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SPACES OF HOSPITALITY:
ETHICS, POWER & THE INTERNATIONAL

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Hospitality is the stuff of everyday international politics, though often so prosaic and banal that it is not seen or discussed. Whenever people seek to cross boundaries or sure up spaces they call their own, hospitality is offered, seized, assumed or refused. Whether those people are the wretched of the earth or the global elite, they depend upon hospitality and become one of two insecure, shifting and contingent subject-positions: host or guest. Guests can be refugees, asylum seekers, regular and irregular migrants, travellers, traders, slaves, students, soldiers, sailors, airmen, labourers, tourists, terrorists, spies, diplomats, heads of state and government or professional athletes, but they come to depend upon the largesse, cruelty or indifference of a host. The hospitality or hostility they experience may be a right or an economic transaction, it may be a form of exchange, an act of compassion or charity, or it may be clandestine and abusive.

What does it mean to claim, with Derrida (2001: 17), that ‘ethics is hospitality’ in this diverse context of global mobility? And what do the inevitable power relations that emerge with such international hospitality do to it as a, or the, ethical relation? I argue that to address this question, we must examine hospitality as a spatial relation. Hospitality may take many diverse forms and for many diverse purposes, but it occurs and, in doing so, unsettles the boundaries that enable it and make it possible. In this sense, my paper argues that hospitality produces spaces in which some of these people belong (as hosts) and some do not (as guests), whether that space be what we conventionally understand as a home, or whether it be a hotel, a camp, a town, a city, a state, or a region. And wherever and whenever hospitality happens, the guest and host can never be entirely sure of each others’ identities, intentions or capabilities. So both hosts and guests must partake in complex strategies and power relations of managing, evading, calculating, guiding, dodging, governing, resisting and surveilling. But the moment a space is opened to the other – the very act of hospitality, perhaps – it is destabilized and thrown into question, for good or ill, along with the subject-positions of host and guest.

I argue that, while much ignored in the field of International Relations (IR) and international ethics, hospitality remains a crucial but underexplored possibility for ethical practice. However, when we delve into precisely what we mean by hospitality and how it relates to ethics, it becomes clear that we must also examine the power relations hospitality involves and the space it produces. International hospitality inevitably involves complex and tangled relations of ethics-power-space and, if we are to seek to develop our understanding of it and work towards ‘better’ forms of hospitality, we must examine this entanglement. The first section of this paper draws
out a particular understanding of hospitality as ethics, one based on the importance and production of space and affect. This then works as a basis for the second section which seeks to draw out the power relations involved in such spatial practices of hospitality, arguing that we must go beyond Derrida’s concentration on sovereign mastery of a space to examine how hospitality is managed and governed. This reveals a much greater complexity in the construction of guests, hosts and the spaces they occupy. Finally, I seek to illustrate (some of) the claims in the first two sections by examining a particular international space of hospitality - refugee camps – before concluding with a few thoughts on how this might help us move towards ‘better’ negotiations of hospitality.

WHAT IS HOSPITALITY? ETHICS, SPACE AND AFFECT

The importance of hospitality has recently been very well marked, with a remarkable rise in its popularity identified by several scholars in various disciplines (Candea and da Col, 2012: S1; Still, 2011: 8; Molz and Gibson, 2007: 6; Dikec, Clark and Barnett, 2009: 2-3; Onuf, 2013: 173). Despite this increased recognition, hospitality can be difficult to draw out or expand upon, in part because it is an ‘everyday practice’ (Still, 2010: 1). It is an occurrence we all know something about as we engage in it on a daily basis, inter-personally and professionally. Like all everyday practices, hospitality is easy to overlook and consider unworthy of deeper thought and conceptualisation. This is perhaps especially the case in a field such as International Relations (IR), which has consistently ignored such apparently banal and secondary concepts (Onuf, 1998). Moreover, hospitality has a certain universality in that it is considered an important practice across many cultures world-wide, and throughout large swathes of history. This ‘fact’ is often central to claims regarding its importance (Still, 2011: 1; 2007: 194; Pitt-Rivers, 2012: 517; Candea, 2012: S46; Benhabib, 2004: 42-3; Friese, 2004: 71; Bolchazy, 1993). Yet upon closer inspection, the diverse and particular codes, rules, norms and laws of hospitality at the very least temper, if not explode, strong universality claims. It is hard to see the strategic, generous, ‘ironic and irreverent’ hospitality practiced by mobile Afghan merchants and traders in ‘unruled regions’ and borderlands of Central Asia (see Marsden, 2012: S118-124) as part of the same universal practice as middle class white Americans’ ‘satisfying medium’ hospitality, between being unwelcoming and being a ‘doormat’ (Dennis, 2011: 19), or the Ancient Greek traditions of hospitality based initially on a fear of the Gods and subsequently on maintenance of elitist social
structures (Bolchazy, 1977). Certainly they are not ‘the same’ in any simple, direct or straightforward sense.

Perhaps in part because of this trickiness then, hospitality remains a largely under-theorised concept. This is especially the case in IR, as I have argued elsewhere (Bulley, 2006; 2010). More surprising, given its venerable tradition, is the failure to take hospitality seriously in the sub-field of international ethics, with a few highly notable exceptions (particularly the likes of Baker, 2011; 2013; Brown, 2010; 2013; Cavallar, 2002; 2013; and Doty, 2006). Admittedly, the resurgence of interest has led to hospitality’s inclusion as a chapter (alongside the more widely-acknowledged ethical issues of humanitarianism, aid, just war, global poverty and justice) in one recent textbook in the area (Shapcott, 2010: 87-121). But this remains rare; more representative texts exclude hospitality entirely (e.g. Amstutz, 2013; Brown, 2002; Bell, 2010), focusing instead on traditional issues such as human rights, distributive justice, international law, the ethics of war, citizenship and terrorism. Likewise, the majority of ‘major’ texts in the field of international ethics make no explicit allusion to hospitality. To take one example from the realm of political theory, liberal cosmopolitan Simon Caney’s *Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory* (2005) discusses the usual topics of humanitarian intervention, just war and global distributive justice, but makes nothing of hospitality. Clearly ‘beyond’ borders involves a one-way movement: global ethics and justice involves a particular type of border-crossing where those with plenty (whether plenty of wealth, values, stable political structures or responsible military capacity) give from their abundance to those that lack.

