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In the introduction to their Nationalité et citoyenneté en Europe, Patrick Weil and Randall Hansen make the point that there exist definite patterns of convergence in nationality laws across the European community. In particular, they highlight the issues that relate to the naturalisation of second-generation immigrants, double nationality, and the right of women to pass on their nationality to their children.

Divergence still exists - frequently driven by the fear of illegal immigration in states that have historically been countries of emigration - but in their view two important factors have contributed to the emergence of several common patterns in nationality legislation: the shared experience of sizable, non-European immigration after the Second World War and the 'necessity to integrate millions of permanent residents into the countries of the European Union'. On this view, the European states 'would not accept the presence, generation after generation, of a large foreign population which did not possess the right to citizenship'. So too Weil and Hansen are sure of the importance of these issues: the right to nationality expresses in institutional terms the nature of inclusion and exclusion within a state.

Where Weil and Hansen seem less certain of their conclusions is in the matter of 'European citizenship'. It is, they write, 'too soon to know if a European "model" of nationality, capable of being applied right across Europe, is in the process of emerging'. Indeed, they make the further point that, for European 'migrants', the Treaty of Maastricht 'was the end of European citizenship, not the beginning'. For the foreseeable future, they conclude, 'inclusion will be negotiated at a national level and the granting of citizenship will be an integral part of this process'.

However, what we further know is that over the last decade or so these nation-state based nationality laws have been changed in most European countries (eg. Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden) and it is this, amongst other things, that has led certain commentators to conclude that the concept of national citizenship is itself in crisis. Accordingly they look to the principles of a 'new citizenship' that is frequently described as a 'postnational political citizenship', resting often, it seems, upon the twin notions of a postnational identity and a version of Habermas' model of a constitutional patriotism based upon shared principles of justice and democracy. I will pass over any objections there might be to either the feasibility or desirability of such a project, limiting myself to the observation that, in the present circumstances, there is little to suggest that either the institutional structure, representative system or decision-making mechanisms of the EU provide the building blocks for such an innovative vision of citizenship. However, it is undoubtedly the case that modes of governance and forms of political association are becoming increasingly more porous, overlapping, multilayered and subject to change (especially within the European Union) and this alone would indicate that there are grounds for such a debate.
David Held but see also Robert Cooper’s influential Demos pamphlet The Postmodern State and the World Order (London, 2000).

Amongst the contending models of European citizenship that are on offer is a revised and much moderated version of republicanism that has recently come to capture the imagination of English-speaking political theorists. Associated with the names of Pettit, Skinner, Sustein and others, it sees itself as providing an alternative to the negative liberty understanding of liberalism and therefore redefines liberty as non-domination. Quentin Skinner, for example, writes: ‘One might say that the neo-roman and classical liberal accounts of freedom embody rival understandings of autonomy. For the latter, the will is autonomous provided it is not coerced; for the former, the will can only be described as autonomous if it is independent of the danger of being coerced’.44. Q. Skinner, Liberty before liberalism (Cambridge, 1998), pp.84-5.

The possible application of such a theory to questions of European citizenship has recently been demonstrated in an article by Kostas A. Lavdas, entitled ‘Republican Europe and Multicultural Citizenship’, published in the last issue of Politics.55. Kostas A. Lavdas, ‘Republican Europe and Multicultural Citizenship’, Politics (21) 2001, pp.1-10. The argument is that ‘the combination of republican institutions and multicultural citizenship can provide a model for European construction’ and that this can be done through the application of ‘a modified republican view’ that takes into account ‘the interest in a new participatory institutional design and the concern for group rights’. To summarise, Lavdas is of the view that: ‘If the contemporary republican emphasis on freedom as non-domination is complemented with a concern for designing institutions with a multicultural bias, a theoretical justification for proposals for Europe’s institutional design can be developed which recognises the need for group rights while upholding the key democratic republican values in the face of the juncture at which the EU currently finds itself’.

This argument appears to rest upon three fundamental premises: 1. ‘group identification within states has perhaps never before been given such prominence’; 2. ‘a degree of issue convergence and economic and financial developments in the context of the EU political system point at the increasing relevance of the EU level from the perspective of Europe’s citizens and their possibilities for control over aspects of their lives’; 3. ‘unlike earlier forms of republican thought, which focused on a basically homogenous political community, republicanism as non-domination can accommodate and even embrace multiculturalism and group rights’.

