Enemies at the Gates: Framing Strategies of Far Right Parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

Alena Kluknavská
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava

Paper presented at the ECPR Graduate Student Conference 2014, University of Innsbruck, 3 July – 5 July 2014
Section: Governance and Leadership
Panel: Challenge to Democratic Societies? Populist and Radical Right Parties in Europe

Abstract
The far right parties offer a clear identification between “us” and “them”. The aim of the paper is to explore the discourse of the far right and analyse the frames employed by the far right that serve to construct meanings of their perceived enemies on the cases in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The paper builds upon the framing perspective and investigates the framing process, in which the collective actors involved in the far right have been dealing with “them”. Applying the frame analysis, it examines the People’s Party Our Slovakia and the Worker’s Party of Social Justice regarding their enemies in the period of 2010-2013. The paper makes an empirical contribution to the research on the far right in Central and Eastern Europe and considers the factors why the parties, though in similar political context and with focus on similar enemies, chose different framing patterns.

Keywords: right-wing extremism, far right, frame analysis, political parties, nationalism, xenophobia

Introduction
Various actions of the far right in Slovakia and the Czech Republic such as anti-Roma demonstrations and rallies contribute to rising concerns regarding the tense relationship between the majority and various minorities, presently particularly the Roma minority. Far right movements and parties appear to be united by their distinct hostility toward various out-groups and offer a clear identification between “us” and “them”. This dichotomous vision helps setting boundaries, where “us” is being presented as a strong actor

---

1 This work was supported by Grant for Ph.D. Students and Young Researchers of Comenius University in Bratislava, Grant UK no. G-14-138-00.
2 Acknowledging the on-going academic discussion about the conceptualization of the terms and the main features and the complexity and sometimes inconsistency, throughout the paper we follow the term far right as the most used concept in the region of CEE (Mareš 2003; Kopeček 2007; Kupka et al. 2009; Smolík 2010).
protecting the defenceless people and “them” as various outsiders that range from holders of power to various minorities. The “people” are thus according to far right’s reasoning defined as suffering from the misdeeds of the elite, and in need of protection by the far right (Caiani, della Porta 2011). The dichotomous vision is in case of the far right often transformed into a friend-foe distinction, in which “the Other” is demonized (Mudde 2007) and dehumanized by far right actors. The category of “them” can therefore be translated into the “enemy”. The enemies are usually targeted by symbolic and/or physical violence (Caiani et al. 2012) and depicted as (specific) human decision-makers, rather than (abstract) impersonal forces (Gamson 1992; Polleta, Kai Ho 2006).

Although there exist some theoretical contributions to different types of enemies of the far right (e.g. Mudde 2007), less work has been done on the ways through which these enemies are built and framed. It seems important to answer the questions that relate to the blame attribution: Who is the source of the misdeeds of good people? Who are the perceived enemies in the discourse of the far right? What frames does the party associate with those enemies? What framing processes can be recognized in the discourse of such parties? While attributing blame to concrete actors, far right parties through strategically built frames usually punctuate the seriousness and injustice of social conditions and specify the action needed to generate change.

This paper investigates the forms of frames in the discourse of the far right in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and looks at the ways, in which the far right constructs meanings of its perceived enemies in the period of 2010-2013. Applying the frame analysis, it examines the framing processes of Worker’s Party of Social Justice (DSSS) and People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) regarding “the Others” and actors these parties perceived as dangerous. Both parties currently stand in an extra-parliamentary spectrum, with the exception of the leader of the LSNS Marian Kotleba, who has been elected as a governor of Banská Bystrica in 2013 regional elections.

The aim of the paper is twofold: First, to identify the enemies to which far right parties have been referring; second, to analyse far right’s active construction of meanings associated with their perceived enemies. The paper in the first part focuses on identification of enemies and on the analysis of the frames that far right constructs and the framing activity, in which the party or movement is engaged. While some studies have looked at the identity building in the far right by analysing the ways in which the collective identity is presented and acted upon (e.g. Caiani et al. 2012), we are looking at the opposite process of meaning construction of far right’s perceived enemies. But since the characteristics of the in-group are largely defined as a mirror image of the out-groups (Mudde 2007), a better understanding of the enemies is thus crucial in a better understanding of the far right’s own worldview.
The paper is structured into four parts. It shortly introduces the research on far right parties in Central and Eastern Europe and academic research on the far right in general. It follows with the introduction of framing perspective, a theoretical approach developed in social movement studies and proceeds with the case and data selection and the method of analysis. It then presents the results of the analysis and concludes with the summary of the findings. In the conclusion it also discusses the relevant factors, which may affect the development of the particular frames constructed by far right parties, mainly the political and discursive opportunities, the organizational resources and the role of the leadership.

**Research on far right parties**

Far right parties are in the academic literature considered as part of the “third wave” of the right wing extremism (Von Beyme 1988), which has started during 1980s and 1990s in Western Europe and has been linked to racist and xenophobic attitudes and populist tendencies. Notwithstanding its sometimes-limited capacity in terms of members and mobilization, the far right is perceived as an increasing challenge in established democracies.

The far right in Central and Eastern Europe has emerged in the region in the course of regime change after 1989. During the last two decades many countries in Central and Eastern Europe saw an increasing intensity of far right parties, which have been successful in putting frames and issues on the agenda, mostly on the topics such as nationalism or minorities issues, sometimes influencing the public discourse or mainstream political parties. Throughout the 1990s, the transformation processes in the post-communist countries affected the activities of far right parties, motivating scholars to emphasize the importance of the historical legacy and geographic location (De Lange, Guerra 2009), from either the pre-communist or communist past, or a combination of the both (Minkenberg 2009). Other researchers (e.g. Mudde 2007) argue that although the far right parties in CEE are usually more extreme than their counterparts in WE, the differences between the far right in both regions on the ideological and strategic levels are not as big as often assumed; the analytical frameworks deployed in the WE may be thus transposed to study of the far right in CEE countries.

