National and minority identification among non-whites in Britain: where is the tradeoff?

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ABSTRACT

Conventional wisdom expects national and minority identities to be negatively correlated. This article investigates the puzzling finding of no significant tradeoff between national and minority identity among non-whites in Britain. To explain the lack of an identity tradeoff I focus on the relationship between assimilation/segregation and expected discrimination. I start with the finding that segregation boosts minority identity and reduces national identity while assimilation boosts national identity and reduces minority identity. I then claim that assimilation increases the expectation of discrimination, which reduces national and boosts minority identity. Likewise, segregation decreases the expectation of discrimination, which reduces minority identity and boosts national identity. These effects cancel each other out and explain the lack of a gap between national and minority identity among non-whites in Britain.

Identities are the driving forces behind many daily decisions, from the purchases we make to the relationships we build (Ackerlof and Kranton 2010). Identity can also mobilize groups into political action (Cederman et al. 2010; Elkins and Sides 2007; Horowitz 1985). For this reason, governments encourage strong attachment to the national community and try to weaken competing identity structures (Aktürk 2011; Joppke 2007). Yet although most people agree that identity dynamics are important, specifying the exact conditions under which different identities will be more or less salient is complex and difficult to predict (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Chandra 2006; Chandra and Wilkinson 2000).

This article examines the relationship between national and minority identity. National identity is attachment to the broad national community. Minority identification is the extent to which an individual identifies with an aspect of his or her character that divides him or her from the national community. Minority identities are generally considered threatening to national stability because when minority communities seek power it often challenges the status quo. Even in institutionally-secure settings, too many minority constituencies with narrow political agendas can overwhelm the state with irreconcilable demands (Lijphart 1999). Conventional wisdom expects national and minority identities to be negatively correlated with the strength of one identity coming at the expense of the other (Alba 1992; Cederman et al 2010; Dahl 1961; Penn 2008). In this article, contrary to the general wisdom, I investigate the puzzling finding of no significant tradeoff between national and minority identity among non-whites in Britain.

Britain has a long history of balancing national and minority identities among the English, Irish, Scots, and Welsh, but the most challenging minority integration in contemporary society is immigrant-origin non-white communities. Like many West European countries, Britain received unprecedented numbers of racial and ethnic minority migrants during the decades
following World War II.1 Most came for low-wage jobs in the expanding economy and initially lived on the margins of society. Over time, there have been many indicators of successful economic and political integration.2 Yet much of the recent political debate focuses on those who have failed to integrate.3 Some even argue that Britain has been the least successful European country at integrating migrants because its multicultural policies encourage minorities to retain their culture and not assimilate. Moreover, the most segregated minority communities (e.g. Muslims) are supposedly a source of terrorist activity and hostility towards mainstream society.4 Most of these debates assume that minority and national identification are negatively correlated among non-whites in Britain but this article confronts those assumptions with findings that suggest no significant minority-national identification tradeoff.

To explain the lack of an identity tradeoff I focus on the relationship between assimilation/segregation and expected discrimination. I start with the basic finding that segregation boosts minority identity and reduces national identity while assimilation boosts national identity and reduces minority identity. However, I then claim that assimilation increases the expectation of discrimination, which reduces national identity and boosts minority identity. Likewise, segregation decreases the expectation of discrimination, which reduces minority identity and boosts national identity. These effects cancel each other out and explain the lack of a gap between national and minority identity among non-whites in Britain. To illuminate the counterintuitive dynamic of assimilation leading to greater expectations of discrimination I

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1According to the 2001 UK Census, non-whites were 7.9% of Britain’s population whereas they were less than 0.1% of the population in 1945.
2Economically, some non-whites have accessed upward mobility and enjoy some of the best economic outcomes in the country, although others suffer from some of the most severe economic disadvantages in the country (Li and Heath 2005, 2008). Politically, participation and representation have steadily been improving for non-whites in general over recent decades (Dancygier 2010; Garbaye 2005; Maxwell Forthcoming).
3This is true for most European countries (Caldwell 2009; Koopmans et al. 2005; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007).
4See Hansen 2011; Joppke 2009. It is important to note that this perspective has critics. Other authors argue that even if minorities are hostile to certain aspects of British society, they tend to have positive overall attitudes about mainsteam political institutions and are generally well-integrated (Abbas 2011; Maxwell 2010).
highlight two mechanisms. First, I claim that assimilated non-whites have high levels of exposure to mainstream society which creates opportunities to perceive discrimination. Second, I posit that assimilated non-whites are especially sensitive to the effects of perceived discrimination and especially likely to strengthen their minority identification as a result.

