Immigration, Elites and the European Union:
How UKIP Frames Its Populist Discourse

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Abstract

This paper sets out to assess empirically the traits of the populist vein enshrined in the rhetoric of the UK Independence Party, moving from a "strategic constructivist" approach that focuses on how UKIP frames its political discourse. We start by providing an overview of the arguments advanced to explain the recent rise of UKIP, ranging from macro-level phenomena to nation-specific aspects and, most crucially in our perspective, to actor-centred strategies. We go on to take into account the literature on populism, in order to distil appropriate concepts for operationalization, and we briefly recall how the "populist" elements in the stances and features of the party have been described. We finally turn to our core task: qualitative analysis of the five keynote speeches delivered by Nigel Farage at the party conference in 2011-2015. The categories we use allow us to understand which representations of the "elite" and the "people", which presuppositions and explicit arguments mark the five speeches, arguably best suited to represent the wider discourse of UKIP.

Although populism in the United Kingdom is not only confined to the UK Independence Party, UKIP is certainly its most representative and successful instance in Britain. Between 2010 and 2015, under the leadership of Nigel Farage, UKIP has risen to become one of the leading standard bearers of Euroscepticism throughout the whole of (Western) Europe. Indeed, to a reasonable extent the rise of British populism can be linked, directly or indirectly, to the increasingly effective agency of the party during this time span. Such consolidation of the party can firstly be attributed to a strategy aiming to reinforce its local appeal and momentum through local elections and by-elections, year after year. On the ideological side, one informed understanding (Ford & Goodwin 2014) contends that the key to the appeal of UKIP has been the successful blending of criticism of the European Union, concern against mass immigration, and hostility towards the distant elites in Westminster and Brussels.

This paper aims to clarify the relationship between populism and the ideology of UKIP, which exhibits unequivocal anti-elite and anti-immigration stances in addition to its core anti-EU leanings. In order to assess how instances of populism emerge from the discourse of UKIP, or how the party frames its populist

discourse, we analyse the five keynote speeches delivered by Farage at the annual party conference since 2011.

The first section provides an overview of the macro-level, nation-specific and actor-centred factors that have been noted in interpreting the rise of UKIP. The second section recalls the main approaches to populism that are found in the literature, with a view to making use of an empirically functional conceptualisation of the phenomenon. The third section contains an introduction to how the populist vein of UKIP has been analysed and summarised. The fourth one highlights the power of discursive framing, also identifying the methodology that we use for the discourse analysis and the key elements that we look for. Such an examination leads us to understand how the categories of populism are employed in the discourse of UKIP, which also provides us with insights about the specific brand(s) of populism to which Farage's party adheres.

The rise of UKIP: Explanatory factors at various levels

Generally speaking, three arrays of factors can be invoked to interpret the rise of populist forces. At the macro- analytical level, accounts of the impact of phenomena such as globalisation, the transformation to post-industrial societies and "modernisation" have often been brought to the fore. At the meso- analytical level, scholars have focused on country-specific aspects mainly of an institutional kind, aiming to identify the structures of political opportunities that the populist parties come to face. At the micro- analytical level, attention is devoted to political agents within countries, such as parties and leaders (particularly in top-down perspectives) and voters themselves (in bottom-up perspectives). We maintain that factors belonging to these three levels can interact, which potentially results in the creation of "critical junctures". Furthermore, each set of factors can be divided according to a second criterion: such mechanisms can be long-term and relatively stable arrangements and features whose impact gets triggered under particular conditions, or they can be situational and contingent events opening up a previously absent "window of opportunity".

In a sense, Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin's (2014) celebrated account of the *Revolt on the Right* of British politics falls under the structuralist label. Certainly the two scholars' understanding of the increasing success of UKIP is theoretically sophisticated and includes variables at different levels; anyway it resonates with the "losers of globalisation" tradition of studies, explicitly linking itself to the studies of Hans-Georg Betz (1993; 2012) and Adam Przeworski (1985). Changes related to globalisation, de-industrialisation, and the spread of more "postmodern" values seem to have economically and culturally alienated chunks of older and scarcely educated citizens, mainly belonging to the working class or the petty bourgeoisie, thus enabling subsequent "matching" between those voters and a populist party. When it comes to more recent macro-level factors, the overlapping crises of the European Union must be mentioned: limited accountability of its technocratic elites, "enlargement fatigue", economic turmoil in the Eurozone, difficulties in framing an identity and a global role for itself, hesitant slowness in reacting to the refugee crisis. Another relevant and historically new factor is the simultaneous consolidation ("contagion") of Eurosceptic and anti-establishment political forces in many countries.

From an institutional viewpoint, the British political scenario has never been a breeding ground for outsiders, *in primis* because of its high thresholds to entry. By referring to "institutions" in a wider and more sociological way, a factor that has been singled out is a long-standing sense of crisis related to the weak connection between the self-perception of the British people and Britain's post-imperial condition (Wallace 1991). Secondly, the traditional divisiveness of the European issue within the British society and political arena, whose polarizing potential increased after Thatcher's Eurosceptic turn, has also amplified its impact (and advantaged the Eurosceptic stance of UKIP) after external events have made it more salient. Thirdly, as in other countries but with distinctive timing, there has been convergence in the political space between the "mainstream" parties, as attempts to reach the rising middle classes have taken place in accordance with the interpretation by Ford and Goodwin. The conversion of the Labour Party into the New Labour diminished its difference from the Conservatives in the economic sphere; the Tories' liberal turn on values has shocked their most socially conservative voters; coupled with their (allegedly) over-liberal or ineffective records in reducing immigration, these shifts have estranged a part of their constituencies and opened up niches for new contenders.

Coming to country-specific factors, firstly, a parliamentary expenses scandal had burst out in 2009, involving politicians of all the three traditional parties, and has continued to echo. Secondly, after 2010 the Liberal Democrats have fallen into disrepute due to their ill-advised strategic choices and broken promises while participating in the Coalition government with the Conservatives: indeed, they have lost much of the "congeniality", prestige and protest votes they had acquired through decades spent as a principled opposition party. Thirdly, in the first half of the life of the Coalition, austerity was having detrimental effects on the national economy, which would start to show stronger GDP growth only during the last two years. Fourthly, for years net immigration has consisted of hundreds of thousands of individuals, many of whom coming from Southern and Eastern Europe: the Tories' announced intention to reduce it to tens of thousands, which was clearly unattainable without unilaterally violating EU legislation on the freedom of movement, ended up undermining the reputation of Cameron's party on that issue. Finally, the increase in pro-independence sentiments in Scotland and the rise of the Scottish National Party have fuelled an opposite surge of English resentment about the *status quo* of the devolution arrangements.

The micro- level of political agents is studied by looking at the specific socio-demographic constituency of UKIP (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 2015; Evans & Mellon 2015). Furthermore, its organisational (un)effectiveness can be understood as a pre-requisite that enables or prevents this party to exploit favourable external conditions: UKIP has prided itself on its amateurism for years and years, while during the 2015 electoral campaign it only partly managed to solve its previous deficiencies (Goodwin & Milazzo 2015). Another source of increased success has been identified in the leadership of Nigel Farage, a man with a long-lasting and respected personal history inside the party, whose flair in playing the role of the "common man" has often been stressed (Docx 2013; Elwes 2014). Considerations about the strategic choices of the party also belong here, whether they concern the relationships with other parties (i.e. UKIP's refusal of any electoral pacts with the Tories to obtain an in-out referendum on the EU membership), its local strengthening over the

last years or, crucially, its political discourse. Indeed, according to Ford and Goodwin's understanding of the appeal of UKIP, since 2010 the party has tightly blended a number of issues around the theme of Europe, so as to make it work "a symbol of other problems in society and perceived threats to the nation: unresponsive and out-of-touch elites in Brussels and Westminster; a breakdown in respect for authority and British traditions; and, most importantly, the onset of mass immigration" (Ford and Goodwin 2014: 146).

