The Europeanization of Party Organizations: towards a Systematic Comparative Analysis across ‘Greater Europe’

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Abstract. Given the particular context of party organizational emergence in Eastern-Central Europe (including historical, cultural and conjunctural factors), a number of dissimilarities in the organizational development of parties are expected, as compared to the internal structures of parties in Western Europe. On the other hand, some comparative researches have pointed out evidences of convergences in the challenges facing party organizations in both European contexts. Typically, the impacts of European integration could be considered as one among those common factors of change. Building upon recent studies, this paper analyses how European integration influences the development of party organizations in Eastern-Central Europe, and to what extent the concept of Europeanization can be used in order to study the new realities of contemporary party organizations across ‘Greater Europe’.

The main propositions are reviewed in both theoretical and empirical perspectives, with a core focus on methodological difficulties such as the comparability of political parties across advanced European democracies, the asynchronic nature of enlargement processes in the various countries, or the isolation of the European integration impacts from the domestic ones. Furthermore, in this methodological perspective, a multi-level approach is necessary to assess the most appropriate level for a dynamic comparison of party organizations. Four macro-hypotheses are formulated in this respect: the effects of the Europeanization on political parties depend on a) party-specific features; b) nation-specific features; c) particular political-institutional patterns across sets of countries (e.g. majoritarian v/s proportional systems), cutting across broad cultural areas within Europe; d) clusters of countries also tapping broad cultural areas (Eastern-Central Europe, Southern Europe, Nordic countries, etc.).
Introduction

Theories that help to explain the development of party organizations generally consider either the Western European area or the Eastern-Central European region. However, in spite of a clear difference in the organizational evolution of ‘old’ and ‘new’ countries, scholars recently pointed out some signs of similarities (Parrott, 1997; Kitschelt, 2001; Lewis, 2001; Mair and van Biezen, 2001). This observation might be worthily integrated into the growing reflexion on Europeanization. Indeed, the European Union might be regarded as a common factor of change. In this perspective, we focus our article on the issue of Europeanization and party organizations in ‘Greater Europe’ which has not yet received much attention from researchers.

From this perspective, two initial ‘candid’ questions: (a) substantive/empirical: is the ‘Europeanization’ process playing a role in the organizational development of parties in ‘Greater Europe’? Is it, for instance, a factor of convergence between the two contexts? (b) methodological: what are the specific methodological challenges we face when trying to systematically address this empirical question across parties within countries (national political systems) both in ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe – and what are the possible solutions?

The research agenda and ambition of this paper is also, quite crucially, to re-frame the specific “party organizational Europeanization” thesis by re-linking it to two broader linked domains: Europeanization research and party organizational change research.

This article aims to (1) (re-)examine the patterns of party organizations in both European contexts (Western and Eastern-Central); (2) investigate to the concept of Europeanization; (3) discuss the methodological challenges linked to empirical work on Europeanization; and, finally (4) elaborate a model and a research design explaining the influence of Europeanization in terms of causal analysis.

1. Patterns of party organization in Europe

1.1. The transformation of party organizations in Western Europe

The changes in party organization in Western Europe have aroused a lot of attention from scholars since the post WWII period (Duverger, 1951; Neumann, 1956; Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988; Katz & Mair, 1995; Koole, 1996; Krouwel, 2004; Frankland et al., 2008). These authors attempt to conceptualize these changes by developing party models or party
‘types’, thereby updating some existing typologies. Sometimes too simplistic, sometimes too
determinist, the models are not consensual but suggest convergent terminologies and ideas.
Most of the recent studies scale the known models of parties down to five types (possibly
complemented by a 6th type, see below), following criteria around four dimensions: (a) the
genetic origin; (b) the electoral dimension (electoral appeal, social support and social origin of
party elite); (c) the ideological dimension (the basis for party competition and the degree of
inter-party competition); and (d) the organizational dimension (the importance and status of
the organization’s members, the position of parliamentary groups and the status of the party in
public office) (Krouwel, 2004:140-143).
Here below, we (re-)examine these typologies, with a particular focus on the organizational
dimension.

The first distinction concerns the transition from elite parties to mass parties. The elite
parties (also called cadre party or caucus party) are founded in the context of limited
suffrage and have parliamentary origins. In consequence, they are elite-centred and do not
involve large membership. A cadre party is an agglomeration of local parties in which a small
core of leaders from higher social strata can count on personal resources and contacts. The
organization is embryonic and is active only during the election periods (Duverger, 1954;

In the early 20th century, the introduction of universal suffrage led to the emergence of
parties as movements outside of Parliament. Mass parties come into being as bottom-up
structures in which the high level of membership mobilization constitutes their political power
and the main source of finance. These parties of ‘social integration’ (Neumann, 1956)
represent the interests of one specific group of class and they display an explicit and complete
ideology. The organization is no longer dormant; rather, it possesses coherent and permanent
(routinized) structures (Duverger, 1954; Neumann, 1956; Kirchheimer, 1966).

In the context of economic growth, development of the welfare state, secularization or
access to modern techniques of mass communication in the late 1950’s, citizens become more
autonomous and more rational in their political choices. They vote less according to their
social or religious identification but according to particular issues. A new type of party
organization is developing in this new background: the catch-all parties (or electoralist
people’s parties). They aim to attract all voters¹ (not only specific social groups) and to build
links with a wide variety of interest groups. The structure is top-down and leader-centred, the

¹ Or rather a broader variety of voters – Kirchheimer’s description of the Allerweltpartei is in fact more nuanced
than a fully « catch-all » model (Rihoux, 2001).
role of members as well as that of ideology is being reduced and media strategies are starting to be preferred to public debates (Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988).

The two further parties appeared during the same period (in the late 1970’s) and reveal the growing dependence of parties to the state on the one hand, and the professionalization of the organization, on the other. While mass parties have played the role of intermediary between society and the state, **cartel parties** become agents of the state. In order to ensure their own survival by gaining access to the state subsidies, all parties work together and form a ‘cartel’. This interpenetration of party and state is made at the expense of the representation of citizens. This evolution is also characterized by a concentration of leadership and by a shift from extra-parliamentary party central office towards the party in public office (Katz & Mair, 1995). Indeed, parliamentarians become less dependent of their organization, a process which was already identified by Kirchheimer (1966).

