Presidentialized Executive Politics

The Effect of European Integration in the Swedish Case

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Abstract

In this paper, we address recent claims that (1) European parliamentary democracies are undergoing a process of “presidentialization”, and (2) that these developments can, in part, be explained by EU integration. Using data on ministerial selection and deselection in Swedish cabinets during the years 1952–2006, we find that (1) there appears to be a slight tendency towards “presidentialization”, and (2) there exists some preliminary support for the notion that Sweden’s economic integration into the EU is part of the explanation for this.
Introduction

According to recent research, executive-legislative relations in parliamentary democracies are undergoing important changes. More power resources are concentrated to Prime Ministers and their autonomy vis-à-vis parliamentary groups is increasing. These developments have prompted some scholars to speak of a “presidentialization” of contemporary parliamentary politics (Poguntke & Webb 2005). Regrettably, few systematic efforts have been made to assess the validity of what we henceforth will refer to as “the presidentialization thesis”.

This thesis is not simply a descriptive statement about contemporary developments in parliamentary systems, but involves a set of interrelated claims about the driving forces of these changes. The diminishing importance of traditional political cleavages, the changing role of the media, and the growing complexity of the state are all said to be important factors. But the internationalization of political decision-making, and in particular European integration, has been deemed the perhaps most important force in accounting for changing executive-legislative relations in European parliamentary systems. In particular, the simultaneous political and economic integration of the EU member states has landed more power in the hands of PMs who – unlike party organizations and parliaments – are key participants to the increasingly important political bargains made in the Council of Ministers.

This paper has twin aims. In order to assess the validity of the presidentialization thesis we (1) study the development of quantitative indicators of the presidentialization of the Swedish PM over the years 1952 through 2006, and (2) preliminarily analyze whether any changes in these indicators can be attributed to increased economic integration of Sweden into the European Union.

In order to gauge the extent of presidentialization in the Swedish case we utilize information on ministerial selection and deselection. While there is a long empirical tradition in comparative politics of studying why some governments form (e.g. Martin & Stevenson 2001; Bäck 2003), and which governments are apt to last (e.g. Diermeier & Stevenson 1999; King et al 1990; Warwick 1994), few have studied how cabinets are staffed, and why they are restaffed.

Our first indicator is the degree of specialization of executive positions and the background of ministers. If expertise in the competencies of the portfolio at hand is increasingly favored over generalist party or parliamentary experience in the process of ministerial selection, indicates a trend towards presidentialization. Indeed, several classical texts emphasize party- and parliamentary experience as a defining feature of parliamentarism (e.g. Verney 1959/1992). And although truly comparative efforts are rare, the empirical evidence does suggest that the recruitment of non-partisan ministers is more frequent in presidential systems (Blondel & Thiébault 1991; Strøm 2000; Amorim Neto & Strøm 2006).

Our second indicator is the frequency of reshuffles or, more precisely, the associated turnover in cabinet personnel. Several authors have suggested that the
frequency of cabinet reshuffles reveal the extent to which the Prime Minister is free to select and deselect ministers at his or her own discretion, without significant interference from party organizations and parliaments (see Budge 1985; Poguntke & Webb 2005). In terms of the presidentialism-parliamentarism dichotomy, a high degree of turnover in cabinet personnel undermines the principle of collegial/collective decision-making in the cabinet that is central to both to maximalist (e.g. Verney 1959/1992) as well as more minimalist definitions of parliamentarism (e.g. Lijphart 1999). The approach taken here thus meshes well with existing theories that PMs use cabinet reshuffles as a method of controlling the other ministers (Indridason & Kam 2005; 2007).

In the section immediately following this, we present the presidentialization thesis as it is laid out in the literature. We begin by proposing a narrower definition of presidentialization amenable to empirical testing and go on to discuss the potential effects of European integration on Prime Ministerial autonomy. Having done so, the research design and the data on ministerial appointments that we use here are presented. We then use this data to chart whether there appears to be a trend towards presidentialization in Sweden. Lastly, we perform some preliminary analyses aimed at evaluating the relationship between European integration and our indicators of presidentialization.

The presidentialization thesis

*Presidentialization – conceptualization and debate*

Presidentialization has become a catchword in recent studies of executive politics in parliamentary democracies. Although the alleged concentration of powers around heads of government is hardly new, Michael Foley’s (1993; 2000) books on “The British Presidency” sparked off a debate on ‘presidentialism’ that has spread from the United Kingdom to other parliamentary systems. It indicates a strengthened role and status of the Prime Minister’s position towards other political players although, in most cases, no changes have been made in formal, constitutional structures. Presidentialization can thus be understood as more powers concentrated around Prime Ministers while, at the same time, their autonomy vis-à-vis parliamentary parties increases (Poguntke & Webb 2005).

Similar observations have been made about the Swedish case (Aylott 2005). In particular, the former Prime Minister, Social Democrat Göran Persson, has been “accused” of leading his government in a presidential manner. The former PM seemed to have become less dependent on parliament and the support of his party, deriving much of his mandate directly from the electorate. When his government

1 By contrast, some depict turnover in cabinet personnel as a consequence of the PM’s efforts to appoint the most talented individuals (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo 2003).
lost power to a centre-right coalition after the 2006 elections, Persson took personal responsibility for the defeat and resigned as PM and chairman of the party.

In spite of the general appeal of this term, as can be judged from the broad usage of it, there is a general vagueness in the public and academic debate of notions of ‘presidentialism’ (Helms 2005). In general, growth of resources along with more formal and informal powers at the disposal of the chief executive is believed to indicate a trend towards presidentialized executive politics (Poguntke & Webb 2005). However, in many cases, Prime Ministers in parliamentary systems can be more powerful than their presidential counterparts. After all, presidents do have to share power with the parliament, and the balance between the two differs widely among presidential systems. In light of this, we believe that it is insufficient to use simple indicators of power resources to measure the presidentialization of parliamentary systems. Rather, it is preferable to use key features of the two regime types as the starting point in a study on presidentialization.

There is a long tradition of research regarding differences between parliamentary and presidential systems. The definition of parliamentary systems is contested. Some scholars use long lists of propositions to define it (see e.g. Verney 1992/1959; von Sydow 1997), while others need only a single defining feature, namely, the accountability of the government to the parliament (Sartori 1997/1994). For Sartori parliamentary governments are “appointed, supported and, as the case may be, dismissed, by parliamentary vote” (Sartori 1997/1994: 101). A reasonable compromise between these extreme positions seems to be the definition of Lijphart (1999: 117-8), who considers parliamentary systems to be defined by three features. First, the government is responsible to parliament in the sense that they are dependent on the parliament’s confidence and can be removed from office through a vote of no confidence. Second, in a parliamentary system, the head of government (normally called the Prime Minister) is selected by the parliament, although this selection can take many forms. Third, and finally, Lijphart notes that parliamentary cabinets are collective or collegial. In contrast, presidential systems, according to Lijphart, have the opposite defining features. The head of government – the president – cannot under normal circumstances be forced to resign by a parliamentary vote of no confidence, presidents are popularly elected for a fixed time span, and, presidential systems have a one-person, non-collegial executive.