We subscribe to the view that renewed attention should be devoted to the agency of the political force itself. In fact, we agree that the "contagion" of populist parties on the radical right may consist of actor-led diffusion and adaptation of a new "master frame" to the national contexts (Rydgren 2005), and we recognise that the performances of such parties have much to do with struggles over issue salience and issue ownership (Mudde 2010). Therefore, our approach broadly amounts to a form of "strategic constructivism", not to deny the importance of material factors, but to underline that "[t]o what extent ideational revision results in profound change is dependent on political entrepreneurship and the alternatives available at the time of crisis" (Bratberg 2011: 330-331). If entrepreneurs can foster political change through strategic framing of shared meanings, then it is straightforward to posit that discursive practices are highly involved in such processes. Especially in critical junctures that correspond to favourable "rhetorical situations", discourse can promote frames that reshape common understandings while resonating with lived experiences and emotions at the mass level, thus having the potential to re-define group boundaries. The room of manoeuvre for constrained but noteworthy agency is well expressed by Benjamin Krämer (2014: 67), who specifically refers to populism:

> *In this potentially self-fulfilling prophecy, populism refers to attitudes as collective ones, even if they have not crystallized so far, and to categories as collectively shared and natural (such as ''the people'' or ''the nation'') even if this vision of the social world has not been widely shared or explicitly considered so far. Of course, such a work of construction needs a basis consisting of latent dispositions that are made explicit and sometimes modified within the restraints imposed by their previous structure. By paradoxically lending their voice to the ''silent majority,'' populist movements or leaders enunciate attitudes that did not exist in the sense that they have never reached that level of concreteness and explicitness before.*

Our aim is to understand how populist elements are framed so as to contribute to the rhetorical strategy of UKIP: we must then start by clarifying how populism can be conceptualised.

Conceptualisations of populism

It has become rather commonplace to begin discussions of populism by pointing out the slipperiness of the concept itself, often defined in different ways depending on usage contexts (Taggart 2000). In fact, populism is perhaps of the most controversial concepts in the political realm. Scholars have frequently raised doubts about the interpretations holding sway, justifying to some extent the suggestion that attempts to specify a clear-cut meaning amount to "defining the undefinable" (Mudde 2004: 542). Anyway, the recent literature on the topic consists of at least three approaches, seeing populism as a strategy in the organisational sense, as an ideology and, finally, as a discourse or a style.

Concerning the first branch, the most relevant definition comes from Kurt Weyland: "populism is best defined as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers" (Weyland 2001: 14). Though influential in informing empirical analysis dealing with Latin American cases (Ellner 2003; Roberts 2003), such a view is affected by shortcomings. Benjamin Moffitt and Simon Tormey (2013: 6) contend that "[t]he primary difficulty with this definition is that it identifies modes of organisation or strategy that appear across the political spectrum in many different articulations that we would ordinarily never consider calling 'populist'", also recalling Hawkins (2010) in underlining that several social or religious movements or forms of community politics could be categorised as instances of populism. Weyland's definition is also problematic in that it assumes as a necessary condition for populism an amorphous organisational structure, while populism has also been shown to prosper in contexts of party discipline. Moreover, the phenomenon itself of the personalisation and "presidentialization" of politics (Poguntke & Webb 2005) is surely not limited to populist leaders and parties, but encompasses the whole political spectrum instead (Swanson & Mancini 1996).

Another strand of literature, probably dominant during the last years, considers populism as an ideology. Following the morphological approach developed by Michael Freeden (1998), most scholars adhering to it view populism as a "thin-centred ideology", marked by an identifiable but restricted core of principles that, alone, are insufficient to provide answers to the defining political issues of a society. Already laid out by Yves Mény and Yves Surel (2002), the interpretation of populism as an ideological interpretative schema has also been taken up by Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (2008: 3), who consider it as "an ideology that pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous others who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights and values". Cas Mudde's definition (2004: 543, emphasis in the original) is the most influential one: "*an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the* volonté générale *(general will) of the people*". Since the defining concepts - the pure people, the corrupt elite and the general will - are "empty vessels", populism is found in conjunction with a range of "thicker" ideologies giving them context-specific meaning (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). The leverage of Mudde's contribution is explicitly acknowledged by Koen Abts and Stefan Rummens (2007: 409), who wish to simplify his formulation by defining populism as "*a thin-centered ideology which advocates the sovereign rule of the people as a homogeneous body*". Ben Stanley (2008) similarly considers it as a thin ideology whose core concepts are: the existence of two homogeneous units of analysis - "the people" and "the elite" - in an antagonistic relationship with each other, respectively connoted with positive and negative value judgments, and the doctrine of popular sovereignty.

The last branch thinks of populism as a peculiar discourse or as a political style (the two understandings are not exactly equivalent). In line with the latter, Jan Jagers and Stefaan Walgrave (2007: 322) argue that "populism is a political communication style of political actors that refers to the people". In

the definition given by Pierre-Andrè Taguieff (2006: 80), "populism identifies neither with a specific political regime, nor with specific ideological contents. It is a political style susceptible to multiple ideologies, it changes its political colour according to them". Among the staunchest supporters of this conception, Moffitt and Tormey (2013: 7) embrace a performative account of populism as a style of politics, meant as "*the repertoires of performance that are used to create political relations*": the three features that they identify as necessary and sufficient are the appeal to "the people", a "perception of crisis, breakdown or threat", and the use of "bad manners". The well-known stance expressed by Ernesto Laclau, who qualified populism as a discourse and a logic, is not dramatically far from this view. Yet the political theorist tended to see populism as *the* logic of political action through his post-Marxist lens, which focused on the discursive creation of a historical bloc centred on "the people" and on the prevailing of a "logic of equivalence" among them.

Actually, both qualitative and quantitative content analysis has been used as a tool for empirical analyses of populism. A recent contribution by Paris Aslanidis (2015) has sought to retrieve Laclau's discursive orientation but turning it into a quantitative direction. By noticing that the literature referring to Mudde's definition has in fact operationalized the concept as "an *anti-elite discourse in the name of the sovereign People*", and by questioning the conceptual foundations of Mudde's "thin-centred ideology" approach, he has aimed to strip it of its "unnecessary ideological clause". In his words, "to seize and measure populism, it has been found sufficient to meticulously analyze the discourse of political actors and see if discursive elements of exalting the "noble People" and condemning "corrupt elites" in the name of popular sovereignty are there, and how much of them" (ibidem: 9-10). His emphasis on discourse can be seen as an attempt to conciliate the main features of Mudde's definition with an orientation towards empirical identification of a "populist frame".

While the literature reflects different understandings of populism, the commonalities are also significant. First of all, while multidimensional concepts including social or economical features happened to be dominant in the past (Weyland 2001), the conceptualisations presented here are eminently *political*. In the light of an increased variance of the content of economic policies proposed by "populist" actors, they are no more understood as a necessary feature of populism (Weyland 1999; Aslanidis 2015), and in fact the same holds true for the content of policy proposals in general (Stanley 2008), or the social electoral constituency of the populist force (Barr 2009). Some political factors that conventional wisdom links with populism have been excluded from most definitions, either because of their significant variance among instances of supposed populism, or because of the scientific community's aim to build a *classical* and *minimal* definition consisting of few *necessary* and (collectively) *sufficient* conditions. Therefore, the presence of a charismatic leader (Aslanidis 2015; Pappas 2014), the promotion of direct democracy (Stanley 2008) and the organisational structure (Moffitt & Tormey 2013; Barr 2009) have often been kept out.

