Introduction

There are no ‘real’ social movements in the post-Communist world. No other sentence better summarizes the contemporary scholarship on the development of East-European civil societies and political activism. Given that today various social movements form a standard group of civil society organizations in the established democracies, one might even wonder whether the extant regimes in Eastern Europe can claim to be real democracies at all. In terms of political mobilization, they seem to be miles away from the “social movement societies” of the West (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Since the 1970s, when robust mobilizations of new social movements hit the Western democracies, social movements have become institutionalized in their political systems; they have professionalized their activities and started to be perceived as major components of the standard political process (della Porta and Diani 2006).

The situation was different in the countries of the former Soviet block. The conditions for the independent existence of social movements in Central-Eastern Europe were created only after the fall of the Communist regimes in 1989. As part of the precarious democratization process the new regimes opened up and sometimes unwittingly provided a wide range of social movement organizations (SMOs) with opportunities for political action (see Tarrow 1998, Ekiert and Kubik 2001). However,
despite the expanding opportunities, the overall level of citizen engagement and political participation remained very low in East-Central Europe (Howard 2003).

While many of the existing studies equate low participation with weak civil societies (see Wedel 1998, McMahon 2001, Howard 2003), a small, yet growing, body of literature challenges the skeptical account by pointing out a special advocacy-based type of activism, so-called transactional activism, apparently characteristic of East-Central Europe, which is overlooked by those who focus only on individual participation (see Flam 2001; Toepler and Salamon 2003; Petrova and Tarrow 2007). This type of activism is based on inter-organizational interactions/transactions rather than direct political mobilization. In other words (see Baldassarri and Diani 2007), while this activist type lacks social embeddedness and the ability to integrate individuals through identity relations, it is based on relatively well-developed inter-organizational instrumental relations (transactions). According to what we know, it mostly comprises of various organizations of the so-called ‘new social movements’, such as networks of environmental, human rights and women’s rights groups (Walker 1991, Skocpol 1999, Edwards and McCarthy 2004, Cisar 2010).

There is no explicit theoretically-based discussion of inter-organizational networks in the original paper which introduced the notion of transactional activism (Petrova and Tarrow 2007). However, as suggested by J. Grote (2009), there is no better way to capture the transactional character and capacity of post-communist SMOs than by means of network analysis. Therefore, the paper strives to define and operationalize transactional capacity, and figure out whether it displays different values in the case of advocacy-oriented ‘new’ SMOs and ‘old’ rather participatory organizations. We operationalize transactional capacity as network centrality and ask the following descriptive question: are there differences between the distribution of particular network properties, i.e. key centrality measures, in the case of post-materialistically-oriented ‘new’ SMOs and the ‘old’ type of participatory activism associated mostly with materialist trade union and professional organizations?

Next, since the available research on the development of transactional activism in the post-Communist world suggests that this activist type has been planted by international programs of civil society building (Flam 2001, Aksartova 2006, Petrova and
Tarrow 2007, Cisar 2008), we ask: is there a relation between network centrality and SMOs’ dependency on externally-mobilized resources? We further test this hypothesis on the relationship between this particular type of resource access and transactional capacity while controlling for variables commonly associated with network centrality such as annual income and the length of existence (see Diani 2003).

The structure of the paper is as follows. First, it introduces both our concepts and explanatory theory. In this section, participatory and transactional activist types are defined, and the mechanism of our explanation of transactional capacity building is presented. Second, our data set is described. Third, the paper maps out the networks of Czech SMOs and focuses on their primary issue composition and resource access. Fourth, the explanatory model is presented.

Theory: Transactional Advocates without Members

Instead of mass movements and membership-based social movement organizations, a stratum of professional advocates without members (Skocpol 1999) has become dominant in the politically-oriented segment of civil society in the Czech Republic after 1989 (Flam 2001, Aksartova 2006, Petrova and Tarrow 2007, Cisar 2008). Although these advocacy-based SMOs lack the ability to mobilize individuals; i.e. to engage them in participatory activism, they nevertheless seem to fare much better in terms of transactional activism. In other words, while these organizations are not embedded in identity-based interpersonal networks, they are well-embedded in instrumentally-oriented inter-organizational network structures.

