TOWARDS AN INCLUSIVE TYPOLOGY OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN EUROPE, NORTH AND SOUTH, EAST AND WEST:
A ROKKANIAN APPROACH

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'The student of politics is torn between two sets of superego demands: he feels an obligation to reduce the welter of empirical facts to a body of parsimoniously organized general propositions but he also feels under pressure to treat each case as *sui generis*, as a unique configuration worthy of an effort of understanding all on its own.’ (Rokkan, 1970: 72)

Far from being a subject of interest only to antiquarians or canon lawyers, the field of church-state relations in Europe represents an interconnected series of issues, institutional arrangements and processes, which collectively present something of a challenge to political science. Towards the close of the twentieth century a number of live issues served as a reminder that the subject was neither dead nor sleeping, even in the relatively secular environment of Western Europe. Instances of recent political controversy included the renegotiation of concordats, for example in the 1980s in Italy, the recognition (or otherwise) by public authorities in a number of countries of Scientology as a religion, the Bavarian crucifixes-in-the-classroom case, or, in Britain, the problems arising over Islamic religious sensibilities (the Rushdie case, religious schools etc).

Casanova, Kepel and others argue that the latterday emergence of troublesome issues such as these represent a significant cultural shift towards the deprivatisation, and, in particular, a new politicisation, of religion (Casanova, 1994, Kepel, 1994). Numerous authors have used the term resurgence to describe either a widespread revival of religion itself or a developing context in which religion has become newly controversial in politics. The individual instances have all been studied on their own but rarely, if at all, in the context of an attempt to develop a conceptual framework for making sense of them comparatively across time and (European) space. There is no agreed taxonomy or typology for the analysis of existing patterns of church-state relations in modern Europe, although scattered attempts have been made, principally by sociologists of religion and constitutional lawyers. Nor is there an established view about how these different phenomena are connected – except that they seem to have a lowest common denominator in religion. Had some settled scheme of types become established it would most likely have been overtaken by the recent and continuing groundswell of challenges and changes in Eastern Europe. Certainly the

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different ways in which actual arrangements have deviated -- and continue to deviate, some more, some less -- from such neutrality in virtually all European states. To examine why, and in what ways, this has been --- and continues to be --- the case requires an attempt to provide a conceptual framework and an approach to the subject, which would facilitate comparative understanding. What follows is an attempt to sketch such an approach by building on the work of one of the ECPR’s principal founders and guiding spirits.

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A ROKKANIAN APPROACH
Stein Rokkan’s path-breaking work on nation-building, cleavage formation and the structuring of mass politics in Western Europe provides a useful starting point for any attempt to develop a framework for analysing church-state relations in Europe. He was particularly concerned to identify and explain the principal contrasts in political structures and processes, which were to be observed in Western Europe after World War II. Coming from the north of Norway, he was always acutely aware of variations across geographical space; for him patterns of politics in the widely-dispersed parts of Europe varied greatly in terms of inherited systems of territorial control, the impact of cultural and economic forces, and the mechanisms of representation, both the electoral and party systems. With such a broad range of variations across such a wide space he did not restrict himself to a synchronic approach however. Instead, he availed himself of the work of, in particular, historical sociologists and pioneered a historical-developmental approach within European political science which has been widely influential. What follows is an inevitably rather jejune attempt to follow his lead and establish a framework with sufficient geographical breadth and historical depth to serve the purposes of comparing and contrasting patterns of church-state relations across the whole of Europe as they affect structures of political conflict and competition.

Although, particularly in his later work, he followed the path of (almost) infinite regress via the *Völkerwanderungen* back to the Roman Empire, his most influential writings were based on an ordered analysis which started with the momentous church-state conflicts of the Reformation period, with their implications for subsequent developments. The choice of starting-point was quite deliberate and explicit:

"The developmental model to be explored posits clear-cut time limits to its operation:

its *terminus a quo* is the conflict over the cultural-religious identity of the emerging nation-state in the sixteenth century;
its *terminus ad quem* is the establishment of universal and equal electoral democracy and the ‘freezing’ of party alternatives, in most countries during the 1920s and the 1930s, at any rate before World War II." (Rokkan, 1970: 75)

It was Rokkan’s view that critical junctures hundreds, if not thousands, of years ago had generated systems of power and opposition which continued to impact on politics in (his) contemporary era. The Reformation-Counter Reformation conflicts combined to generate the first of two dimensions of opposition, which Rokkan referred to under the common heading of the National Revolution. The second, which also related in a powerful way to church-state conflicts and tensions, he saw as arising out of the French Revolution as its influence was spread across Continental Europe in the succeeding twenty-five years of war. Other, more materially-based dimensions of conflict generated through the Industrial Revolution – between opposing interests in the commodity and labour markets – were also presented as of great significance, of course, in the fixing of decisive cleavage patterns, in some cases even adding a distinctive twist to issues affecting church-state relations. They did so however only within the context of, and under the constraints provided by, pre-existing patterns of conflict deriving from what he called the National Revolution. Thus, the sharp division in Latin Europe between
revisionist socialists on the one hand and ‘revolutionary anarchists, anarchosyndicalists and Marxist factions’ on the other were seen as developing within a context, where a culture war between the Roman Catholic church (and its allies) and radical anti-clericals (and their allies) was already ongoing. The distinctiveness of the Latin pattern of what Martin calls ‘reactive organicism’ (Martin, 1978: 41) was seem to derive, then, from the earlier, rather than the later, cleavage base. As Rokkan pointed out, the owner-worker cleavage, which generated mass working class parties in all countries of Western Europe before World War I, actually made for the similarity of party systems, while the impact of the cleavages rooted in the National Revolution made for the ‘decisive contrasts’, which it was his particular concern to explain (Rokkan, 1970:113). As he argued, ‘[t]he decisive contrasts among the systems had emerged before the entry of the working-class parties into the political arena, and the character of these mass parties was heavily influenced by the constellations of ideologies, movements, and organizations they had to confront in that arena.’ (ibid) And these ideologies, movements, and organizations were all implicated in issues related to, if not solely concerned with, church-state relations.

As Rokkan freely admitted, the limitations of time (sixteenth century to the 1920s) were clearly suggested by the geographical focus of his model. It only applied ‘to the territories and the polities which were immediately affected by the clashes between Reformers and the Roman Catholic Church and the consequent strains between secular and religious powers.’ (ibid: 75).iii By the same logic, in order to develop a more extended model for the analysis of church-state relationships across the whole of Europe, ‘from the Atlantic to the Urals’ for example, it is necessary not only to move eastwards in spatial terms but also further back in temporal terms. The natural terminus a quo for an all-Europe model would seem to be 1054, the conventional date for the decisive schism between Latin Catholic, and Greek - or Eastern - Orthodox, Christianity.