This argument has numerous implications. On a practical level, my results suggest that contemporary debates about the tradeoffs between minority and national identity are misplaced. In addition, my argument suggests that there are other important tradeoffs for minority integration. Assimilation may improve minorities’ ability to engage mainstream society but it also creates psychological difficulties that strengthen minority identification. Likewise, segregation may hinder minorities’ ability to engage mainstream society but it helps moderate their expectations of discrimination and helps boost national identification. More broadly, this strengthens arguments about the multi-faceted and subjective nature of identity formation.

In the next section, I review literature on the relationship between national and minority identity and develop my argument in more detail. I then discuss the data and measures used to analyze identity in Britain. The fourth section provides an overview of minority identification in Britain and examines whether existing literature can account for the outcomes. The fifth section develops my argument about discrimination and assimilation tradeoffs. The sixth section examines the mechanisms that account for the discrimination-assimilation tradeoffs. The seventh section discusses robustness checks and the last section concludes.

**Existing literature on the relationship between minority and national identification**

Most literature assumes that minority and national identification are negatively correlated. The assumption is that when minorities are loyal to a narrow group identity their
interests will diverge from those of the national community. Often, this is because minority groups gain significance in the first place when they are excluded from the broader political community. When they then find their minority identity salient it is usually a rebellion against the national status quo (Cederman et al. 2010; Horowitz 1985; Marx 1998; Penn 2008; Rabuska and Shepsle 1972). The specific minorities analyzed in this article were formed through migration, which means that their homeland identity is by definition external to the national British community. Over time immigrant communities integrate and adapt to the host society, which is generally considered a process of shedding minority attachments (Alba 1992; Brouard and Tiberj 2011; Dahl 1961; Gordon 1964; Moynihan and Glazer 1963; Tribalat 1995, 1996). The results in this article challenge this accumulated wisdom because they find no evidence of a significant tradeoff between minority and national identity among non-whites in Britain.

Although most research assumes a tradeoff between minority and national identification, there is literature that identifies two potential mechanisms for the lack of an identity tradeoff. One argues that ‘ethnic pluralist’ environments – where no one ethnic group is dominant and all are considered equal partners – can avoid identity tradeoffs. Moreover, even if some hierarchy is inevitable, ethnic pluralist environments will have minimal ethnic stigmatization and discrimination which should make individuals less likely to feel a tradeoff between attachment to their specific group and to the broader national community (Berry et al.1977; de la Garza et al. 1996; Parekh 2008; Sidanius et al. 1997). If this argument could account for the outcomes in Britain, we would expect most non-whites to live in racially-tolerant environments and have lower identification tradeoffs than non-whites living in racially-intolerant environments.

A second mechanism comes from social psychology research on the general formation of self identity. The key insight here is that individuals with more confidence and self-esteem will
My Argument: Discrimination, Identity, and Integration Tradeoffs

This article explores the relationships between assimilation, segregation and expected discrimination, which are summarized with two diagrams in figure 1. The top of each diagram starts with claims that are standard in the minority identification literature. I posit that assimilation should lead to stronger national and weaker minority identification while segregation leads to stronger minority and weaker national identification. My leverage comes from the subsequent novel claim that assimilated minorities are more likely than segregated ones to expect discrimination. More expected discrimination increases minority and weakens national identification while less expected discrimination weakens minority and strengthens national identification. This leads to countervailing effects with the top of the diagram that explain the lack of a significant gap between national and minority identity.

‘Figure 1 about here’

My focus on discrimination builds on social and political psychology literature about how systems of hierarchy and dominance increase the likelihood that dominated individuals will identify with their minority group (Berry et al. 2006; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Sellers and Shelton 2003; Sidanius et al. 2008; Taylor 1992). Minorities rally around their group identity to build confidence and protect themselves from the trauma of discrimination. However this
literature highlights segregated minorities as the ones most vulnerable to discrimination and domination. My results suggest the opposite, as it is assimilated minorities who appear most susceptible to the negative effects of perceived discrimination.

To account for the seemingly-paradoxical outcome that perceived discrimination has strong effects on the identity of assimilated non-whites, I focus on two mechanisms. The first is that assimilation increases non-whites’ exposure to mainstream society, which then creates opportunities to perceive discrimination. This builds on research arguing that when individuals feel threatened by another group they develop more negative out-group sentiments along with more positive in-group sentiments. Much of this literature has focused on identity dynamics among majority populations, where a loss of status is the primary threat (Bowyer 2010; Key 1949; Quillian 1995; Tajfel 1981). However there is evidence that similar dynamics exist for minorities. Research has found that middle-class minorities may be particularly vulnerable to the threat of discrimination and likely to emphasize their minority identity as a result.\(^5\) I build on that concept but take a different approach by focusing on how aspects of assimilation like language usage, inter-ethnic friendship patterns, and country of birth also increase the likelihood of perceiving discrimination due to more exposure to mainstream society. The second mechanism argues that even under the same conditions of perceived threat, the effect on minority identity will be stronger among assimilated as opposed to segregated individuals. This suggests that in some ways assimilated minorities are more sensitive and vulnerable.