If one accepts these features as defining of parliamentary and presidential systems, a development towards the former system becoming more like the latter without changing the formal, constitutional, structure would constitute a presidentialization. Thus, we define presidentialization as a trend towards a) more autonomy of the executive vis-à-vis parliamentary parties, b) increasing leadership centered electoral processes, and c) decreasing collegiality/collectivity within the
executive. This definition puts the emphasis on the increased autonomy of the chief executive as follows from a separation of powers-system. The public debate and much of the research on this matter has focused mainly on the electoral dimension, i.e. the extent to which electoral processes have become increasingly leadership centered (Mughan 2000). We believe instead that executive-legislative relations and the collegiality in the executive are central for understanding the phenomena of presidentialization. If relations between executives and parties in parliament are unchanged, as well as relations between Prime Ministers and other ministers within cabinet, then it would be hard to claim that there is indeed a process of presidentialization going on. Our focus will accordingly be on these two defining features of the parliamentary/presidential divide.

How can presidentialization, understood in this way, be measured? In the present paper we propose two indicators: ministerial selection and cabinet reshuffles. As an indicator of the executive’s autonomy vis-à-vis parties in parliament, the extent to which ministers are recruited from parliament will be used. In parliamentary systems ministers are usually members of parliament (Verney 1959/1992; De Winter 1995). They are not only ministers but at the same time members of parliament, although they are sometimes obliged to leave their position as MP’s during their time in cabinet, as is the case in Sweden since 1975. Moreover, in Sweden, the Head of State is not even formally involved in the appointment of ministers: hence, the power to select the latter (especially in single-party cabinets, which were the rule rather than the exception in post-war Sweden) resides completely in the hands of the Prime Minister to be.

Under these conditions (i.e. almost no constraints on the PM’s right to appoint), presidentialization would imply that over time fewer ministers are recruited from parliament. Instead it can be expected that other types of experience become more important for becoming a minister, such as expertise from different societal sectors. In presidential cabinets ministers are more of expert advisors to the president. We will thus investigate if other types of experience become more important over time, such as experience in trade unions, in business or in public administration. We will also seek to evaluate to which extent Prime Ministers make political recruitments, i.e. select ministers with previous political careers, since in presidential systems, non-partisan ministers are frequently recruited (Amorim Neto & Strøm 2006), while the opposite is true in most parliamentary systems (Blondel & Thiébault 1991). Notice however that according to Strøm’s (2000: 196) descriptive and temporal analysis, non-party appointments represented 3 percent or more of the ministerial personnel in a third of 17 OECD countries (1945–1997) only in the immediate post-war years. In Sweden in particular this author recorded a trend towards less, and not more, non-partisan appointments until the mid-nineties.

2 Poguntke & Webb (2005:5) define presidentialization as “the development of (a) increasing leadership power resources and autonomy within the party and the political executive respectively, and (b) increasingly leadership centered electoral processes”.
Since minority governments have to build parliamentary majorities, we may find that most ministers still have a parliamentary background because, more than in majority governments, these ministers must have both socializing skills (some form of incentive compatibility with MPs) and expertise of parliamentary techniques (because winning a vote in the assembly cannot be taken for granted). Hence, the drop in parliamentary expertise of ministers may not be spectacular because of the specific political conditions of minority cabinets. On the other hand, we may expect coalition governments to include a higher proportion of ministers with parliamentary experience than single-party cabinets do, as each party has less executive positions to fill and will tend to select their parliamentary heavyweights. Performing multivariate analyses and controlling for the type of cabinet therefore seems to be warranted if we want to gauge the effect of the passage of time and assess the trend towards presidentialization with this type of indicator.

The second indicator, i.e. cabinet reshuffles, measures the turnover rate of cabinet ministers. Frequent cabinet reshuffles may indicate the growing autonomy of the Prime Minister vis-à-vis other ministers, as would follow from a presidentialized executive. The Prime Minister’s position is accordingly strengthened while other ministers become more and more dependent on his confidence. As indicated by frequent turnovers, the collegiality/collectivity in cabinet decision-making is undermined. However, it must be said that the Prime Minister’s position in the cabinet can vary in parliamentary systems from preeminence to almost equality with other ministers (Lijphart 1999: 118; Sartori 1997/1994: 102-104). In a recent comparative effort, Bergman et al. (2003: 179-194) indeed show that the institutional powers of Prime Ministers vary a great deal in Western Europe with Spain, Germany and the UK ranking highest and Austria, Iceland and the Netherlands at the lower end of the spectrum. Sartori (1997) furthermore argues that these formal institutional powers of the PM only translate into effective power if specific party political conditions, such as strong party discipline and a two-party system, apply to the case studied. Previous comparative empirical evidence (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo 2003) looking specifically at the question of ministerial turnover show that Prime Ministers gain prominence within the executive when only their party is in power and that ministerial stability is significantly lower in single-party governments than in coalition ones. Research analyzing temporal patterns of ministerial turnover with the goal of evaluating presidentialization claims have not, to our knowledge, yet been undertaken.

Taken together, our indicators illustrate the potential long-term development of a stronger chief executive. The president-like domination of the political executive

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3 According to these authors, ministers serving in coalition governments have been subjected to more intense screening in the first place. Hence, they are expected to be more talented or at least competent to do the job than those emanating from a single party. The second part of their argument relates more closely to the power (or ability) of the Prime Minister to sack or reshuffle ministers: coalition partners constrain Prime Ministers in their ability to change ministers (especially if these do not belong to the Prime Ministers party).
by leaders such as Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair, Silvio Berlusconi and Göran Persson is often explained by short-term contingent factors, such as the parliamentary support on which they can draw, their current standing with the electorate, and their personalities (Webb & Poguntke 2005: 337). However, contingent factors such as these constrain and shape executive leadership in all types of democratic regimes. We are instead looking for evidence of a long-term development of a stronger chief executive reflecting an adaptation to underlying structural causes of presidentialization. This development is hypothesized to promote the selection of non-party technocrats or politicians lacking parliamentary experience as ministers, as well as more frequent cabinet turnovers indicating reduced cabinet collegiality/collectivity. The major factor that is believed to cause this trend, European integration, is discussed in the next section.

The hypothesized effect of European integration

In their effort to explain the ongoing presidentialization of executive politics Poguntke & Webb (2005) find support for four major explanatory factors, although they have not tested their data statistically. European integration, as we will focus on in this study, is accordingly not the only plausible explanatory factor of presidentialization. Besides the internationalization of politics (of which European integration is one important aspect), they claim that macro-societal factors such as the erosion of cleavage politics, the changing structure of mass communications, and the growth of the state all accounts for presidentialization.

