The external dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: the role of third countries in EU migration policy

Natasja Reslow
Maastricht University
Email: n.reslow@maastrichtuniversity.nl


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Introduction

International migration is by its very nature a matter of foreign policy (Geddes, 2004). Documents by the European Commission and Council of Ministers have long indicated the importance of cooperating with third countries on migration. In a 2001 communication on illegal migration, for instance, the Commission stated that:

bearing in mind that any action to counter irregular migratory flows should take place as close as possible to the irregular migrants concerned, the EU should promote actions in, and support actions of, countries of origin and transit. To that end, migration issues should be integrated in the existing partnerships, which are the general framework of our relations with third countries (Commission, 2001, pp.3-8).

The EU seeks to incentivise such cooperation for third countries. Following a communication by the Commission, the Council recently acknowledged that visa facilitation agreements are an important incentive for third countries to sign readmission agreements (Council, 2011a). The EU is involved in migration dialogues, such as the EU-Africa Regional Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development (the Rabat process), and the Global Approach to Migration (adopted in 2005) defines a strategy for the external dimension of migration policy.

However, several authors have pointed out that the interests of third countries on migration issues are very different to those of the EU. Whereas the EU is primarily concerned with the prevention of illegal migration, “sub-Saharan African countries are not necessarily interested in curbing the migration of their own citizens and are not

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interested in cooperation on readmission of non-nationals, fearing the impact it may have on their capacity to deal with migration flows” (Weinar, 2011, p.7). It is particularly readmission that is costly for the readmitting state: “repatriation nearly always constitutes the loss of vital foreign currency [in remittances]… the return of émigrés regularly puts further pressure on already-saturated labour markets… [and] reintegration can pose significant social challenges where deportees have engaged in criminal or ‘subversive’ political activity abroad or where migrants return with only a rudimentary knowledge of their ‘native’ language and culture” (Ellermann, 2008, p.171). There is usually little offered to third countries in exchange for their cooperation on readmission – generally only some funding and the prospect of a “more favourable international reputation”. However, this is not sufficient to ensure third countries’ cooperation. More concrete benefits, such as the prospect of EU membership, are required (p.175).

EU membership is clearly not on offer to all third countries, and so the question is under which circumstances do third countries (that are not eligible for EU membership) choose to cooperate with the EU on migration policy, and what role are they able to play in the policy-making process? This paper answers these questions by focusing on the EU’s Mobility Partnerships with West African countries. The Mobility Partnerships are a tool launched by the Commission in 2007 and are negotiated with third countries “that have committed themselves to cooperating actively with the EU on the management of migration flows… and that are interested in securing better access to EU territory for their citizens” (Commission, 2007a, p.3). They take the form of legally non-binding political declarations signed between interested member states, the Commission, and the third country. So far, Mobility Partnerships have been signed with Moldova, Georgia and Cape Verde, and are under negotiation with Ghana and Armenia. Partnerships will soon be offered to Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. Negotiations with Senegal stalled in 2009.

The paper argues that the EU’s unilateral approach towards the negotiation of the Mobility Partnerships cannot explain the different outcomes of the Mobility Partnerships in Cape Verde and Senegal. Instead, it is the coherence (or incoherence) between national and EU policy objectives and the costs and benefits of cooperation which determine a third country’s decision to cooperate with the EU on migration issues.
Explaining the role and interest of third countries in EU migration policy

Chou (2006) has identified two main strategies that the EU pursues in its external migration policy. The first is a ‘comprehensive’ approach which “takes into consideration the needs of all three parties involved (EU member states, sending countries and the migrants)” (p.2). Lavenex (2004, p.684) emphasises that such an approach implies voluntarism on the part of the third country. In its external relations in general, the EU emphasizes ownership of policies by third countries (e.g. Commission, 2010). Recently the Commission has proposed a dialogue on migration with the countries of the southern Mediterranean “with the aim of delivering tangible benefits for them as well as for the European Union” (Council, 2011b, p.10). In 2005 the Commission issued a communication suggesting strategies for preventing brain drain from developing countries (Commission, 2005a). The Global Approach to Migration (adopted in 2005) had as one aim to ensure that “migration works to the benefit of all countries concerned” (Council, 2005a, p.9)

On the other hand is a ‘coercive’ approach which is one that “uses development aid or related incentives in exchange for third countries’ cooperation in achieving EU migration objectives, such as the tackling of irregular migration” (Chou, 2006, p.2). The Commission has indicated that, as readmission agreements are exclusively in the interests of the EU, incentives must be offered to third countries to encourage the conclusion of such agreements (Commission, 2002; 2011a). At the Seville European Council meeting in 2002, Spain and the United Kingdom proposed to limit the provision of development aid to third countries that do not cooperate with the EU on migration issues (Chou, 2006, p.4). Although this was rejected by other member states, it was agreed that measures may be adopted (under the Common Foreign and Security Policy or other policies) against countries that do not cooperate on migration (Council, 2002). Due to the dominance of the ‘coercive’ approach in EU migration policy, Chou (2009, p.19) argues that “for the migration ministers the idea of ‘cooperation with third countries’ [is] less centred on how both partners could obtain shared advantage and more concentrated on formulating a common EU approach in the first instance, and then subsequently enforcing it on third
country ‘partners’”. A unilateral approach has proved counterproductive in the past: partner countries played no role in the production of action plans by the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, leading to a very angry reaction by Moroccan officials (Chou, 2006, p.18).

In order to explain the role and interest of third countries in EU migration policy, it is necessary to look beyond the EU’s strategy and consider the process of decision-making in the third countries concerned. In his survey of the literature on ‘Europeanisation beyond Europe’, Schimmelfennig (2009) highlights that conditionality is one of the best-known models of EU influence on third countries. Conditionality is “based on the direct, sanctioning impact of the EU on the target government” (p.8). The EU offers certain incentives for third countries to comply with its requirements, and sanctions for non-compliance. Importantly, there is then a cost-benefit calculation by the third country: “the better the cost-benefit balance between EU rewards and domestic adaptation costs, the more likely EU rule transfer is to succeed” (Trauner, 2009, p.776).

This cost-benefit balance depends on a number of factors: (i) if the EU policy objectives are coherent with national policy objectives, then domestic adaptation costs will be low; (ii) if the expected benefits offered by the EU outweigh the costs of cooperation (for example the expected administrative burden), then EU bargaining power is high (Barbé et al., 2009; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Killick, 1997).