Most studies on the far right in Western Europe are oriented on emergence, development and electoral successes of far right parties, but the literature also deals with classification of far right party family, far right ideology, including their socio-economical orientation, the role of women in far right’s ideology, the internal organization of the far right, or the far right’s influence on various topics (e.g. immigration issue) and political and public matters. The literature usually looks at horizontal and vertical level of research, orienting on micro-, meso-, and macro-level conditions on both demand and supply side of factors. Much of the previous academic work in Western Europe has focused on the structural conditions that have
facilitated emergence of far right parties, mainly the presence of specific grievances, usually the indicators of structural social problems, such as immigration and presence of immigrants or unemployment rates. These demand side approaches treated the far right mainly as unreflected reactions to social crisis and unsuccessful integration (Caiani et al. 2012). A growing body of research has therefore pointed to the need to incorporate the supply side factors (van der Brug et al. 2005; Arzheimer, Carter 2006) and turn the focus to the role of far right parties as a strategic actors attempting to best respond to their political environment.

When looking at the horizontal level, scholars have usually focused on either macro-(usually state-level variables) or micro-level (individual behaviour) explanations, creating the lack of meso-level explanations for the emergence and success of the far right (Eatwell 2003; Mudde 2007), which could investigate the link between individual motivations at the micro level and structural conditions at the macro level. At this point Caiani et al. (2012) suggest to investigate movement’s understanding of external reality and its position in this perceived reality by using the concepts from social movements studies which could have high heuristic capacity in the field of the far right study (Caiani et al. 2012). In this regard, the framing perspective, which is flexible enough to link ideas, actions and events, could shed some light on understanding how the movements present the reality and actors involved in it.

**Frames and framing as a meaning construction**

Framing is well-established and quickly developing concept in the social sciences. The concept of frame was introduced by Gregory Bateson in 1955 and elaborated by Erving Goffman in Frame Analysis (1974). The concept of frame transposed to several disciplines such as cognitive psychology (e.g. Tversky, Kahneman 1981), sociology (e.g. Gamson et al. 1982; Snow et al. 1986; Snow, Benford 1992) or media studies (e.g. Entman 1993; Pan, Kosicki 1993). With regard to the study of the far right, the framing literature deals with the news/media frames about far right parties or its leaders (e.g. Bosman, d’Haenens 2008), framing of issues that are emphasized by the far right, such as immigration (e.g. Vliegenthart, Roggeband 2007), or framing of “the Others” (e.g. Boomgaard 2007). The research also investigates the discourses of the far right and the identity frames they construct (e.g. Caiani, della Porta 2011).

Goffman (1974) posited that the world is too complex for individuals to completely understand it and people use schemas to make some sense of it, looking for social cues for interpretation of an event or action. Frames thus enable an individual or a group “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” events within their immediate situations (Goffman 1974: 21). A frame refers to an interpretive schemata that “simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and
sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment” (Snow, Benford 1992: 137). A frame is therefore a structure, which allows to make sense of the reality and to build expectations about what is to happen (Donati 1992).

In relation to the social or political movements, Snow and Benford (2000: 614) define frames as conscious outcomes of negotiated share meanings among their members, but also as being created by confrontation with actors outside of the movement. That is not say that frames are actor-independent; on the contrary, involved actors often propagate their unique and largely diverging views of the issue (Snow et al. 2007). Moreover, frames are subject to change over time rather than static cultural and/or interactional entities (Snow 2006a). The communicative processes of social movements’ actors are not simple reflections of frames; they actively reinforce pre-existing frames and generate new frames in a dynamic and evolving process of meaning construction (Benford, Snow 2000). Framing therefore focuses attention on an active construction of reality by which actors give meaning to symbolic actions and promote specific issues (Benford, Snow 2000; Snow 2006b). It comes from the assumption that meanings are not given or naturally attached to the experiences, events or objects, but are produced through interpretive processes mediated by various contextual factors (Snow 2006a).

Frames have been characterized in terms of the core framing tasks of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing. The diagnostic framing refers to the problem identification and interpretation of the perceived reality (What is the problem?) and identification of the source of problem responsibility or blame – the attribution of blame for the problem (Who is responsible for the problem? Who caused it?). The social movement actors point at particular facts and refer to them as a problem because the problems do not exist on their own, but only “in the amount, in which the phenomena as problems are interpreted” (Caiani, della Porta 2011: 70). It is this part of the process, which delineates who are “we” (self-naming collective identity) and “they” (actors blamed for the problem, various out-groups). Prognostic framing refers to the articulation of a possible solution to the identified (diagnosed) problem or a strategy for action of carrying out the plan in solving the problem (How should the problem be solved? What means should be used?), usually by identifying new social patterns or ways of regulating relationship between groups (Caiani et al. 2012). It also carries the actor responsible for carrying out this strategy (Who is responsible for action?). The motivational framing refers to a rationale for engaging in collective action or call for action, including the construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive (Benford, Snow 2000). The symbolic elaboration aims at producing the motivations and the incentives for mobilization (Caiani et al. 2012). A motivation often relies upon an
appeal to shared values, demonstrating alignment between the social movement actors and the targeted audience.

In order to convince individuals to act, frames must generalize a problem, showing the connections with other events or conditions of other social groups. Frames must also demonstrate the relevance of a given problem to individual life experience (Caiani et al. 2012). While diagnostic and prognostic framing are mostly not sufficient to provoke masses to participate in some collective action (Benford, Snow 2000), the motivational framing is more focused on the calling for action, including the strategies often related to the creation of a collective identity (della Porta, Diani 2006). It constructs a compelling motive that serves as a motivation to engage in collective action toward the proposed solution (Benford, Snow 2000).

