Fragmentation vs. Integration?
Regionalism in the Age of Globalization

Abstract: In the following, I will outline central hypotheses and results from an empirical project which focused on the influence of globalization on regionalist conflicts. To understand the connection between the two phenomena, globalization must be operationalised in a way that helps us identify aspects which could influence the state's capacity for territorial management as well as regionalist motives and goals. The results of the empirical study show that globalization can support regionalist movements and at the same time restrict their options, depending on their ability to adapt. However, whether they are able to exploit the changing opportunity structures is highly dependent on internal factors and, therefore, path-dependent. Globalization will support only certain types of regionalism, therefore leading to pronounced asymmetrical challenges for the nation state.

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Aspects of Globalization and their Possible Impact on Regionalism

1.1 Approaching a contested concept

When speaking of globalization, two people rarely mean the same thing. Disagreement exists not only regarding its sources and consequences, but also whether such a process is actually taking place. Some call it "globaloney", thereby indicating that no qualitatively new development can be observed (Strange 1995: 295). When it comes to the sources of globalization, they are detected within the capitalist mode of production (Altvater/Mahnkopf 1996; Hirsch 1995), technological development (Wriston 1988), or the deregulation of financial markets (Cerny 1994). Therefore, globalization is also seen as a project on behalf of economic and political elites (Gill 1995). This is definitely true for the economic sphere: Deregulation is a result of political decisions driven by the neoliberal belief that the unleashing of market forces would lead to collective welfare. While the debate on the sources of globalization is definitely fascinating (cf. Beisheim/Walter 1997), the more important question is whether such a process can be detected and which aspects are important for territorial politics. Hence, I will now depart from the largely analytical explanations surrounding globalization, and turn to the question of what is actually occurring.

Aspects of globalization are usually detected in three interlinking areas. The first and most widely discussed aspect is the changes in the economic sphere. We do not simply witness a growth in international trade, which is largely taking place in the form of intra-firm-transfers, but also accelerating transnational investment flows. Huge amounts of capital can be deinvested at one place and reinvested elsewhere within relatively short periods of time (Cerny 1994: 233f). In this sense, the state loses one of the principal tasks linked to its formation: the procurement of an integrated market. Exchanges increasingly take place between societies, which means they are no longer international but transnational in nature (Thompson 1994: 199). The state loses control over such exchanges, but also over the economic development within its own territory as such, which reduces its role in the economy. The state loses power to the market (Strange 1995: 296), even as an organisational principle. Agreements binding governments to the liberalisation of markets for goods, services and especially capital, restrict their capacity to fulfill their welfare function traditionally pursued with macro-economic policies (Jessop 1992: 248). Even in their monetary policies, states become more and more dependent on private actors since they have to be "credible" in the true sense of the word (Holloway 1993: 218f.).

Yet, this loss of efficiency is not restricted to economic policy. Many problems facing political actors are no longer restricted to politically defined territories. Pollution does not stop at national borders and internationally organised crime is undermining the states internal security function (Zürn 1998). Hence, the state is no longer capable of guaranteeing its citizens' health and security, which may well endanger its legitimacy. Increasing (illegal) migration adds to this blurring of national boundaries. These developments have two central consequences. First, the state loses its exclusive problem-solving capacity, which used to be a major source of legitimacy. Second, the individual government has to co-operate with other governments and non-governmental actors such as NGOs and multi-national capital in order to solve problems. Hence, governance becomes more complex and difficult to understand for the individual citizen. Outcomes are usually the results of negotiations, which are hardly democratically controlled. To sum up, nation states are no longer the only institutions providing governance, individuals are increasingly being alienated and governance loses legitimacy. As a result, another function linked to the formation of the nation state is deteriorating, namely, nation building, that is, providing a normative framework to bind people together and incorporate
them into a political project. Thus, "imagined communities" (Benedict Anderson) other than the traditional nation state are at least conceivable.

The formation of these "imagined communities" is supported by developments in a third sphere, which are usually referred to as "cultural globalization". Of course, we are still far away from a "global culture" (Featherstone 1994), but the existing developments, like those in the economic and political spheres, have severe consequences for existing states. The formation of the modern nation state went hand in hand with its task to establish "context free communication" (Zürn 1992: 495-498). This points to a communication system (language) that is sufficiently large and inclusive to meet the requirements of modern capitalist society. It involved the standardisation of languages, education and, to a certain extent, values, all of which lay the foundation for modern nationalism. The state was then seen as representing a culturally defined community. In this sense, the constructed "sense of belonging" played a major role in the foundation of "imagined communities", i.e. nations.

These foundations are now undermined. While communications networks spanning around the world become more tightly interwoven and quicker, the number of transnational or – societal contacts between individuals via telephone, fax, e-mail or snail-mail increases, as do imports of films, books and other culturally relevant goods (for detailed data, see Beisheim et al. 1998). States have lost control over the external relations of their societies, which are exposed to mutual cultural influences. Cultural influences appear in a commodified way, they approach societies as imported goods, news, or people (e.g. tourists). This is particularly true of "everyday culture", where the patterns of consumption are converging throughout the world (without ever being the same), languages become "anglicised" and the youth consumes similar styles of music and pop culture. This may well lead to counteraction, that is, attempts to "prevent" societies from such (mainly secularised Western) influences, tempting some observers to hypothesize a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington). What is noteworthy here is that such an exchange exists and is increasing, regardless if resistance exists or not, whether you ban satellite dishes in one country or try to control transnational telecommunications in another. The state's traditional function aimed at standardising language and communication is meanwhile performed at a higher level.

Two critical points have frequently been made: (1) the term globalization implies a process that occurs on a global scale; and, (2) there is nothing new about all this. To be sure, all the developments indicated above are most visible within the OECD world, although we can observe their traces in almost every corner of the world. Of course, Africa as a continent is practically entirely excluded from the benefits of economic globalization (Altvater/Mahnkopf 1996). However, this does not mean that Africans can easily escape this process. Television sets showing international programs can be found anywhere, and conflicts over human rights and democracy cannot be separated from international influences. Even states which do not integrate or co-operate politically are faced with growing problems of interdependence. Thus we must grasp the fact that globalization is not a uniform process; but rather, one that is qualitatively uneven and disproportionate in its intensity and territorial scope. It consists of (a) intensified transnational exchange of all kinds (goods, capital, people, problems and ideas) and (b) the decreasing capacity of nation states to deal with such challenges.¹

¹ This is why Zürn (1998) prefers the term "denationalization": it reduces the reach of political institutions of nation states. Others call it "deboundarization" (Entgrenzung, see Brock and Albert 1995), while Kohler-Koch speaks of "selective globalism" (Kohler-Koch 1996: 91). However, since all these terms bear contradictions I don't want to argue about definitions. "Globalization" has of course weaknesses, but there is no convincing alternative and it is the most term widely used in the attempt to capture the above developments.
Interdependence and international interactions have always been central topics in International Relations theory and other subdisciplines of Political Science. The new quality surrounding the theme of globalization is observable in the following two points. First, the quantity, or better yet, the intensity of transnational exchanges is not comparable to earlier stages. Second, the process is widely observed as being irreversible and bearing a new logic of political and social action that transcends traditional political boundaries. Economic activities follow a functional logic which is less compatible to the interests of nation states in the spheres of security and welfare. This leads to social and economic uncertainties which can no longer be restricted by nation states to the same extent as they previously were (Kohler-Koch 1996: 87). This can be understood in a materialistic way, but it can also be comprehended as social constructivism. Globalization also takes place in the minds of people, thus influencing their beliefs and actions. Within the Western world, global competition is often used as an argument against social progress. Others praise the opportunities individuals face in the global village and try to exploit the situation for their purpose. The material manifestations are not the only aspects that must be taken into account when analysing the political and social consequences of globalization. The ideological dimensions must also be considered.

1.2 Now, what does this have to do with regionalism?

To understand the consequences of the diverse developments subsumed under the term globalization for regionalism, the underlying understanding of regionalism has to be made clear. While the term usually refers to the decentralization of political powers or competencies from a higher towards a lower political level, we must distinguish between "top-down" and "bottom-up" regionalism (Keating 1995: 2). The former describes the decentralization of competencies or setting up of regional institutions by the state, whereas the latter includes all kinds of strives toward political decentralization from within the particular region. Although globalization can also support top-down regionalism, i.e. by tempting central governments to decentralise responsibilities, what Anderson (1991) calls the "decentralization of penury", this paper deals with regionalism from below. To be more precise, regionalism shall be treated here as the politicisation of the regional political level (Gerdes 1985: 27, 56), which aims at its political strengthening. Its goals range from the mere decentralization of competencies to the establishment of a new independent state, i.e. separatism. It is precisely this kind of political regionalism or regional nationalism, whose opportunity structures are changed by globalization in a way that, if political actors make use of these changes, may increase such movements' chances to achieve their goals.

As noted above, globalization undermines some traditional functions of the nation state. Although this by no means indicates the end of the nation state, the latter's functions which have become impaired are crucial in cases where a regionalist potential exists. More to the point, the loss of efficiency and integrative power restricts the states' capacity for territorial management, which is crucial to the integration of peripheral regions into the national project. Territorial management includes the provision of benefits to the region as such, for instance, via structural and social policies. In addition, it means the incorporation of regional elites into the national elite system to prevent challenges to the established power structures (see Keating 1988: 18ff). If the existing state is no longer able to provide such benefits, the incentive to remain part of it diminishes and the regionalist cleavages traditionally restrained by territorial management are more likely to be mobilised. Hence, the consequences of globalization for regionalism should first be felt in regions with an established regionalist cleavage. However, as the following arguments will make clear, the changes induced by globalization do not only ease restrictions regionalist mobilization had to face in the past, they do also provide some new incentives to strive for regional autonomy.
Returning to the three areas which have been transformed by globalization, the most obvious argument in the economic sphere is of course one of diminishing risks for regionalism. Since one of the central tasks of the nation state was the establishment of a large market, the diverse regions were granted access which they in turn did not wish to risk. In the past, the fear of losing markets used to be one of the main obstacles to regionalist mobilization. Considering the degree of economic integration within the OECD and regional economic blocks such as the EU and NAFTA, the size of a state is no longer relevant to its economic development. The argument has even been turned around, so that within an integrating world economy, the advantages of small states are increasingly being emphasised (Katzenstein 1985). Such hypotheses can also be found in political economy approaches, particularly, "flexible specialization" (Piore/Sabel 1989), regulation theory (Boyer 1991; Lipietz 1992, 1994) or neo-Schumpeterian works (Freeman 1990; Perez 1988; Freeman/Soete 1990) and were popularised in the debate on a "Europe of the Regions". In the absence of macro-economic steering and in the face of increasing competition between territorial units, which are not separated by borders, the following argument gains credibility: the political level that is closer to the problems at hand requires more power and resources so as to increase the regional economy's competitiveness. Furthermore, if the region is already a part of trade agreements, it might even make sense to represent regional economic interests directly on the international agenda, since they are otherwise subordinated to the interests of the core.

In sum, the incentive to gain more autonomy for economic reasons increases. Two additional factors may well reinforce this motive. First, relatively rich regions may see an opportunity to pursue their own economic strategies without having to care for the interests of other, poorer regions within the nation state. In addition, decentralization or separation could be pursued as a means to escape duties linked to being part of the nation state, such as equalization payments. This kind of welfare regionalism, the most prominent example being the Lega Nord (Schmidtke 1996), is most likely to emerge in regions which form part of the economic core, but not the political centre of the nation state. The Lega Nord even managed to portray the Italian state as too inefficient in economic terms and used arguments similar to those used in the political economy debates (Woods 1992: 58). The key factor was an economic self-confidence which had been developed over decades. Economic disparities, as they served to explain regionalist movements since this phenomenon appeared in the late 1960s, do remain important variables, but their logic changes.

Second, the incentive to gain autonomy for economic reasons increases when the economic functions traditionally performed by the nation state have become increasingly provided for by a supranational political level, such as the EU. This holds especially true for relatively poor regions. For instance, in the face of diminishing control over economic affairs, which is supported by the neo-liberal withdrawal of the state in the field of social security, the nation state is less capable of sheltering its citizens from the disruptive effects of market forces and ensuring their economic well-being. In this case, the advantage of belonging to the existing nation state is seriously put into question. The nation state might even be held responsible for the loss of economic shelter, while regional autonomy is sought to protect the market. Some Galician nationalists support such arguments. Hence, not only welfare regionalism, but also a type of regionalism which is directed against economic deprivation of the periphery can be supported by globalization.