This paper shows that, for both of the Mobility Partnerships being examined, the EU applied a ‘coercive’, unilateral approach to the negotiation of the Mobility Partnership. This approach alone cannot explain the different outcomes in the case of Senegal and Cape Verde. In addition to the approach applied by the EU, the paper considers the coherence between the Mobility Partnership and the national policy objectives of Cape Verde and Senegal, and the costs and benefits of the cooperation for

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1 This model has been developed in relation to the enlargement process (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004), where the reward on offer for compliance (eventual membership in the EU) is significant. As outlined earlier, this reward is not on offer for African countries. In a non-enlargement context, it is more useful to speak of ‘policy conditionality’ (Trauner, 2009), in other words policy-related incentives that are not related to accession.
these two countries. The following section sets out the case selection and discusses the comparability of Cape Verde and Senegal.

**Methodology**

This paper carries out a focussed comparison of two cases by tracing the process of decision-making on the Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde and the failed negotiations with Senegal (i.e. one positive case and one negative case). These were the first Mobility Partnerships to be negotiated with African countries, but there is good reason to believe that more Mobility Partnerships will be signed with African countries in the future (in other words, these first partnerships will be typical cases). So far, Mobility Partnerships have been signed with countries in the south and in the east, reflecting the balance of the Global Approach to Migration (Commission, 2009, p.3). These regions are considered important in terms of migration – in 2006, the Commission recognised that countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Northern Africa lack the infrastructure to effectively deal with migration, leading to illegal immigration to the EU (Commission, 2006, p.4). In the same year, migrants from non-EU European countries and Africa together accounted for approximately 50% of all immigration to the EU (Eurostat, 2008).

This paper focuses on African countries. As outlined in the introduction, the prospect of future EU membership can be a significant benefit for a third country when deciding whether to cooperate with the EU on migration issues. In the case of African countries, this prospect does not exist. Nevertheless, the EU has emphasised the importance of the relationship with Africa, for example in terms of trade and development but also the political, economic and cultural links existing between certain member states and African countries (Commission, 2005b, p.2). It is therefore vital for the EU to have a “comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relations with the African continent” (ibid.), clearly indicating the significance of this region in the EU’s external relations. This communication was followed by the Council’s adoption of the EU Strategy for Africa, which recognises that “Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa” (Council, 2005b, p.8) and listed several measures to be achieved, including in the area of migration (addressing the root causes of
migration; fostering links with development; and combating illegal migration) (ibid.). Negotiations for a Mobility Partnership are currently ongoing with Ghana and Mobility Partnerships are to be offered to countries in North Africa as well (Commission, 2011b, p.12).

Cape Verde and Senegal are both part of the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and ACP countries. Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement deals with migration – in particular, article 13(5) stipulates an obligation to readmit own nationals. Under the agreement, five-year country strategy papers are drawn up, and migration is an important component of the 2008-2013 country strategy papers of both Cape Verde and Senegal. The country strategy paper for Cape Verde includes specific objectives on migration under the general objective of support for national security. The objectives focus on improved border control and management of migratory flows (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008, p.39). The country strategy paper for Senegal recalls that Senegal has traditionally been a country of destination for migrants, but it has increasingly become a country of departure. However, migration is not a priority area for cooperation between the EU and Senegal. The national indicative programme focuses on regional integration, sanitation, and budgetary support. Only 8% of the funds available are allocated to non-priority areas (migration, civil society and culture) (Senegal-European Community, 2008; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Senegal, n.d.). The migration profiles for both countries highlight the importance of remittances. Although the value of remittances to Cape Verde as a percentage of GDP has declined over the past decades, they are still estimated to make up between 10% and 20% of GDP (Interview 2; 3; 4; Cape Verde-European Community, 2008; Carling, 2008, p.23; World Bank, 2011) and are important in the economic development of Cape Verde (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008, p.6; Interview 25). Remittances are also an important part of Senegal’s economy: IOM estimates that remittances made up 12% of Senegalese GDP in 2007 (IOM, 2009b), whilst the World Bank puts the figure at 9% of GNI for 2010 (World Bank, 2011). In 2002, remittances to Senegal were estimated to be worth one and a half times the value of official development aid (IOM, 2009b).
There are, however, also important differences between Cape Verde and Senegal. Firstly, there is less emigration from Cape Verde than from Senegal. The net migration rate for Cape Verde of -0.66 per thousand in 2011 is considerably lower than in Senegal, where the rate is -1.9 (CIA World Factbook, 2011a; 2011b; IOM, 2009b). The 2008-2013 country strategy paper for Senegal indicates that a high level of unemployment contributes to illegal emigration (Senegal-European Community, 2008). The estimated unemployment rate in 2007 was 48% (CIA World Factbook, 2011b), which reflects the fact that many people, whilst not officially unemployed, are underemployed (Senegal-European Community, 2008; IOM, 2009b). Migration from Senegal and including Senegalese migrants became headline news in the mid-2000s. In 2006, tens of thousands of migrants attempted to reach the Canary Islands, of which 50% were estimated to be Senegalese. Over 1,000 migrants were confirmed drowned and thousands more were missing (Gerdes, 2007, p.6). Following pressure from Spain, Frontex missions were deployed in Senegalese waters starting in September 2006, in order to prevent further illegal migration from Senegal (van Criekinge, 2008, p.21). In comparison, the ‘migration pressure’ from Cape Verde is low. The migration profile shows that only 183,000 Cape Verdeans are estimated to live in the EU (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008). This is relatively insignificant compared to the numbers of migrants coming from some other African countries. In 2006, for instance, an estimated 481,000 Algerians were living in France alone (EMN, 2009). Generally, Cape Verdeans perceive migration as only temporary – most migrants have the intention to return (Carling and Åkesson, 2009; Carling, 2002). The migration profile in the country strategy paper also indicates that Cape Verde is increasingly becoming a country of destination or transit, particularly for ECOWAS citizens (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008).

A second difference between Cape Verde and Senegal is their different economic and governance status. Within the Cotonou Agreement, Cape Verde represents a special case. The country was removed from the list of least-developed countries by the UN, after having satisfied two of the three conditions: GDP and level of human development. For the third condition (degree of economic vulnerability) Cape Verde remains in a weak position (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008, p.18; Interview 13). Nevertheless,
Cape Verde has achieved a “high level of governance” (Commission, 2007b, p.3). In comparison, the migration profile included in the 2008-2013 country strategy paper is critical of Senegal’s governance of migration, stating that there is a lack of coordination between different actions and no clear leadership by the Senegalese authorities (Senegal-European Community, 2008, p.45). This is echoed by the 2009 migration profile by IOM: “Despite the size of regular and irregular migration flows, Senegal has neither a formal migration policy nor a structure dedicated to the migration issue for determining and implementing the national migration policy. Migration management is entrusted to various ministries” (IOM, 2009b, p.28; cf. Dia, 2009). The economic differences between Cape Verde and Senegal are clear from their GDP per capita for 2010: the GDP per capita for Cape Verde ($3,800) is twice that of Senegal ($1,900) (CIA World Factbook, 2011a; 2011b).