**Data and methods**

**Case Selection.** We focus on two far right parties in Central and Eastern Europe – Worker’s Party of Social Justice in the Czech Republic and People’s Party Our Slovakia in Slovakia and their framing activities between 2010 and 2013. The far right political parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia began to form in the region of Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. They do not represent a homogeneous block, but range from parties established in mainstream politics and marginal parties occupying extra-parliamentary spectrum since the 1990s to more recent or radical counterparts, as well as dissolved political subjects. We focus on extra-parliamentary parties, which share a similar path in the development. Both parties were founded after 2000 and formed from previous far right movements, but had been dissolved (Slovak Togetherness – National Party, current LSNS, in 2006, and Worker’s Party, current DSSS, in 2010), but re-emerged with the same membership and leadership (LSNS in 2010 and DSSS immediately after dissolution as another, already-existing party). Moreover, both parties never entered parliament, but run for the office; however, with each elections, their electoral gains have slightly arisen. Both the DSSS and the LSNS were running for several positions in regional and local elections, and were to some extent successful. The biggest success so far has been M. Kotleba’s victory in the 2013 regional elections when the leader of the LSNS became a governor of the Banská Bystrica region.

**Data Source and Sample Selection.** The data are derived from 478 articles that appeared in electoral programs or party manifestos and the party press (monthly or quarterly party journal). As the article, being a unit of the analysis, we counted each press item and each paragraph or coherent section in the party programs which were separated by the sub-headline. We analysed 250 articles in the DSSS sample and 228 in the LSNS sample.
First, we analysed parties’ programs: electoral program and manifesto 2010 and 2011 for DSSS (34 units) and electoral programs 2010 and 2012 for ĽSNS (10 units). Second, we analysed the on-line journal Naše Slovensko (Our Slovakia), which is irregularly circulated by members of the LSNS, and Dělnické listy (Workers’ Post), which is issued by members of the DSSS approximately four times a year. Throughout our research period of 2010-2013, we analyse 19 issues of Naše Slovensko (121 articles) and 17 issues of Dělnické listy (216 articles). Each issue is printed on four pages. However, LSNS began to circulate the journal Naše Slovensko in September 2011 and during first two years released only five issues altogether, we supplement the data with statements, articles and commentaries published on www.naseslovensko.net (2010-2013) and www.pospolitost.wordpress.com (2010-2011); 45 articles for 2010, 28 articles for 2011 and 24 articles for 2012 (together 97 articles). The first is the official Internet page of the party and the latter webpage is the official page of political movement Slovak Togetherness (Slovenská pospolitost’), with which the LSNS has had close ideological and personal connections and common activities. Until 2012 the movement’s webpage was used as a platform for presenting ideas of (then-emerging) party. We selected only those articles that were signed as written by LSNS or its members.

Frame analysis. The paper is based on a qualitative frame analysis, with providing quantifiable measures. Although theoretically the concept is well established, there is not a shared criterion on how to perform the frame analysis methodologically. To analyse the framing processes qualitatively, most studies use techniques borrowed from discourse analyses and sociolinguistics, as frames can be reconstructed through the analysis of the discourse of the social movements (Johnston 1995). However, it is not to say that studies look at the discourses, i.e. the sums of symbolic interchange, of what is being talked and written about. But since the analysis of the framing processes, i.e. what meanings actors ascribe to particular actors or events, the discursive techniques may prove themselves helpful in analysing the way in which movements frame specific issues. The quantifiable measures present descriptive statistical data about the enemies and frames as well as the sources of frames and actors associated with the problem and blame attribution.

In order to identify the issue specific frames we conducted a qualitative pre-study on the sample of articles across years and both parties and developed a codebook used for further analysis. We arrived at a frame structure building on previous theoretical basis proposed by Snow and Benford’s (1988) framing perspective and Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) catchphrases. In a dichotomous vision of world divided into “us” and “them”, the core framing tasks are linked to respective causal chains – the causal relationships between different actors; in case of the far right, between people and enemies or among various enemies. Causal chains are the connections between who is seen as a cause and who is seen
as affected by a certain problem, and are interpreted through particular diagnostic, prognostic and/or motivational frames. Therefore, we firstly analysed the small sample of articles to identify the main topics and the main diagnostic (What is the problem?), prognostic (How should the problem be solved?) and motivational (the rationale for action) frames, along with the actors responsible for the problem (problem attribution), actors affected by the problem (problem holder) and actors associated with the solution (responsibility for solution) and motivation (responsible for motivation). Drawing upon Gamson and Modigliani’s catchphrases, for each actor associated with a diagnosis, we coded (if present) following framing devices: metaphors, catchphrases, stereotypes, dichotomies and historical examples.

After defining the initial set of actors, topics and frames, we then refined those categories and analysed additional sets of articles. By analysing the “perpetrator actor” (the problem attribution) we identified who are enemies in the discourse of far right parties and by analysing the “victim actor” (problem holders) we identified those who are presented as affected by the problem caused by enemies. Based on the pre-analysis, we identified main enemies, as well as issues, actors and frames associated with those enemies. For each article, we coded one topic and multiple diagnostic and/or prognostic framing elements. Framing element represents a concrete (part of) sentence or paragraph, which contains at least one of pre-defined frames. First of all, a general topic was coded for each article. We identified ten general topics: social issues, civil society, policies/law and order, politics, breaches of the law (criminality), culture, history, economic issues, information technology, environment. A total of 478 issues were coded; 250 issues for the DSSS and 228 for the LSNS.