The nation states' capability of successful territorial management is further decreased by the changes in the political sphere, namely by its loss of problem solving capacity in other fields. The value of belonging to the given state deteriorates simultaneously with its capability to secure citizens' security and other collective goods. While this loss of efficiency is partly compensated for by international agreements and co-operation, such an internationalisation of
governance bears qualitatively different, but equally severe consequences for, the integrity of
the national political community. On the one hand, the rising complexity of governance leads
to fears and perceptions of powerlessness, particularly amongst the less educated and socially
deprived parts of the population. Political Sociology has demonstrated that feelings of uncer-
tainty foster the readiness to vote for right-wing extremist and nationalist parties. On the other
hand, the desire for clear-cut units grows, while in the face of the decreasing problem solving
capacity of the nation states alternative potential units may well gain acceptance. In this man-
ner, globalization can support nationalism at the state level and sub-state nationalism.

Supra-national integration and membership in international organisations can also support
regionalism in a more constructive way, however. Serving as an example, multi-level govern-
ance could be discovered by individuals as well as collective political and social actors as
being functional to their interests. For regionalist movements, such an experience could help
overcome one of their most substantial obstacles, such as institutional path-dependencies.
This is especially true for in centralised states, where the fulfilment of regionalist goals means
a substantial change of the established institutional structure. Such far-reaching changes are
usually viewed with suspicion, since they imply a high degree of uncertainty. Nevertheless,
the experience that the sharing of responsibilities and competencies between several political
levels works to their benefit, can change people's perceptions of politics, i.e. traditional under-
standings of sovereignty (see Lange 1998). Therefore, it should be easier for regionalists
legitimise their demands for institutional change, one of the most difficult political processes
in democratic societies.

Finally, integration and co-operation could also constitute reasons to represent region-specific
interests on the international agenda. This applies to specific security interests or threats, but
also the shelter of a minority culture within the existing state. While this relates equally to the
-cultural sphere, the establishment of a smaller territorial unit as an actor on the international
scene can also serve to suggest an impression of "closer proximity" (Bürgernähe) to the peo-
ple, helping to overcome the disturbances created by the growing complexity of governance.
To summarise the argument thus far: The changes that globalization induces in the political
sphere change the logic of some political variables used to explain regionalism. It is no longer
only the political acting of the nation state that provokes regionalist responses, but also the
nation state's growing incapacity to act. Reactions to this challenge are not restricted to leav-
ing established political communities as international integration opens up new opportunities
for flexible forms of belonging to larger units.

This consequence of globalization interacts with changes taking place within the cultural
sphere. As noted above, states are no longer able to protect their 'national culture' from exter-
nal influences via media, telecommunication and travel or migration. Deprived of its original
task of establishing a common national cultural space, the state also loses the capacity to
express or represent a common 'national' culture. Taken together, these two factors undermine
the nation state's ability to bind people normatively. In other words, the 'diffuse support'
(Lindberg/Scheingold 1970) for the nation state wanes. On the other hand, the need for a sense
of belonging and a collective identity remains, and might even increase in strength. Regardless
of whether different cultures become more similar, it is the impression that counts. Consider-
ing all the attempts by nation states to protect their culture and language, one can easily con-
clude that there is a widespread belief that a homogenising pressure on cultures exists.

Within this context, the Freudian "narcissism of little differences" emerges and even small
cultural differences can be revived politically (Zürn 1998: 269). While collective identities are
always social constructions, the sense of belonging can more easily be focused on other enti-
ties such as regions. Consequently, other collective identities than those associated with the
existing nation state are more likely to be mobilised. This holds particularly true in regions with an existing regionalist cleavage. Wherever regionalist movements emerged from the late 1960s onwards, they were paralleled by a widespread revival of traditional regional culture, that is arts, both visual and performing, and literature. In many cases, regionalist movements were accommodated by the establishment of radio and television programs in the autochthonous language. Such a cultural region-building can satisfy the widespread need for (new) collective identities.

The latter does not only derive from the nation state's problems to provide a normative framework; socio-economic developments leading to the break-up of traditional, e.g. working class milieux, support this need for strong identifications. Although regions like nation states do not allow face-to-face-communications (Schmidtke 1996: 49), in the presence of the decreasing capacities of the nation state, smaller units are easier to be socially constructed as reference points for identities (Hüglin 1986: 454). Neo-liberalism and the deconstruction of welfare systems support this by making collectivist values such as solidarity more attractive, provided regionalist actors manage to incorporate them into their construction of the regional collectivity. The case of the Lega Nord, however, has shown that newly created identities do not need to relate to smaller units: While the Lega failed to convince their followers of a "Lombard" identity, they managed to sell a sense of belonging to "Northern Europe" (Urquhart 1994: 36-39; Schmidtke 1996). The blurring of national cultural boundaries does open up the space for alternative cultural identities in two ways: their units of reference can be smaller or larger.

Finally, the consequences globalization in the cultural sphere can have the same impact on regions with a distinct cultural identity as they have on nation states. The perceived loss of cultural differences may well lead to fears that the regional culture will be undermined and, hence, attempts to defend it. As a result, the political mobilization of regional cultural differences is no longer only a reaction to the nation state, but to developments beyond its boundaries. Taken together, the changes implied by cultural globalization serve to strengthen the potential of cultural differences for political mobilization.

1.3 Hypotheses and leading questions

The above shall by no means imply a new theory to explain regionalism. To be sure, most of the independent variables traditionally applied to explain regionalist tendencies remain the same, although the actual mode of their influence may change. As such, the factors induced by globalization have to be understood as intervening rather than independent variables. Globalization modifies the opportunity structures for traditional regionalist movements, adds incentives to pursue regionalist goals and, thus, can even support the formation of new territorial cleavages, as the example of the Lega Nord has shown.

To summarise the argument thus far, regionalism can be expected to grow where

(1) the nation state is exposed to economic integration, so that the market exceeds its boundaries, especially where

- the respective region is relatively wealthy, that is, part of the economic core, but not the political centre, or

- the region has at least made significant economic gains within the last decades, while its economic structure and/or model seems to be well-equipped to meet the economic challenges of globalization, or, alternatively,

- the regional economy suffers from economic integration supported by the nation state;
(2) the existing nation state's capability of effective governance is undermined so that it can no longer provide the benefits which secured its integration;

(3) the existing nation state is subject to political integration and some of its traditional functions are taken over by international or supranational institutions, while governance becomes complex and less transparent;

(4) as part of the nation state, the region is exposed to increased external cultural influences via trade of culturally relevant goods and communications, which

- strengthens the desire to express one's own cultural identity and, hence, mark it off against that of the majority within the nation state (provided the region possesses a divergent cultural identity and tradition), or

- opens up the opportunity to redefine the reference point of the regional collective identity by incorporating it into a transnational context.

In brief, regionalism is expected to be strengthened by globalization especially in relatively wealthy regions within nation states which are exposed to economic and political integration as well as intensified exchange of cultural goods. None of the above factors will by itself increase the regionalist potential. The hypotheses have to be understood as elements of an encompassing and complex hypothesis, that is, only specific mixtures of factors should be expected to do so.

2 Operationalization and methodological remarks

2.1 Variables

Together with the restricted number of possible cases, this complexity of variables does not allow for traditional "variable testing". This suggests that to examine their influence, variables have to be operationalised accordingly. Instead of clear cut, measurable variables, indicators implying that the above factors actually have had an impact on the (growing) strength of regionalism must be identified. The first entails operationalising the independent variable.

If we return to the underlying understanding of bottom-up regionalism (Gerdes 1985; Keating 1992), we can see that this means nothing more than the strive for the redistribution of political power from the nation state towards a lower political level. First, the strength of such movements is a function of popular support for regionalist goals, expressed in votes for regionalist parties and surveys on different constitutional options. Another indicator is the support regionalist objectives receive from relevant collective actors in the political and social spheres, for instance, parties which are not explicitly regionalist and organized interests, mainly business organisations and unions. Qualitatively, the radicalism and scope of the regionalist discourse can serve as an indicator for the strength of regionalism. The question here becomes, to what extent has the redistribution of political power been pursued, and, in case there are several options, whether the more radical variant, such as outright separatism, has gained support within the regionalist camp.

While most the classical (in the core of research on regionalism) independent variables such as the existence of a divergent cultural tradition or economic disparities shall be treated as more or less constant variables here, the intervening variables have to be differentiated according to their scope and their mode of influence. Most of them can be recorded on the macro level. However, quantitative and qualitative factors have to be distinguished from each other.

The core economic variable is the extent of economic interdependence, which can be measured according to
- the growth of foreign trade;
- the growth of foreign direct investment and
- the depth of incorporation into regional economic blocks as a qualitative factor.

Political variables are as follows:
- membership in international organisations and treaties, in numbers as well as depth of integration and
- the decline of legitimisation and integrative capacity of the nation state, measurable in the possible growing splintering of the party system, but mainly to be assessed from the context.

Cultural variables can be detected on the macro level according to the growth of the following:
- the import of culturally relevant goods and
- transnational communication.

Although it is difficult to find accurate data for the sub-national level, differences in the scope of most variables between the regional and national levels can account for a different impact on regionalism.

2.2 Framework of analysis

Since a simple correlation analysis is impossible, the causal relationship between the changes caused by globalization and the growing strength of regionalism has to be investigated by logical analysis. This implies that an empirical study has to be able to detect evidence that there exists a logical connection between the independent and the intervening variables. Hence, the point of departure has to be the actual content of the regionalist discourse. Regionalist concepts are never isolated issues though: they are usually linked to other political debates and have to be supported by arguments on behalf of their benefits. In Western democracies, political objectives have to be presented as serving the common good, while the conceptions to reach these goals have to appear as being functional. Whoever fails to use such arguments of functionality in political debates runs the risk of being reputed as irrational. On the other hand, actors who manage to claim functional relevance of their objective for the common good strengthen their position in the discourse (Vobruba 1992: 224-228).

To find out in how far globalization has influenced regionalism, changes in the patterns of argumentation of the regionalists and their opponents have to be examined. At the level of observation, the empirical question is in how far arguments relating to developments induced by globalization have appeared and gained importance within the debate. Such arguments can be related to the developments induced by globalization either directly or indirectly. This means that the arguments used by regionalist actors and their opponents either to advocate or oppose political decentralization do not need to relate to different aspects of globalization outlined above. Their arguments can also build on changes caused (indirectly) by developments on the inter- or transnational level.

Consequently, the analysis has to focus on changes in the patterns of argumentation which paralleled the growth of regionalist tendencies in the respective region. For the case selection, this means that only regions where with a traditional regionalist cleavage are eligible for empirical analysis. The changes induced by globalization in the different spheres have taken place (a) mainly in OECD countries and (b) in several, not necessarily simultaneous stages within the last three decades (see Beisheim et al. 1998, Zürn 1998). This implies that a longi-
tudinal comparison should include periods before and after such steps, at least earlier and more recent phases of globalization in the economic, political and cultural spheres. It has to be borne in mind that actual material changes will emerge in public debates only after a certain delay – although globalization should also accelerate this process.

For a comparative analysis, indicators for the influence of globalization on the regionalist discourse have to be found. Based on the above intervening variables, economic, political, and cultural factors have to be distinguished.

2.2.1 Economic factors

In the economic sphere, three lines of argument can be derived from the hypotheses: (a) external trade and economic integration, (b) welfare regionalism and (c) criteria of functionality.

(a) trade and market integration

The growth of foreign trade and the integration of markets diminish or even eliminate the risks traditionally associated with the realisation of regionalist objectives: the loss of markets and investors. If economic globalization strengthens regionalism, it should be expected that regionalist actors do increasingly refer to this process. The applicable variables are the growth of trade and investment as well as membership in regional trading blocks such as the European Common Market or NAFTA. In order to trace the influence of such variables within the regionalist discourse, it has to be asked:

- To what extent has the argument that political decentralization leads to the loss of markets played a role in the past? Is it still employed or has it disappeared from the debate?
- Are economic interdependence and integration increasingly used to defend regionalist objectives against such accusations? To what extent do regionalist actors refer to the transnational market?
- What role does the question of ‘national’ control over the economy or resident ownership play in the regionalist program? Has this traditional aim of regionalist movements been replaced by strategies to attract foreign investment?

(b) welfare regionalism?

If the hypothesis that regionalism is driven more and more by welfare chauvinism holds true, then economic benefits of autonomy or separation should replace traditional regionalist claims for self-determination and social justice as they dominated the discourse in the seventies. The (in this case independent) variables are the economic performance and recent development of the region compared to the rest of the nation state. The influence of such factors can be traced by inquiring:

- In how far has the weight of the argument regarding the lack of size and/or economic strength would make more autonomy or independence risky, lost importance? Is the strength of regionalist tendencies based on growing economic self-confidence?
- Are regionalist claims increasingly based on arguments relating to economic advantages? To what extent is the belonging to the current nation state portrayed as an economic burden?
- Are the regionalists’ economic objectives linked to social equality or restricted to economic growth in the region?
- Have democratic arguments such as self-determination been replaced by such economic arguments?