I wish to focus upon the third of these premises. By way of immediate context it is perhaps sufficient here to note that the republican conception of citizenship has frequently been criticised for combining a false universalism with the suppression of particularity and the exclusion of subordinate identities. From Aristotle onwards it has privileged the public over the private, giving precedence to active involvement and participation in the life of the polity over the mundane activities of family and work. As Ruth Lister, writing from a feminist perspective, has commented: ‘the ideal citizen of classical republicanism...was largely freed from the necessity to labour and to meet his bodily requirements...unencumbered by the demands of everyday living’.66. R. Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives (Basingstoke, 1997), p.32. Accordingly, the classical republican tradition of citizenship has endorsed and valued the politics of civic virtue, given supreme embodiment in the willingness of the citizen to both serve and die for the
state. As another feminist writer has observed: 'the problem with the tradition of civic virtue can be stated succinctly: that virtue is armed'.77. J. B. Elstain, 'Citizenship and Armed Civic Virtue: some critical questions on the commitment to public life', Soundings, (69) 1986, p.102.

Republicanism has also been a secular doctrine, finding no place for the public role of religion except in the guise of a civic faith designed to purge the male citizen of everything that distinguished him from the civil body. In short, if, as Lavdas contends, republicanism is to be blended with multiculturalism in order to provide the basis of a new approach to European citizenship, then the former looks as if it needs to be divested of a considerable amount of historical baggage. Moreover, as I hope to show, such a republicanism would need to distance itself from actually-existing republicanism as it presently operates in one of the EU's major constituent parts: France.

It is indeed the case that Philip Pettit, the most articulate of recent advocates of republicanism,88. P. Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford, 1997), seeks to refashion 'republican freedom' as an 'ideal' that is 'compatible with modern pluralistic forms of society'. As he writes: 'though the premodern beneficiaries of freedom as non-domination, the traditional champions of republican ideals, were all well-resourced males, there is every reason why freedom as non-domination should appeal also to feminists and socialists'. He further acknowledges that these earlier 'men of substance...also belonged to the mainstream culture of the societies in which they lived' and that this raises the question of whether the republican ideal 'can appeal, for example, to immigrant groups or indigenous, postcolonial populations'. His reply is that 'if the modern state is orientated around the promotion of freedom as non-domination, then it will have a reason and a capacity to cater for the claims of those in minority cultures'. What this means in terms of substance is not made clear, except for the acknowledgement that members of a cultural minority 'may have to be furnished with resources that are tailored to their special position'. For the rest, they are to become participants in the deliberative democracy of an 'inclusive' and 'responsive republic'.

There is, in truth, much that is attractive in this vision of what Pettit himself describes as 'a gas-and-water works version of republicanism', even if it is short on detail. It is, however, not at all clear that Pettit has succeeded in divesting republicanism of the ideological inheritance associated with the virtuous and active (male) citizen. This is most evident in the sections which explore the themes of 'checking' and 'civilizing' the Republic, where he invokes the 'intangible hand' of civility as a means of nurturing 'patterns of behaviour'.

These points are set out in his 'propositional summary'. 'Republican civil norms', he writes, 'need to be supported by widespread civic virtue, by widespread civility, if they are to have any chance of being effective; the legal republic needs to become a civil reality'. He then goes on to call up one of the central themes of the classical republican tradition: 'ordinary people', Pettit affirms, 'have to maintain the eternal vigilance that constitutes the price of republican liberty', stating clearly that 'the need for civility and trust is consistent with the republican emphasis on the necessity of vigilance'. To complete the picture, he concludes that the attainment of such 'civic virtue' involves 'not just the internalization of public values and the disciplining of personal desires; given the communitarian nature of freedom as non-domination, it also involves identification with larger groups, even with the polity as a whole, and access to new and satisfying identities'. Note too his claim, made several pages earlier, that 'freedom as non-
domination is not the sort of good that can be left to people to pursue in a decentralized way; all the signs are that it is best pursued for each under the centralized, political action of all: it is best pursued via the state’.