Finally, within the Cotonou Agreement, Cape Verde has achieved a special status. The Cape Verdean government actively approached the EU to request closer cooperation (Interview 25) because there was a feeling that “the Cotonou agreement is not enough” (Interview 6). In 2007, the Commission issued a communication on the future of relations between the EU and Cape Verde, in which it proposed a ‘Special Partnership’ (Commission, 2007b). One month later, the Council endorsed this proposal (Council, 2007b). The Special Partnership is “intended to strengthen dialogue and policy convergence between the two parties, so enhancing the traditional donor-beneficiary relationship with a framework of mutual interests” (Commission, 2007b, p.2). This does not signal the end of Cape Verde’s inclusion in the Cotonou Agreement – rather, the Special Partnership is to be compatible with the Cotonou Agreement (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008, p.21). It provides for a regular dialogue between the parties, centred around six pillars: good governance; security/stability; regional integration; technology and standards convergence; knowledge-based society; and poverty alleviation and development (Commission, 2007b). These pillars were identified based on the Cape Verdean government’s document on the transformation and modernization of the country (Interview 3; 10; 25). Interviewees indicated that, despite the fact that the Special Partnership does not incorporate a financial envelope, it nevertheless has huge symbolic
and political value for Cape Verde, because it provides for a permanent, structured dialogue with the EU (Interview 3; 6). The 2008-2013 national indicative programme indicates that €11.5 million of Cape Verde's allocation (€51 million) will be spent on the development of the Special Partnership (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008, p.32).

The comparison of Cape Verde and Senegal is therefore not a perfect one as there are some important differences between these countries. However, this is the best comparison possible, given that the case selection is limited to those African countries that have so far negotiated a Mobility Partnership. The analysis in this paper is based on fieldwork in EU institutions, member states, and the third countries concerned in the period February 2009 – June 2011. In-depth, open-ended interviews were conducted mainly with government officials. A list of interviewees is presented in the annex.

**Cape Verde**

**Selection as a candidate country**

Cape Verde played an active role in becoming a candidate country for a pilot Mobility Partnership, by requesting member states to propose Cape Verde to the Commission (Interview 10). Through the ambassador in Brussels, the Cape Verdean authorities became aware that the EU was looking to test the concept of a Mobility Partnership with an ACP country. The government believed that the Mobility Partnership was coherent with national policy objectives (both on migration, and more generally in terms of the relationship with the EU; see below), and so approached the Portuguese authorities and the permanent representation of Luxembourg in Brussels to discuss the issue (Interview 6).

Spain and Portugal, in particular, supported the idea, as these two countries have significant economic interests in the county (Interview 11). These member states were therefore active in suggesting Cape Verde as a partner country for a Mobility Partnership in informal discussions between the Commission and member states. Cape Verde was ultimately selected for a Mobility Partnership, with the Council inviting the Commission to open negotiations (Council, 2007a). The reasons for the EU to select Cape Verde were not so much related to its importance in terms of migration flows to the EU, but rather to
its image as an “easy” country with which to cooperate. In addition, there is an informal understanding between the Commission and the member states that there will be a “balance between east and south” in the Global Approach to Migration (Interview 16; 17; 19; 20; 21; 22; 24). More generally, Cape Verde as a partner country has been willing to cooperate on security issues, which are normally seen as being sensitive and therefore a difficult area for cooperation between the EU and third countries (Interview 25).

Negotiations on the declaration
Despite playing a proactive role in the process of being selected as a candidate country for a Mobility Partnership, Cape Verde was less able to play a role in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the text. After the Council invited the Commission to open negotiations with Cape Verde, the Commission approached the Cape Verdean authorities (Interview 24). The Commission conducted the exploratory talks with Cape Verde, and later member states interested in taking part were also invited to join (Interview 23). Talks were conducted on behalf of the Commission by then-DG JLS (with the involvement of others, such as Development, Relex, and Aidco) (Interview 24). For Cape Verde, the ambassador in Brussels was responsible for the negotiations (Interview 6).

In terms of the content of the Mobility Partnership, interviewees point out that this partnership “started as an experimental project of the EU… That’s why the beginning of the project was mostly a project from the EU than a project of bilateral genesis” (Interview 3). Ultimately it was the EU that made the formal proposal to the Cape Verdean government for a Mobility Partnership, and interviewees point out that the text of the partnership is very similar to the text of the Mobility Partnership with Moldova (Interview 6). The EU therefore very much determined the priorities of the Mobility Partnership (Interview 9). A glance at the scoreboard2 (dated 29th January 2010) confirms this: of the 45 projects listed, Cape Verde is an official partner in only 12.

During the negotiations, the Cape Verdean delegations also came up against the problem of their limited resources. For instance, the Cape Verdean ambassador in

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2 The scoreboard is an internal Commission document, listing all the projects being implemented in the framework of the Mobility Partnership, the partners in the projects, the sources of funding, the current state of implementation, and the end date of the project.
Brussels had not realized that the negotiations on the Mobility Partnership would impinge on matters relating to mode four of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), as the Cape Verdean government does not have an expert on WTO matters (Interview 6). Whereas Commission negotiators are experienced and negotiate in a large team, the Cape Verdean delegation is less experienced and smaller (Interview 9). In the Cape Verdean administration, responsibility for migration is fragmented between several ministries, and there is a lack of reliable statistical data on migration and remittance flows (Carling, 2008). For the purposes of the negotiations of the Mobility Partnership, the Cape Verdean foreign minister at the time created a working group incorporating also representatives from the ministries of labour and internal affairs (Interview 14). However, the ambassador in Brussels was getting only limited input from the ministry of internal affairs and no input from the ministry of labour. This affected the role that Cape Verde was able to play in the negotiations: “When you [negotiate an agreement] you might be pleased that you've done something good for your country, but you have the frustration of knowing that if you had specialists in other sectors you might have done better” (Interview 6).