Second, a source was coded for each framing element. A source could be either the party in general, the party leader or (other) party member. Together, we coded 1071 sources; 493 sources for the DSSS sample and 578 sources for the LSNS sample. Third, we coded the presence and form of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational element respectively. The presence of a diagnostic or prognostic framing element was indicated when one of the sources made a direct or indirect statement that addressed the character of the frame.

For coding of diagnostic framing elements, we differentiate between 15 diagnostic frames in relation to various enemies:

**Abuse of political power**: the notion that the government and established politicians in general abuse their political and economic power by stealing state’s assets and destroying state’s economy, all for their own benefit.

**Roma menace**: the frame links Roma criminality and Roma parasitism. It present the idea of increasing Roma criminality and attacks of Roma on majority population, as well as the way of life of Roma, according to which they live at the expense of people and do not want to follow the rules of society.
**Persecution of political opponents**: interventions, criminalization and persecution of political opponents, suppression of free discussion and oppositional opinions with the threat of imprisonment.

**Discrimination of people**: solutions, laws and actions discriminative against majority population. Failure of the government to secure the safety of people and decent life for them. Failure and unwillingness of authorities in solving the minority/immigrant/Roma problems; in turn, the majority population suffers.

**Positive discrimination of Roma**: protection, support and favouritism of Roma minority. The government puts the rights of the Roma minority ahead of the rights of majority population, tolerates the Roma criminality and ignores their violations of law.

**Loss of independence**: the party points to loss of national sovereignty, federalization of Europe, or the control over member states by European Union. It includes the domination and favouritism of foreign interests (such as EU, USA, Israel, foreign financial groups, NATO); the government put the foreigners first, before its own people.

**Destruction of traditions**: the government or politicians destroy the national, Christian traditions and virtually destroy the society.

**Immigrant threat**: inflow and favouritism of immigrants, who are taking jobs of people and do not want to integrate. Criminality and problematic behaviour of immigrants. Multicultural destruction of national identity.

**Surveillance**: technological control over people, by government or financial businesses

**Financial lobby and control**: the government controlled by financial and lobby groups.

**Media propaganda**: the media disinformation and manipulation.

**Police incompetence**: inactivity and idleness to protect people.

**Homosexual threat**: the notion that homosexuals present moral and physical danger to the population, so-called traditional families and society.

**Greedy executors**: stealing money from people, with the official orders.

**Establishing New World Order**: the idea that world is dominated by a few individuals, USA or Israel (Zionist) domination, who try gain control over global power.

A total of 967 diagnostic elements were coded: 424 for the DSSS and 543 for the LSNS. In addition to diagnosis, when mentioned by the source, we coded for the attribution of responsibility and the problem holder. We coded for 771 problem attributions altogether (363 for the DSSS and 408 for the LSNS) and 516 problem holders (260 for the DSSS and 256 for the LSNS).

For coding of prognostic framing elements, we identified eight major frames:
Anti-governmental actions/stances: to overthrow or clean the political scene, to stop political elite in the elections, to establish a real democracy, to organize anti-government demonstration.

Voting for political/ideological opposition: people should vote for real opposition, usually the far right itself.

Chauvinist national economy: the government should prioritize own people for job positions, support businesses of own people or limit foreign capital. It should make stricter conditions for hiring unqualified foreigners, higher penalties for illegal workers.

Restitution of independence: withdrawal from EU, Eurozone and/or NATO; more strict foreign policy; restoration of food, economic and energy self-sufficiency.

Law and order: following laws, order, justice; various policy reforms and law changes; the law should apply to all equally; stricter enforcement of law, especially when it comes to minorities and immigrants, homosexuals or the government.

Empowerment: people or the far right should keep going and keep their heads up, they must help themselves, so they have to mobilize and use their potential, resources, organizational skills, etc.

Nationalisation: The government should nationalize the strategic businesses and restore privatized state assets.

Emphasis on traditions: emphasis in all aspect of political and public life should place emphasis on national and/or Christian traditions; traditional, national and Christian principles should be followed.

A total of 422 prognostic elements were coded (232 for the DSSS and 190 for the LSNS). In addition to prognosis, we coded for responsibility for carrying out the solution; a total of 196 responsible actors were coded (75 for the DSSS and 121 for the LSNS).

When coding for actors associated with the problem attribution, problem holder and responsibility for the solution and motivation, we clustered actors after preliminary analysis into 13 categories: government (politicians, political regime, establishment, ruling parties, MPs, political system, etc.), citizens (majority population), Roma (individuals and minority), the far right (far right parties), political opposition, immigrants, media, homosexuals, financial businesses, executors, foreigners (EU, NATO, USA, supranational financial groups), Hungary/Hungarians, Israel (or “Zionists”).
The Enemies in the discourse of far right parties

The identification of actors held responsible of problematic situation of any kind is usually accompanied by identification of victims and perpetrators and the link between them. Figure 1 shows the connections between problem attributions (perceived perpetrators) and problem holders (perceived victims), i.e. between those seen as a cause and those seen as affected by a certain problem.

Figure 1. The dichotomy of “us” (orange) and “them” (blue) in the discourse of Worker’s Party of Social Justice (left) and People’s Party Our Slovakia (right), and the causal relationships between actors.

The discourse of both Worker’s Party of Social Justice and People’s Party Our Slovakia clearly differentiates the two broad groups – “us” and “them”, where “us” presents identity frames, i.e. those affected by certain problems, and “them” presents oppositional frames, i.e. those responsible for certain problems (Figure 1). The in-group in both countries is comprised of people and the political opponents, including the party members themselves. Both parties allocate themselves as part of people, but at the same time as part of the political opponents, protecting the goodwill of people and suffering from the government (and police) persecution. The people are in the discourse of the DSSS usually referred to as “citizens” or “decent citizens”, or “our citizens”, “Czech citizens”, “Czech workers”, while the LSNS frequently refers to the in-group as “decent people”, i.e. those, who go to work every day, pay taxes, live their ordinary lives and struggle with their living from paycheck-to-paycheck.
Figure 2. Problem attributions (actors responsible for certain problems) in the discourse of Worker’s Party of Social Justice (left) and People’s Party Our Slovakia (right), 2010-2013.