One should note that my argument is about *perceived* discrimination and not actual experiences with discrimination. The latter dynamic is notoriously difficult to measure at the

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\(^5\)One proposed reason that middle-class minorities are more vulnerable to perceiving discrimination is that their higher levels of education may make them more aware of inequality. Another is that middle-class minorities may resent facing difficulties despite their socio-economic success and retreat into minority identity as a result. (For more see Dawson 1994; Cose 1995; Hochschild 1985; Tate 1993).
individual level. My claim is not about social dynamics that encourage discrimination but rather the conditions that shape subjective perceptions of discrimination among non-whites.

A key implication of my argument is that contemporary debates about minority and national identification should be revised. Contrary to notions that the two dynamics involve inevitable tradeoffs, my results suggest that both minority and national identification are simultaneously strong among most non-whites in Britain. Instead, my claim that the key tradeoff for identification is between assimilation and expected discrimination suggests that minority integration is a complex process that does not always proceed smoothly and can involve internal contradictions. Finally, my emphasis on perceived discrimination builds on a broader literature about the subjectivity of identification (Kuo and Margalit Forthcoming; Verkuyten 2005).

**Data and Measures**

The data in this article are from the 2007 Citizenship Survey (CS). The CS is a bi-annual survey which started in 2001 as a way of obtaining reliable data on social cohesion in Britain. The CS is well-suited to analyze British minorities’ identification because it includes extensive questions on political attitudes and behavior. The 2007 CS is especially useful because I was able to access restricted data from the National Centre for Social Research that allowed analysis of ward-level variables such as neighborhood ethnic concentration. This provides important data on assimilation and segregation and was not available for all versions of the CS.

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6Outside of a carefully controlled laboratory setting it is difficult to be sure that someone was treated a certain way because of his/her race and not for other reasons.
7I have written about other aspects of these attitudinal tradeoffs elsewhere in XXXX, XXXX.
8Wards are electoral constituencies for British municipal councils. This demographic and political definition does not always perfectly relate to sociological and cultural boundaries, which is an issue with any measure of local communities. However, electoral wards have political significance because they are the forum for electing councilors. The size and population count varies according to whether the wards are in rural or urban areas but generally wards are small units with an average of 5,500 residents. There are over 10,000 wards in the UK, of which over 1,180 are represented in the CS sample.
The other advantage to the CS is the large minority sample. The 2007 CS uses a representative national sample of 9,336 people and an ethnic minority booster sample of 4,759 people (Citizenship Survey Team 2008), which makes it one of the best surveys for examining ethnic minority political attitudes in Britain. This provides a sample of 5,539 non-whites, including 1,678 Black respondents (of which 810 are Caribbean and 822 are African) and 2,481 South Asian respondents (of which 1,369 are Indian and 1,112 are Bangladeshi-Pakistani).

I conduct factor analysis on four items to derive latent variables for minority and national identification. ‘Importance of ethnic or racial background to sense of who you are’ and ‘Importance of country your family came from originally to sense of who you are?’ load onto a factor which I use to measure minority identification. ‘How strongly do you belong to Britain?’ and ‘To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of British society?’ load onto a factor which I use to measure national identification. Each identification variable is recoded on a scale of 0 (weak) to 1 (strong). To gauge the extent of a tradeoff between the two forms of identification I create a new variable which subtracts an individual’s national identification score from his/her minority identification score. This ranges from -1 (strongest national/weakest minority) to 1 (strongest minority/weakest national).

To test literature on the effect of ethnic pluralist environments I use a measure of the mean ward-level attitude towards cultural and religious difference. I also use a measure of individual-level expectations of discrimination, which is an index based on questions asking whether or not respondents would be treated worse than other races when interacting with fifteen

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9These four groups (Africans, Caribbeans, Indians, and Bangladeshis-Pakistanis) are 74% of the non-white sample in the 2007 CS and 68% of the UK non-white population according to the 2001 Census.
10These latent variables are derived from the non-white sample. Details on the factor loadings and scoring coefficients are in the appendix.
mainstream institutions. To test the arguments about self-confidence I use a latent variable derived from four items that ask how respondents feel they are treated in public.

For my argument about the relationship between assimilation/segregation and identification I use several variables: whether or not respondents have close white friends, the proportion of friends that are of the same ethnicity as the respondent, whether or not the respondent was born in the United Kingdom, whether or not the respondent uses English as his/her main language, the percentage of white residents in the respondents’ ward, educational, employment, and occupational status. More details can be found in the appendix.