Yet, even in disciplines that do seek to theorise the topic, hospitality’s universality mixed with its vast variation across space and time does not allow for stable representation. What unites all forms, however, is that any practice of hospitality will inevitably be torn between complete openness and various degrees of closure. This is the divide between what Derrida calls the law of unconditional (unquestioning, absolutely open) hospitality and the laws of hospitality (with interrogation, restrictions and exclusions) in their conditional form (Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000: 77-91). The two are both entirely distinct and yet impossible to separate – both require the other and yet are violently opposed. This is because we find that the unconditional law of hospitality, an absolute openness, is not only impossible to organise into a law or politics (Derrida, 2003: 129; Derrida, 1999a: 90), but even if it were to operate, it would destroy the host’s mastery of the home that makes hospitality possible in the first place (Derrida, 2002a: 364). Rather than a home, we would be left with indeterminate space that could offer
nothing determinate, none of the ‘goods’ of hospitality such as security, sustenance and shelter. And yet, the conditional laws of hospitality are no solution to this problem; as conditions placed on an unconditional, they will always contraventions, annulments of the Law. Indeed, in placing such conditions, these laws appear to remove themselves entirely from the realm of hospitality as such. What saves them from being merely laws (as opposed to laws of hospitality) is that they keep at least the thought, the reference point, of the unconditional: the absolute openness of an impossible ethics (Derrida, 2003: 129).

The need to negotiate and renegotiate the relation between the law and the laws is thus at the heart of hospitality’s instability and variety. It is also in large part why Derrida warns us against attempts to tame it: ‘We do not know what hospitality is’ as it ‘rebels against any self-identity, or any consistent, stable, and objectifiable conceptual determination’ (Derrida, 2000: 6; see also Nyers, 2006: 72). Yet some attempts at determination, though remaining tentative, are necessary to ward off an expansionist approach where hospitality comes to encompass any social relation or ethical practice. Therefore, I want to argue that hospitality is a spatial relational practice with affective dimensions (Still, 2010), and this is what makes it a complex interplay of ethics and power relations.

Hospitality is necessarily a spatial practice because it involves the crossing of borders and thresholds. It requires an inside and an outside, and that the two be separated by more or less clearly defined boundaries. But it also requires that the divide between the two – whether they are in the form of the walls and doors of a house, the more or less clearly defined boundaries that separate communities or cities, the borders of the state or region – be transgressed. That which belongs outside must be welcomed, permitted or called inside. Space is, according to Doreen Massey (2005: 71), a sphere of coexistence containing a multiplicity of trajectories, involving previously unrelated subjects and objects, people and things, coming into contact with each other. What hospitality works to do then is delimit space, tame it as a sphere of coexistence, restrict the multiplicity, regulating, filtering and channelling the trajectories and contacts that it allows; preventing the ‘bad’, enabling the ‘good’, while missing and failing to see others. But more than this, hospitality makes or produces a space – it is no longer just any sphere of coexistence or any kind of relation or contact. It makes the space your space rather than my space,

1 On this point, I am at odds with Gideon Baker’s Levinasian reading of humanitarian intervention which he claims cannot be ‘finally separated’ from hospitality (2011: 111). While true to the extent that all ethical praxis can be seen as a way of exercising a responsibility to the other, I think it is crucial to maintain a separation between these two.
and the practice of my crossing into your space is conducted on this basis. Hospitality brings a space into being, cordoning it off from other spaces, as this rather than that – as private rather than public, as individual rather than collective, as home rather than away, as domestic rather than international, imbued with certain values and excluding others. The outside constitutes the inside, but the practice of hospitality ensures that this inside is not constituted as an impregnable fortress but through a permeability that both welcomes and rejects. Hospitality presupposes the possibility of rigorously enforced frontiers that separate the self from the other (Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000: 47-9; Derrida, 1999a: 92), but also that these frontiers open, allowing crossing. The work of hospitality then is in both maintaining and disrupting this inside, this delimited space, by allowing the outside in. It is both consolidating and transformative (Selwyn, 2000: 19). As I will go on to show, the crossing of boundaries that is the hallmark of hospitality means that the space is both this and that: it is the becoming public of the private, the often carefully circumscribed and managed disruption of the home with the away, the more or less internationalising of the domestic. Hospitality requires a spatial relation that it also disrupts and upsets, but seeks to manage and contain, thereby constructing a highly particular, contingent and contested space.

Yet, it is this spatial relation then that helps distinguish hospitality from other forms of ethical and social contact. If I offer a stranger a sandwich in the street, this may be a charitable but not a hospitable gesture as it involves no crossing of spatial boundaries – indeed, we need not even touch. If I step in to break up a fight in a pub, unless I am the publican I may act responsibly but not hospitably, as all parties to the quarrel share a space that they make not claim to be their own. If an NGO such as Action Against Hunger sends food aid to a starving or malnourished population, this need involve no hospitality. If human rights organisations campaign for the rights of those suffering under a violent regime, this may be compassionate and caring but it is not hospitable. If a state intervenes, militarily or otherwise, in the affairs of another sovereign state, the act of the intervener may be considered right or wrong, legal or illegal, responsible or irresponsible, but it is not hospitable (indeed, it can be a violation of hospitality as a forceful incursion on another’s space). Hospitality requires the spatial boundaries that it simultaneously displaces though an act of crossing.

It is also in part this spatial aspect, along with its affective dimensions, that makes hospitality a particular kind of ethics, or even as Derrida (1999a: 50) suggests, ethics itself. Hospitality does not take place in just any space and nor does it involve transgression of non-meaningful boundaries.
What gives the space and boundaries their meaning is their affective-relational structure in that they constitute lines between feelings of belonging and non-belonging, comfort and discomfort, security and insecurity, ease and awkwardness. The space of hospitality is the home, along with its sense of ease and comfort of being-at-home-with-one-self. Crucially, it is this idea of the ‘good’ encapsulated by the idealised ‘home’ that makes hospitality ethics itself, because it is a matter of the ‘ethos’, our way of being, the residence, one’s home, the familiar place of dwelling, the manner in which we relate to ourselves and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners’ (Derrida, 2001: 16-17). Hospitality produces a home because it is ethics; it describes our ethos, our way of being, spirit and character, values and principles. As such it constitutes and is constituted by our relation with otherness, that which comes from outside. One’s welcoming of the outside into the inside involves how we produce the outside as outside, as not belonging (and thus produce the inside as precisely what belongs); thus, how one welcomes or chooses not to welcome it is then the very definition of the ethics as a matter of relating and relationships (Diken and Laustsen, 2005: 184). Hospitality, as ethics, is always a matter of ‘answering for a dwelling place, for one’s identity, one’s space, one’s limits’, one’s home (Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000: 149).