As for the **electoral-professional parties** (or **business firm parties**), they are launched by political ‘entrepreneurs’. The latter expertly use the modern techniques of communication and base their strategies on the personal attractiveness of candidates and on popular issues (rather than ideology). The organization is minimal; especially active at election time; financed by commercial activities or business capital; held by a very autonomous and personalized leader and mainly composed of political careerists (Panebianco, 1988; Hopkin & Paolucci, 1999; Carty, 1991).

Finally, the **amateur-activist parties** display some elements of the more recently emerging types of parties, but at the same time they display some features which are opposite to those of **electoral-professional** parties. Indeed these are parties where the locus of power lies more in the hands of activists and members, among whom a significant proportion of ‘believers’ (v/s careerists), with limitations placed on the prerogatives of leaders, among other through more collective forms of leadership. Such parties also lay more emphasis on ideology than on individual candidates, and follow less a logic of vote maximization (Lucardie & Rihoux, 2008).

This chronological presentation should not be considered as an evolutionary or a deterministic process (Panebianco, 1988; Koole, 1992; 1996; Rihoux, 2001). The types here above are presented as ideal types, which imply that a political system can include several types of party at a given point in time, and that a political party can embrace characteristics from several party types. As ideal types, even tough they have mainly been developed in the context of ‘Western advanced liberal democracies’ (chiefly Western Europe), we can assume
that they can apply to other parties in other countries with more recent pluralist party systems, such as Eastern-Central Europe.

1.2. The formation and the development of party organization in Eastern-Central Europe

So far, most research endeavours on party organizations in Eastern-Central Europe aim to apply models elaborated in the Western context. Because parties in Eastern-Central Europe are highly personalized, elitist, state-centred and built with little or no presence on the ground, the organisational development in Eastern-Central Europe is usually explained following the ‘cartel’ and/or the ‘professional electoral’ models (Hanley, 2001: 151). On the one hand, the Western models can be a convenient starting point since these are as yet the only theories available for the study of party organizations in pluralist contexts. On the other hand, in doing so, the path-dependent development of party organization in this part of Europe is neglected. Moreover, this approach raises difficulties in terms of empirical investigation because of the difficulty to gather the relevant data (where such data is available).

More recent research endeavours consider that the convergences with the Western organizational type are due to the external context of party formation (disinterest or disgust for politics; presence of mass media, emergence of political entrepreneurs, etc.) (van Biezen & Mair, 2001; Hanley, 2001; van Biezen, 2005). The paths of party development are then best understood as processes *sui generis* because of their particular historical and institutional emergence (van Biezen, 2005: 147). This idea stands close to the hypothesis of ‘evolutionary leaps’ which considers that new democracies have missed the first stages of party evolution but have reached the new Western models by following very different trajectories (Smith, 1993:8). To a certain extent, this is a ‘convergence theory’ (like Duverger’s or Kirchheimer’s), but it could be compatible with a plurality of coexisting ‘modern’ party types in the current context, both Western and Eastern-Central European.

Indeed, in Eastern-Central Europe, political parties were created only shortly before or during the transition process because of the prohibition of free political organization under communism. For this reason, parties have had little time to expand the extra-parliamentary organization, and many of them took part in government shortly after their creation, when their organization was in its infancy. In contrast, most Western parties could build up their

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2 We don’t involve single party systems because of the absence of political competition which precisely constitutes an intervening variable influencing the organisation changes (Neumann, 1956; Sartori, 1976, 217-243; Luciano & Mair, 2008)
organization even before they gained access to Parliament, and *a fortiori* governmental participation. Moreover, in Eastern-Central Europe, because of the lack of pre-established partisan identities, and because strong anti-party traditions (after the communist party era), parties did not originate from society but from institutions. New parties in the East occurred as a movement of the state rather than as acting against the state. The lack of potential membership explains why the priority has been the parliament and government activities rather than the building of party on-the-ground and the formation of local networks. Furthermore, while in the Western countries, party funding has shifted from society towards the public authorities, the Eastern-Central European parties have immediately been funded mostly by public money. They have also directly elaborated strategies of personalized campaigns and electoral mobilization (rather than partisan mobilization), with the help of the pervasiveness of mass media.

1.3. Different paths but signs of convergences

In spite of the distinct paths outlined above, the main features of party organization in both contexts and the related challenges are similar: the disconnection of parties from society, the centralization of leadership, the strengthening of linkages between parties and the state and the professionalization of politicians (van Biezen & Mair, 2001:112-115). Nevertheless, several organizational features remain specific to the Eastern-Central European context. Among these differences, we can mention the dominance of party executives on the party in public office, explained by the need of party cohesion and the weak institutionalization of parties.

Distinguishing between the party formation and development, the Table below lists the differences and the similarities of the organizational development of parties in Western and Eastern-Central Europe.

*Table 1 around here*

Although the environment of party formation and development differs, some convergences (in some respects at least) are observed in parties of both European contexts. Close ties with state, minimal importance of membership, concentration of leadership and professionalization of political campaigns are certainly among those points of convergence.
The explanatory factors of this convergence are located at three levels. First, convergence can be explained by organizational logics shared by parties whatever their national or regional context (as Duverger already argued in his seminal work, not to mention Michels). Second, convergence can be the result of similar pressures (and opportunities) of party competition through competitive elections in the respective national contexts (as Kirchheimer argues, too, for earlier periods). Third, less discussed in party studies, Europeanization can shed light on the explanation. Indeed, we can assume that the decision making at the European level alienates (at least partly) the relationship between citizens and national political parties. Another potential mechanism is that leaders who negotiate in the European institutions and, more broadly, who have access to the European decisional spheres, increase their power within their party. Finally, European elections may provide specialized staff and resources for the election campaigns – especially for parties which have gained access to representation in the European Parliament.

From this perspective, our research aims to assess: (a) to what extent Europeanization constitutes a factor of change in party organizations; (b) if so, following which ‘causal mechanisms’; (c) to what extent this factor is of greater or lesser importance to other factors; and (d), with regards to the direction of the (possible) impact, to determine to what extent Europeanization can be considered as a factor of organizational convergence across ‘Greater Europe’. Naturally, these 4 research questions map a quite broad research agenda, which we will not be able to address fully within the scope of this ‘framework’ paper.

2. Patterns of Europeanization

2.1. Conceptualization

Just as there is no full consensus among experts concerning the typologies of party organizations, neither is there a fully shared definition of ‘Europeanization’. The concept remains quite polysemic and the empirical evidence remains scarce – or not systematic at this

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3 If we follow a simple/simplistic “additive” logic. Naturally different factors can be combined and act rather in conjunction or ‘intersections’ (“multiple conjunctural causation”; Rihoux & Ragin, 2008); see also section 4 below.