For our present empirical purposes, we tentatively believe that some reconciliation among those perspectives is possible. A hint in this direction comes from Mudde's own celebrated contribution (2004), which after defining populism as an ideology seems to deal with it in rhetorical and discursive fashion more

than once. Even without accepting Stavrakakis and Katsambekis's (2014) claim that Mudde's definition actually derives from Laclau's discursive logic, we can highlight again that Aslanidis's recent approach, while denying the ideological core of populism, explicitly preserves the main features of that definition. Another theoretical insight is Hawkins's (2009) view of populism as a discourse combining elements of rhetoric and ideology, which accounts for the assertion that discourse and ideology are indeed intertwined. Coming to the empirical side, "[a]s an expression of the populist ideology, populist communication strategies may be used to identify the populist ideology empirically, i.e. the operationalisation of the populist ideology may be based on an analysis of populist communication strategies" (Kriesi 2014: 364). And in conclusion, from a point of view linked to rhetorical analysis, ideologies are blends of content and form: non-static structures of thought which can be partially altered and influenced by the challenges coming from the surrounding context, and that encompass ranges of categories, arguments, presuppositions, frames and cognitive shortcuts (Finlayson 2013).

Having analysed the prevailing understandings of populism, we can now summarise the populist traits found in the attitude of UKIP, before specifying hypotheses on the populist discourse of Farage's party.

The populist vein of UKIP

An overview of the influence of the populist "tradition" on UKIP is offered by Karine Tournier-Sol (2015). A first remark is that UKIP qualifies as an "anti-political establishment party", in Amir Abedi's terminology. A political force can be labelled as such according to three criteria: "[i]t challenges the status quo in terms of major policy issues and core elements of the political system"; "[i]t perceives itself as a challenger to the parties that make up the political establishment"; and "[i]t asserts that there exists a fundamental divide between the establishment and the people, thereby implying that all mainstream parties, whether in government or in the opposition, are essentially the same" (Abedi 2004: 12).

The first condition is satisfied, as immigration has stood out as a central issue in the voters' minds for years, and as the membership of the European Union and the first-past-the-post voting are surely "core elements of the political system". Moreover, frequent allusions to the "LibLabCon" consensus and electral appeals to "Sod the lot", or the assertion that the three parties' proposals over the main policy issues are almost indistinguishable, contribute to the squeezing of the traditional parties into a single group. Finally, the party is found to rely on the populist argument that "ordinary people are being sold out by an out-of-touch political elite" (Geddes 2014: 29).

The party has exhibited an image of "proud" amateurism, representing the willingness to speak for "the people" and the authenticity in doing so. Therefore, UKIP has consistently made appeals to the "common sense", to the point that his policy proposals appeared under the heading of "Common sense policies"; it has bashed the political class as people never having had any jobs in the "real world" outside politics; and it has claimed, again and again, to be the only one party ready to talk straight on contentious issues (Tournier-Sol 2015: 150).

The approach of UKIP to national democracy is surely interesting. Thanks to its earlier single-issue Euroscepticism, Farage's party has managed to exploit much of the ideational legacy of traditional British Euroscepticism, including references to the threat of a "European super-State". The lack of legitimacy of the EU is exposed as a political deception stripping Britain of its national sovereignty, since when the British political elites falsely depicted the entrance into the EEC as just a common market. Thus, what UKIP has engaged in is a "re-moulding of the Eurosceptic tradition along populist lines" (Tournier-Sol 2015: 142), which calls for the "taking back" of previous self-government. Turning to national politics, the party exhibits a fascination for instruments of direct democracy such as local and national referendums. Yet there is even more: although on occasion UKIP prides itself on being represented in all four corners of the United Kingdom, it also wishes to represent the growing *English* discontent in the face of Scottish demands.

All in all, although anti-establishment populism "has been part and parcel of the party's thinking since its foundation, it has been increasingly stressed in recent years under the agency of Nigel Farage as a strategy to widen its electoral appeal and transcend its image as a right-wing offshoot of the Conservative Party" (Tournier-Sol 2015: 150). What the scholar describes as a "catch-all attitude" displayed by UKIP is maybe a corollary of this populist strategy, given that no appeal to "the people" can logically co-exist with the explicit pursuit of particular constituencies. It is also a corollary of a growing recognition of the possibility to attract support not only from traditionalist, Eurosceptic Conservative voters, but also from disgruntled, working-class Labour voters.

Finally, one oft-mentioned populist feature is the current leader himself. As noted by Jay Elwes (2014):

> *Farage's appearance, and his ability to play the everyman, has been crucial to Ukip's appeal as a party that is explicitly not part of this elite structure. He smokes, goes to the boozer, wanders up to people outside pubs for a bit of banter. None of the other three party leaders could dream of doing likewise. The whole Farage character is central to the notion that Ukip is a break with the past, that the party is not part of the metropolitan class. [...] The fact that Farage is a former public schoolboy and city trader is lost in all this. Unlike the other party leaders he has transcended his background.*

Let us now relate these insights to the prevalent conceptualisations of populism. Some traits of UKIP, like reliance on a charismatic leader or emphasis on direct democracy, are common among populist actors but not part of minimal definitions of populism. Anyway, UKIP displays the three defining elements of a populist force according to the Mudde/Aslanidis criterion: positive reference to the people, negative reference to the (political) elite, and some kind of deference to the will (or "common sense") of the people.

What distinguishes different subtypes of populism is the use they make of its fundamental concepts: who is included in the "pure people" and who is not, who is included in the "corrupt elite" and who is not. By subsuming into the "enemy group" both "corrupt elites" and "dangerous others", Takis Pappas (2014: 29) recalls three subtypes of European populism:

> *in primarily political populism the antithesis is between the "pure" people (il popolo) and the current "corrupt" political class (the political establishment); in ethnic nationalist populism, a national community with reputedly common cultural attributes (an éthnos or kulturnation) is pitted against*

menacing foreign forces (immigrants, the EU); regional separatist populism, finally, echoes Europe's ancient centre-periphery cleavage as it sets secessionist regions (e.g., Catalonia, Padania, Scotland) against their respective national centres (cf. Roma ladrona).

Which type(s) does UKIP belong to? On first approximation, no category seems wholly improbable. True, the populism of UKIP easily falls under the "primarily political" label. Yet, although UKIP does not subscribe to ethnic racism, it can also be viewed as defending a "national community with reputedly common cultural attributes" from mass immigration and the EU. Finally, UKIP is far from being a separatist entity but in a sense is a "regionalist" one, because of its defence of the English nation against a supposedly out-of-touch and careless political centre.

In sum, UKIP could be included in two and a half of the mentioned categories. But the fundamental underpinning of our "strategic" approach is this: each one of the three lines of populist framing is expected to allow Farage's party to reap some benefits among the voting population. At the same time, achieving consistency and reaching an equilibrium among the three frames is a complex task for the party and involves trade-offs. Therefore, empirical analysis has to be carried out to shed light over the party's actual rhetorical choices.

Methodology and hypotheses

Our focus on discourse rests on two pillars. Firstly, it is consistent with approaches conceiving of populism as discourse, but also with approaches willing to find empirical referents for its ideological tenets. Secondly, it derives from our attention to the (context-dependent) strategic power of discursive agency. Discourse has potential to hide divergence between ideas or interests or, at least, to move them to the background; conversely, it can be used to bring divergence between or within groups to the fore, and to describe and re-define the boundaries between such groups.

Then, Laclau's "logic of equivalence" and "logic of difference" must be seen as active efforts of discursive framing. A concept such as "the people" is what the literature on discourse analysis views as an "empty signifier" (Finlayson 2013: 198). If parties can turn it into an instrument for the construction of relations of equivalence and frontiers of difference, there is reason to believe that parties that especially engage in the "politics of identity" are especially well-equipped to do it. When trying to re-frame such a concept, the linkage between its "entrepreneurial" usage and its more traditional understanding(s) must be somehow subverted yet somehow preserved. Pre-existing understandings and feelings among the public are constraints and rhetorical assets at the same time: they are foundations on which arguments based on implicitly shared presuppositions can be built.

