exile, Andreas Papandreou espoused Third-World national liberationist views and founded the Pan-Hellenic Liberation Movement (PAK), an underground anti-junta guerilla group. At its birth, the
Panhellenic Socialist Movement included progressive centrists (former EK members) and many ‘new faces’, namely citizens that had participated in anti-dictatorship resistance organizations committed to armed struggle against the colonels’ regime (Pagoulatos 2002), such as members of the PAK and Democratic Defense anti-junta organizations. Thus, when democracy was restored, PASOK started out as “a movement” to differentiate itself from the bourgeois parties of notables (such as ND and EK) and to emphasize the continuity of the democratic struggle in the era of Metapolitefsi. Moreover, Andreas Papandreou sought to express the formerly underprivileged and thus capitalized on a fervently anti-right rhetoric, often referring to the authoritarian practices of the rightist governments in the pre-junta era.

In what follows, I evaluate the organizational structures of ND and PASOK since their foundation, based on interview data and information collected from their statutes.

**Organizational complexity**

Drawing on Duverger (1963), Janda (1980) operationalizes the concept of organizational complexity with the following variables: structural articulation, intensiveness and extensiveness of organization, frequency of local and national meetings, records maintenance and organizational pervasiveness. Structural articulation is understood as related to three ideas: firstly, the identification of existent party organs; secondly, the specification of the ways in which membership in these organs is attained and thirdly, the establishment of functional relationships existing among those organs. Organizational intensiveness refers to the ‘basic element’, namely the smallest organizational unit of the party (i.e. caucus, constituency, branch, precinct and cell). Organizational extensiveness addresses the geographical coverage of the organization and focuses on the extent to which the party’s usage of the most intensive level of organization is widespread. The frequency of local meetings refers to the most intensive unit of the organization, whereas the frequency of national meetings refers to the national committee/council. Record maintenance comprises the activity of maintaining list of party members and party activists, the preparation and publication of party propaganda and the preservation of some kind of party archive, library, or research division. Last, organizational complexity
is measured through the pervasiveness of the organization, namely the extent to which the organization penetrates into mass social and economic groups (e.g. youth cadres, women’s clubs, labor unions, etc.).

PASOK was structured along the Leninist organizational model. According to its statutes the superior national organ was the national congress, which elected the president and the central committee (which in turn, elected the executive bureau). Crucially, PASOK conducted a pre-congress in 1975 and its first regular congress was convened only in 1984, namely ten years after its foundation. While in 1974 ND structures were established as strictly top-down, PASOK made a call for the self-organization of the popular forces that, emerging from a dictatorship, wished to change the Greek society and political landscape. Self-organization was conceived as a process that functions not vertically but horizontally, to forge ideological discussions and collective action. PASOK started out as a movement and got organized both spatially and functionally (in sectors of production). Although after 1981 self-organization faded, when the son of the founder took over the presidency in 2004, George Papandreu sought to re-establish the party’s connection to the citizens and re-launched self-organization by utilizing new communication technologies.

PASOK’s smallest organizational unit was the district, which we understand here as the ‘most intensive level’ of the organization; it could be found throughout the country. Nonetheless, the years between PASOK’s two electoral successes (in the 1981 and 1985 elections) made “all party ranks realize that the role of the party’s organization changed”: the formerly active organization moved towards professionalization and away from deliberative processes at the district level (Interview PASOK 5). Despite the large coverage, the strength of the most intensive unit of organization was minimal and the frequency of its meetings decreased. There is no data to assess the exact frequency of local meetings but they definitely met during campaigns.

New democracy was the continuation of the pre-junta party (National Radical Union/ERE). In the pre-junta era politics was a profession confined to a number of families, so that constituencies -and consequently also parliamentary seats and ministries- were distributed among them. Traditional political families reserved something like a “hereditary right to run in a specific constituency” so that, for example, when a politician
would resign from politics, his son/daughter would compete in the next election (Interview ND 4). Moreover, Greek parties of the pre-junta era had traditionally been ‘parties of persons’ rather than ‘of principles’: they constituted coalitions of party notables distinguished by loose organization. Therefore, at its birth, ND had neither organizational structure nor statute. Meetings among ND notables were mainly at the bilateral level; small group of deputies would also (irregularly) gather at some deputy’s house.

ND founder was a governor, rather than a party leader (Voulgaris 2001). Consequently, although New Democracy wished to present itself as democratic in terms of structure (Pappas 1999), it lacked the relevant institutional arrangements that would transform it from a ‘party of nobles’ to a more organized and democratic party. In 1981, having faced a bitter electoral failure, ND (under Averoff leadership) started faithfully copying the structure of its rival PASOK. It created peripheral and local organizations, a central committee, an executive bureau, etc. However, the top-down character of the party structure did not change. For instance, ND’s “local organizations initially carried the paradoxical name ‘central peripheral organization’” (Interview ND 3). Throughout time, ND’s organizational intensiveness and extensiveness increased. Its most intensive unit became the district, which could be found scattered all over the country, despite its limited strength. Similarly to PASOK, there is no sufficient data to assess the exact frequency of local meetings; to be sure, basic units meet during campaigns.

Importantly, interview data reveal a gap between statutes and reality. Neither PASOK nor ND abided by its formalized rules and lots that appeared on paper had nothing to do with the way the parties were actually run. For example, according to the statutes, the superior party body for both PASOK and ND is the party congress, which elects the central committee, decides on the statutory changes, ideological orientations etc. Yet, during their first twenty years of their existence, ND and PASOK conducted only three regular congresses4. So, in reality, apart from the leader, the main collective national organs were the central committee and the executive bureau (which were presided by the President). Structural articulation changed through the (infrequent) regular congresses that were convened, and since the mid-1990s we can identify more than four national party organs; the selection procedures involve a substantial amount of
cooptation but the functional responsibilities of these organs are now clearly specified. Nowadays, both parties’ national councils meet at least four to five times a year.

During my fieldwork in 2006, the parties under study were found to lack organized archives (e.g. of their party manifestos and other party publications) despite the existence of research institutes. ‘Konstantinos Karamanlis’ Institute of Democracy’ was founded in 1994 to study issues of democracy and provide consultancy and guidance to newly established democracies. Similarly, in 1995 PASOK founded the ‘Andreas Papandreou ISTAME’, which is a think tank engaged in strategic and development studies. Though Greek parties (and especially PASOK) did prepare and publish speeches and policy statements, these are hard to locate. In the case of PASOK, according to interviewees, after the death of Papandreou much propaganda material was purposely destroyed (burnt). However, both parties are since 2006 publishing all speeches and policy positions online, through the websites. Apart from the lists of members composing the national organs, lists of party members and activists are archived at the local level.