**Results: Minority and national identification**

Figure 2 provides an overview of identification dynamics among non-whites in Britain. The data on the left side plot the tradeoff between minority and national identification. The mean identification tradeoff score is 0, which suggests that most non-whites in Britain do not face a significant tradeoff between minority and national identification. In fact, the box plot indicates that only the top 25th percentile has minority identification scores that are at least 0.2 points higher than their national identification scores. Similarly, only the bottom 25th percentile has national identification scores that are at least 0.2 points higher than their minority identification scores. This suggests that non-whites in Britain cluster around similar levels of attachment to minority and national identities. The right side of the graph reinforces that point by plotting minority and national identification separately. This indicates that non-whites in Britain have relatively strong attachment to both forms of identification, as 75% of respondents have minority and national identification scores that are higher than 0.65.

‘Figure 2 about here’
To examine the predictors of minority-national identification, table 1 presents results from ordinary least squares regression analysis with weighted data and robust standard errors clustered at the ward level.\textsuperscript{11} Model I focuses on whether or not arguments from existing literature can account for the lack of an identification tradeoff. The results indicate that variation in the ward level of cultural and religious tolerance is not statistically significant.\textsuperscript{12} One explanation for this could be that ethnic pluralist environments are most salient for tradeoffs with national identity when they are measured at the national level. Unfortunately my data do not permit cross-national analysis. However, if ethnic pluralism could account for the lack of significant identification tradeoffs in Britain we would expect this broad national environment to be one of tolerance. Yet the statistical significance of the measure for expected discrimination suggests otherwise. In addition, the fact that 38\% of non-whites in the CS expect some discrimination based on their race, also suggests that ethnic inequality is an important aspect of life for many non-whites in Britain.\textsuperscript{13} The lack of a significant identification tradeoff does not appear to be explained by an environment of ethnic equality.

‘Table 1 about here’

The measure for perceived respect in public space in model I is statistically significant at p<.001 and suggests that as respondents are more self-confident their identification shifts towards the national end of the spectrum. Using these results to predict identification scores

\textsuperscript{11}The clustered robust standard errors account for the fact that respondents are clustered in wards. This is especially relevant given the measures for ward-level ethnic segregation and socio-economic deprivation.

\textsuperscript{12}An alternate measure of ward-level variation in attitudes towards immigration policy was statistically significant. This suggests that non-whites living in wards where residents are more open to increased immigration are more likely to have strong minority as opposed to national identification. In addition to the fact that this is a less precise measure of the ethnic pluralism environment, this does not support existing literature because the identification gap increases as non-whites live in more open/tolerant wards.

\textsuperscript{13}Moreover, existing literature on ethnic pluralism was developed to account for identity dynamics in Canada and the United States where ethnic diversity is more accepted than in Britain. Existing research on ethnic and race relations in Britain reinforce the notion of entrenched hierarchies and difficulty accepting the new non-white minority communities as part of the national (Bleich 2003; Favell 2001; Gilroy 1987).
indicates that non-whites with the lowest levels of expected respect have an identification gap of 2.5 (in favor of minority identity) while those with the highest levels of expected respect have a gap of -0.5 (in favor of national identity). This trend towards smaller identification gaps among those with more perceived respect offers some support for the literature about self-confidence boosting all forms of identification. However when respect is modeled as an independent variable separately predicting national and minority identification it is only statistically significant for the former.\textsuperscript{14} Moreover, the results in models II and III suggest that assimilation has more substantive significance than levels of expected respect for the identification gap.

‘Table 1 about here’

Model II in table 1 includes a series of control variables for assimilation and model III includes controls for assimilation as well as the context of ethnic tolerance, expected discrimination, and perceived respect in public space. Both models are consistent with conventional wisdom: lower levels of cultural assimilation and socio-economic status are associated with weaker national/stronger minority identification while higher levels of cultural assimilation and socio-economic status are associated with stronger national/weaker minority identification. The column on the right side of the table compares predicted identification gap scores for independent variables at their minimum and maximum levels.\textsuperscript{15} These indicate that assimilation has substantive effects on identification gaps that are larger than the effects of discrimination and respect and are approximately ten times as large as the effect of ward-level

\textsuperscript{14}In a bivariate regression predicting national identification, the measure of respect (with values ranging from -4.7 to 1.2) has a coefficient of 0.047 with p<.001. In a bivariate regression predicting minority identification, the measure of respect has a coefficient of 0.000 with p>.930.

\textsuperscript{15}In the case of ward-level cultural tolerance, perceived discrimination, respect, integrated friendship, and ward percent white these scores are calculated for the bottom and top 15\textsuperscript{th} percentiles because the literal minimum and maximum scores contain too few respondents. The predicted scores for assimilation are an accumulation of outcomes from each measure.
cultural tolerance. The next section explores the relationship between these significant assimilation effects and expected discrimination.