As Rokkan’s ‘intellectual executors’ point out in their intensively worked and comprehensively annotated edition of his core works, extending the model geographically is not an easy task: ‘The fundamentally different historical development of the Eastern European ‘nation-states’ would have complicated his already complex model even further. In order to be able to arrive at general conclusions despite this complexity, Rokkan always advocated developing region-specific models. The end of the division of Europe that resulted from World War II would have forced him to think more about how to delimit the ‘region’ Europe, i.e. about the long-term effects of its historical boundary-building: the division of the Roman Empire into an eastern and a western empire, the confrontation between the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox Churches, the long isolation of the emerging Muscovite empire from the West, the carving-up of the East under the despotic Ottoman Empire, the autocratic Russian Empire, and the absolutist Austrian Empire, and finally the totalitarian Soviet Empire.’ (Flora et al, 1999: 88) The point is well-taken. Even for present purposes, the task can perhaps only be satisfactorily assayed, if at all, by removing one of the sources of complexity not directly relevant to church-state relations and substituting a confessional oneiv. The latter is, ex hypothesi, both directly relevant and of great significance in defining the differences between East and West in Europe. Church-state relations in the world of Eastern Orthodoxy are collectively quite distinctive, relative to both Catholic
and Protestant patterns, and can by the same token be expected to have particular consequences for patterns of political conflict.

The two maps (F.1 and F.2) present Rokkan’s conceptual map of Western (and, in part, Central) Europe as established by Flora et al in its most complete form and my attempt to adapt and extend it to embrace Eastern Europe. Extension to the East means that it is necessary to take into account the existence of a second band of territories of mixed confession extending from Estonia in the North to the Balkans in the South. This second band connects with the first in the Ukraine, where the Uniates with their acceptance of the primacy of the Pope confront the Ukrainian Orthodox, and in the mountains of Transylvania, where Hungarian Calvinists confront a Romanian Orthodox majority. The existence in the Balkans of significant enclaves of Islamic observance adds an extra dimension of complexity to this second confessional mix, just as further north prior to the Holocaust the existence of large Jewish populations had complicated the patterns of the Catholic/Orthodox and Lutheran/Orthodox border regions. Uniquely, it is in Bosnia-Hercegovina that a three-way confrontation of Catholic Croat, Orthodox Serb and Muslim Bosnian illustrates the potential for intractable conflict that these confessional mixes can still represent under particularly fraught circumstances. What portion of this intractability can be traced to the nature of the different confessional traditions, particularly as these affect the state, and what to local balances of force and influence, can of course only be addressed by testing alternative hypotheses.
MAPPING EUROPE-AS-A-WHOLE BY CONFESSION

From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century Europe knew three mono-confessional culture areas of major size located severally across the Eastern, Southern and Northern margins of the Continent: the Orthodox, Catholic and Lutheran. In each the confessional state pattern was institutionalised so as to make full membership of the political community coincident with submission to the locally dominant creed. This rule was typically adhered to even in adjacent subject territories, which included substantial populations of a different confessional loyalty; such populations were often excluded from holding public office, receiving university education and even the right to hold land, have their marriages officially registered etc. As Rokkan recognised in the case of Western Europe, confessional state systems in the Lutheran North and the Counter-Reformation South have left a legacy of confessional loyalties in the present-day populations which has still not been effaced by the secularising trends of the twentieth century. What follows is an attempt to identify the contemporary extent of these deposits left by the early-modern confessional state system, as reflected in the confessional breakdown of existing populations. The cases are listed in order of their closeness to complete confessional conformity with a cut-off point (except in the case of Russia) of 70%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORTHODOX</th>
<th>CATHOLIC</th>
<th>LUTHERAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece: 10.71 [98]</td>
<td>Spain: 39.17 [99]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova: 4.46 [98]</td>
<td>Italy: 56.74 [98]</td>
<td>Iceland: 0.27 [96]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal: 9.92 [97]</td>
<td>Malta 0.38 [98]</td>
<td>Sweden: 8.91 [94]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland: 38.11 [95]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark: 5.36 [91]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland: 3.5? [92]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Finland: 5.16 [89]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France: 58.40? [90]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Norway: 4.44 [88]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria: 8.19 [85: M13]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia: 146.39 [?]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus: 10.42 [80]</td>
<td>Lithuania:3.58 [?]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia: 4.68 [76;O11]</td>
<td>Belgium:10.18 [75]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia: 1.9 [71]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot popn: 202.9 m</td>
<td>Tot popn: 134.7 m</td>
<td>Tot popn: 24.14 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Total: 363 m

Population estimates and confessional breakdowns from CIA Factbook 2000

Codes: Arm = Armenian; Ath = Atheist; C = Roman Catholic; Cv = Calvinist; M = Muslim; O = Orthodox; P = Protestant.

Across the intervening central space of the Continent running roughly North-West to South-East from the British Isles to Hungary via the Netherlands, western and southern Germany, Switzerland and the Czech Republic lies a belt of territories where, crucially,
the populations have been divided in their allegiance between the Roman Catholic tradition and, alternatively, a number of Protestant confessional types, including in addition to the Lutheran, the Anglican, Calvinist and what might be called broadly the Sectarian. Rokkan emphasised the coincidence of this band of territory with the ‘city belt’, for long ‘the stronghold of the Roman Church, with a high density of cathedrals, monasteries and ecclesiastical principalities’ (Rokkan & Urwin, 1983: 27). It is extended here to include at its north-western pole the territories of the present United Kingdom which have since the Reformation been characterised by moderate-to-high levels of both inter- and intra-confessional pluralism. Both Anglicanism and, in Scotland, Presbyterianism have incubated a range of internal dissident movements, which have at times divided from the main church and added to the historically broad fringe of non-conformity and dissent. Anglican disestablishment in Ireland (1869) and Wales (1914) represented a belated recognition of the local strength of alternative religious traditions.

**The West-central Multi-confessional Culture Area**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ang-Cath-Calv-Sectn</th>
<th>Calv-Cath-Sectn</th>
<th>Luth-Calv-Cath</th>
<th>Cath-Calv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom: 59.11</td>
<td>Netherlands: 15.81</td>
<td>Germany: 82.09</td>
<td>Hungary: 10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[An55:C9:P9:M2]</td>
<td>[C34:P25:None 36]</td>
<td>[P38:C34:Other38]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland: 7.28</td>
<td>Czech: 10.28</td>
<td>[C67:Cv20:L5:Oth7.5]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T: 59.11 m</td>
<td>T: 23.09 m</td>
<td>T: 92.37m</td>
<td>T: 10.00 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grand Total: 184.57m**

*Population estimates and confessional breakdowns from CIA Factbook 2000*

Codes: An = Anglican; Arm = Armenian; Ath = Atheist; C = Roman Catholic; Cv = Calvinist; M = Muslim; O = Orthodox; P= Protestant; Sectn = Sectarian