4 During the last few years, however, some more systematic empirical work has been conducted – but rather in the field of public policy (the Europeanization of [national] public policies) – see e.g. a review in Haverland (2007). Haverland also points to serious remaining methodological and empirical limitations in this field. See also section 3.
stage, at least. Consequently, in spite of the growing attempts to model the mechanisms of ‘Europeanization’, the concept is still contested.

‘Europeanization’ implies at least two different levels of analysis – two different concepts in fact.

Following one perspective, ‘Europeanization’ means the institutionalization of a distinctly European political system (“bottom-up” meaning). Risse et al. define Europeanization as “the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, [...] that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules” (2001: 3). This dimension involves the examination of the evolution of growing competences of the European structures.

Following another perspective, ‘Europeanization’ is understood as the penetration of the European rules and logics in domestic areas of politics and policy (“top-down” meaning). One of the early definitions of Europeanization following this approach is formulated by Ladrech: “[Europeanization is] an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” (1994: 69) – or in a more compact formulation: “the institutional, strategic and normative adjustments generated by European integration” (EPPIE, 2007: 39, translated by Exadactylos & Radaelli, 2009: 508).

The common question underlying both definitions is: how do domestic actors and institutions adapt their practices to the constraints of obligatory implemented rules? Analyzing Europeanization from this perspective also involves the study of the effects of conformation to informal and cultural norms, practices and customs, as the second definition stresses.

Most scholars who work on Europeanization and political parties focus on the ‘top-down’ process of Europeanization in which European integration is the independent variable while the changes or/and the adaptations (at the domestic level) are the dependent variables. However, the process is more complex and involves a two-way process: without institutionalization of Europe, there is no penetration of European rules/practices and vice versa (Bomberg & Peterson, 2000; Bomberg & Carter, 2006). In other words, the responses of national actors concerning the impacts of Europeanization influence themselves the path towards European integration (Ladrech, 2002). We will treat this question more deeply in the section dealing with the methodological difficulties. The next section is devoted to the overview of the literature on Europeanization and party organizations. As mentioned, this literature mainly falls within the top-down approach and then aims to analyse how party organizations change under the influence of European integration.
A large number of studies have investigated the influence of European integration in the field of policy analysis, the Europeanization of national institutions (parliament, government, trade unions, etc.), as well as the effects on multilevel identities or on the influence of interest groups. In contrast, only a limited number of studies have empirically examined the impacts on national political parties.

In connection with the increasing power of the European Parliament (EP) and the official recognition of transnational party federations given by the Maastricht treaty, the interest in political parties and Europeanization has grown. The first studies have concerned the national parties’ positions on European integration (pro v/s anti-UE; intraparty divisions, etc.) and the analysis of party federations or ‘Europarties’ at the EU level (patterns of competition, etc.).

However, five other areas can be investigated, each one of which is linked to the [potential] impacts of Europeanization on domestic political parties: the policy-programmatic content; the national organizations; the patterns of party competition; the party-government relations; and the relations beyond the national party system (Ladrech, 2002). Among these five dimensions, little attention has been paid so far to the impacts on how parties organize. The focus on the influence of European integration on domestic party organizations specifically was initiated only recently, with the work of Robert Ladrech in 2002, followed by Mair (2006); Carter et al., Ladrech, Aylott et al., in Poguntke et al. (2007); and Ladrech (2009). We can also quote some more focused researches such as the article of Raunio (2002) who has studied the impact of European integration on the leadership centralization or the work of Pennings (2006) who has investigated the EU influence on national party manifestos.

These analyses are conducted in line with party organization theories and the assumption that organizations adapt to significant changes in their environment (along the lines of Panebianco’s (1988) theoretical views, among others). On the one hand, ‘Europeanization’ is considered as a stimulus for political parties to benefit from new opportunities. On the other hand, the growing complexity of the political environment involves pressures to parties which must attenuate the potential constraints.

The changes expected from the influence of Europeanization are situated at two levels. First, the formal organizational structure can be modified. Typically, the growing relevance of European-level decision making involves an increasing in employed personnel (dedicated
staff) specialized in EU domains; the creation, at the national level, of committees specialized in European affairs; the right for MEPs to vote at national party congresses; changes in the allocation of resources (e.g. a share of the party budget to fund European positions); a more controlled selection of EU specialists; etc. (Ladrech, 2007: 213; Carter et al., 2007:10)

The second type of transformation concerns the behaviour of actors. Europeanization is likely to affect the power of two kinds of actors within the party: the party elites and the EU specialists. On the one hand, the intergovernmental logic of decision making tends to work in favour of party elites. Indeed, their autonomy is increased because the surveillance of the national party is more relaxed and the accountability of a particular minister is difficult to attribute. As consequence, incumbency represents a crucial factor. Furthermore, elites have information resources and often expertise in European affairs (Raunio, 2002; Poguntke et al., 2007; Ladrech, 2008). On the other hand, because of a growing demand of expertise, EU specialists expect to have more access to resources and to control more zones of autonomy, including on policy decisions within the party (Poguntke et al., 2007; Ladrech, 2008).

However, analyses conducted in countries of Western Europe point out the limited degree of organizational change attributed to European integration: there are few additional career positions and when there is more staff, the functionaries are mainly juniors without influence; the autonomy of European committees are limited; there are no crucial changes in policy formulation and elite selection due to the growing importance of European decision making; the autonomy of MEPs is more due to the lack of attention and interest of European affairs in the domestic party (the MEPs being rather ‘peripherical’); the prestige and influence of EU specialists remain low. Concerning the strengthening of the elite autonomy, they have more power only when they participate in national government (Raunio, 2002; Ladrech, 2007; Carter et al., 2007; Poguntke et al., 2007).

In spite of this relative consensus, these statements can be re-evaluated in two ways. On the one hand, one could examine the Europeanization of party organizations in the specific context of Eastern-Central Europe. For instance, could it be that Europeanization has had stronger effects on party organizational change in those countries specifically? On the other hand, one could identify the methodological problems and limitations encountered by scholars, in the view of performing more systematic empirical tests. The two next sections are devoted to the examination of these questions.