It is therefore clear that Cape Verde was not able to play an active role in the negotiation of the Mobility Partnership. As one interviewee put it: “you can say that the partners are equal, that things have been discussed, this is politically correct, but the reality is not that. The partners are not equal or at an equal level, the partners don’t understand all the problems being discussed” (ibid.).

Coherence between Mobility Partnership and national policy objectives?
Despite the limited role it was able to play in the negotiation of the declaration on a Mobility Partnership, the Cape Verdean government accepted the agreement because it was coherent with national policy objectives. Specifically, the government believed the Mobility Partnership could help it to achieve certain objectives: dealing with illegal migration and strengthening relations with the Cape Verdean diaspora; achieving closer relations with the EU; and giving shape to the security pillar of the Special Partnership.
Migration is an important aspect of Cape Verdan history, culture and society, and shapes Cape Verdeans’ views of themselves (Carling and Åkesson, 2009; Carling and Batalha, 2008; IOM, 2009a). The government generally views migration positively: “Le Cap-Vert voit la question de la migration comme un facteur essential au développement de l'humanité” (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008). It is generally estimated that there are more Cape Verdeans living abroad than on the islands themselves (Interview 1). The population of Cape Verde is 430,000 (in 2011), while the diaspora is estimated to be between 600,000 (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008) and 1 million (CIA World Factbook, 2011a). Emigrants continue to play an important role in Cape Verdan society, for instance through their electoral rights (Interview 2). For this reason, there is a Cape Verdan saying that “the 11th island of Cape Verde is abroad” (Interview 5). The government is very aware of the importance of the diaspora, and actively seeks ways in which to help them to contribute to the development of Cape Verde (Interview 4). The Mobility Partnership was seen as a chance to develop such projects.

Traditionally, Cape Verde has been a country of emigration (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008), but it is increasingly becoming a country of immigration and transit migration (Interview 6; 13; 25). There has been a wave of immigration to Cape Verde. This immigration has been both legal, such as entrepreneurial immigration from China (Haugen and Carling, 2005), but also increasingly illegal, with boats for the Canary Islands departing from Cape Verde. The vast majority of migrants leaving Cape Verde in this way, however, are not Cape Verdeans but mainland Africans, mainly from Ghana, Mali and Senegal (Carling, 2008, p.10; Carling, 2002, p.28). Cape Verde has become an attractive country for ECOWAS citizens due to its economic growth, political stability, and higher salaries (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008). ECOWAS citizens have the right of free movement to Cape Verde, but government officials state that this is problematic because the labour market is not big enough to absorb all those arriving (Interview 5). The Cape Verdan government is trying to deal with the new issues related to migration. Each year, Cape Verde returns approximately 800 citizens of ECOWAS countries who are illegally resident in Cape Verde. Returning these citizens is
expensive, but the government is keen to convey an image of Cape Verde as a “serious country”, where migrants who are illegally present will be returned (Interview 2). The increase in immigration also led to the creation of an inter-ministerial committee on migration, whose objective was to elaborate a national migration policy (Interview 7). This policy was presented to parliament in February 2011. The government emphasizes that Cape Verde has no interest in being a country of transit for migrants heading to Europe. Instead, it favours well-organised legal migration (Interview 1; 2). For instance, one objective of the national institute for employment and vocational training (IEFP) is to prepare Cape Verdeans to migrate, by providing training courses or by matching skills of Cape Verdeans with skills needed in the European labour market (Interview 8). For this reason, the government was interested in taking part in the Mobility Partnership, which combines cooperation on legal migration and illegal migration.

A central objective of the Cape Verdean government is the establishment of closer relations with the EU across all policy issues. Both the government of Cape Verde and the European Commission see Cape Verde as a bridge between Europe and Africa (Interview 2; 25; Commission, 2007b). Interviewees point to several affinities between Europe and Cape Verde in terms of culture, religion, norms and values, the legal system, the organization of the state, and respect for human rights (Interview 2; 6; 10). In its communication on the future of relations between the EU and Cape Verde, the Commission also indicates that the EU and Cape Verde share “close human and cultural links, the common experience of major events and strong, shared socio-political values” (Commission, 2007b, p.2). For the Cape Verdean government, membership of ECOWAS is not seen as satisfactory for the country’s political ambitions due to the corruption and unbalanced development in West Africa, and the fact that Cape Verde’s main trading partners are in Europe (Interview 6). In 2011, the three most important countries for Cape Verdean exports are Spain, Portugal and Morocco, and the three most important countries for imports to Cape Verde are Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain (CIA World Factbook, 2011a). The 2008-2013 country strategy paper also notes Cape Verde’s lack of involvement in ECOWAS – for instance, Cape Verde is not much involved in the decision-making process of ECOWAS and does not contribute to its financial
mechanisms (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008). As one interviewee pointed out, “the references [in Cape Verde] are in the north, not in the west coast of Africa” (Interview 6). This can be attributed to the interaction between Cape Verdeans and the diaspora, which is mainly found in the United States and Europe (ibid.). Cape Verde is one of the most stable democracies in Africa (CIA World Factbook, 2011a), and the government therefore believes that cooperation with Cape Verde can be interesting for the EU as an example that democracy in Africa can be successful (Interview 6; Cape Verde-European Community, 2008, p.6). The EU delegation in Praia agrees, noting that Cape Verde lacks many of the problems (such as corruption) that other ACP countries grapple with (Interview 11). In terms of migration, the government perceived that Cape Verde would be an interesting country for the EU to cooperate with, as the migration risk from a country of less than 500,000 citizens can be considered limited (Interview 6).

The Mobility Partnership should also be understood within the framework of the Special Partnership between the EU and Cape Verde (Interview 22). One of the reasons why the Cape Verdean government was interested in the Mobility Partnership was because it would be an instrument in the framework of the Special Partnership (Interview 6). The Mobility Partnership is frequently referred to as ‘the most dynamic aspect of the Special Partnership’ (Interview 12; 13; 24). A starting point for the Special Partnership was the pillar on security. The Commission communication states that this pillar covers cooperation on “transnational organized crime (cooperation on counter-terrorism, human trafficking and the smuggling of immigrants, illegal trafficking in drugs, arms, money-laundering), whilst promoting respect for human rights; effective management of migration, including improving the contribution of the Cape Verdean diaspora to the development of the country (remittances) and action to tackle illegal migration; maritime safety” (Commission, 2007b, p.5). These issues are also highlighted in the national indicative programme for Cape Verde, where the “improved management of migratory flows” is one objective to be achieved in support of national security (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008, p.39). It is particularly the issue of drugs that concerns the Cape Verdean government. In 2005, Cape Verde requested the assistance of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the CAVE INTECRIN programme (Cape Verde
Integrated Crime and Narcotic Programme on strengthening the rule of law) was launched, with funds contributed the Commission, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (UNODC, 2005). The Cape Verdan government sees that the EU has an interest in cooperating with Cape Verde on drug trafficking, as the drugs that pass through Cape Verde are headed for the European market (Interview 2; 3; 6). For the government, the issue of drugs is also related to migration – those in the diaspora who have criminal records have generally been involved with drugs in some way (Interview 6). Sometimes these people are then deported back to Cape Verde, creating further problems with reintegration (Interview 4).