Source: the author.

The out-group, i.e. those actors responsible for various problems, is in both countries comprised of similar enemies (Figure 2). The exception is the presence of one particular enemy in the discourse of the Czech party DSSS in the form of *executors* (which almost does not emerge in the discourse of the LSNS) and different composition of the *foreigners*. Both parties include the EU, NATO, immigrants and supranational financial groups into the groups of foreigners, however, the LSNS also points to countries such as Hungary, USA, Israel or Turkey.

While the composition of the enemies appears to be similar, the saliency of respective problem attributions (Figure 2) and the way the parties diagnostically frame, i.e. what problems do they allocate to the enemies (Figure 3), differ in the two countries. The DSSS in almost two thirds of its framing activity blames the responsibility on the government, and then almost evenly distributes the blame among the Roma, the media and the foreigners (including immigrants), and slightly less the financial businesses. The LSNS also stresses the government as the enemy responsible for the problems; however, the party also greatly emphasizes Roma as actors causing certain problems. The two actors stand behind 80 per cent of the blame responsibility in party’s framing strategy (Figure 2). The rest of the blame responsibility is assigned mostly to the police, the media and the foreigners, less to financial businesses and homosexuals.

With regard to diagnostic framing, half of the parties’ framing activity, respectively, belongs to three particularly strong frames – both parties stress *Abuse of political power* (the DSSS as the most emphasized, the LSNS as the second most emphasized frame), while the DSSS then highlights *Persecution of political opponents* and *Discrimination of people*, and the LSNS accentuates *Roma menace* and *Loss of independence*. Moreover, the intensity of
other frames in the discourse of the parties varies as well. Within the most emphasized frames, for example, the DSSS underlines *Financial lobby and control* (7.3 per cent) and *Immigrant threat* (7.3 per cent), whereas the LSNS places almost no emphasis on such frames. On the other hand, while the LSNS highlights *Destruction of national traditions* (5 per cent), the DSSS (almost) does not involve such a frame into its discourse.

**Figure 3. Variations in diagnostic framing of Worker’s Party of Social Justice (left) and People’s Party Our Slovakia (right), 2010-2013.**

Source: the author.

The most salient frames in the discourse of the DSSS are *Abuse of political power* (25.2 per cent), *Persecution of opponents* (15.1 per cent), and *Discrimination of people* (10.9 per cent), which show that the party mostly emphasizes that the government and established politicians abuse the economic and political sources for their own good, while discriminating ordinary people and persecuting those, who speak about government’s misbehavior, again by abusing their powerful position. The *Abuse of power* frame mostly stresses the corrupted nature of the government, current and/or past established politicians and of political regime in general, while pointing to stealing the national economic assets and “devastation of our country” (DSSS, 17. 4. 2012) by ruling politicians and parties. It frames the politicians in high politics as “thieves” who have stolen the state resources; firstly through privatization during 1990s and later through their powerful position and opportunities in politics. The *Abuse of political power* frame was the most emphasized frame during the whole period, with the growing tendency over the years (Figure 4).
The second most emphasized frame focuses on criminalization and persecution of oppositional opinions and actions by the ruling establishment. The DSSS usually uses this frame to point to (according to party false) accusations and interventions against party’s members and the party itself. They presented is as “a fight against oppositional political party” (DSSS, 8. 1. 2010) or “the effort of the government to destroy the opposition” (DSSS, 19. 3. 2010), when the party “is being prosecuted for political activism” (DSSS, 18. 1. 2013), “for the truth” (DSSS, 17. 4. 2012), since “the government does not tolerate oppositional ideas and criticism of current affairs” (DSSS, 19. 3. 2010). The saliency of Persecution of political opponents frame was mainly affected by the dissolution of Worker’s Party, predecessor of the DSSS, which was dissolved in early 2010, and thus the saliency of the frame declined over time (Figure 4).

The third most emphasized frame, Discrimination of people, is presented by the party as the failure of authorities, in the most cases the government, to secure the decent life for ordinary citizens and unwillingness to solve their problems. It also presents the idea that the government itself is discriminatory against the citizens, since it makes the laws because of which the citizens suffer. It holds that “asocial program of the government” (DSSS, 25. 6. 2010) affects “people suffering from everyday work and stress” (DSSS, 15. 4. 2011) and who, “except occasional elections, do not have rights to interfere with the public life” (DSSS, 15. 4. 2011). The Discrimination of people frame also declined in the intensity of the usage by the party.

Figure 4. Diagnostic framing of Worker’s Party of Social Justice (DSSS) over years 2010-2013.
On the other hand, the intensity of Roma menace and Media propaganda frames increased. The Roma menace frame had a particularly interesting development – while in the 2010 the party used this frame only in 4 per cent of the activity, it gradually grew to 13.5 per cent in 2013. In overall, it was fourth most emphasized frame of the party. The other frame related to Roma minority, Positive discrimination of Roma, gained only little attention, 5.2 per cent (and did not even fit the most emphasized frames in the discourse of the party, thus is placed among Others). Nor the Loss of independence frame (6.6 per cent) was at any point more emphasized in the discourse of the party.

While in 2010 the framing activities of the DSSS were more balanced, the saliency of the Abuse of political power frame increased over time and in 2013 presented 30 per cent of the framing activity, setting itself far above the other frames. In overall, the DSSS largely emphasized the abuse of the government’s power, either by stealing the “money of people” (the state’s assets), discriminating people, or by persecuting the regime’s opponents. By 2013 the party also began to stress the Roma menace and Media propaganda, pointing to perceived threat coming from the Roma communities and the media, which was supposed to manipulate the public.