At the risk of sounding like those dismissed by Pettit as the 'theory-weary, world-weary critics' whose counsels presage 'premature despair', the vision now placed before us sounds distinctly like an old-fashioned, civic republicanism, which privileges political participation and encourages cultural assimilation and integration within a broadly secular framework. Nor, for that matter, does it sound that different from the situation in France, where both the official discourse and practice of republicanism places a very heavy emphasis upon citizenship as a participatory, democratic, secular and national ideal. Just as importantly, French republicanism is not uniquely a political theorist's construct: it is the dominant 'public philosophy' of that country. For example, without France's republican commitment, it would not be possible to make sense of its assimilationist conception of national citizenship, the commitment to public, secular education, and the characteristic anxiety towards the risk of social disintegration held to be inherent in multicultural societies. The oddity is that this republican alternative has hardly been studied in its own terms - the recent volume by Adrian Favell is a notable exception99. A. Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain (Basingstoke, 1998). - and little effort (even inside France) has been devoted to a critical appraisal of the viability of the republican model of citizenship in a de facto multicultural society. In brief, my argument is that debates about the future of European citizenship would be better situated if, rather than drawing inspiration from a watered-down, social democratic theory of republicanism that in any case fails to free itself from the politics of civic virtue, it focused upon the question of whether contemporary French republicanism is able to provide a distinctive, and compelling, response to the contemporary challenge of immigration and ethnic diversity.

At a normative model, French republicanism is different both from liberalism and communitarianism, offering an alternative understanding of modern society and politics to that provided by prevailing Anglo-American models. Multiculturalism - the demand that a diversity of cultural identities be recognised in the public sphere - has been the central focus of attention of Anglo-American political theorists in recent years, and has forced both liberals and communitarians to take seriously issues of cultural diversity. While these two schools of thought have made significant contributions to the understanding of the normative significance of multiculturalism (see, for example, the work of Kymlicka and Taylor) relatively little attention has been paid to the contribution of a third, 'republican' school (despite the translation into English of the most sophisticated attempt to re-think the republican model of citizenship, Dominique Schnapper's La Communauté des citoyens).110. D. Schnapper, La Communauté des citoyens: sur l'idée moderne de nation (Paris, 1994). Schnapper's text was published in English by Transaction Books).0 Most interestingly, the diverse responses within orthodox republicanism have in common the fact that they consider cultural pluralism to be not a welcome fact but a potential problem. On this account, cultural pluralism must be transcended through the involvement of the individual in a common civic community, presupposing that individuals must be ready to consider themselves first and foremost as citizens of the republic. It is this emphasis on civic membership that distinguishes French republicanism from both Anglo-American liberalism and communitarianism.

The standard republican objections to multiculturalism - namely, that individual emancipation is secured at the expense of inherited cultures and traditions and that a
shared national identity is essential for social cohesion and political unity - have in recent years been supplemented by a new awareness, particularly on the part of Nouvelle Gauche republicans, of the potentially non-threatening significance of multicultural demands and of ethnic diversity. The works, notably of Alain Touraine, Michel Wieviorka, Joël Roman, and Farhad Khosrokhavar, testify to the emergence of a republican form of multiculturalism. Articulated as an explicit rejection of orthodox republicanism (both in its universalist and nationalist versions), it nonetheless incorporates and rests upon premises that are central to republican thinking. For an analysis of the arguments associated with these debates see M. Boucher, Les Théories de l'intégration: Entre universalisme et différentialisme (Paris, 2000). The key question, which here can only be answered tentatively in the affirmative, is whether this new synthesis provides an original republican philosophy of multiculturalism which can supplement the existing theories on offer in the Anglo-American tradition. The fact is, however, that these voices remain a small minority surrounded by a mighty chorus which continues to trumpet the merits of the republican philosophy of integration (the success of which is apparently no better proven than by the victories of the French national football team). Much has been written on this and what has been called "l'effet Zidane": see for example the special edition of Hommes et Migrations (1226) 2000, which is devoted to the theme of "Tricolore et Multicolore".

Here is how Michel Wieviorka described his own intellectual evolution in a volume of essays published in 1997. When I began, he writes, 'I continued to have confidence in the republican model, which I thought might be able to be reformed by being brought up to date...I therefore asked for greater openness towards cultural difference, a debate about identities and the way in which democracy might make more of them rather than ignoring and "demonising" them'. The result, however, of posing the issue of 'cultural particularisms' was one of 'marginalisation' in a 'general climate which was becoming more and more hostile to everything which seemed to challenge both the Republic and its universal model'. Dating his break with this model around 1993-4, he writes: 'How could one accept a form of toleration which demanded of cultural particularisms that they should dissolve themselves or, what amounts to the same thing, preserve themselves within the confines of private life'. This 'rigid, dogmatic and abstract' understanding of the Republic, Wieviorka concludes, was based upon 'a fear and a misunderstanding' of cultural differences.