With regard to the penetration of Greek party organizations into mass social and economic groups, PASOK had traditionally a higher degree of pervasiveness than ND, especially in youth cadres, women clubs, labor unions, agrarian leagues and commercial associations. ND in turn was more pervasive in religious bodies, youth cadres, commercial association and agrarian leagues; since the 1990s ND has penetrated into women clubs and labor unions as well.

**Centralization of power**

Janda (1980) operationalizes centralization of power utilizing the following indicators: the hierarchical distribution of power (‘nationalization of structure’), leadership selection, candidate selection, fund allocation, policy formulation, communication control, discipline administration and leadership concentration.

In the case of PASOK and ND there is a discernible party hierarchy that runs from a single national council through regional party organs down to local organizations and parliamentary organization is subordinated to national organs. With regard to leadership selection, ND and PASOK exhibit different patterns, though they have the same starting point: both were founded by two personalities without having been selected
by the party’s members. While ND moves from oligarchic towards more inclusive forms of leadership selection, PASOK has no stable course: PASOK’s leadership selection has included extremely oligarchic as well as largely participatory processes.

ND’s first statute was created when the party’s founder decided to resign from the party’s leadership (and premiership) to become President of the Hellenic Republic; this statute was composed in the 1977 pre-congress and foresaw the replacement of the party’s leader by the vice-president of the government. In 1980, ND leader Karamanlis arranged to meet and discuss with the two candidates for his succession --and then ministers of his cabinet-- George Rallis and Evangelos Averoff. Due to disagreements between the two candidates, Karamanlis proposed to appoint one of them as a leader under the condition that the other one would become vice-president of the government (Giannaka, 1999a). In fear of not being the one appointed as leader, Rallis opted for an intra-parliamentary group election and eventually won with a narrow difference (ibid.). Confronted with a momentous electoral failure in 1981, ND leader Rallis asked for the vote of confidence of the ND parliamentary group and did not get it. A new contest for the leadership took place less than a month after the elections (7.11.1981), Averoff won and unilaterally proceeded to the restructuring of the party. Until the mid-1990s the leader of ND was elected by a special body of electors, consisting of the entire parliamentary party as well as representatives of the peripheral organizations and of the Greek Diaspora (ND, 1994). Facing internal opposition by high-ranking (mainly neoliberal) party elites, ND leader Evert decided to enlarge the size of the body electing the President and consequently increase the leader’s legitimacy. The 4th congress of the party especially convened to elect a president, which made leadership selection more inclusive (ND, 1997; 2005; 2007); nevertheless, the post’s tenure remained unspecified. The homonymous nephew of the party’s founder was the first leader to be elected by a party congress. He won by gathering 40% in the first round and 70% in the second round of the 1997 intra-party leadership election. The President of ND has no specified term but leadership is traditionally challenged after electoral defeat.

In the case of PASOK, the President was supposed to be elected by the congress, but its term of the presidency knew no “expiry date”. So, while ND was in search of the leader that would beat A. Papandreou, PASOK’s successive electoral successes helped
the founder consolidate his power within the party, to the extent that nobody dared to appear as a challenger for the party’s presidency. The first leadership change occurred twenty-two years after the party’s birth and only due to the lethal sickness of the founder. While PASOK was in government, A. Papandreou’s resignation from the premiership on January 17, 1996 opened the way to succession. This decision was dealt with by the party’s parliamentary group, which convened to elect a new Prime Minister. Kostas Simitis won the contest for the premiership (against A. Tsohatzopoulos, J. Haralambopoulos and G. Arsenis). A. Papandreou preserved the role of the party’s presidency until death did them part and Prime Minister Simitis was elected president by the party’s 4th congress in June 1996.

In 2004, Simitis made a move that stood above and beyond party rules and democratic organs: two months before the national election, he nominated his successor himself. Simitis remained Prime Minister but appointed George Papandreou, the son of Andreas Papandreou, as party leader. To legitimize this ‘change of leadership by appointment’, G. Papandreou then set up a referendum type of ballot and invited not only members but also “friends of PASOK” to support/reject him as a leader of PASOK (February 2004); around a million members and friends of PASOK cast their ballot. This high turnout in support of G. Papandreou was interpreted as the first step towards reestablishment of the party’s connection with its social roots “via the practice of participatory democracy” (PASOK 2008a). Yet, via this election, non-registered citizens that sympathized with PASOK were treated as having equal rights with registered party members and the increase of the leader’s legitimacy through a direct election intended to give the post a bigger say within the party. In the context of a general organizational restructuring fostered by electoral defeat, G. Papandreou specified the term of the party’s presidency (i.e. his/her (re)election is supposed to take place every four years and not to exceed three terms).

Under G. Papandreou’s leadership PASOK came second in four electoral contests at different levels (general elections 2004, 2007; European Elections 2004; regional and prefectural elections 2006). When prominent PASOK members publicly challenged G. Papandreou’s leadership after the party’s failure to achieve office in the 2007 election, members and friends of PASOK were called to decide upon the leadership. This time,
however, there were three candidates: G. Papandreou, E. Venizelos and K. Skandalidis.

In total 1,376 polling stations were set up at various constituencies around the country and abroad (Gemenis 2008: 99). The turnout was impressive: 769,156 members and friends of PASOK participated in this election, where Papandreou won by gathering 427,021 votes (55.91%).

Candidate selection procedures are similar in ND and PASOK. If we only look at PASOK statutes, we will get the impression that candidate selection is conducted through primaries. However, important articles in its statute regarding closed primaries for the selection of candidates running in general elections (PASOK, 1990; PASOK, 1999) were never implemented. In Greek office-seeking parties, the only bodies (other than the leader) that can exert control over candidate nominations is the executive bureau or a specially created council. In both parties, even though the youths were generally supposed to function as recruitment mechanisms, the composition of the ballot has been largely dependent upon the preferences of the leader as well as of the office-seeking elites composing the political bureau and/or the central committee (that acts in concert with the leader). As to the selection of candidates for the European Parliament, the choice was and is entirely in the hands of the leader. The same holds for the selection of the so-called ‘state deputies’, who were placed above the entire candidate list, to be elected through a nationwide constituency, based on the party’s overall electoral performance. Thus, candidate selection is highly centralized. After PASOK’s electoral defeat in 2004, efforts were made to change the party in the direction of democratization and decentralization. However, in spite of new article 49 (PASOK 2005; PASOK 2008), which required democratic primaries for the selection of candidates at various levels of government, many PASOK candidacies for the 2006 prefectural election were the personal decision of the leader; sometimes, they came as a surprise to the rest of the party, which was informed about the candidacies through the press.