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5 EU specialists include the MEPs, the national politicians with an EU brief and staff with an EU brief (Carter et al., 2007:12).
2.3. Europeanization and party organizations in Eastern-Central Europe

Even though there is a growing interest in the field of Europeanization and political parties, few works have examined the Eastern-Central area. It seems obvious that the study of the Europeanization of party organizations in this part of Europe requires different approaches than those used to examine the phenomenon in the established members.

First, the conceptualization needs to be at least partly distinctive, considering the particular context of the Europeanization process. Institutions (in the broad sense) in the Eastern-Central Europe must undertake a quicker process of adjustments while Western parties can adapt slowly to the European standards (Carter et al., 2007: 8; Poguntke et al., 2007: 753; Ladrech, 2008: 140). Moreover, this time pressure is accompanied by a strong political conditionality to meet the *acquis communautaire* (Ladrech, 2008:141). Further, while in the West the stabilisation of parties preceded the influence of EU, the process of party institutionalization in Eastern-Central Europe takes place simultaneously with EU accession (Lewis, 2008:158).

Second, this specific environment raises several methodological issues/difficulties such as isolating EU effects (v/s domestic effects) and detecting the specific role played by the party consolidation (phases of development/institutionalization) – which also raises the broader issue of party-specific. These issues are discussed in the next section.

Given the rapid accession to the EU (and all its institutional, legal and political correlates) and the poor degree of party crystallization, the influence of Europeanization would be expected to be more significant. Theses effects are playing on two levels. Firstly, the participation in the EU institutions and the affiliation to ‘Europarties’ allow the quick professionalization of parties (presence of experts, advices for political campaigns) and the socialization of party elites as well as their networking. From this perspective, in contrast to their Western counterparts, the EP is more considered as a significant benefit for career advancement than a ‘consolation prize’. Secondly, in addition to these direct effects, we can observe several indirect effects: the promotion of anti-corruption reforms which has influenced the regulation of party funding or the import of some rules such as the gender quotas (Pridham, 2007).
3. Methodological challenges and possible goals

3.1. Few systematic analyses

So far, few empirical analyses have systematically investigated the validity of the hypotheses resulting from the theoretical expectations. Several works have still enriched the theoretical development in this field and have given some approaches for empirical studies. Among these enlightening analyses, we can distinguish the general approaches from the single-case studies. On the one hand, Ladrech (2002), Poguntke et al. (2007) or Lewis (2008) have identified the areas of change in party organizations and have attempted to consider the influence of European integration on it. On the other hand, Raunio (2002) have examined the impact of European integration on the autonomy of party leadership and Bomberg & Carter (2006) have explored the influence of EU membership on Green parties. In short, they all point out the little formal organization change (e.g. the weak significance of EU specialists’ influence) but they underline the empowerment of party elites, especially when he is in government.

The work of Aylott, Morales and Ramiro (in Poguntke et al., 2007) actually constitutes the first empirical attempt to analyse Europeanization and party organizations. They conducted a comparative analysis of six Western European countries (Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden) – all 6 being EU-member countries – in order to assess the impact of Europeanization on party organizations (top-down dimension). Because it is not feasible to analyse informal changes from the first direct elections of the EP in 1979, the authors have considered the period from 1993 to 2005 (and proceeded to elite interviews between 2003 and 2005).

The independent variable is the European integration, and they identify two dependent variables (the power of EU specialists and the power of party elites). The authors select a number of indicators which identify the features of the dependent variables:

- 3 indicators for the power of EU specialists:
  - “1/ whether MEPs sit in their party’s executive organs automatically, by dint of their representative positions, or whether they do so by convention;
  - 2/ the degree to which EU specialists are integrated into their party’s everyday life;
  - 3/ the extent of EU specialists’ influence in drafting national election manifestos and empowerment, such as the role given to national politicians with an EU brief.”

- 5 indicators for the power of party elites:
• “1/ the party leadership’s influence in the selection of candidates for elections to the EP;
• 2/ the degree of active policy coordination with the party’s MEPs that is initiated by the leadership;
• 3/ the control exercised by a governing party over its ministers when they are active in EU decision-making forums;
• 4/ EU specialists’ accountability to their party;
• 5/ their influence in their party”

They also consider 6 intervening variables:
• “1/ the status of the party as ‘governmental’;
• 2/ the state of opinion within the party on European integration;
• 3/ the party’s association with a party family, in the sense of its having an ideological affinity with certain parties in other countries;
• 4/ the time that the country within which a party operates has been an EU member;
• 5/ the size of the party’s delegation to the EP;
• 6/ national-level institutional features and party organization traditions”.

Regarding the internal power of EU specialists, little empirical evidence has been found. The party family plays some role in the integration of European parliamentary delegation into party leadership organs, but there are no clear traces of intervening variables effects.

On the other hand, the authors have detected more empirical evidence concerning the impacts of European integration on the power of party elites. First, the candidate selection for elections to the EP is more controlled when the party is divided and when party leadership is in government. Next, party family and size of delegation affect the political coordination with MEP’s. In particular, Green parties tend to give more freedom to their MEP’s, and the delegations that display least coordination represent small parties. Finally, the national tradition and the duration of a country membership play a role in the party control of ministers acting at EU level (the ministerial activity is more controlled in a country recently member of the EU).

However, as in the other works, the authors conclude by arguing that changes induced by European integration are limited. We could then reply that these conclusions only reinforce the previous findings resulting from single-case studies; however this study also allows us to identify the methodological challenges in more detail.
Indeed, throughout their analysis, the authors highlight a relative high number of methodological difficulties. In the following sections we will try to list as exhaustively as possible the main challenges that may be encountered and try to put forward some solutions. First, we will first focus on the methodological challenges and goals related to the issue of the European integration influence. Second, we will propose a certain number of solutions to meet these challenges.

3.2. Problems and ‘bottlenecks’ linked to empirical work on [the] Europeanization [of party organizations]

A chief added value of Aylott, Morales and Ramiro’s (2007) work is that they move one step beyond single-case ‘narratives’ & descriptive work, and are able to engage in an analytic perspective (i.e. distinguishing & operationalizing core variables) and in hypotheses-testing. However they still meet some quite fundamental limitations, in particular in terms of ‘limited diversity’ of the cases analyzed – in particular the fact that they have only selected parties in EU member countries.

This being said, this issue of limited diversity is only one of several methodological issues and challenges which, in fact, are common to all fields of ‘Europeanization research’ (in particular for “top-down” Europeanization as defined above).