The most salient frames in the discourse of the LSNS were Roma menace (25.4 per cent), Abuse of political power (15.9 per cent) and Loss of independence (12.5 per cent), which indicates that the party first and foremost stresses the perceived danger coming from the Roma minority, which is threatening the majority population, and then places emphasis on the government’s abuse of its power and on the loss of the state’s independence and the deepening dependence on the foreigners, mostly the EU and the NATO. The party thus mostly underlines the misfortunes of “decent people”, which are defenseless against Roma minority and the government. Moreover, people’s national belonging is threatened because the state is loosing its independence.

According to the most salient frame in the discourse of the LSNS, Roma “steal, beat and kill decent people on the daily basis” (LSNS, 1. 9. 2013) and we are witnessing “the Gypsy terror” and “Gypsy criminality” (LSNS, 1. 9. 2011) by “brutal Gypsy extremists” (LSNS, 1. 10. 2011) and “unadaptable asocial parasites” (LSNS, 25. 10. 2010). The party claims that Roma “exploit the social system” (LSNS, 1. 4. 2013) and “are separating themselves from the majority population because of their asocial way of life” (LSNS, 1. 3. 2013). The Roma menace is particularly strong frame, which dominates the party’s framing activity during the whole period (Figure 5), however, with small decline in 2013.
The second and third most emphasized frames of the LSNS also showed somewhat steady persistence of the intensity during the period (Figure 5), pointing to rather balanced framing strategy. The party spoke about “failure of the whole system” (LSNS, 3. 2. 2010) and “rotten and corrupted politicians (LSNS, 22. 1. 2010), who “stand behind the poverty in Slovakia” (LSNS, 1. 1. 2012) and “senselessly spend the money of people” (LSNS, 1. 7. 2013). According to the party, “Slovakia lost all of its independence and subordinated to foreigner’s dictate by joining the European Union” (LSNS, 1. 9. 2013), “gave up on the Slovak crown” (LSNS, 1. 1. 2013) and “became dependent upon countless regulations of Brussels” (LSNS, 1. 1. 2013). Within this frame, the party also stressed the own belonging to the in-group and collective self-identity. “We must obey Brussels’ dictate,” “we lost the army, the currency, the state’s borders, hence all main attributions of the independent state” (LSNS, 1. 1. 2013). The three frames represent more then half of the LSNS’s diagnostic framing activity.

The other frame related to the Roma communities, Positive discrimination of Roma, received in the discourse of the LSNS 8.1 per cent. It pointed to the notion that Roma are protected and supported by the government through “Roma projects” (LSNS, 18. 10. 2010), at the expense of majority population. Roma are in the reasoning of the party “unfairly favoured over decent people” (LSNS, 1. 5. 2013) and “get everything for free” (1. 9. 2011), even though “they do not appreciate it” (LSNS, 1. 10. 2013) The two frames, that were the most emphasized in the discourse of the DSSS, Persecution of political opponents and Discrimination of people, gained less attention in the discourse of the LSNS. The notion of

---

**Figure 5. Diagnostic framing of People’s Party Our Slovakia (LSNS) over years 2010-2013.**

Source: the author.
persecuting the regime’s opponents gained only 6.1 per cent in the discourse of the ĽSNS and the discriminatory laws and actions against the majority population received 8.1 per cent of the party’s attention. The other frames, Media propaganda and Destruction of national traditions, both received 5 per cent of the party’s framing activity.

In overall, the diagnostic framing strategy of the ĽSNS persistently highlights the threat coming from Roma communities and the government, either in the form of direct danger (Roma menace), direct influence on people’s lives, coming from the government (Abuse of political power, Loss of independence and Discrimination of people) or indirect effect and perceived injustice (Positive discrimination of Roma). Almost all their framing activity points to misdeeds of ordinary people.

Both parties present the government as corrupted thieves and political puppets. The DSSS frames it as “corrupted regime”, “totalitarian regime”, “governing mafia” or “asocial government”, which “prioritizes foreigners against own people”, is “being parasitic on the society” and continuously “fight for the safe place in the politics”. Moreover, the government, which they present as “the rotten political regime”, according to the party “lost all its legitimacy” and “does not care about people”. The ĽSNS presents the establishment (and all mainstream political parties) as “inactive”, “millionaires and frauds”, “slick criminals” who are “stealing national treasure” (meaning strategic businesses) and who are “financially secured to death”. It frames the government as “treacherous traitors” who have been spending money of people and always put another burden on people’s shoulders (Table 1).