A second, narrower band of mixed-confession territories running North-South has also separated the Orthodox East from the two other mono-confessional culture areas from Estonia and Latvia (Lutheran-Orthodox mix)\^\text{vii} in the North to Bosnia-Herzegovina (Catholic-Orthodox-Islamic mix). In Rokkanian terms they are all classic buffer territories, constituting historically contested peripheries of the great landward empires of early-modern Eastern Europe, the Russian and the Ottoman. In the North Lutheranism is a legacy of Swedish overlordship, while the division between Uniates and Orthodox in the Ukraine stands as a reminder of the time when Poland-Lithuania was locally hegemonic. The scattered Islamic populations of the Balkans represents a deposit of the period of Ottoman rule when significant proportions of Slavs in some areas converted to the religion of their imperial masters. The presence throughout this band of territories of as many as six major confessional types (including the Armenian Orthodox, descending from the first of Christianity’s great schisms, approx 500 AD) makes for considerable complexity particularly at the southern end, where in the 1990s bitter ethno-religious struggles have occurred.
The Eastern Multi-confessional Culture Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lutheran-Orthodox</th>
<th>Orthodox-Muslim-Catholic</th>
<th>Orthodox-Catholic(Uniate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox-Muslim</td>
<td>Macedonia: 2.00 [O65:M25]</td>
<td>Orthodox-Islamic-Armenian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox-Orthodox-Catholic</td>
<td>Cyprus: 0.73 [O61:M15]</td>
<td>Georgia 5.01 [O65:M11:Arm8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox-Musl</td>
<td></td>
<td>Peripheral Dominance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armenia 3.41 [Arm 94]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia: 2.35 [?]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Azerbaijan 7.90 [M93:O3:Arm2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Azerbaijan 7.90 [M93:O3:Arm2]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Total: 147.81 m

Population estimates and confessional breakdowns from CIA Factbook 2000
Codes: Arm = Armenian; Ath = Atheist; C = Roman Catholic; Cv = Calvinist; M = Muslim; O = Orthodox; P = Protestant.

As is well-known Rokkan attempted to represent the key dimensions which entered his approach by means of what he called a topological-typological or, more euphoniously, a ‘conceptual’ map of Europe. In all he produced fourteen versions, according to Flora et al (349); Figure 1 represents one of the two most complete editions as modified by them but as with all the other versions it extends no further east than Central Europe. Flora et al regard the conceptual map with its underpinnings as representing ‘the most important single piece of Rokkan’s innovations (ibid). Not everyone has been so complimentary, Charles Tilly in a book actually dedicated to Rokkan made the following comment:

Rokkan died before he produced a satisfactory version of his conceptual map. As he left it, his scheme called attention to marked geographic variation in the forms of European states, singled out the distinctiveness of state-formation in Europe’s central band, and hinted at the importance of long-term changes in relations among rulers, neighbouring powers dominant classes and religious institutions. But it left a muddled idea of the actual social processes connecting these changes with alternative state trajectories. It is hard to see how Rokkan could have gotten much farther without laying aside his maps and concentrating on the analysis of the mechanisms of state formation. (Tilly, 1992: 13)

Therborn called this verdict severe and unduly curt, adding ‘Within his limits Rokkan went rather far, and is still illuminating the spacing of Europe’ (Therborn, 1995: 208) In the spirit of the latter Figure 2 shows what the map might have looked like if it had been extended so as to include the Territories of the Orthodox East. The spatial distribution of these areas is also represented (if somewhat crudely) in Figure 3 A Confessional Map of Europe of the Ancien Regime. Maps are limited tools of analysis however and Tilly’s point that mechanisms are often not themselves illuminated by map-like treatments is well-taken.
The purpose of the mapping exercise undertaken here is to locate parts of Europe where shared, or juxtaposed, confessional traditions and identity might, if anywhere, be expected to have some impact on the structuring of politics in the modern age of mass suffrage – if Rokkan is right. The initial assumption is that it makes a difference if the basis for political division over matters related to religion exists or not, whatever the stakes – and that it will matter, where such a basis does exist, which confessional groups, in what proportions, are involved. The argument can be presented in terms of two dimensions of difference which are likely to be of importance: whether a territory is mono- or multi-confessional, and what particular differences distinguish one confession from another. By cross-classifying these two dimensions the universe of significant relationships can be divided into two groups of two, thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situational Commonalities</th>
<th>Mono-confessional Territories</th>
<th>Multi-confessional Territories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ia: Mono-confessionality features</td>
<td>Ila: Multi-confessionality features</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situational Particularities</td>
<td>Ib: Confessional Particularities</td>
<td>Iib: Particularistic mixes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the historic mono-confessional areas:

(Ia) There will be common features related to the dominance of a single confessional type (mono-confessionality features), regardless of any differences between the major confessions but:

(Ib) each of the major confessional types will be distinctive in important respects, exhibiting particularities peculiar to each culture area (confessional particularities).

In the historic multi-confessional areas:

(Ila) The two mixed-confession bands of territory will share certain characteristics (multi-confessionality features), not least a tendency for confessional differences to take on political significance through the development of patterns of, alternatively, accommodation and conflict;

(Iib) in addition, the nature of the conflicts and, where achieved, accommodations will reflect the composition of the particular mix in a given territory/state (particularistic mixes).
Ad (Ia): There will be common features related to the dominance of a single confessional type (mono-confessionality features), regardless of any differences between the major confessions.

Mono-confessionality where it exists in three of Europe’s corners is the outcome of histories of successful regulation by either church or state authorities – or, most commonly, by both in combination. Prior to the great schisms around the first millenium and then five hundred years later ‘the unity of the faith’ was the ideal throughout christendom, despite the actual existence of a great deal of local variety and continuous ‘subterranean’ heretical movements of a more or less mystical stripe. (Troeltsch, 1931) In the core mono-confessional territories of the early-modern period it was usually underwritten by the legal apparatus of the confessional state, whereby conformity with the established religion of a territory was typically rewarded, while nonconformity was punished. In West and East the dominant rule was cuius regio, eius religio (to whom the territory, to him the religion – i.e. the rule that it was for legitimate rulers to decide which creed should be established within a particular territory). The established religion and its officials enjoyed a range of privileges both particular to them or deriving from the high status accorded to their functions. In the three principal mono-confessional areas identified, Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Lutheranism all preserved hierarchical forms of organisation in a manner unlike the Calvinists, anabaptists and others whose presence tended to be confined to the multi-confessional areas. In each case the precedence accorded to bishops in church and state reflected the honour attaching to established religion and encouraged attitudes of reverence and submission in the population at large for as long, at least, as religious observance and orthodox belief – shored up by legal protections -- retained some hold. In early-modern Europe the confessional state was the norm, varying little in substance, if greatly in form, between the different confessional culture areas; everywhere by the mid-eighteenth century the state authorities were in the ascendant (Casanova, 1994; Remond, 1999).

All three traditions were in important ways church, as opposed to sectarian, traditions. As such they had a common prejudice in favour of ‘comprehension’, the principle that all members of society should be included. The corollary of this prejudice was that those who for whatever reason resisted inclusion in the church and submission to its demands were also excluded from ‘normal’ society and subjected to numerous indignities and punishments. As church traditions the three principal confessions all made their own accommodations with the world, developing bodies of social teaching which established the legitimacy of state authority under certain conditions and provided the foundation for a social ethic not based on impossible demands. Whereas sectarian traditions by contrast maintained strict boundaries between themselves and the surrounding society and insisted on keeping themselves ‘unspotted from the world’, church traditions typically embraced worldly institutions and attempted to guide them, where possible in alliance with ‘those whom God has put in authority’. Undeniably an aspect of these church traditions was a tendency towards social and cultural conservatism, and a tendency to accept the status quo, although the mission to embrace all sorts and conditions within society made them concerned with certain issues of
inequality and social justice which less comprehensive organisations could easily slide over.

