

How radical right-wing populist parties can combine left and right-wing economic policies

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Abstract

This article proposes that radical right-wing populist parties can combine left- and right-wing economic policies if we understand the economic agenda through the group-based account of Ennser-Jedenastik (2016), which proposes that the welfare state agenda of radical right-wing populist parties can be understood in terms of populism, nativism and authoritarianism. Each of these elements is linked to a particular economic policy: economic nativism, which opposes the economic interest of natives and foreigners; economic populism, which seeks to limit economic privileges for the elite; and economic authoritarianism, which opposes the interests of deserving and undeserving poor. By using these different oppositions radical right-wing populist parties can reconcile left-wing and right-wing positions. This article illustrates this by analysing the economic parliamentary activity of the Dutch Freedom Party.

Key words: radical right-wing populist parties, economic policies, welfare chauvinism, populism, deserving poor.

1. Introduction

Political scientists find it difficult to pinpoint the economic policy position of radical right-wing populist parties. For instance, in the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the uncertainty around the average economic left-right estimate of radical right-wing populist parties (expressed as the standard error) was eighty per cent

higher than the uncertainty for liberal or social-democratic parties (Bakker et al. 2015; own calculations). Voters also find it difficult to place these parties. For instance, in the 2012 Dutch electoral survey when asked to place the Dutch Freedom Party (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*, PVV) on a redistribution dimension, 14% of voters could not place them; 38% put them on the pro-redistribution side and 28% on the anti-redistribution side (Van der Kolk et al. 2012; own calculations).¹

The lack of clarity that exists among experts and voters is reflected in debates among researchers who focus on radical right-wing populist parties. There are authors like Rovny (2013) who argue that in general radical right-wing populist parties mix left and right-wing policies to blur their position and broaden their appeal. There are also those such as De Lange (2007) and Pellikaan et al. (2016), who place radical right-wing populist parties in the centre of the economic scale. Other scholars such as Kitschelt and McGann (1995) place the family of radical right-wing populist parties on the economic right.

The goal of the paper is to understand how radical right-wing populist parties can have views that seems inconsistent from the perspective of the traditional left-right politics without becoming internally incoherent. So the goal of the paper is not explain (‘erklären’) *why* radical right-wing populist parties have a particular position on the left-right dimension but to understand (‘verstehen’) *how* they can combine a package of policy positions that appear to be contradictory from the perspective of left-right politics. The group-based account of Ennser-Jedenastik (2016) will be an important theoretical device to this end. He argues that it is actually these parties’ populism, nativism and authoritarianism informs their economic profiles. Each of these is linked to a specific economic agenda: economic authoritarianism, which is a combination of limiting welfare state access to undeserving citizens, whose poverty is a result of their moral failing and expanding welfare state access for deserving citizens, whose poverty is beyond their control; economic nativism which is reflected

¹ The question used was: “Some people think that the differences in incomes in our country should be increased. Others think that they should be decreased. How would you place the PVV on a line from 1 to 7, where 1 means differences in income should be increased and 7 means that differences in income should be decreased?” By comparison, 71% of voters put the Labour Party on the pro-redistribution side and 62% the Liberal Party on the anti-redistribution side. It is not that voters are completely oblivious to the policies of the PVV: 80% of voters identified the party as anti-immigration in a similar question.

in welfare chauvinism; and economic populism, specifically understood here as an opposition to the economic privileges of elite groups, who disregard the interests of the groups they are supposed to serve. The central argument here is that because radical right-wing populist parties are economically populist, they are against the privileges of bankers (left-wing) and bureaucrats (right-wing); because they are economically nativist and authoritarian, they may want to roll back the welfare state for immigrants and undeserving poor (right-wing) and extend it for natives and deserving poor (left-wing). This article will also further extend the work of Ennser-Jedenastik (2016) by looking beyond just welfare state policy to economic policy in broad perspective, namely at *all ways in which the government can intervene or abstain from intervening in the economy*. This selection does not just include welfare state issues, but also proposals that concern other spheres such as taxation, business regulation, healthcare, housing and education for as far as they have implications for, for example, economic growth, economic equality and the budget. Moreover, this article looks at a different case, namely the Dutch PVV, where Ennser-Jedenastik's article analysed the Austrian Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ). In this way this article tests the external validity of the group-based account. Finally, this article analyses parliamentary behaviour, specifically parliamentary resolutions introduced by PVV MPs. This offers a greater wealth of data and shows that economic authoritarianism, populism and nativism are more than campaign tools.