When traditional social cleavages like religion and class no longer dictate voter loyalties, other factors, such as personal qualities of the party leaders, become more important. The erosion of cleavage politics thus accounts particularly for electoral presidentialization, which we have chosen not to cover in this study. Similarly, the growing and changing role of mass communications seems to be another obvious candidate in accounting for electoral presidentialization.

To the contrary, the growth and the complexity of the state provides a plausible explanation of executive presidentialization, since it creates a pressing need for greater coordination from the centre. Although we do not discard this potential cause, there are two main reasons why we do not scrutinize it in the present paper: first, it is not quite clear how the growth of state is thought to affect the relation between executives and legislatures as well as the relation between the PM and other ministers in cabinet; second, amongst the factors conducive to the increasing bureaucratic complexity and organizational specialization of national core executives (and their ‘hollowing out’ through the development of quasi-autonomous agencies, privatization, etc.) we find the internationalization of politics, both directly through adaptations to European integration in member states and indirectly through general transnational policy learning. Hence, even though we believe interrelated processes are at work, we prefer to concentrate in this explorative effort on the potential impact of European integration on changes in executive-legislative relations and of relations within the executive.
The process of European integration means that a substantial part of domestic politics is now decided at the supranational level. This is also a domain where chief executives have a particularly strong role as opposed to other domestic actors. As has been argued by Poguntke & Webb (2005:350) national chief executives are provided with additional power resources and autonomy vis-à-vis potential sources of domestic political dissent (including their own cabinet and parties) due to the process of European integration. Within our framework of research, the underlying theoretical mechanism is that European integration disturbs existing relationships and power equilibria between various domestic actors, more specifically executive-legislative relations and the collegiality in the executive.

The nature of EU’s impact on national governments as actors is hotly contested. While intergovernmentalists (Moravcsik 1993; 1998; Milward 1992; Hoffmann 1982) argue that governments are strengthened by European integration, neofunctionalists (Haas 1958; Sandholtz & Stone Sweet 1998; Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1997) emphasize the constraints that the Union imposes on them. Regardless of the dispute over who is in charge of integration (national governments as intergovernmentalists claim, or supranational actors as neofunctionalists claim), there is general agreement that national governments are the most powerful member state institutions in European affairs.

By contrast, because of the increased autonomy of national governments in Council negotiations and the empowerment of the European Parliament, national parliaments are usually considered to be the political losers of European integration (Maurer & Wessels 2001). In addition, the difficulty of scrutiny because of the lack of transparency at Union level (secrecy of Council deliberations) and the lack of parliamentary resources at national level create greater information asymmetries in national executive-legislative relations. This is also true for Sweden (Hegeland & Mattson 2000). However, since the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty and growing concerns of the “EU’s democratic deficit”, national parliaments have sought to re-gain some influence in the definition of national positions to be defended by their executives in the Council, for instance by asking the right to be informed earlier in the EU legislative process (Raunio & Hix 2000). Recent developments, such as the setting up of the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committee (COSAC) or the protocols in the Amsterdam Treaty and in the pending EU Constitutional Treaty, confirm this trend.

Hence, we should not take for granted that the increase of executive power with regard to national parliaments induced by European integration is a linear process. Moreover, this process is likely to be quite different according to national political settings. In a recent article Raunio (2005: 336) finds that in countries where EU integration is a divisive issue (where public opinion expresses Euro-skeptical sentiments) and where the parliament is strong, the overall level of parliamentary control of the executive in EU matters is higher. The increasing autonomy of executives with regard to national parliaments supposed to take place due to European integration seems to depend largely on the national organization of
executive-legislative relations⁴, and on the divisive potential of EU integration issues amongst voters and parties. Overall then, we may not expect much of a disrespect of national parliaments by Prime Ministers in countries, such as Sweden, which share these characteristics.

European integration nevertheless confronts national governments with strong incentives to reorganize the executive branch of government. There has been a general tendency to enhance the role of Prime Minister’s and their offices, a corresponding decline in the importance of foreign ministries, and the development of specialist bodies responsible for cross-departmental coordination close to the heads of government (Kassim, Peters & Wright 2000; Peters, Rhodes & Wright 2000). Looking mainly at potential adaptations of national policy-making due to EU integration, Maurer et al. (2003: 67) point out that “no matter whether Prime Ministers have a strong or a weak position in ‘their’ national policy arena, they have become real multi-level players in EU affairs”. They go on to assert that, given the need to act forcefully and coherently in making key decisions, which are increasingly taken through the European Council, Prime Ministers have gained power vis-à-vis their ministerial colleagues. For instance, in the powerful European Council, chief executives provide strategic guidelines for the development of the Union, serve as ultimate decision-makers on issues too complex or contentious for the Council of Ministers to handle, shape the EU’s foreign policy, and decide if, when and how new members are welcome to the EU. The traditional role and prestige of foreign affairs ministers has declined due to the wish of Prime Ministers to be in charge of politically sensitive issues, and also because of the greater role of other ministers (e.g. finance, agriculture) on the international scene.⁵

⁴ See e.g. the case of the Danish European Affairs parliamentary Committee which has the formal mandate to provide ministers with bargaining mandates; Damgaard and Jensen (2005: 410) indeed argue that for EU issues in Denmark “…it is difficult to claim that the parliament has declined in relation to the government”.

⁵ An indirect effect of EU integration is also the proliferation of bilateral talks and summits between Prime Ministers or between a Prime Minister and EU officials such as the President of the Commission or the President of the EU Council.
Research design and data

A Swedish case study

A systematic analysis of presidentialization trends and the effects of EU variables in parliamentary democracies should preferably include a number of countries. However, at this point we do not have access to a data set covering ministerial appointments in a large number of countries across the entire post-war period.\(^6\) We have therefore chosen to analyze the Swedish case more in-depth. We recognize that our ability to generalize the results from this type of single case study is limited. We here discuss the potential generality of our empirical results.