Where historic uniformity of religion had been achieved and maintained by means of coercion, there often remained a heritage of resentment, or resistance, and a tendency to reject the mechanisms of religious uniformity when occasion offered. Where the coercive imposition of a particular religion on a society was or is merely a historical fact (ie. its dominance has been so successfully established, as virtually to eliminate deviant alternatives, as in the cases of Catholicism in Scandinavia, Protestantism in Austria or Judaism, Islam and Protestantism in the Iberian peninsular) it was presumably less likely to have any continuing impact in more recent times. However, as rates of migration across most parts of Europe have increased in recent decades and demands for multicultural tolerance have been voiced, such historical facts can take on a new significance. Furthermore, in a number of historically mono-confessional societies, remnants of long-suppressed minorities survive as living monuments to the repressive practices of the past. Thus, in the case of French Protestantism, a leftist political orientation is clearly a legacy of the repression which followed the Revocation, in 1685, of the Edict of Nantes, which had previously protected them. The consequences of the dragonnades of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries is seemingly still reflected in levels of left-secular strength in the Cevennes and elsewhere.

Long-established mono-confessionalism has its own pathologies, which also make for commonalities between the cases. Insofar as the confessional monopoly in a particular territory is maintained by positive state support on the one hand and the repression of challenges on the other, established churches tend to become less vital as organisations. They no longer depend for their sustenance on mobilising support within civil society, looking instead to those in authority within the state to provide, pursuant to the bargain of mutual support between ‘Crown and Altar’. Finke, Iannacone and others trace to this circumstance the ‘hollowing out’ of the established churches of much of Europe (Young, 1999). Protected from the challenges of competition in an open religious ‘market’ of the sort which patently exists in the USA, many, if not most, of Europe’s established churches are seen progressively to have lost the ability to maintain levels of commitment and loyalty without which they tend to go into institutional decline. A second pathology arises from the likelihood that over time state-guaranteed mono-confessionalism engenders secularist counter-reactions all the more vigorous because of the absence of alternative channels of religious expression of the sort that are provided in multi-confessional settings. In this case the intolerance of the established religion is mirrored in the intolerance of its opposition. Eighteenth and nineteenth century France provided the classic illustration: ‘The Baroque autocracies eliminate substantial religious dissent and forces build up within the system towards a revolution with an explicit secular ideology. Such revolutionary explosions become endemic, and religion as such is frequently a political issue. Coherent and massive secularism confronts coherent and massive religiosity’. (Martin, 1978: 6) This indicates a generic aspect of the socio-logic of mono-confessionalism, which has been mitigated, for example in the Lutheran case, only by the relaxation of religious monopoly regulations and effective toleration over time of intra-confessional differences.
Outside the core territories effective mono-confessionalism has often been the product, not of long histories of church establishment however, but of successful resistance to outside power centres which have attempted to impose other, alien creeds. The cases of Ireland, Poland and Belgium attest to the powerful mobilising effect of such experiences. In each case attachment to Catholicism was associated with the successful assertion of claims to national autonomy against powerful neighbours: respectively, England with its Anglican establishment, Prussia with its Protestant and Russia with its Orthodox establishment and the Netherlands with its Calvinist establishment. The relative vibrancy of the Catholic tradition in each case, at least until recently, can be taken to reflect the fact that religion not only operates powerfully as an ethnic marker in such circumstances, it can also come out of the struggle greatly strengthened. Similarly, the strength of Bulgarian or Rumanian Orthodoxy or of the Armenian Apostolic Church can be taken to reflect the importance of religion in maintaining an independent ethnic identity vis-à-vis the Ottoman Turks. This reflects the point made by Haynes that where religion finds other work to do beyond ‘its own’ it often thrives mightily even where secularism would be expected to prevail. (Haynes, 1996?)

Whatever the historical background, where there is an strong tradition of religious uniformity within a particular society one would not expect questions of religion to become politically contentious\textsuperscript{xiii}. This does not mean of course that religion need be politically irrelevant; rather it can as often as not be associated with the political entrenchment to the point of unchallengeability of a particular religious tradition. On one view this is the case with the Irish Republic where it has often been argued that, until recently at least, the position of the Catholic Church has been so strong that no party (and very few individual politicians) dare to challenge it. This is a limiting case however where Catholicism has, as just noted, for long been as much a matter of loyalty to country as to church and the possibility exists that as soon as national autonomy is taken for granted the hold of the church on the population will decrease. A feature of mono-confessionalism which might be expected, regardless of any differences between the major confessions, however is an inherent tendency towards generalised intolerance against non-conformity in speech and behaviour. If this hypothesis holds dissenters and outsiders, whether defined in religious or other terms, will typically be met with a lack of understanding and a demand that they conform. Mono-confessional societies might then be less tolerant than multi-confessional societies, where pluralism and difference is -- and has for long been -- part of common experience, and civility is held to require mutual non-interference, if not respect.

Religiously-informed political conflict in mono-confessional societies might be expected at the most generalised level to take on the character of an internal debate. There will typically be agreement that ‘we are all Lutherans/Catholics/ whatever’ and that this common identity is reflected in certain central common understandings and value-commitments. So much common ground still however leaves room for disagreement about the implications of what it means to be a ‘Lutheran/Catholic/ whatever’ for particular questions. Debates will counterpose conservative against radical, this-worldly against other-worldly emphases even if within a common frame of reference. In such
internal debates the prestige of recognised religious leaders, institutions and procedures might provide the means for authoritative settlement of particular issues. But even where such a route to settlement is available, conflict might still turn on arguments about appointments to key roles, how authoritative pronouncements should be regarded and the legitimacy of attempts to overturn, or reform, previous arrangements.

Ad: (Ib) Each of the major confessional types will be distinctive in important respects, exhibiting particularities peculiar to each mono-confessional culture area (confessional particularities).

While they all represent ‘churchly’, as against sectarian or ‘denominational’, forms of Christianity the Orthodox, Lutheran and Catholic traditions are distinctive in a number of respects. Some of the points of difference and distinction derive from the doctrinal and other conflicts occurring at the time of schism when they divided from each other. Historical institutionalism and notions of path-dependency suggest a number of respects in which patterns set centuries ago might continue to have consequences long afterwards:

* core values,
* authority patterns,
* and traditions of social teaching.

Once fixed in conditions of conflict and incorporated into the shibboleths of each faith such characteristics are not easily or lightly changed. Almost all versions of Christianity, whether churchly or not, share with the other monotheistic religions a commitment to preserving an original deposit of faith, however much changing conditions in the world call for interpretative responses. The commitment is common, the actual interpretation and attendant institutionalisation however varies.