The costs of cooperation: readmission
In the text of the Mobility Partnership, there is a proposal by the Commission to request a negotiating mandate from the Council for a readmission agreement (Council, 2007c, p.13). Readmission has therefore been part of the Mobility Partnership from the very beginning. At the outset Cape Verde accepted this because the government perceived the Mobility Partnership as being about more than only the readmission agreement, and identified a coherence between the Mobility Partnership and national policy objectives (see above) (Interview 17). However, it is becoming clear to the Cape Verdan government that “the readmission issue is at the heart of the Mobility Partnership, everything else is just window dressing” (Interview 9). An official of the EU delegation in Praia confirms that a major interest of the EU in concluding the Mobility Partnership was “the will to fight illegal immigration” (Interview 11). The EU has made it very clear that a readmission agreement is a pre-condition for a visa facilitation agreement to be signed (ibid.). Cape Verdan officials state that the government has no problem with readmitting its own citizens; indeed, it has agreements on readmission with some European countries, for instance France, Spain and Portugal. However, it is not prepared to sign a readmission agreement that includes a clause on third country nationals, because, as one interviewee put it, if a migrant is found to be illegally present in the EU then it means that EU border controls have failed, so why should Cape Verde then have to take this person back? (Interview 9) Interviewees indicate that the real objection is to
the readmission of third country nationals who have only transited through Cape Verde: “we won’t accept anybody, just because he has a piece of paper proving that he bought gas here in Praia, that he should therefore be sent back to Cape Verde” (Interview 10). Cape Verde is still a relatively poor country and is starting to have its own problems with immigration; the government therefore will not accept the readmission of such third-country nationals (Interview 14).

The benefits of cooperation: EU bargaining power?

Negotiations on the readmission agreement between the EU and Cape Verde are still underway, but the outcome is uncertain and will depend on the benefits to Cape Verde of cooperation. Despite the rather unilateral approach by the EU to the negotiation of the Mobility Partnership, the Cape Verdean government accepted the text because its sees many advantages of the partnership: access to resources to improve border management; the opportunity to work with the Cape Verdean diaspora; and a permanent dialogue with the EU on migration issues (Interview 2; 15). Significantly, the government sees the Mobility Partnership as providing opportunities for mobility, which is important given that European immigration policies have become increasingly restrictive over the past years (Interview 5; Åkesson, 2008). Achieving visa-free travel for all its citizens to the EU is a stated goal of the Cape Verdean government (Interview 3). There is strong mobility from Cape Verde to the EU, with 45% of the Cape Verdean diaspora living in the EU (Interview 2).

However, the EU visa procedure is seen as overly complicated (Interview 14). The Cape Verdean government believes that a visa liberalisation agreement would be a fair deal in return for signing the readmission agreement (Interview 9). In the first draft of the text of the Mobility Partnership, visa liberalisation was mentioned. Given that this is a key long-term objective of the Cape Verdean government, this gave the EU considerable bargaining power. However, by the time of the second draft, the EU had replaced this offer of visa liberalisation with one of visa facilitation (Interview 2). The Cape Verdean government accepts that this indicates that visa liberalisation is simply not possible at this time. An official of the EU delegation confirms that visa liberalisation is not on the cards
at the moment, particularly given the current situation with Libyan and Tunisian migrants arriving in southern Europe (Interview 11). The Cape Verdean government is happy to accept a visa facilitation agreement as a step-by-step approach towards visa liberalisation, because, as one interviewee put it, if the government cannot solve the visa problem for all Cape Verdean citizens, it can at least solve it for some citizens (Interview 10). The Cape Verdean government also displays understanding of how the EU functions. Officials understand that, on issues such as visa liberalisation, it is not only ‘Brussels’ taking the decision, but rather the member states (Interview 6). They are also aware that immigration policy remains a member state competence (Interview 15), but equally that EU governance is in flux and the situation may change as a result of the Lisbon treaty (Interview 3). A visa facilitation agreement therefore does provide the EU with some bargaining power, but it remains to be seen whether this benefit can outweigh the costs to Cape Verde of the readmission agreement. Although Cape Verde cooperates with EU member states on migration issues on a bilateral basis, this bilateral cooperation does not weaken the EU’s bargaining power because the Cape Verdean government attaches enormous importance to its relationship with the EU (this is in contrast to Senegal, where bilateral cooperation weakens the EU’s bargaining power; see below).

Senegal

Selection as a candidate country

In contrast to Cape Verde (which approached member states regarding the Mobility Partnership), Senegal was approached by the EU (Interview 29). Commission officials