One of the main indicators of leadership power within the executive suggested by Poguntke and Webb (2005: 19) is “a growing tendency of chief executives to appoint non-party technocrats or to promote rapidly politicians who lack a distinctive party power base”. However, the applicability of this type of measure varies across countries, as noted by the authors. In some countries the constitution allows for the appointment of ministers who do not hold a seat in parliament, which makes it possible for a strong PM to appoint a large number of non-party specialists, whereas in other countries a parliamentary origin is a requirement (e.g. in Britain). The Swedish constitution does not include such a requirement; ministers in fact have to resign their parliamentary seats when appointed to cabinet (since 1975). This feature of the Swedish institutional setting makes Sweden a suitable candidate for gauging presidentialization trends, in the sense that we are here dealing with a most likely case, since an increase of PM power is likely to be mirrored in the selection of ministers without parliamentary background.\(^7\)

The second quantitative indicator used here to study presidentialization trends is the frequency of cabinet reshuffles that occur under the same Prime Minister. Previous research has shown that cabinet reshuffles are less frequent in coalition governments (see e.g. Budge 1985; Huber & Martinez-Gallardo 2003), as Prime Ministers have limited freedom to fire and replace ministers that belong to other parties than his own. The typical Swedish government has been a single-party minority government. The Social Democratic party has long dominated the scene, holding power for 65 of the past 74 years, in later years, usually with the support from the Left party and the Greens. The center–right parties have only been able to

\(^6\) The main available comparative data set covering a large number of countries is the data gathered by Blondel & Thiebault (2001). However, this data set only covers the 1945–1984 period, which is a problem since presidentialization is mainly expected to have occurred after the 1990s. Another data set on ministerial appointments has been gathered by Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2003). This data however does not include detailed information on the background of ministers, and also is not yet available from the authors.

\(^7\) Goetz (2006: 85) argues similarly that presidentialization and such changes should be studied in cases, such as Sweden, where the “cabinet ministers may not, at the same time, be members of parliament and ministers often do not have prior parliamentary experience”.

form coalition governments on three occasions during the past three decades: 1976–1982, 1991–1994, and most recently in 2006, when a majority government formed. Thus, Sweden has a tradition of governments that offer the Prime Minister a high opportunity to shape the cabinet to his liking.

All in all, the institutional setting suggests that we are here dealing with a most likely case, a case where we would expect a trend towards higher PM autonomy and power. Also, previous research on the topic, performed by Nicholas Aylott (2005), has found that there is in fact evidence in favor of the presidentialization thesis in Sweden. This type of reasoning is of course important if our aim is to generalize descriptive results from a case study, which we strive at here. However, we are also interested in gauging the effect of European integration on our indicators of presidentialization. Thus, we also have an explanatory goal.

Large-n studies typically have an advantage when it comes to measuring causal effects, since we can estimate regression coefficients, and provide estimates on the likelihood that these effects could have occurred by chance (Bennett 2002: 4). Case studies are in general less powerful means to measuring effects (Bäck & Dumont 2007), suggesting that we are not able to achieve our explanatory aim. However, in one respect our study is a large-n study, since we are studying Sweden across time, giving us a large number of units within this case. What is important to determine is of course if we have any within-case variation in our main explanatory variable, i.e. European integration. Since Sweden is a late member of the EU (joined in 1995), there should be substantial variation in European integration across time.8

Data on ministerial appointments

The main data source for this paper is a data set on all ministerial appointments in Sweden, between 1917 (breakthrough of parliamentarism) and 2006.9 Here, we focus on the period after the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), i.e. from 1952, since we do not expect any presidentialization or Europeanization trends before this time. The data set includes information on each individual that has been appointed to a ministerial post during the post-1952 period, and if an individual has held several posts, he or she appears several times in the data set. In total, we are dealing with a data set of 224 individuals who together have held 405 ministerial posts, in 14 cabinets.10 The data set includes

8 An advantage of focusing on the within-country variation is of course that we do not have to control for institutional and other contextual features. This of course also means that we cannot study the effects of such contextual variables. For example, we expect a varying effect of EU integration in different institutional settings, i.e. EU variables are likely to interact with contextual variables. This type of hypothesis can not be tested in this study.
9 The data was gathered by Ludvig Beckman, Hanna Bäck, Jörgen Hermansson, and Thomas Persson, at the Department of Government, Uppsala university.
10 A change of government is assumed to occur whenever there is a change in the party composition of the cabinet, or when there is a change of Prime Minister.
information on the social and political background of ministers, and on the timing of ministerial appointments. Thus, we are able to provide two systematic indicators of presidentialization, focusing on the selection and reshuffling of ministers.

In the analysis of ministerial selection we include a number of variables measuring the background of ministers. Parliamentary experience is a dummy variable measuring whether a minister has held a seat in parliament at some point before the appointment. Held party office is a dummy variable measuring whether the minister has held an important position in the party. Union representative is a dummy describing whether the minister has been the leader or representative of a union. Held private sector position is a dummy variable measuring if the minister has held an important position in the private sector (in an employer confederation or private company). Held public sector position is a dummy variable measuring if the minister has held a high position in the public sector.\textsuperscript{11}

As mentioned above, we are not only interested in describing trends of presidentialization in Sweden, we also aim at performing some preliminary explanatory analyses, aimed at gauging the relationships between European integration and our measures of presidentialization. In order to measure the extent to which Sweden has been integrated with Europe we will use primarily economic indicators, such as Sweden's trade with EU member states. This is, of course, a very rough measure of integration since it deals primarily with aspects related to the first pillar of the EU (i.e. the common market), while second and third pillar issues are for the most part excluded. Moreover, it covers only economic aspects of integration, as can be contrasted with legal, political, cultural and social aspects. We believe, however, that economic integration – which undisputedly is at the heart of European integration – provides a good measure of the extent to which single states (whether they are members of the EU or not) become increasingly dependent on the European community. The data on intra-EU trade, measuring the share of exports and imports to and from EU member states in total trade at a specific point in time, is based on data from Statistics Sweden.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11} Party position is one of the following: party leader, party ombudsman, member of the party leadership, member or leader of the party executive committee, district position, position in youth organization, leading position in women’s organization. Position in the private sector is one of the following: leader or representative of an employer confederation, member or chair of the executive of a private company. Public sector position is one of the following: vice president, chair or member of the board of a publicly owned company, or as a general manager, chair or member of a government office.

\textsuperscript{12} At a later stage we will also include other measures of European integration, such as the share of migration and immigration to and from EU countries. Our goal is also to include measures of Europeanization, in order to gauge the relationships between European integration, Europeanization and presidentialization. One such indicator of Europeanization based on resources for EU coordination at the disposal of the Prime Minister, i.e. the proportion of personnel in the PM offices working with EU related issues.
An analysis of presidentialization trends

The selection of ministers – a trend towards non-political ministers?

One of the main results in previous comparative research is that a parliamentary background is the main career path for becoming a minister. De Winter (1991) shows that on average, 75 percent of the Western European ministers (1945–1985) were members of parliament before joining government. However, this proportion varies substantially across countries, where countries like Ireland, Great Britain and Italy display the highest proportion of parliamentary ministers (about 95 percent), and other countries, such as the Netherlands, on average have cabinets where almost half of the ministers do not have such a background. Sweden is one of the countries, together with Norway, with a relatively low proportion of ministers with an MP background (about 60 percent). De Winter (1991) also shows that many ministers both belong to the party leadership and to parliament, and that a smaller group can be defined as true “insiders”, being parliamentarians of long-standing and belonging to the leadership circles of their party (on average 17 percent).