**Discrimination and the assimilation tradeoff**

The foundation for my argument is the counterintuitive claim that non-whites who are more assimilated expect more discrimination and those who are less assimilated expect less discrimination. Table 2 presents results for levels of expected discrimination across assimilation indicators. For each measure, non-whites with the more assimilated outcomes expect discrimination from approximately one more institution (out of fifteen) than non-whites with segregated outcomes. In addition, the percentage of non-whites expecting some discrimination is ten to twenty percentage points larger for assimilated as opposed to segregated outcomes. Non-whites with the accumulated assimilation profile expect discrimination from two more institutions and are forty percent more likely to expect some discrimination than those with the accumulated segregated profile.

‘Table 2 about here’

This relationship is relevant for identification because results in table 1 indicate that non-whites expecting more discrimination are more likely to have strong minority/weak national identification while assimilated non-whites tend to have strong national/weak minority identification. These two dynamics suggest that assimilation and discrimination have competing forces that influence non-white identification. If these competing forces could explain why there is no significant tradeoff between minority and national identification for most non-whites in Britain, we would expect a larger tradeoff among those whose relationship between assimilation and discrimination conforms to conventional expectations (i.e. more assimilation -> less
expected discrimination). Figure 3 explores this by plotting identification among non-whites in Britain according to different assimilation and expected discrimination dynamics.

The results in figure 3 indicate that the gap between minority and national identification is smallest (mostly between 0 and -0.05) among assimilated non-whites who expect high levels of discrimination. The gap is slightly larger (mostly between 0.05 and 0.10) among segregated non-whites who do not expect any discrimination. However, the two profiles that fit the classic understanding of the relationship between assimilation and discrimination have much larger identification gaps. For assimilated individuals who do not expect discrimination the score is roughly -0.15 and for segregated individuals who expect high levels of discrimination the score ranges from 0.20 to 0.30. Yet because assimilation and expected discrimination are positively correlated among most non-whites there is no significant overall identification gap.

‘Figure 3 about here’

**Mechanisms for the assimilation/expected discrimination tradeoff**

To elucidate the counterintuitive notion that assimilation and expected discrimination are positively correlated I focus on two mechanisms. First, I claim that assimilated non-whites’ exposure to mainstream society increases their likelihood of expecting discrimination. Second, I claim that assimilated non-whites are especially sensitive to discrimination, which then has strong effects on identification.

A basic implication of assimilation is that it facilitates interactions with mainstream society. Of the fifteen institutions that comprise the index about expectations of discrimination in the CS, non-whites with the most extreme assimilation profile have visited an average of four in the past year compared to three for non-whites with the most segregated profile. The CS also
asks how often respondents mix with different ethnic and religious groups at home, at work, in daycare facilities, at a pub, club, café or restaurant, at a group, club, or organization, in a place of worship, or at the shops. In almost every case, CS data indicate that assimilated non-whites are much more likely than segregated non-whites to mix with different groups.

A benefit of interaction with mainstream society is exposure to opportunities that are unavailable to segregated non-whites. However, I claim this exposure also increases the opportunities to expect discrimination. CS data support this claim and indicate that non-whites with the maximum amount of institutions visited in the past year (12) expect discrimination from approximately four institutions while those who have not visited any expect discrimination from only one. Moreover, CS data indicate that non-whites with the maximum level of mixing with other religious and ethnic groups expect discrimination from a bit less than three institutions while those with the minimum level of mixing expect it from a bit less than one.

It is important to remember that my measure of discrimination focuses on perceptions and cannot address whether assimilated non-whites are more likely to actually experience discrimination as a result of mixing with mainstream society. One counter-argument is that assimilated non-whites may not be suffering from more racial discrimination but are generally

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16 Admittedly, these two measures are not ideal indicators of interactions with mainstream British society. When visiting mainstream institutions it is possible that minorities could interact with co-ethnic officials or employees. In addition, mixing with other ethnic and religious groups could include other minorities as opposed to whites. However, at a minimum these are indicators of a lack of ethnic segregation.

17 The mean level of mixing with different ethnic and religious groups at home for the most assimilated non-whites is weekly as opposed to at least once a year for segregated non-whites. Assimilated non-whites mix daily at work compared to at least once a year for segregated non-whites. In daycare facilities and at a group, club, or organization assimilated non-whites mix with others at least once a year compared to less than once a year for segregated non-whites. Assimilated non-whites mix weekly with other groups at the shops compared to monthly for segregated non-whites. At a pub, club, café or restaurant, assimilated non-whites mix monthly while segregated non-whites mix less than once a year. The only situation in which the two groups have similar mean levels of mixing is in a place of worship, which is less than once a year.