Our interest is devoted to the five keynote speeches that Nigel Farage delivered at the annual UKIP party conference since 2011 until 2015[1], which are the years of the "critical juncture" corresponding to the Eurosceptic force's leap forward. The valuable consequence of this choice is to limit our perspective to a

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[1] As far as we know, no reliable written version of Farage's five speeches is retrievable on the Internet. Therefore, we found them on the YouTube platform and transcribed them. Though we hope to have reduced to a minimum amount the errors arising from the transcription, we are responsible for any such errors.

handful of instances of discourse that are comparable in terms of circumstances, audience, and general style. We then reckon we must privilege a qualitative and manual approach, because the extension of the database is limited, and because we mainly deal with very specific parts of the speeches.

Following an Aristotelian categorisation, some British scholars use a tripartite scheme for discourse analysis underlining elements of *ethos*, appealing to the personal credibility of the speaker, elements of *pathos*, evoking or amplifying emotions among the public, and elements of *logos*, presenting logical or quasi-logical arguments (Finlayson & Martin 2014; i.e. Crines & Hayton 2012). We also take inspiration from Norman Fairclough (2003)'s Critical Discourse Analysis. Among the fundamental categories that we shall take into account, based on his approach, we mention the "network of social practices" in which the discursive action takes place, the "social event" it represents, and the "genre" of the text, encompassing its purposes, the social relationships among the involved individuals, and the means of communication. More crucial is the speaker's "orientation to difference", potentially including up to five types: acknowledgement of difference and openness towards it, accentuation of difference and polemic against it, attempt to go beyond difference, explicit choice to set aside difference and focus on what is in common, or rhetorical representation of a consensus "suppressing" difference. "Intertextuality", too, is a category deserving our interest, since it consists of the inclusion of other "voices" in the text; and of course, the representation of other social actors and social events is key to our assessment. Another noteworthy aspect is the use of value judgments, attribution of blame and praise, etc. And we especially attach importance to presuppositions assumed to be self-evident and/or shared by the public.

The two kinds of discourse analysis significantly overlap[2]. For instance, strongly asserted value judgments, blame and praise can be said to belong to the realm of *pathos*, while implicit presuppositions pertain to the sphere of *logos*. Furthermore, "orientation to difference", "intertextuality" and representation of other actors have much to do with the depiction of "the people" and the enemy groups, but also with the *ethos* that the leader and the party can claim in comparison to the political competitors. The relevant questions now become: what do we look for, and what do we expect to find?

Firstly, the three criteria identified by Mudde and acknowledged by Aslanidis as empirically valid are our guiding star: positive reference to the "people", negative reference to the "elite" (at least the political elite), and some kind of positive allusion to the "general will". One interesting additional element results from a suggestion by Moffitt and Tormey (2013): since populism draws strength from perceptions of a crisis, a breakdown, or a threat, we pay attention to statements conveying such a perception. (Though admittedly interesting, their other insight about "bad manners" cannot be easily operationalized.) And finally, determining who (in addition to the elites) is included among the "dangerous others" helps highlighting which subtypes of populism are outlined in the political discourse of UKIP.

Plausible answers to the second question lie in the following set of hypotheses.

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[2] In turn, it will not be possible - as it is both more complicated and less central to our purpose - to provide analysis of the more "performative" elements of the speeches, including body language and the use of the voice.

- *The corrupt elite*. To attack effectively the "political class", the elite criticized by UKIP should always include the mainstream parties. Given the party's "core business", they should also include the European elites. For UKIP to champion the English cause, they may also encompass the Scottish (SNP) elites. Among the national elites, economic ones should not be attacked, given UKIP's willingness to be perceived as a pro-business, pro-market party.

- *Dangerous others*. The EU and mass immigration can be added to the elite as "dangerous others", and maybe Scotland too. SNP (elite) stalwarts and EU elites can substitute for the political entities they represent, but immigrants are not "elites": we wonder if the criticism of immigration will simply rely on other, non-populist frames.

- *The pure people*. To foster a truly catch-all appeal, the "people" must be so from a political point of view which unites them against the political elite. Yet, for a party engaged in the "politics of identity", they must also be a culturally homogeneous group: here the question is how much nativism will be incorporated, who will be depicted as a legitimate member of "the people" and who as a foreign body. Somehow, Farage should also be expected to speak for the English people without alienating the Scottish and Welsh one, perhaps simply by shifting blame onto the Scottish elites.

- *Crisis, breakdown or threat*. We expect Farage to evoke all the crises he can, including: disconnect between elites and people, a crisis in or with the EU (or both), threats to shared culture and identity, and a breakdown of relationships among the constituent nations of the United Kingdom.

About the precise framing of popular sovereignty and the general will, we make no assumption.

Analysis of the speeches

In the United Kingdom, each party holds an annual conference in autumn, usually between mid-September and the first half of October (a second gathering event in spring is generally less important). Party conferences are "the annual events where MPs, councillors and activists from the parties gather to hear their political leaders give platform speeches, to debate and vote on policies, discuss political intrigue and party into the night with like-minded souls"[3]. Among other functions, such conferences are an occasion to attract the attention of the media and achieve public visibility: in fact, the conferences held by the major parties tend not to overlap with each other. In times of increased professionalization of the parties and diminished decisional power of the membership, this externally-oriented function has recently ended up competing with - or gaining the upper hand over - the once established key purposes, namely to define the stances of the party and endorse or reject policy stances.

Farage's keynote speeches, setting the tone for the respective conferences, are instances of the rather well-defined political "genre" of the long speech held by a leader before his supporters. The "genre chain" to which they belong - the group of other "texts" in connection to which they should be read, in Fairclough's

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[3] www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11334315

terminology - encompasses at least every discursive practice through which the party seeks to build stronger linkages with its members, its voters, and the public opinion in general[4]. Communication here is unidirectional, non-mediated, personal, direct and non-interactive. Yet, of course, one of the leader's tasks is to make the listening audience feel involved, for instance through an accessible style and by consistently making inclusive references to "we": he must blur both the differential of power and the social distance distinguishing him from them. As to their purposes, Farage's speeches aim to uphold the "faith" of party members, to galvanise them and exhort them to be locally active, to recapitulate the centrepieces of the party's doctrine and to wrap them up, to back authoritatively the policy proposals freshly conjured up and, decisively, to instil into the wider public a sense both of the messages and of the atmosphere. In the public communication of UKIP, given its almost complete absence from the Houses of Parliament and the centrality of its leader for the image of the party, these speeches by Farage occupy a pre-eminent position,

Eastbourne, 9th September 2011

This discourse marks the comeback of Farage as leader of UKIP, after a rather disappointing result in the 2010 general election (just above 3 per cent) which meant a complete squandering of the momentum gained with the 2009 European elections (above 16 per cent). In that moment, nothing would have led to think that UKIP would soon enjoy a success spree.

The elite & dangerous others. The more "political" form of populism in Pappas's terms is at work here. At the very beginning Farage claims that "all three established political parties [...] are virtually indistinguishable from each other on most major policy issues" and that "you can't put a cigarette paper between them". He explicitly criticizes "our political class", by asserting that they are undermined by both the EU and "political correctness" and consequently incapable to "stand up for the nation", and he chastises them for "[t]heir broken promises and failure to deal with real issues". By a remarkable exercise of "othering", with which he places himself among the people and builds a two-groups difference, he concludes that "we are being led by a group of college kids with no experience of the real world and who always put their careers first". Almost the whole first half of the speech is then devoted to a three-tiered onslaught of the mainstream parties. The Lib Dems are mocked with sarcasm for their record in government; the Labour Party is attacked with *pathos* for its alleged "betrayal of working-class people" through open-door immigration policies. Then, still reflecting the previous closeness of UKIP to Tory stances, Farage takes issue with Cameron's inaction on the EU: he concludes that "the Conservatives get their votes by promising to stand up for the nation and the truth is that they never really meant it in the first place", and that UKIP is the new home for "a patriotic Eurosceptic Conservative voter".