Note, first, that the definition of top-down Europeanization (see section 2.1. above) is causal by nature: EU integration is assumed to cause, somehow, some (domestic) changes, adjustments, re-orientations etc.. Only recently has this been more seriously tackled in terms of causal analysis using more rigorous tools developed around political science and comparative politics specifically – “rigorous” not necessarily being equated here with “quantitative” (see below). This ‘causal’ issue is in fact deeply intertwined with research issues, as we shall try to demonstrate below.

One immediately bumps into a double limitation: (a) so far, the bulk of the literature and reflections on this issue has been produced by scholars working on the Europeanization of domestic public policies, not political parties – hence some of their proposals might not be easily ‘transferable’ to political party analysis; (b) most of this literature, at least up till recently, has remained endogenous to the Europeanization studies ‘community’ (Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009: 509), hence taking too little stock of the broader literature on the issue.
Several ‘causal’ proposals (or rather ‘approaches’)\(^6\) have been made, not all of which are applicable to party-organizational changes. The main ones which might be applicable in principle are listed below – not all of them being fully compatible:

1. ‘goodness of fit’ approach: “Europeanization is a process, not an outcome” (p.509); this process comprises both the EU and domestic levels, and produces ‘adaptational pressures’ at both levels: “the lower the compatibility between European and domestic processes, policies and institutions, the higher the adaptational pressure” (Börzel & Risse, 2003 : 61). Following this view, the EU level is not ‘exogenous’ to the domestic level;

2. ‘critical junctures’ approach (our own labelling): the EU level could be an exogenous factor. Once a major domestic change has been observed, one should move “up” and “backwards” in the causal chain of events and address the question: “was the cause of this major change domestic, or did the change come from exogenous variables like the EU-level variables or global-level variables?” (p.510);

3. ‘complex causal chains’ approach (our own labelling): the ‘causal chain’ leading to domestic change is more complex and involves different levels and temporal sequences, including the within-country level\(^7\) (e.g. Dyson, 2000);

4. ‘control group’ or ‘quasi-experimental’ approach (our own labelling): “even if n EU Member States are experiencing change, it well may be that k countries outside the EU are also going through the same process of change – for example, because they are all part of a global process of diffusion” (p.512) – applied for instance by Saurugger, 2005; Levi-Faur, 2004). Such an approach is also valid if parties, not nation-states, are the cases.

So far, only few scholars in the field of Europeanization have systematically applied these approaches – in particular, so far very few have applied the “control group” design, or an analytic approach to Europeanization (i.e. involving variables), privileging ‘softer’, qualitative, mechanisms-oriented research (p.526), often focusing on one single case or a very small number of cases. Therefore, altogether, very few studies have gone some way in actually demonstrating that “domestic continuities and changes are indeed causally related to European-level factors rather than global or domestic forces” (Haverland 2007 : 59; our emphasis). At this stage of development of the field, ‘Europeanization scholars’ still need to “(...) demonstrate whether observed domestic developments would have occurred even in the

\(^6\) Indeed, few scholars in the field of europeanization have so far systematically applied these approaches.

\(^7\) E.g. the role of “policy communities” in the field of domestic policy change.
absence of the European regional integration and needs to account for alternative explanation in order to establish the relative importance of the EU, or its ‘net impact’” (Haverland 2007: 62).

3.3. Towards a research strategy

Basically the approaches outlined above have been translated into two contrasted concrete research strategies, also coinciding with contrasted research designs. The first strategy revolves around process tracing, which is more theory-driven and ‘qualitative’ by nature: “the researcher starts by deriving observable implications from the EU-level theory and alternative theories. These implications or predictions can denote what should happen, how it should happen and when it should happen if the theories are valid. These “patterns” of implications will then be compared with the empirical pattern identified by the case study” (p.62). This strategy most often takes the form of a single, more or less ‘thick’ case study (or a limited number of such case studies) which also identifies temporal patterns and processes.

The second strategy revolves around control, in an indirect or direct way. The indirect way relies on “counterfactual reasoning”, in which the researcher develops a ‘counterfactual argument’ (typically: in the form: “what would have happened if EU integration had not occurred?”), to then establish to what extent EU integration has been causally important. This procedure is quite proximate to Moore’s “thought experiments” (1966). The more direct way, which coincides with the “control group” approach (see above), is the inclusion of non-EU cases as a “control group”. This is a very usual design in comparative politics, following for instance Lijphart’s earlier suggestions (1971, 1975). In short, such a design coincides with “larger-N” analysis and with an analytic approach (relying on variables) – typically with the help of some statistical and/or formal modelling tools.

Those two strategies coincide largely with what Blatter & Blume (2008) have labelled, respectively, the “causal mechanisms” and “co-variational” approaches. According to Haverland, one of the main weaknesses of Europeanization research so far is precisely that there has been virtually no dialogue between the two approaches – even though they are, in

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8 Haverland (2007: 62-63) presents these as 3 strategies; our argument is that the 2nd and 3rd ones are in fact two variants of the same strategy.

9 Haverland mentions an interesting variant, which might be useful for political parties: the “control group” could also consist of “sections” within member states that are not subject to EU pressures or stimuli.
principle, complementary, as “(...) full explanation requires both co-variation and the identification of the connection between cause and effect” (2007: 68).

In conclusion, and in short: we need to elaborate a model and a research design which, ideally, would meet the following goals:

- a. give insights on the “how” dimension of Europeanization of (domestic) party organizations (referring to ‘causal mechanisms’);
- b. give insights on “how much” each variable (or causal factor, determinant, …) contributes to the observed outcome (relative weight of factors, following the ‘co-variational’ approach);
- c. more specifically, isolate the ‘net’ effect of EU integration on (domestic) party organizational change;
- d. and/or, if such is the case, to identify the core ‘causal combinations’ which enable EU integration (as a specific causal factor) to take effect;
- e. enable longer-term, longitudinal analysis.

In other words, the ambition is also to bridge and subsume the “causal mechanisms” and “co-variational” approaches, which are often presented as alternatives, or even opposed.

4. The proposed model and research design

4.1. Model-building: a revised and broader model

This all being considered, it seems quite a challenge to actually establish the specific causal importance of “top-down” Europeanization on domestic party organizations – it might be the case that even a systematic comparative research design (such as sketched in this paper, below) will not deliver satisfying or convincing results. One additional difficulty is that, following the ‘causal’ discussion above, in principle one should at least consider four empirical levels: the party organization level (“meso” level), the national context level, the EU context level, and the global level – not to mention the level of the individual ‘players’ (e.g. party leaders, cadres, activists – or possibly even voters).