In Sweden, there are no restrictions on how many and which posts can be appointed. Also, there are no formal requirements on what background, or competence the ministers should hold. However, there are of course informal requirements, implying that the Prime Minister is not completely autonomous in selecting ministers. For example, for a Social Democratic government it has long been common practice that one minister has a background in the labor union. In addition, the Prime Minister often have to take the representativity of the cabinet into account, appointing some women, individuals from younger generations, and more recently, also taking the ethnicity of the ministers into account.

In table 1, we present some information on the background of ministers in Sweden. In our data set, we find that over 60 percent of the ministerial posts appointed were held by a person who had been a member of parliament. We also find that 80 percent of the ministerial posts were held by an individual who had held a post in parliament or in the party. Defining insiders less strictly than De Winter, as individuals who have some parliamentary and party background, we find that 59 percent of the cabinet posts were held by insiders.\(^\text{13}\) We also present information on “expert” background, defined as a background within the labor union, or a high private or public sector position. A very large share of the ministers have some form of expert background, most notably by having held a high position in the public sector. Finally, looking at the ministers’ social background, we see that about 30 percent of the posts have been held by women, and that less than 15 percent of the ministers have been 40 years or younger.

\(^{13}\) At this moment, we do not have reliable measure of the number of years in parliament.
In table 1 we also present the shares of ministerial posts held by individuals with specific backgrounds over decades. Looking at the variables measuring the political background of ministers, we can see that none of them show a clear trend towards ministers having less of a political background in more recent years. There does seem to be a decrease of MPs during the 2000s (from 67 to 58 percent), but no such clear decrease can be found if we look at the party background, which, consistent with Strøm’s findings (2000), is on the rise until the end of the 1990s.

Looking at the variables measuring expertise, we see different patterns for different variables. For union background there is clearly no trend towards the PM hiring more individuals with this type of experience. Instead, union background was more important in the previous periods, especially during the 1960s (for the vanishing ties between the Social Democratic party and the trade union see for instance Aylott 2004). Looking at expertise in terms of high positions within the private and the public sector, we can see a slight increase, but this change seems to have occurred already in the 1970–1980 period. In comparison with the 1950s, it is clearly more important to have this type of expertise to become a minister now.

What is also interesting to note is that women were much less likely to become ministers during all earlier decades than during the 1990s and 2000s. Thus, women have become more and more frequent in the cabinet during the post-war period. We see no such clear trend for younger people becoming more likely to be ministers, even though there does seem to have been an increase of younger ministers during the last governments (i.e. the 2000s).

In order to fully describe the trends over the post-war period, we also present the distribution of parliamentary, party, and expert background for each cabinet in figure 1. Looking at the parliamentary background, there seems to be a trend towards fewer ministers with this kind of background since the 1980s. However, this decrease of parliamentarians is starting from a historically high level, with the coalition governments led by Fälldin during the late 1970s–early 1980s including a very high proportion of MPs. This trend during the last three decades is also interrupted by the bourgeois coalition governments 1991–1994 and 2006. Thus, controlling for coalition governments, the trend should become a bit clearer.

This trend in decreasing parliamentary background is however not accompanied by a decrease in ministers with a party background; in fact this feature reaches its high point in the latest 2006 government. Looking at expert background, it is clear that this feature is more important during the past three decades, but it has been equally important in most cabinets since the 1980s. All in all, there is some, but weak, evidence in favor of a presidentialization thesis, in the sense that PMs to a somewhat higher extent appoint ministers without parliamentary experience.
The deselection of ministers – an increase in cabinet reshuffles?

In an early study of cabinet reshuffles in 20 countries, Budge (1985) finds that the amount of reshuffling, which he defines as the simultaneous movement of two or more ministers, varies widely across countries. Countries characterized by single-party governments, such as United Kingdom and Canada display the highest frequency of reshuffles, but also multiparty systems, like Denmark, who has typically been ruled by Social Democratic single-party governments, display relatively high levels of ministerial turnover. Budge concludes that reshuffles are more likely to occur in single-party governments than coalition governments since the Prime Minister has more freedom of action in such governments.

In a more recent study, Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2003) study the duration of ministers in 19 parliamentary democracies, and draw the same conclusion; “duration is lowest when Prime Ministers have the fewest constraints – i.e., when Prime Ministers enjoy a single-party majority”. Nevertheless, in their study of British ministers, Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding (2007) show that about 90 percent of the ministers are in government 12 months or longer, and that over 80 percent are in cabinet for 24 months or longer. Thus, even in a country governed solely by single-party cabinets, most ministers last longer than two years.

Since we are here interested in gauging the duration of individual ministers in their portfolios, we analyze our data on Swedish ministerial appointments using event history analysis, also called duration or survival models (see e.g. Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004 for a general overview). Duration models are typically used when the dependent variable is the occurrence of a terminal event, and we here assume that a minister is “terminated” when leaving his or her post, either by being reshuffled to another post, or by leaving the cabinet as a whole. When using event history models of ministerial turnover, we study hazard functions, which give “the probability that an individual minister survives to time \( t \), given that she has not exited the government prior to that time” (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo 2003).

Figure 2 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival function for all Swedish ministerial appointments since 1952. The horizontal axis displays the number of months, and the vertical axis shows the share of ministers that have lasted this long, or longer in their positions. The figures shows that less than 75 percent of the ministers last 12 months or longer in their post, and that about 50 percent of the ministers last 24 months or longer. This suggests that in general, Swedish ministers have relatively short tenure, at least when compared to their British colleagues. The fact that the curve becomes more flat as time goes by, suggests that a minister who has held his or her post a long time, is less likely to be separated from this post.

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

\[\text{14 Part of the explanation may be that we are here studying how long a minister has held a specific post, whereas Berlinski et al (2007) study how long a minister stays in the cabinet.}\]
In order to say something about the development over time in cabinet reshuffles, we also illustrate Kaplan-Meier functions across the 14 governments studied here in figure 3. The length that a cabinet has stayed in place varies widely, between the short-lived non-socialist governments in the 1970s and 1980s (Ullsten, Fälldin II, III) and the Social Democratic cabinets in the 1990s (Carlsson II, III), and the marathon Social Democratic government of Erlander in the 1950s and 1960s. By looking at these functions, we see that ministerial survival in short-lived cabinets typically have a flatter function than in longer-lived governments. This illustrates the fact that most ministers last at least 12 months, and if the government falls relatively soon thereafter, there will not have occurred many reshuffles.