(c) functionality
The argument that the regional level is more "functional" for economic steering is usually based on structural changes in the world economy. However, it is an ideological concept based upon a certain understanding of what is logical and feasible. Such ideologies are spreading amongst elites like Keynesianism (see Hall 1989, 1992) and Neo-liberalism (Gill 1995) at their times. The question then becomes to what degree such considerations have both entered into the debate within and about the region and are used to support regionalist claims. Empirically, we need to ask:

- To what extent is the popular "small is beautiful" argument regarding economic steering used to support regionalist claims? Do regionalists relate to the nation state's loss of economic steering capacity?

2.2.2 Political factors

While the state loses exclusive problem-solving capacity ion many areas, regionalist movements could react to this change by adapting their concepts. They could either question traditional notions of sovereignty by, for example, relating to supranational integration and international co-operation as chances to gain autonomy from the nation state. Or, as the example of the Lega Nord makes clear, they could also make use of the individuals' fears and insecurities by propagating "law-and-order" and promising the re-establishment of the state's problem solving capacity. In the same manner, they could promise gains in welfare and security by excluding social groups such as foreigners from the political community. While the central intervening variables would be supranational integration and co-operation of the respective state, indicators for their relevance lie in the regionalists' understanding of the state and the political sphere. It has to be inquired in how far and in which manner regionalist arguments account for interdependence.

- Concepts of statehood: Which form and what extent of autonomy do regionalists proclaim? Have their concepts changed from a more fragmentative (i.e. absolute sovereignty) to a more integrative (pro supranational integration) regionalism? If this is the case, do they base their argument on the nation state's lack of problem solving capacities while aiming at re-establishing it through supranational integration and regional governance? If not, do they blame international co-operation and integration for reducing autonomy and being against the region's specific interests?

- Concepts of politics: On a lower level of abstraction, it can be examined what kinds of benefits for the people regionalists actually expect and promise once their aim of more autonomy or sovereign statehood will be fulfilled.

- To what degree do democratic arguments such as self-determination and better access to political decisionmaking play a role in the regionalist discourse?

2.2.3 Cultural factors: identities

If cultural globalization strengthens the desire for difference, then smaller units constitute attractive alternatives to national identities. An interesting point of departure would be to examine to what degree identification with the region has grown and national identification has diminished. This could be done by analysing empirical data derived from polls. Besides the role of regional identities within the regionalist discourse, another important aspect is the actual contents of identities, that is, how the collective regional identity is constructed. This relates to the attributes associated with the regional population, but also to the point of reference. As the example of the Lega Nord demonstrates, the latter does not have to be restricted to the regional culture, but can also include wider conceptions of belonging such as "the West", "the North" or simply Europe. While the intervening variables are increases in communication and the import of culturally relevant goods, empirical questions are as follows:
- Do regionalists see external cultural influences as threatening the region’s cultural identity?

- Is there a growth of cultural events (theatre, exhibitions, film production) in the autochthonous language and/or relating to the regional cultural tradition? Does the circulation of regionally based newspapers and extent of regional TV programs increase?

- How important is the regional identity for regionalist propaganda? Has it grown or diminished?

- Construction of collective identity: Is the regional collective identity defined according to ethnic, historical, linguistic or territorial criteria? Who belongs to the constructed or "imagined community"? Is there a change in the relative importance of one or several factors? What is the geographical framework and point of reference: Is it restricted to the region itself, does it reach out to trans-national or post-national collectivities and how is the "other" constructed?

Whenever such patterns of argumentation can be found in the regionalist discourse, they can be regarded as indicators of the influence of globalization-induced changes on regionalism. These recourse can be either direct or indirect, which means that the patterns of argumentation have to be interpreted in the context of globalization.

3 Case selection: Nationalism in Scotland and Québec

Such an analysis requires a longitudinal study, or, a comparison of former and current regionalist debates. In this sense, the Lega Nord, the “prototype” of welfare regionalism and transnational identity construction (see Schmidtke 1996) does not qualify for empirical analysis. Case selection is restricted to traditional regionalist movements, which emerged before the recent globalization pushes. Therefore, Scotland and Québec, two regions which possess the characteristics of established regionalist cleavages and being located within OECD states were chosen for the project. Both Canada and the UK are subject to economic integration and increasing transnational exchanges of goods, services, and communication, while the latter is also involved in a process of political integration in the European Union.

Although much can and should be said about nationalism in Scotland and Québec, i.e. regarding its sources and developments, I shall restrict myself to some very basic indicators here. There is no doubt that in both cases, regionalist tendencies have become stronger. Like other regions in the Western world, Scotland and Québec have experienced two waves of regionalism, one from the late sixties until the late seventies and one in the late eighties/early nineties. The respective nationalist parties, the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Parti Québécois (PQ), gained electoral support in the early seventies. The SNP reached an electoral peak with 30% of the popular vote in 1974 and became a decisive factor for the minority Labour government in Westminster, while the PQ even managed to take over the provincial government in 1976. These developments resulted in a referendum on both the establishment of a Scottish Parliament in 1979 and the concept of Québec's sovereignty-association in 1980 respectively. In both cases, the regionalists lost. Although a majority voted for devolution in Scotland, they failed to reach the required 40% of eligible voters. In Québec, 60% voted against sovereignty-association.

Of course, in both cases protagonists of regionalism would consider themselves nationalists: they regard both Québec and Scotland as proper nations. Since the motivation for regionalist tendencies is based on an appeal to a nation, there is no doubt that one can speak of nationalism. Hence, both terms will be used for these cases. For reasons of comparability with other cases and relating to global developments, I have used the term regionalism in the theoretical approach.
After years of disappointment and silence, the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, which was supposed to end the constitutional crisis by allowing Québec some specific rights and accepting the province as a "distinct society", and growing discontent with England-based Conservative politics in Scotland led to a re-emergence of claims for more autonomy and even separatism. This is indicated by the growing success of both parties as well as polls on preferred constitutional options. In Québec, the PQ, having campaigned for a new referendum on sovereignty, regained power in 1994, while in Scotland the social base supporting claims for devolution grew. For the first time, the Labour Party was unanimously favouring devolution, backed by the unions, churches, local authorities and other parties and organisations. In addition, voting behaviour in Scotland diverged from the UK average in a way that allows us to speak of a different party system. While the Labour Party became the strongest party in Scotland, the SNP emerged as the second party, while the Conservatives faced severe defeats, leaving them with 11 out of 72 seats in 1992 and none in 1997. The Québec government called for a new referendum which lost by slight margin this time. Scottish devolutionists had to wait for a change in the London government until they could hold their referendum. A broad coalition including the separatist SNP campaigned for the establishment of a Scottish Parliament and succeeded in receiving the support of three quarters of the voters.

Fig. 1: Percentage of votes for the Parti Québécois in elections for the National Assembly

Source: Beisheim et al. 1998: 358
Apart from electoral developments, polls also indicate growing support for constitutional change in both cases (see Pinard 1997; Keating 1996). In Scotland, the separatist option has gained support amongst the mere 80% favouring constitutional change. A change in the discourse can also be detected in Québec: While the 1980 referendum was about sovereignty-association, thereby stressing a future association with Canada, recent debates focus on sovereignty as such. The future will show to what extent the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 will lead to claims for more competencies and autonomy. In Québec, regionalism was also strengthened by the emergence of the Bloc Québécois, a separatist party running in federal elections which usually gains two thirds of the provinces seats. In sum, regionalism in both cases is stronger than ever and by no means a phenomenon of the past.

4 Globalization in Regionalist Discourses

Since it is not possible to present the entire analysis within this paper, the following section includes an extract of the discourse analysis and the main conclusions of the empirical project. The sources used are literature, campaign documents and print media in specific periods. In addition to this, interviews were conducted with representatives of parties and other relevant collective actors such as unions and business associations. The aim of both analyses was to reveal changes in the patterns of argumentation within the regionalist discourses in specific topic areas derived from the theoretical approach outlined above. In Scotland, the first period analysed is the time from the first electoral success of the SNP until the referendum of 1979. The second period, from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, includes the life of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, whose final report was presented in 1990. Finally, the third period to be analysed is the referendum debate of 1997. The phases examined in Québec are quite similar, the first ranging from the rise of the PQ until the referendum of 1980, the second from the failure of the Meech Lake Accord to the presentation of the Bélanger-Campeau-Commission. The third period is the debate prior to the most recent referendum in 1995. However, in the Québécois case, the debate on the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) allows some insight and was included whenever necessary.
4.1 Economic Factors

As indicated above, both states are subject to economic integration. While Canada is a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the UK is a member of the EU and thereby part of the Common Market. Foreign trade has grown significantly over the last decades, in Britain from US $20.65 billion (1970) to $112.99 billion (1980) and $250.02 billion in 1990 (Beisheim et a. 1998: 269). The Scottish economy is even more open, accounting for more than 10% of British exports (Scottish Enterprise 1993: 37). Canada has the highest export quota (foreign trade compared to GDP) amongst the G7 states, followed by the UK, while foreign trade has changed directions: After a long period of protectionism against US imports, during which the largest share of foreign trade was with the UK, successive trade liberalisation has made the USA the most important external market for Canadian products.

For both regions, however, the "national" market remains important. In 1986, Québec exported around 40% of the GDP, and half of it went to other Canadian provinces (Québec/ministère du commerce exterieur 1988: 8). Meanwhile, this ratio has changed: While the ratio of interprovincial versus international trade was 116% in 1981, it has declined to 72% in 1994 (Proulx 1996: 185). In the Scottish case, it should be kept in mind that market access was the main motive of Scottish elites to negotiate the Act of Union (Stolz 1998: 87). Scotland’s most important market remains the rest of the UK, although the importance of the EU has grown significantly. When the UK entered the EC in 1973, only 23% of all Scottish exports went to other member states. In 1992, this share had more than doubled: 59% went to the European Common Market (Stolz 1998: 175). The significance of the national market has to be regarded with caution anywise: As long as Scotland remains a member of the EU, access to the English market should be guaranteed.

When it comes to "welfare regionalism", neither Québec nor Scotland should be regarded as a potential case. However, both regions have caught up significantly within the last two decades. In the long run, Scotland has developed from a periphery into a part of the economic core (McCrone 1992: 46). Having suffered from the concentration of crisis ridden industries during much of this century, the Scottish economy recovered significantly, which was supported by the still quite interventionist policies even in the days of Thatcherism (Bell/Dow 1995: 46). In 1992, per-capita GDP had reached 98.14% of the UK average; bearing the concentration of economic activity in the South-West of the UK in mind, this leaves Scotland in a far better position than most other parts of the UK. Québec, on the other hand, has always been part of the economic core, although peripheral in comparison to Ontario (McRoberts 1979: 298f). Per-capita GDP remained below average and fell between 1965 and 1979 from 91.7 to 89.7% (Shipman 1986: 15). In the long run, however, the reforms of the so-called Quiet Revolution and successive policies directed at strengthening the regional economy bore fruits. In 1987, Québec's economic growth was for the first time higher than Ontario's, grew from 3.1% to 5.3% in 1988 and had been positive for six years by then (Fraser 1987: 97ff; Canada/Department of Industry, Science and Technology 1989: 2). On the whole, Québec can no longer be regarded as peripheral.

4.1.1 Market access

4.1.1.1 Scotland

"Contemporary Scottish Nationalism has been dominated by the relative advantages and disadvantages for the Scottish economy by constitutional change." (Lindsay 1991: 92).

The question whether Scottish autonomy or separation would lead to a loss of market access has always dominated the debate on nationalism in Scotland. Hence, the SNP was reproached
with risking Scotland's economic well-being from their first electoral campaigns onwards. Although the party tried to repudiate this blame by explicitly declaring the maintenance of the economic union with England a principal goal (Wolfe 1973), they remained quite defensive in this subject area. The problem was aggravated by the party's stance on European integration at that time: their slogan "no to London and Brussels", which was meant to defend the steel and fishing industries (Criddle 1978: 55), did not seem to favor economic integration. The unionists, on the other hand, succeeded in convincing the public that a big market was more important than autonomy and the possibility to employ specifically Scottish economic policies (Lindsay 1991: 92). The debate of the seventies was shaped by such fears, as the arguments put forward by business (Criddle 1978: 66) and even within the Labour Party (Gow 1975: 64) indicate. The anti-devolutionists' main line of argument was, however, the "slippery slope" argument: devolution would lead to separation, which then would mean the break-up of markets (McLean 1989: 36, press analysis). Although the Labour government tried to convince the public that devolution would actually preserve the union, the devolutionists retained a defensive stance.