Figure 1 visualizes the model elaborated by Aylott, Morales & Ramiro (as we understand it). It displays at least three limitations with regards to the discussion in the previous section: (a) it does not make explicit what the causal connection (“causal mechanisms”) are expected to be between the various levels; (b) it considers a priori a
‘directional’ form of causality (from the EU level to domestic parties; (c) it isolates a priori the Europeanization of a domestic party as an ‘independent variable’, not taking into consideration that parties could also undergo, possibly simultaneously, other types of organizational changes.

**[Figure 1 around here]**

Therefore it would be useful to at least envisage a change in focus – not that we would position ourselves as a priori ‘opponents’ of the party Europeanization thesis. Some scholars would probably define themselves as such, for at least two reasons: (a) at the more theoretical level, they would contend that Europeanization as a concept has been overly « stretched » (in the Sartorian sense) and should be restricted to “high politics” (i.e. political institutions stricte sensu, and possibly public policies as well) and not expanded to “low politics” (e.g. political parties, social movements etc.) (Kassim, 2000); and/or (b) at the empirical level, they are not convinced that significant Europeanization effects on party organizations can be established (Gaziano & Vink, 2007). Our own position is ‘non-dogmatic’ in this respect.

The change in focus consists in a broader empirical (& theoretical) focus, as follows: (a) the “dependent” set of variables is defined, more broadly, as “party organizational change” or rather “party organizational adaptation” (the latter phenomenon being empirically more specific; Rihoux, 2001; Rihoux 2006) ; (b) Europeanization of the party organization is one variable (or possibly a subset of 2 variables, consisting of 3 + 5 indicators, following Aylott’s et.al.’s. proposition) within this set of variables ; (c) consequently, the set of « explanatory » or « intervening » variables needs to be broadened as well – in particular with the addition of national-level variables (not specifically linked to EU integration). The revised model is displayed in Figure 2.

**[Figure 2 around here]**

This revised model displays the further addition features: (a) it makes the distinction clearer between party-level determinants – which are in fact part of the “case” (the party organization) – and determinants at higher levels; (b) it adds an intermediate cluster of

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10 Though we would be more inclined not to use statistical terminology – « outcome variable » (= ‘output’) versus “condition variables” (= ‘inputs’) is a much more cautious formulation, which is precisely why it is used when applying Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) – see section 4 below.
possible determinants between the party level and the national institutional level: the “party system and party competition”-related variables. Indeed party organizational adaptation is often mediated or stimulated by competition effects vis-à-vis other parties (Kitschelt; Panebianco, 1988), and often contains elements of organizational ‘imitation’ (Torgersen, 1967; Deschouwer, 2001). In particular, the Europeanization of other, directly competing parties could be a stimulus for a party to Europeanize (variable C2); (c) it leaves (at this stage) the issue of ‘causal direction’ quite open, as there could be more complex forms of causal mechanisms, with feedback effects etc.; (d) it add a certain number of potential determinants, in particular at the party level. Indeed recent empirical work has demonstrated that some core party-related variables often play a role in organizational adaptation – related to variations in size (variable D5; e.g. Rihoux 2001; 2006) and to the evolution of the party’s position in its ‘lifespan’ in terms of institutionalization (e.g. access to Parliament, government etc.) (variable D6; e.g. Rihoux 2006; & other sources such as Buelens etc.). NB this is a non-limitative list; (e) it also fine-tunes the variables at the country level – in particular it adds a variable on the national legal framework with regards to parties, which may play a strong role in some countries at least (van Biezen).

Considering this enriched model, and so as to meet the goals stated above, the next choices to be made concern research design, especially case selection. This procedure of case selection must actually be split in two phases: (a) the selection of countries (national contexts); (b) the selection of parties within these countries – the buzzwords being (see section above): ensure sufficient diversity across the relevant dimensions which are linked to the theory and the ‘causal’ model, enable a logic of control, and enable longer-term analysis. This means, in fact, that quite a significant number of countries and of parties within each country must be included, otherwise the “control” approach cannot be implemented. In other words, we will have to articulate the two complementary logics of “MSDO” and “MDSO”: “most similar cases [with] different outcomes” and “most different cases [with] similar outcomes” (Levi-Faur 2004; 2006).

4.2. Selection of countries

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11 In fact this variable is partly tapped by the variable on “status of party as governmental” (D1) put forward by Aylott et al.
It seems reasonable to take ‘greater Europe’ as the universe of investigation, as party organizations outside this realm – e.g. in North America etc. – display some quite different features (e.g. Katz; and others), and as the greater European context meets basic criteria in terms of longer-term historical features, cleavage structures, nation-building etc, following a Rokkanian perspective (see e.g. Seiler with regards to the comparison of parties in this broader context) – in a nutshell, greater Europe, in some respects, constitutes an ‘area of homogeneity (Berg-Schlosser, 2008) which enables comparison while holding some more distant background features constant.

Within this universe of investigation, to meet the two core criteria of diversity and control (see above), and considering the revised model, it means we should select a ‘certain’ number of countries in each one of the empirical categories here below:

- some EU-member countries and some non-EU member countries;
- some Western European countries and some Eastern-Central European countries;
- within Western European countries: both some EU-member countries and some non-EU member countries;
- within Eastern-Central European countries: both some EU-member countries and some non-EU member countries;
- some countries in the respective main European ‘regions’ – meaning: Nordic countries, Southern European countries (Ladrech, 2008: 146), as well as Balkans, Baltic states, etc.;
- some countries corresponding to the successive waves of EU enlargement (e.g. the founding 6, UK & Ireland, then Portugal-Greece-Spain, Cyprus-Malta, then the 2 waves in Eastern-Central European countries);
- some countries with a strict v/s flexible legal framework for party organizations;
- some countries with ‘strong’ v/s ‘weak’ party organizational traditions;
- some countries with highly multiparty v/s biparty systems (and intermediate situations).