[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

These functions do not show any clear trend, which could support the hypothesis that the Prime Minister’s use of cabinet reshuffles has become more frequent over time. Rather, some Prime Ministers seem to be more inclined to reorganize in the cabinet than others, for example we see that the cabinets Erlander II and III, Palme I and II, Carlsson I, and Persson. The frequent reshuffles during the Carlsson I government may to some extent be due to the fact that Carlsson inherited most of his cabinet members after the murder of Prime Minister Olof Palme. For the other Prime Ministers among the top reshufflers, we see that more than 25 percent of the ministers have been terminated or moved already after 12 months.

In figure 4 we present an alternative measure of the amount of reshuffling that occurs within a cabinet, which we here call cabinet turnover per portfolio-year, measured as the number of appointments and terminations of specific cabinet posts, divided by the number of posts in a cabinet times the number of years that it lasted. Thereby, we obtain a summary measure of the amount of reshuffling that has occurred in each cabinet. The most interesting pattern displayed here is that some Prime Ministers, most notably Carlsson, Persson and Reinfeldt, are portrayed as frequent reshufflers. If we exclude the “anomalies”, Carlsson inheriting a cabinet from Palme, and Reinfeldt only having governed for a limited period, the Persson government of the late 1990s and early 2000s could indicate an increase in Prime ministerial power during the past decade, but this is hard to tell at this point.

[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

All in all, neither of our measures suggests that there is a clear trend towards a presidentialization of Swedish executive politics, but there is nevertheless some evidence in favor of the presidentialization thesis, in that we find that there is a slight decrease of ministers with MP background during the 2000s and a slight increase in cabinet reshuffles since 1996. What is clear is that there is substantial variation across governments in both measures, and the question is whether these patterns can be explained by European integration or some other variables.
The effect of European integration

A multivariate analysis of European integration and ministerial selection

In this part of the paper we investigate the effects of European integration on our presidentialization indicators. We start out by studying the effect on ministerial selection, more specifically the background of ministers. In the analysis performed here, each portfolio is one unit of analysis (individuals can thus appear several times), and the dependent variable describes the type of political and expert background that the appointee to this position has. In order to gauge the trade-offs between different types of background, we have here chosen to categorize an individual as belonging the one out of four exclusive categories: having an insider background, which is here defined as having held party office and a seat in parliament before being appointed, having an expert background, defined as having held a high position in the private or public sector or a labor union, having both an insider and expert background, and having neither an expert or insider background.

Since we are dealing with a dependent variable with more than two categories, that cannot be ordered, a multinomial logit, or some similar model aimed at estimating the effects of features varying across units on a multiple choice, is an appropriate statistical model. Conceptually, the multinomial logit model is like simultaneously estimating binary logits for all possible comparisons among outcome categories (Long 1997). The coefficients should be interpreted in comparison with the base category, which we have here chosen to be the political insider category, that is ministers with a background within the party and the parliament. Since the unstandardized multinomial coefficients do not tell us much about the size of our effects, we also present discrete change coefficients (in brackets), which indicate the change in the probability of a specific outcome when we move from the minimum to the maximum on the independent variables.

Besides our main independent variable, European integration (EU trade), we include three other independent variables in our model. First, we include a variable measuring whether Sweden was a member of the EU at the point the ministerial post was appointed. Second, we include a variable measuring if the minister was appointed in a coalition government or a single-party government, and third we include a variable measuring whether the minister was appointed in a majority or minority government. In table 2 we present our main results from this analysis.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Studying the coefficients for the European integration variable, we can see that the coefficients are positive and significant for two categories, having a pure expert background and having a combination of an insider and expert background. As mentioned above, these coefficients should be understood in comparison with the base category, which is the political insider category. Thus, as European integration
increases, the ministers that are appointed are more likely to have an expert background (either only this type of background or in combination with a political background) than a pure political insider background, in the party and parliament.

Also, by studying the discrete change coefficients we can see that the effect of European integration is substantial and positive for the third category, the combination background type: when we move from the minimum to the maximum on the integration variable, ministers are 36 percentage points more likely to have a political and expert background. Also, the discrete change coefficient for our fourth category, having a purely political background, shows that as European integration is increased from its minimum to its maximum, ministers are 40 percentage points less likely to have a purely political background. Thus, the hypothesis that European integration leads to an increase of ministers with an expert background and a decrease of ministers with a political experience is given some support here.

We also find some interesting results for our variables measuring government type. The coalition government coefficient for the expert category is negative and significant, suggesting that experts are less likely to be appointed in coalition governments. Looking at the discrete change coefficient for this category we can see that when we go from a single-party to a coalition government, individuals with an expert background are 26 percentage points less likely to be appointed. This is in line with our expectations that we should find a higher proportion of ministers with political experience in coalition governments as each party has less executive positions to fill and will tend to select their political heavyweights.

The minority cabinet coefficient is positive and significant for two categories; the category with individuals without an expert or political insider background (1) and the combination category (3). Thus, looking at minority cabinets, individuals with a combination of political and expert background are more likely to be appointed than pure political insiders. The discrete change coefficient is also relatively large – individuals with a combination background are 18 percent more likely to be appointed in minority cabinets. We hypothesized that minority cabinets should be characterized by more ministers with an MP background. We find no support for this idea. However, we do find that the discrete change coefficient for expert background is negative and relatively large (-20 percentage points), suggesting that ‘pure’ experts are less likely to be appointed in minority cabinets. Thus, ministers in such governments are not likely to have a non-political profile.

A multivariate analysis of European integration and cabinet reshuffles

As we have mentioned earlier, several authors have argued that the frequency of cabinet reshuffles should be considered as an indicator of prime-ministerial powers. Other authors have argued that European economic integration strengthens PMs. Taken together, these two lines of reasoning suggest that European economic integration will be accompanied by increased turnover in cabinet personnel. In this section we study whether cabinet ministers’ risks of being reshuffled are increasing as the share of Sweden’s international trade taken by EU member states grows.
Empirically modeling why ministers face different risks of being reshuffled across space and time raises a number of methodological issues. Probably, the most important one is accounting for duration dependence. That is, the risk of being reshuffled facing an individual minister at any given point during his or her tenure is likely to be highly dependent on how long he or she has served so far. For instance, do cabinet ministers enjoy a honeymoon effect? Or does it become more difficult to reshuffle a minister the longer they have served? Even if answering these kinds substantive questions are of little concern to us, failing to account for the possibility of duration dependence may lead to inaccurate conclusions concerning the impact of European economic integration on ministerial survival.