18 This is based on an additive index for responses to each of the individual mixing items. The Cronbach’s Alpha for the index is 0.75, suggesting the items scale well together. I also conducted factor analysis which produced a latent variable for instances of mixing at home, at work, at a pub, club, café or restaurant, at a group, club, or organization, or at the shops. (Daycare facilities and places of worship each loaded onto their own dimension). Using the latent variable provides the same results as using the index.
more sensitive people. To partially address this issue the CS questions about whether respondents are treated with respect in public space provide a baseline for how non-whites perceive their general social interactions. This offers leverage on the extent to which expectations of discrimination are about specific racial/ethnic dynamics or are a more general manifestation of social sensitivity.\textsuperscript{19} Among non-whites with high expectations for respect in public space, those with the full assimilation and the full segregation profile each have mean expected discrimination scores below 0.5. However among non-whites with low expectations for respect, assimilated respondents expect discrimination from almost six times as many institutions (eleven) as segregated respondents (two). This suggests that something about being assimilated makes non-whites more likely to expect racial and ethnic discrimination, above and beyond differences in their general perceptions of social interactions.

The second mechanism goes further to claim that assimilated non-whites are more sensitive to the effects of discrimination on identity. Figure 4 provides evidence by plotting identification across levels of expected discrimination among assimilated and segregated non-whites.\textsuperscript{20} The graph indicates that the identification gap moves from zero to approximately 0.2 (in favor of minority) as segregated non-whites expect more discrimination. In comparison, the identification gap ranges from -0.5 (in favor of national) to 0.5 (in favor of minority) as assimilated non-whites expect more discrimination. Figure 4 also indicates that segregated non-whites do not expect more than eight instances of discrimination whereas assimilated non-whites go up to fourteen instances. In addition, once assimilated non-whites expect more than nine their minority identification is even stronger than that of segregated non-whites. This suggests that

\textsuperscript{19}Admittedly this is not a perfect measure as expectations of discrimination are related to perceptions of respect in public space. Nonetheless, the questions about respect are a more general formulation of how one is treated, do not focus on racial or ethnic discrimination, and are only moderately correlated among non-whites (the correlation score is -0.26).
\textsuperscript{20}These calculations use the maximum assimilation and segregation profiles defined earlier.
assimilated non-whites are not only more likely than segregated non-whites to expect discrimination, but it has stronger effects on their identification.

‘Figure 4 about here’

Robustness checks

This article juxtaposes minority and British identification but it is possible that this is not the right comparison. Non-white minorities may be comfortable with the somewhat ‘generic’ British identity but reluctant to adopt the more ethnically-loaded English, Irish, Scottish, and Welsh identities (Condor et al. 2006). The real tradeoff could be between ethnic/racial/country of origin identities and these more specific national identities. Yet, while non-whites are more likely to identify as British than as English, Irish, Scottish or Welsh, the inclusion of dummy variables for these alternate choices does not alter the results presented in table 1.

Another concern is differences within the non-white category. For example, Africans and Caribbeans lean most heavily towards minority and national identification (with mean scores of 0.10 and 0.80 respectively), while Bangladeshis/Pakistanis hover at 0.01 and Indians slightly lean towards national identification with a mean score of -0.03. In addition, the central independent variable (expected racial discrimination) may be more relevant to Caribbeans and Africans who are more likely to identify as racial/ethnic minorities than South Asians (Modood and Berthoud 1997; Statham 1999).21 These differences could alter my results because the tradeoff between assimilation and expected discrimination may exist for ethnic/racial identification among Africans and Caribbeans but not among Indians and Bangladeshis-Pakistanis who value other identities. To address this I estimated regression models from table 1

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21In the CS question about the importance of ethnic or racial background used to construct the minority-national identification latent variable, 71% of Caribbeans and 67% of Africans responded in the most positive category (‘Very important’) compared to 53% of Indians and 58% of Bangladeshis/Pakistanis.
for each non-white group. The results were the same as those presented earlier. The strong positive correlation between assimilation and expected discrimination as well as the greater sensitivity to the effects of discrimination among assimilated non-whites holds for each group.\textsuperscript{22}

A third issue is the importance of religious identity. Religion was not included in the main measure of minority identity because Caribbeans and Africans primarily share the Christian religion with mainstream Britons so it is a weak measure of minority identity for these groups. However, existing literature as well as CS data suggests that Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh religious identities are particularly relevant for South Asians.\textsuperscript{23} If religious identity is the main minority identity for South Asians and it does not involve tradeoffs between assimilation and expected discrimination then the argument in this article may be missing a key part of the story. However, in regression analyses on the tradeoff between religious and national identity among South Asians the results were substantively similar to those presented for all non-whites and minority-national identification earlier in this article.