Relatedly, Kostas Karamanlis attempted to further consolidate his power within the party via a move that relates to the executive face of presidentialization. Notably, when ND got the power in 2004, Karamanlis JR proposed to increase the number of state deputies from 12 to 30 (out of 300 parliamentary seats). If this proposal would pass, Greek party leaders would become even more powerful, as 10% of the Greek Parliament...
would depend neither on party organizations, neither on the electorate but solely and exclusively on the preferences of party presidents. Whereas the entire parliamentary group of the party, namely 162 ND deputies, took part in the vote, only 107 deputies voted in favor of the proposal. Given the high prices paid by ND parliamentarians when they deviate from the party line, these ND deputies were quite bold in preventing further presidentialization of Greek party organizations and Greek politics in general.

Also, while they were in power, ND and PASOK leaders chose to recruit candidates from the world of theatre/TV, sports, business and academia, despite their little (or no) experience within the party.

With regard to funds, they are collected at all levels of the party but big amounts are transferred to the national organization that allocates them. Importantly, Greek parties are funded by the state in proportion to the number of votes they received in the last election. In 2009 for example, the state gives parties 68million Euro (ND got approx. 26million, PASOK 24million and the rest is distributed to the three small parties in proportion to their vote shares).

Both parties’ policy formulation is extremely centralized. Policy positions are determined and announced by the party leader or the executive bureau (political council), without need for approval by other party organs. PASOK made an effort to decentralize the process of policy formulation by involving lower levels of the organization (in terms of dialogue and feedback and not simply approval); yet, it is still too early to judge whether this will become an institutionalized practice.

PASOK and ND national organizations control media of their own; depending on who is in government, either ND or PASOK control the state’s radio and TV channels but they also broadcast through their homepages and are influential through specific newspapers (e.g. Ta Nea, Ethnos for PASOK, whereas Kathimerini, Apogeumatini are ND for).

Most importantly, both parties’ executive committees and especially leaders administer the major disciplinary techniques. In the beginning of 1975, when the journal of PASOK’s youth (PASP) published an article about socialism and democratic procedures criticizing the leader of PASOK, the executive bureau ordered that the journal shall stop functioning (see also: Lakopoulos 1999). Soon afterwards, faced with demands
(esp. from the Democratic Defense faction and PASP) for proportional representation at all party organs and less power concentrated in the leader’s hands, Papandreou called for a pre-congress (March 1975). Though his leadership was consolidated at the pre-congress, the internal conflict spilled over to the base. Papandreou started with expelling members from PASP and the Democratic Defense faction to provoke “a mass defection of some 2000 active members of the party” (Moschonas, 1999: 113; Interview PASOK 1). Accused of having a rightist orientation, important members of the central committee were expelled; until the end of June 1975, 48 among the 75 members that composed the Central committee were either expelled or resigned on their own initiative (Interview PASOK 1). Under his successor Simitis, the practice of expulsion was preserved although party whips were milder. For example, one year after he took over the party’s presidency, he expelled three parliamentarians from the party’s central committee (but not from the party) for not having entirely supported the budget proposed by PASOK government).

With a symbolic move that reminded of the past, G. Papandreou dissolved PASP, the party’s organized youth on the party’s ‘birthday’ (03.09. 2005) to re-found it as ‘Youth Movement’; the youth was totally out of his control and was serving established office-seeking cliques within the party. Notwithstanding his endorsement by the party on the ground, established members within the party organization continued challenging G. Papandreou’s leadership (Interview PASOK 1). Thus, his originally rather limited recourse to disciplinary sanctions as a means of solving intra-party conflict, he eventually turned more authoritarian. When former PASOK president and Prime Minister K. Simitis publicly objected to Papandreou’s proposal regarding a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, he was immediately expelled from PASOK’s parliamentary group (June 2008).

Similar tactics were frequently used by ND leaders. For example, soon after his election as ND leader (1998), Kostas Karamanlis expelled six important party members (N. Kakkalos, V. Kontogianopoulos, S. Manos, A. Papaligouras, G. Souflias and P. Tatoulis), who deviated from the party line in a parliamentary vote on the reform (/privatization) of the Public Services of Common Good (Δημόσιες Επιχειρήσεις Κοινής Ωφέλειας - ΔΕΚΟ), e.g. Olympic Airlines, the National Electricity Company, the National Post, etc. One among them, George Souflias, had been Karamanlis’ main competing candidate for the party’s presidency.
A parliamentarian that dares go against the party line (as expressed by the leader) is immediately expelled from either the party’s central committee/the party’s parliamentary group or from the party in general. In the former case, the parliamentarian can retain his/her seat and remain independent. In the latter case, as the parliamentarian got the seat via the party list, he/she is ‘forced’ to resign from his post so that he/she is replaced by the next person on the party’s list that gathered the most votes in the constituency of the expelled member. So far, politicians that have been expelled from the parliamentary group and continued their term as independents have shown good will by supporting the government because if they did not, they would be expelled from the party altogether. The government’s and the opposition’s cohesion has been thus ensured through strict party whips.

Though this method has been applied by ND and PASOK leaders irrespectively of whether they were holding office or not, the Greek prime-ministerial model is but a reflection of the two office-seeking party organizations’ structure. In comparative studies (e.g. O’Malley 2007; King 1994) Greek Prime Ministers are ranked among the most powerful, surpassed only by their Canadian and Maltese counterparts. To illustrate, the autonomy of Greek Prime Ministers with regard to government formation and portfolio allocation is immense. Greek Prime Ministers rely on ministers and officials to pursue their goal but exercise significant authority and power, like in the original Westminster model (see Heffernan and Webb 2005). In Greece, is not unusual for a minister to be suddenly replaced upon decision of the Prime Minister. Ministers are usually replaced when their words and deeds contradict the line promoted by the leader. Prime Minister A. Papandreou in particular, often surprised members of his cabinet by informing them through the media, e.g. that they were not ministers anymore (e.g. vice-minister of foreign affairs Fotylas in 1981) or that some policy they sought to implement was cancelled upon decision of the Prime Minister (e.g. minister of Finance Drettakis in 1982). Alternatively, ministers may be replaced when their policies cause/have a potential to cause a negative reaction of the public opinion or specific electoral target groups (e.g. farmers) or when their involvement in scandals (e.g. nepotism, clientelism, corruption) is revealed. The current ND government experienced a number of such replacements (e.g. due to the Siemens scandal). However, in the latter case party leaders
remove (at least temporarily) stigmatized party politicians from key party offices also when they are in opposition, so as not to spoil the general party’s image. The Greek case suggests a straightforward relationship between the ‘executive’ and ‘party’ faces of presidentialization.