But what is a ‘home’? Home is of course spatial and structural in the way outlined above, it requires an inside and outside. But it is just as much affective, a matter of feelings and emotions (Blunt and Dowling, 2006: 22), whether they be of belonging or strangeness, comfort and discomfort, homeliness and unhomeliness. This fusion of the spatial, structural and affective is what makes the ‘home’ a matter of an ethos, what links it to one’s identity, making it a concept not of being alone, but of being-at-home. And of course, both the spatial and affective are relational and political. Treating the home as a product of affect does not mean we need to romanticise it as a pure, fixed and secure place of belonging, a static, ‘comforting bounded enclosure’ (Massey, 1992: 12), something opposed to the ‘away’ of uncertainty, strangeness and danger (Ahmed, 2000: 87-8; George, 1996: 2). Such boundedness is always contested, as is the belonging and homeliness of its affective identity and history.

A large component of the identity of that place called home derived precisely from the fact that it had always in one way or another been open: constructed out of movement, communications, social relations which always stretched beyond it. In one sense or another most places have been ‘meeting places’: even their ‘original inhabitants’ usually came from somewhere else. This does not mean that the past is irrelevant to the identity
of a place. It simply means that there is no internally produced, essential past. (Massey, 1992: 14)

If we let go of ‘home’ as a stable, fixed, secure ethos and identity with an essential past, we must acknowledge that homes can never be politically neutral. They are always the product of selected inclusions and exclusions, a ‘negotiated stance’ (George, 1996: 2). For me, the name of this ethico-political negotiation is hospitality, the process by which the subject produces and manages its ethos, its boundaries and openings, its spatial and affective sense of belonging and unbelonging, identity and difference.

Another crucial aspect that emerges from what Blunt and Dowling (1996) call a ‘critical geography of the home’ is that our understanding must necessarily be ‘multi-scalar’. Once we conceive of home as a ‘spatial imaginary’ (1996: 2), rather than something fixed and timeless, through which we negotiate our ethos, identity and subjectivity we can no longer limit it to a particular scale, such as that of the house or, for IR, the state. Imaginaries of home and home-making negotiations can occur at the level of the family, community, suburb, neighbourhood, nation, region or ‘located on a park bench’ (Blunt and Dowling, 1996: 29). For me, the home can be houses, hotels, home-lands, refugee camps, cities, states or regions. If home is the affective and spatial imaginary produced through the ethico-political processes and management of inclusion and exclusion (i.e. hospitality), it cannot be restricted to one space. Should we try to restrict it to a single scale, the complexity and contingency of the home would immediately deconstruct.

None of this suggests that hospitality is a practice performed by some kind of stable subject (an ‘I’, a ‘one’ or an ‘our’) with a pre-existing spatial and affective home, ethos and sense of belonging. Rather, the home and its ethos of belonging are co-produced with the other, that which does not belong, the foreign. The ‘host’ and ‘guest’ are only ever present as such through their encounter with each other. After all, the space, limits and boundaries of home, ethos, identity and belonging only contain and retain any meaning because of their opposite: spatial and affective difference. Hospitality, its granting or refusal, describes a particular coming-into-relation then, which serves to both create, recreate, sure-up and transgress the boundaries that produce and enable the home, the self and its ethos. This is further complicated by the fact that we cannot go back to some kind of originary first moment of contact in which such a coming-into-relation first took place. As Jean-Luc Nancy (2000: 29) has argued, ‘we’ have never been singular
but have always been plurally singular and singularly plural. Subjects did not simply appear as separate entities, but rather ‘compeared’, appearing in an original exposure to each other as existence has only ever been co-existence (Nancy, 1991: 58). Hospitality and hostility are then ways in which identity and difference, self and other, spaces of belonging and non-belonging, home and away, have been violently carved from an originary but non-essential ontological coexistence (see Odysseos, 2007). The fact that these practices are so imbued into the everyday existence of international politics makes them crucially important for how we think and theorise international ethics; but also incredibly mundane, such that they can easily escape the attention of a discipline like IR which remains steadfast in its focus on the exceptional and extreme.

MANAGING HOSPITALITY: ETHICS AND POWER

Explicit discussion of power is often something that is avoided in explorations of international ethics. An important exception here would be the Realist tradition, in which the pursuit of power in the national interest is in fact the highest of moral duties (Morgenthau, 1951: 242; Donnelly, 2000: 164-7). This simplistic conflation of ethics and power through nationalism is more often perceived as unethical or amoral from anyone holding to a universal conception of ethics. Beyond Realism, it appears more common for cosmopolitan approaches to seek a transcendence or evasion of the power relations that seem to dominate the international (e.g. Pogge, 1989: 218-229; Linklater, 1998). Indeed, Molly Cochran (1999: 228) describes it as a ‘formidable criticism’, primarily emerging from Feminists, that the question of power has not been ‘adequately addressed in normative IR theory’. At the basis of this evasion is perhaps that, even when the thought is not made explicit, we retain a hankering for a conception of the ethical as the pure, the absolute, the non-negotiable. And, indeed, for Derrida (2002b) it is absolutely crucial to retain this commitment to the absoluteness of ethics, even if we recognise that it is always of the order of the impossible and never to be realised. Yet retaining this view makes ethics appear something always beyond politics, beyond power, resistance, negotiation and the problem of ‘dirty hands’ (see Walzer, 1973); it is why John Caputo (1993) declares himself ‘against ethics’. This is perhaps why Constructivists in IR have fastened on to the concept of the ‘normative’ as it does not commit them to anything as pure and undiluted as ‘ethics’ (e.g. Manners, 2002; Thomas, 2001; I have made this argument at greater length in Bulley, 2014b).
Either power can be seen as the opposite of ethics, or some ethical rider or prefix must be added to power to dampen, mitigate and ameliorate its ‘hard’ and violent edges (see for example discussions of ‘soft’ power (see especially Nye, 2004), ‘civilian’ power (Duchene, 1972; 1973; Bull, 1982)). Power, it seems, does not have an easy relationship with ethics; if they mix at all beyond Realism, ethics appears as a slightly unnatural softening and civilising outside influence on power. But they do not belong together – one somehow diminishes the other.\(^2\) One of my central concerns is that the study of international ethics and international hospitality should move beyond this rather simplistic approach, acknowledging that ethics and power are completely and irreversibly inseparable.