Hans Küng provides a useful shorthand for identifying how what he calls the principal paradigms still extant within present-day Christianity were initially generated and fixed. (See Figure 5: Paradigms of Christianity) His text also provides a useful summary of the principal differences between these paradigms. From it it is possible to generate the following table of contrasts between the Eastern Orthodox (or Byzantine) and the Western Catholic church traditions:
### Byzantine Paradigm

| I. | Church forms a fellowship (*koinonia*) of churches without centralized authority. |
| II. | Church legally incorporated into imperial state law. |
| III. | Church incorporated into imperial system in which secular power dominated spiritual. |
| IV. | Entangled in most of the political and military conflicts of the secular power, often gave theological legitimation to wars, even inspired them. |
| V. | Clergy, apart from bishops, remained married and therefore closer to the people and more assimilated into structure of society. |

### Roman Catholic Paradigm

| I. | Church completely focussed on the Pope in faith, law, discipline and organization: highly centralized absolute monarchy. |
| II. | Own church law totally oriented on Pope as absolute ruler, lawgiver and judge -- even of secular rulers. |
| III. | Church presented itself as a completely independent ruling institution of the very first order, which at times succeeded in getting almost complete control over secular power. |
| IV. | Augustinian theory of the legitimate use of force to achieve spiritual ends >> wars of conversion, wars against pagans, wars against heretics, even crusades against fellow Christians. |
| V. | Celibate clergy, set apart by celibacy. Dominant social status, totally superior to the lay state and totally subordinate to the Pope, who was thus supported by an omnipresent, centrally organized, available and mobile troop of auxiliaries: the mendicant orders. |

An additional aspect of the contrast between Eastern and Western traditions not mentioned by Küng but which Rokkan would almost certainly have emphasized, concerns the linguistic factor. As Flora points out in his discussion of ‘The Theory of Stein Rokkan’,

‘the Roman Church with Latin as its official language hindered the development of vernacular literatures in its core regions and prevented the rise of autocephalic territorial churches … In the East, the situation was rather different: Greek was never as dominant as Latin in the West, and the rise of Church Slavonic paved the way for vernacular literatures; in the Greek Orthodox realm it was much easier to establish autocephalic churches’ (Flora et al,1999: 87).
The subjugation by outside powers of successive Orthodox territories in Eastern Europe, from the Mongol destruction of Kievan Rus in the twelfth century, through centuries of domination until the final stages of liberation from the Ottoman legacy in the early twentieth, made for a close identification between the autocephalic churches of the East and the peoples they served. The Ottoman ‘millet’ system which allowed the Orthodox churches to subsist with relative autonomy and provide a central cultic focus for their communities had the effect of further strengthening this bond. The continuing close connection between religious and ethnic identity reflects an important feature of Eastern Orthodoxy.

Rokkan, with this focus on Western Europe, gave great emphasis to the religious-cultural contrasts between the mono-confessional Protestant North and the mono-confessional Catholic South. With his interest in explaining the many striking differences in the style and structure of mass politics within Europe he placed these contrasts at the forefront of his analysis. It was partly a matter of the contrasts generated at the time of the Reformation and the ensuing Wars of Religion and partly a matter of how nineteenth century elites responded to the challenges arising out to the French Revolution and its ensuing wars. Accordingly, cases were coded in the following way, as illustrated by the contrasting outcomes of particular consequence for church-state relations:

[4 categories of Precondition Variables: territorial, organizational, cultural and economic. The cultural variable is subdivided into, broadly, linguistic and church-related. These are listed as:]

3.2 State-Church settlement  
3.21 All Protestant  
3.22 Protestant rule, Catholic minority  
3.23 Independent Catholic  
3.24 Counter-Reformation Church-State alliance

[Same four categories of Elite Response Variables with the same subdivisions:]

3.2 Policy on religious control of education  
3.21 Control through State church  
3.22 Pluralist solution: concessions to several churches, sects  
3.23 Schisma State-Supranational Church  
3.24 Alliance State-Supranational Church

(Rokkan, 1970b: 78-9)

Rokkan’s understanding of the consequences of decisions taken at the time of the two critical junctures (the Reformation and the French Revolution) are illustrated in Figure 4: his ‘Schema of Developmental Linkages: Revolutions, Issues, Cleavages, and Party Systems in Western Europe’. Of particular note here is the contrast between the weight of the different cleavages in the formation of the national party systems as between the Protestant and Catholic (mono-confessional) culture areas. In terms of centre-periphery cleavages there is no difference but ‘moralist/religious rejections of the central culture’
accounted for moderate to strong cleavages in Protestant, and weak in Catholic, territories. Church vs. Secular State cleavages arising out of the French Revolution critical juncture on the other hand were the reverse: uniformly strong in (mono-confessional) Catholic—and for that matter, mixed confession—territories and non-existent in the mono-confessional Protestant north. In each case the distinctive amalgams of values, institutional patterns and traditions of social doctrine associated with the different religious traditions are clearly associated with the different outcomes. In each also the cast of elite actors who were involved in the critical decisions and the nature of the strategic choices they made varied in ways which were partly constitutive of, and partly derivative from, distinctive religious-political traditions.

Clearly the three-way comparisons involving East-West in addition to North-South contrasts cannot be addressed here except in the most summary way. Rémond in his recent survey of church-state-society relations across Europe refers to a number of the more salient points of difference: in the Orthodox East ‘the heritage of Byzantium, taken up by tsarist Russia practising Caesaro-papism, partly explained the tradition of the eastern churches’ submission to the will of the sovereign. In none of the nations in which orthodoxy was the religion did the churches ever enjoy true independence. To this specifically historical fact may perhaps be added a spiritual tradition turned more towards union with God than to sustaining the body of society, thereby implying a passive acceptance of temporal events.’ (Rémond, 1999: 24) By contrast ‘[n]ot only did [the Roman Catholic church] expect the secular powers to recognize it as the perfect society, but it also made it their duty to support the faith in the exercise of its spiritual mission……for the catholic church relations between religion and society were especially close, and ran counter to the idea of a total separation between the two … catholicism is always characterized in its relation with society by its attitude of maintaining an active presence.’ (ibid: 24-6) Finally, so far as the Protestant north is concerned, the churches of the Reformation ‘were more willing to accept a certain reduction of the religious factor to a matter of personal conscience and confinement within a private area. …. they did not seek to work out such a coherent social doctrine … In view of the positions adopted by certain churches today regarding demands for the autonomy of individuals and the liberating of everyday behaviour, demonstrating great liberalism, it would be tempting to think that [the Reformation churches] allowed personal responsibility a greater freedom that catholicism, which was accustomed to surrounding individual conduct with a network of obligations and constraints, if history did not remind us that no society went as far as protestant societies in the desire to dictate behaviour and impose a moral order. Puritanism is more the affair of protestant than catholic societies.’ (ibid: 26)
Ad (IIa): **The two mixed-confession bands of territory will share certain characteristics** (multi-confessionality features), not least a tendency for confessional differences to take on political significance through the development of patterns of, alternatively, conflict and accommodation.