In general, not only is there a gap between the principles of the statutes and the party’s practices, but the party organs were undermined because PASOK and ND leaders perceived themselves as being above party rules. For instance, in 2000 two ND deputies (A. Andreoulakos and G. Karatzaferis) publicly protested against the leadership’s announcement that ND is a centrist party. The deputies argued that ND had always been center-right and that ideological reorientations should be decided by the party-congress and not by the leader alone. Facing the refusal of the party committee responsible for the statute to convene and deal with the issue, Kostas Karamanlis expelled Karatzaferis from ND’s parliamentary group and central committee.

Interviewees comment that ND and PASOK did not adapt to way other European parties function in the sense that it is difficult to express any divergence from what the leader advocates; in essence, “the leader does whatever he wants” (Interview ND 2). As a result, ND and PASOK became organizations “in support of a leader’s image” instead of “organizations that elect and simultaneously control a leader” (Interview ND 2; Interview ND 4). Relatedly, PASOK and ND know no vice-presidents. Leadership is exercised by one individual who can commit the party organization to binding courses of action; hence, both parties exhibit high degrees of leadership concentration.

**Factionalism**

The coherence of the parties under study is assessed using legislative cohesion, ideological factionalism, issue factionalism, leadership factionalism and strategic/tactical factionalism.

The choice of this particularly complex and disproportionate electoral system11 (see Appendix IV) during transition to democracy was crucial for the development of the party system and the goals each party could pursue. This system gave considerable power to ND and PASOK leadership. Legislative cohesion is generally high for both parties, due to the threat of expulsion. PASOK founder also used the practice of color votes to
ensure cohesion (Clogg 1987).

Factionalism is a phenomenon observed in ND and to a lesser extent in PASOK. Prominent PASOK members G. Arsenis, A. Tritsis and D. Tsovolas founded the parties Hellenic Socialist Movement/ESK (1986), Hellenic Radical Movement/ERK (1989) and Democratic Social Movement/DHKKI (1995) respectively. Yet, only DHKKI managed to get parliamentary representation (9 seats in the 1996 general election and 2 seats in the 1999 European election). However, the party did not gain representation ever since and its leader retreated in the private sector. G. Arsenis returned to PASOK in 1989. A. Tritsis managed to become Mayor of Athens with the support ND but was later hit by a lethal sickness. These instances of factionalism were born due to conflicting ideological concerns; the factions that broke away opted for a more ‘radically’ socialist party and disapproved PASOK’s direction towards social democracy.

ND experienced more instances of factionalism. The party’s lack of ideological coherence facilitated the co-habitation of various office-seeking factions under the label of New Democracy (Interview ND 1). When the party was founded, it covered the entire range of Greek right-wing conservatives, from moderate to extreme-right thus comprising both democratic and anti-democratic right-wing forces. Most of ND members belonged to old political families, descending from the pre-World war People’s Party and the post-World war parties, namely the Greek Rally and National Radical Union. The so-called ‘Karamanlists’ include all party members, who are loyal followers and friends of the Karamanlis’ family. These supported the democratic program of Karamanlis in the post-junta era and represent, until today, the ‘traditional right’, which includes mainly two nuances of conservatism: the populist-right and the neo-nationalists.

The Mitsotakis political family descends from the pre-World War Venizelist Liberal Party, which competed with the People’s Party. Hence, some antagonisms between the political families composing ND date back to the 1920s. Konstantinos Mitsotakis created his own faction within the party and though this faction was also personalized (i.e. the bonds within its members have been determined by their relationship to the Mitsotakis family), it embraced center-right and liberal right-wingers, thus having a clearer ideological orientation. Apart from personalized conflicts, the main ideological difference between Karamanlists and Mitsotakists has been the extent of state
intervention in the economy. Whereas the Karamanlists favored a strong state, the Mitsotakists supported liberalizations and privatizations. Except for Konstantinos Mitsotakis\(^2\), all ND leaders belonged to the Karamanlist faction.

Despite their disagreements, Karamanlists and Mitsotakists have managed to coexist. Other factions, however, tried to break away from the party and create formal organizations of their own (see also Appendix II). Kostis Stefanopoulos’ DHANA (1985) gained one seat in the 1989 and 1990 elections respectively. Though DHANA was dissolved in 1994, Stefanopoulos was elected President of the Republic (1995-2005) with the support of PASOK. Antonis Samaras’ ‘Political Spring’ (1993) was initially successful (4.38%, 10 seats); nevertheless, it was not able to grow strong enough to survive the Greek bipartisan political scene, so Samaras returned to ND. Stefanos Manos’ ‘Liberals’ (1998) cooperated with the ND electoral ticket for the 2000 election and with PASOK for the 2004 election. Due to financial difficulties the party was afterwards dissolved.

The extreme-ring faction of ND attempted twice to break away from its mother-party. This faction ran the 1977 election under the label ‘National Alignment’ and gathered 6.8% of the popular vote (5 seats) in disagreement with Karamanlis, who discouraged the return of the King. Before resigning from the party’s presidency to become President of the Republic, Karamanlis reintegrated most of the politicians of the National Alignment ticket, including their leadership\(^1\). The extreme-right would remain within the gulfs of ND for a couple of decades, until ND deputy Karatzaferis broke away in 2000 to found the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), which, thus far, has been a progressively successful rebellion. In 2004, LAOS won 2.2% (0 seats) in the general election but 4.1% (1 seat) in the EP election. LAOS managed to gather 3.8% of the popular vote (10 seats) in the 2007 general election.

The Mitsotakist-Karamanlist divide that, apart from ideological, constitutes also an instance of leadership factionalism and so does the aforementioned DHANA faction, which resulted from a contest between Mitsotakis-K. Stefanopoulos for the leadership. All other instances of factionalism experienced by ND followed clashes of party deputies

\(^2\) In 1974 Mitsotakis ran with the Liberal party and joined ND in the late seventies.
with their respective leaders fostered by ideological concerns rather than issues. The foundation of the ‘Movement of Free Citizens/KEP’ (2001) is a special case. It was created by ND Mayor of Athens Dimitri Avramopoulos was encouraged by his high rates of popularity among Greek citizens. In other words, polls inspired Avramopoulos to go it alone; his party, however, ceased existing before competing in any election and the deputy returned to ND.