Roma are in the discourse of the DSSS presented as “unadaptable community”, which “causes problems” and “is being parasitic on social welfare system”, “attacks decent people” and “do not follow rules of the society”. The ĽSNS frames Roma minority in more strict, even harsh, way as “aggressive asocial parasites” and “Gypsy extremists”, who “brutally attack” people and have “different moral code”. As for foreigners, the DSSS mostly points to the immigrants, Muslims (in general to Islam) and Vietnamese community, while the ĽSNS focus more on the EU and NATO. The DSSS emphasizes “deadly Tsunami immigrant wave”, “Islamization”, immigrant “growing criminality and threat to Czech citizens”, “Vietnamese criminality” and foreigners’ ”refusal to adapt to majority society”. The ĽSNS marks the Euro as “the senseless political project” and “hasty and politically thoughtless hazard”, the NATO as “aggressive organization”, the EU as full of “absurd EU directives and regulations” and points to “Zionist servants”, “foreigners’ dictate” and “unadaptable immigrants".
Table 1. Framing devices (metaphors and catchphrases) associated with the main enemies of the DSSS and the ĽSNS, 2010-2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enemy</th>
<th>Worker’s Party of Social Justice (DSSS)</th>
<th>People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>corrupted, totalitarian regime, the governing mafia, lost all legitimacy, rotten political regime, asocial government; the state listens only to business sponsors, does not care, fights for safe places in politics, is being parasitic on the society, prioritizes foreigners against own people</td>
<td>Inactive, corrupt, treacherous politicians, traitors, thieves, millionaires and frauds, slick criminals from high politics, financially secured to death, system of injustice, power misuse, puppets in the parliament and government, another burden on the shoulders, stealing national treasure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>unadaptable community, being parasitic on social benefits, causing problems, being favoured based on their skin color, attack decent people, do not follow rules of society, increasingly brutal individuals, do not want to adapt to majority population</td>
<td>aggressive asocial parasites, Gypsy extremists, Gypsy terror, brutal attacks, growing Gypsy criminality, different moral code, asocial way of life, socialism but only for the chosen ones; if they behaved like decent people, they would have the same opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>growing criminality and threat to Czech citizens, brutality of immigrants, dangerous, spreading Islam, Islamization, Vietnamese criminality, refusal to adapt to majority society, deadly Tsunami immigrant wave, restrained sovereignty</td>
<td>Euro is the senseless political project, absurd EU directives and regulations, EU bureaucracy, NATO-aggressive organization, Zionist servants, foreigners’ dictate, unadaptable immigrants, intruders, Euro as hasty and politically thoughtless hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>manipulation, disinformation, mocking the patriots, constant attacks, media wall, which prevents people from knowing the truth</td>
<td>total anti-campaign, making fake image of malignant ideals, train to hell, brain-massage, brain-washing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial businesses</td>
<td>everything is subordinated to business interests, oligarchs, have wrapped ‘puppet politicians’ around their fingers</td>
<td>the chosen groups, frauds from the upper-class</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author.

Both DSSS and ĽSNS, in absolute numbers, construct less prognostic frames regarding their enemies than diagnostic frames, which means, that the parties create more problematic situations, than propose solutions to these problems. The most salient solution for both the DSSS and the ĽSNS is the Law and order, which touches upon several enemies, including the government, Roma, the media, foreigners and homosexuals. In both cases, the frame scored almost identical percentage points – 45.7 per cent for the DSSS and 46.3 per cent for the ĽSNS, which means that both parties in almost half of the proposed solutions consider the laws and institutionalized principles as the answer to proposed problems. The frame touches
upon general references that “law applies to everyone equally” (DSSS, 19. 3. 2010), and “so that law will finally apply to everyone equally – for the Whites, as well as Gypsies” (ĽSNS, 19. 1. 2010), or “so there would be justice, law and order again” (ĽSNS, 1. 11. 2011), “corruption and stealing our common assets must be punished severely” (DSSS, 30. 4. 2010), and “it is time to make an order in Prague” (DSSS, 30. 4. 2010). It also contains more concrete actions such as that party “filed criminal complaints” (e.g. ĽSNS, 1. 9. 2011), wants “to adopt orders to protect decent people” (DSSS, 13. 10. 2011) or to “deport the illegal immigrants… to their home states” (DSSS, 16. 10. 2010), or “stop to inflow of immigrants” (DSSS, 16. 10. 2013). The ĽSNS also calls for establishing the home defense and wants to expand the right to use the gun in case of life and property protection.

Figure 6. Variations in prognostic framing of Worker’s Party of Social Justice (left) and People’s Party Our Slovakia (right), 2010-2013.

Source: the author.

The composition and saliency of other prognostic frames constructed by both parties is very similar. Both parties similarly emphasize the Restoration of independence (9.5 per cent DSSS, 13.7 per cent ĽSNS) and Empowerment (10.8 per cent DSSS, 12.1 per cent ĽSNS) frames. Both parties want to withdraw from Eurozone, which is supposed to be “the only rational and real way out of this trap” (ĽSNS, 1. 10. 2011) and to re-introduce the national currencies. The DSSS states that it wants “Europe consisting of strong and sovereign nation states” (DSSS, 15. 4. 2011) and the ĽSNS claims that the party “puts the national interests above the Brussels’ dictate” (ĽSNS, 1. 11. 2011). The DSSS posits that the party “will go on, you can take our brand, but you can not take our ideas away from us” (DSSS, 19. 3. 2010).
The ĽSNS, similarly, declares to “keep our heads up” (ĽSNS, 1. 11. 2011), because people will have to take care of them by themselves (ĽSNS, 11. 2. 2010).

However, the intensity of one particular frame in the discourses of both parties differs. The parties place different emphasis on the *Anti-government actions* frame; while the DSSS uses it in 13.4 per cent, the ĽSNS only in 5.8 per cent. The DSSS calls for “immediate purification of political scene” (DSSS, 17. 4. 2012) and to “head to streets and show them that our goal is only to have peaceful and criminal-abuse-free life” (DSSS, 30. 10. 2011). It states that their “goal is the parliamentary change of affairs in the country” (DSSS, 10. 1. 2011). The ĽSNS also wants to “head to the streets and try to change this system” (ĽSNS, 5. 5. 2011). It calls for radical measures, because “the nation needs real political change” (ĽSNS, 13. 4. 2012).

**Figure 7.** The most salient diagnostic (D) and prognostic (P) frames and associated enemies (the government, Roma, the media, the foreigners) of Worker’s Party of Social Justice (DSSS), 2010–2013.