A second attack to "our leaders" comes when Scotland is brought into the picture. Having underlined the "growing feeling that somehow our leaders are ashamed of the very word "England"", Farage joins the ranks of the people again and asserts that "we are discouraged from describing ourselves as English". In

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[4] To be sure, one cannot be wrong in extending the boundaries of the genre chain to the discursive acts of other parties as well, since the political battle is a struggle to conquer the hearts and the minds of the citizens, who are always exposed to different "sirens" simultaneously.

short, if the English resentment isn't addressed, "it will be the English that end the Union by voting to get rid of Scotland, and not Alex Salmond doing it to us". The attribution of blame, conveyed through extensive use of emotion-laden words, thus hits the politicians of Westminster, more than the Scottish First Minister (and avoiding Scotland itself).

Another exemplar and simultaneous building of equivalence and difference appears when Farage, aiming to exploit the success of Eurosceptic parties elsewhere, describes "the mood that is sweeping across Europe" as if it were one single phenomenon: "it is happening right across Northern Europe, that whole political class are under attack for such stupidities as the euro and the illegalities of the bailouts". In particular, the Finnish politician Timo Soini, present there as a guest, is praised as "nobody has done more to rock the establishment, not just in his own country, not just in his own capital in Helsinki, but in the corridors of Brussels as well". Yet the EU elites themselves are almost absent, except for an ironical remark about "a feeling that the days of my good old friend Herman van Rompuy may be numbered."

The people. When bashing the Labour Party for beginning "the myth that all British workers are useless, lazy, can't be bothered and are not worth employing", Farage contends this: "Yes of course, yes of course we know we do have some people living on benefits, dealing in a few drugs on beside [...] but there's a huge number of good ordinary decent people in this country, that want to work, that want to obey to the law, they've been denied from doing it". Through apt manipulation of intertextuality, which means employing the voices of unspecified individuals for rhetoric purposes, he extends the appeal to the Tory side: "[f]or thirteen years the Conservatives were in opposition [...] and for years people said: "Nigel, I agree with you, but we have to vote Conservative because we want to get Labour out". And they used to tell me: "You'll be surprised" they said, "just you wait till David [Cameron] gets in. Well, David is in, isn't he?"

The reference to "the mood that is sweeping across Europe" implicitly presupposes some degree of popular attachment to the new politics and the attacks against the political class. Explicitly, the only other specification of "the people" is found in connection with the English issue. Farage argues that "the English feel put upon" while they "need and deserve accolade with our other partners in this Union"; finally speaking as a leader, he makes a strongly emotional appeal: "Let's save the Union and let's give the English people the self-respect and pride that they so desperately need and deserve!"

Notably, the issue of immigration only appears once among other ones, in relation to Cameron's "broken promise" to reduce its scale. Consequently, there is no trace of ethnic or cultural delimitation of "the people" apart from the reference to the English subgroup of the population.

Crisis, breakdown and threat. A first source of crisis is said to be the fact that the political class's "broken promises and failure to deal with real issues has led to an almost total breakdown in faith and trust in politics in this country". Secondly, the uncertain status of the relationships among the constituent nations of the United Kingdom is described grimly: as "a problem in England", as the English feel put upon and their leaders are ashamed of Englishness, as a gap to plug that requires nothing less than to save the Union.

Popular sovereignty. A first reference is contained in the attack against the Lib Dems: "They seem to support bans on everything, do everything they can to stop us having referendums on key issues, they are

neither liberal nor democratic". The implied assumption is that "having referendums on key issues" is *the* democratic way. The second one is a claim, made in the name of the Eurosceptic movements, that "the best thing we can do in our own countries is to put the interests of our nations and our nations' people first". Those interests are arguably assumed, as in following speeches, to be clear and unambiguous.

Birmingham, 21st September 2012

In 2012 opinion polls were bringing UKIP close to 10 per cent, but the party hadn't yet translated this progress into any kind of electoral success.

The elite & dangerous others. Here, too, the rhetorical onslaught of the political elites is clear since the beginning. Farage devote a some words to Clegg's broken promise about the tuition fees, Cameron's overturned "cast-iron guarantee" of a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, and Miliband's general indecisiveness. Yet "actually it's not about the individuals": "[p]eople are turning to UKIP because they look at the three old parties - they look the same, they sound the same, and many of us now have the impression that this country is run by a bunch of college kids on work experience". To make the logic of difference work and gain *ethos*, Farage counters that "we may have not all the answers in UKIP, but, my goodness me, we've got a front-line team of people who held down proper jobs, who've done things in the world, and we have some understanding of what is going on out there in our country".

The EU elite is more present in this discourse, as Farage violently evokes the menace of a new treaty leading to a federal Europe: "I've been in Strasbourg last week, where Mr. Barroso fired the opening shot - they're not hiding anymore, they're not pretending anymore, they've used the euro crisis to try and take yet more power for themselves". Not only, in the UKIP leader's words, was Barroso arguing for "a stronger army" and "more overseas military intervention": the dangerous "they" were "designing the treaty in such a way that they [want not to hold] any more referendums on this EU question". The EU also appears as a "dangerous other" because of the British contribution to its budget, its implications for immigration policy, and the allegedly harmful consequences of its social, health and environmental policy.

After attacking the "unelected European Commission", the attention turns to the national elites again. Farage expects that the British parties will not approve of the treaty being drafted and will hold a referendum on the issue, which he presents as the likely scenario. What he warns the public against is "the political class uniting around a position" willing to maintain Britain's membership of the single market, therefore he urges the party to "take on the political class" to highlight the advantages of the Brexit option. Moreover, following a traditional argument of British Euroscepticism, "what is happening is now remarkably similar to what happened back in 1975, when [...] the older members of UKIP had the opportunity to vote in that referendum and you were told it was a common market - you were told it was all very nice, the water was lovely, "come on in"". Farage claims that "we [have been] given lies and deceit for decades by UK politicians about the true nature of the European project " and "they're trying to do the same thing again"; in the conclusion of the speech, he recalls that "we will have a political class doing their best to ignore the issue, doing everything they can to give us a fudged, stitched-up referendum".

The people. In fact, this discourse contains very few references to the people as such, even though the leaders is at ease in placing himself among the ordinary people as he does in the quote just mentioned. The other one in which Farage remarks how the leading members of UKIP have held jobs in the real world is the strongest praise of the *ethos* of people (and the party itself). Apart from that, he asserts that "people are coming to us and joining us and supporting us" not only as a means of protest but also "because they see us now as the voice of opposition in British politics on a broad range of issues". On the same line, in one of the many excerpts of this speech in which Farage assumes the tone of a party leader, he recalls the sacrifices and efforts made in the past to proudly underline that UKIP "is now connecting with millions of ordinary men and women out there". Also, in relation to the perils of the EU, Farage tries to enhance the Eurosceptic forces' *ethos* by claiming that "I think the British public and indeed the public now over much of Europe are beginning to see that we were right".

Again, immigration is only one issue among other ones and there are no instances of nativism or delimitation. Finally, Scotland is never mentioned.