Due to the fact that party strategy is decided by the leader and disciplinary sanctions are high, there has been little or no disagreements with regard to the appropriate strategy towards the party’s goal orientation. However, the strategy of ND leader Karamanlis has been publicly criticized by prominent ND member Dora Bakoyanni, daughter of former leader Konstantinos Mitsotakis and challenger of ND leadership. According to Bakoyanni (2003), the identification of a politician and/or a party with the majoritarian public opinion ensures a temporary popularity that rests on a shallow basis that lacks endurance. Moreover, Bakoyanni (2003: 4) explains that this approach serves as a political alibi for “those who are incapable of producing substantial policy and choose idleness as apolitical action” and welcomes her party’s move away from such a strategy.

As small parties got crashed by the electoral system, it was not easy for rebellions to survive in the Greek political scene outside the ‘sheep-run’. Relatedly, as state funding is provided to parties in proportion to their parliamentary representation it is extremely hard for non-established parties to endure. The fate of brave rebellions that attempted to found new parties shows that PASOK and ND members are better off within their parties than without them.

**The interplay between the party and the electoral face of presidentialization: parties’ leaders or leaders’ parties?**

Importantly, their position in the party structure at the time of the parties’ birth enabled ND and PASOK leaders to determine what the party stood for as well as the foci of the party’s electoral campaign. For instance, PASOK’s founding declaration set national independence, popular sovereignty, social liberation and democratic procedures as its
These ideological foundations laid by A. Papandreou were linked to an important trait of Greek culture, the feeling of being a ‘small’ and ‘threatened’ nation. Despite the fact that PASOK called itself an ‘international party’, it was deeply disappointed in the Socialist International due its indifferent stance towards the dictatorial regime in Greece. What is more, PASOK denounced social democratic parties across Europe because “in PASOK’s view, social democracy was too conservative” (Interview PASOK 1). In this respect, PASOK presented itself as “more radical than social democracy and more modern, democratic and participatory than Soviet socialism” (Moschonas, 1999: 111). The ‘third way’ of PASOK rested upon decentralization, collectivization and self-management. Against this background, A. Papandreou wanted to create a political block beyond the classic Cold War divide and was more interested in creating relationships with countries other than European (e.g. Latin American, Middle Eastern). Indeed, PASOK won the 1981 election by competing with Rallis-led ND on an ardently anti-right, anti-NATO and anti-EC program --exactly when ND had achieved EC accession.

Once in office, however, Prime Minister Papandreou exited neither NATO nor the EC and quickly modified PASOK’s stance towards the Community, by cultivating a different political climate amongst the electorate. In particular, PASOK government argued that PASOK had not been against the EC but against “the terms of Greek accession to the EC” (Interviews PASOK 1, 2). As Moschonas (1999: 119) rightly points out, “a more rigidly mass and collectively functioning organization would have difficulty undertaking the shift with such speed and ease”.

When the founder died, the new PASOK leader drew legitimacy via two successive elections, which enabled him to reorient the direction of PASOK so as to govern in the post-Maastricht era. Simitis’ campaigns capitalized on his commitment to ‘modernization’. Once elected at the party’s presidency, he tried to distance PASOK from the strategies and rhetoric of the past and -decisively and completely- asserted the abandonment of an ethnocentric perception of the world. Under Simitis’ leadership PASOK’s international profile made a U-turn: from the Third World PASOK looked exclusively towards Europe. PASOK’s European strategy was perceived as the “central policy for the country’s progress in terms of economic growth and social cohesion”
National interests were redefined and acquired a European dimension; and it was through this dimension that policy solutions were pursued (e.g. relationship with Turkey in general and regarding Cyprus in particular). In this way, Simitis “stole” the European label from ND by presenting PASOK as more pro-European than ND. Simitis brought PASOK closer to European Social democracy, but also to ND’s positions, so that the platforms of the two parties were increasingly indiscernible. An interviewee explains that in the post-Maastricht period, “the tools PASOK borrowed from the EC were common” for PASOK and ND so that the difference between them did not consist in different policies but in different management (i.e. “which party can better manage a specific system”) (Interview PASOK 2). Simitis’ campaigns underlined his governmental oeuvre and especially that his government raised Greece’s status within the EU.

ND was founded by Konstantinos Karamanlis in 1974 as an apparatus for governing in the new democratic era. Seeking the support of the new, dynamic social forces that had been prompted by the sudden social and economic changes of the previous twenty five years, Karamanlis could not run under the label of the National Radical Union (ΕΡΕ). That party (founded by Karamanlis in the mid-1950s as a reconstitution/relabeling of General Papagos’ Greek Rally) had been an unfailing supporter of the monarchy and the army and had expressed a consistently tough anti-communist stance. Therefore, the new post-junta reality demanded alleviation of the Greek right’s face and rhetoric. So, Karamanlis decided to run the election of 1974 with the old party disguised under a completely new party label, which would be silent with regard to the historical continuity with the pre-junta era; crucially, the label “conservative” was avoided (Voulgaris 2001). Instead, the party’s name was cautiously chosen to emphasize its freshness and its democratic credentials (Pappas 2001: 241) and thus it was symbolically baptized ‘New Democracy’ (ND).

ND founder aspired to “a broad political formation capable of gaining the confidence of the majority of the Greek people, a majority that would offer the country a stable and efficient government” (Pappas 1999: 45). Thus, ND presented itself as “a ‘catch-all’, ‘people’s party’” (Interview ND 5), moving “between the center and right of the political spectrum” and taking “sometimes less liberal and sometimes more liberal
“ND lacked a clear ideological orientation” (Interview ND 1), which is most evident in its founding document, which was drafted by Karamanlis alone: ND would “serve the ‘true’ interests of the nation”, and to be free from “the misleading labels of right, center and left” (ND 1974). So, ND presented itself as a ‘progressive party of the center’, ‘rightist on national issues and leftist on domestic policies’ (Clogg 1987: 156). This initial ideological confusion was due to the fact that the main concern of Karamanlis was the establishment of democracy. The dominant motto of the 1974 electoral campaign, however, was: “either the tanks or Karamanlis” (Ethnos 2008; Delastik 2008). This message sought to transform the electoral battle into a single-issue competition: the electorate was called to choose between Karamanlis and a new military dictatorship. As the army would not easily compromise with a government whose intentions it could not trust, Karamanlis was presented as the ‘gate-keeper’ of democracy. Karamanlis indeed won the 1974 and 1977 elections by presenting himself as the guarantee of democracy.