All these criteria can be summarized in a table/matrix format, and each country can be “mapped” following these criteria, so as to ensure that there is sufficient diversity across each of these distinctions [will be done at a later stage] – so as to diminish as much as possible the “limited diversity” problem (e.g. Rihoux & Ragin, 2008). In concrete terms, it seems likely that we will have to include:

- a large proportion of current EU member countries;
• as well as some major non-EU Western European countries: Norway, Switzerland\textsuperscript{12} and Ireland;
• and as well as some significant non-EU Eastern-Central European countries, where Europeanization effects would also be hypothesized to be absent – though this might be disputed for those countries which are already at the “pre-accession” stage? Some obvious cases would be: Croatia, FYROM, Albania, Serbia, and Montenegro.

4.3. Selection of parties

Following the same rationale, we will have to select, within each country – or at least within each cluster of countries which share a sufficient number of features – a sufficient number of parties on both sides of each one of the distinctions below:
• both governmental and non-governmental parties;
• both pro- and anti-EU parties;
• both parties associated and non-associated to a EU party “family”;  
• both parties with a large EP delegation and parties with a small (or no) EP delegation;
• both ‘larger’ and ‘smaller’ parties;
• parties at different stages in their ‘lifespan’, i.e. more or less institutionalized.

We can also map all the possible parties in a matrix-type of format [will be done at a later stage], so as to maximize diversity across those dimensions, while still keeping the number of parties under control (“intermediate-N” design).

4.4. Collection and analysis of data [rough draft]

Naturally, the collection of data, including the compilation of existing data, raises many challenges which should be discussed further in another contribution.
In short, we can identify one core difficulty and one core preoccupation.
First, the core difficulty: in some countries, especially in Eastern-Central Europe, many party organizations are less stable over time and are organizationally much more fluid, and therefore it may be difficult to include many of these in the systematic comparison.
Second, the core preoccupation: not much \textit{systematic} party-organizational data is available at this stage across greater Europe. The existing data are mainly qualitative and formal

\textsuperscript{12} Though the Swiss case is quite difficult to handle, given the confederal nature of the political system – and of party organizations (Ladner & Brändle, 2008).
(historical context, institutional features and formal rules). However informal data are crucial as well (e.g. practices within the party, conflicts, perceptions of actors, etc.).

4.5. Possibilities of systematic comparative analysis [rough draft]

A full discussion of comparative analyses and tests which could be performed also falls beyond the scope of this contribution. Here below, we just sketch a few (non-limitative) possibilities.

Upstream of the analysis itself, four particular difficulties (among others) will first have to be lifted. The first relates specifically to West/East comparison: the simultaneous process of EU accession and party development in Central-Eastern European countries. As a consequence, the impacts are less tangible, even impossible to detect. However, the influence of Europeanization is expected to be more significant than in their Western counterparts because the party is not consolidated yet. Taking into account the time dimension and party consolidation/institutionalization dimensions (see revised model), it should be possible to go some way in tackling this difficulty.

The second is related to concepts and the comparability. Indeed one of the first rules that must be observed in a comparative analysis is the comparability of concepts (Sartori, 1991). It may well be that “Europeanization” is too specific in some ways, and that it takes different forms and meaning, for instance, depending on the duration and ‘depth’ of a country’s insertion in the EU – not to mention the specific difficulty for pre-accession countries.

The third and fourth difficulties are shared by all systematic cross-national comparative analyses over time: (a) how to operationalize the time dimension, and in particular how to define the “cases” – will these be synchronic or non-synchronic, for instance ?; (b) how to model and control for possible “diffusion effects”, i.e. some possible ‘contagion’ effects from one country to another (for instance within a culturally more proximate set of EU countries, etc.) ? There are many ways and strategies around those difficulties.

With regards to the comparative analyses themselves, five quite obvious types of possibilities stand out. First, for more exploratory purposes, and to further consolidate the model, one could perform a few “focused, binary comparisons” – for instance one binary comparison of two “most similar cases” (say, for instance: the German and Austrian Social-Democratic parties),
complemented by one binary comparison of two “most different cases” (say, for instance: the Spanish Socialists and the Estonian Liberals).

Second, we could undertake two distinct regional analyses (Western v/s Eastern-Central Europe), each time using non-EU countries as controls, and, by triangulation, we identify similarities and/or differences between the two contexts.

Third, we could consider a comparison between Eastern-Central European countries, on the one hand, and Spain, Portugal and Greece, on the other hand. Indeed, all these countries were dealing with Europeanization effects at the same time as party consolidation.

Fourth, following a similar reasoning, we could integrate in a single analysis the influence of Europeanization on Eastern-Central European parties and on ‘new’ Western European parties which have consolidated during the accession to the EU (or during the preparation phase) e.g. shortly before the accession to the EU in 1973: creation of the Workers party (in 1970) in Ireland & formation of the Christian Democrats (in 1970), the Progress Party (in 1972) and the Centrum-Democrats (in 1973), in Denmark. The Liberal Forum created in 1993, two years before the integration in the European institutions is another example of party which can be integrated in such an analysis in Austria.

Fifth, we could also attempt a more global comparison, across a broad set of countries, provided this does not increase too much the number of variables in the model.

With regards to the comparative techniques used, besides ‘case-oriented’ qualitative-narrative comparisons, we would naturally be inclined to exploit the potential of “Configurational Comparative Methods” and in particular different versions of QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis), which seems particularly adequate for such comparative analyses (Rihoux & Ragin, 2008; Rihoux & Lobe; 2009): (a) it is designed to handle small- to intermediate-N research situations; (b) it combines features of “case-oriented” and “variable-oriented” (analytic) approaches, and therefore also of “causal mechanisms” and “co- variational” templates; (c) it takes on board the notion of complex causation (e.g. “multiple conjunctural causation”); (d) it allows for different forms of ‘control’ (quasi-experimental design); and (e) it produces ‘parsimonious’ results, i.e. one would be able to conclude quite clearly, for instance, after the analysis, whether or not EU-level factors play a distinct role in party organizational change, and/or if this role is in fact part of a “causal combination” with other factors. Surprisingly, in spite of these advantages, so far QCA has been very seldom exploited in Europeanization research at large (Haverland, 2007).
Conclusion: several open points [rough draft]

Reviewing the literature on the development of party organization in ‘Greater Europe’ (Western and Eastern-Central) we have identified some signs of convergence between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ European democracies: centralization of leadership, professionalization of parties and strengthening of the links between parties and the state. Indeed, in the same vein as the hypothesis of the ‘evolutionary laps’, we can argue that, in spite of a *sui generis* process of party formation, the development of party organization in Eastern-Central Europe follows a trajectory more or less similar to that of Western Europe. Among the factors explaining this organizational ‘convergence’, we have chosen to investigate one which is still rarely explored and often contested: Europeanization. More precisely, two main aims emerged from our research: assessing the ‘net’ role played by European integration as factor of organizational convergence in ‘Greater Europe’, and discussing the methodological challenges linked to this ambition.