The situation changed in the late 1980s, when the SNP developed their "Independence in Europe" concept, which allowed them to propagate the advantages of an even larger market. Yet, a central, and usually the first, argument was that Scotland would remain a member of the EC (SNP 1989a: 2; 1992c: 16). "For example, the single market between Scotland and England is guaranteed by the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the 1987 Single European Act - not the 1707 Treaty of Union" (SNP 1992d: 2). The party moved beyond such defensive lines of argument and began to embrace the idea of an open economy as such. According to the SNP, the Common Market is a chance for the Scottish export-oriented economy which can only be employed properly by an independent Scottish government (SNP 1992c: 12). The unionists (mainly the Tories and organized business), on the other hand, did not change their strategies at all and tried to fight devolution and separatism with the same arguments, i.e., based on the "slippery slope" thesis (HMSO 1993: 12f.). Still, the devolutionists were no longer put under pressure by such arguments. On the contrary, the Labour Party, the Constitutional Convention, and later Scotland Forward, the umbrella organization campaigning for devolution before the referendum, used the European context quite offensively to demonstrate the advantages of a Scottish Parliament. Pointing at other successful sub-state units and small states in Europe, devolution was portrayed as the "natural" answer to the challenges and prospects of European integration and globalization (Smith 1996: 16; interviews).

Two qualitative changes in the patterns of argumentation can be detected: First, the traditional aim of Scottish control (=ownership) of the economy was replaced by strategies to attract foreign investment. Second, the necessity of more autonomy within European and global context was increasingly substantiated with arguments of functionality (see below). On the other hand, the old line of argument referring to potential losses of market access was completely marginalised in the referendum debate of 1997. In sum, the roles within the debate on this issue had changed completely, with the devolutionists moving from the defensive to a pro-active, offensive position.

4.1.1.2 Québec

Similar to the SNP, the PQ has always been charged with endangering the access to the national market, although such fears have been reflected in all their programs, and, in particular, in their concept of "sovereignty-association". In spite of such attempts to assure the public that sovereignty would not mean fragmented markets, their political opponents on the national and provincial level as well as organized business did not stop to advance this issue. While the federal government announced that it would reject any negotiations with a sover-
eign Québec, business leaders declared that they would pull out of the province if it became sovereign (Marsolais 1992: 224-226; Fraser 1987: 83f).

When the Free Trade Agreement with the United States was negotiated in the mid-eighties, hardly any one saw a connection between free trade and Québec's sovereignty. A remarkable exception was the later PQ-leader Jacques Parizeau, an economist, who declared that sovereignty could no longer endanger markets for Québécois business. He even considered "sovereignty-association" obsolete, since markets would now be guaranteed by the FTA and expected business to line up with the nationalists (Riggs/Velk 1987: 214ff). Although the claim for free trade with the USA had a certain tradition within the nationalist camp, this discussion was restricted to a very small group of intellectuals and did not play a role in the public debate.

After Parizeau had been elected as the party leader, free trade became a central issue for the PQ. Parizeau assumed that free trade had also changed Canada's ideological landscape, making it impossible to cut economic ties with any partner (Parizeau 1990: 14; Meadwell 1993: 224). The federalists, on the other hand, argued that a sovereign Québec would not automatically become a member of the FTA and that economic ties would have to be re-negotiated (Marsolais 1992: 231). The Bélanger-Campeau-Commission\(^3\) agreed that the maintenance of the Canadian market was essential, but did not see them endangered by sovereignty. On the contrary, trade liberalisation was even seen as a reason to devolve all the political competencies in the economic sphere to Québec. Nevertheless, the question of guaranteed access to the FTA and later NAFTA should become a central issue within the regionalist discourse. The other main issue was the necessity of more competencies in the face of globalization, which became a central component of successive PQ platforms (PQ 1993, 1994a, 1994b).

As the date of the referendum approached, the federalists managed to make market access the central issue of the debate. In doing so, they, once again, pressured the PQ government to assume a defensive stance. The federal government assisted by declaring that Canada, not Québec, would dictate the conditions of future economic links, and even the US government supported this view with respect to NAFTA. During the campaign, both sides employed experts to support their views, but the federalist camp was clearly in the lead. To sum up, although the PQ had developed from a traditional social democratic to a liberal party at least in terms of foreign trade and explicitly developed a concept of "free trade nationalism" (Keating), the opposite camp had grasped the importance of this issue. The polls suggested that guaranteed economic union was a major precondition for voting Yes in the referendum (The Globe and Mail, 30.09.1995), and the federalists were clever enough to shatter the PQ's argument that this would be the case in the public mind.

4.1.2 Welfare regionalism?

4.1.2.1 Scotland

Traditionally, the SNP had its biggest electoral support in economic crises, especially when both major parties could be held responsible. As a result, the rise of the party in the late sixties correlated with the decline of heavy industries (Criddle 1978: 49). On the other hand, the sense of being financially dependent on the UK proved to be a major obstacle to the growth of

\(^3\) The "Commission sur l'avenir politique et constitutionnel du Québec", named after their presidents Bélanger and Campeau, was set up after the failure of the Meech Lake Accord. The commission held hearings all over the province and received petitions from over 600 organizations and individuals. 55 experts were asked to assess Québec's future prospects. The final report was issued in March, 1991, declaring that, if renegotiations of Québec's status within the federation should fail, the province should become sovereign (Bélanger-Campeau 1991/Report).
nationalism. This correlation waned during the 1970s, when new growth poles emerged in Scotland and North Sea Oil was discovered. In the following years, their line of argument was a two-edged sword. The SNP could point at the problem areas saying "look how it is" and at the oil centres saying "look how it could be" (ibid.). These examples indicate that the argument, Scotland was actually rich, but betrayed of her wealth, had already become a central part of SNP propaganda. The actual "oil-campaign" began in 1971, arguing that, according to international law, the oil belonged to the Scottish people. Being part of the UK, Scotland had to remit 90%, and Scottish oil were used to readjust the English economy, i.e. London's traffic system (Wolfe 1973: 157ff). Central slogans were "We Scots are the most generous people on earth – we are giving our oil away", and "Scotland's oil – to London with love?" (ibid.). On the other hand, the SNP tried to improve their leftist image by declaring a "war on Scottish poverty (Bayne 1991: 52).

When devolution was on the agenda of the post-1974 Labour government, the SNP blamed the government for not breaking London's monopoly over the oil resources. For Labour and the unions, devolution was mainly a means to improve economic steering and control. They blamed the SNP for their "bourgeois" economic policy and criticised the devolution plans for not going far enough. On the whole, their arguments aimed at social redistribution and functional advantages of devolution (see below). The unionists, however, used the same strategy as in the sphere of trade and markets: They portrayed devolution as a risk to lose British subsidies. Their campaign centred around three issues: (1) the costs of a Scottish Assembly, (2) too much government, and (3) the end of the UK (McLean 1989: 36). These issues provided a negative agenda, which meant that the devolutionists always had to argue against negative consequences instead of proclaiming the advantages (Perman 1980: 59).

After the referendum was lost, the SNP focused on the "big lie" (Sillars 1991: 3), which pointed to the fact that Scotland was dependent on UK finances. North Sea Oil was still on the agenda, but to a lesser extent than in the seventies. The SNP used the oil-argument against the Constitutional Convention's devolution plans, claiming that such a concept would leave the oil with London (Salmond 1995: 74; SNP 1996a: 4). However, the argument surrounding Scotland's potential wealth was moved away from the oil question and tended to be based on factors such as Edinburgh being a financial centre, and the emerging High Tech industries. The devolutionists concentrated on London's policies, which were said to harm the Scottish economy. Correspondingly, their line of argument focused increasingly on the functionality of economic policies being decided at the Scottish level.

The unionists did not change their strategy to portray Scotland as being financially dependent on the UK and tried to convince the public that the recent growth was a result of governmental policies (HMSO 1993: 13f). Even after the 1997 election, they centred their campaign against devolution particularly on the argument that public expenditure in Scotland was higher than the UK average. Although this was a relevant issue for the voters (Political Context 1996: 5), their strategy did not bear fruit. Scotland Forward and member organisations, although still reacting to such claims, successfully appealed to the growing economic self-consciousness amongst Scots, which, according to observers (several interviews), was one of the main reasons of the referendum result. In sum, there is no reason to speak of welfare regionalism in the Scottish case. The analysis nevertheless shows how important a reasonably strong economy, in this case based on export oriented sectors - and especially a conscious awareness of this fact - is for regionalist mobilization. Scotland moved from relative deprivation (in the face of oil) towards relative economic stability and devolution. Since economic success used to be a central legitimizing factor for the UK in Scotland (Paterson 1993), the unionists now had severe problems to sell the advantages of the union to the Scottish electorate.
4.1.2.2 Québec

Québec’s relative peripherality towards Ontario was a major obstacle for the separatists. They had difficulties in convincing the public that sovereignty would be economically viable. When the support for the PQ grew in the late sixties and early seventies, the federalists focused their arguments on economic issues. They published calculations suggesting that the province received half a billion dollars more than it paid to the federal government annually and promised "profitable federalism" as the only viable alternative (Saywell 1977: 31ff). Since the subjective economic expectations amongst the public were rather pessimistic, the PQ was in an unfavourable position to argue against fears that sovereignty would mean a net financial loss (Clift 1982: 89). The PQ's situation worsened after the 1976 elections when federal politicians declared that, in negotiations on future financial transfers, they would bear in mind that the province had a separatist government (The Toronto Star, Nov. 20, 1976). The economic crisis at that time added pressure on the PQ government and the supporters of sovereignty-association. As a result, they declared that the referendum would be held on the mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association, while any future changes of the status quo should be subject to a second referendum (Marsolais 1992: 150f). On the other hand, the PQ and the unions argued that the economic difficulties were a result of Québec being disadvantaged within the federation (Québec/Gouvernement 1979; FTQ 1980). Finally, their strategy failed to dissipate widespread economic fears, as they were indicated by several polls (see Pinard/Hamilton 1986).

When the Meech Lake Accord was rejected, Québec’s economy was in a far better position; some Liberals even argued that a separation could be economically advantageous (The Gazette, March 9, 1990). PQ-leader Jacques Parizeau centred his arguments for separation on the negative effects that Canadian federalism had on the Québec economy (Parizeau 1990: 9). In its report to the Bélanger-Campeau-Commission, the PQ even argued that inter-provincial transfer payments would cost Québec more than it received (PQ 1990: Annexe). Based on the experts' views, the Commission concluded that Québec's economy was healthy and well-equipped to play in the "jeu économique mondial" (Bélanger-Campeau 1991/Report and document de travail 4). Even the federalist Liberals stated that the economy was strong enough for Québec to survive as a sovereign state (Parti Libéral 1991). Although they did not share the conclusion that sovereignty was inevitable, they agreed that Québec could consider all alternatives to the constitutional status quo (Bélanger-Campeau 1991/Report: 92-98).

During the referendum campaign of 1995, the PQ still argued that Québec would be better off without Canada. The federal government would spend less money on economic development in Québec than elsewhere (Québec/Gouvernement 1995: 7, 15) and the province would save three billion Canadian Dollars in expenditures if it became independent (PQ 1995: 26). The umbrella organisation for the Yes side, the "partenaires pour la souveraineté ", argued that an independent Québec would be one of the "small wealthy countries" in the world (partenaires pour la souveraineté 1995). The unions supported the PQ and blamed the federalists of "scaremongering" (FTQ 1995c: 5). In sum, the question of competencies in the field of economic policies played an important role in the campaign, while both sides quoted experts on whether sovereignty would harm or benefit the economy.

Finally, the federalists had another forceful argument at hand: the national debt. Since Québec would have to take over its part of the debt, they argued, the province would run into a financial crisis (Raynauld 1995: 81, 84). A smaller state would not be as "credible" to the banks, and the financial situation would result in a lower standard of living (CPQ 1995: 4). Their arguments were supported by the ongoing economic crisis in the mid-1990s. While support for the status quo always grows during crises (Keating 1995: 23), the federalists did not have to pronounce the benefits of federalism. Instead, they focussed their campaign on the risks of
sovereignty. This strategy did obviously breed the intended results: 75% of all those opposing sovereignty did so because they feared negative economic consequences (The Gazette, 3.10.1995). Even though the separatists gained 10% compared to the referendum of 1980, they failed to convince the public that sovereignty was an economically viable option.

4.1.3 Functionality

4.1.3.1 Scotland

Adequate and Scotland-specific economic policy strategies already played a significant role when the SNP had their first electoral success. At that time, however, the debate centred around domestic control of the economy lay at the centre of (see above), although concepts were also important. For the SNP, it was clear that all relevant decisions had to be made at the Scottish level if the economic situation were to be improved (Burnett 1975: 110). After the Labour government had presented its devolution plans, the question of adequate powers for the Scottish Assembly in the field of economic policy dominated the subsequent debate. The Labour Party was split between its commitment to decentralization and the centralist agenda of seventies-style socialism (McLean 1989: 18-21). Hence, even the Scottish Council (Development and Industry) argued in favour of much more competencies for Scotland (Kellas 1977: 68).