Given Karamanlis’ structural position, as the sole manager of Greece’s and his party’s transition into the democratic era, everybody in ERE/ND was on board. In fact, Konstantinos Karamanlis was the glue holding together a mosaic of divergent ideologies. In an effort to come up with an ideological flag that would express ND’s internal divergence, Karamanlis presented the ideological model of New Democracy at a pre-congress in Chalkidiki (1979); the so-called “radical liberalism” was established as ND’s ideology. This model was Karamanlis’ invention and referred to a soft version of economic ‘liberalism’ that would allow ‘radical’ state interventions in the name of social justice. Given the simultaneous decline of the Center Union party (EK) and the success of the extreme right in the 1977 election, Karamanlis chose to compete with PASOK regarding who would fill the political vacuum created by the collapse of the centrist party. However, when the founder resigned from the leadership, the ideological divergence that was hidden behind complex ideological labels became more problematic and more vociferous. Rallis did not manage to successfully hold the political center, as he had to confront both the anti-right and anti-EC rhetoric of A. Papandreou and blackmalls from within the party to reabsorb the ultra-rightist voters (Pappas 2001: 244-5).

Under Mitsotakis leadership (1984-1993) ND acquired a clearer ideological
profile, supporting a trade-friendly (rather than nationalist) approach to Greece’s neighbors as well as the decrease of the state’s role in the Greek economy via privatizations and liberalizations. However, ND’s transformation into a neoliberal front by Mitsotakis brought about two serious instances of factionalism (DHANA and POLAN). Under his leadership, ND achieved office in the electoral period 1989-1990 when gigantic corruption scandals (involving the then Prime Minister A. Papandreou) purged PASOK. PASOK however had passed a more proportional electoral law (1989), which resulted in a narrow ND parliamentary majority. Mitsotakis was the first Prime Minister of a single-party government to rely on a fragile parliamentary majority. As cohesion was traditionally ensured via expulsion: the smaller the size of the parliamentary majority, the more vulnerable the leader to rebellious party members. A conflict about the name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) between the foreign minister Samaras (who was supported by ND founder) and Mitsotakis escalated, Samaras was ‘fired’ and the Mitsotakis government fell.

Haunted by the organizational experiences of the pre-junta era, which contributed to the development of a leader-dominated and quasi-authoritarian party structure, ND’s inner circles saw leadership change as the only available remedy to the frustration caused by successive failures to gain office (1981, 1985, 1993, 1996 and 2000). With each leadership change, ND was steering back and forth, towards the traditional Greek right (Averoff 1981, Evert 1993), the right-of-center (Rallis 1980), the neoliberal center (Mitsotakis 1984) to finally settle where at its very starting point: having centrist intentions and a blurry ideological profile (Karamanlis 1997). Interestingly, ND managed to improve its electoral performance in the late 1990s, under the leadership of a politician who carried the exact same name as its founder.

According to interview data, this latter leadership change made the systematic study of public opinion the central element of the party’s strategy formulation. The rhetoric of the leader and the positions advocated targeted and faithfully reflected the wishes of the public opinion. The first election ran by Kostas Karamanlis was the 1999 EP election. During that time, there was widespread public disappointment in the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia and the role played by the EU in this respect. Based on the negative public sentiment, Kostas Karamanlis launched a Euroskeptic campaign despite
leading a party that had always been bragging about its European orientation. In his speech in the Greek parliament (16/02/1999), the President of ND argued that the EMU goal was “secondary” and “unimportant”, while ND’s press spokesperson A. Spiliotopoulos called Europe “a dwarf” (Giannaka, 1999b). ND’s attacks on Europe did not signify a reorientation of the party vis-à-vis the EU. Rather, they were communication tricks, namely electorally induced assaults against the EU-level achievements of PASOK government and of Prime Minister Simitis. ND did indeed manage to gather more votes than PASOK in the 1999 EP election.

Given that the majority of the Greek public opinion was disenchanted by the malfunctioning of the Greek state, in 2000, Karamanlis launched a campaign against the state; in fact, the campaign was targeting PASOK, which was representing the state due to the fact that it had been in office almost uninterruptedly since 1981. In other words, all allegations against the state (e.g. nepotism regarding appointments at the public sector) were essentially against the system as it was shaped during PASOK’s term in office, ‘the state of PASOK’. ND lost the 2000 election only for some thousands of votes, which led the ND party to talk about ‘equivalent’ electoral results. Consequently, Kostas Karamanlis preserved this kind of rhetoric at post-electoral public appearances, while also emphasizing the party’s firm centrist orientation and the end of the era of ideological rifts.

The leader’s new approach seemed to work well, as during 2001-2003 ND scored better than PASOK with regard to vote intention in 14 out of 17 public opinion polls, while the gap between the two parties was constantly increasing (Rori 2008: 195). Following public opinion closely, Kostas Karamanlis concentrated his 2004 campaign against rising prices and in favor of a more transparent and effective management of the country. In essence, the electoral campaign focused on PASOK government’s mishandlings of the Greek state and especially on corruption issues. This was a winning electoral strategy, and ND finally got back to office by gathering the 45.03% of the popular vote. Moreover, it was once more a communication strategy in the absence of a specific program to effectively fight corruption—this was evident in the numerous scandals that have purged ND since it took office (e.g. Siemens, ‘Zachopoulos affair’, Vatopedi Monastery, Pavlides-Manousis case, etc.).
In 2004, Simitis was competing with a leader that had established the systematic study of polls as his main electoral strategy. Despite the fact that before the election Karamanlis’ popularity did not surpass that of Simitis and Papandreou, the ND party under Karamanlis’ leadership managed to come up with the program that the biggest part of the electorate would endorse. His leadership’s effect on vote choice should thus be seen against the background that, under his leadership, ND’s profile and campaign changed radically. Karamanlis distanced himself from the left-right ideologically charged rhetoric of the past and concentrated on specific issues that concerned Greek electorate. Simitis followed Karamanlis’ example and chose to compete on the basis of polls. A big motive behind the ‘monarchical style’ of Simitis’ succession was the public opinion: according to a number of polls conducted in 2004, PASOK was generally doing poorer than ND in terms of vote intention, while G. Papandreou appeared as the most popular face within PASOK (Simitis 2005: 591-592; See also: Rori 2008). Moreover, to compete with ND led by the founder’s nephew, Simitis chose PASOK founder’s son. Given that both ND and PASOK were haunted by their father figures, Simitis’ successor surname had highly symbolic connotations that fostered party unity. Thus in 2004, two big bang surnames competed against each other and the election was turned into a pure horse-race between the founders’ descendants.