My next point would be that such attitudes have roots deep within the republican tradition. Critics might be inclined to suggest that calling forth the Jacobins in this context is inappropriate and unfair to the republican cause. If so, they should read Patrice Higonnet's Goodness beyond Virtue: Jacobins during the French Revolution (Cambridge, Mass, 1998), where it is stated that Jacobinism 'can still be a model for modern democrats' and that Jacobinism's vision puts to shame 'our own inactive allegiance to socially inert and pluralistic democracy'. 'We can still learn', Higonnet writes, 'from Jacobinism's desire to harmonize the private and the public through purposeful and libertarian civic-mindedness'. Drawing upon the classical model of virtue derived from Greece and Rome, the Jacobins saw public participation in the communal affairs of the state as the highest source of moral worth. The good individual was the good citizen and the good citizen was the good patriot. Saint-Just summed this up when he said that the 'good citizen' was 'ardent and pure, austere and disinterested'. There, he
proclaimed, was 'the character of the patriot'. The common good always took precedence over the individual interest, the public always outweighed the private. The Jacobins were unambiguous about this. 'A man who lacks public virtues', Robespierre announced, 'cannot have private virtues'. And this had a clear political dimension. What, Robespierre asked, have the 'enemies' of the Republic understood by virtue? 'By this word', he responded, 'they have all understood fidelity to certain private and domestic obligations; but never have they understood it in terms of public virtues, never as selfless devotion to the cause of the people'. Thus such private virtues as friendship could be dismissed out of hand. See here the magnificent volume by Lucien Jaume, Le Discours jacobin et la démocratie (Paris, 1989).5 Far more important, as Mona Ozouf has noted, was the ardent desire to create a 'new man', to recreate a new Adam, to fashion a virtuous people immune from ordinary and earthly passions.116. M.Ozouf, L'Homme régénéré (Paris, 1989).6 Further, it is interesting to note (especially in the light of a continued antipathy towards what is seen as the 'pluralist approach' towards ethnic diversity adopted in Britain) towards a 'new man', to recreate a new Adam, to fashion a virtuous people immune from ordinary and earthly passions.117. See, for example, C. Neveu, Nations, frontières et immigration en Europe (Paris, 1995). But see also E.Todd, Le Destin des immigrants: assimilation et ségrégation dans les démocraties occidentales (Paris, 1994), where Todd explores what he sees as the links between England's 'différentialisme de classe' and a 'différentialisme de race'.7 that the ordinary and earthly (ie. mercantile) passions of the English, with their undemanding enthusiasm for negative liberty, were quickly (ie. from the late summer of 1789) dismissed as not being worthy of admiration. Moreover, there is no more fascinating tale, as Sophie Wahnich has shown,118. S. Wahnich, L'impossible citoyen (Paris, 1997).8 than the way in which the universalistic aspirations of the Revolution were replaced by the denunciation of the foreigner and a definition of citizenship resting firmly upon the nation.

Clearly the model and the idea of the Republic is a complex one, as too it has been subject to change.119. See, for example, C. Nicolet, L'Idée républicaine en France (Paris, 1982) and M. Ozouf, 'L'Idée républicaine et l'interprétation du passé national', Annales (53), 1998, pp.1075-87.9 However, it is possible to distil certain general principles of citizenship which have endured over time and which still inform both policy and rhetoric. Fred Constant highlights four: citizenship as an expression of national identity; citizenship as a set of rights and obligations; citizenship as active participation in the life of the polity; and citizenship as a set of moral qualities.220. F. Constant, La citoyenneté (Paris, 1998).0 Taken together, he argues, it leaves us with the vision of the citizen as a 'decontextualised figure'.221. For a fuller examination of some of the ambiguities associated with conceptions of French citizenship see S. Duchesne, Citoyenneté à la française (Paris, 1997).1 This is precisely the characterisation embraced by Dominique Schnapper, an academic recently nominated for the important post of membership of the Conseil constitutionnel, when she talks of 'the citizen as an abstract individual, without identity and without particularistic qualities'. The important distinction she makes is between 'the citizen and the concrete individual', citizenship taking 'precedence over ethnic or religious particularisms, over family or clan solidarities'. Elsewhere she makes the similar distinction between 'the specifics of the private person and the universalism of the citizen'.222. D. Schnapper, 'La tolérance suffit-il pour vivre ensemble?', in F. Barret-Ducrocq, Migrations et Errances (Paris, 2000), pp.306-11.2 What this republican conception of citizenship further entails is made clear by Marc Sadoun: 'the Republic does not conceive of citizenship without the instruction of the citizen: the individual is not born but becomes a citizen'.223. M. Sadoun, 'L'individu et le citoyen', Pouvoirs (94) 2000, pp.5-17.3 Thus, to refer to Schnapper again, 'the school is the supreme institution of the nation...it is at
the school that citizens are formed, where membership of the collectivity is developed and nourished'.