Understanding the economic profiles of radical right-wing populist parties is of great value, as Mudde (2016, p.11) wrote: “we must move beyond the dominant focus on the two issues of immigration and European integration, and reflect the broader range of [...] socio-economic issues”. There is a number of reasons for this: First, many radical right-wing populist parties have undergone a process of mainstreaming; this process includes attaching greater importance to economic issues (Akkerman et al. 2016; Lefkofridi and Michel 2017) Second, radical right-wing populist parties have come closer to government. Some such as the Austrian Freedom Party have entered government; others such as the Dutch Freedom Party have supported a minority government. This means that these parties actually have the chance to influence government policy, a large share of which concerns economic management. For instance, recent evidence suggests that radical right-wing populist parties have been able to get welfare chauvinist policies implemented (Jørgensen and Thomsen 2016). At the same time, government participation can create new dilemmas

for these parties for instance when their natural allies are on the political right but their voters have left-wing economic preferences (Afonso 2015).

This article first charts the literature on the economic position of radical right-wing populist parties. Next, it will introduce the case of the PVV, consider what the selection of this case means in terms of external validity and discusses the coding scheme and methodological issues related to coding. Next, we will show how radical right-wing populist parties can balance left-wing and right-wing positions. The conclusion in turn focuses on the meaning of these results for the general discussion of the economics of radical right-wing populism.

2. Radical right-wing populism and the economy

Until recently, many political scientists agreed that parties of the populist radical right also pursued a right-wing, free market economic agenda. (Betz 1994; Ignazi 1992; Kriesi et al. 2008): Kitschelt and McGann (1995) even went so far as to mark the combination of authoritarian, repressive, nationalist positions on cultural matters and pro-market positions on economic matters a 'winning formula' for the radical right. In this view, this combination of economic and cultural policies explained much of the electoral success that these parties had in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Against this consensus, Mudde (2007, p.119) took a clear position: 'it's *not* the economy stupid'. He showed that actually many radical right-wing populist parties did not favour neo-liberal economic ideas. Moreover, he argued that their economic policy positions did not motivate voters to opt for radical right-wing populist parties. Crucial for the argument presented in this paper, Mudde (2007, p.122) also suggested that what radical right-wing populist parties did share in economic terms was nativism, a core feature of radical right-wing populism: many of these parties had protectionist positions on trade and welfare chauvinist positions where it came to the access of immigrants to social services. On the key division of more or less state intervention these parties took centrist, inconsistent or mixed positions.

De Lange (2007) followed up on this last point by suggesting that the combination of such centrist economic views in combination with the parties' continued commitment to law-and-order and anti-immigration policies forms a 'new winning formula', as this combination allows radical right populist parties to appeal to working class voters. Pellikaan et al. (2016) place the Dutch radical right consistently

in the centre of the economic left-right dimension. Lefkofridi and Michel (2017), Kriesi et al. (2012), Eger and Valdez (2015), Ivaldi (2015) and Hartevelde (2016) observe a further shift to the left on economic issues in many cases that they study. Their research suggests that many radical right-wing populist parties now combine left-wing positions on economic issues with right-wing positions on economic issues. This combination of left-wing and authoritarian positions, is where according to Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) most European voters are concentrated but no parties place themselves: a new winning formula.

Other academics, however, argued that the mixed of inconsistent positions that radical right-wing populist had on economic issues meant that these parties are beyond left and right. Derks (2006) for instance argues that radical right-wing populist voters and parties desire a more equal distribution of income but at the same time do not believe that the welfare state can realize this in an efficient way; that is these voters favour the principle of egalitarianism but not the principle of economic interventionism that are equated in a left-right economic scheme. Rovny (2013, pp.5-6) also observes inconsistency in the left-right position of radical right-wing populist parties. He attributes this to a conscious strategy by these parties to capture as many voters as possible by blurring their position, taking vague and ambiguous policy positions.

In contrast to the existing literature, that focuses on the left-right position of these parties, the group-based account of Ennser-Jedenastik's (2016) proposes to understand the economic policies of radical right-wing populist parties as a reflection of their radical right-wing populist ideology and specifically its key aspects: populism, nativism and authoritarianism. Each of these three elements of radical right-wing populism has economic implications.

Nativism is an ideology that holds that the state should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (Mudde 2007, p.19). It sees non-native, 'alien' elements as threatening to the homogeneity of the nation state. It creates a dichotomy between 'us' and 'them'. Mudde (2007) suggests that nativism can feed into the economic policies of radical right-wing populist parties. This can take two shapes: immigration and trade. According to Ennser-Jedenastik (2016, p.412) the economic implications of these parties' anti-immigration positions are "straightforward: Full benefits should be extended for only to members of the native group, while non-natives should receive limited support if any." This position is generally known as

welfare state chauvinism (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990, 212). The core idea is that in order to maintain solidarity within the welfare state, the welfare state should only be restricted to native people and foreigners should be excluded (Koster al. 2012; Keskinen 2016). Many authors see this kind of policies in the economic agendas of radical right-wing populists (Mudde 2007; Lefkofridi and Michel 2017; Schumacher and Van Kersbergen 2016; Keskinen 2016; Norocel 2016; De Koster et al. 2012). There is a second way in which nativism may inform a party's economic policies, namely where it comes to trade. Global competition may be a threat to blue-collar jobs. Radical right-wing populist parties may favour protectionist policies such tariffs against international trade. From the same perspective, economic nativism opposes development aid and bail-outs of Eurozone countries.

Populism draws a division between a 'pure people' and 'corrupt elite'. The will of the people should determine government policy, but according to populists, the elite refuses to listen to the people. Populists seek to remedy this (Mudde, 2007). Populism is a thin ideology because the terms of people and elite are empty vessels that can be imbued with meaning on basis of different ideologies (Stanley, 2008), such as neo-liberalism or socialism (Pauwels 2010; March 2011). Ennser-Jedenastik (2016, p.414) takes another approach, he argues that populists will tend to strip politicians and bureaucrats from any economic privilege and that taxpayer money should be used to the advantage of the 'common man'. Economic policies that seek to limit the economic role of elite groups, such as the size of the bureaucracy, the power of management in the public sector and the spending on politicians are economic populist in this sense. These policies are often motivated by the idea that in the public sector these elite groups, such as civil servants, managers, and politicians focus too much on their own self-interest and neglect the interest of the groups their institutions are supposed to serve: citizens, students and patients, teachers and doctors. Ennser-Jedenastik (2016) only looks at public sector elites, but his logic can be transferred to private sector elites as well: here, populists could take aim at groups like bankers and argue that their focus on their own self-interest has endangered the savings of normal people and therefore their freedom and income should be reined in. Here populism can be clearly contrasted with the left and the right. Where the economic left would tend to turn against the privileges that private sector elites (bankers, CEO etc.) have, the economic right would turn against the privileges that public sector elites (civil servants) have. Populism takes aim at both due to its anti-elitism

Authoritarianism is the idea that “infringements on authority are to be punished severely” (Mudde 2007, p.413). It makes a distinction between criminal, immoral groups that ought to be punished and innocent, moral groups that ought to be protected. This article follows the work of Ennser-Jedenastik (2016, p.413) and Afonso and Papadopoulos (2015, p.620), who explicitly link authoritarianism to the distinction between deserving and undeserving poor. There are the undeserving poor, whose poverty can be attributed to their own moral failing or those who exploit and cheat the welfare state. To ensure the solidarity in the welfare state, such undeserving groups must be excluded from its benefits. We can see the logic of authoritarianism return here: there are immoral, criminal groups who ought to be punished, namely those who can work but still rely on the welfare state. Their parasitism undermines the social order necessary to maintain the welfare state. Opposed to them are the deserving poor, disabled people whose poverty is due to circumstances beyond their control and pensioners who have built up their countries after the Second World War. From the perspective of authoritarianism, they are a moral, innocent group, who ought to be protected. The notion of ‘deservingness’ plays an important role in the sociological literature on welfare state support (Handler 2004; Will 1993; Van Oorschot 2006). Indeed, citizens tend to view seniors and disabled people as deserving of government support (Van Oorschot 2006; Bang Petersen et al. 2010). People who commit social fraud have lost their entitlement to support and tend to be seen as the least deserving in the eyes of citizens. Economic authoritarianism applies to any proposal that seeks to limit access to public services for some group, who are characterized as undeserving or seeks to expand public services for some other groups, who are identified as being deserving. Therefore a proposal to segregate remorseless bullies from innocent school children according to radical right-wing populist parties, is also identified as economic authoritarian.

It is an unanswered question whether economic authoritarianism and welfare chauvinism are separate. Both at the political and electoral level these terms appear to be correlated: in studies of deservingness, citizens tend to consider immigrants to be less deserving than natives (Van Oorschot 2006; Hjorth 2016). At the same time in political debates about the economic implications of immigration deservingness is also employed (Keskinen et al. 2016). Norocel (2016, p.3) and Schumacher and Van Kersbergen (2016, p.3) equate the foreign other with the undeserving poor into a category of ‘undeserving others’ opposed to a ‘deserving natives’.

3. Case Selection

This article will study the Dutch PVV. The Dutch PVV is comparable to the FPÖ, the case where the group-based approach was developed. This makes it a likely case to find that the group-based account developed for the FPÖ will work here. Both parties have their roots in conservative liberal parties. The PVV was founded as a split from the Dutch Liberal Party (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, VVD): the PVV was formed in the 2004 when Geert Wilders, until then a liberal MP left the Liberal parliamentary party. The issue that had caused Wilders' defection was his opposition to Turkey's membership of the EU. Between 2004 and 2006 Wilders operated as an independent MP. In 2006 his PVV entered in the parliamentary election and won nine seats out of 150. Its liberal roots will make it more likely that it will pursue more right-wing, market-oriented policies than the minority of radical right-wing populist parties that have their roots in the extreme right.

One difference between the FPÖ and the PVV, is that the PVV has never been in government, while the FPÖ has governed with the ÖVP. The PVV did support a centre-right government: after the 2010 elections, the PVV became a support party for a centre-right coalition of Christian Democratic Appeal (*Christen-Democratisch Appèl*, CDA) and VVD. The support agreement committed the PVV to the budgetary policies of the cabinet but specifically excluded the pension age and European economic cooperation. The PVV's cooperation with the centre-right cabinet lasted until 2012 when the PVV backed out of negotiations over budget cuts. The political alliances may also influence the positioning of radical right-wing populist parties: while their voters may generally desire more left-wing policies, both parties can only form governments with right-wing parties (Afonso 2015). This may give them a more right-wing bent than parties that face a cordon sanitaire.

Another difference is the party system these two parties operate in. The Dutch party system is far more fractionalized than the Austrian: on average there are six effective parties in the Dutch *Tweede Kamer* for as long as the PVV has been in parliament, compared to 2.6 for the Austrian *Nationalrat*. In particular the PVV competes for votes with the Christian-democratic CDA, the liberal VVD and the left-wing populist SP. While the SP and the PVV might be far-removed on the traditional left-right dimension, they are not on issues such as EU integration and their appreciation of elites; in comparison the FPÖ only has to compete with the Christian-

democratic ÖVP and the social-democratic SPÖ, and for a short period the Alliance Future Austria (BZÖ), the moderate split of the FPÖ. The more complex field around the PVV may create different incentives.

Both are radical right-wing populist parties from countries that are strongly integrated in the European Union. Both the Netherlands and Austria are member of the Eurozone. Eurozone membership gives radical right-wing populist an opportunity to craft a particular rhetoric that opposes European to national interests. Moreover, radical right-wing populist parties may oppose redistribution between EU member states and EU-regulation, while favouring redistribution and regulation at the national level. This may be particularly the case for radical right-wing populist parties from Eurozone countries during the on-going European sovereign debt crisis.

4. Methodology

Most of the studies of the economic policy positions of radical right-wing populist parties have focused on their election manifestos or expert placement (Rovny 2013; Schumacher and Van Kersbergen 2016; Lefkofridi and Michel 2017; De Lange 2007; Akkerman et al. 2016; Eger and Valdez 2015; Ennsner-Jedenastik 2016). In studying the economic policy agenda of parties election manifestos have a few important drawbacks: in manifestos parties can afford to be vague, inconsistent and send mixed signals. Moreover, as radical right-wing populist parties tend to keep these documents short and focus on issues like safety and immigration, the economic policy paragraphs can be relatively short. Expert surveys in contrast have the problem that one can only study what the scholarly community already expects to be present at the time of the survey. It is difficult to test to what extent new social-economic concepts such as ‘economic populism’ or ‘economic nativism’ matter in previous periods if those questions were not included in pre-existing surveys. This study focuses on parties’ activity in parliament. Here parties have to write clear policy positions if they propose a motion. Moreover, in parliament, parties accrue a large number of proposals that allow for a more extensive empirical basis. Specifically, this analysis will look at the substantial proposals PVV members make in the form of motions (also called resolutions). When adopted these are non-binding expressions of the opinion of parliament. In practice they can be used by parliament to direct the government to propose certain legislation or interpret legislation in a particular way.

This paper examines motions proposed by the PVV in the lower house of the Dutch Parliament concerning economic policies. The individual unit of measurement is the motion. These can be aggregated for different periods or categories. Looking at all motions proposed between 2004 and 2015 (which can be accessed through Louwse et al. (2017)), the motions where a PVV MP was the first sponsor are selected. Multiple MPs can sponsor motions, but the first sponsor is the author of the text. Note that there are practically no restrictions to introducing a motion by a single MP except for that it must pertain to an issue that is discussed in parliament; a large number of economic motions are introduced in the yearly budget debates when any issue concerning the policy of a government department can be debated. From all motions, those motions were selected that were classified under the labels ‘work’, ‘finance’, ‘economics’, ‘education’, ‘health’, ‘housing’ and ‘social security’ by the clerk of the lower house. This includes all motions that were proposed during yearly budgetary discussions. Motions that concern agriculture, defence, justice and transport were excluded: although many of these motions concerned economic issues in this sense that the PVV favoured or opposed defence, justice and transport spending, these issues are disregarded because they tend to defy a left-right logic with left-wing parties proposing to cut spending on these issues and right-wing parties asking for more spending on those issues. By excluding these issues the likelihood of finding more consistent left-right positioning for the PVV is increased; something, that goes against the expectation of this paper.

<FIGURE 1>

Out of a total of 3953 PVV motions 864 were economic in nature (22% of all motions). This is a considerable share of the party’s activities. The introduction defined economic issues as all ways in which the government can intervene or abstain from intervening in the economy. A motion was deemed economic if it obliged the government spend or tax more or less, or if it obliged the government to decrease or increase regulation in economic sectors. All coding was done by the author. Figure 1 shows that as a share of total activity of the party, economic issues have become more important. The bars are years, unless there have been elections, in which case the years are split in before and after the election periods. In the period that Wilders was an independent MP, he proposed only two motions that touch on economic issues. In

the period in which the party was in opposition against the centre-left Balkenende IV government economic motions made up less than 15% of the total. The period 2010-2012 when the party was a support party sees the largest increase. After this year the share of economic proposals flattens out to about 30%.

The key question is whether radical right-wing parties consistently make statements that go in a left or right-wing direction, or whether their position is mixed. The economic left and right motions are defined in the following way: economic left-wing motions seek to (1) increase the government's role in the economy by nationalizing sectors or increasing taxation, regulation and government spending and (2) increase economic equality through redistribution of income or by choosing the interests of weaker parties (such as employees) over stronger ones (such as employers); economic right-wing motions seek to (1) reduce the government's role in the economy by privatizing or liberalizing sectors or lowering taxation, regulation and government spending and fighting government waste or (2) decrease economic equality by limiting access to the benefits of the welfare state or by making those who benefit from services pay for them, and choosing the interest of stronger parties (such as employers) over weaker ones (such as employees). A separate category was made for motions that were neither left nor right-wing. This includes motions that are budget-neutral (for instance proposing a spending increase in healthcare and an equivalent cut to subsidies for the arts), motions oriented at providing or declining public services to specific groups, without noting that this would lead to less spending overall, international economic issues (e.g. Eurozone membership), motions oriented at valence goals such as growth, stability or fighting fraud and motions concerning the organization of specific (semi-)public economic agencies.

<TABLE 1>

Next up are the economic interpretations of radical right-wing populism: economic populism, authoritarianism and nativism. These are approached as frames. This is not because radical right-wing populism is seen here as merely a rhetorical style (as some have argued about populism - f.i. Jagers and Walgrave 2007), but because this ideology expresses itself as frames in written documents. They are the observable expressions of these ideologies in these texts. These frames are present when an opposition is drawn between two groups. As discussed above each of the

frames draw upon some opposition: between the people and the elite in populism; between national groups and foreigners in nativism; between the deserving poor and undeserving poor in authoritarianism. A frame is present when motions explicitly mentions at least one of the two groups or uses language that implicitly refers to these groups: if one would only rely on explicit mentions of these groups, motions in which these groups are reified would be excluded, such as motions that refer to managers as ‘overhead’. Categorization is not exclusive: a motion can be right-wing, economically nativist and economically populist at the same time. Table 1 provide some examples of referents.

When looking at the left-right position of the PVV, the left-right balance is reported. This is the share of left-wing motions in a year is subtracted from the share of right-wing motions. If all motions are right-wing the value is one; if all motions are left-wing the value is minus one. The value is zero if there is a balance between left-wing and right-wing motions or if all motions are neutral.

5. Results

The core argument of this paper is that we can understand the mixing of economically left and right policies of radical right-wing populist parties by referring to their economic nativism, economic populism and economic authoritarianism. Before we look at the intersection of these, it may be useful to see how comprehensive and consistent these categories are.

The categories of left and right perform are more comprehensive than the categories economic nativism, authoritarianism and populism. 72% of the motions could be characterized as either left or right-wing. The remaining 28% was coded as neither: these could for instance mix left-wing and right-wing proposals or were concerned with valence goals such as fighting fraud. In comparison: 55% of motions can be characterized as either economic populist, authoritarian and nativist: more than half of the motions can be linked to these core aspects of radical right-wing populist parties, but almost half cannot. 24% of the motions is economic nativist. 90% of those mention a foreign group (that should be excluded) and 30% a national group (that should benefit). This group includes both welfare chauvinist motions that seek to exclude migrant groups from accessing the welfare state, but also motions that advocate protectionist policies, such as keeping Dutch control over vital economic sectors. It is clear that the economic nativist policies of the PVV go beyond ‘welfare

chauvinism’: 103 motions are welfare chauvinist if one takes a broad approach and argues that policies that concern education, health, housing, labour, labour migration and social affairs and that are economic nationalist are welfare chauvinist. That is two-thirds of economic nationalist motions, but only 12% of all economic motions. 17% of motions is economic populist. 99% mention an elite group that should be made worse off. 38% of motions mention some ‘people’ group who should be made better off. The top categories that use this frame are in healthcare and government (where public sector management is the focus) or enterprise (most of which focus on the failing bank management after the financial crisis). 16% of motions is authoritarian. 58% of these mention a deserving group that should benefit. 43% of these mention a non-deserving group that should not benefit. Most of these motions focus on healthcare and to a lesser extent social security (where seniors are quite clearly the deserving group).

One additional question that comes up is to what extent economic nationalism and economic authoritarianism that are often equated in the literature are actually empirically distinct (Norocel 2016; Schumacher and Van Kersbergen 2016; Mudde 2007). When one strictly looks the coding the overlap is small: only in a limited number of occasions (12 motions) the undeserving group is equated with a foreign group. So empirically these two are different. At the same time there are differences between the recipients of the kind of social security schemes that the PVV seeks to boost (such as the government insured minimum pension (‘AOW’)) and those that it seeks to limit access to (such as the welfare scheme *‘bijstand’* that every legal resident without means to survive in the Netherlands can call on) under the banner of its economic authoritarianism: according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (2015) 3% of people with a Dutch passport rely on welfare compared to 11% of non-Dutch people who live in the Netherlands; in contrast 20% of residents of the Netherlands whose parents are both born in the Netherlands receive a government insured pension; compared to only 11% of residents of the Netherlands one of whose parents is not born in the Netherlands (CBS 2016). Boosting pension spending and limiting welfare spending can be understood from an economic nationalist perspective.

41% of motions that the PVV proposed was economic right-wing and 31% economic left-wing. The party quite clearly mixes left-wing and right-wing positions; neither left nor right has a majority when it comes to all proposals. The party cannot be consistently characterized as left or right-wing. In terms of economic

authoritarianism, nativism and populism the party is far more consistent than on the left-right dimension. Two motions could be characterized as anti-nativist;² four motions could be characterized as anti-populist;³ and a single motion as anti-authoritarian. The PVV is more consistently economically populist, authoritarian and nativist than it is economically left- or right-wing.

<TABLE 2>

The next question is to what extent the mix of left and right policies that others have observed for radical right-wing populist parties (Mudde 2007; De Lange 2007; Rovny 2013) can be explained by reference to the party's economic populism, economic nativism and economic authoritarianism. Table 2 shows how the mix between left-right policies matches with economic nativism, populism and authoritarianism. When one looks at economic nativist motions, one can see a right-wing slant: only 6% of these motions are left-wing. A large share of these motions is neither left- or right-wing: note that motions concerning international economic affairs (such as those calling for the Netherlands leaving the Eurozone) were coded as neither left or right-wing. When one looks at economic authoritarian motions one can see a mix as well. The differentiation between deserving and undeserving poor is useful to understand this mix. Motions that mention deserving poor groups (pensioners, handicapped) are 73% left-wing and only 7% right-wing: they are aimed at increasing services for these deserving groups. Motions that mention undeserving poor groups (fraudsters, junkies, bullies) are 71% right-wing and only 4% left-wing: these proposals seek to cut services to undeserving groups. The mix of left and right-wing policies here is not due to inconsistency but actually a reflection of consistent economic authoritarianism that differentiates between deserving poor groups who should be supported ('left-wing') and undeserving poor groups who should not be supported ('right-wing'). Where it comes to economic populist motions a similar combination of right and left-wing policies can be observed. One can differentiate this cluster by distinguishing between motions that target the private sector (e.g. energy,

² Both motions called to defund Dutch development organizations for their opposition to the Israeli government

³ These sought for instance to maintain distinction between research universities and universities of applied science

communication, banking) and motions that target the public sector (e.g. healthcare, education, government). When economic populism is applied to the private sector the PVV predominantly makes left-wing proposals: they seek to regulate irresponsible businesses, such as the banking sector after the financial crisis. When economic populism is applied to the public sector left and right-wing policies hold each other in balance: left-wing populist motions could aim at redistribution for instance by paying top-level civil servants less and street-level civil servants more, while right-wing populist motions often simply propose cuts in spending or bureaucracy. These results show that economic authoritarianism, economic nativism and to a lesser extent economic populism can be used to understand why these parties are seen as mixing left and right-wing policies. These parties seek to restrict access to the welfare state for some groups (immigrants and fraudsters) while at the same time expanding welfare for other groups (e.g. seniors). They propose economic populist policies that would limit the power of and spending on managers and bureaucrats. In the private sector, such proposals are left-wing.

Still, there are the 45% of motions that were neither economic nationalist, economic authoritarian or economic populist. 47% of these motions is right-wing and 35% left-wing. Half of the right-wing motions that are not economic populist, authoritarian or nationalist are anti-tax motions. Nearly a quarter of these motions oppose regulations for enterprises. Conceptually, these motions come close to the neo-liberal populism that opposes the state ('the elite') to hard-working employees and business owners ('the people'), but they do not tend equate the intervening state and the elite explicitly. Finally, there are the left-wing motions that do not use an explicit populist, authoritarian or nationalist frame. Nearly half of these motions concerns health followed by around an eighth of these motions that concern pensions. These motions, however, do not refer to (un)deserving groups. It could be easy to link these right-wing motions to a neo-liberal version of economic populism (opposed to the government taking away hard-working citizens money) or the left-wing ones to the party's economic authoritarianism (healthcare mainly benefits deserving groups), but the research strategy here specifically needed framing devices such as the identification of deserving or undeserving, people or elite, foreign or national groups to justify linking these motions to these categories, therefore this study is likely to underestimate the importance of party's populism, authoritarianism and nativism for its economic policies.

This clearly shows that the economic populism, economic authoritarianism and economic nativism of the PVV underlie its mix of economic left and right-wing policies. Because of its economic authoritarianism the party can unite left-wing and right-wing positions on economic issues by distinguishing between deserving poor whose hardship is due to circumstances beyond their control and should not be helped and undeserving poor whose poverty is due to their own moral failing and should not be helped. Economic nativist motions added to the party's right-wing slant, where economic populist motions that concerned the private sector counterbalanced this.

6. Conclusion

How should one characterize the economic agenda of radical right-wing populists? This article applied the group-based account developed by Ennser-Jedenastik (2016) to the Dutch PVV and showed that the core elements of radical right-wing populism, their populism, nativism and their authoritarianism informs more consistently than the terms 'left' and 'right' do. One can roughly summarize the radical right-wing populist economic agenda as follows: it desires government action in the economy oriented at the needs of a deserving poor group, such as seniors, and not at bureaucrats ('the elite'), immigrants ('the other') and lazy people who can but refuse to work ('the undeserving').

This paper sought to show how the approach of Ennser-Jedenastik (2016) and the conventional left-right approach could be reconciled. In a left-right analysis the PVV would be placed in the centre or its position would be characterized as 'blurred'. The mixing and matching of left and right-wing perspectives is the expression of different elements that form a coherent whole: the PVV wants to increase pensions and healthcare provisions for seniors and decrease bonuses for managers of failing banks and in the public sector (left-wing) but opposes welfare state benefits going to immigrants or fraudsters and it opposes bail-outs that do not benefit the national economy (right-wing). Even when it comes to policies that were not characterized here as an expression of the party's populism, authoritarianism or nativism, one can see a conscious selection of right and left-wing policies rather than centrism or blurring. The party opposes taxation (right-wing) and favours a strong healthcare sector (left-wing). This shows that economic populism, economic authoritarianism and economic nativism are much more worthwhile to understand the economic policies of radical right-wing populist parties than the terms left and right.

This paper extends the work of Ennser-Jedenastik (2016) by showing that populism, nativism and authoritarianism, were not just relevant for welfare policies but also for the general economic policy of radical right-wing populist parties. For instance, the PVV is welfare chauvinist, but it would be too limited to leave the party's economic nativism to that. Rather in their economic nativism there are also seeds for the opposition to foreign trade, foreign take-overs of key national industries and financial transfers to foreign countries.

So what do these results mean beyond the border of the Dutch case? First, by applying the group-based account developed for the programs of FPÖ to the parliamentary resolutions of the PVV, this article corroborated the external validity of this account. It is likely that other right-wing populist parties with similar profiles from similar countries will have similar economic agendas. Even if these parties differ in their position on the left-right dimension, their populism, authoritarianism and nativism is likely to inform their economic ideology. The Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*) or the True Finns (*Perussuomalaiset*) are likely cases to have very similar economic policy platforms to the PVV and the FPÖ. Some radical right-wing populist parties may veer more clearly to the economic right, such as the UK Independence Party, the Norwegian Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*) and the Swiss People's Party (*Schweizerische Volkspartei*). It seems likely that they will then also prioritize their economic populism against government elites and economic nativism and block the access of immigrants to the welfare state. Other parties, such as the French National Front (*Front National*) may veer more clearly to the left (Ivaldi 2015). They will be more likely to emphasize their economic authoritarianism and nativism and distinguish between native, deserving poor who should be given more support and foreign, undeserving poor who should not. Future research may want to determine to what extent authoritarianism, populism and nativism can be seen in the economic policies of other radical right-wing populist parties and to what extent this party family may stand more united on the economic implications of its radical right-wing populism than on the left-right dimension.

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Table 1: Referents of Economic Populism, Nationalism and Authoritarianism

Aspect		Referent 1		Referent 2
Economic Populism	Elite	Civil Servants Directors of schools Directors of hospitals Directors of public housing companies Directors of the postal service Fraudulent bankers The king Politicians	People	Dutch taxpayers “Normal” citizens Parents, pupils and students Patients Employees Hard-working business owners All of us
Economic Nationalism	Foreign	Illegal Immigrants Labour Immigrants Moroccan Thugs Foreigners Bulgarians Poles Romanians Turks Muslims	Native	Hardworking Dutch people Dutch taxpayers Dutch citizens Dutch students Dutch employees
Economic Authoritarianism	Undeserving	Beggars Welfare fraudsters Welfare recipients who use violence against civil servants Young people younger than 27 People who can but refuse to work Bullies	Deserving	Seniors Pensioners Children Vulnerable Seniors Senior unemployed people Handicapped Patients


Table 2: Ideological Orientation and Economic Nationalism, Authoritarianism and Populism

Orientation	All	Economic Nationalism	Economic Authoritarianism		Economic Populism		Others
			Deserving	Undeserving	Public Sector	Private Sector	
Left	31%	6%	73%	4%	30%	76%	35%
Neither	28%	49%	19%	24%	37%	20%	17%
Right	41%	44%	8%	71%	33%	4%	47%
Balance	+10	+38	-66	+67	+2	-72	+12
N	875	209	90	96	126	26	394

Balance: percentage of right-wing motions minus the percentage of left-wing motions

N: Number of motions

Figure 1: Share of Economic Motions



Share of all PVV motions that concern economic issues over time.