The opposite argument was pushed by organized business. Blaming the devolutionists of "emotional nationalism", the CBI denied any economic rationale for devolution and warned that devolution would lead to confusion, insecurity and, thus, the withdrawal of investors (Risk 1978; The Herald, Feb. 20, 1978). This lay the foundation for the No-side's main line of argument in the referendum debate. Together with the costs of an Assembly, "insecurity" was their main argument. They went as far as claiming that, if business was against devolution, it must be bad for the economy (The Herald, Feb. 28, 1979). The Yes-side was on the defensive. They could hardly do more than blaming the unionists of "scaremongering", but the agenda was set by the No-side.

During the eighties, the Labour Party slowly replaced their traditional centralism by the "small is beautiful" argument. Partly in reaction to the Tories' neo-liberal policies, devolution was more and more linked with economic policy reforms, which meant that a Scottish Parliament was supposed to have more competencies than the Assembly proposed in the seventies. The 1992 election manifesto declared that devolution was part of a renewed industrial policy (Labour 1992a: 10). The unions followed this line of argumentation. The "functionality" of economic planning at the Scottish level became a central element of their manifestos (STUC 1987, 1992). Both Labour and the STUC were central actors within the Constitutional Convention, whose economic policy concepts were rather interventionist (Constitutional Convention 1990: 14-16). The establishment of a Scottish Parliament was increasingly seen as a source of wealth, while the "functionality" of such an institution was seen as based on (a) the rather corporatist tradition in Scotland, (b) the closeness to the problems, and (c) the possibility to overcome London's detrimental economic policies (Constitutional Convention 1995). Besides criteria of functionality, territorially defined economic interests moved towards the centre of their argument.

The SNP's program underwent a similar development. Political competencies to shape policies according to the needs of the economy became a central element of their demands. Taking the European context explicitly into account, the party saw economic planning at the Scottish level as the key to economic growth, while "control" was replaced by "attracting investment". When Salmond became party leader, the "Scottish Centre for Economic and Social Research" was founded to supply the party's arguments with expertise. Later, the SNP also employed
external experts to convince the public of their economic aptitude. This proved to be the strategy with which to counter the Conservatives' argument concerning business. The SNP and the devolutionists were eager to quote businesspeople who favoured devolution or even independence.

Organised business, on the other hand, had become rather careful. Although they were still against devolution, they argued along functional lines and mainly against "too much interventionism" and other leftist points. Only ideologically neo-liberal organisations such as "Aims of Industry" publicly fought against devolution. The Conservatives, however, did not change their strategies at all. They disputed that devolution would inevitably lead to interventionism – without mentioning the negative effects of this. Even when the 1997 referendum drew near, there was barely any change of arguments in the unionist camp. They focused on the costs of a Parliament and too much bureaucracy, both of which would inevitably lead to more taxes. Labelling them "Tartan Tax", they implied that Scots would have to pay taxes for folkloristic nationalism. Finally, they repeated their old argument that public expenditure was higher in Scotland, which would mean that a Scottish Parliament would inevitably have to rise taxes. As the referendum result reveals, such arguments did not fall on fertile ground. Being deprived of their most important ally, organized business, the Conservatives failed to convince the public of the dangers of devolution. Aside from a small group of conservative businessmen, most organisations remained silent during the campaign, although CBI was sure that most businesspeople would still be against devolution (The Scotsman, April 14, 1997).

Taxes proved to be the only point for the No-side to be made during the referendum campaign. Although the devolutionists were never able to overcome the widespread mental connection of tax powers and tax rising powers, it was not sufficient to deter the people from devolution. When it comes to the "trust" of the business community and "functionality", the devolutionists moved from the defensive and reactive to the offensive and pro-active position. They even managed to make the benefits for the economy a central campaign issue (press analysis) and sell devolution as a means to improve the economy. With the aid of polls, they were able to grasp the people's fears and hopes and shape their arguments accordingly. Although social issues were more dominant in the debate, it was the economic policy agenda where the devolutionists gained the most ground.

4.1.3.2 Québec

The PQ has always been concerned with economic policy conceptions. As opposed to the Canadian mainstream, it was founded as a social democratic party favouring interventionist policies. Therefore, organized business (mainly Anglophone) opposed the party from the beginning and threatened to pull out of the province if the PQ were elected. The 1976 election campaign was dominated by economic themes (Saywell 1977: 156). Although the PQ platform was already more business friendly than 1970, they demanded tripartite corporatist strategies, foreign investment controls and public ownership in some areas – and won. The Liberals, trying to use the threats uttered by business for their federalist purposes, did not succeed in portraying a PQ government as an economic risk. Business associations continued to fight separatism and financed the "federalist committee" which led the No-side in the 1980 referendum campaign. Backed by the unions, the PQ campaigned for sovereignty-association and linked this model to their interventionist strategies. While the Lévesque-government blamed Canada's "inherent centralism" of causing economic problems for Québec, it demanded more economic powers for the province, including taxation and tariffs (Québec/Gouvernement 1979: 89ff). The lost referendum yet shows that the PQ had been elected for their economic and social policy, but not because the public wanted sovereignty.
In the early eighties, the PQ moved toward the neoliberal mainstream and favoured deregulation (Keating 1995: 18). Their relations with business improved, but the latter were still opposed to the PQ's main goal. After the failure of Meech Lake, the Conseil du Patronat (CPQ) did at least support the decentralization of important competencies. Within the parameters of the Bélanger-Campeau-Commission, business representatives agreed that Québec, not Canada, should have the resources and powers to support the provincial economy's adaptation to the world market. They were not in favour of sovereignty, albeit less opposed than before. Parizeau attempted to use this change of mind as an argument for the economic soundness of separatism (e.g. Journal de Québec, March 2, 1991).

The Bélanger-Campeau-Commission focused on functional arguments. Canadian federalism was considered inefficient while struggles about competencies would bind too many forces, polarise and scare investors. According to the Commission, current system was unable to face the challenges of globalization (Bélanger-Campeau 1991/Report: 4of). Their experts argued in a similar manner, quoting small states like Norway as examples for successful adaptation to the world economy (Bélanger-Campeau 1991/Doc. de travail 4). Parizeau argued that Québec needed sovereignty to reach goals such as full employment and environmental protection (Parizeau 1990). The Liberals did not quite share this view, but agreed that Canada did not pay enough for R&D in Québec and that the constitutional situation was the main source of all economic problems (Parti Libéral 1991). Québec's advantages were seen in the rather corporatist structures and established policy instruments within the province – a legacy from the interventionist past (ibid.).

Such a unanimity amongst political forces concerning the necessary decentralization of political powers in the economic sphere could easily be used by the PQ, who won the 1994 elections. The PQ's program "Québec dans une monde nouveau" (PQ 1993, 1994b) concentrated on functional arguments about the potential of economic steering in Québec and explicitly referred to globalization. Canadian federalism was considered dysfunctional for accomplishing a new projet de societé. Elements of the "industrial districts" were as obvious in the program as the traces of Katzenstein's Small States in World Markets being Parizeau's favourite book (interview). During the referendum campaign, experts and reports stressing the competitiveness of small states were quoted. PQ officials compared a sovereign Québec to financial centres like Luxembourg or Singapore (Le Devoir, Sept. 23, 1996).

Just as 15 years before, the referendum debate was dominated by economic issues. When it came to considerations of functionality, the Yes-camp was in the offensive. While the unions backed the PQ's functional arguments (CSN 1995), business moved again to the opposite camp. Although some industrialists joined a group which declared that business should stay away from the debate would accept every result of the referendum, the big organisations publicly opposed sovereignty. Their main arguments, however, considered resources and markets, the only "functional" point being the threat of "insecurity" damaging the economic climate (Coté 1995: 20). Liberal leader Johnson referred to liberalised financial markets, indicating that investors' first reaction to a Yes in the referendum would be to withdraw large sums from Québec (The Gazette, Oct. 11, 1995).

To sum up: The widespread agreement that economic steering in smaller territorial units has functional advantages did not help the sovereigntists. Although they were able to set the agenda in this issue area, arguments of functionality did not convince the public of the necessity of sovereignty. Neither did they convince business, which feared constitutional change more that it thought to profit from decentralization. Finally, this functional line of argument was overshadowed by the questions of resources and consequences of political conflicts in the case of separation.
4.2 Political Factors

To what extent is regionalism influenced by the state's decreasing problem-solving capacity in areas beyond economic policy, on the one hand, and, international integration as well as cooperation, on the other hand? Both Canada and Britain are involved in international co-operation, the latter even being part of a political integration process. While this particular aspect shall be discussed in an extra section, the level of observation to start with shall be the regionalists' understanding of statehood and politics. The questions are then, what role is played by the state in their political conceptions, whether it changed over the years, and what particular meaning is given to sovereignty.

4.2.1 Scotland

From the beginning, the SNP linked their goal of sovereign statehood to strong interventionism. The Scottish state was expected to support the economy and secure wealth, but the party was rather careful when it came to international politics (see Wolfe 1973). At that time, such an understanding of Scottish sovereignty marked a decisive split between the SNP and Labour. The latter were as state-centred in their strategies, but the state they had in mind was the British state. This social democratic centralism changed after the 1974 elections, for tactical reasons, that is, now, they expected a Labour-dominated Parliament as a tool to reach their political goals (Niven 1975: 214). This points to their purely instrumentalist approach to devolution. While their perception of sovereignty changed in the following years, the SNP fought on the same platform: Sovereignty was the principal goal, allowing Scotland to redistribute wealth and steer the economy (Tait 1975: 125). The 1977 program still declared "sovereignty over territory and resources" the principal aim (SNP 1977).

The unionists only started to pick up such issues when the referendum drew closer. Their political arguments centred around the "West Lothian Question", that is, the reduction of Scottish MPs at Westminster, and the "slippery slope" argument, which implied that devolution would be the first step to independence (press analysis; McLean 1989: 28, 36). The argument stirred the growing dissatisfaction with reforms and institutional changes in the last years of the Labour government. Hence, one of their central points was "too much bureaucracy", thereby forcing the devolutionists to argue against negative consequences, instead of promoting positive ones. The only positive altercation the devolutionists could forward was the democratic question, but they failed to establish this as an issue in the debate. Finally, the "slippery slope" and other negative issues dominated the agenda, supported by the negative record of the then unpopular Labour government (Gallagher 1991: 12).

The election of the Thatcher government changed things completely. All political and social forces who were opposed to the neo-liberal retreat of the state saw devolution as a means to re-establish the state's problem solving capacity. The unions, being active members of the Constitutional Convention, made devolution a core element of their platforms. Devolution was seen as the only strategy to get "better policies" in many fields: "... a Scottish Parliament could take action to intervene – to create jobs and cut unemployment. The same arguments hold when you are talking about other "bread and butter" issues too – health, education, social services" (STUC 1992b). The growing perception of the necessity of devolution was clearly a reaction to Conservative politics. Labour and the Constitutional Convention argued in two ways: First, they stressed the democratic argument, blaming the government of establishing many undemocratic QUANGOS. Second, they wanted to re-establish instruments for economic and social planning (Constitutional Convention 1990, 1995; Labour press releases etc.). Although Labour subsequently watered down the Convention's proposals in their own platforms, the party clearly incorporated devolution into a wider concept of political reform.
Labour also left the line of the Convention's definition of sovereignty. After the party had stressed Scots Law and the sovereignty in the people until the early 1990s, Blair now declared that the sovereignty of Westminster would not be touched by devolution (The Scotsman, March 8, 1995). Of course, the SNP did not have to face such problems. Their definition of sovereignty remained rooted to Scots Law, while the self-determination of the Scottish people was declared the main reason for independence (SNP 1992b: 1). However, their understanding of sovereignty had already changed within their concept of "Independence in Europe". Membership in the EC was considered a legitimate reason to reduce sovereignty in some areas (ibid.). Sovereignty was still considered necessary to be "equal amongst equals" in Europe, but the "pooling of sovereignty" in was welcomed (Sillars 1991: 5). The Labour Party's devolution plans were attacked for refusing to give Scotland sovereignty and allowing Westminster to veto any law passed by the Scottish Parliament. On the other hand, the SNP perfectly understood the changing role of the state. The program stated that in many areas, the state could only be able to solve problems in c-operation with other nations (SNP 1996a: 3). Similar to the Convention, the SNP linked their constitutional goals to democratic reforms.

As in other areas, the Tories' arguments did not change at all. They insisted on the "slippery slope" and the threat of losing Scottish influence in Westminster, which had secured Scotland's advantages under the union (HMSO 1993). Democratic reforms such as proportional representation were regarded with suspicion: Scottish MPs elected on lists would not have direct links with their voters. Consequently, allowing them to decide would be an "insult" to Scotland (The Guardian, July 6, 1996).