Here we reach the core republican doctrine of laïcité, the idea that the public sphere, in the name of individual autonomy, equal respect, and civic solidarity, should remain neutral towards group identities and towards what are described as such private practices as religious observance, a strategy which in part achieves its objectives not only by providing a very broad definition of the public sphere (to include schools, for example) but also by excluding these practices and groups from recognition within that sphere. The 1905 law separating Church and State (a law which, for historical reasons and without adverse effects, does not operate in the French region of Alsace) is a key pillar of this doctrine of public neutrality. However, the loudly-proclaimed freedom to practice religion (as long as it does not harm the public interest) should not disguise the fact that laïcité came replete with a secular ethic that was deeply antagonistic towards Catholicism (teachers in state schools could not be priests, for example) and which, according to some, is antagonistic towards Islam.224. For a discussion of some of these themes see the special issue of Migrations Société (XII) 2000.4 With regard to the latter, let me briefly refer to a speech made in January 2000 by the then Minister of the Interior, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, an ardent defender of the republican model. Chevènement’s ambition was to establish a proper working relationship with the representatives of Islam in France in line with the principles of laïcité. Islam, it is affirmed, has nothing to fear from laïcité, because 'the Republic respects Islam as it respects the other religions that have played a role in the moral elevation of humanity'. What follows, however (and in addition to the remark that it has been necessary for Islam ‘to affirm publicly that there does not exist a principle of conflict between the tradition of muslim worship and the lawful organization of religious worship in France’) is a completely secular appreciation of the value of Islam which focuses upon what is described as its 'rational kernel' and its capacity 'through the light of natural reason' to engage in fruitful dialogue with 'other religions, other cultures, and even with the beliefs of unbelievers'. Laïcité, the audience were assured, determines that the public sphere is a location 'where there is a place only for argument informed by the light of reason'.

Our next point needs to be the recognition that of all the European countries France alone from the end of the nineteenth century onwards has been a country of immigration, with an estimated 3 million people securing French citizenship through naturalisation between 1890-1990. The so-called 'creuset français' welcomed first workers and their families from Italy, Poland and elsewhere in Europe, for this later to be replaced by immigration from the former colonies, leading to a situation today where it is estimated that France has a Muslim population of just over four million.225. See G. Noiriel, Le Creuset français: histoire de l’immigration (Paris, 1997). Precise figures are difficult to obtain because republican principles outlaw the collection of data about ethnic origin and religious faith.5 This is not the place to analyze in detail the history of French immigration policy226. In addition to the text by Favell cited earlier see J. Costa-Lascoux, De l'immigré au citoyen (Paris, 1989); M. Tribalet, Cents An's d'immigration, étrangers d'hier, Français d'aujourd'hui (Paris, 1991); P. Weil, La France et ses étrangers: L'aventure d'une politique d'immigration (Paris, 1991); and V. Viet, La France immigrée: Constructions d'une politique 1914-1997 (Paris, 1998). For an article which gives an excellent overview of the numerous French periodicals which explore and review issues relating to immigration and integration, see J. M. Ruiz-Funes, 'Enquête sur les revues de l'immigration et d'intégration', La Revue des revues (27) 1999, pp.3-46.6 but at its heart has been the conviction that such ethnic diversity has to be matched by a
policy of active integration - at times also referred to as both 'insertion' and 'assimilation' - operating in accordance with and informed by the principles of republicanism. See D. Schnapper, La France de l'intégration (Paris, 1991).

These principles - which until recently went unchallenged and which were also deemed to have been broadly successful in practice - dictate that the integration of immigrants must be in accord with the principles of laïcité and that it is individuals, rather than groups of persons, that are to be integrated, thereby ensuring that the actions of the state do not contribute towards the constitution or maintenance of structured communities.