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3 Cape Verde cooperates on migration issue mainly with Portugal, Spain and France. Spain has helped to patrol Cape Verdaen waters (Carling, 2008, p.11). Labour migration agreements have been concluded with both Spain and France. However, despite the fact that both agreements are signed and ratified by both parties, no Cape Verdeans have yet migrated under these schemes due to the economic crisis in Europe (Interview 2; 8). A bilateral labour migration agreement with Portugal has been in place since 1997, allowing Cape Verdeans to work in Portugal for up to three years, subject to having an employment contract. However, this scheme has not been much used, partly due to the difficulty of finding employment contracts and partly due to a lack of information about the scheme (Carling, 2002, p.28). The labour migration scheme with France falls under the accord de gestion concertée des flux migratoires (agreement on the joint management of migratory flows) signed between France and Cape Verde. This agreement incorporates facilitated access to the French labour market for 40 selected professions; readmission and police cooperation; reinsertion of migrants returning to Cape Verde; and co-development with the diaspora in France (Interview 18).
were aware that, unlike with Cape Verde, Senegal would be a real test for the concept of Mobility Partnerships because there is and has been significant migration from Senegal to the European Union (Interview 39; Chou and Gibert, 2010; van Criekinge, 2010, p.7). Interviewees were divided over how Senegal was selected as a partner country. Some indicated that the Commission initiated the process, seeing advantages to a Mobility Partnership with Senegal (Interview 27). Others assign importance to member states’ preferences (Interview 24), with Spain particularly favouring a Mobility Partnership with Senegal (Interview 22; 26). Regardless of whether the member states or the Commission initiated the process leading to Senegal being selected, Council conclusions were adopted in June 2008 authorising the Commission to open negotiations with Senegal (Council, 2008a) before the Senegalese authorities were consulted (Interview 27). Following the formal decision at EU level, a first meeting was held in Dakar in July 2008, in which the Senegalese government indicated that it was very interested in the idea. The EU sent the draft declaration of the Mobility Partnership to the government, but never received any reply. Despite bringing the issue up in bilateral meetings (for instance in the follow-up meetings of the Rabat process), and assurances by the Senegalese government that they were very interested, still the EU received no reply (Interview 24). A European Parliament delegation visiting in Senegal in 2008 once again forwarded the request regarding the Mobility Partnership, and the Commissioner for development cooperation (Louis Michel) sent a letter to Senegalese President Wade (Interview 28). Eventually, the Commission abandoned the issue, and it does not foresee a revival of negotiations (Interview 24).

Negotiations on the declaration
When making the written proposal for a Mobility Partnership, the EU approach was to send the completed draft text of the declaration to the Senegalese ministry of foreign affairs for signature (Interview 30). Indeed, the proposed text was largely identical to the Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde, with only minor changes made due to differences in Senegalese population and migratory flows (Chou and Gibert, 2010, p.9). Although the Cape Verdean government did not object to a unilateral approach by the EU, the
Senegalese government describe this approach as inappropriate, unacceptable and ineffective. Interviewees point out that the EU projects on migration cannot be implemented without the cooperation of third countries, and yet the EU takes decisions unilaterally and then afterwards approaches third countries concerning the implementation. The Senegalese government believes that third countries should instead be invited to discuss and debate the contents of the policies which they are expected to help to implement (Interview 30). Senegal is an active partner in the global dialogue on migration, such as the Rabat process (Interview 28) and the government therefore insists that it will not accept decisions being imposed on it (Interview 32). There was particular anger among interviewees that such a unilateral approach was also employed by the EU in signing the Pact on Immigration and Asylum (Council, 2008b). The pact relies on third countries for implementation, but third countries were not consulted in the process leading up to the signature of the document (Interview 35). This finding confirms previous research by Chou and Gibert, who also noted the “tendency by European officials to present a ‘joint cooperation’ document in the state of near finality to non-EU partners” as a reason for the failure of the Mobility Partnership with Senegal (2010, p.8). The unilateral approach is in stark contrast to the stated principle by the EU to base its cooperation with Senegal on partnership, a dialogue between the two parties and support for the sectoral strategies identified by the Senegalese government (Senegal-European Community, 2008, p.31).

Coherence between Mobility Partnership and national policy objectives?

Some EU officials speculate that the lack of response by the Senegalese authorities to the offer of a Mobility Partnership might signal a problem with coordination between the Senegalese ministries involved in migration matters (Interview 24; 28). Senegalese interviewees acknowledge that competence for migration is “sprinkled” across several ministries and that these ministries very much work separately as no independent coordination structure exists (Interview 30; 34). The ministry of foreign affairs is responsible for bilateral migration agreements (although some may be dealt with by technical ministries if there is a need for the dossier to move quickly); the ministry of
interior is broadly responsible for immigration policy, including border controls and travel documentation; the ministry of Senegalese abroad is responsible for relations with the diaspora, for their reintegration upon returning to Senegal, for facilitating their access to accommodation and for assisting them with their investment projects in Senegal (although PLASEPRI, a joint Italian-Senegalese project to encourage the Senegalese diaspora in Italy to invest in Senegal, is managed for Senegal by the ministry of microfinance); the ministry of labour is responsible for social security whilst the ministry of employment is responsible for labour migration; a directorate of the ministry of economics and finance is responsible for population statistics, including migration flows; the ministry of justice is responsible for the fight against illegal migration and criminality; and the ministry of youth promotes employment of young people (Interview 31; 32; 33; Ministry of Senegalese Abroad, n.d. a; Ministry of Economics and Finance of Senegal, 2002; IOM, 2009b; CIGEM, 2009). To compound matters, the office of the President sometimes takes control, for instance of the projects developed under the *accord de gestion concertée des flux migratoires* with France (Interview 33). Ministries frequently change name (and therefore remit): the ministry of Senegalese abroad started as an independent ministry, was then incorporated into the ministry of foreign affairs, before being made independent again in 2003; and the ministry of microfinance used to be part of the ministry of family (Diatta and Mbow, 1999, p.249; Interview 36). Interviewees particularly stress that there is rivalry between the ministries of foreign affairs and interior (Interview 22; 26; 38). The ministry of foreign affairs guards its competence in external relations, however the ministry of interior was tasked with conducting the negotiations with France on the *accord de gestion concertée des flux migratoires* (Interview 35). The accord was therefore signed by the ministry of interior, although the steering committee overseeing the implementation of the accord has been chaired by the secretary-general of the ministry of foreign affairs (Interview 37). On the Mobility Partnership, interviewees in the ministry of foreign affairs imply that coordination problems may have been an issue: the ministry of foreign affairs forwarded the offer of a Mobility Partnership to other ministries with a request for proposals for projects. No reply was received (Interview 36).
Despite the lack of coordination among the Senegalese ministries concerning migration, interviewees in the Commission acknowledge that, as Senegal has been capable of signing migration agreements with countries such as France and Spain, the stalled negotiations on the Mobility Partnership indicate a lack of interest by the Senegalese in this policy instrument (Interview 22; 27). Indeed, Senegal is open to cooperation with the EU on migration issues, as long as this reflects Senegalese policy objectives such as legal migration opportunities for its citizens (Interview 40; van Criekinge, 2010, p.9). However, interviewees indicate differences between EU and Senegalese policy objectives due to different philosophies of migration. In Senegal, immigration is viewed positively and the government is not particularly restrictive regarding residence permits (Gerdes, 2007, p.3; Ndione and Broekhuis, 2006, p.9). Although the government has taken measures to prevent illegal migration from Senegal (p.12), illegal immigration is not seen as a big problem: illegal migrants in Senegal, if discovered, are not automatically deported (Interview 40). In September 2010, a meeting was held between the various ministries involved in migration matters, in order to establish an integrated national migration policy. The resulting document shows that illegal migration is not a priority; rather, the focus is on improving data on migration flows, promoting the contribution of the diaspora to the development of the country, protecting the rights of the diaspora, and reinforcing the capacities of the actors involved in migration (Interview 38). Indeed, international migration has only recently become a topic of importance for the government: the government’s 2002 policy on population focusses largely on internal migration (Ministry of Economics and Finance of Senegal, 2002), although the next policy to be formulated in 2012 will take into account international migration (Interview 38).