Crisis, breakdown and threat. The threat represented by the European Union and by "their" plans for closer integration is a central element of this discourse (and undoubtedly the sense of threat conveyed by Farage's words was a complete exaggeration). Anyway, to the first risk caused by those who are about to turn Europe into "a militarised undemocratic danger to global peace", Farage adds the second risk of a British political class only willing to fudge the issue and preserve the *status quo*. Farage adds that "at a time when we have a 22 per cent youth unemployment rate in Britain, it is completely irresponsible to have a total open door to the whole of Eastern Europe". Finally, "keeping us in this innocuous-sounding single market means that our employment legislation will continue to come from Brussels, that our health and safety legislation will continue to come from Brussels, and that some other crazy elements of environmental policy which are driving manufacturing industry out of this country and sending it across to India".

Popular sovereignty. In fact, *national* sovereignty is the main focus, as when Farage states that "[i]t is only by winning back our independence that we can actually put in place the policies that will regenerate this country". Yet a reference appears where Farage remarks that "on the issue of democracy Mr. Barroso says we must transfer our national democracy to a model of European democracy by which, I mean, he guesses we must give up parliamentary democracy for all time to the unelected European Commission". A second one is presented in direct opposition to the "stitched-up" referendum that the political class would grant. In asking for a referendum of the in/out kind, Farage defines it as (the only) "full, free and fair" one, and equates it with the choice about who will rule over Britain: "We in UKIP demand that this country is given a full, free and fair choice in a referendum so that we can decide who governs Britain".

London, 20th September 2013

When this discourse took place, the good performances obtained in the 2013 local elections and in some recent by-elections provided the party with some momentum on the way to the European elections of the following year. Having to pave the way for that challenge, this was a longer and more complex discourse.

The elite & dangerous others. The difference in *ethos* with the rest of the political class is marked by underlining several times that UKIP talks clear. Most notably, as concerns immigration, "we talk about it honestly, directly" and "we're unafraid to stand up and say it as it is"; instead "the establishment have done everything they can to close down debate on this issue and to decry anybody that dares to discuss the issue somehow as being bad and racist". Farage also repeats that what the mixed groups of citizens interested in UKIP have in common is that "they're fed up to the back teeth of the cardboard cut-out careerists in Westminster who look the same, sound the same, and are never prepared to put the interests of Britain and the British people first [...] And just look at them: it's - it's like a game, isn't it? Spot the difference, between the politicians. They're all desperately themselves fighting to hold the middle ground, which they can't even find or define. They're made up of focus groupies, triangulators (sic), dog whistlers, politicians who daren't say what they really mean". A humorous remark later familiarly strengthens the opposition: "I spent many years working in the financial services industry - yes, I had a job before doing this, I know it's unusual". Here, too, appears in explicit form something that had been implicitly taken for granted in the previous speeches: "What they do know is if they take us on, on the big issues, and debate them openly with us, they will lose. They will lose"; and so "what they decided to do is - they decided not to go for the ball, but to go for the player". Farage also contends that "our own politics frankly has become a charade" as the three party leaders are rhetorically talking tough about immigration, which "is the issue, perhaps, of the biggest disconnect between the political class and the ordinary people in this country". All in all, as UKIP is said to be changing the agenda of British politics, "in terms of rhetoric, the other parties are attempting to move into our territory; but of course without the slightest intention of actually delivering": for instance, "[t]hey all promise a referendum, they've done it in every single general election since 1997, and none of them has really had the slightest intention of ever carrying it through".

On the EU, here Farage begins by using more identity-driven arguments: "we should never have joined this Union in the first place, frankly because we're different", "our geography, our history, our institutions produced by that history, make us look and think differently". Continental Europe does not emerge well from such a historically bizarre comparison, as Farage adamantly builds this implicitly shared vision of a hiatus: "You know our history gives us common law, civil rights, habeas corpus, the presumption of innocence before guilt, the right to a trial by jury; on the continent they have an entirely different system, where confession is the mother of all evidence". Then it is the European Commission that gets framed:

> *I now believe that the European Commission has hijacked the - the very concept and name of Europe. They adopted a flag and anthem, a president [...] and through their mad Euro projects they've driven tens of millions of people into poverty, through their climate change obsession they destroyed much of industry, much of manufacturing industry across Europe, and their refusal to listen to people or offer them any alternatives is now beginning to lead to the kind of very extreme nationalisms that the project was supposed to stop in the first place. And I can declare today that we in UKIP are actually the true Europeans, because we want to live and work and breathe in a Europe of free democratic sovereign States, that trade and cooperate together but are not governed by those monstrous institutions.*

In line with UKIP's neo-liberal roots and Farage's own experience in the financial services sector, this industry is passionately defended. In fact, it is said to be a non-elite one: "it's not all about the City of London [...] and it's not all about the bankers: it's about insurance, reinsurance, stocks and shares, pensions, commodities, a whole range [of] industries, in which Britain is a world leader". Indeed, the rhetorical representation of irreconcilable difference is fully at work in concluding that "we have transferred management of Britain's biggest industry over to a very charming Frenchman who doesn't wish our industry well": the EU is equated with foreign elites.

There is no reference to Scotland, as the focus is on the forthcoming European elections. As regards immigration, Farage actually speaks in positive terms of the people coming from Romania and Bulgaria to work hard in Britain, and yet he does depict a "dangerous other" when he refers to a "Romanian crime wave" already visible in London.

The people. Farage conveniently exploits his party's status as an outsider by stepping in and out of "the people", that is, by speaking as a party leader while representing shared presuppositions introduced by the formula "you know", and then speaking as a member of the people below politics and claiming for instance that "we've never been told the truth" about the real essence of the European integration project. The interpretation of the British identity itself is an attempt to build bonds within the people, by dignifying its historical attributes ("throughout Europe, England was known as the land of liberty, here you could dissent, here you could think freely, independent minds and voices"), yet stopping short of explicitly denigrating the rest of Europe.

We find, here as elsewhere, some vague but positively connoted references to the people. One is a description of the people attending the meetings organised by UKIP throughout the country, who are said to be mainly non-members of UKIP, but "members of the great British public who are interested and engaged", disconnected not from politics but from careerist politicians:

> we have a range of the whole of our society in - in that room, we have workers, employers, self-employed, big businesses, corner-shop owners, rich people, people in the middle, people who are struggling, people young, people old, people unemployed, people few of whom have left-wing or right-wing opinions, they're mostly people roughly somewhere in the middle, very few of them are political activists, some of them haven't voted for anybody for the last 20 years, but they are good, decent, patriotic, hard-working, law-abiding British people, and frankly I feel that we are now the only party that stands up and speaks for them.

Yet the most significant depictions of the people are related to immigration - which is said to be a problem in relation not to the immigrants, but to the scale of the phenomenon. Farage denies being anti-immigration, he even says: "I don't wanna be anti-people from those countries wanting to better their lives", and he recognises that "there are many people that come to Britain that we really should look up to and admire: the people that come here, they work hard, they pay taxes, they contribute to our life, they obey the law, they're not a drain on the health service... of course we welcome, and we understand, why people want to come into this country". In delimiting the boundaries of "the people" he means to represent, he claims he is "speaking here as much for the settled ethnic minorities in this country as I am for the families who've

been here forever". Farage indeed asks: "[H]ow can it be right that people can come here to Britain and effectively claim jobseekers' allowance and housing benefit within a couple of weeks of arriving here? How could that make sense and how can that be fair to our own people, who in many cases have paid, their families have paid into the social security system for generations?" The dichotomy built here is between having been in Britain for a couple weeks or for generations, and one is left wondering whether the line is drawn. And yet Farage explicitly condemns racism.

Lip service to common sense as regards immigration is paid when asserting that "you really haven't got to be a rocket scientist to work this out". Twice in the speech, the fact that a 67 per cent majority of the people now support withdrawal from the EU is used as a reference to the *vox populi*, to show that "Britain is moving in UKIP's direction".