Over the last decade or more these principles have been repeatedly reworked and restated in a series of official documents which, either implicitly or explicitly, have addressed the issues posed by the existence of a now substantial Muslim population within the Republic. Beginning with the report of the Commission de la nationalité, entitled Etre Français, aujourd'hui et demain (published in 1988), this has been continued in the regular reports of the Haut Conseil à l'intégration, a body established by then Prime Minister Michel Rocard.

For example, its 1995 report entitled Liens culturel et intégration states: 'the French model is based on undifferentiation between individuals. Every human being has intrinsic worth, independently of the community to which he belongs'. The 1997 report, Affaiblissement du lien social, enfermement dans les particularismes et intégration dans la cité, similarly states: 'France has always refused to recognise collective rights that are specific to groups or minorities. It is to each man and to each woman that it has granted full rights to allow him or her individually to take a place in French society'. The same reasoning dictates that 'French universalism' cannot acknowledge the 'rights of minorities' or accept the claims of communal 'particularisms', something which is associated with the 'logic' of 'the ghetto, of separation and of exclusion'. The aim remains 'the integration into the national community of the most diverse populations, whether or not they are attached to their particularisms'. What we can see is that during this period the reports have sought progressively to adopt a more flexible and pragmatic approach to the issues apparently posed by France's Muslim minority, whilst at the same time working within the hallowed republican principles of integration and laïcité. This is no better shown than in the latest report of the Haut Conseil à l'intégration, significantly entitled L'Islam dans la République, published in early 2001 and chaired by former government minister Roger Fauroux. On the eve of the publication of this report Fauroux presented its conclusions at a meeting held at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. Both he and those present who had already read the report were at pains to point out what was seen as its 'pragmatic' approach. Fauroux also drew attention to the title of the report and the significance of saying 'in' rather than 'and' the Republic.

The document begins by recalling the general principles of the Republic, defined as laïcité, citoyenneté and égalité, leading Fauroux himself to conclude that 'our national community does not define itself as a mosaic of communities but more than ever as the daily plebiscite by our fellow citizens of which Renan spoke'. This is a reference to the famous statement made by Ernest Renan in his 'Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?' This is followed by a detailed history of the policy of the French state towards religion, justified on the grounds that Muslims might be unaware of its content. The report then seeks to explain what it takes to be the 'five pillars' of Islam, before addressing what it sees as the
practical issues raised in three areas: Islamic religious observance, food preparation and schooling. With the former, for example, it explores what has been the controversial issue of the building of mosques as well as matters associated with death and burial; with the second, it looks mostly at public health questions associated with the ritual slaughter of animals; whilst the third examines a range of issues associated with the education of Muslim children in French state schools (including, of course, the wearing of the foulard but also issues that relate to timetabling, the curriculum, school canteens, and so on). The overall aim is stated succinctly as follows: 'if it behoves the public powers to reaffirm the core principles the respect of which is beyond negotiation, by the same token, they should seek to create the conditions for a just and non-conflictual relationship between the Republic and Islam'. This ambition is perhaps best summarised in its conclusion (disputed by a minority of the report's membership) that no hard or fast rules should be applied to exclude girls wearing the foulard from school.

However, what cannot be 'negotiated' is also made abundantly clear, by reference to 'the republican pact' and the objective of 'integration', which as before is taken to imply that 'unlike the communitarian models, the French model rests upon the indivisibility of the Republic which means that integration is not based upon the recognition of communities cohabiting together but upon the active and voluntary participation within the national community of different individuals'. Thus, with regard to schools, it follows that: 'there exists a fixed core of principles and requirements derived from the republican pact which render unacceptable a certain number of demands. The school system cannot in any way make concessions which run the risk of allowing the development of an "école à la carte", a prefiguration of a multiculturalism diametrically opposed to the French model of integration'. So, for example, there could be no compromise over the introduction of 'halal' meals in school canteens, school opening hours and timetable, the academic content of classes, or 'more generally any behaviour likely to question again the equality between men and women'. 'Such concessions', the report concludes, 'would lead to the granting of specific advantages to such a group as a consequence of its religious identity, in contradiction with the French model which rests upon the integration of individuals'.