During the referendum debate, linking devolution and democratic reforms proved helpful to the Yes-side. Their campaign was dominated by four topics: (1) polarising between Scotland and the Tories, (2) portraying devolution as a means to modernization, (3) arguing against the threat of higher taxes and, finally, (4) devolution would imply that Scots would decide Scottish affairs (Jones 1997: 9). The latter point moved towards the core of the debate. The Tories' lack of political legitimation and unpopular policies were increasingly used to mobilise the public. In this issue area, the Yes-side managed to concentrate on the positive aspects of devolution, while the negative agenda was limited to Tory policies. Scotland Forward and affiliate organisations promised progressive, interventionist and socially equitable policies. Social policy remained a strong issue, and devolution was sold as an "insurance" against Conservative onslaughts on the welfare state.

Such a positive, policy-oriented manner of arguing also made it easier for the devolutionists to counter the Tories' arguments, which had not been changed (slippery slope, loss of influence). In sum, their whole line of argument was against institutional change as such, and based on an ancient understanding of sovereignty. That is to say, regardless whether it was about Europe or devolution, Westminster should not be touched. In their fight against institutional change, they even argued in contradictions: On the one hand, two levels of government were said to inevitably cause conflicts and confusion. On the other hand, they fought the proposal that the Scottish Parliament's laws would not be subject to the approval of the Upper House because this would not allow a system of checks and balances (Conservatives 1997b: 14). Scotland Forward and the Labour Party were not even frightened by the slippery slope argument any more. They declared that it would be up to the Scottish people whether devolution would lead to separation (Jones 1997: 15). Labour, however, continued to contend that they would give Scotland "the best of Britain and the best of Europe" (Labour 1997: BN 9).

## 4.2.2 Europe and Scottish Nationalism

The development of the SNP's understanding of sovereignty cannot be analysed without taking the European context into account. Of course, their No-campaign before the referen-
dum on EC-membership was based on fears of centralisation ("No to London and Brussels"), and the main reason was that Scotland would not be represented ("No voice, no entry"). Being a proper nation, Scotland could not be represented in Brussels by England (Wolfe 1973: 138). But even before "Independence in Europe" was adopted as an official strategy, their programs became more pro-European, although "Scotland's voice" remained the central argument for symbolic and pragmatic reasons. Amongst the former was the expectation that a positive image a Scottish EU Commissioner or EU presidency could broadcast would strengthen Scottish self-consciousness. A pragmatic reason is the simple fact that many relevant decisions are now taken on the European level. Finally, a pro-European stance was a nice opportunity to blame the Tories for their anti-European image, of which it was said that it deprived Scotland of some benefits.

Yet, the most important change can be detected in the party's understanding of sovereignty. The necessity of veto powers in the EU was no longer derived from historical claims to sovereignty. Instead, it was increasingly seen in pragmatic terms, and it was thought that veto powers would never be invoked anyhow. A positive, pro-European image would be the best for Scotland. The "little Englanders" had always fought against Europe and developed a negative image. European integration was seen as an example for small states, who had never been as powerful as in the EU framework, where the Commission would support their interests (SNP 1992, several publications). Finally, the change towards "Independence in Europe" was a strategic move to fight the Tories' argument, the SNP would turn Scotland into a "socialist, isolated state" (Conservatives 1991: 31). They could even turn the argument around and blame the Tories for isolating Scotland from the rest.

The non-separatist devolutionists increasingly referred to the European context to support their arguments as well. Following the STUC, the Labour Party portrayed Europe as a means to fight back Conservative policies by gaining allies across the continent (STUC 1990, 1992; Labour 1992). Decentralization was seen as compatible with developments on the continent, where, according to the Labour Party, subnational units like the German Länder had the opportunity to influence European policies. Within their concept, having a Scottish voice and belonging to a big member state were two ways to exert as much influence as possible. The fact that they referred to the Committee of the Regions did, of course, cause harsh criticism from the SNP, who did not want to define Scotland as a mere region. The concepts of the Constitutional Convention and other organisations includes the European context as well. The Convention was the one who moved the furthest away from traditional understandings of sovereignty. Scotland should have a voice in Europe, but not by establishing a new nation state. In any event, Europe moved away from that concept, while the principle of subsidiarity would increase the importance of sub-national units (Constitutional Convention 1990: 8).

Taken together, domestic political factors and the European context have advantaged those forces in Scotland who fought for political decentralization. The devolutionists' goal to re-establish the state's problem solving capacity was obviously in line with the desires of the Scottish electorate. Scotland Forward was clever enough to study their opinions and needs and use the results of such polls to adjust their campaign (see Political Context 1996). The positive reference towards Europe shows that this Scotland-specific reaction to the retreat of the state was by no means fragmentative (fragmentary). Instead, it is the Tories' position that would fit into this category. For instance, in centralising powers within the UK, they were unwilling to cede any power to the European level. On the other hand, the home rule movement has developed a new and less orthodox understanding of sovereignty, which allowed them to adapt to the changing environment.
The same holds true for the SNP, whose perception of sovereignty has become rather pragmatic (Stolz 1998: 128). According to Isobel Lindsay, three aspects of the SNP's pro-European move have to be distinguished. Europe is a means to (a) achieve independence by bypassing Westminster, (b) refute the blame of being separatist, and (c) to find a way out of the psychological and practical dependence on the UK (Lindsay 1991: 87-90). Finally, their change of strategies from "independence, nothing less" to supporting devolution might have to do with European integration as well. Many of the functions the EU is expected to take over from the nation state are those reserved to Westminster, namely foreign policy, defence and monetary policy. For some, it seems possible that Westminster will become redundant (interviews).

4.2.3 Québec

The debate on economic policy has indicated that the PQ has always been a political force which stressed the importance of state intervention. This strong role was not restricted to domestic policies, for their understanding of sovereignty resembled de Gaulle's "Europe des patries" (Waldmann 1989: 145). This mixture of a strong state and absolute sovereignty led the federalist Liberals to blame the Pèquistes of isolationism and refer to their leader, René Lévesque, as the "Castro of Québec" (Saywell 1977: 33). The PQ's strong interventionism made the unions their truest ally, since they expected sovereignty to lead to "democratic socialism" (Marsolais 1992: 205). When the PQ was first elected the provincial government in 1976, the "patriation" of the Canadian constitution was on the agenda, while both parties used the debate to demand more powers for Québec within the federation. The difference, however, lay in the PQ's insistence on sovereignty, which was still traditional but did not exclude economic interdependence. Referring to international law, the PQ government defined sovereignty as the ability to make political decisions without being subordinate to any superior political level (Québec/Gouvernement 1979: 50). While the social democratic program had already been watered down, the PQ government still promised state-centred social development. An independent Québec should be able to combine social, employment and education policies in order to follow a coherent strategy of social development, which again convinced the then PQ-critical unions to support them in the referendum campaign.

In this area, the Liberals had more problems to counter the PQ's arguments. They were eager not to appear as defenders of the status quo, but promised "renewed federalism" with more powers for Québec (Marsolais 1992: 14f). They still believed in the possibility of asymmetrical federalism, claiming that both levels of government should be "sovereign" in their competencies (Parti Libéral 1980: 22). Being attacked by Lévesque that their position would even fall behind the attempts of the last 20 years to reach more powers, the Liberals turned towards the Québec version of the "slippery slope" argument. A Québec run by the separatists and wanting "sovereignty-association" with Canada would be similar to Cuba trying to become a Canadian province (Marsolais 1992: 102).

Political rights and sovereignty re-entered the political agenda only two years after the referendum, when the constitution was repatriated without Québec's consent. The refusal of special competencies to the province was seen as the denial of the Francophones' political community (Latouche 1986: 57). The claim of more political power was also based on the federal government's refusal to include Québec's status as a "distinct society" into the constitution. Hence, political and cultural aspects are difficult to separate here. The distinct society clause was included in the later rejected Meech Lake Accord. After its failure, the Bélanger-Campeau-Commission also argued that Québec needed more political powers to defend the Francophone community. On the one hand, the Commission admitted that, in the face of globalization, the state had lost some influence. On the other hand, it was expected that having
all powers of a sovereign state would enable Québec organise social change (Bélanger-Campeau 1991/Report: 53).

The PQ considered sovereignty the only means to decide on immigration policy and take part in international politics. Together with the unions, the party expected the state to play a central role in the economy and even out social inequalities (PQ 1990, FTQ 1990). The Liberals did not share this view of the state, but insisted "que le Québec exerce désormais sa pleine souveraineté" in all areas except defence, monetary policy, tariffs and transfer payments (Parti Libéral 1991: 44). Changes in the international sphere were also reflected in the debate. Parizeau even expected foreign (French) aid to achieve sovereignty, although less from "internationalists" than from Gaullists. Both parties referred to the collapse of the Soviet Union in order to demonstrate that sovereignty was actually feasible (The Gazette, August 26, 1991; Parti Libéral 1991: 63).

In the following years, a gap between the PQ's platforms and actual policies can be detected. While the party's economic policy had become rather neo-liberal and traditional concepts of social policy were criticised rhetorically, every single promise what a sovereign Québec could do still implied a strong state (PQ 1994b, 1995). Sovereignty was defined according to the following three criteria: (1) Québec should collect all taxes, (2) every law should be passed by the National Assembly, and (3) every international treaty should be negotiated by the Québec government and ratified by the National Assembly (PQ 1994a: 5; 1994b: 43). Changes in the international context served as an argument that the Québec needed full sovereignty to pursue her interests (PQ 1994a: 6). The willingness of Canada was not seen as a prerequisite for independence and the establishment of common institutions with the former mother country was restricted to the economic sphere (PQ 1994b: 45).

This radical stance was severely watered down during the referendum campaign. In the face of widespread fears, Parizeau accepted the necessity of proposing a political union with Canada in order to ensure public support (Conley 1997: 84f). Bloc Québécois leader Bouchard referred to the Maastricht treaty as an example of a future relationship between the two countries (Corneiller 1995: 144). Finally the original plan to declare sovereignty and then negotiate a political union (Québec/Gouvernement 1994: 3) was reversed. As such, the referendum question was: "Do you agree that Québec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Québec and of the agreement signed on 12 June 1995?" (Bateman 1996: 5f). In spite of this moderation, the unions and the "Partenaires pour la souveraineté" declared sovereignty the primary means to achieve social solidarity. In contrast with the PQ, whose political reforms linked to sovereignty consisted of a mere decentralization within Québec, these two organisations combined sovereignty with democratic reforms (CSN 1995). The PQ, on the other hand, only used the democratic argument in connection to Québec's right to self-determination.

The opposite camp was eager to make clear that a No in the referendum would not mean satisfaction with the status quo (interview). Canadian federalism should be "flexibilised". Claiming that Québec could exercise more sovereignty within Canada than EU member states, the Liberals accused the PQ of having an "orthodox" understanding of sovereignty while hiding the main consequence of sovereignty: borders. A Yes in the referendum would mean the end of mobility for Québécois in Canada. Liberal leader Johnson declared (The Globe and Mail, 28.9.1995). Prime Minister Chrétien made clear that a Yes would result in Canada treating Québec "just like every other foreign country" (The Gazette, 27.8.1995).

In sum, the role of the state played a significant role in Québec's regionalist discourse. The specific corporatist tradition was used by the nationalist forces to mobilise the public for
sovereignty. Yet, the peaks of regionalist mobilization had less to do with the state's decreasing problem solving capacity. Rather it was the perceived refusal of the Canadian state to meet Québec's specific needs that led to upsurges of separatism. Whenever the Liberals' promise to renew Canadian federalism seemed to have failed, the public was more likely to support sovereignty. The federalists were clever enough though to account for the growing discontent with the status quo. The corporatist political culture did nevertheless force the sovereigntists to link their primary goal to social reforms which in turn require an active state. Their only method with which they could convincingly promote sovereignty was to find functional arguments why full sovereignty was needed to pursue the common good. They had to insist on the policy making capacities of nation states. Consequently, they were torn apart between their aspirations and the actual loss of the state's problem solving capacity.

4.3 Cultural Factors: National Identities

4.3.1 Scotland

The existence of a distinct Scottish cultural identity has always been subject to debate. The widespread conviction that such a culture exists is based on a few myths which nonetheless reflect aspects of reality. There is hardly any distinct language to speak of (only 1-1.5% of the population speak Gaelic), but the cultivation of Scots, the dialect spoken North of the border, is definitely part of the collective identity. Scottish Nationalism is said to have weak historical connections (Finlay 1994: 129f), but some elements of the collective identity are based on historical events which are interpreted in a specific way (the re-interpretation of the Act of Union as English conquest is one example). Another prominent myth is Scottish "collectivism", based on the radical tradition of the labour movement. Studies have actually revealed that collectivist values are shared by more people in Scotland than in England (Midwinter et al. 1991: 210). Finally, the distinct institutional system including the Presbyterian Church, Scots Law, the educational system and especially the national football team have shaped Scottish identity and the consciousness/awareness thereof to a great extent.