Crisis, breakdown and threat. The issue of immigration is clearly pre-eminent within the speech. It is a "risk", even more so with the end of the transitional period for Romania and Bulgaria: its scale "is totally unprecedented, it has never happened before, the effects are obvious in every single part of our national life, with massive strain on the NHS and primary schools, shortage of course of social housing, and a driving up, in many cases, of house prices - and I feel very sorry for the one million youngsters in this country who are currently without work, and yet we have a massive oversupply in the unskilled labour market coming into this country from Eastern Europe and elsewhere". All of these aspects are identified as problems - worse so given that immigration in the years to come is described as difficult to forecast accurately - but the main amount of *pathos* in this speech is devoted to the European Union *per se*, the European Arrest Warrant, the harmful EU legislation and the British "difference". In turn, it seems that on immigration Farage wants a bit less to represent an existing consensus through catchphrases and a bit more to build it through arguments. Yet once the leader strikes a different chord, when lamenting the "Romanian crime wave" that has hit London in the last years (apparently blaming open-door immigration policy for a phenomenon that has taken place in a period when there was definitely no open-door policy towards Romanian immigrants).

Another remark is that "we've got to free up British business, we've got to get European laws off their backs". But in the end, what the speech explicitly aims to is to convey positive messages about the future, so problems are treated as problems, instead of being depicted as breakdowns or overarching crises.

Popular sovereignty. Here again, the emphasis is more on independence from the EU than on the precise internal balance between popular democracy and representative democracy. So Farage claims that by exiting the European Union "we'll get our borders back, and we'll get our Parliament back, we'll get our democracy back". One element of direct democracy that is consistently backed is the people's opportunity to make its voice be heard through an EU referendum. The political class is attacked for having promised kinds of referendums on the European issue since 1997 but never having delivered. This leads Farage to suggest what follows: "we turn the European elections on May the 22nd into the referendum that we've never had, so that we can express our opinion on the European Union and on open borders".

Doncaster, 26th September 2014

By this time UKIP had obtained a historical result, beating both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party in the 2014 European elections, and it looked forward to carry the momentum forward towards the general election (despite a less favourable electoral system). This speech is then marked by orientations which are less "European" and more "national", as Farage seeks to depict the party as a credible alternative.

The elite. Here the attack to the political class is manifold, firstly general and then taking issue with one mainstream party after another. The logic of equivalence is heavily used while commenting the success achieved despite the hostility of the establishment, with which the newspapers are explicitly grouped, too:

> *the establishment threw at us absolutely everything they got, even people we would have thought were friends of ours, the Eurosceptic newspapers couldn't do enough to say "Please, please, don't vote UKIP! Please, maintain the established political order in this country!". You know the established political order that I mean, don't you? The Labour, Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties: parties that look the same, parties that sound the same, parties between whom frankly on major issues of substance there is now very little difference, and parties that have all been committed to signing Britain up to the European project, parties that have been wholly uncritical of open door immigration, parties that have contributed directly to a downward shift in living standards in this country over the course of the last decade and more.*

Farage goes on to argue that "mainstream national media, [...] rather like our political class, rarely leave the confines of Westminster, or its restaurants, or bars". Repetitions full of *pathos* are also used to claim that the establishment has "failed them, failed their families and failed their lives". Farage then complains about the "total and absolute corruption of our voting system" due to "a postal voting system that [...] has led to fraud, that has lead now to intimidation, that has rendered some of our by-elections almost pointless to contest". That is allegedly true for the Labour Party, whose "one-party State" in the North of England has led to "complacency", "corruption", and the child abuse in Rotherham "on a scale that I think is actually difficult to decent people to even comprehend", caused by the fact that "because they were so scared of causing a division within the very multicultural society that they had created, they were more fearful of being branded racists than they were of taking on and tackling an evil that existed within that town". But it is also true for the Lib Dems and the Tories, who don't denounce the postal voting system "because, actually, they are using [it] in their strong areas, too". At times the political class is attacked collectively: "our political class in Westminster simply seem to be unable to comprehend and understand what the effects of wage compression have been on people's lives" (due to immigration), "only 12 members of Parliament voted against us bombing Libya and without any shadow of a doubt Libya is now a very much worse country than it was before we bombed it" (on foreign policy), and repeatedly for pretending to be able to forecast the numbers of immigrants coming into the country in the years to come. The Labour Party is especially chastised also for its management of the National Health System, and the Tories for the Prime Minister's stated willingness to deliver for England within the United Kingdom ("I've heard Mr. Cameron make promises on England, and on Europe, and on many other things before").

In this speech the EU is not an actor, it is just the arrangement turning the country into "borderless Britain" and preventing it from controlling its own immigration policy. Immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, again, are explicitly excluded from any blame: "I don't blame the youngsters from Italy or Spain from wanting to come here, I'd do the same thing".

In turn, the Scottish issue appears again. The key point here is that Farage depicts a disparity of treatment between England and Scotland, and yet, for the fact that "the devolution genie is out of the bottle", he only blames the political elite of Westminster, that is to say, the leaders of the mainstream parties: "once again we saw our three leaders get the whole thing completely and utterly wrong through arrogance and through complacency".

The people. At one point the leaders speaks in positive terms of "Britain's 4.6 million men and women, brave men and women that are running our small businesses, or acting as sales traders". He also argues that UKIP as a party is "now in touch with a large segment of this country", but that hardly qualifies as a full-fledged populist reference. One other populist reference appears, in the final appeal, but we consider it in the "popular sovereignty" section. Finally, intertextuality leads us to notice how Farage exploits the voice of some unspecified people he met on the very same day of the keynote speech:

> *I was out this morning visiting [...] a factory not too far from here, we popped into the local caf[e] and I met a couple of guys there, and they all said the same thing, they all said: "We're taking home less money than we were ten years ago. We're living in divided communities. We don't feel happy with the country we're living in and we want change".*

The definition of the boundaries of "the people" in relation to immigration is once again eschewed. Farage states that "it's no good for our young people and it's no good for our working people to suffer from wage compression, from unemployment, and to see a level of social change in our communities that we simply can't keep up with"; yet how far one should extend in identifying "our young people" and "our working people", or how many immigrants can be let in, is left unspecified.

Turning to the intra-UK settlement, Farage positively comments upon the engagement of the Scottish people in the independence referendum: "[a]n 86 per cent turnout [...] goes to show that, if you actually make politics important, if you make voting relevant, then people will go out and do so". But wishing to represent the English people, even though identifying with UKIP and not directly with them, he concludes: "I'm sorry, but those promises that were made on behalf of non-Scottish voters across the rest of the United Kingdom were, as far as I'm concerned, not legitimate and not made in my name".

Crisis, breakdown and threat. Actually, the overarching narrative of the discourse is linked to a "time of political change" of which UKIP tries to be a positive part, so that some problems - the settlement between England and Scotland, the errors in foreign policy - are referred to just as problems to be faced. Even immigration, despite the expression "borderless Britain", is not referred to in apocalyptic terms.

One exception is the harsh and morally staunch criticism of the evils of Labour "one-party State" in Northern England, which also serves as an attempt to present UKIP as a credible competitor to Miliband's party in those regions. But the main exception is represented by the menace of Islamic radicalization on the "home front": it is described with *pathos* and military metaphors, referring to internal and non-identified

"dangerous others", it refers to a "collapse in our self-confidence in much of our leadership", and reference to the will of "the people" against multiculturalism is also present:

> What about the radicalization that has been taking place in our schools and our prisons? What about the collapse in our self-confidence in much of our leadership? [...] the battle on our home front is really rather an important one, and one in which we have failed very badly. The multicultural experiment, the attempt by the State to divide everybody up and keep them separate, has been a disaster. It is not what anybody in this country wants, and we must be the party that says: "We put this behind us, and we don't care what colour, or religion, or where people come from, they must be here together, in one Britain together, equal before the law". That is the home front fight we must win.