Senegalese government officials are critical of the EU’s policies on both legal and illegal migration. Selective immigration policies of EU countries (which officials see reflected in the Mobility Partnership) cause developing countries like Senegal to lose talented and qualified citizens, whilst not making adequate provision for return or circular migration (Interview 31; 40; Dia, 2009, p.24). The EU common approach to migration is seen as nothing more than a cynical approach to extend border control further away from
the EU by giving competences to third countries (Interview 40). This common approach is seen as ineffective: interviewees expressed the opinion that, if the EU wishes to prevent migration, a more appropriate strategy would be to create more wealth in African countries. If the aim is to prevent illegal migration, the EU should create more channels for legal migration (Interview 35).

**The costs of cooperation: readmission**

Particularly on the issue of readmission, there is significant incoherence between the EU’s policy objectives and Senegalese priorities. Senegalese interviewees complain that the EU is overly focused on the issue of return, without adequate attention for other migration issues, such as the integration of migrants in the country of destination (Interview 30). Just as with Cape Verde, Senegalese interviewees insist that Senegal will not accept the return of non-Senegalese migrants (Interview 40). Emigration can be a ‘safety valve’ for the many unemployed youths in Senegal (Fall et al., 2010, p.10) and the government therefore has little interest in preventing it. There is also public opposition to the return of migrants. In 2003, Senegal and Switzerland signed a readmission agreement which was the first of its kind to include the return of third-country nationals. However, the Senegalese parliament refused to ratify the agreement (Ellermann, 2008, p.168; Panizzon, 2008, p.29; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2010, p.4). CONGAD (a Senegalese grouping of NGOs) issued a statement in response to the adoption of the EU returns directive, condemning the human rights implications and underscoring the right of people to move freely in search of a better existence (CONGAD, 2008). Negotiations under article 13 of the Cotonou agreement have been interpreted by the Senegalese government as an EU attempt to force the signature of a readmission agreement (van Criekinge, 2010, p.10). Cooperation on readmission is a precondition for a Mobility Partnership (Commission, 2007a) but the Senegalese government decided this was too high a cost for such a partnership.

**The benefits of cooperation: EU bargaining power?**
The EU could not overcome Senegalese objections to the Mobility Partnership due to its low bargaining power. In particular, Senegalese interviewees indicated that the voluntary nature of the partnership for the EU member states was problematic (Interview 35; 36). This would mean that not all member states would have to contribute to or finance the Mobility Partnership, but any member state could still hold Senegal to a readmission agreement signed in the framework of the partnership because such agreements are EU-wide (Interview 40). The Senegalese government sees this as a result of the structure of decision-making in EU migration policy, whereby the only element that member states can agree on is security (Interview 35). Given such “negative perceptions of the EU’s capabilities in migration management”, the Senegalese government prefers to deal bilaterally with the member states whose agendas are often much more appropriate for Senegal’s own preferences (van Criekinge, 2010, p.12). Indeed, the competition between member states to offer the most attractive agreement has built the confidence of the Senegalese government to make demands of bilateral partners and say ‘no’ to the EU when it feels the agreement being offered is not satisfactory, such as with the Mobility Partnership (Panizzon, 2008; Interview 19). The most important bilateral partners in terms of migration are France, Spain and Italy.

*Bilateral cooperation with France*

France and Senegal have a long history of cooperating on migration, and France has also implemented several programmes in Senegal with EU co-financing. One example is the *partenariat pour la gestion des migrations professionnelles* (in cooperation with the Belgian and Italian authorities and IOM) which aims to promote circular labour migration and capacity-building in Benin, Cameroon, Mali and Senegal (Commission, n.d.). At the bilateral level, an agreement entered into force already in 1980 offering professional training to Senegalese living in France, in preparation for their return to Senegal. A co-development convention was signed between France and Senegal in 2000, with the aim of directing the diaspora’s resources towards the development of Senegal (Panizzon, 2008). In 2006, Senegal signed the first agreement on the joint management of migratory flows with France. The agreement covers cooperation on visas, residence permits, border control, return of illegal migrants, and migration and development. The central
programme being implemented under the agreement is PAISD (Programme d’Appui aux Initiatives de Solidarité pour le Développement), which aims to help Senegalese living in France to contribute to the development of Senegal through investments, projects, or expertise (Interview 37; Ministry of Senegalese Abroad, n.d. b). Significantly, the agreement with France was signed in two rounds, the first being concluded in 2006 and the second in 2008. The reason for the renegotiation was dissatisfaction on the Senegalese side with the first agreement, which did not offer more in terms of migration opportunities than the existing French immigration law. French visas target highly-skilled migrants, and the Senegalese government was therefore concerned about a possible brain drain (Panizzon, 2008, p.2). The second agreement signed in 2008 extends the clause on return of illegal migrants, but in return lists over 100 professions which are opened up to Senegalese (meaning that a French employer in one of these professions may hire a Senegalese without having to prove that no other suitable candidate can be found in the French or European labour market) (Interview 37; 41). The Senegalese government is satisfied with the inclusion of this labour market opening and describes the agreement as a “good deal”, better than what is offered by France to other West African countries such as Mali or Benin (Interview 30; 35). According to interviewees in the Commission, the Senegalese authorities are aware that signing a Mobility Partnership would not necessarily result in a visa facilitation agreement or quotas for migration such as those offered by France (Interview 39). Such legal migration opportunities are precisely what the Senegalese government seek in agreements with Europe (Gerdes, 2007, p.4).

In terms of implementation of the agreement, however, the French government expresses dissatisfaction regarding “the possibility to repatriate illegal migrants from France to Senegal... We need a laissez-passer consulaire. And Senegal is one of the countries where we get less positive responses by consular authorities to confirm that people are from Senegal and can be sent back. Politically it was also a little bit the counterpart for the concessions we had made on the agreement. And on this part we felt that the rate of positive response has diminished since the agreement was signed, it's around 20% now where it was above 50% some years ago” (Interview 37; 42). Senegalese government officials, however, do not see the agreement as a commitment to
readmit, but rather a commitment to discuss the issue of readmission at a later stage (Interview 30), which may account for the problems experienced by the French authorities.