In course of this project, the question arises to what extent the identification with Scottish identity has grown (a) parallel to the strengthening of regionalism, and (b) in the face of globalization. Although Britain imports less culturally relevant goods than other G-7 states, the growth from 1970 ($ 457,4 million) to 1987 ($ 7303,9 million) is significant. Imports of newspapers and journals grew from $ 14,1 billion in 1970 to $ 230,7 billion in 1993. In British TV channels, the content produced outside the UK grew from 12,5% in 1973 to 17% in 1986 (data according to Beisheim et al. 1998: 73-90). Being a part of Britain, Scotland is exposed to a significant influx of cultural influences. It should be noted, however, that Scottish TV programs have increased as well and that the newspaper market is dominated by Scottish products (Stolz 1998: 108f.).

For the SNP, Scottish identity has always been linked to the myths of collectivism and egalitarianism. The ethnic element has never been strong, although some people like ex-leader Billy Wolfe tended to derive such values from the Celtic origins (another myth) of the Scottish people (Burnett 1975: 117). At the same time, Scottish identity has hardly been exclusive, that is, usually all people living in Scotland were usually included in the construction of the Scottish people. There were, however, certain fears that Scottish culture might be endangered by "uncontrolled immigration from England and elsewhere" (Wolfe 1973: 160), but such factors never played a role in SNP policy. Their definition of Scotland has always been a territorial one, Scottish citizenship should be given to everyone living in Scotland at the time independence was achieved (SNP 1977: 1).
To be sure, questions of cultural identity never played a role in election campaigns of the seventies or the referendum debate of 1979. Scottish nationalism seemed to be "acultural" (Harvie 1991: 30), while intellectuals were more concerned with socialism and modernization than with cultural nationalism. Apart from slogans such as "Life here in Scotland is different" (Sunday Mail, Feb. 11, 1979), the devolutionists did not use Scottish identity for their campaign. The unionists, on the other hand, tried to appeal to the dual identity of Scots, but also the lack of self-confidence. "Don't Tear Britain Apart" called a possible Scottish Assembly an assembly of "high school debaters" (Daily Express, 19.2.1979), while "Labour Vote No" leader Brian Wilson warned that, without English influence, Scotland would become a "reactionary province" (Glasgow Herald, Feb. 21, 1979).

In the following years, cultural identity only played a role in SNP platforms. The construction of identity was still inclusive, immigrants were seen as enriching Scottish society (SNP 1987: 3-8). History was used to mark Scotland's affinity towards the continent, pro-Europeanism thereby declared a central element of Scottish identity. At the same time, the anti-European bias of English politics was seen as isolating Scotland from Europe, the "little Englanders" accused of xenophobic tendencies (SNP 1992c). Scottish inferiority should be overcome by strengthening the European component of Scottish identity. Only the plans to support Gaelic by printing all official documents bilingual (SNP 1987: 16) and rise the proportion of Scottish-made broadcasting programs to 40% (SNP 1992a: 8) seemed a little backward-looking, but did not imply strict enforcement. On the whole, the party tried to appeal to the voters' emotions by accusing opponents of independence of being "anti-Scottish" (SNP 1992d: 4).

The non-separatist wing of Scottish nationalism remained silent on this issue until the debate on a Scottish Parliament emerged again in the late eighties. Scottish culture was seen endangered by British centralism, while the construction of identity was still open (Canon Wright 1989). According to the Labour Party, Scottish identity had to be "outward-looking" (The Scotsman, 11.6.1995), and the STUC explicitly wanted to include the ethnic minorities (STUC 1992a: 35). The Constitutional Convention argued that devolution was necessary because Scotland is different – while the difference was defined in historical, cultural, economic and political terms (Constitutional Convention 1995: 6f), Scottish history and especially intellectuals were used to improve self-confidence. The unionists, although agreeing that there is a distinct Scottish identity, behaved rather clumsy. Questioning Scottish politicians' ability to run the country was seen as an attack on Scottish identity, as was John Major's labelling devolution as "teenage madness" (The Economist, Jan. 7, 1995: 32).

During the referendum campaign of 1997, the Yes-side clearly appealed to the emotional side of Scottish identity. Without explicitly marking elements of Scottishness, the campaign focused on "Scottish solutions, Scottish issues, Scottish priorities" (Labour 1997c). The press, almost unanimously on the Yes-side, stressed the right to self-determination, while Scotland Forward and the SNP portrayed the No-side as the "same old anti-Scottish right" (press releases). Such an emotional campaign was difficult for the unionists. They tried to blame the Yes-side of backwardness and "jingoism", calling their appeal to Scottish identity the "Braveheart-campaign" which would endanger Scottish jobs. Such allegations of irrationality were again seen as an attack on Scottish self-confidence and identity, especially when they were picked up by Baroness Thatcher, one of the post unpopular people in Scotland (The Scotsman, Sept. 9, 1997). Hence, on referendum day, The Scotsman wrote that "those who would save Scotland from itself seem to think little of the Scots." Their attempt to appeal to a sense of Britishness also failed – not even the death of Princess Diana could mobilise pro-British sentiments (Jones 1997: 12). Finally, they repeated the mistakes of the past by blaming Scottish politicians of being incapable of running the country and threatening that Scotland's share of the budget would be reduced.
In sum, the development of Scottish identity reveals two interesting aspects. First, the perception of a distinct identity and a positive understanding thereof has definitely increased, as can also be detected in polls (Bennie/Brand/Mitchell 1997: 132-134). This development made it easier for the devolutionists to blame the No-side of being anti-Scottish. Second, the Scottish collective identity seems to be compatible with cultural globalization. There is, however, a growing consciousness of the Scottish past. Symbols such as the Kilt have reappeared in public life and a renaissance of Scottish literature, drama, music and arts can be detected (Harvie 1991: 30). Scottish history is increasingly presented abroad, sometimes in a strange way ("Braveheart"). This development has by no means changed the openness of Scottish collective identity construction. While the personal openness is rooted in the widespread myth of collectivism, the easy incorporation of a European component was made easier by the former dual identity of being Scottish and British. Also rooted in Scots Law, the traditional Scottish understanding of sovereignty made it easier to adapt to the changing world, while the English tradition had increasingly more difficulties. The emerging strength of the home rule movement in Scotland was not based on a newly constructed collective identity; but rather, on the rejections of British definitions of sovereignty. Without the established perception of a national identity, such a broad coalition for home rule would have been impossible (Penrose 1994: 596-605). Other elements of Scottish identity played a significant role without explicitly being named. One of the central issues of the referendum debate was the cut-backs on the welfare state during the Tory government. This policy, like the poll-tax which was implemented in Scotland first, was rejected by a vast majority in Scotland. The fact that this issue dominated the debate although there had been a change in government indicates that Scots see devolution also as a guarantee against such unpopular policies coming from England.

4.3.2 Québec

There is no doubt that the French language is the key element of Québécois identity. In the past, it was used by the clerical elites to "shelter" the population from secularised influences on the continent (Clift 1982: 87-90). Later, the construction of identity changed from "French Canadians" to Québécois", while the territorial component increasingly replaced the religious one (Karmis 1997: 14). The fight for the language has always dominated the debate and shaped the cleavage against English speaking Canada. Within the political elite, there is a consensus that there is a Francophone nation represented by the sovereign government of Québec. The main cultural difference towards Canada is the relationship between individual and group rights. For the Québécois, Canada consists of several communities whose rights have to be sheltered. Hence, they never shared the "Canadian dream" of a society based on individual rights (Jenson 1997: 638f). Although this view changed with the Quiet Revolution, the cleavage between individual rights and the defence of Québec's cultural identity remains on the agenda. The question arises whether the aggravated fight for Québécois culture has to do with cultural globalization and in how far the perception thereof has changed qualitatively. Data is difficult to find. On the one hand, Canada has one of the highest shares of culturally relevant imports in the Western world (Beisheim et al. 1998: 88ff). On the other hand, Québec's imports are mainly from Francophone countries and, hence, used to support the development of Québécois culture (Hero/Balthazar 1988: 218, 255f).

The traditional definition of Québécois identity, as it was represented by the PQ and predecessors, was at least in part an ethnic one. The PQ believed that every people possesses a "collective personality" which has to be cared for (Waldmann 1989: 145). In the political debate, the main issue remained the French language and its shelter against assimilation. From the beginning on, the PQ promised to make French the only official language (Saywell 1977: 40). Especially after electoral defeats, the party tended to polarise between linguistic groups, blaming the "Anglophone block" of preventing the majority from living up to their needs.
Over the years, immigration policy became another element of the battle for the Francophone culture. The fact that immigrants preferred to send their children to Anglophone schools caused the PQ to propose laws forcing them to be educated in French.

Having been elected in 1976, one of the first moves of the Lévesque government was to pass a law to protect the French language. The party was split on this issue (Tremblay 1996: 51), but the assimilationist wing was in the lead when Bill 101 was passed. Even the unions declared the shelter of French their main goal (FTQ 1980: 5). The referendum debate was dominated by cultural issues; the Lévesque government declared the equality of Francophones the main reason for sovereignty-association. Having been one of the founding nations, Francophones had been disadvantaged by Canadian federalism. On the one hand, the PQ tried to avoid any ethnic definition of the Québec nation. Like the SNP, they declared that all people living in Québec could become citizens (Québec/Gouvernement 1979: 55). On the other hand, they constructed their collective identity along linguistic characteristics and historical developments. Historical events such as the 1763 law excluding Francophones from public service were dug out to show how disadvantaged Francophones had always been. Canada's extension to the West was portrayed as an anti-Francophone conspiracy meant to turn them into a minority (ibid.). This demographic threat was a cornerstone of the PQ's line of argument in the referendum campaign. Although the Liberals shared many points (Parti Libéral 1980), this lead to a polarisation along the linguistic cleavage. Almost every single non-Francophone including the native peoples in the province voted against sovereignty-association (Marsolais 1992: 135).

After the lost referendum, the integrationist wing within the PQ gained influence. Nationalism was modernised and deprived of some authoritarian elements. The fear that the Francophone culture might be undermined, however, remained (Clift 1982: 127). The debate on the Canadian-American Free Trade agreement (FTA) allows for some interesting insights. While the unions saw the FTA as a threat to provisions of bill 101 and bilingual product labels, which could have been considered illegal non-tariff-barriers (FTQ 1987: 7), the PQ's original opposition against the agreement was over when Parizeau became party leader. Both the PQ and the Liberals criticised the federal government for not guaranteeing the shelter of the bilingual culture, but their support for free trade seemed to be more important.

For Québec's political elites, the failure of the Meech Lake Accord was but one more backlash against the Francophone community within Canada. The rejection of the distinct society clause was the main motive for the strengthening of Québécois nationalism in the aftermath of Meech Lake. Parizeau stated that the fact that Canada had remained together over such a long period was obviously the result of a misunderstanding: While Québec had always thought that Canada was comprised of two founding nations, English Canada considered the country to consist of ten equal provinces (Parizeau 1995: 3). Within the PQ, the integrationist wing lost influence; an attempt to allow for bilingual signs again was turned down at a party convention (Karmis 1997: 20).

No other topic took more room in the debates and the final report of the Bélanger-Campeau-Commission than Québec's culture. Québec's identity, not only defined by language, but also by the province's former achievements and international presence, was considered to be endangered within the Canadian federation. The Commission stated that it was obviously impossible to reconcile the Québécois and Canadian identities, visions and aspirations within the framework of Canadian federation (Bélanger-Campeau 1991/Report: 19, 27). The conclusion was clear: Either Québec would get full sovereignty in all culturally relevant areas and a right to veto in constitutional affairs, or separation was inevitable (ibid: 48f). The PQ and the unions went further still, and declared that Québec could live up to her "personality" as a
sovereign part of "global village" (PQ 1990: 6). The international context was explicitly referred to as a better framework to shelter Québec's culture.

While the main concern of the Commission had been Canada's rejection of the Francophone culture, the referendum debate was again shaped by attempts to positively define Québec's identity. The PQ program was torn between civic and ethnic definitions; the 1991 program defines Québécois as being Francophones. In 1993, Parizeau declared that independence could only be achieved with the support of the "Québécois de souche" (old stock Québécois, Keating 1995: 18). At the same time, the party tried to appear open and tolerant by stressing the rights of the Anglophone minority, whilst insisting that French was the main vehicle of Québec's cultural identity. Therefore, French must remain the official language and central means to integrate immigrants (PQ 1994a: 6, 26). However, their main argument in the referendum debate remained the fact that Canada had rejected the distinct society clause. Every publication of the Yes-side declared that Canada was not willing to accept (=constitutionally guarantee) Québec's distinct character. The protection of the Francophone culture remained the focal point of their campaign while the federal government was accused of attempting assimilation. For example, the government would try to convince immigrants that there was no distinct culture. As a result, they would come to Québec with false expectations. Family policy was seen as a means to increase Québec's birth rate (Coalition for Change 1995; partenaires pour la souveraineté 1995). Admitting that no culture could survive without external influences, the PQ made clear that Québec's culture was Francophone. A sovereign Québec could profit from co-operating with other Francophone states and immigrants would make a clear decision to go to a Francophone country (PQ 1994b: 36ff).