It can be argued that historically, even in Europe, multi-confessionality is the most common condition. Most empires from the Roman to the Russian/Soviet have spanned wide territories where the coexistence of different religious traditions was generally an accepted fact of life. Imperial religious policies have typically had two aspects: on the one hand, there was the insistence that certain central symbols of political authority be acknowledged and deferred to, and on the other, that adherents of the different religious traditions should not offend each other and so disturb the imperial peace. The Ottoman Empire was exemplary in this respect: under the ‘millet’ system Jews and Christians as ‘peoples of the book’ were allowed to maintain their own communities and perform their own religious rites so long as they acknowledged Ottoman rule and paid their taxes.

In the early modern period the Spanish realm, born of the reconquista of the Iberian peninsular, was rather untypical in its religious intolerance. The expulsion, forcible conversion and persecution of the Moors, Jews and heretics represented a legacy of the anti-Islamic crusade, which had culminated in the re-establishment of Christianity across the whole of the Iberian peninsular by the end of the fifteenth century. The policy of ruthless repression symbolised by the creation of the Spanish Inquisition also presented an omen of a new, rising religious intolerance, which established the repressive monopoly structures of the confessional state across Europe. In the other Habsburg territories on the other hand, and in particular in the Holy Roman Empire in the C16 after the first wave of religious wars a tradition of mutual tolerance more typical of imperial regimes was first pioneered through the cuius regio eius religio rule of the 1555 Peace of Augsburg. Other wars of religion followed before this rule was finally accepted and expanded in scope in 1648. The limits of imperial toleration were also clear however; in 1555 only Lutherans and Catholics were to benefit from the cuius rule, in 1648 its application was extended only to include recognised Calvinist communities and apostasy continued to be outlawed. At no time were adherents of the Anabaptist-sectarian traditions officially allowed the benefits of toleration anywhere in Europe before approximately 1700 except for short periods in the mixed-religion territories of England (during the Interregnum), the Netherlands, Hungary and Poland xiii. For most of the early modern period even in the mixed religion territories established churches were imposed as the only officially recognised cult and adherents of deviant traditions – even where they constituted large majorities of the population, as for example in Ireland – suffered the consequences of more or less draconian systems of legal persecution.
The second, Eastern band of mixed-confession territories had a much longer history of confessional oppositions and rivalries. As one author explains:

‘From the time when eighth-century popes and Byzantine emperors had quarrelled over whether Illyrium was under the authority of the pope or the patriarch of Constantinople, there had been demarcation disputes in this part of Europe. As relations grew more strained, the disputes took on a sharper tone. The conversion of Bohemia and Moravia in the ninth century had seen the clash of the two brothers, Constantine and Methodius, natives of Thessalonica and inventors of the Slav script with “the cohorts of Latins”, Bavarian priests from Regensburg and Salzburg. Even today one of the sharpest cultural divisions in the Slavic world is between those peoples who were converted by Germans and those converted by Greeks.’ (Bartlett, 1994: 8)

In both cases the bands of mixed confessional allegiance displayed the fate of buffer territories, dominated alternately by stronger neighbours with less ambiguous confessional commitments. Few suffered the fate of Poland (partition) but all, including Switzerland, bore the marks of proximity to rivalrous imperial neighbours. Nor did many succeed, as Poland did in moving to a vigorous mono-confessional identity. Instead, the historic pattern of religious pluralism within society tended over time to be reflected in the structure of the state, typically through the recognition of the dominance in different areas of alternative religious traditions. In the Swiss case the cantonal structure first developed in the old Catholic core of the Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden allowed for the establishment of a range of patterns in different areas. In the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation until its demise in the first years of the nineteenth century a tradition of parity between the principal confessions was observed on the basis of the lines established by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In the patrimonial territories of the Habsburgs religious toleration was finally introduced in 1781. Although this was too late for the last Protestants of Austria who had been expelled sixty years earlier from the Salzburg area, it allowed for the survival in Bohemia and Hungary of Protestant minorities who had long been hard-pressed. Unsurprisingly, practical and permanent measures of religious toleration were first established in the mixed-confession territories, principally in the eighteenth century. This achievement nowhere took the form of full religious liberty and equality however, let alone of a religiously neutral state.

As Rokkan’s Schema of Developmental Linkages (Table 2) indicates, in the countries of mixed confession in Western Europe, Church vs. Secular State cleavages were translated into the party system with the same regularity and strength as in the mono-confessional Catholic territories. This was partly because of the existence of large Catholic minorities, which had survived the period of Protestant ascendancy. In the Netherlands it was also translated into the existence of the (Calvinist) Anti-Revolutionary Party, which rivalled, and in some respects excelled, the Catholic party in its opposition to state secularism. In the end, as Lijphart argued, during the first World War, Calvinist, Catholic and Secular parties agreed on a consociational bargain by which the state would remain officially neutral vis-à-vis the religious bodies while supporting them across a wide range of community functions. In Switzerland the bargain was a different one, as mentioned, building as it did on a federal structure which accorded to the cantons wide discretion in the matter of church support. The German solution lay in between. In the
Eastern band of mixed confession territories the interwar period saw a number of different experiments to accommodate religious differences. One of the most novel was that undertaken in Finland where, uniquely in Europe, two state churches were established for the same territory, one to serve the great, Lutheran majority, the other the very small Russian Orthodox minority. In Estonia and Latvia meantime …….

Ad (IIb) The nature of the conflicts and, where achieved, accommodations in the multi-confessional territories will reflect the composition of the particular mix in a given territory/state (particularistic mixes).

A brief comparison of contemporary patterns of church-state relations as between the different mixed-confession territories of Europe reveals the unsurprising fact that there is a great deal of variation, both in terms of de jure constitutional arrangements and the de facto realities. Tables 1 and 2 represent an attempt to use Barrett’s 1982 codings for the Religio-Political Situation, as he calls it, across the whole of Europe. Because the data relates to a time when Europe was still sharply divided between East and West it is of limited utility but could in principle be updated to take account of recent dramatic changes (if the information was to hand). The fact that all the territories of Eastern Europe, regardless of confession, are classified – and only they are so classified -- as having Atheistic regimes, hostile to religion, is clearly related to the dominance of the Soviet Union. On the other hand it is noteworthy that even within this group of territories the de facto arrangements affecting liberty of religion spans four categories from complete suppression of religion (Albania) to relative freedom, limited only by a ban on political activity (Yugoslavia). In Western Europe the mixed-confession territories also vary in terms of the overall religio-political situation ca 1980. The ‘orientation of the state’ in the Netherlands is classified as secular, indicating official neutrality relative to religion, neither promoting nor opposing it. On the other hand the de facto arrangements indicate that this is a case of positive neutrality, since the state provides indirect aid to religious groups, while not interfering. The position in the United Kingdom is that religious groups also benefit from similar de facto arrangements, for example by state funding of Anglican, Catholic, Jewish and, finally since 1998, some Islamic religious schools. The state orientation of the UK is also coded as religious, reflecting the fact of religious establishment. In Germany and Switzerland the state is religious in orientation and provides large direct subsidies in addition, distributing them in proportion to the support of different officially recognised religious bodies. A glance at Table 2 further reveals that the classification of state orientations in the case of these four countries has not changed since 1900 (except for the case of the GDR, under Soviet influence for some forty years).