Because of its polysemic character and the scarcity of its empirical evidence, we have had to devote a section to the concept of Europeanization and its potential ability to influence the structures of party organization. Many of studies devoted to ‘party organizational Europeanization’ consider the ‘top-down’ meaning; however our research has shown the significance of Europeanization as a two-way process in which organizations adjust their structures to the dynamic of European integration as much as organizations shape the EU. Concerning the ‘net’ influence of European integration on party organization, authors have only displayed limited impacts in both Western and Eastern-Central Europe. On the other hand, they highlight a certain number of methodological problems that we have tried to tackle more systematically.

Based on the first comparative piece of work following an analytic approach (by Aylott *et al.*, 2007) and considering the lack of dialogue between the “causal mechanisms” and “co-variational” approaches (Haverland, 2007), we have proposed an enriched model and research design, aiming to meet 5 distinct goals. The revised model includes 5 additional features and the research design takes in account some new considerations regarding the selection of countries, the selection of parties, the analysis of data and the possibilities of systematic comparative analysis.
This contribution is still pretty much “work in progress”, and quite many issues remain open and would need to be arbitrated. For instance:

- our ‘revised model’ could be further refined, at both ‘extremities’. On the one hand, how could “global trends” or “global stimuli” (beyond the EU sphere) be included – as indeed it may well be that the same stimuli would produce different effects in different national or party-political settings? On the other hand, how to include more micro-level factors, such as the state of the public opinion on EU integration – which may have some impact on party organizational change and strategies?

- how to balance the “top-down” and “bottom-up” dimensions of Europeanization – or rather the two concepts of Europeanization (see section 2.1.)? Indeed it is not evident to distinguish European integration as a process from its impact because of the mutual influence of the two processes. Therefore, we should probably find ways of complementing the “top-down” perspective (as applied e.g. by Carter, 2007; or Ladrech, 2008) by the “bottom-up” perspective. One possibility in this respect would be to analyze the case of European leaders (political leaders in ‘Brussel’s Europe’) who are not involved in domestic party-political structures (e.g. the president of the EP, or the presidents of political groups in the EP).

- and more generally – since this basically the agenda of this paper -- : how to better enrich the “narrow view” on party organizations’ Europeanization with the broader view on party organizational change, on the one hand, and the broader view on Europeanization processes in general, beyond the ‘special’ case of party organizations, on the other hand? Or, to put it bluntly: what could those “party organization scholars” who are not really interested in Europeanization, on the one hand, and those “Europeanization scholars” who are not really interested in political parties (but rather, say, in public policies), on the other hand, learn from a systematic comparative analysis of Europeanization within party organizations?
References [still to be completed]


Risse, Thomas; Green Cowels, Maria, and Caporaso, James A. Europeanization and domestic change: introduction. in Green Crowels, Maria; Caporaso, James A.; Risse, and Thomas, eds. Transforming Europe: Europeanization and domestic change. NY: Cornell University Press; pp. 1-20.


### Tables and Figures

Table 1: party types, revisited

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<tr>
<td>Origins</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>Extra-parliamentary</td>
<td>Elite or mass party – links with interests groups</td>
<td>Merger of parliamentary fraction with state</td>
<td>Private initiative of political entrepreneurs</td>
<td>New social movement</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relation to civil society</td>
<td>Elites overlap</td>
<td>Strong ties</td>
<td>Weak ties</td>
<td>Weak ties</td>
<td>No ties</td>
<td>Informal ties</td>
<td>Weak/No ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to state</td>
<td>Elites overlap</td>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Close ties</td>
<td>Close ties</td>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>Close ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of membership</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Minimal/Irrelevant</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Personal amateur</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Formal professional</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Collective amateur</td>
<td>Personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation MP/Party</td>
<td>MP in control</td>
<td>Party in control</td>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>MP in control</td>
<td>MP in control</td>
<td>Party in control</td>
<td>Party in control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Locus of power</td>
<td>Local leaders</td>
<td>Party leaders</td>
<td>Party executive</td>
<td>Party leaders</td>
<td>Party leaders and staff</td>
<td>Activists</td>
<td>Party leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Member fees</td>
<td>Interest groups and state subsidies</td>
<td>State subsidies</td>
<td>Business capital and commercial activities</td>
<td>Member fees</td>
<td>State subsidies and business activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political campaigns</td>
<td>Personal networks</td>
<td>Mass mobilization</td>
<td>Capital intensive and professional organization</td>
<td>Permanent campaign organization</td>
<td>Expert staff and use of marketing techniques</td>
<td>Member mobilization</td>
<td>Capital intensive and professional organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Aylott, Morales & Ramiro’s model (2007) [our own representation]
[A], [B], [C], [D]: clusters/categories of variables

EU-level variables
* [A1 ?: size of party’s delegation to the EP]

Country-level variables
* B1: duration of country’s EU membership
* B2: national institutional features & party organization traditions

Party-level variables
* C1: status of party as governmental
* C2: opinion within party on EU integration
* C3: association of party to party ‘family’ in EU
* [C4 ?: size of party’s delegation to the EP]

Europeanization (of domestic party organization)
* D1: power of EU specialists (3 indicators)
* D2: power of party elites (5 indicators)
Figure 2: revised model (first draft)

EU-level variables
* [A1 ? : size of party’s delegation to the EP]
* …?

Country-level variables
* B1 : duration of country’s EU membership
* B2 : national institutional features
* B3 : national legal framework for parties
* B4 : party organization traditions
* …?

Party-level variables
* D1 : status of party as governmental
* D2 : opinion within party on EU integration
* D3 : association of party to party ‘family’ in EU
* [D4 ? : size of party’s delegation to the EP]
* D5 : party size/growth
* D6 : party institutionalization – « life span »
* …?

Europeanization (of domestic party)
* F1 : power of EU specialists (3 indicators)
* F2 : power of party elites (5 indicators)

Other party organizational changes (in domestic party)
* E1…?
* E2…?

Domestic party (« case »)

Party organizational adaptation

Party system /party competition – level variables
* C1 : level of party competition
* C2 : europeanization of other parties
* …?