After all, the only way we can ‘free’ ethics from power relations is through complete abstraction; the moment we discuss the immanent, the concrete or the everyday, power impinges on all our relations, our encounters with otherness, the foreign, the non-belonging. To take the common examples we used above: acts of aid, responsibility or duty assume material capabilities, abundance and conscience that are implicitly or explicitly associated with moral capacities those being helped are seen to lack. As postcolonial approaches have demonstrated (for example, see Doty, 1996; Orford, 2003; Rajagopal, 2003; Korf, 2007; Fox, 2001), whether motivated by pity, compassion or charity, these practices work to produce a moral hierarchy of actors (from the base of those lacking in all respects, to the top of those overflowing with abundance). This hierarchy is then used to exercise further power in terms of justifying surveillance, oversight and control over the management, use and channelling of aid, intervention, or financial and political governance (Duffield, 2001; Fox, 2001; Ilcan and Lacey, 2011). We cannot free such interactions of power relations, but they can be examined contextually to draw out how power is operating and what it is doing, both to and through claims to charity, duty, responsibility and obligation.

Hospitality is particularly interesting in this regard because, unlike the giving of aid or acts of intervention, it can involve as much disruption of the self/host as the other/guest. The one with ‘abundance’ can be made to feel as insecure and threatened as the guest by their presence at the door, as that guest does not ‘belong’ there. It therefore enacts, or involves an at least fleeting glimpse of equality, of confrontation and potential equal relation between self and other. This is because, unlike aid giving, charity or intervention, hospitality requires no movement of the abundant toward the lacking, the strong to the weak, but can be entirely passive on the part of

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\(^2\) I myself largely evaded this issue in my earlier book (Bulley 2009) which proposed a theory of ethics as foreign policy with barely any explicit discussion of power whatsoever.
the abundant. It can even work by subverting those distinctions and rendering the weak strong and the strong weak (see particularly Ramadan, 2008).

This point, however, cannot be reached through relying on Derrida’s reading of hospitality and power, and this necessitates something of a break, a supplementation or a venturing beyond his work (Bulley and Lisle, 2012). Throughout his writings on the concept, Derrida effectively traces hospitality to the question of the state and the decision of the sovereign – whether the state as sovereign or the state contesting our sovereignty over our own private home (for example, see Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000: 47-79; Derrida, 2001: 22-23; 1999a: 20-1; 2003: 127-9; Derrida and Stiegler, 2002: 17-19 and 36). A frequent recurrence in these writings is the reference back to the work of the structural linguist Émile Benveniste, who ties hospitality to the Latin chain hosti-pet. Here the notion of host and guest, hostis and hospes, links to potis, potestas and ipse (Benveniste, 1973: 71; see for example, Derrida, 1998: 14 and fn. 2; Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000: 41). Thereby, hospitality is linguistically closely linked to power (poti-, potior – ‘to have power over something, have something at one’s disposal’ (Benveniste, 1973: 74)) and self-identity (through ipse). The power of hospitality is treated as a specific and traditional kind of power here, that of power over, sovereign power and possession of the home and its space (Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000: 41). Thus the power of hospitality is that of ‘mastery’ for Derrida (2000: 13), mastery of the self, the self’s space and the self-same (ipse) (Derrida and Stiegler, 2002: 111). It is about control of thresholds, of the decision to welcome or reject (Derrida, 2000: 14). So the power of hospitality is the power of the male sovereign to decide on who is allowed in and to control the borders of the home, often equated with the state, that which is self-same.

Traditionally, of course, IR has followed this defining structural differentiation and separation of inside (the state) from outside (the state), with the border between the two monitored and maintained through sovereign power (see Ashley, 1987; Walker, 1993; Buzan, 1996; Agnew, 2007; Vaughan-Williams, 2009). However, in the case of IR, this structuralism has led to the factoring out of ethical issues (Bulley, 2006; Hutchings, 2007; Williams, 2003), and questions of belonging (Ehata, 2013), both of which are so central to hospitality. For IR, characterising the ‘inside’ as a realm of hierarchy and ‘outside’ as one of anarchy means that community, justice and ethics are deemed only possible and indeed relevant in domestic politics. And as identity is defined solely by the nation (read as state) as the only relevant form of community, domestic politics is also the realm of affect and tricky questions of ‘belonging’, leaving IR to deal with the
cold, hard rationalism of survival under conditions of anarchy. Thus, while for my analysis of hospitality, spatial structure, affect, ethics and power all work to define it as a paradoxical concept and practice, for IR, the same spatial structure and sovereign power work to marginalise and reject questions of ethics and affect from its purview. This is, of course, a peculiarity of IR and one which I seek to remedy, in part, by moving away from its state-centrism, supplementing its purview with insights from political geography, anthropology, sociology and examining the space of the ‘home’ as ‘multi-scalar’ and produced through practices of hospitality.

This sovereign power over the home is, for Derrida, a large part of what allows the equation of hospitality as ethics described earlier. Without it, the ethos, the self-same, the being-at-home-with oneself that is produced by and through the relation to otherness, is threatened and potentially void. Yet this leads to a paradoxical trait of hospitality, beautifully outlined by Derrida (2000: 14),

... the host, he who offers hospitality, must be the master in his house, he (male in the first instance) must be assured of his sovereignty over the space and goods he offers or opens to the other as stranger. This seems both the law of laws of hospitality and common sense in our culture. It does not seem to me that I am able to open up or offer hospitality, however generous, even in order to be generous, without reaffirming: this is mine, I am at home, you are welcome in my home, without any implication of ‘make yourself at home’ but on condition that you observe the rules of hospitality by respecting the being-at-home of my home, the being-itself of what I am. There is almost an axiom of self-limitation or self-contradiction in the law of hospitality. As a reaffirmation of mastery and being oneself in one’s own home, from the outset hospitality limits itself at its very beginning, it remains forever on the threshold of itself... It becomes the threshold.

This is in fact another way of stating the law/laws of hospitality conundrum. Self-mastery and sovereignty, preserved by conditional laws that filter and select, are essential to hospitality and yet radically undermine it. Without sovereignty, we would offer nothing to the other by welcoming them into our home, and as Derrida affirms, hospitality would be ineffective ‘without, in some concrete way, giving something determinate’ (2003: 129; 1999b: 69). But in offering something, we offer this but not that; food, but not a bed; a bed, but not the master’s bed. We offer a conditional and conditioned hospitality. If the host were to offer free-reign over the home, a genuinely unconditional hospitality, it would be to relinquish mastery, making the host
the guest and the guest the host, and thereby offering nothing, nothing that was not already the property of the guest/host. The destabilising, and indeed genocidal, effects of such an unconditional hospitality have been elegantly illustrated by Gideon Baker (2010; see also 2011: 27-37) in his retelling of the conquistador’s visitation on their Aztec host Moctezuma in the early sixteenth century. Thus the undecidability that Derrida reveals simultaneously reverses the power of sovereign mastery, and displaces it. What we are left with is the hôte, that which in French means both ‘host’ and ‘guest’ but neither simply one not the other, while also indicating the impossibility of ‘host’ and ‘guest’ as stable identities (Derrida, 1999a: 41-2).