Endogeneity is often a problem for cross-sectional analysis that cannot distinguish between correlation and causation. Yet there is no logical reason for this to threaten my argument. My first claim is that assimilated non-whites are vulnerable to discrimination in unique ways. Endogeneity could be an issue here if non-whites who suffer from discrimination are more likely to become assimilated as a result. However, there is no reason to believe this to be the case and if anything it is more likely that non-whites who suffer from discrimination become more segregated as a result. My second claim is that higher levels of perceived

\textsuperscript{22}One problem with the sub-group analysis is the small sample size. Larger datasets may be necessary for a more complete confirmation of this trend.

\textsuperscript{23}Among CS respondents, 33\% of Bangladeshi-Pakistanis claim that religion is their most important identity. In comparison, 11\% of Indians, 18\% of Africans, and 10\% of Caribbeans cite religion as the most important identity. (This question was posed with a long list of potential sources of identification: occupation, ethnic or racial background, religion, national identity, where you live, your interests, family, social class, the country family originally came from, gender, age and life stage, income, and level of education). For more see Modood 2005.
discrimination boost minority as opposed to national identification. Endogeneity is more likely
to be an issue here as psychological research suggests that individuals with strong minority
identification are more likely to perceive discrimination (Berry et al. 2006; Sellers and Shelton
2003; Sidanius et al. 2008). However, the results in this article question the universality of that
dynamic as segregated non-whites have stronger minority identification than assimilated non-
whites in Britain, yet it is assimilated non-whites who expect more discrimination. Engodeneity
does not appear to be a significant threat to the validity of my argument.

Finally, results are similar when the analysis is conducted for individual dependent
variable items as opposed to the latent variables. In addition, similar results hold when alternate
measures of perceived discrimination,\textsuperscript{24} ethnic friendship patterns,\textsuperscript{25} socio-economic status,\textsuperscript{26} and
self-confidence\textsuperscript{27} are used.

### Conclusion

This article has examined the relationship between minority and national among non-
whites in Britain. Conventional wisdom, contemporary policy debates, and existing literature all
assume that non-whites should experience significant tradeoffs between minority and national
identity. Yet, the results in this article suggest that is not the case. To account for these

\textsuperscript{24}I used two alternate measures of perceived discrimination. One was whether individuals reported being turned
down for a job because of race or color and the other was whether individuals reported being treated unfairly at
work because of race or color. Each measure yielded similar results as that for expected discrimination from fifteen
institutions. In addition, similar results hold with alternate specifications for the index of expected discrimination.
There is some variation in expected discrimination across the fifteen institutions but the relationship between
expected discrimination, assimilation, and minority-national is consistent across institutions.

\textsuperscript{25}I also estimated the regression models in table 1 with the two individual measures that comprise the latent variable
for ethnic friendship and results were substantively similar to those presented in this article.

\textsuperscript{26}Alternate measures of socio-economic status include employment status, whether respondents have high school
diplomas, whether respondents have any educational qualifications, whether respondents are employed as manual
laborers, and the level of socio-economic deprivation in the respondent’s ward. None of these alternate
specifications changed the substantive results presented in this article.

\textsuperscript{27}Admittedly the CS is not well-designed for robust measures of self-confidence. Nonetheless, several alternate
measures were available including social trust and political efficacy at the local and national level. None of these
measures changed the substantive results presented in this article.
surprising outcomes I argue that the more relevant tradeoff is between assimilation and expected discrimination. All else equal, assimilated non-whites are more likely to have strong national as opposed to minority identity while segregated non-whites are more likely to have strong minority as opposed to national identity. However assimilated non-whites are also more likely to expect discrimination (which boosts minority identification) while segregated non-whites are more likely not to expect discrimination (which boosts national identification). Together, these dynamics create pressures that cancel each other out and account for the lack of a significant minority-national identification tradeoff among non-whites in Britain.