There can be no doubt that this document represents a sincere and thoughtful attempt to demonstrate that there exists no incompatibility between the practices associated with the Muslim religion and the values of France's republican tradition. It probably pushes those values as far as they can go on the road of compromise. It is not insignificant, for example, that several members of the Haut Conseil à l'intégration were not prepared to endorse all of its conclusions. As such, L'Islam dans la République reveals all the tensions inherent in a republican model of citizenship that struggles to come to terms with the reality of a de facto ethnically and religiously diverse society. It is also, it might be noted, far removed from the report of the Commission on the Future of a Multi-Ethnic Britain, in which its Chair, Bhikhu Parekh, could speak of 'our vision of a relaxed and self-confident multicultural Britain'.

Cécile Laborde, in a paper which is soon to appear in Political Theory, has suggested that contemporary French republicanism 'suffers from a mild form of schizophrenia'. It tends, she writes, 'to be liberal and universalist when faced with multicultural demands, but communitarian and nationalist when faced with global and supranational claims'.330. C. Laborde, 'The Culture(s) of the Republic: Nationalism and Multiculturalism in French Republican Thought'.0 She cites, for example, the curious incongruity between
official French policy on the importance of the French language (francophonie) in the
world at large with the intense reticence that surrounded France’s signature of the
European Charter for Minority Languages in 1999. As she comments: ‘While claims for
the recognition of regional languages are routinely confronted with (and often
outweighed by) the overriding need for national unity, the promotion of the French
language worldwide is invariably defended as a valuable contribution to cultural
diversity’. The point is that the defence of the cultural identity of France in the name of
diversity is matched at sub-national level by a continued antipathy towards cultural
diversity.

This is a view echoed by sociologist Alain Touraine, but in a far more strident tone. He
writes, for example, that ‘the republican mentality of today is a pure reaction devoid of
meaning to the globalisation of the market or, even worse, a perversive form of
communitarianism’.331 A. Touraine, ‘Multiculturalisme ou communications
interculturelles’, in F. Barret-Ducrocq, op.cit., pp.295-305.1 Many politicians and
commentators, he continues, ‘oppose the republic to democracy and those who choose
the former usually add the defense of the French exception. This is to imagine that only
France has the capacity to defend universal rights against particularistic interests and
that the history of France can be identified with an aspeticised triumph of an endless
French Revolution, transforming the Terror into political liberation, the exploitation of
the workers into a faith in education and the rejection of minorities into the right to be
integrated into the country of the rights of man’. What, he asks, is a republic if it is not
also ‘a social and cultural democracy?’ His answer is a Greece and Rome where only a
minority were citizens.332 A similar, if less combative, analysis can be found in M.
Wieviorka, ‘Le Multiculturalisme est-il la réponse?’, Cahiers internationaux de Sociologie
(CV) 1998, pp.233-60.2

Yet Touraine, for all his conviction that republicanism is detached from reality,
recognises the legitimacy of its source of concern: ‘the dissolution of the social bond’.
For him, however, the problem is less one of cultural pluralism than of anomie. He thus
calls up for consideration the German concept of Bindung, recognising that it cannot be
adequately translated into either French or English, but which he explains as ‘an
awareness of interdependence created through belonging’. Stated thus, it is hard for the
Anglo-American reader not to be reminded of the arguments recently put forward by
Robert D. Putnam in Bowling Alone and of the wider literature on social capital.333 R.
D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New
York, 2000). 3 The problem, in other words, is not the strength but the weakness of our
sense of belonging to particular communities that follows from the erosion of the
institutions and associations that make up civil society.

Here we find ourselves in the presence of a more relaxed conception of citizenship that
would regard itself as both liberal and pluralist and which is far removed from what
Michael Walzer has called ‘the heroic intensity of Rousseauian citizenship’.334 M.
Walzer, ‘The Concept of Civil Society’, in M. Walzer (ed), Towards a Global Civil Society,
pp.7-27.4 Unlike republicanism, it makes only occasional demands upon the virtues of
its citizens and does not believe that participation in the public sphere is our highest
calling; rather, it assumes, as Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman summarise, that ‘most
people find the greatest happiness in their family life, work, religion, or leisure, not in
politics’.335 W. Kymlicka and W. Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent
Work on Citizenship Theory’, Ethics (104) 1994, p.362.5 It replaces the deliberative
citizen imbued with the constitutional patriotism of contemporary republican theory with a
vision of society which is fragmented and localised and with a vision of individuals as both autonomous and interdependent. Likewise, it recognises that the good life (to quote Michael Walzer again) will be found ‘in the details’ and not in some abstract vision of a postnational republican European citizenship.