Derrida’s reading of hospitality thus exposes the deconstruction of sovereign mastery as it pertains to the moment, the decision, of inclusion or exclusion. It is, as he notes, a matter of thresholds. But what becomes of the power of hospitality once the literal threshold is crossed? Once inside, both host and guest are destabilized, both will perhaps seek in various ways to assert their sovereignty, but neither can successfully do so without ending the hospitable relation and casting the other out. Once the outside is inside, as it always necessarily is, how is the power of hospitality exercised to manage and control the home? How does this work to produce more or less inclusive exclusions and exclusive inclusions? What subjects or identities are enabled when ‘host’ and ‘guest’ are displaced? Does such power multiply and diffuse thresholds throughout the space of the home, or has the threshold been defused, placing it in the past?

Peter Nyers (2006: 94), in his examination of the use of ID cards to control and watch over the movement of refugees notes that, while they were initially ‘promoted as a technology of

3 Derrida shows an awareness of the diversity of power relations once the threshold is crossed. After claiming that ‘ethics is hospitality’ he goes on to observe that being at home with oneself ‘supposes a reception or inclusion of the other which one seeks to appropriate, control, and master according to different modalities of violence’ (Derrida, 2001: 17). But his concern is with the reception and inclusion, and he does little to further the thought of what modalities of violence and power such efforts to control produce. In Of Hospitality, Derrida also hints at the way diverse forms of power are beginning to further disrupt the sanctity and inviolability of the home. Access to one’s home is no longer just through windows and doors, but also through the internet and the telephone line. However, the state, in the form of police and security services, is increasingly intercepting communications made in this way, as are private actors and companies (Derrida and Dufourmanetlle, 2000: 49-65). Such ever-possible (if not ever-probable) intervention means a ‘violation of the inviolable, in the place where inviolable immunity remains the condition of hospitality’, such that ‘every element of hospitality gets disrupted’ (Ibid: 51). This disruption however is not caused by a sovereign power of inclusion and exclusion, but an ‘anonymous technological power’ (Ibid: 53) which challenges the self-identity of, and our sovereign mastery over, the home. Interestingly, Derrida notes here that anonymous exercises of the under-theorised ‘technological power’ are effectively producing ‘new spaces of hospitality’ (Ibid: 57). Yet he does not effectively pursue these hints at changes in the power or space of hospitality. Instead, he views such transformations under a traditional rubric of the sovereign decisions of inclusion and exclusion. As he sums it up, there is ‘No hospitality, in the classic sense, without sovereignty over oneself, over one’s home, but since there is also no hospitality without finitude, sovereignty can only be exercised by filtering, choosing and thus excluding and doing violence’ (Ibid: 55).
hospitality’, they ‘almost immediately became yet another technology of control’. But why do hospitality and control need to be ‘opposed’ in this manner? To gain a more thoroughgoing understanding of how international hospitality works, ethically and politically, in all its complexity, we need to go beyond a focus on sovereign decisions and mastery which has characterised the work of Gideon Baker (2011). We need to see technologies, norms, rules and laws of hospitality and control as inextricably tied together. We need to explore how hospitality is managed and controlled, indeed, how ethics itself is governed, surveilled and made less risky.

To examine this, we need to supplement the insights gained from IR, and especially with those from Political Geography. IR and security studies, even in their critical form, are still tightly bound to sovereign power (Walker, 2010). In contrast, William Walters (2004: 241) has argued that increasingly we are seeing the use of borders and the government of the state as if it were a home, as a form of ‘domopolitics’. Conceiving the state as a home to be ‘kept’, we see a conjunction of the goods of home – ‘as hearth, as refuge or a sanctuary in a heartless world; the home as our place, where we belong naturally, and… others do not’ – with the domo as taming and subduing, domesticating forces that threaten those goods (Walters, 2004: 241-2). This produces a multifaceted form of governance; domopolitics is a rationality of government, a ‘governmentality’ in Foucault’s (2007) terms, concerned with the management of a population within a particular space using mechanisms of security (see Darling, 2011: 265). What this produces is not a host as sovereign, seeking to ‘arrest’ the mobility of the guest, but rather one that seeks to ‘tame it; not to build walls, but systems capable of utilizing mobilities’, extracting their useful productive aspects and preventing their dangers (Walters, 2004: 248). Jonathan Darling’s superb account of the British government’s management of the politics of asylum and immigration draws out how domopolitics operates to produce a risky population to which its power can be applied (2011: 266), regulates the mobility of that population and the space of the home through the policy of ‘dispersal’ of asylum accommodation (2011: 267), and ensure the discomfort of these guests within the home (its ‘unhomeliness’) in order to discipline them and ensure their compliance with bureaucratic decisions (2011: 268-9). I would suggest that this domopolitics is not only working to control natives and non-natives alike. Through the attempt at controlling and taming trajectories and circulations it actively produces and reproduces the space of the home, here the space of the state.

What involves pushing beyond Derrida then is in arguing that hospitality is not being performed through sovereign power alone. In fact, if anything, the domopolitics of hospitality is above all a
form of governmentality in which, as Darling points out using Butler, we see a ‘spectral sovereignty’ emerging ‘within the field of governmentality’ (Darling, 2011: 268; Butler, 2004: 97). Asylum claimants, produced through a domopolitics which ensures their discomfort, are subject to the decisions of bureaucrats, ‘petty sovereigns’ who make simple, everyday managerial decision over their very lives. While both Darling and Walters conceive domopolitics operating over the state (i.e. by producing and governing the state as a home), I wish to extend this analysis by claiming that any space produced through hospitality will be governed through a governmental rationality of domopolitics with sovereign power arising spectrally at times to reassert the subject positions of host and guest. I also want to extend it by arguing that domopolitics must be seen in conjunction with what Nikolas Rose identifies as another form of governmental rationality: ethopolitics. This is essentially a governmentality that seeks to conduct a population through its own individual and collective ethos – its beliefs, values, morals and sentiments (Rose, 2000: 324). While Walters argues that the two (domopolitcs and ethopolitics) intersect (Walters, 2004: 254), I would suggest that with an ethico-political hospitality the two are completely fused. After all, the home is not just a space, it lays claim to an ethos, a way of being, and this is what makes hospitality ethics. The ethics of hospitality is thus enabled, managed and resisted through a highly productive fusion of domopolitics, ethopolitics and emergent, resurgent sovereign power within these governmentalities.