The five most emphasized diagnostic and prognostic framings and the causal relationships between respective actors indicate that while framing activity of the DSSS is rather chaotic (Figure 7), the ĽSNS constructs two strong framing strategies (Figure 8). The DSSS inconsistently creates diagnostic and prognostic framing in regard to four enemies – the government, Roma, the media and the foreigners. Firstly, it focuses its framing activities on relation between the in-group (either people or political opponents) and the government, presenting two framing chains. Second, it constructs the diagnostic link between people and
the media, when people are supposed to by manipulated by the mass media on the daily basis. Third, it presents the diagnostic and prognostic link between Roma and people. Fourth, the DSSS also constructs prognostic frame between the government on the one side and the other enemy, foreigners, on the other side. The framing activity of the DSSS does not present a coherently constructed narrative.

Figure 8. The most salient diagnostic (D) and prognostic (P) frames and associated enemies (the government, Roma, foreigners) of People's Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS), 2010-2013.

Source: the author.

The most salient frames of the ĽSNS create more monolithic scheme, almost a clear narrative. The government unfairly protects and supports Roma at the expense of decent people (Positive discrimination of Roma), who are in turn terrorized by Roma (Roma menace) and discriminated as well as controlled by the government (Discrimination of people). Above it all, the government is responsible for loosing the national sovereignty, serves the interests of foreigners (Loss of independence) and abuses the power by stealing the state assets and by spending the money of the decent people (Abuse of political power). The solutions to these problems are according to the party Restoration of independence (including restoration of self-sufficient state economy and withdrawal from Eurozone and NATO), the party’s and people’s Empowerment, Emphasis on national and Christian traditions and Voting for the ĽSNS. In relation to Roma minority – Law and order should be applied. The
party states that on the one hand, the law should apply to all equally and on the other, institution such as Home militia should be established or gun law changed – e.g. holding and right to use the gun to protect one’s life and property should be extended.

**Conclusion and discussion**

The discourse of both Worker’s Party of Social Justice and People’s Party Our Slovakia distinctly differentiates the belonging to the in-group and various out-groups. While the in-group involves “the decent citizens” (DSSS) or “decent people” (ĽSNS), where parties also include their members, the out-groups consist of parties’ perceived enemies. The composition of the enemies is in both countries similar; however, the saliency of these enemies and the way how parties frame such enemies differ. In 2010 the framing strategies of the Worker’s Party of Social Justice were more balanced, with party mostly emphasizing the abuse of the government’s power, in the forms of destructing the economy, discriminating people or persecuting the regime’s opponents. By the 2013 the party also begun to highlight the dangers coming from Roma communities and the misinformation of the mass media, but the abuse of power by the government became such a strong frame that it took third of the party’s framing activity, leaving the other frames rather insignificant. The People’s Party Our Slovakia, on the other hand, persistently highlighted the threat of Roma minority and the government, and their combined blame over the misdeeds of the ordinary people’s lives. Both parties saw the solution to perceived problems mostly in enforcing the law and order.

The results indicate that while the framing activity of the DSSS is rather disordered, the LSNS constructs two strong framing strategies. The DSSS creates diagnostic and prognostic framing in regard to the government, Roma, the media and the foreigners and makes no coherent story. The LSNS, on the other hand, creates almost a clear narrative, according to which people suffer, because Roma, who are unfairly protected by the government at people’s expense, terrorize them; the government is also responsible for loosing the national sovereignty and for abusing its political power, which in turn also affects the well-being of people.

Although the theoretical and empirical literature on the framing perspective is extensive, we still do not know enough about the determinants in selection of particular framing strategies. Why do actors choose and modify the frames they do? Although two parties exist in the countries with similar political and economic background, framing strategies of two far right parties differ quite considerably. The literature suggests that far right frames are mainly determined by three sets of factors: opportunity structures, organizational resources, and the party leadership. In this way, the political and cultural opportunities, the presence of organizational resources and the role of the leadership
influence the extent and forms of frames constructed by the far right. According to Caiani et al. (2012) the discourse of far right actors is first of all influenced by a political opportunity structure, i.e. the political and discursive political context. Here we cannot find a lot of differences when comparing two countries; both states have an open political system to challengers and state possesses a capacity for repression. Both parties (or to be more precise, their official predecessors) were at some point in their existence officially dissolved – the Worker’s Party in February 2010 (a couple of days later Worker’s Party of Social Justice was launched) and Slovak Togetherness – National Party (Slovenská pospolitost’ – národná strana) in March 2006 (it re-emerged in 2009/2010 as the ЉSNS). The dissolution of the DSSS in early 2010 might have affected the party’s framing, when the party stressed the *Persecution of the political opponents* frame. However, the party keep on emphasizing the frame also in the following years. In both countries, the public opinion concerning relation between Roma communities and the majority population, as perceived by the majority, is rather negative (CVVM 2013; SASD 2008), and parts of the media tend to stereotype Roma minority (e.g. Kluknavská, Zagibová 2013), which can lead to deepening of racial stereotypes in the society and contribute to the formation of the favourable context for the parties of the far right.

The differences in the framing strategies can neither be fully understand by the type of resources by the far right parties. Both parties have rather weak organizational structure (the DSSS have built the strongest structure in the north part of the Czech Republic, Mareš, Vejvodová 2010), which is centralized around the leadership, and they usually organize campaigns through internet-shared party magazines, and various local rallies and protests. The parties’ leadership the most likely appears to affect the framing strategies of the parties. The ЉSNS‘ leader Marian Kotleba appears to have more charismatic skills then the DSSS‘ leader Peter Vandas, while also possesing stronger position within the party. The effect of the leadership on the framing process seem to be of particular importance when dealing with the far right, which tends to rely on the charismatic persona of the leader. The more elaborated answers, however, require further research in this area. This paper tried to analyze the form of the frames that parties construct in their discourses, which is the first step in explaining why the parties chose certain strategies and avoided others. The further research could also focus on answering the question, whether these strategies succeeded or failed the far right parties in the electoral arena.
Literature