In light of these concerns, we estimate a number of discrete event history logit models, which all take the following general form:

$$\log \left( \frac{Pr(Y_{i,t} = 1)}{Pr(Y_{i,t} = 0)} \right) = \alpha + \beta I + \delta I_i + \phi G_j + \gamma E_t + \lambda f(D_{it})$$

where \(Y_{i,t}\) is a dummy variable indicating whether the minister \(i\) was reshuffled during the year \(t\). That is, did he or she leave the cabinet or move to another position? The log-odds ratio on the left-hand side is assumed to be a function of an intercept term, \(\alpha\), and several types of variables: apart from our time varying measure of European economic integration, \(E_t\), we include a set of fixed characteristics, \(I_i\), of the individual minister. These are the minister’s level of education when entering office, sex, whether he or she holds a portfolio or not, and whether he or she was a non-political legal expert.\(^{15}\) In principle, one can also think of several individual characteristics of ministers that vary during their time in office, \(I_{it}\). Here, we settle for including a variable measuring the minister’s age. We also include a number of characteristics that vary across governments, \(G_j\); dummy variables for the various Swedish PMs 1952–2006 (with Erlander, who was PM during the first 18 years of our study, as the base category), as well as for their term in office. Finally, in order to account for possibility of duration dependence, we follow the advice of Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004: 74–79) and include \(f(D_{it})\), a variable that is some function of how many years a particular minister has served, \(D_{it}\). \(\beta\), \(\delta\), \(\phi\), \(\gamma\) and \(\lambda\) are the coefficients to be estimated.

The results are shown in Table 3. Beginning with the model in column 1 – in which no duration dependence is assumed, \(\lambda = 0\) – we find that the share of Sweden’s international trade that is being conducted with EU member states does indeed have a statistically significant and sizeable positive effect on a minister’s risk of being reshuffled. The probability of being reshuffled increases by 54 percentage points when going from the sample minimum of EU share of Sweden’s

\(^{15}\) During the 1940s and 1950s Swedish governments included two non-political legal experts. This practise was abandoned in 1959.
trade to the sample maximum. What difference does our failure to account for duration dependency make for this result? As can be seen from column 2, the Likelihood Ratio test suggests that the fit of the model improves substantially, when we assume that the log-odds ratio of the probability of being reshuffled to the probability of not being reshuffled is a linear function of how many years a particular minister has served (i.e. $f(D_{it}) = D_{it}$). Using this specification of duration dependency, the relationship between EU trade and ministers’ risks of being reshuffled is slightly weakened, but the coefficient estimate is still large and statistically significant. The probability of being reshuffled facing a minister increases by about 46 percentage points when moving from the sample minimum to the maximum. Surely, this must considered as a substantively significant effect.

In columns 3 and 4 we try out different specifications of $f(D_{it})$. Irrespective of whether we model duration dependence as a logarithmic function of how many years a minister has served (i.e. $f(D_{it}) = \ln(D_{it})$), or use a more flexible natural cubic spline smoothing function (see, e.g., Beck, Katz & Tucker 1998: 1270f), these models outperform the one in column 1, as can be seen from the Likelihood Ratio tests. However, when we compare columns 2, 3, and 4, it is apparent that there is no tendency for model fit to improve as we allow the risk of being reshuffled to be a more complicated and flexible function of ministerial tenure.

Since the linear duration dependence model performs as well as the models in columns 3 and 4, while at the same being more parsimonious, we use it to address two final methodological issues. In column 5 we make an attempt to correct the standard errors for the likely event that there remains some temporal dependence in our data, even after we have included a variable that measures how many years a particular minister has served. As is evident when one compares column 5 to column 2, the standard errors change slightly when the assumption of temporal independence is relaxed, but the relationship between the impact of the share of Sweden’s international trade that is being conducted with EU member states and the risk of being reshuffled remains statistically significant.

In column 6 we consider another possible source of incorrect standard errors: During any given year, the risk of being reshuffled is likely to be correlated across

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16 All estimated changes in probabilities of being reshuffled presented in this section are computed while holding dummy variables at 0 (their mode, in all cases) and other variables at their sample mean.

17 Essentially, creating the cubic spline variable involves estimating the probability of being reshuffled as a third-degree polynomial function of the time counter, on a fixed number of subtimeintervals. These functions are constrained to be joined (and to have equal first and second partial derivatives) at the points, or “knots”, where subtimeintervals meet. In our analysis, we use five evenly spaced knots.
the ministers who are currently serving. For instance, when an incumbent government receives continued support in an election, and the PM harbors a desire to make some more thoroughgoing personnel adjustments, he or she is probably less constrained to do so than between elections. Hence, column 6 shows how the standard errors are affected when we relax the assumption of no contemporaneous correlation. As can be seen, the standard error for the coefficient measuring the impact of the EU share of Sweden’s trade increases considerably. Despite this, the coefficient estimate remains statistically significant. Our substantive conclusions about the impact of Sweden’s trade with EU member states on cabinet reshuffles thus remain unchanged when we take into account the possibility of temporal dependence and contemporaneous correlation.

Turning to our controls variables, we find several relationships that are consistent and statistically significant across all specifications. Of the individual ministerial characteristics, two stand out: the risk of being reshuffled increases with the age of the minister. The results in column 2 suggest that the risk of being reshuffled increases by 27 percentage points when moving from the sample minimum (age 28) to the sample maximum (age 76). Also, the parameter estimate for a minister’s “rank” is statistically significant across all specifications. Again basing our calculations on the results in column 2, we find that ministers without a portfolio are slightly more than 7 percentage points more likely to be reshuffled. Both of these results accord with Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding’s (2007) findings in their study of ministerial tenure in the United Kingdom.

We also find that the risk of being reshuffled tends to be lower for ministers serving in coalition governments (the non-socialist governments led by Fälldin, Ullsten, Bildt and Reinfeldt) as compared to one-party governments (the socialist governments led by Erlander, Palme, Carlsson and Persson). By contrast, there are few indications that ministers in the majority governments in our sample (essentially, Erlander’s second term in office, Fälldin’s first two terms in office and the Reinfeldt government) faced slightly lower risks of being reshuffled.

Setting our controls to one side, the main result of this section is that cabinet ministers’ risks of being reshuffled are increasing in the share of Sweden’s international trade that is being conducted with EU member states. Moreover, this relationship is robust to a wide array of plausible model specifications. The findings in this section are thus consistent with the hypothesis that economic integration into the EU makes the PM more “presidentialized”.

Conclusions

According to recent comparative research, parliamentary democracies are becoming more like presidential systems. Scholarly observers report that Prime Ministers’ status, and autonomy vis-à-vis parliamentary parties are on the increase (Poguntke & Webb 2005). Moreover, according to this “presidentialization thesis”, these developments are, to a large part, explained by the increasing
internationalization of politics, and in particular by European integration. As a consequence of European integration, a substantial part of domestic politics is now decided on a supranational level; an arena where chief executives have the upper hand against other domestic political actors.