**INTERNATIONAL SPACES OF HOSPITALITY: REFUGEE CAMPS**

Paying attention to the interaction of ethics and power in practices of international hospitality reveals their irreducible relation to the construction of spaces. As a complex and shifting configuration of ethico-political relations, hospitality works to construct certain subjects – hosts, guests, host-guests, guest-hosts and (g)hosts – and through conducting their movement works to produce a particular spatial configuration. Simply put, practices of hospitality produce international spaces that are of increasing ethical and political significance, yet are frequently ignored by the mainstream discipline and rarely figure within international ethical discussion. These are spaces such as homes and hotels, refugee camps, cities, tourist enclaves and regions, most particularly ‘Europe’. Such spaces are produced through the governance of hospitality, but themselves exert a major influence over the way that hospitality comes to be governed. Clearly in this paper I do not have the space to offer more than a very simple and reductive portrait of
Refugee camps are quite literally spaces produced to offer hospitality to the displaced, providing food, shelter and (some) security for those who need it most. Such spaces have never been more important with the UNHCR estimating that by the end of 2013 a record 50 million people are currently displaced worldwide. The number of people is now equivalent to the population of Spain or South Africa (Economist, 2014), with around nine million from Syria alone. Despite the concentration of international ethics on the immigration and asylum policies of Western states, the vast majority remain in the global South, including all the internally displaced and 80% of refugees (UNHCR, 2011: 23). Offering hospitality to the displaced in the form of (more or less) temporary camps has become an increasing solution, yet is entirely ignored by the field of international ethics and IR more broadly. Camps are by and large left to the interdisciplinary ‘refugee studies’ as a technical problem.

The hospitality provided by camps is not merely palliative; it aims beyond mere survival, allowing recovery, providing dignity and the sustenance of ‘goods’ such as family and community (Sphere, 2011: 244). They go further than provision of ‘components’ displaced populations are missing; ‘Camps replicate an entire support system’ (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 115). While such attempts at a more holistically hospitable space have been dismissed as naïve and misguided (Hyndman, 2000), they have nonetheless become a key part of extensive guidance and planning by charities, NGOs and the UNHCR. To illustrate this, I turn to three interrelated and cross-referential guides and handbooks on the spatial planning of these spaces: the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies (2007), the Sphere Project’s Handbook, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards for Humanitarian Response (2011), and Oxfam/shelterproject’s Transitional Settlement: Displaced Populations (2005). Together, these guides form something of a manifesto or template for the governmentalised production and management of hospitable spaces.

One way into this issue is to look at the tactics of ‘domopolitics’ on display here, where the governance of hospitality produces a space as a ‘home’ in Darling’s terms. Firstly, as noted, this involves is the production of a risky population to which power can then be applied whilst,

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4 I am currently in the process of researching and writing a book which concentrates on offering a fuller discussion of several of these spaces. Much of the research for this section has previously been published (see Bulley, 2014) and is here used to illustrate the wider point about hospitality.
secondly, seeking to regulate the mobility of that population. Thus, an attempt to map and govern the spatial mobility of refugees as potential guests begins before a crisis even takes place and while the displaced are ‘in transit’ (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 41). This phase includes collecting a wide variety of information about the guests, forming them into a population to be welcomed (Ibid: 40-42). While the ‘displaced population’ are in the process of being displaced then, a phase of ‘influx management’ governs the ‘process of supporting and guiding the transit of displaced populations away from danger, and towards appropriate TS [transitional settlement] options’ (Ibid: 357). If this mobility is correctly and pre-emptively conducted, it allows for a better ‘reception’ and securing of the displaced by ensuring sufficient capacity is available in the physical construction of the space. But this means maintaining control of the ‘influx’ – i.e. the movement of the displaced before that movement even begins. To facilitate this, a ‘network of support and pre-registration facilities’ are erected, consisting of ‘way-stations, transit centres, and reception centres’, each of which is used to gather more information in producing the refugee population, and each with sufficient protection, capacity and clean water (Ibid: 258). A fictitious example allows this situation to be ‘mapped’ in terms of how each facility stands in relation to the others (see figure 8a, Ibid: 359).

We can see here that camps, as hospitable spaces which conduct mobility, are extended spatially far beyond their apparent boundaries. Indeed, they arguably extend to the very moment and place of displacement. Each facility along the line of flight is individually mapped out, with areas for assembly, registration, health screening, distribution centres, food preparation, latrines, accommodation and departure. Minimum spatial standards are specified for each, with reception and transit camps requiring at least 3m² per person (though Sphere (2011: 259) suggests 3.5m²); at least 100m² per 500 people for food preparation (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 361) and at least 100 metres from accommodation to refuse disposal (Ibid: 366; UNHCR, 2007: 223). These maps are organised around small arrows that direct the movement of refugees through each facility, from their guarded entry to their guarded departure. The aim is for quick, efficient and safe circulation through each facility, allowing the ‘influx’ to be managed effectively. The UNHCR (2007: 172 – Annex 6) even provides a ‘Registration layout’ concept map, with arrows moving the refugees from their waiting areas, through ‘admissions’ to ‘registration desks’, back to waiting areas and on to the computerised data-entry and photo desk.

5 For example of a way-station, see figure 8b (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 363); for a transit centre, see figure 8c (Ibid: 364); and for a reception centre, see figure 8d (Ibid: 366).
A great deal of advice is offered on the spatial planning and organisation of camps. It is emphasised that the creation of a ‘master plan’ is essential (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 368; UNHCR, 2007: 206). This is an overall site plan, regularly updated, marking boundaries, subdivisions, infrastructure and facilities (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 382), but also including information on the social organisation of the refugees as well as topographical and planimetric surveys (UNHCR, 2007: 215). This allows for continuity of controlled hospitality despite the rapid turnover of international staff. A range of minimum standards set out in each document (compared in Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 278-9), include the location and number of tap stands, latrines, showers, fire breaks, distance between buildings and blocks, number and location of refuse (Sphere, 2011: 239-59; UNHCR, 2007: 206-211). The headline figure in each case is that the minimum surface area is 45m² per person, including infrastructure and household agricultural plots (Sphere, 2004: 257; UNHCR, 2007: 210). This creates a mathematics of hospitality, where the size of the space is determined by the numbers to be secured. Thus, 20,000 people – and all advice is to avoid camps larger than this – generates a space whose dimensions are as follows: ‘20,000 people × 45m² = 900,000m² = 90 hectares (for example, a site measuring 900m × 1000m)’ (UNHCR, 2007: 211).