**Bilateral cooperation with Spain**

Spain has seen an enormous increase in the number of West African migrants arriving on its territory since 2004-2005, and has therefore launched a major policy towards the region, including the opening of new embassies (Interview 43). In its 2009-2012 Africa Plan, the Spanish government lists as one of the six main objectives the consolidation of the partnership with Africa on migration (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain, 2009). In Senegal, Spain has “signed a Basic Development Cooperation Agreement... cancelled €65.5 million from Senegal's external debt, and started preparations for establishing a Fund for Concession of Microcredit” (Fall et al., 2010, p.15). In 2006, in response to the rising number of West African migrants making the journey to Europe, Spain and Senegal signed a memorandum of understanding. The agreement is a transparent trade-off between labour migration and illegal migration: Senegal received work permits for 4,000 Senegalese to work temporarily in Spain and funding for job training in Senegal, and in return had to accept Frontex patrols in its territorial waters and the return of 4,000 illegal Senegalese migrants by Spain (Panizzon, 2008). In 2007, Spain and Senegal signed a more comprehensive agreement on migration matters which included provision for 2700 Senegalese workers (in agriculture and fisheries) to go to Spain (ibid.). Like France, Spain has implemented projects with EU financing, such as the Seahorse project on border controls and interregional cooperation between Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Morocco and Senegal (Commission, n.d.).

Panizzon (2008, p.34) argues that a central difference between the French and Spanish approaches to bilateral cooperation on migration is that Spain has been “quicker than France in opening its labour market on a quota-basis to Senegalese migrant workers and more pragmatic in the sense that it will offer pre-departure orientation, linguistic and pre-employment training to the low-skilled or even unemployed workers in Senegal”. This willingness to open channels for labour migration explains why the cooperation is positively viewed by the Senegalese government – interviewees feel that this is an
appropriate way to respond to the problem of illegal migration, as opposed to the French immigration policy which is selective and favours the highly-skilled (Interview 31). The 2008 renegotiation of the French agreement with Senegal (which facilitated access to the French labour market for around 100 professions) was a response by France to the Spanish cooperation with Senegal (Panizzon, 2008, p.2). This demonstrates that the competition between EU member states strengthens the Senegalese negotiating position on migration matters. Cooperating with several different bilateral partners also means that Senegal can benefit from different types of funding because the partners may be duplicating their efforts (Interview 28). This seems to be the case with the general observatory on migratory flows created under the French-Senegalese migration agreement, and the observatory on emigration envisaged under Spain’s framework agreement with West African countries (Panizzon, 2008, p.13).

Bilateral cooperation with Italy

After France introduced a visa requirement for Senegalese citizens in 1985, Italy became the most important country of destination for Senegalese migrants (Gerdes, 2007, p.3). Senegal is the main recipient of Italian development aid in West Africa, and Italy has also carried out projects with co-financing from the EU. One example is the COOPI project which ran in the period 2004-2006 and aimed to support development-related initiatives by the Senegalese diaspora (Fall et al., 2010, p.16). The project MIDA (Migration for Development in Africa) is the result of cooperation between the Italian government and IOM. MIDA aims to improve knowledge transfer from the diaspora in order to stimulate development (Ndione and Broekhuis, 2006, p.22). Senegal has also benefited from an annual quota of work permits for Italy. In 2008, this was fixed at 1,000, although the decision is taken unilaterally by Italy (Dia, 2009, p.29).

Conclusion

Table 1 below summarises the main findings of this paper. Both Cape Verde and Senegal were only able to play a limited role in determining the contents of the Mobility Partnerships. However, it is clear that the unilateral approach adopted by the EU to the negotiations on the declarations of the Mobility Partnerships cannot explain the different
outcomes in the two cases. Instead, it is the coherence between national and EU policy objectives and the costs and benefits of cooperation that determine a third country’s decision to cooperate with the EU. In Cape Verde, the Mobility Partnership was coherent with the government’s own policy objectives. It is, however, unclear whether the EU’s bargaining power is high enough to be able to conclude a readmission agreement that includes third country nationals (something that Cape Verde is opposed to). In Senegal, the Mobility Partnership (and indeed the entire EU approach to migration) was incoherent with the government’s policy objectives. The EU’s low bargaining power (due to the alternatives provided to the Senegalese government by bilateral cooperation) led to the failure of the Mobility Partnership.

Table 1: Summary of findings

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<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Cape Verde</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
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<tr>
<td>Selection as a candidate country</td>
<td>Approached member states</td>
<td>Was approached by the EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negotiations on the declaration</td>
<td>Limited input into text of declaration</td>
<td>No input into text of declaration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coherence between Mobility Partnership and national policy objectives?</td>
<td>Yes (illegal migration; relations with the diaspora; closer relations with the EU; giving shape to security pillar of the Special Partnership)]</td>
<td>No (approach to migration policy differs from EU approach)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The costs of cooperation: readmission</td>
<td>Not prepared to accept return of third country nationals</td>
<td>Not prepared to accept return of third country nationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The benefits of cooperation: EU bargaining power?</td>
<td>Government sees advantages of Mobility Partnership, but will a visa facilitation agreement give the EU enough bargaining power to conclude the readmission agreement?</td>
<td>Low EU bargaining power (bilateral cooperation on migration provides alternative)</td>
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The findings of this paper confirm the strength of the conditionality model in explaining the influence of the EU on third countries. It is not enough to look only at the approach employed by the EU; rather, academic work on the EU’s external governance must also consider the decision-making process in, and preferences of, third countries. These findings also have policy relevance: the EU has been negotiating a Mobility Partnership with Ghana since March 2010. These discussions have, however, stalled due
to a lack of response from the Ghanaian authorities (similar to the case of Senegal).\textsuperscript{4} Mobility Partnerships are now set to be offered to Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia (Commission, 2011b). If the Commission is to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion, it must bear in mind the cost-benefit balance of cooperation for third countries and ensure that the proposals it makes are coherent with their national policy objectives. Third countries are actors in EU external migration policy, not merely passive recipients of EU policy proposals.

\textsuperscript{4} Internal communication, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 1 February 2011
References


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### Annex: Interviews

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<td>Spanish embassy, Dakar</td>
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</tbody>
</table>