The new PASOK leader, however, had very little time to structure his leadership profile and consolidate his power within the party mechanism (Mavris 2007). Dinas (2008) points to a similar conclusion by underlining that the length of the leader’s experience at the presidency post matters. In 2004, while G. Papandreou was placed at the head of his party two months before the election, his opponent Kostas Karamanlis had been at his post ND since 1997. It should be noted that ND, under Kostas Karamanlis leadership had gathered more votes than incumbent PASOK in the 1999 election to the European Parliament and it lost the 2000 general election for a few thousands of votes. Moreover, by changing its leader, PASOK “increased the salience of leadership evaluations but only at the cost of squeezing, at the same time, the influence of other political factors with more favorable distribution” (Dinas 2008: 515). Hence, both Dinas’ (2008) and Mavris’ (2007) analyses classify this leadership change by PASOK as a strategic faux pas. Yet, it should be underlined, that this leadership change was not a
collective decision: it was a strategy shaped by the leader alone, who personally selected who and when would succeed him. Interestingly, Simitis strategy had an important implication: the electoral failure was charged to the new leader of PASOK, who started his term by shouldering a substantial electoral loss. For office-seeking PASOK elites, electoral defeat mattered more than the success of G. Papandreou plebiscitary experiment-selection. It was thus more difficult for Papandreou to consolidate his power within the party. Interestingly, leadership evaluations for Papandreou started slightly increasing after Simitis’ expulsion.

According to the findings of the present research that approached the issue from the perspective of political parties, successive ND and PASOK leaders have been in strong control of their parties’ strategies and appeals. However, this control was extremely high already at the beginning of the parties’ life, due to the leadership styles of the founders. In other words, in Greece, presidentialization was the starting point. I argue that the two major parties in Greece that were established at the aftermath of the seven year junta were built around the personalities of their founders and served to a great extent as their leaders’ personal vehicles towards office. As parties were strongly presidential by birth, their ideological and organizational development was extremely leader-dependent: neither PASOK nor ND matured as collective organizations but remained vehicles serving the visions and ambitions of long established Greek political elites. Yet, the type of ‘presidentialization’ that distinguishes PASOK and ND is uneasy with democracy and utters nostalgia for pre-democratic standards (see: Pelinka, 1999; 1994), namely authoritarianism.

1 Gunter and Montero (2001) use the CNEP 1996 data together with data from the Four Nation Study that investigated Italian, Greek, Spanish and Portuguese voters in 1985.
2 The term refers to a process similar to de-nazification.
3 Papandreou renovated the party’s official website (where most activities of the party are posted on a daily basis) and created several innovative e-fora (e.g. Dialogue with the citizen, Re-public, Self-Organization/Αυτοοργάνωση), where citizens can participate in discussions regarding the structure and ideological orientation of PASOK, make policy proposals, etc.
5 Results: Rallis: 88 votes, Averoff: 84 votes, blank votes: 3 (Giannaka, 1999a; Chasapopoulos, 1997).
7 For results of other candidates see previous endnote.
8 Among those votes, the valid ballots amounted to 763,674.
9 Venizelos gathered 291,593 votes (38.18%) and Skandalidis 43,848 votes (5.74%). Invalid and blank ballots amounted to 5,482 and 1,212 respectively.
10 PASOK’s youth was initially established as “Friends of Andrea Papandreou/Φίλοι Ανδρέα Παπανδρέου” (1974) before evolving into the “Panhellenic Fighting Student Front (PASP)/Πανελλήνια Αγωνιστική Σπουδαστική Παράταξη (ΠΑΣΠ)” (1975).
11 Nikolakopoulos (1989: 77) calls the Greek PR a “mixed system” as it is neither plurality nor proportional representation and adds that the proper name for it would be (not reinforced but) “distorted PR”. In all its versions --excluding the one used in the 1989 and 1990 elections-- it is a greatly impure type of list PR. The label “reinforced” is deceptive as it does not reinforce proportionality but the large parties (Lijphart 1999: 163; Nikolakopoulos 1989: 106). For example, the laws 65/1974, 626/1977 and 895/1981 set the legal threshold for participation in the 2nd distribution of seats at: 17% for one party, 25% for a coalition of two parties and 30% for a coalition of more than two parties. Though the law 1516/1985 lacked such a threshold, the distribution of seats had many elements of the plurality formula. The more proportionate laws established in 1989 re-introduced but lowered the threshold: the parties gathering 1-2% of the national vote had a legitimate claim to seats and the 3rd distribution was abolished. The law 1990/1907, which was used in the 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2004 elections fixed the threshold at 3% and re-introduced the 3rd distribution. To participate in the 3rd distribution, a party should come first at the country level as well as be the first party in the constituency containing seats that had not been distributed during the 2nd distribution. After this procedure, the remaining seats were distributed on the basis of a new electoral measure and the number of valid votes got divided by the number of non-distributed seats. The law used in the 2007 elections did not change the threshold. However, 260 seats were distributed based on proportional representation and 40 seats were given as a bonus to the party coming first, irrespective of the difference between first and second party.
12 The National Alignment was led by two political figures: Spiros Theotokis, originating from pre-junta National Radical Union (ΕΡΕ) and Stefanos Stefanopoulos, originating from the conservative wing of the Center Union/EK. The former was elected as a ND deputy in 1981 whereas the latter died in 1982.
13 During this time, Kostas Karamanlis launched a general attack against PASOK and a personal attack against Simitis, whom we called the “pontiff of corruption” at various occasions, and for many years (until winning the 2004 election).

Appendix I

Interviews:

- PASOK 2: party member, former Member of Parliament, former Minister. Athens, 9th May 2006.
- PASOK 4: party member, counselor of current President since 1999, Athens, 10th May 2006.
- PASOK 7: party member, counselor of former Prime Minister since 1996. Athens, 16th May 2006.
- PASOK 8: past and current Member of Parliament, former Minister. Athens, 27\textsuperscript{th} May 2006.
- PASOK 9: party member, expert/scientific advisor of MEP team since 1981. Athens, 30\textsuperscript{th} June 2006.
- ND 1: past and current Member of Parliament, current Minister. Athens, 17\textsuperscript{th} May 2006.
- ND 2: past and current Member of Parliament, former Minister. Athens, 18\textsuperscript{th} May 2006.
- ND 3: past and current Member of Parliament, current Minister. Athens, 23\textsuperscript{rd} May 2006.
- ND 4: past and current Member of Parliament, Athens, 27\textsuperscript{th} May 2006.
- ND 5: past and current member of parliament, current Minister. Athens, 27\textsuperscript{th} May 2006.
## Appendix II