Popular sovereignty. There is only one, strong and very vague statement falling under this label, contained in the discourse's final appeal and depicting sort of a promised land: "if we hold the balance of power [in the next Parliament] there won't just be a referendum on our EU membership, there will be a culture change in British politics. It will be a kind of politics that actually represents ordinary men and women in this country, it will be a politics of change, it will be a politics that is far better than the one we have today".

Doncaster, 25th September 2015

In 2015 the party achieved 12.6 per cent and over 4 million votes in the general election, yet it was able to win only one seat in the House of Commons (due to the first-past-the-post electoral system): it was a success and a defeat at the same time. Having promised to stand down as leader in case of defeat in his own constituency, Farage abode on such promise, but subsequently "unresigned" when the executive committee of the party asked him to stay. By the time of the party conference, even though the turmoil caused by these events was not wholly over (because of policy disagreements), after the electoral success of the Conservative Party the craved in/out referendum on the EU issue was finally in sight. Then the speech is two-sided: side A has to do with the election result and party politics, while side B is about the challenge ahead.

The elite. At first Farage recalls the difficulties that the party had to face in taking on the establishment: " [u]p against parties that were bigger, stronger, and better funded", "what decided this election was a big swing to the Conservatives for fear of that woman north of the border - and that Ed Miliband wasn't really up to be Prime Minister". Remarks against the mainstream parties, then, are scattered arguments against each leader, more than a single onslaught against the political class. Miliband's successor at the helm of the Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, is scorned for his allegedly scarce displays of patriotism and for having turned to support British membership of the EU despite his previous principled scepticism. Cameron is blamed for his "so-called renegotiation": in fact, "He isn't asking for anything substantial at all - nothing, nothing!", neither the control of borders nor the supremacy of British law. Yet here there is no truly "anti-establishment attack". Such attacks only come when Farage describes the referendum campaign groups. Apart from the soft Eurosceptics, reproached for their weak stance, the elite criticised here is "those who want us to stay in the European Union, and I'm talking about most of our political class, I'm talking about many of the giant corporate business interests": "they're out there, and they're campaigning hard, and we

know they'll campaign hard, and we know they'll be well funded". But the political class cannot be attacked too heavily, as the support of a part of it is crucial for ensuring victory for the "Leave" side: and Farage is quick in sending out "a message [..] to other activists and councillors and MPs and MEPs in the other political parties: this is the moment to put country before party, this is a once [...] in a lifetime opportunity to get back the independence and self-government of this nation". Farage targets for criticism the entrepreneur Richard Branson, Tony Blair and Peter Mandelson from the Labour Party, Nick Clegg from the Lib Dems and Ken Clarke from the Tories as Europhile politicians - he actually derides them through humour rather than with explicit criticism - and he attacks "what they're all really saying" (allegedly) about Britain's inability to rule itself. This way, he manages to somehow take issue with all the mainstream parties (and, maybe incongruously, with "big business") while only attacking the pro-EU side.

Here, too, the European Union appears as a "dangerous other": its dangers lie in the mishandling of the immigrants' crisis, but more crucially in the fact that it is still an integrationist project likely to go beyond the *status quo* with asylum policies or military cooperation.

The people. Concerned with presenting a positive image of Britain outside the EU, Farage roars: "Let's talk about who we are as a people!" And the answer, despite what "they're all saying", is that "we are patriotic and proud of who we are as a people, as a country; we are proud of those that went before us and sacrificed much so that we could be that free, independent country, and we certainly! We certainly believe that Britain is good enough, that we are good enough to stand on our own two feet and trade with the world". The issue of immigration is raised not with reference to the boundaries of "the people", rather as a decisive issue for the *ethos* of UKIP as "the British public believes us on that issue" (or, in political and actually not very popular terms, as "we do actually own that issue"). Also, as has already been noted, Farage acts as a champion of the people, when claiming that Cameron "certainly isn't asking for anything that the British public in a full debate would like to have".

Finally, Farage even sides (consistently) with the Greek people in its struggle against the nonelected European decision-makers: it is a European Union, and a Eurozone, "where now if the Greeks have a general election and decide a course of policy they can be overridden".

Crisis, breakdown and threat. A first problem, touched upon very rapidly, is that the disparity between votes obtained and seats achieved by UKIP signals that "the system is crying out and we need electoral reform". Much more attention is devoted to the menace represented by the "integrationist project" of the EU and to its dysfunctional approach: "the risk of voting to remain in this Union is far greater than the risk of voting to take back control of our law and our borders and our own lives". Here again, however, the discourse is marked by continuous references to the necessity to make big, positive arguments.

Popular sovereignty. The emphasis is on sovereignty and independence: what Farage is willing to obtain is to "get back the supremacy of British law in our own Parliament", to "get back the independence and self-government of this nation".

Conclusions

One goal of our study was to inquire how different brands of populism - political, ethnic, and regionalist in Pappas's tripartition - are present in the public discourse of UKIP, how they are framed and how they are made to coexist. In fact, the fully political subtype of populism holds sway within Farage's speeches. It appears extensively in all of them, even though a bit less so in the last one: the criticism against the political class is harsh, and the people in its various specification is invariably connoted in positive terms. In turn, and notably so, references to the "general will" or to "popular democracy" are not straightforward. In fact, Farage focuses on the supremacy of the Parliament when talking about repatriation of sovereignty from the EU, but on referendums when dealing with the choice about the EU itself: the balance between popular democracy and parliamentary democracy in UKIP's leanings remains unclear.

The ethnic subtype of populism, too, is somehow present. The EU is frequently depicted as a "dangerous other" due to its set of arrangements, its potential of further integration, and the nonelected European Commission; and there are incursions into the meaning of British identity and the pride of the nation. But as regards immigration, the official discourse of UKIP would lead to think that it does not describe immigrants as "dangerous others" *per se*: rather, it is the phenomenon that is blamed for consequences that have to do with its scale. Indeed, the people of other countries enjoy positive value judgments as well. However, one must also note that the boundaries are never precisely made clear, which seems to be the result of a purposely rhetorical choice.

Finally, the subtype that Pappas labels as "regional separatist", which in our case could apply to UKIP's revisionist approach to the devolution settlements within the UK, also appears in some form in two speeches. Yet we would surely need a different label: UKIP does pit a region against the centre, but it does so to represent *political* resentment in England and a restructuring of the settlement among the constituent nations, not an irreducible *territorial* cleavage. As a confirmation, Farage never blames Scotland itself or the Scottish people: he even neglects the Scottish political elites, heavily criticising the ones in Westminster as the sole guilty party.

Two general conclusions shall be drawn. A first one is that UKIP displays various types of populism, which are clearly related to the political situations in which the different speeches take place. This strengthens the hypothesis that UKIP can indeed frame its discourses strategically. As a matter of fact, Farage makes use of the populist paradigm so as to reinforce a partially varying set of stances in different circumstances.

The second one is a remark on the limits of UKIP's populist vein. In the ethnic acceptation, the boundary is set by the unwillingness to define precisely who "the people" are and how one decides which immigration is "in excess" from economic and cultural points of view. In the purely political acceptation, the lukewarm approach to popular democracy is surely a limit. Another one is reflected by an important fact: the five speeches continuously make reference to the importance of letting people know, to remind them of the position and battles of UKIP, to have debates with the political class, to make the arguments. In other words, while at times the leader of UKIP rhetorically assumes the existence of consensus among the population, on other occasions he speaks about the necessity to make the arguments "out there" as a party. The *ethos* of Farage as a party leader is present in the speeches, also upheld by his 2013 aspiration that UKIP "become

established as the third party in British politics", and his identification swings between the party and the people at will.

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