In this paper, we have inquired into the validity of these claims by looking at two indicators of presidentialization in Sweden: the specialization of executive positions and the frequency of cabinet reshuffles. First, we argue that, if there is a presidentialization at work, then expertise in the area of the portfolio at hand, rather than general party or parliamentary experience, should be increasingly favored in the process of ministerial selection. Second, we argue that frequent cabinet reshuffles are a sign of presidentialization, since this would suggest that the Prime Minister is selecting and deselecting ministers at his or her own discretion, without significant interference from parties and other institutions. Arguably then, any trends towards presidentialization should reveal themselves in changes in these indicators. This should be especially so in Sweden, where the institutional structure is relatively conducive to such developments.

Our findings suggest that there is some evidence in favor of an ongoing presidentialization. It appears that Prime Ministers, to a somewhat higher extent, reward expertise, rather than party- and parliamentary experience, when filling cabinet positions. Also we document a slight increase in ministerial turnover since 1996. However, and in both measures, there appears to be more variation across governments, than across time. In our multivariate analyses we assess to what extent variations across time can be explained by European integration. The analysis reveals that as European integration increases, the ministers that are appointed are more likely to have an expert background, either as pure experts or in combination with a political background. Consequently, the hypothesis that European integration leads to an increase of ministers with expert background and a corresponding decline in ministers with political experience is supported. Moreover, we find that the effect of European integration on the probability of being reshuffled is substantial. Deeper integration, as defined by us, has the effect of lowering the duration of ministers in cabinet.

Our results suggest that European integration has, to some extent, disturbed existing relationships and power equilibria between various domestic actors in Sweden and, thus, transformed executive politics. In light of this, it would be fruitful to inquire into whether this conclusion also holds for other comparable parliamentary democracies. If we wish to gain a better understanding of the effects of European integration on executive politics, further systematic empirical work examining presidentialization trends in other EU member states as well as states outside the European community is necessary.
References


Table 1. Backgrounds of ministers in the post-ECSC Swedish governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<td><strong>Political background</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Member of parliament</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held party position</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP or held party position</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP and held party position</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expert background</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Union member</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>22%</td>
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<td>Held private sector position</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>34%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Held public sector position</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some expert background</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>80%</td>
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<td><strong>Social background</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>31%</td>
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<tr>
<td>40 or younger</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Number of observations</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>405</td>
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Note: All appointments since 1952 are included in this analysis.
Figure 1. Backgrounds of ministers in the post-ECSC Swedish governments
Figure 2. Ministerial survival, 1951–2006, all post-ESCE governments.

Note: Prime Ministers and ministers resigning due to death are excluded.
Figure 3. Ministerial survival, 1951–2006, across governments

Note: Prime Ministers and ministers resigning due to death are excluded.
Figure 4. Ministerial turnover per portfolio-year, 1951–2006, across governments.

Note: Prime Ministers and ministers resigning due to death are excluded.
Table 2. Multinomial logit of ministerial background, all post-ESCE governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of ministerial background</th>
<th>(1) Neither insider or expert</th>
<th>(2) Expert background only</th>
<th>(3) Expert and political insider</th>
<th>(4) Political insider only</th>
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<tr>
<td>EU share of Sweden’s trade</td>
<td>5.660</td>
<td>8.347**</td>
<td>11.063***</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.271)</td>
<td>(3.733)</td>
<td>(3.012)</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[-0.034]</td>
<td>[0.077]</td>
<td>[0.364]</td>
<td>[-0.401]</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU membership</td>
<td>-0.767</td>
<td>-0.631</td>
<td>-1.166</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.054)</td>
<td>(0.874)</td>
<td>(0.774)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.004]</td>
<td>[0.081]</td>
<td>[-0.152]</td>
<td>[0.067]</td>
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<td>Coalition government</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>-1.296**</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.806)</td>
<td>(0.614)</td>
<td>(0.475)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.111]</td>
<td>[-0.257]</td>
<td>[0.090]</td>
<td>[0.057]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minority government</td>
<td>1.255**</td>
<td>-0.216</td>
<td>0.771**</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.600)</td>
<td>(0.427)</td>
<td>(0.354)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[0.040]</td>
<td>[-0.197]</td>
<td>[0.181]</td>
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Number of observations 956
Pseudo R² 0.062

Note: Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Entries are unstandardized multinomial logit coefficients where type of ministerial background is the dependent variable and political insider (party and parliamentary background) is the base category. Entries in parentheses are robust standard errors (clustered on portfolio), and entries in brackets are discrete change values, indicating the change in probability when a variable changes from its minimum to its maximum and other variables are held at some values (EU integration=mean, EU membership=1, coalition government=0, minority government=1).
### Table 3. The Risk of Being Reshuffled 1952–2006

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<td>(1.566)</td>
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<td>(1.588)</td>
<td>(1.546)</td>
<td>(1.502)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>EU share of Sweden’s trade</td>
<td>8.651***</td>
<td>7.871**</td>
<td>7.841**</td>
<td>7.690**</td>
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<td>(1.018)</td>
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<td>EU membership</td>
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<td>0.879</td>
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<td>Years of education</td>
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<td><strong>Type of minister:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister without portfolio</td>
<td>0.672**</td>
<td>0.560*</td>
<td>0.593*</td>
<td>0.617*</td>
<td>0.560**</td>
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<td>Legal expert</td>
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<td>(1.142)</td>
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<td>(1.066)</td>
<td>(1.077)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.823)</td>
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<td>(0.810)</td>
<td>(0.809)</td>
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<td>Fälldin</td>
<td>-5.315***</td>
<td>-5.536***</td>
<td>-5.479***</td>
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<td>(1.223)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ullsten</td>
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<td>-5.198***</td>
<td>-5.174***</td>
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<td>(1.426)</td>
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<td>Persson</td>
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<td>-4.293***</td>
<td>-4.312***</td>
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<td>(2.253)</td>
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<td>-6.403***</td>
<td>-6.506***</td>
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<td><strong>Serving under PM’s:</strong></td>
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<td>(0.622)</td>
<td>(0.624)</td>
<td>(0.628)</td>
<td>(0.630)</td>
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<td>3rd term</td>
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<td>-2.258***</td>
<td>-2.296***</td>
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<td>(0.717)</td>
<td>(0.706)</td>
<td>(0.709)</td>
<td>(0.708)</td>
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<td>(1.012)</td>
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<td>Duration dependence</td>
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<td>-0.644***</td>
<td>14.281***</td>
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<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.164)</td>
<td>(3.714)</td>
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<td>Natural log (5 knots)</td>
<td>Cubic spline (5 knots)</td>
<td>Linear</td>
<td>Linear</td>
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<td>Clustered standard errors</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1155</td>
<td>1155</td>
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<td>Log Likelihood</td>
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<td>LR-test (against model 1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15.66***</td>
<td>14.16***</td>
<td>13.81***</td>
<td>15.66***</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

*Note:* Entries are Logit-coefficients. Robust (heteroskedasticity consistent) standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level.