My focus on integration tradeoffs provides a new perspective for literature on minority identification and integration. My results suggest that the success of cultural assimilation involves a wide range of expectations and experiences that may lead to numerous psychological difficulties. It is beyond the scope of this article to trace those experiences in great detail, but there is existing research that addresses the discrepancy between expectations and reality for assimilated minorities in Britain (Maxwell 2008). More generally, my argument supports broader research about the subjective nature of the identification process. The pathways that lead to identity formation are not necessarily based on objective status markers. Instead, identity is based on multi-faceted interpretations of society. To the extent that assimilation, segregation, and expected discrimination involve contradictory pressures operating on the same person, this insight has the potential to both comfort and debilitate governments seeking to stabilize society and avoid excessive fragmentation.
### Table 1: Ordinary least squares regression estimates of minority-national identification gaps among non-whites in Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>Min-Max Predicted ID Gap Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ward-level cultural</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>0.00 -&gt; 0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tolerance</td>
<td>(.025)</td>
<td>(.026)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived discrimination</td>
<td>.018**</td>
<td>.022**</td>
<td>-.01 -&gt; 0.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>-.031**</td>
<td>-.032**</td>
<td>0.09 -&gt; -.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated friendship</td>
<td>-.067**</td>
<td>-.068**</td>
<td>0.10 -&gt; -.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English language</td>
<td>-.018</td>
<td>-.031†</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in UK</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward percent white</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>-.050*</td>
<td>-.044*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.015)</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.025</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.058)</td>
<td>(.016)</td>
<td>(.062)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of ward clusters</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>802</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4169</td>
<td>4777</td>
<td>3883</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2007 Citizenship Survey
Note: Minority-national identification dependent variable is scored (-1 strong national/weak minority, 0 – even national/minority, 1 – strong minority/weak national)
Core and minority ethnic boost samples, weighted data
Each cell gives the estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by wards in parentheses
†=p<.05, *=p<.01, **=p<.001
Table 2: Expectations of discrimination across non-white assimilation profiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Avg. # situations (0-15)</th>
<th>% Expecting Disc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assim.</td>
<td>Segregated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated friendship</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English language</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in UK</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>1.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ward percent white</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full profile</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2007 Citizenship Survey, Weighted Means
Figure 1: The assimilation, expectation discrimination, and minority-national identification argument

- **Assimilation**
  - Strong national identification → More expected discrimination → Strong minority identification
  - Weak national identification → More expected discrimination → Weak minority identification

- **Segregation**
  - Weak national identification → Less expected discrimination → Weak minority identification
  - Strong national identification → Less expected discrimination → Strong minority identification
Figure 2: An overview of minority and national identification among non-whites in Britain

Source: 2007 Citizenship Survey
Note: Weighted data

Minority – National is scored from -1 (strong national/weak minority) to 1 (strong minority/weak national). Minority and national identification are each scored from 0 (weak) to 1 (strong).
Figure 3: Minority-national identification among non-whites in Britain according to different assimilation and expected discrimination dynamics

Source: 2007 Citizenship Survey, weighted data
Note: Minority-national identification is scored (-1 strong national/weak minority, 0 – even national/minority, 1 – strong minority/weak national)
Figure 4: Minority-national identification across levels of expected discrimination among assimilated and segregated non-whites

Source: 2007 Citizenship Survey, Weighted data
Note: Minority-national identification is scored (-1 strong national/weak minority, 0 – even national/minority, 1 – strong minority/weak national)
REFERENCES


Kuo, Alex and Margalit, Yotam (Forthcoming). “Measuring Individual Identity: Experimental Evidence.” *Comparative Politics*.


**APPENDIX:**
Factor analysis results for minority and national identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rotated factor loadings</th>
<th>Scoring coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of race/ethnicity</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of family country</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How strongly belong to Britain</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel a part of British society</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Descriptive statistics for non-whites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ward-level cultural tolerance</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived discrimination</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-4.73</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated friendship</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English language</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in UK</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward percent white</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>8.31</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2007 CS

**Variable Description**

**Minority identification:**
Importance of ethnic or racial background to sense of who you are?
Importance of country your family came from originally to sense of who you are?
0 – Not at all important, 1 – Not very important, 2 – Quite important, 3 – Very important

**National identification:**
How strongly do you belong to Britain?
0 – Not at all strongly, 1 – Not very strongly, 2 – Fairly strongly, 3 – Very strongly
To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of Britain?
0 – Strongly disagree, 1 – Tend to disagree, 2 – Tend to agree, 3 – Strongly agree

**Cultural tolerance (ward level mean of):** 0 – Strongly disagree, 1 – Tend to disagree, 2 – Tend to agree, 3 – Strongly agree

**Perceived Discrimination:** An index of responses to questions about whether or not respondents would be treated worse because of their race. The fifteen situations were when interacting with a local doctor, hospital, the health service in general, local schools, the education system in general, public housing department, local council, private landlord, real estate agent, courts, crown prosecution, police, immigration officials, prison, and probation officer. The variable ranges from 0 – 15 according to the number of situations in which respondents expected to be treated worse because of their race.
Respect: A latent variable derived from four questions about how often respondents are treated with respect at work, at the health services, when shopping, and when on public transportation. From the four measures, one factor was identified.

Each question was coded:
0 – Never, 1 – Rarely, 2 – Some of the time, 3 – Most of the time, 4 – All of the time

Integrated friendship:
Do you have any close white friends? 0 – No, 1 – Yes
What proportion of your friends are of the same ethnic group? 0 – All the same, 1 – More than a half, 2 – About a half, 3 – Less than a half

Main Language English: 0 – No, 1 – Yes

Born in UK: 0 – No, 1 – Yes

% White Ward: The percentage of white residents in each ward

Higher Education: 0 – No, 1 – Yes

Professional: 0- Not employed in professional or managerial occupation, 1- Employed in professional or managerial occupation