### PASOK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Duration of Term</th>
<th>Party Image</th>
<th>Competing Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Andreas Papandreou</strong></td>
<td>3/09/1974 - 03/1984</td>
<td>1974: “Greece belongs to the Greeks” National liberation &amp; Independence from foreign powers National/popular sovereignty Democratic Socialism anti-right anti-EC+NATO (“EC and NATO are the same syndicate”) After 1981: moderation towards EC and NATO (“fighting the battle from within the EC”) Keynesian economic policies, welfare state After 1987: adaptation to EC goals (‘one-way street’/ ‘necessary evil’)</td>
<td>1975: massive expulsion of Democratic Defense faction, members of PASOK’s youth (PASP) and others. Some found Socialist March party and compete with PASOK in 1977 election 1976: expulsion of around 1000 members accused of organizing armed struggle against the leader 1978: expulsion of several members from the Thessaloniki sub-organization 1990: Election of PASOK’s secretary at the Pendelikon Congress: A. Tsohatzopoulos (proposed by the leader, 70 votes) vs. P. Avgerinos (proposed by other members, 40 votes). Since 1993: Modernizers vs. Presidents (Papandreists) 1995: Tsolovas leaves PASOK and founds Socialist DHKKI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(former: Center Union/EK, Panhellenic Liberation Movement/PAK)</td>
<td>03/1984-17/1/1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(former: Panhellenic Liberation Movement/PAK)</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>
### New Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRESIDENT</th>
<th>DURATION OF TERM</th>
<th>PARTY IMAGE</th>
<th>COMPETING CANDIDATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1977: Extreme right ring breaks away and founds National Front/Εθνική Παράταξη.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Term Dates</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Leader/Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George Rallis</td>
<td>8/05/1980 – 7/11/1981</td>
<td>Same as above but more conservative-moderate image (right of center)</td>
<td>E. Averoff Tositsas (Ultra-conservative populist right)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kostas Karamanlis
{former: ONNED
(youth of New Democracy)}

1/03/1997 – 1999: Euroskepticism
2000: Centrist party, socially sensitive

New relationship state-citizen: fight against corruption, re-foundation of the state, effective & transparent management.

Rising prices Greece’s benchmark problem (laggard within EU)

1997: George Souflias** (Centrist/Neoliberal)
Miltiades Evert (Ultra-conservative-Populist right)
Vyron Polydoras (Ultra-conservative Populist right)

1999: Stefanos Manos** (Neoliberal) founds The Liberals/Οι Φιλελεύθεροι

1999: Stefanos Manos** (Neoliberal) founded the Liberal Party

2000: George Karatzaferis (Extreme right) breaks away to found Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS/ΛΑΟΣ) party

2001: ND Mayor of Athens Dimitris Avramopoulos (Center right) breaks away to found Movement of Free Citizens/Κίνημα Ελεύθερων Πολιτών

Mitsotakis did not approve how Foreign Minister A. Samaras handled the FYROM issue and expelled him.

** In 1997 Souflas, Manos and four other ND parliamentarians did not follow the party line on a parliamentary vote on Public Enterprises/ΔΕΚΟ and Kostas Karamanlis expelled them.

Appendix III

ND& PASOK: Electoral Results in National and European Elections 1974-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Election Date</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>PASOK</th>
<th>% of the popular vote</th>
<th>Seats in Vouli</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No of Votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/11/74</td>
<td>2.669.133</td>
<td>666.413</td>
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<td>2.762.309</td>
<td>35,87</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/06/85</td>
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<td>2.916.735</td>
<td>40,84</td>
<td>45,82</td>
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<td>39,13</td>
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<td>2.724.334</td>
<td>46,19</td>
<td>40,68</td>
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<td>8/04/90</td>
<td>3.088.137</td>
<td>2.543.042</td>
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<td>3.003.988</td>
<td>45,36</td>
<td>40,54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Election Date</td>
<td>No of Votes gathered</td>
<td>% of the popular vote</td>
<td>Seats in EP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
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<td>PASOK</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>PASOK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/10/81</td>
<td>1.779.462</td>
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<td>40,12</td>
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<td>41,59</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2.366.460</td>
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<td>35,96</td>
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<td>2.459.470</td>
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<td>37,65</td>
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<td>13/06/99</td>
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<td>2.116.507</td>
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<td>13/06/04</td>
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<td>2.083.260</td>
<td>43,04</td>
<td>34,02</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Appendix IV

Table 1: Parties gaining more than 1%, parties entering Parliament and the effective number \((N_p)\) of Greek parties (1974-2007) based on the Index of Laakso & Taagepera (1979).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Election</th>
<th>No of Parties (at least 1% of national vote)</th>
<th>No of Parties in Greek Parliament</th>
<th>Effective Number of Parties ((N_p))</th>
<th>Electoral law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/1974</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,78</td>
<td>65/1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/1977</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,35</td>
<td>626/1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1981</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,10</td>
<td>626/1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1989</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,40</td>
<td>1847/1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/1989</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,32</td>
<td>1847/1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1993</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,18</td>
<td>1907/1990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Np for all national elections has been calculated by the author based on official elections’ results (Ministry of Interior Affairs, www.ypes.gr); see also: Appendix IV. For more information on the calculation of the effective No of Parties see Lakso and Taagepera (1979); Lijphart (1999). Information on the electoral laws are available in Mendrinou (2000) and the Greek Elections Portal (http://www.ekloges.gr).

Table 2: Disproportionality in Greek General Elections based on Gallagher’s (1991) Least Squares (LSq) Index (1974-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Elections</th>
<th>Electoral Law</th>
<th>LSq Disproportionality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/1977</td>
<td>626/1977</td>
<td>13,58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1981</td>
<td>626/1977</td>
<td>8,40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1985</td>
<td>1516/1985</td>
<td>7,08</td>
</tr>
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<td>10/1993</td>
<td>1907/1990</td>
<td>7,57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/1996</td>
<td>1907/1990</td>
<td>9,45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2000</td>
<td>1907/1990</td>
<td>6,78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 presents the deviation of the Greek electoral system from proportionality, to illustrate how the electoral system may hamper small parties and produce disproportional representation of all parties. Michael Gallagher calculated the LSq for Greece (1974-2007); the indices are available on his website: http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/index.php (See also: Mendrinou, 2000). For more information about the use of the Gallagher index, see: Gallagher (1991); Lijphart (1999). Information
on the electoral laws are available in Mendrinou (2000) and the Greek Elections Portal (http://www.ekloges.gr).
For information on the electoral results, see: Ministry of Interior (http://www.ypes.gr).

References:


Secondary Data Sources:


