Security & citizenship: becoming political in securitised sites

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Introduction

In this paper we argue that the concept of citizenship can be a vehicle for politicizing securitised sites. We read security as a depoliticizing technique of governance that ‘erases’ political agency that is historically invested in the democratic category of ‘the people’. This is slightly different from – but not unrelated to – arguments emphasising the instrumental and technological depoliticizing of value deliberations – i.e. the reduction of value rationality to instrumental, technocratic rationality in politics. In this paper de-politicizing means: governing work upon bodies of collective and individual subjects that either excludes them from the political field or implicates them in the reproduction of docility and existing stratifications and exclusions.

In articulating such a problématique we are raising a certain number of questions: What can becoming political in sites pervaded by securitizing practices mean? And more specifically, what conception of citizenship can be a vehicle for recovering political agency of ‘the people’ from within security knowledge? What conception of citizenship can make visible the capacity for and practices of transforming stratifications and power relations by claiming citizenship within securitised sites? Security studies thus offer citizenship studies with a specific locus where the processes by which citizenship constitutes ‘the people’ and ‘the people’ citizenship can be fruitfully problematised. Securitised sites force us to transcend the traditional conception of citizenship-as-status and citizenship-as-practice to concentrate on citizenship-as-process. ‘The people’ that are facing securitised sites can hold or not the status and are constituted by the practices and technologies at work in such sites but their ways of transforming, and we will argue through forms of re-appropriation, these sites all participate in citizenship-as-process. To concentrate on what Isin calls acts of citizenship is to put forward this processual dimension and to situate political agency as a way to re-instate within these the programmatic unfolding of securitising a form of unfinalizability within securitised sites.

The paper starts from the assumption that security studies develop a dominantly dystopian view of security practice. They emphasise the structuring, dominating, politically debilitating nature of security practices and technologies. Conceptions of transformative agency enter either as an after-thought (something that exists and needs to be researched but is not really researched as such) or as a normative call for the need to recover agency. We then use Etienne Balibar’s notion of citizenship and Engin Isin’s conception of acts of citizenship to turn the emphasis around. It leads to an agenda for privileging the question of transformative political agency in analysing the politics of insecurity. The purpose is not a naïve assertion of the existence of people’s agency or the recovering of revolutionary practices. Security technologies and practices are heavily structuring social, economic, environmental and many other relations, but while security studies privileges the unpacking of the structuring power of security practice, we develop conceptual vehicles that privilege analyses of
appropriative capacities and practices in securitised sites. Instead of studying the securitising effects and slotting in an after thought on resistance, possibilities and desirability of change, the purpose of this paper is to introduce a conception of citizenship that makes the after-thought the key vehicle for interpreting the politics of insecurity in securitised sites.

**Security: techniques of governing insecurity**

Languages of dangers, insecurities, fears, and anxieties are widely dispersed within Western societies today. Many issues and policy developments are accounted for in terms of security. Living together, in its everydayness, is being heavily mediated by representations of insecurities, ranging from deadly bacteria to nuclear terrorism. We can read these languages as both symptomatic and constitutive of reconfigurations in political, security, media and other fields of practice. Neat distinctions between policing and defence, high politics and low politics for example don’t work very well for understanding how surveillance technologies connect terrorism, identity fraud, welfare provisions, and counter-terrorism intelligence. Currently the security field has been reconfigured in such a way that police, military and in other sectors humanitarian, development or environmental organizations operate within the same field, competing over resources, expertise, etc. The classical categories of security studies such as ‘protecting public order’ and ‘interstate enmity’ are a little too static to grasp the way in which the media for example can let insecurities float from cleaning products over teenage behaviour to the rise of China as a new superpower.

In the discipline of international relations, security studies have mirrored these developments. From a narrow focus on military dimensions of interstate relations it expanded from the 1980s onwards into a much wider field of interests.\(^1\) Its understanding of security widened to economic, environmental, societal and political insecurities and deepened to notions of individual, regional and global security.\(^2\) Arguably more important however was that a significant group of scholars turned away from unpacking the reality value of threats, credible counter policies and the strategic interactions that emanate from them. Instead they started looking at how security practice itself constitutes insecurities; how security is not a question of a given threat but of a definitional process of securitising issues. Using security language is then no longer simply a matter of talking about insecurities that exist outside of the language. Instead the language itself plays an important role in making issues like migration or the environment into security questions upon which security institutions can act legitimately.\(^3\) Also the relation between security professionals is then not determined by seeking efficient and effective responses to new threats. Instead they exist in a field where they compete with one another to bring their

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expertise but also their organizational and economic resources to bear upon policy questions by framing them as insecurities. It leads to a view in which institutionally available solutions define the problem rather than the other way around. For example, the victory of home and justice affairs ministries over the foreign affairs ministries in the Schengen negotiations in Europe has played a significant role in the constitution of an internal security *problematique* in the European integration process.

The latter approaches treat security less as a problem and more as techniques of governing, i.e. methods and strategies of doing things in a security way. It has led to a rich body of analyses of the political and social constructions of insecurities. These approaches also more easily move between terrains of life that academically are often kept apart because of disciplinary boundaries. Therefore they are well positioned to study the dispersal of insecurity languages and security technologies and strategies. Although they often have an explicit normative and political orientation, or at least sensitivity, they focus on securitising process and in doing so often present security sites as depoliticized in the specific sense that the structuring effects of security practice take on an elitist, technocratic or systemic mode.

Governing through security is often seen as a depoliticizing move. Its depoliticising nature differs according to the specifics of the security practice. But in each case, securitizing practices emerge as curtailing central dimensions of modern democratic politics. A first securitising technique frames politics in exceptionalist terms. Security practice consists in declaring existential threats to a state or community which demands emergency measures if the community is to survive. Asserting insecurity consists in making sharp distinctions between friends and enemies and positing a need for swift decisions. All other activities need to be subordinated to and functionalised for dealing with the existential threat because if the threat is not dealt with the community will be destroyed and all other activities and policy priorities will be destroyed with it. In this rendition securitising thus implies a decisionist move. In concrete political terms this means that executive government claims a necessity to act beyond the constraints of the rule of law. This security technique is articulated and contested in the contemporary debates about the balance between liberty and security and its revaluation. Securitising depoliticizes in a number of way here. First, it poses

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the logic of necessity against logics of freedom and deliberation. To retain freedom one needs to postpone deliberative politics and the freedom to articulate different positions because of the necessity to unite against the enemy. Secondly, securitising contains an authoritarian move in which the sovereign ruler, embodied in the executive or the president, claims a monopoly of deciding, temporarily or permanently, what is right and wrong. In doing so, they side line other mechanisms and institutions of decision making, like inter-institutional checks and balances and pluralist interest representation. Finally, exceptionalist politics assert the primacy of an existential dialectic between friends and enemies. It displaces politics, which is necessarily based on an orientation towards one another, with relations aimed at elimination or effacement.

A second securitising practice consists in configuring security fields in which security professionals and experts compete over resources but most importantly over what counts as proper security knowledge and technology. Securitising is here not first of all a matter of declaring exceptional circumstances by evoking existential threats, but the formation of competitions and relations of domination between security professionals. For example, the idea that contemporary insecurities question the distinction between internal and external security is not a question of the transversal nature of security threats, e.g. environmental or migratory developments, but rather a matter of military, police, environmental experts, and various intelligence branches being interlocked in a struggle over resources, the definition of the nature of insecurity, the most effective security knowledge, and distributions of security tasks. The blurring of internal and external security is the result of reconfigurations in the field of security professionals, among others because the police credibly claims expertise to work abroad, e.g. in peace building initiatives, and because the military claims an expert contribution to policing tasks and/or humanitarian operations. The politics of insecurity are not in the first instance about the government declaring emergency situations and its contestation but rather the competition and struggle between professionals of security who claim a monopoly over the proper definition of insecurities. They are trained to do security and they do it as a full time job; they embody a security routine.


A third securitising practice works through the constitution of cultures of fear. Advertising, the media and popular culture continuously disperse images and narratives of insecurities into everyday life. Dangers, safety, infections, etc. are seen as becoming central to how people mediate their relations to one another, commodities, and the environment. Fear is seen as having a paralysing effect on citizens. Cultures of fear make people focus on their own safety and on the many minuscule and big dangers of life rather than the conflicts and stratifications in society. The citizenry imperative to mobilise against injustices and on policy decisions is then severely reduced. Cultures of fear are seen to depoliticise by producing docile, politically passive citizens.\[14\]

Finally, securitising can also be seen to work through technologies of government. Specifically the dispersal and use of surveillance technology and the development of governing through risk in many areas of life work insecurities into a disciplining technique and a technique discriminating through categorising populations and sites of life in terms of degrees of riskiness. These securitising practices are often seen to implicate people in their own subordination. The disciplining effects of surveillance work by people incorporating their visibility to authorities in their everyday practice; being visible makes them act in accordance to expected norms and patterns. Besides disciplining, risk technologies in particular make freedom of people into a governmental technique. Freedom is not something external to power relations but becomes incorporated into governing technologies as a requirement of subjects to be free to choose responsibly. It is a technique of governance based on a market analogy. The market produces its structuring or governing effects through the free, self-interested practices of individuals. Individuals are thus required to constitute themselves in terms of market freedom for the market to operate. These securitisations are depoliticising because they implicate subjectivities in the reproduction of their own domination and subordination.\[15\]

That securitizing is depoliticizing does not mean that security practice is uncontested. Exceptionalist securitising often involves a severe contestation between sections of the juridical profession and the government. The field of security professionals is a strongly contested field in which various professional organizations compete and negotiate over insecurities, resources, etc. All four securitising practices share however that they neutralise or ignore the political agency that is in democratic traditions referred to as the power or sovereignty of the ‘people’. Securitising depoliticizes because it produces an absence: the capacity of ordinary people to emancipate from and appropriate securitised sites. In securitized sites ‘the people’ are acted upon, acted for or implicated in the reproduction of political docility. Critical security studies literature unpacks these processes and often incorporates the idea that it is possible to re-appropriate political agency within securitised sites. However, the question of resisting political agency often comes towards the conclusion or as an aside rather than as the main interest of the analysis. Despite the political and


normative orientation of critical security studies, they therefore produce knowledge that mainly draws attention to the structuring effects of securitizing practices while leaving the possibility for challenging agency hanging in the air as an abstract possibility. In that sense, ‘the sovereignty of the people’ remains an afterthought in security studies; securitised sites and securitising practices are not studied in the first instance from the perspective of the practices of resistance that take place.\footnote{There are exceptions. However, mostly this research is not primarily identified as security studies research. Consequently it is not taken up sufficiently in this field of study for the original intervention they actually make to it. For example: Rutvica Andrijasevic, 'Trafficking in Women and the Politics of Mobility in Europe' (Doctoral, Universiteit van Utrecht, 2004), Peter Nyers, 'No one is illegal between city and nation', in Acts of Citizenship, ed. Engin F. Isin and Greg M. Nielsen (London: Zed Books, 2008), Peter Nyers, Rethinking Refugees: Beyond the Politics of Emergency (London: Routledge, 2006), Peter Nyers, 'Taking rights, mediating wrongs: disagreements over the political agency of non-status refugees', in The Politics of Protection. Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency, ed. Jef Huysmans, Andrew Dobson and Raia Prokhovnik (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephenson and Vassilis Tsianos, Escape Routes. Control and Subversion in the 21st Century (London: Pluto Press, 2008).}

Something similar can be said about an important part of the citizenship literature that looks at how securitising processes work citizenship. They mainly analyse how security practice render conceptions of citizenship, reinforcing the highly structuring and exclusionary capacity of security techniques through renditions of citizenship. The power is with the governing technology and governing apparatuses. They are historicized and contextualised structurational analyses of citizenship. The question of resistance and transformative and appropriative capacity at best emerges as an after thought, very much like in critical security studies.\footnote{This literature is not homogenous. It includes arguments driven by universal human rights, the primacy of humanitarian needs, the primacy of individuals and their needs over the collective, the use of insecurity claims to mobilise against instituted relations of domination, etc. But they share a set of ideas that can be grasped under the heading ‘human security’.}

Let’s take the after-thought more serious and make it the ‘fore-thought’. Hence our question: can citizenship be a vehicle for introducing political agency, for rendering strategic and tactical action in which ‘the people’ have political agency. How do we theorize the afterthought so that it frames an agenda that makes it the central in-road into studying a politics of insecurity that has a place for the political tradition inscribed in the idea of sovereignty of the people?

Before venturing into this terrain, we need to briefly respond to positions that seek to address the structurationist orientation of security studies by calling for a redefinition of security as human security. They translate the priority of ‘the people’ over governmental apparatuses and techniques into an argument for giving priority to security claims in the name of humanity and for letting individual needs normatively prevail over national security claims.\footnote{Andrew Linklater, 'Political community and human security', in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, ed. Ken Booth (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005).} Often they bring a cosmopolitan position to bear upon securitising practices that emphasise the need to protect national citizens. However, human security is not a particularly useful vehicle for inserting political
agency of ‘the people’ into securitised sites. It tends to present subjects as driven by needs and/or as victims. Both renditions neutralise the social, political and economic conflicts that refugees, ‘trafficked’ women, inhabitants of slums enact. They are mainly spoken for and they are often rendered as subjects not capable of serious political voice because of the structural and/or psychological situation they find themselves in.\footnote{Claudia Aradau, \textit{Rethinking Trafficking in Women. Politics out of Security} (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2008), Nyers, \textit{Rethinking Refugees: Beyond the Politics of Emergency}.} In addition, by using security language to introduce humanity as a critical political question sites of human security practice open up for the involvement of more traditional security agencies, technologies and frameworks. Human security practice therefore reconfigures in some instances sites of humanitarian and development practice in such a way that security agencies become a legitimate part of the competition over the definition of the problem, the solutions and the resources.\footnote{Mark Duffield, \textit{Development, Security and Unending War. Governing the World of Peoples} (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), Mark Duffield, \textit{Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security} (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2001).} Finally, those human security approaches favouring references to the security of the individual over the security of the citizen, reproduce an individualising effect which is a depoliticizing move in modern politics. Social conflict and the collective enactment and contestations of stratifications and exclusions tend to become a more private and particular matter of individuals rather than an attempt to express conflicts as a matter that should define the collective. Not the individual is the issue but the stratifications and exclusions worked by securitising practices and how humanitarianism enacts them.\footnote{Jennifer Hyndman, \textit{Managing Displacement. Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).} To sum, although human security is central to critical knowledge and politics in the security area since the UNDP posited it in the struggle over the peace dividend after the end of Cold War, its governmental rationale and the way it plays out institutionally imposes serious obstacles to insert collective political agency of ‘the people’ in securitized sites. It has at best a limited capacity for remedying the depoliticising effects of securitising knowledge and practice.

**Citizenship between statecraft and popular sovereignty**

‘Citizenship’ is not an obvious concept for making the move to upfront the afterthought. Citizenship is indeed generally considered as a status formally delineating individuals’ horizontal and vertical relations within a polity. Although it draws attention to a right, or a duty, of being political\footnote{Engin F. Isin, \textit{Being Political. Genealogies of Citizenship} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 1.}, citizenship is also a process drawing our attention to how such delineation comes to being in the first place; citizenship henceforth is also an instrument of statecraft and domination. For example, Rebecca Kingston shows how banishment changed in 19\textsuperscript{th} century France from a criminal justice practice to a practice asserting the state as an entity that can take citizenship rights from its subjects. In doing so, the idea of citizenship implying universal rights that a people hold irrespective of their status and lineage shifts to the universal rights of citizenship becoming a privilege granted by the state.\footnote{Rebecca Kingston, 'The unmaking of citizens: banishment and the modern citizenship regime in France', \textit{Citizenship Studies} 9, no. 1 (2005).} Peter Nyers makes a similar argument in relation to the notion of ‘accidental citizenship’ as employed in the US after the attacks of 11 September 2001. ‘Accidental citizenship’ is a pejorative way of referring to citizenship conferred upon individuals born in the
US to non-US citizen parents. He argues that the idea of such citizenship being accidental has been used in the US to take citizenship away from US citizens.25

In both cases, citizenship is not a universal right that individuals hold in their relation to a state but an instrument of crafting the state as an entity that has a monopoly over the legitimate granting and taking away of rights. In doing so, citizenship is an instrument through which the state asserts itself as a governing entity with the power to work universal rights into privileges. Securitising plays a significant role in legitimating these practices. Claiming that the security of the state is at stake is central to justifying challenges to the universality of rights among the body of citizens. The state crafts itself and its people in the name of its own security.

“Under the old regime, banishment was a sentence used for reasons of public security and often levied against vagabonds as a means to rid a jurisdiction of the groups of people most likely to commit crimes of assault and theft. In contrast, we no longer see banishment in the 1810 code in relation to matters of everyday public security, but rather to matters of state. As presented by Count Berlier in a further elaboration on the new legislation, banishment like deportation would be used by courts in instances where the acts of individuals indirectly compromised state security, such as in disobeying certain orders or communicating inappropriate information to enemies short of aiding and abetting invasion (matters of outright rebellion and treason were punishable by death).”26

In addition, citizenship is heavily shaped and reshaped by dispersed governmental practice. Here the issue is not how state institutions craft themselves as a state that unifies a people by making citizenship into privilege. Rather at issue is how dispersed practices of governing insecurities, for example through the spread of biotechnological surveillance, work upon citizenship. For example, Benjamin Muller argues that biometric management of identity works citizenship differently from conventional ways of determining identity, access and entitlements. Among others securitized citizenship does not depend on a sharp distinction between enemies and friends but on establishing authentic identities.27 Engin Isin develops the argument that neoliberal politics have moved into what he calls ‘neuropolitics’ in which subjects are governed through working upon affects and especially anxieties and fears rather than reason and instrumental rationality. This Neuropolitics constitutes a new citizen, the neurotic citizen, who exists in conjunction with the rational citizen.28 In these analyses citizenship remains something that is subjected to and constituted by (changes in) governmental practice rather than a vehicle for becoming political in the sense of challenging and disrupting, however fleetingly and momentarily, stratifications and exclusions that are instituted by securitising governmental practices and practices of statecraft. As a category, citizenship is fully implicated if not exhausted by securitising practices. Why then do we think citizenship can be a vehicle for politicizing securitising sites?

Citizenship cannot be reduced to a tool of statecraft or something that is governed. It contains irresolvable tensions that make it a political rather than simply a

27 Benjamin Muller, '(Dis)qualified bodies: securitization, citizenship and 'identity management'', *Citizenship Studies* 8, no. 3 (2004).
governmental category. 

Citizenship does not only refer to the constitution of a polity by granting and guaranteeing rights and by narrating and ritualising a people as citizenry into being. Indeed, citizenship constitutes what Bonnie Honig calls a “dilemmatic space”, whereby ‘the people’ is constituted as a political agent not through discrete events but through an on-going positioning on “multiple, conflictual axes of identity/difference such that [the people’s political] agency itself is constituted, even enabled—and not simply paralyzed—by daily dilemmatic choices and negotiations”.

It includes the idea that rights, membership and political legitimacy are subjected to political contestation among ‘the people’.

The politicizing nature of citizenship rests on the excessive nature of the category of the ‘people’. This category is limited neither to the assertion of a common body of members of a polity nor to statutory participation of members in the political field. Tensions with a capacity to rip apart statutory, cultural and territorial conscriptions of the citizenry are immanent to the category of ‘the people’. Both the idea of popular sovereignty and histories of the political mobilization of masses of people in the name of justice and equality historically carry this excessive political dimension of ‘the people’ and therefore of the notion of citizenship. The historical political factualness of the masses and the political authorizing effects of popular sovereignty make citizenship into a vehicle that cannot be fully embraced by statecraft (or, in a world where political community is not necessarily reduced to states, of ‘polity-craft’) and governance but remains a resource for challenging them.

More specifically two aporia – insolvable impasses because of equally valid but inconsistent principles or premises – play a central role. First, citizenship addresses the question of constituting political community among a plurality of people. It is therefore one of the issues through which the aporia of democratic politics requiring the coexistence of the constitution of unity and the existence of plurality is expressed and negotiated. Citizenship unifies a body of individuals and groups into a political ‘people’. It does not only express formal relations existing between individuals and the state, but more fundamentally it expresses a central feature of a polity’s self-understanding and representation: To be citizen means to be part of an imagined political community as well as to participate in a political and national collective project.

This process is inherently tensional because the people need to exist as parts of a common will while at the same time they need to remain a plurality of wills that negotiate their living together. The people need to be real enough to exist as an autonomous force in their relation to the governmental and political institutions but they also need to be unreal enough so as not to delete individuals as rights holders.

The immanence of popular sovereignty to the idea of citizenship implies that this tension can never be overcome. Political authorities work the unity of the plural wills and claim to represent the community and its interests. But their claims are necessarily hypocritical because for politics to continue they cannot delete the plurality of wills and therefore the full unity and complete representation of the people is impossible. The political rulers cannot absorb the community of autonomous

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29 Etienne Balibar, Droit de cité (Paris: Quadrige/puf, 2002), 175-204.
32 Balibar, Droit de cité, 181.
people with different opinions from which they derive their legitimacy. The inscription of popular sovereignty into modern conceptions of politics and political authority prevent this. The mechanism of representation can therefore not close. It cannot transcend plurality into self-sufficient unity where the people are indeed one rather than many.

This inherent tension in political representation is not limited to representing a plurality of opinion. It is also about the articulation of social conflicts and struggles in the name of or in reference to the political community. In other words, political representation is not limited to the pluralist problem of aggregating opinions and interests into a collective equilibrium. It is also about representing the collective as a unity consisting of conflicts. This requires the representation of social conflicts as immanent to the polity. Citizenship is then a vehicle for translating conflicts over social stratifications, class, discriminations, etc. into political issues that bear upon and become an inherent part of the definition of the polity. For example, racial and gender discriminations and the conflicts they imply become political through a struggle for representing these conflicts as something that concerns the polity and that forms a legitimate terrain for political mobilization within the polity.

The second tension that is immanent to notions of citizenship draws on the idea of the people as equal, rather than their unity in plurality. Citizenship is an instrument of crafting a people of equals in which rights are universal and not a privilege. However, citizenship is always also an instrument of divisions, of dividing the masses into political individuals as citizens and non-political groups as vulgus or multitude. On the one hand the masses comprise a people united around a body of law and rights and/or a common origin, both of which allow the people to recognize themselves as a collective unity and a body of individuals with political status. On the other the masses comprise those without rights or limited rights, those who remain outside of the community of origin, the ‘undisciplined’ rabble … Citizenship has historically been a vehicle for working this differentiation within the masses; it is an instrument for constituting splits in the masses between the citizenry and the plebs – or one of the other names used to identify the ‘undisciplined’ sections of the masses, the multitude, vulgus, mob.

This is too dichotomous a rendering of how citizenship works the category of ‘people’, however. The citizens themselves are never equal. They are stratified because rights are often assigned differentially and citizens do have different capacities to claim rights within the citizenry body. Citizenship thus works discriminations as well as exclusions. However many differentiations we introduce the key point remains the same however: citizenship works differentiations and hierarchies within the masses by assigning rights, belonging and political capacity to certain sections. The people are never one in that sense but always already split. Therefore citizenship never fully maps onto the notion of ‘the people’ as the masses. Citizenship is ‘a kind of identity within a city or state that certain agents constitute as virtuous, good, righteous, and superior, and differentiate it from strangers, outsiders,

34 Balibar, Droit de cité, 185.
36 Ibid.
and aliens who they constitute as their alterity via various solidaristic, agonistic, and alienating strategies and technologies.\textsuperscript{37} 

Popular sovereignty brings a critical tension to bear upon the splitting work that citizenship does. It inserts ‘the principle of the non-exclusion of one’s own mass or multitude’ from the people.\textsuperscript{38} Through the inscription of a universal principle of equality it prevents that the citizenry can close itself off from its self-constitution through discriminations and differentiations with the plebs. Equality mobilises not simply claims based on a formal equality in legal status or equalities in relation to public institutions. The principle of equality also refers to the equality of chances to develop one’s capacities. This reading of equality relates to a double reading of freedom. Popular sovereignty encompasses on the one hand freedom as being an author of the laws to which one conforms, which is at the heart of contractual approaches of citizenship. On the other popular sovereignty also includes the idea of freedom as being one’s own property and thus being free to develop and articulate one’s own capacities.\textsuperscript{39} The idea of popular sovereignty as something immanent to citizenship means that the universality of equality can always be re-enacted by those placed in the multitude or those stratified towards the bottom of the social and political hierarchy to rework the splitting of the people. The historical facticity of the masses who move in numbers to raise inequalities as well as the struggles over stratifications and discriminations in the allocation of rights revive the political tension that is immanent to the constitution of a community of citizens.

As long as these tensions remain inscribed in the notion of citizenship, it remains excessive to statist and governmental appropriations. Making citizenship a focal point in the study of and practice in securitised sites inserts these politicizing aporia into governmental sites where security practice produces docile bodies, collective unity and technocratic strategies.

While drawing on this reading of the aporitic nature of citizenship, we will work a transfiguration of the conception of the political practice of ‘the people’ in the next section. We introduce a reading that emphasise the resisting capacity of appropriating practice and thus a less strategic and spectacular but more everyday understanding of the enactment of freedom and equality.

\textbf{Becoming political in securitised sites: acts of citizenship}

Articulating the politicizing tensions that are built into modern conceptions of citizenship does important ground work for making it possible to use citizenship as a vehicle for politicizing securitised sites. However, in itself it does not necessarily turn the analytical focus on practices of statecraft and governance that we observe in both critical security studies and citizenship studies looking at security. To shift the analytical focus to the ‘afterthought’ we need a concept of citizenship that privileges the opening of the tensions through the enactment of popular sovereignty by the vulgus, the multitude, resistance to instituted stratifications. In other words, we need a concept of citizenship that not simply highlights the aporitic nature of citizenship but that draws our attention immediately to practices that enact these tensions to challenge the politically structuring work that security practices as techniques of statecraft and governance do.

38 Balibar, Droit de cité, 181.
39 Ibid., 196-97.
Engin Isin’s conception of ‘acts of citizenship’ offers this vehicle. Acts of citizenship are the necessary conditions of possibility producing an actor and enabling her to “rupture or break given orders, practices and habitus. Creative ruptures and breaks take different forms that are irreducible. … What actualizes an act is not determinable in advance”. Acts of citizenship condition and enable the transformation of a subject into a citizen, that is to say from a situation where one is subjected to “scripts” already created by conforming to “given orders, practices and habitus” to a situation where one is engaging in re-writing those “scripts”. To focus on acts of citizenship rather than on status or constitutive practices offers a window to approach the question how one transforms “oneself from a subject to a claimant”. This conception of citizenship as a vehicle for the ontological transformation of the subject and the relations in which they are caught, we believe, is key to understanding how we can identify political agency within securitised sites. Indeed, contrary to much of the literature in critical security studies, political agency is not here posited as naturally emerging from a right that has to be reclaimed by the acquisition and spread of a specific status – citizenship – in a cosmopolitan fashion. Neither it is the victim of dystopian security practices constitutive of a debilitating political self that has to be salvaged.

While we believe Isin’s move from status and practices to acts is a necessary one to concentrate on political agency, we move further in that by focusing on securitised sites we specify a hard case of “where” political agency can be enacted. Securitised sites are sites that constrain to such extent the ability of subjects to creatively break from or rupture these sites’ material and symbolic structures that to consider political agency as a break or a rupture might hide from our gaze a series of phenomenon that are appropriative rather than emancipatory in nature. Balibar’s conception of the aporitic nature of citizenship draws attention in the first instance to rupturing mobilizations in the name of the people based on universal claims of equality and freedom. The sovereignty of the people introduces a tension between citizenship as status and citizenship as emancipation. Claiming the excess of citizenship – for example, by claiming the right to hold rights – ruptures instituted practices and status of citizenship. It opens the possibility – not necessarily the actuality – of transforming hierarchies and stratifications. But how is the excess of the equal people enacted in sites that are either quasi ‘totally’ dominated by governmental apparatuses – the idea of the totalitarian state – or that implicate the subject in the reproduction of the instituted relations of power – such as panoptic discipline? How can ‘the people’ enact equality and freedom from inside such sites? These questions invite rethinking acts of citizenship in terms of (mis)appropriation rather than strategic or random mobilization of people.

At this point, we believe it is useful to introduce Michel de Certeau’s distinction between two dimensions in practices of resistance, the strategic and the tactical.

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43 Andrew Linklater, 'Political community and human security'
44 Engin Isin’s conception of acts does not exclude such a reading of acts of citizenship. The notions of act and rupture remain quite ambivalent in their relation to these different ways of thinking political agency, i.e. as (i) emancipation and collective mobilisation and (ii) appropriation and transfiguration. On the one hand the notion of act is theorised in a Heideggerian and Derridean philosophy on the other it is placed in Bakhtin’s dialogical and more process oriented thought.
dimension. The strategic dimension refers to the power relations some social agents can develop through their ability to delimit and define, even if only partially and symbolically, an environment “as their own” and through which they will manage their relations to others. Securitised sites reflect such strategic dimension because they reflect strategies by certain agents to resist an exteriority that is defined as targets (who/what/where is granted security) or threats (who/what/where constitutes a threat to security). Spatiality is key for strategies. They seek to institute a site “in itself”, to shield the site from the decay of time, but also to participate in “panoptic practice” vis-à-vis this exteriority (controlling, managing, invigilating). These strategies “uphold and determine the power to appropriate for oneself one’s own site”. Securitised sites are sites imposing onto ‘the people’ a certain mode of governance and governmentality, they are sites ‘the people’ cannot make their own. They exist in securitised sites by being implicated into the mechanisms producing the site either as docile bodies, free subjects making choices within the parameters set by the governing practice, or as dangers, threats, risks that ‘animate’ the site. Strategic acts of citizenship rupture these sites through mobilising numbers of people – multitudes – enacting claims of freedom and equality, justice and injustice that seek to transform the existing hierarchies, stratifications and boundaries that security practices institute. Acts of citizenship fall here squarely within the tradition of critical social movements, civil society, and revolutionary moments that mobilize subordinated people to redefine instituted parameters of sites of living together; to impose their alternative conception of what makes the collective living together just and worth living. The civil rights movement in the US, the sans papiers movement in France, and the anti-globalisation movement are among the paradigmatic examples of the era in which the class struggle gave way to a focus on exclusions.

Tactics, on the other hand, refers to an art de faire (art of doing) and an art de dire (art of saying) developed through time by social agents who can only deploy themselves, and their possible actions, in an environment that they cannot delimit or define “as their own”. The securitised airports are one such site; the regime of visibility created by surveillance cameras connected to profiling methods is another. How does one challenge instituted procedures of identification, boundaries that are drawn – e.g. the coloured person being always stopped at the checkpoint – when one needs to necessarily ‘function’ within these sites? While strategies “bet on the resistance that establishing a place offer to the decay of time; tactics bet on a cunning use of time, of opportunities that time offers and of the games that time introduce in the foundations of power”. Tactics offers no gain but only a fleeting moment of re-appropriation over an environment that is designed and imposes signs to impress itself symbolically and/or physically on the people coming in contact with it. As De Certeau puts it, “it is an art of the weak”. Indeed, within securitised sites, ‘the people’ acts out on a terrain that is not its own and upon which it cannot act. Yet it can act within it. Tactics thus reflects the inability of ‘the people’ to possess “a global project” or to “encompass its adversary in a distinct, visible and objectivated space”. The excessiveness implied by the ‘sovereignty of the people’ becomes one of challenging or questioning the logic of social practice that the securitising practices seek to inscribe in sites and bodies by re-appropriating instruments, schedules, schemes of

46 De Certeau, L’invention du quotidien, 61.
security practice rather than mobilising a multitude of people against discriminating practices.

How does this conception of tactics as *art de faire* and *art de dire* translate in acts of citizenship? Within securitised sites, ‘the people’ can only generally seize the “opportune moment” to re-appropriate for themselves a site that will never be their own, it is but only a fleeting moment whence the act “transforms” the situation. The form of this appropriation cannot be defined a priori; “the occasion continues to trump definitions, because it cannot be isolated from a conjuncture or an operation”47. Yet, within securitised sites, tactics may represent, as we will argue in the next section, a form of political agency. In the securitizing process of depoliticizing citizens as potential claimants into individuated subjects that are a function of security practices and technologies, tactics disrupt the logic behind securitization by momentarily re-establishing a form of equality between a “then subject now citizen” and a security apparatus as well as momentarily re-instating freedom by the sheer enactment of a tactic. We argue that by enacting tactics, ‘the people’ re-appropriate to themselves a situation and through this enactment are underlying the inherently political character of securitised sites as well as re-instating political agency within the logics of securitization.

It is important, however, to unpack what this appropriative dimension of tactics is and to do so it is worth turning to De Certeau’s inspiration for his concept.48 The concept of tactic partially comes from an important book by Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant about the Greeks’ *mètis*, their “ruses of intelligence”. Their study of the term throughout almost ten centuries of Greek civilisation highlights four key characteristics of appropriative practices as *mètis* “presides over all activities whereby human beings must learn to manoeuvre hostile forces, too powerful to be directly controlled, but that one can use despite them, without confronting them face-to-face”.49 These four characteristics are (i) the *mètis’ ambiguity* – the *mètis* can be either seen as a fraud, as a cheat or it can be seen with admiration and wonder –, (ii) it’s *temporality* – the *mètis’ “temporal horizon” is the opportune occasion whence the action is not reflective of an impulsion but of a practical decision –, (iii) its *multiplicity* – the *mètis* is “multiple and diverse”, it reflects its ability to adapt to “changing and contrasted” situation and environment –, and (iv) its *craftiness* – the *mètis* “acts in disguise. To deceive its victim, it borrows a shape that mask, instead of revealing, its actual being”.50 Appropriate acts are ambiguous because within securitised sites they can be transgressive or deferring of the security apparatus within which they are enacted; yet, they are not defined by the moment of their enactment but by the processes through which this enactment takes place within the security apparatus. Acts of citizenship lead our attention not to the moments or events of resistance by ‘the people’ but to ‘the people’ as a *series* of events and moments within which appropriative practices take place; appropriations that unfold as excessive enactments of freedom and equality.

This is a necessary step for processes are “actual or possible occurrence that consists of an integrated series of connected developments unfolding in programmatic coordination: an orchestrated series of occurrences that are systemically linked to one

another either causally or functionally". 51 This definition should not suggest that processes are only ordered linearly, they are only partially so, the focus having to be on the relationality within the processes. 52 The difficulty in identifying the relationality of acts of citizenship within a series of processes, themselves determined to a great extent by a security apparatus, is precisely the fact that appropriation as resistance has multiple forms that cannot be delimited a priori; these acts reflect the practical knowledge of subjects, their craftiness, that translate into a (re)instalment of political agency within a series of occurrences largely structured, controlled, and managed by the security apparatus. Henceforth, appropriative acts do not constitute a “rupture of politics”, 53 but rather enable us to consider how securitised sites already are full of politics. As such our reading offers a counterpoint to perspectives that reads acts of citizenship as solely a specific event or ruptures. Defining acts of citizenship as appropriations is to recognise the unfinalizability of such acts. Acts of re-appropriation cannot represent an ‘event’ per se because they do not break or oppose the technologies of the securitised sites but ‘make use’ of them if the ‘opportune moment’ arise. Acts of citizenship thus reinstate the unfinalizability that is extracted from securitised sites; they reinstate political agency within rather than create without.

A possible example of re-appropriating security products was the news item that a Manchester band used CCTV to make a promotional video. 54 They allegedly played in front of different CCTV cameras, then used the Freedom of Information Act in the UK to claim the footage and assembled a video out of it. They claimed it was much cheaper than doing it through a production company. It probably was a hoax. Not all the footage was from CCTV and the band could not produce documents that they had claimed the CCTV footage. But even if it did not really happen, as a possibility it illustrates how appropriation of security products can work. The important question that this example does not answer but definitely raise is how such a practice of re-appropriation can be an act of citizenship, i.e. an articulation – which necessarily is a re-articulation compared to the centrality of universal claims of equality and freedom in Balibar – of the aporia of citizenship, of the sovereignty of the people, of equality and freedom.

We are thus left with two questions, a) what can actually constitute an actualization of an act within securitised sites and b) how such actualization constitute a re-instatement of political agency as act of citizenship within securitised sites. These are difficult questions for by their nature, acts of citizenship within securitised sites cannot be ascertained before their enactment. One cannot rely on a philosophical anthropology posited previous to any processes but rather to extract from these processes an empirical anthropology 55 that will be consistent with and reflect the

context, the expression and the relationality of these acts.\textsuperscript{56} Let’s now turn to our two remaining questions.

The question of what constitutes an actualization of an act brings naturally to mind questions that have been at the heart of studies about everyday resistance in sociology, as we have seen with De Certeau, anthropology and organization studies. In his classical opus \textit{Weapons of the weak}, James C. Scott clearly underlines that the question of identifying what constitutes an act of resistance is problematic because we are facing, in a certain sense, with the chicken and egg question. Is resistance an intentional act or is it a consequential act?\textsuperscript{57} How can one adjudicate between forms of resistance if one is positing a philosophical anthropology excluding forms of resistance that do not fit a certain canon? Are acts of resistance that do not bring about change acts of resistance at all? Are acts of resistance that are not intended to be so acts of resistance at all? Organization studies are facing a different but somewhat related issue. How to make sense of worker resistance when a series of new controlling and managing practices and technologies have appeared in the workplace? While some have harbingered the end of worker resistance, some have stressed, “these approaches have limited definition of resistance to formalized, organized acts, dependent upon some transcendental principle”\textsuperscript{58}.

What these developments stress is that to understand political acts within securitised sites, one has to move beyond an understanding to what Scott typified as “real resistance” to one focusing on “epiphenomenal activities”. Indeed, if one sets aside the presence or absence of revolutionary consequences – a central issue in approaches interested in class struggles –, what is understood as “real resistance” is characterising as activities that counts as resistance, and political agency, those that are organised, selfless and intentional and that are working against domination. In accordance with De Certeau or Scott, we consider that this is a limited and limiting conception of resistance and by extension of political agency. Resistance (political agency) can be “unorganized, unsystematic, and individual, … opportunistic and self-indulgent, … and/or … imply, in their intention or meaning, an accommodation with the system of domination”.\textsuperscript{59} In order to illustrate this, we would like to turn to the place of humour in securitised sites and how it can constitute an actualization of an act in Isin’s sense and how it can particularly constitute an act reflective of political agency – i.e. an act of citizenship.

\textbf{Example: humour as act of citizenship}

Why humour? Considering the specific characteristic of securitised sites, humour is a potential tactic at hand to re-appropriate an environment, even an atmosphere, that is not subject, by nature, to external change from individuals. Think about airports. Airports are in many ways “possible microcosms of wider societal surveillance


\textsuperscript{59} Scott, \textit{Weapons of the weak}, 292.
trends”. Airports are non-places (non-lieux), they are spaces that are not defined in terms of identity, relationality or historicity, even though the latter can re-instate themselves in these spaces at some point. Airports are spaces within which “are set the conditions of circulation [by which] individuals are supposed to solely interact with texts with no enunciators than ‘moral’ persons or institutions … which presence is vaguely guessed or more explicitly affirmed … through the injunctions, advices, comments, ‘messages’ conveyed by countless ‘medium’ … all an integral part of our contemporary scenery”. Moreover, airports are dystopian and securitised sites par excellence; passengers’ mobility, behaviour and affects are watched, channelled, controlled, monitored and disciplined. Transport Security Administration (TSA) guidelines in the United States of America conveniently indicate to any passengers how to pack one’s bag and how not to pack it, how to dress, and also how to address. In effect, TSA indicates to you that you have to “Think before you speak. Belligerent behaviour, inappropriate jokes and threats will not be tolerated. They will result in delays and possibly missing your flight. Local law enforcement may be called as necessary.” It is customary now to find, at least in U.S. airports, signs in ordering passengers not to crack a joke while going through security checkpoints.

In De Certeau’s terms, airports are reflective of a strategy to inscribe in space ways to confront the exteriority that is represented by ‘the people’. Airports are designed and produce signs to efficiently control and channel targets that are not only to be authenticated and identified as potential threats through surveillance technologies but also commoditized as potential consumers. More, airports as a security apparatus are more and more designed and produce signs in order to pre-empt behaviours and emotions. As a strategy, the airport seeks to induce expressions – physical, behavioural or emotional – and confessions in order for passengers “to betray the movement of an intention, an ideology, a belief, or, indeed, what is becoming known as terrorist or ‘hostile intent’”.

In such environment, humour is forbidden because it precisely disrupts the rhythm and atmosphere airport’s signs and designs carry. Humour cannot be emancipatory for “the parameters of resistance are also set, in part, by the institutions of repression”. As such humour cannot be expected to perform an emancipatory task; it is not a strategic mobilization by a movement that disrupts

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61 Marc Augé, Non-lieux. Introduction à une anthropologie de la surmodernité (Paris: Seuil, 1992), 100-101. Adey and Salter are critical of Augé’s characterization of the airport as a non-place. We believe that Adey and Salter are not contradicting the key intuitions behind Augé’s move. Augé does not deny the re-instatement of precisely what Adey and Salter are saying Augé’s depiction is missing – airports are characterised by designs, technologies and practices that are reflective of contemporary societies. Rather, Augé is interested in non-places as epitome of what he calls supermodernity (surmodernité). Supermodernity is characterised by factual and spatial overabundances as well as the individuation of references (see Augé, Non-lieux, 35-56). These characteristics are precisely those at work in Adey and Salter’s work (hope we are right Mark :-).
62 Augé, Non-lieux, 121.
65 Adey, ‘Facing airport security’, 7; Salter, ‘Governmentalities of an airport’.
66 Scott, Weapons of the weak, 299.
mobility in the airport in the name of addressing discriminations while drawing on claims of a universal equality of people. Yet, it can be appropriative. Consider the following illustration.

On August 2, 2002, a screener at Hartford’s Bradley International Airport poked through the wallet of Fred Hubbell, an 80-year-old World War II combat veteran who had already undergone two full searches in that airport that morning. “What do you expect to find in there, a rifle?” the exasperated Hubbell asked. He was then arrested for “causing a public disturbance” and fined $78. Dana Cosgrove, the TSA airport security chief, later justified the arrest on the grounds that “all that the people around him in the waiting room heard was the word rifle.”

This local “incident” was even elevated to a more national prominence when Senator Lieberman toured the airport, 10 days after the “incident”, as it was one of the first to federalize its security. Senator Lieberman himself “raised the recent arrest of … Fred Hubbell… who made an ill-conceived joke after being searched twice at Bradley. … Lieberman said airport security was no laughing matter. ‘Be forewarned that federal airport screeners do not view their jobs as a joking matter’ …”. Hubbell’s sarcastic comment is clearly seen as disruptive, not because it is a threat but because it momentarily breaks what is expected from the target of surveillance, it momentarily exposes what is induced by (de)sign by the security apparatus. By essence, humour is unable to modify the environment and circumstances within which it is enacted. Yet, humour can be recognised as a form of resistance or, even, social protest. It is a moment in which citizens can turn strangers triggering a need for security apparatuses to take explicit position in a contest; they need to negotiate their relation to the citizen-stranger and thus render visible the discriminations and stratifications that are enacted by security practices in the name of protecting the people.

As a form of resistance, humour – whether under the form of clowning, cynicism, sarcasm, teasing, or irony –, however, should be seen as more than a mere “safety valve” enabling oneself to defend or distance oneself from the effects of a security apparatus. A major issue with such a conception lays in the idea that humour shields an authentic self from external and unsettling forces. Indeed, humour can be seen as a “productive act because it crafts [appropriative] space within relations of domination. This space … is not pregiven …”. It is precisely at this productive juncture that we can understand how humour can be conceived as a political tactic. Humour is a form of political agency in so far as it shed lights on and, within a security apparatus, disrupts by its utterance the “expression of a particular structure of power relations”.

The political is a constellation of power relations that is subject to challenging and

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71 Peter Fleming, ‘Metaphors of resistance’, Management Communication Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 1 (2005), 54-55. We replace Fleming’s “emancipatory” by “appropriative” in order to reflect the tactical dimension of humour as resistance.
conflicting utterances about what is the dominant “ordinary model of legitimacy”.

The political thus is reflective of a situation of heteroglossia, where centripetal and centrifugal utterances are competing while living in “complex space-time configurations that are produced… by different actors and are only able to reach relative, incomplete and temporary adjustments; they therefore are unachieved and open historical systems”. Within a security apparatus, humour is a form of political agency precisely because it re-instates, however fleetingly and momentarily, an openness within the apparatus. Moreover, it ‘demands’ of the security personnel to enact their conception of the people, often not only on the marginalized, excluded subject but also on the citizens they are protecting. As already said, in the current conditions at the airport, humour can turn a citizen into a stranger not because of humour but because the security personnel and routines enact a conception of citizens as a humourless people. In such conditions, humour can indeed become an act of citizenship through which people implicitly claim equality as a human being towards the security personnel who then have to negotiate this implicit claim.

Naturally, humour is not necessarily epiphenomenal in Scott’s sense and can represent a form of organised social protest. As Mikhail Bakhtin has shown, the carnivalesque was fully part of the organisation of medieval societies. During specific periods, the official world was challenged by the world of laughter; they were not competing but were simultaneously available. “All of these ritual-spectacular forms, organized on the principle of laughter, were distinguished extraordinarily sharply … from serious official (ecclesiastical and feudal-state) cultic forms and ceremonies. They provided a completely different, emphatically unofficial, extra-ecclesiastical and extra-state aspect of the world, of the person, and of human relations; it is as if they constructed a second world and a second life beyond everything official ….”. Humour was, in a sense, part of the strategy; it was integrated within the fabric of society. Ritualised transgression, that was accommodating social domination, could end up turning into violent rebellions against this domination. Within securitised sites, humour cannot deploy itself in that fashion, its modus operandi is limited to its tactical disengagement, “whereby the self is detached from the normative prescriptions of [the security apparatus] through irony and cynicism. … [D]isengagement of this kind is not capitulation; rather it is a re-engagement with another register of [political] life. … it is … an active disengagement; the ability to comply without conforming.”

Confronted with a security apparatus such as those of the airport, humour is a tactic that fulfils the métis’ requirements. If one takes the example of flannelling, a passenger can laud security measures, “through an elaborate, even exaggerated, display of deference, enthusiasm or conformity” yet “signals the exact opposite, displaying contempt for those very norms”. Flannelling is ambiguous, it acts “in

disguise”, it evolves and is enacted depending on the situation and environment one is faced with and, at heart, it is ambiguous. Humour then disrupts the unfolding of the programmatic securitizing process not by disturbing it in any way that would lead to emancipation from the process. Rather, humour is more simply re-instating an element of unfinalizability of both the securitising process and the instituted conception of citizenship on an occasion within the process. Citizens can turn strangers, security personnel needs to negotiate its relation to the humorous voice who suddenly dialogues rather than acquiesces. This moment of unfinalizability thus opens the site of pre-emptive screening momentarily into a site of negotiating the ‘sovereignty of the people’.

**Conclusion: bringing citizenship into security**

The principal aim of this paper was to offer a reflection on the citizenship/security nexus by providing an argument on the possibility to see citizenship as enabling the politicization of securitised sites. This reflection stemmed from the absence within the security literature of an actual engagement with resistance-as-politicizing beyond a mere “afterthought”. Indeed, while critical security studies seek to unpack dystopian security practices and technologies and mention the possibility of re-instating political agency against security apparatus, they often fail to bring to the fore what such political agency will look like and how resistance works. In order to do so, we drew on Balibar’s understanding of the double aporetic quality that the notion of ‘sovereignty of the people’ inserts in conceptions of citizenship: the people as simultaneously one and many and as universally equal and particularly stratified. These inherent tensions constitute citizenship as a “dilemmatic site” whereby political agency “is constituted, even enabled—and not simply paralyzed—by daily dilemmatic choices and negotiations”. The importance to introduce citizenship in our analysis of securitised sites precisely resides in the insertion of the politicizing aporia into governmental sites where security practices produce docile bodies, collective unity and technocratic strategies. We believe, however, that another intervention is necessary.

How does one bring this aporetic nature of citizenship to bear upon securitised sites? Reworking Isin’s “acts of citizenship”, we introduced a distinction between emancipatory and appropriative resistance. Whereas the first seek to transforms these sites the second can only appropriate these sites during a fleeting moment since it cannot overtake the overwhelming asymmetry of power relations inscribed in these sites. At this juncture we were left with two key questions: what constitute an actualization of an act within securitised sites and how such actualization constitute a re-instatement of political agency as act of citizenship within securitised sites in which security techniques often work on the micro dimensions of everyday practice and in which subjects are often constituted and constitute themselves as insecure and are thus in enacting this insecurity implicated in the reproduction of stratifications, exclusions and discomforts. A first move was to decentre resistance, and thus political agency, from a motivated, organised, collective, altruist and strategic conception to a conception that include the possibility that it can be “unorganized, unsystematic, and individual, … opportunistic and self-indulgent, … and/or … imply, in their intention or meaning, an accommodation with the system of domination”.

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addressed a priori its enactment. A second move was to discuss a potential form of enactment – humour – within a specific securitised site airport. We argued that humour disrupts the unfolding of the programmatic securitizing process not by disturbing it in any way that would lead to emancipation from the process but by re-instanting an element of unfinalizability on an occasion within the process. This moment of unfinalizability, we argue, is where political agency lays and where citizenry practice can bring to bear claims of equality and discrimination upon securitising practices.