The free-trade-critical unions were able to relate their arguments to the dangers of increased trade for Québec's culture (FTQ 1995; CSN 1995). They also stressed other elements, particularly the corporatist structures and "collectivist" values, which were said to be incompatible with neo-liberal free trade ideology (FTQ 1994b: 6). In regard to the cultural nationalist organisations such as the Société St. Jean-Baptiste and the Mouvement National des Québécoises et Québécois, Canadian constitutional history remained the principal threat. Still they also referred to cultural globalization: In the face of uncontrolled trade, efforts to maintain Québec's "exclusively French" character should be increased (SSJBM 1995: 20). The latter was also seen to be endangered by the immigration of Anglo- and Allophones. Hence, they demanded legal guarantees that immigrants are integrated into the Francophone community (Conley 1997: 78). In addition, they wanted French to be the only language of instruction in Québec's schools, English lessons to begin at the higher grades and to improve student's knowledge in history in order to develop a "culture publique commune" (SSJBM 1995: 14).

The PQ shared some of the above anxieties. The globalization of the media and cultural markets as well as migration were seen to undermine the cohesion of national cultures and spaces (PQ 1993, 1994b: 14). In their view, national cultures were still necessary to lead societies; even economic strategies would not make sense without a "cultural plan" (ibid.). On the other hand, the party still tried to portray globalization as a chance to strengthen Québec's culture and develop a positive image of open-mindedness (Québec/Gouvernement 1995). Parizeau defined the increasing exchange of information and culture as a chance to present Québec to the world (Parizeau 1994: 3). According to Québec's minister of culture, growing interdependence leads to an increasing demand for cultural affirmation and recognition amongst countries and peoples. Having subjected her own cultural market to americanisation, English Canada would not be able to understand such aspirations (La Presse, Oct. 19, 1995; The Gazette, Oct. 17, 1995).
However, all the attempts to outfit Québec nationalism with such an open-mindedness image were undermined when some prominent nationalists made inept comments. For example, one Bloc Québécois politician declared that only people of French decent would qualify as Québécois; another one wanted to deprive immigrants of their right to vote in the referendum (Conley 1997: 80). The cultural nationalist organisations took the most radical position on the language issue. They even criticised the fact that the referendum question did not include proposals for language regulation in a sovereign Québec. According to their perspective, sovereignty was primarily a means to protect Québec's culture (Conley 1997: 78). Their construction of identity was primarily based on descent: "Les Québécois partagent une histoire, une culture et une langue: le français" (SSJBM 1995: 3). Such definitions, however, exposed the nationalist camp to allegiations of being ethnically minded or even racist. In this case, the debates surrounding the situation of linguistic minorities proved to be the nationalists' biggest problem. Their organisations stayed away from the public hearings, thereby further undermining the legitimacy of the pre-referendum proceedings. The nationalists were in a catch-22 position: "In case the PQ government ignores the existence of such minorities, it is accused of being assimilationist. If it does, it is accused of making differences and discrimination" (Interview).

Despite the nationalists' problems in this issue area, it also proved to be the most difficult point for their opponents. No one could afford to downplay the defence of the Francophone culture, and even the Liberals considered the language to be the "heart" of it (Parti Libéral 1994: 58). Thus, the only chance to argue against sovereignty was to claim that Québec's culture was better protected by a larger state like Canada (Interviews), while a sovereign Québec would have to leave NAFTA and then re-negotiate entry. This was seen as a danger, since, under NAFTA, only sub-national governments were allowed measures to protect the endogenous culture, while national governments were not (The Gazette, Oct. 18, 1995). The federal government was in a better position, but had apparently underestimated this issue and thought that the federalists could win the referendum solely on economic issues. In a desperate speech, Prime Minister Chrétien tried to convince the electorate that they could be "proud Québeckers and proud Canadians" at the same time (Conley 1997: 87).

Finally, the bilingual cleavage remained the crucial one. The separatists' gains compared to 1980 were only made amongst the Francophone population, 60% of which voted Yes, while 95% of those with other mother tongues voted No (Lacroix 1996: 72; Milne 1996: 82). Their definitions of collective identities had changed significantly: In 1970, only 21% of the Francophone population had considered themselves Québécois, while 44% had thought of themselves as Canadiens français and 34% as Canadiens. The latter option had already dropped to 14% in 1979, with 37% seeing themselves as Québécois. In 1990, the proportions had changed completely: 59% of the Francophones identified as Québécois, 28% as Canadiens français and only 9% as Canadiens (for data, see Pinard 1997). Hence, identification with Québec has risen significantly. It is quite interesting to see that this process went hand in hand with the modernization of the identity construction and increasing openness of Québec's society to external influences. In a certain way, one can detect a growing (Freudian) "narcissism of little differences" here.

When it comes to qualitative aspects of collective identities, modernising party positions and the persistence of traditional elements have to be distinguished. The content of the construction of Québec's national collective identity has nevertheless changed over the years. Religious elements have practically disappeared and the ethnic component has been superimposed by territorial and civil elements, but has never fully disappeared. The PQ's attempts to avoid any ethnic definition were undermined by reactions of individuals to defeats and their difficult relationship towards ethnic minorities. In such periods, the radical wing whose concept of Québécois identity is restricted to Francophones, usually gained influence. The PQ's policy is
a clear indicator that Québec nationalism largely follows the French example by insisting on the assimilation of immigrants (Keating 1995: 20). Immigration policy and the relation towards linguistic minorities became touchstones for the nationalists’ image and the openness of their collective identity. Being a minority in North America, whose culture has to be protected, the representatives of the majority in Québec found it difficult to grant minorities, who were living within the Québec territory, the same degree of protection (Cotter 1995: 40; Karmis 1997: 22). This difficulty could easily be used by their opponents to polarise between nationalists and ethno-linguistic minorities and proved a major obstacle to developing a modern and open-minded image. Their dilemma is that if they appeal to fears of undermining Québec’s culture too vehemently, they deter those parts of the population who consider such an assimilationist position repressive.

To sum up, the PQ has so far been unable to effectively use the changing international environment to mobilise a majority in favour of sovereignty. The only direct link to be found in the regionalist discourse is the fact that the PQ considers cultural globalization as a chance to even strengthen Québec’s identity by presenting it on a global scale. Only some cultural nationalist organisations consider it a threat to Québec’s cultural identity; yet, they did not consider trade to undermine it. During the debates on the FTA, only English Canada saw it as a threat to their culture. The Québécois have always had a more positive attitude towards the USA than the rest of Canada, even more positive than towards France (Hero/Balthazar 1998: 219f). Québec’s (changing) cultural identity remains the primary mobilising factor, whereby English Canada as opposed to globalization is considered to threaten this factor.

5 Conclusion

Scotland and Québec are merely two amongst many other cases where globalization is paralleled by an upsurge in regionalist mobilisation. Comparing the changes in the regionalist discourse in these two cases allows for some careful but interesting hypotheses with regard to the chances and restrictions regionalist movements have to face in the context of globalization. To summarise, it can be concluded that globalization offers new opportunities for regionalist mobilisation by reducing risks and creating new incentives. On the other hand, globalization has to be treated as a constraint to some traditional aspects of nationalist regionalism. This means that regionalist movements can only take advantage of these new opportunity structures if they are able to adapt. As both cases reveal, this adaptability does not simply depend on political entrepreneurs’ strategies, but proves to be highly path-dependent.

The most obvious impact of globalization on the regionalist discourse can be found in the economic sphere. In both cases, regionalists were able to employ the reduced risk to lose markets for their purposes. The comparison however shows that the degree of economic integration plays a significant role: the European Common Market seems to be more convincing than a mere trade agreement such as NAFTA. The PQ had more difficulties to convince the public that market access was secured than the devolutionists in Scotland. Given the fact that economic recessions turned out to be the main obstacle to gain sufficient support in the referenda, demonstrates that larger states still promise more economic security. In Scotland, this function as to a certain degree been taken over by the EU. The latter serves as an external support system for the regionalists. Still, it should not be forgotten that sovereignty implies a deeper cut and further reaching institutional changes than devolution. On the other hand, the separatist option gained support in both cases, which means that the establishment of a new state seems to appear more appealing today.

Regional or endogenous development strategies can support regionalist mobilisation especially in regions where the political tradition differs from the national level. One important precondition is the relative success of such strategies: Both Scotland and Québec have caught
up economically because their strategies of concertation proved more coherent. Since region-
alist actors could easily refer to globalization here, they can be regarded as regionally specific
responses to the challenges of globalization. Success implies another precondition: Relative
wealth proved to be important for extending the support base for regionalism. As opposed to
the seventies, protagonists of regionalism avoided to portray the regional economy as weak.
Instead, they stressed the endogenous potential which could only be developed if strategies
were employed at the appropriate level. The other significant change is the different meaning
of "endogenous control", which no longer implies ownership of the means of production by
residents. In both cases, the left-of-center political agenda avoided the development of Lega
Nord type welfare regionalism. The example of the PQ even demonstrates that too much
adaptation of neo-liberal ideology can alienate important allies. The innovative connection of
adaptation to economic globalization and regionally specific capacities by regionalist actors
will nevertheless be crucial to the future success of regionalism.

Legitimacy crises could be detected in the UK and Canada, although both were home made,
rather than induced by globalization. In Scotland, the widespread support for devolution was a
clear rebuttal of the neo-liberal withdrawal of the state. As in Québec, the legitimacy of the
state was further undermined by centralisation. Therefore, one of the main arguments for
devolution was that a Scottish Parliament could protect Scotland against such policies. In spite
of the PQ's neoliberal turn, corporatism and social cohesion did play a significant role in the
regionalist discourse. Hence, regionalism has to be regarded as a strategy to re-establish the
state's ability to act.

The main difference, however, lies in the fact that Scottish nationalists explicitly refer to
European multi-level-governance, while the PQ wants to reduce the number of political
levels. Their arguments against Canadian federalism resemble those of the British Tories
against devolution and supranational integration. These patterns of argumentation are based
on a traditional understanding of sovereignty which is less compatible with the complex
situation induced by globalization. While in the PQ case, this is definitely a reaction to Can-
da's unwillingness to acknowledge Québec's needs, the comparison shows that people can be
more easily convinced of political decentralisation in cases where an external support system
such as the EU remains. Even unpopular nation states still promise more protection than
states-to-be, which means that the significance of the nation state has not declined as much as
the debate on globalization, at times, implies. Yet, national sovereignty loses importance
wherever governance systems beyond the nation state turn out to be functional. In such cases,
regional nationalists do not need to continue waving the sovereignty flag, which seems to
place them in conflict with reality.

Regional cultural identities can be both a mobilising factor and an obstacle to modernisation.
Although there was scant evidence to be found indicating that globalization is seen as a threat
to the regional cultural identity, this does not falsify such a hypothesis. The underlying
mechanism is a rather subconscious one, and explicitly negative reactions to other cultures
have a negative connotation in Western democracies. Yet the correlation between cultural
globalization and growing identification with Scotland and Québec is obvious. On the other
hand, increased cultural exchange not only leads to defensiveness, but regionalist actors also
regard it as a chance to strengthen the regional cultural identity internally by presenting it
externally. The Scots were more successful in this regard than the Québécois, although cul-
tural factors play a much more important role in the latter case, where the Francophone culture
is perceived to be under threat. It is precisely this strong bilingual cleavage that has been the
main obstacle to develop a convincing modern and open-minded construction of Québécois
identity. The perceived threat leads to an increased desire to mark off one's own cultural iden-
tity against others. In the case of Québec, this led to polarisation and even alarmed members of the Francophone community.

A collective identity which does not even include traces of ethnic criteria of belonging can obviously mobilise broader segments of the population for regionalist goals. In Scotland, the boundaries are territorial and institutional, which means that every person who lives within the country can be won for a regionalist project. Again, the Scots do not have to face the same problems as the Québécois. Immigrants, for example, do not have the choice to associate with another linguistic group, which is seen as a threat to the Francophone (on the Canadian scale: minority) culture and in turn increases assimilationist tendencies. The Scottish identity construction is as path-dependent as the Québécois: Having joined the UK voluntarily provided for a dual identity in which the "British" part is now increasingly replaced by a European part. In Québec, the development of the collective identity construction took the opposite direction, from Canadien français to the unidimensional Québécois, which still includes exclusive and repressive elements.

The question whether regionalist movements are able to use globalization induced changes to mobilise the population for their goals cannot be answered unequivocally. The analyses of Scotland and Québec indicate that certain preconditions have to be fulfilled. Resources, economic strategies, political and institutional structures as well as identity constructions are highly path-dependent. Hence, in the context of globalization, regionalism will remain an asymmetric phenomenon, some variables lose while others gain significance. Most economic, political and cultural variables remain the same; whereas the manner in which they influence regionalism changes qualitatively.
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