What is not really shown in these guidelines is the way that, once set up, some camps work to control and limit movement. From the transit and reception centres onwards Michel Agier (2011: 150) notes that refugees are ‘processed’ through categorisation procedures. In multiethnic camps such as Maheba in Zambia, which expanded with a range of different ‘arrivals’ since it was ceded to the UNHCR in 1971, refugees must wait in squalid and overcrowded conditions after registration before being taken to the ‘zone’ in which they are thought to belong (Agier, 2011: 120-6; see also Malkki, 1995: 137). Even without zonal constraints, there is often highly restricted movement beyond a camp’s boundaries. While Palestinians in Lebanon have experienced both relative freedom (from 1968-75) and stark confinement (from 1982-1995) in different periods (see Peteet, 2005: 6-11), the remoteness and isolation of Mishamo in Tanzania and Dadaab in Kenya has always severely restricted mobility. Here movement is also regulated using leave passes (Malkki, 1995: 138) and identity documents (Horst, 2006: 23).

What these spatial constraints contribute to is the third domopolitical tactic suggested by Darling, that of producing the space of the camp as ‘unhomely’, generating discomfort for the refugees as a disciplining technique to ensure compliance with bureaucratic decisions. Such a space of hospitable discomfort is maintained through a variety of tactics, though they also often remain places of violence, rape, deprivation, disease and terrible insecurity rather than mere
discomfort (see Agier, 2011; Hyndman, 2000). Refugees are subject to head counts, regular and invasive health checks, compulsory education of children, often with little control over these processes. Meanwhile, in terms of their management, camps can form in-between places, based on land ceded or leased by the host state to the temporary jurisdiction of the international community, generally represented by the UNHCR (see UNHCR, 2011: 121, 221) or the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Such territory may be taken away at any time producing a space of existential insecurity.

Indeed, one of the major problems in discussing refugee camps as spaces of hospitality is that there is no sovereign ‘host’ with mastery over the space concerned. UNHCR specifies that while it has ‘unique statutory responsibility’ for providing international protection, the ‘provision and distribution of material assistance’ can be carried out by NGOs and host governments. Indeed, ‘wherever possible’ assistance is provided by an agency other than UNHCR (2007: 116). This means that camps such as Dadaab in Kenya see a range of actors providing food (the World Food Programme), medical and health care (Médecins Sans Frontières), and community development (CARE International). The Kenyan authorities merely provide the local police, wearing UNHCR uniforms, to secure the camp and its boundaries (see Agier, 2011: 135; see also Horst, 2011: 116-7). All can be considered ‘stakeholders’ in the provision and administration of refugee camp hospitality, including the displaced population themselves (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 30-31), with no one sovereign host controlling the space completely or producing an ethos, an affective sense of belonging which I specified above as key to hospitality. Camps such as Killis in Turkey, set up for Syrians fleeing the civil war, are extraordinary in this regard, with Turkish authorities retaining complete control (see McClelland, 2014).

What this essentially produces, however, is an assemblage of hosting practices; a complex, more or less (dys)functional, array of actors that govern the camp as a home via a particular advanced liberal ethos. Such domopolitical governmentalities allow the possibility of a spectral sovereignty emerging in many different places and times: on decisions over who to allow in to and out of camps via leave passé, or through decisions over access to food and other resources. But these emerge within a regime where governmentality predominates. Randy Lippert argues that the governmental rationality exercised over refugees has changed in the recent decades, from disciplinary mechanisms towards the use of modern, advanced liberal tactics (1999: 308-314). This change, which can be characterised as a partial and incomplete movement from camps as spaces of discipline to spaces of security (see Foucault, 2007: 1-27), reflects changes in the way
other spheres were governed in industrialised societies from the 1980s, from welfare to health (see Miller and Rose, 2008). Camps have come to be managed by a similar liberal rationality of government to these societies (see Duffield, 2001), using ‘security mechanisms... installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life’ (Foucault, 2004: 246). The ethos that the assembled host produces is similar to that I have identified in global cities (see Bulley, 2013), one of advanced liberalism which seeks to welcome a particular population and manage that welcome through tactics of security, allowing the good, useful and beneficial movements while preventing or restricting the bad, or threatening. One way in which this ethos is born out is through the co-optation and instrumentalisation of a particular vision of community to better conduct the conduct of refugees in camps (see Bulley, 2014a). These tactics seek to bolster community and belonging within refugee camps specifically in order to make refugees themselves accountable for their own welfare and security.

However, as international spaces of hospitality, refugee camps which welcome via an assembled host leave plenty of opportunity for counter-conducts, resistance and redirection of that welcome. The liberalising logic of governmentality, unlike disciplinary power, seeks to enable movement and circulation, if only along certain paths, as well as constraining it (Foucault, 2007: 44-9). Much like cities, the assemblage of hosting practices leads to a range of blind spots, gaps and anomalies in camps which enable the evasion of control (Amin and Thrift, 2002: 92; Bulley, 2013). What we see in refugee camps then is a range of tactics used to evade the management of hospitality (examined at greater length in Bulley, 2014a). For example, to secure more rations refugees’ engage in the double-entering of names on lists, registering in more than one zone or village, adding fictional family members and declining to registers deaths and departures from the camp (Peteet, 2005: 72).

More subversive are what Horst calls the identity/ration ‘card games’ played by Somali refugees and Kenyan locals in and around Dadaab. Such games are a counter-conduct produced by the difficulty of fixing and restricting the identity and community of refugees. For example, when individuals and families leave the camp, it is common for them to leave their ration cards with family or friends (Horst, 2006: 94). These can then be used to increase the ration received by the remaining family, while any surplus can be traded. More importantly, the card itself can be traded at local markets for money, goods and services. Because of the access it provides to food and services, such a card is a precious commodity and sought-after by less affluent local Kenyans. Moreover, due to Dadaab’s location close to the Somali border, it is often difficult for Western authorities in the camp to distinguish between Somalis and Kenyans, let alone between refugees
and non-refugees (Horst, 2006: 23). Manipulation of control through such ‘card games’ can also increase wider mobility and the options available to refugees. Thus, a particularly prized exchange for a ration card would be for a Kenyan identity card, which allows the possibility of travel throughout Kenya.