Arend Lijphart argued that in the two mixed-confession territories where Catholics and Calvinists had historically faced off against each other, the Netherlands and Switzerland, distinctive consociational arrangements had eventually been negotiated in
order to avoid destabilising conflict. Both were traditionally Protestant-dominated states where Catholic rights had been (largely) secured only in the nineteenth century. The elements of the bargain have included Grand Coalitions, Proporz arrangements, mutual veto, and different mixes of pillarization and federalism sufficient for the purpose of underwriting the religious autonomy of the different confessional groups. In neither state does either of the two major confessions enjoy a majority position, the once-dominant Protestants indeed having become a minority among the religiously observant section of the population. In Germany where the principal pattern in the religious arena has been an opposition between Lutherans (Evangelisch) and Catholics, with the Calvinists (Reformiert) embracing a considerably smaller element a weaker version of the same pattern is in evidence. The existence within German Christian Democracy of a cross-confessional axis, which might even be seen as reproducing the parity arrangements of the old Holy Roman Empire, has further strengthened the consociational bargain. In the UK a different pattern has developed: separate state churches for England and Scotland, with no establishment in Wales and Northern Ireland makes for an uneven disposition of symbolic authority, while the evolution of political oppositions has undercut the development of anticlerical secularism as a political force. Only in Northern Ireland where Protestants (Anglican, Calvinist and Sectarian) face Catholics across both psychological and physical barricades, do the cleavages between the different confessions continue to add to, rather than take away from, the depth of political cleavages. In this respect, and because of the connection between ethnicity and the uses of religion as an ethnic marker, conditions of conflict in Northern Ireland continue to resemble, if in less sanguinary form, the ethno-religious conflicts of the Balkans.

CONCLUSION:

From the fourth to the eighteenth centuries secular authorities throughout Europe, with few exceptions, tended to support or maintain systems of religious control which were based on the premise that true Christianity alone could provide for the ultimate interests of themselves and their subjects. Extra ecclesiam nulla salus and, furthermore, religious uniformity and conformity provided a valuable guarantee of internal order and stability. In this they were, not unnaturally, seconded by Church authorities, which had their own reasons, both theological and prudential, for maintaining religious discipline and cohesion.

With the division of Christianity every five hundred years since the time of Christ into its various dissident branches and varieties attendant on the great schisms, the prospect of unity across the whole of Christendom was progressively undermined. This circumstance posed, first in various juxtaposed border areas, and eventually across the whole territory, the question of how the reality of religious differences between and among populations should be handled. That they should be ‘handled’ in some way -- managed, dealt with, controlled, suppressed -- continued in some parts of Europe until well into the twentieth century to be a governmental rule-of-thumb.
Faced with a population dividing, or already divided, into groups or communities characterised by religious differences, secular authorities for a thousand years tended to regard themselves as faced by the necessity of choosing between just two options:

1. They could, of course, undertake to suppress or eliminate what the Church took to be heresy, so uniting the whole population on the basis of a continuing single, authoritative tradition. Historically, this was the dominant strategy of governments East and West from the ancient to the early-modern period, or for as long as the *ancien régime* remained in place – in much of Western Continental Europe until approximately 1800 and in the East until approximately a hundred years later. Throughout the early modern period, after the Wars of Religion had by 1648 established new religious borders across Western Europe, confessional state arrangements were used to shore up conformity to the locally dominant tradition and suppress heretical deviations. In 1685 the earlier error of providing relief for Huguenot deviations in France was rescinded. In parts of Europe the confessional state survived well past the French Revolution. In 1817 the Prussian king forced Lutheran and Calvinist subjects to sink their differences in a United Protestant state church, while in the Russian home of the contemporary Holy Alliance itself the Tsar continued until 1917 to impose his and his government’s will on the Church and on the population at large.

2. Secondly, they could take sides with one of the groups committed to change of reform, granting it formal recognition and support, and promoting it in preference to all others. Positive support for one such group or community was easily buttressed by discriminating against the others through the use of penal laws and other measures. This was the option chosen by the Electors of Saxony in their support of Luther, as it was elsewhere throughout what became Protestant Europe. It was also practised in the other mixed-religion territories of Europe where the first option of suppression or elimination was found to present extreme practical difficulties. The predominant pattern involved state support for an established church buttressed by discrimination against non-conformists through the use of penal laws. In Britain this system involved the incorporation of two established churches, the Presbyterian and the Anglican in, respectively, Scotland and the rest of Britain, with those who refused to conform being excluded from public office, the suffrage and other amenities of public life. In addition various penal laws restricted nonconformists’ religious activities and outlawed certain expressions of religious opinion.

There were of course two other logical options but they were rarely taken seriously by governmental elites until the twentieth century:

1. They could choose to tolerate all groups equally, holding the ring between them in the case of conflict, either arbitrating their differences without prejudice or refusing to have any involvement except through the civil adjudication of disputes. This stance would have been attractive where divided loyalties were well-established and the difficulty of eliminating them correspondingly great. As Chadwick points out relative to the Reformation period however ‘[n]owhere in Europe [in the early C16] was
religious toleration thought compatible with civil stability, and the few lone Erasmian voices who advocated it were drowned in the general call for religious uniformity, whether Protestant or Catholic’ (Chadwick & Evans, 1987: 111). The case for toleration pushed by the politiques in France in the late sixteenth century and by Enlightenment thinkers in the eighteenth, by and large went by default until the nineteenth century; the early experiments in Poland and Transylvania remained for long exotic failures. It was, finally, only the emergence of a vigorous anticlerical movement in southern (Catholic) Europe, which finally made it a viable option.

2. They could also chose to attempt to suppress or abolish all existing religions, or religion as such. There are cases where something like this solution was attempted, for example during the Year Zero of the French Revolution, when Catholicism was declared substituted by a Cult of the Supreme Being. Other attempts in the same heroic vein were made by the Bolsheviks after 1917, the Chinese Communists after 1949 and by the Albanian regime of Enver Hoxha between 1967 and 1990. In all cases the experiments failed insofar as in not one of the cases could it be said that religion was effectively destroyed.

As has been seen above, the range of options actually available to state elites is considerably greater than these four (see tables 1 and 2). It is curious that the one that would seem most to recommend itself to the rational choser, uncommitted in advance, namely neutrality of state orientation de jure and state non-interference de facto, is the only fully coherent solution occupied by not a single one of the 45 states which currently occupy the whole of Europe North, South, East or West.

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2 Monsma and Soper (1997) is a rare exception. Traditional terms such as Theocracy, Hierocracy, Erastianism and Caesaropapism as used by Weber and other scholars can scarcely be applied to contemporary patterns without heavy qualification and Monsma and Soper have instead adopted more appropriate labels which reflect aspects of the dilemma surrounding the notion of state neutrality in matters of religion.