Another important way in which the boundaries of the camp’s hospitality are exceeded is through transnational social networks and remittance flows. Peteet stresses the role that cash remittances played in the options available to Palestinians who remained in refugee camps, especially remittances sent by relatives working in oil-producing Middle Eastern states (2005: 80; 175; see also Ramadan, 2013). Horst argues that remittance flows into Dadaab in Kenya from the Somali diaspora have worked to produce changes in the space of the camp itself, allowing for the development of property and small businesses (Horst, 2006: 130-157). Such investment can add layers of meaning and markers of identity to these spaces. Camps have been described as ‘non-places’ that do not integrate other places, meanings and traditions (Diken and Laustsen, 2005: 86), yet ethnographers show that camps are spaces with a plethora of meanings, demonstrating the agency of the refugees and, ultimately, the inability of the assembled host to fully control the camp space and its ethos. Indeed, a concentration on the specifics of individual camps reveals the way that such spatial counter-conducts change the identities of host and guest by altering the power relations that constitute these hospitable spaces.

An especially useful example can be found in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon (see Peteet, 2005; Ramadan, 2010; 2013; Sanyal, 2011). Peteet’s detailed study in particular shows that not only do camps vary geographically, they also vary temporally – Shatila camp in Beirut looked completely different in the initial period of exile (1948-1968), in the era of Palestinian resistance (1968-1982), and after its violent re-crafting and subjugation (1980s and 1990s). Throughout Shatila’s history (set up in 1949), ‘the spatial device of the camp simultaneously engendered transformations in Palestinian community and identity’ (Peteet, 2005: 29). Initially, meaning was given to camp spaces through their organisation according to villages of origin. Thus refugees imposed ‘their own sense of spatiality on the camps, crafting a microcosm of Galilee’. Indeed, four generations on from displacement, Peteet still found children defining themselves as being from villages in Galilee they had never seen (Ibid.: 100-101).

While villages were a point of departure for placemaking, they were gradually ‘overlaid with other sorts of space’, from the institutional (distribution centres and schools) to informal social gatherings (dawaween), inter-village marriage venues, and the markets and bakeries which
produced an embryonic national cuisine (*Ibid.*: 116-117). All these acts worked to appropriate the camp space, generating an ethos and affective sense of belonging separate to that of the UNRWA, the Lebanese state and refugee NGOs. Layers of meaning appeared through readopting the rural peasant Palestinians chequered head scarf (the *kuffiyeh*), and producing communal arts and crafts incorporating Palestinian flags and maps in jewellery and home decor (*Ibid.*: 149-50; Ramadan, 2013: 73). At its height this resistant meaning-giving was not exclusive or nationalistic. Interactions and solidarities were formed across camp boundaries and it was rarely clear where the borders of camps like Shatila lay (*Ibid.*: 137). A much wider sense of solidarity formed, encompassing Westerners working in the camps, Lebanese on the outside and those sending remittances from abroad (*Ibid.*: 134). This resistance would eventually be crushed by a combination of outside forces, with truly horrific results in Shatila (see Fisk, 2001: 359-400).

Nonetheless, this reorienting of camp spaces had built up an ethos that continues to have repercussions. One particularly good example has been examined by Adam Ramadan (2008), who notes that during the war between Israel and Hizbullah in 2006, around 100,000 Lebanese citizens received hospitality from Palestinian refugees in the camps of Southern Lebanon. Israeli airstrikes generally avoided the Palestinian camps in 2006, making them relatively safe spaces.

This produced a moment of inverted power relations where the Palestinian guests were able to dictate terms of hospitality to citizens of Lebanon, their hosts. In the flux of war, old categories could no longer be maintained, and relations were temporarily reversed. (Ramadan, 2008: 663).

The relatively unconditional terms upon which the Palestinian refugees’ hospitality was offered, he notes, was both ethical and instrumental, in that it sought to renegotiate relationships with Lebanese citizens. Yet, without the building of an ethos, a particular way of being, a habitual manner of dwelling and affective sense of belonging through the placemaking of subsequent generations, this reversal of relations would not have been possible (*Ibid.*: 666). This exchange of ethics and power relations did not last, and has perhaps not had the repercussions that some Palestinian refugees had hoped (*Ibid.*: 673), but it demonstrates the ethical and political possibilities that refugee camps as international spaces of hospitality could produce, perhaps.
CONCLUSION

I have argued that, if we are to take Derrida’s claim seriously that ‘ethics is hospitality’, we need to examine hospitality as a spatial affective relation involving a complex entanglement of ethos and power in the production of spaces. I suggested that this involves pushing beyond Derrida’s concentration on the decision of welcome/rejection and the sovereign mastery of borders that enables this. Doing so could have a profound impact on the way international ethics tends to reduce hospitality to a purely state-based exercise of marginal importance. It could prompt the field to look beyond the state, to other practices of hospitality and their production of international spaces (such as refugee camps in this paper, but also cities, regions, enclaves, and so on) that enact ethico-political welcomes to different types of guests. Arguably, it could also prompt us into developing ‘better’ forms of hospitality, less exclusive, violent or constraining forms of welcome. Nothing is less clear or obvious than this claim. However, by pushing beyond the sovereign power relation to an examination of the everyday, mundane governmentality (the domopolitics, ethopolitics, etc.) that seek to manage hospitality and the space of welcome, we are allowed a much greater critical insight into those practices as well as how they might be improved.

What we need then is a critique of the many different hospitalities we see operating in today’s international, of the spaces they produce, the ethos, values and principles that enable them, and the power relations that facilitate and constrain them. This is a critique in Foucault’s sense of the term, asking whether we want our hospitality to be ‘governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures’ (Foucault, 1997: 28). In what ways are an assembled host preferable or not to the traditional sovereign host? Do we want our hospitality to produce spaces that operate via advanced liberal logics and tactics of security? Can we interrogate the ‘forms’ of guests that are privileged and question the construction of those being constrained, their ‘badness’, the risk or threat they represent? What counter-conducts and tactics of resistance do these governmentality produce? Are these irruptive, disruptive and potentially subversive redirections of the hospitable relation generative of better ways of ‘doing’ hospitality? Is the agency of the guest and their becoming-host important to strengthening the ethics of hospitality? And can these interrogations give us a way of offering judgements regarding the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ welcome?
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