3 A further bias Rokkan admitted at this point in his text was the concentration on the Smaller European Democracies. Later as Flora et al point out he ‘extended his analysis to include at least those parts of Eastern Europe once under the Roman Church.’ (Flora et al, 1999: viii). Had he lived longer, they speculate in addition, ‘he would certainly have responded to [the collapse of communism] by extending and revising his models’. (ibid: 88)

4 The west-east axis/dimension/gradient in Rokkan’s conceptual map is derived from a re-analysis of the work of Barrington-Moore, Perry Anderson, Immanuel Wallerstein and William McNeill and refers in different versions to political-structural, economic and even military factors of differentiation. Had he extended it further east it seems likely that he would have added (or just possibly, substituted – as here) a cultural variable which other wise only appears in the south-north axis.
According to Flora et al, Rokkan produced altogether fourteen versions of his conceptual map. The editors reduced the large amount of variation between these and produced two basic maps, of which the one presented here as F.1 is the most comprehensive. For example, in this one the South–North 'state–culture' axis is subdivided into five, as opposed to three, categories, whereas the less-relevant West–East 'state-economy' axis is not complicated by further subdivision in terms of 'closeness to city-belt'.

Note the partial coincidence of the 3-way split with the Latin/Germanic/Helleno-Slavic ethnic split. The extent to which religious and ethnic differences are cause or consequence of entrenched cultural differences can only be addressed by going back a long way in time. Islam is not included as a fourth case of mono-confessionalism, because although the Ottoman empire occupied South-Eastern Europe for much of the early modern period in none of its territories (even European Turkey) did it impose conformity to Islam. Instead, under its ‘millet’ system it tolerated and licensed the existence of the religions of ‘the people of the book’ i.e. Christians and Jews. Of all the former Ottoman territories in Europe, Albania alone approached a condition of Islamic mono-confessional conformity.

Finland is not included here as the Orthodox community, although it is still represented in the country’s second established church, is – and almost always has been, extremely small in size.

Philip Abrams was perhaps the most trenchant critics of Rokkan’s approach as constituting ‘a cumbersome, outrageously elaborate apparatus of formal classification and analysis’ (Abrams, 1980:162)

This point might suggest a qualification of the view implicit in Rokkan that the differences between Protestant state churches and throne and altar alliances in Counter-Reformation Europe were important. Rokkan’s point stands however since however similar in effect confessional states were in Western Europe up to the time of the French Revolution at least in the nineteenth century crucial differences emerged between political trends in Protestant and Catholic mono-confessional areas.

A brief summary of a weighty analysis deriving from Weber, Troeltsch, Yinger and others is provided by Beckford: ‘The sect-type of religious collectivity stood for social exclusiveness, doctrinal purity and rigorous ethical consistency. The church-type, by contrast, stood for social exclusiveness, doctrinal latitude and a degree of ethical relativism. In other words, the sect-type tried consistently to maintain distance from the world, whereas the church-type sought to influence the world from within.’ (Beckford, 1989: 34)

'The prisoners of Montaillou were the last of the Cathars. But it was not the absolute end. For the brave fight put up by the peasants of Ariège to preserve the remains of their heterodox beliefs after 1300 foreshadowed the great Protestant revolt of two centuries later.' (Ladurie, 19XX, xi)

Thus Rose and Urwin in their work on social cohesion, political parties and strains in regimes in 1969 listed religion as ‘not relevant’ as a basis for parties’ distinctiveness in Denmark and Finland. A year later Finland’s small Christian party finally achieved parliamentary representation and a Danish party was launched. In addition, several parties of the far left that were noted for their anti-church commitments would have qualified as cohesive on (anti-)religious attitudes quite as well as other parties elsewhere that were so listed in the rankings. (Rose & Urwin, 1969).

Poland in the sixteenth century was a pioneer in the area of religious toleration. In the seventeenth century however religious toleration was snuffed out and Catholicism became a defining feature of Polishness, threatened to the West by Protestant Prussia and to the East by a resurgent Orthodox Russia.

It was also true in the case of Ireland prior to independence. The Irish Nationalist party (and before it the Catholic Emancipation movement), although it was not officially only for Catholics, represented the Catholic interest vis-à-vis Unionism.

In Spain the Reformation was seen as a potential solvent of the precarious ideological and spiritual unity of the kingdom -- the savage pogrom launched by the Spanish Inquisition against heresy in the generation after Luther crushed the Erasmian movement which had promised so much for Spanish religion. It did so at the behest of the Crown, who saw in Catholicism not simply God’s truth, but the cement of a society only recently welded out of the kingdoms of the Peninsular. (cp Chadwick: 111)

The 1680’s were indeed ‘a climactic decade of confessional politics’ (Walker: The Salzburg Transaction: 15) In 1683 Vienna came under threat by the Turkish armies and in 1684 the Protestants of Defereggental in Austria were expelled, followed the year later by many thousand Huguenots of France, the toleration of whom was abrogated with the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The same year the accession
of the Catholic James in Britain precipitated the events which by the end of the decade had brought about his replacement and ultimate defeat at the Battle of the Boyne by the Protestant head of the Dutch house of Orange. The 1680s also saw a peak in witch-hunting activity in Europe and America.

In Russia, the Orthodox establishment enforced severe restrictions on religious diversity. Although the Protestants of the ex-Swedish Baltic provinces, the native Christians of the Caucasus, and the Muslims of central Asia enjoyed a large measure of autonomy, the Jews, Roman Catholics and Uniates of the ex-Polish provinces were subject to state control, harassment and discrimination. Jews had to live within Pale of Settlement. The Roman Catholic Church in the imperial territories was run by the so-called Holy Synod, and deprived of all direct contact with the Vatican. St Petersburg refused all official ties with Rome until it succeeded in arranging the Concordat of 1849 on its own terms. The Uniates on the other hand were forcibly converted to Orthodoxy, in the Empire in 1839 and in the ex-Congress Kingdom of Poland in 1875. (Davis, 1997: 795)

In the case of Britain the 1689 Toleration Act did not meet up to earlier promises. Not a single old law against religious liberty was repealed or suspended; instead Protestant dissenters were granted relief by being exempted ‘from the Penalties of certaine Lawes’. Catholics and Unitarians on the other hand received no relief. Baptists and Quakers were to be tolerated only if they made a declaration in place of the required oath against the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. Dissenters continued to be excluded from public office. It took a long time before religious liberty was expanded into civil equality.

The toleration principle had by then been thoroughly elaborated over a hundred years of polemic and argument (Kamen 216 quoting W.K. Jordan: ‘the theory of religious toleration stood substantially complete in 1660’) but, as Kamen points out, ‘only a minority of people actively supported toleration and ... the principles ... were seldom put into effect by politicians’ (Kamen,, 1967: 216). Instead, in southern Europe absolutist Catholic governments stifled the emergence of religious dissent while in France and Hungary where large dissident minorities had been long established themselves severe persecutions were recommenced toward the end of the C17.

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