Transactional activism means “the ties – enduring and temporary – among organized non-state actors and between them and political parties, power holders, and other institutions” (Petrova and Tarrow 2007: 79). The notion of transactional activism captures the ability of SMOs to engage other relevant collective actors through exchange of the control over physical or symbolic media (Knoke and Yang 2008: 12). Although transactional activism is generally associated with advocacy organizations, it is in fact a broader concept than advocacy, since it includes not only explicit attempts at issue advocacy, but all types of transactions including exchanges of resources, coalition building around different policy issues, collaboration with civil society actors across
sectors, and interactions with elites (see also Baldassarri and Diani 2007). The employment of the concept of transactional activism makes it possible to see relatively rich political interactions among various civil society actors even if these actors lack the capacity to mobilize many individuals. Indeed, according to Petrova and Tarrow, instead of mass participation transaction seems to have become the hallmark of political activism in post-communist settings.

In fact, the theoretical implications of the concept’s employment are much more consequential than supposed by Petrova and Tarrow. The concept of transactional activism not only makes it possible to re-evaluate the state of political activism in post-Communist countries, but invites a broader theoretical innovation in the study of social movements. Transactional activism defies the definitions of social movements that depend on the ability to mobilize individuals, and makes it possible to conceptualize a probably new generation of political activists. Transactional activists no longer seem primarily concerned with mobilizing individuals, as the traditionally-understood movements would be, but are instead developing capacities that would enable them to shape public debates and influence various publics via the media: “Protest assumes the form of dry statistics, shocking and distressing photographs, eye-witness accounts, fliers, posters, graffiti, protest e-mail, lobbying or scientific expertise. Protest becomes expressed in publications, legal challenges, film festivals, art exhibits, training-programs, conferences, national and international networking efforts” (Flam 2001: 5, italics added).

The dichotomy of the participatory and transactional forms of political activism actually differentiates between two forms of the capacities of activism. While participatory activism refers to the ability of activists to mobilize individuals, i.e. to induce them to participate, the term transactional capacity refers to their ability to enter into transactions with other non-state actors as well as representatives of formal political institutions. Both mobilization-based and transaction-based activists have emerged in the post-Communist Czech Republic. While the former are most visibly represented by materialistically-oriented interest groups such as trade union organizations, the latter are mostly SMOs in the post-materialistically-oriented areas such as human rights and environmental protection (Ekiert and Kubik 2001, Flam 2001, Toeppler and Salamon 2003, Petrova and Tarrow 2007).
Based on our previous research (mostly Cisar 2008, 2010), we expect two very different network structures to be found in the Czech Republic, a dense network of post-materialistically-oriented transactional activists and a somewhat less dense network of materialistically-oriented participatory activists:

1. *Participatory activism* is based on membership organizations, which enjoy good access to the political system. These organizations, typically trade unions, have been partners of state institutions for a long time, representing material interests of large and relatively well-defined groups of population. Their strength and legitimacy depend on their ability to mobilize a significant number of followers, who also supply them with necessary resources. In terms of resource access, we expect this type of activism to derive its resources internally, mainly through membership dues. This activism’s self-presentation is based on displaying ‘numbers of loyal members’ (Tilly 2004).

2. *Transactional activism* is based on small advocacy organizations, which “are staff-driven, derive their resources from institutions and isolated constituencies, and “speak for” rather than organize their official beneficiaries” (Jenkins 1998: 208). Since they seek “a collective good, the achievement of which will not selectively and materially benefit the membership or activists” (Berry in Berry and Wilcox 2007: 22), they are unable to count on a “ready-made community waiting to be organized” (Walker 1983: 398). In order to compensate for their insufficient mobilization capacity, they establish inter-organizational relations, spanning from long term partnerships to short-term ad-hoc coalitions (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Tarrow 1998, Skocpol 1999). As a result, their strength, even if not their legitimacy, depends on their (transactional) capacity to link up with other organizations, and integrate them into broader platforms. In terms of resource access, we expect these organizations to be mainly dependent on external patronage. Their self-presentation is based on displaying their active involvement in various inter-organizational projects.
In our descriptive analysis we focus on the visualization of the distribution of two key indicators of horizontal transactional capacity, i.e. two selected measures of organizations’ network centrality. We operationalize this capacity both as a number of real organization’s cooperative ties and nominal reachability of an organization within the network. There are several possible ways to conceptualize and visualize them in the context of our data. Regarding the former, the in-degree measure may be used; however, data on in-degrees cover only the ‘demand side’ of transactions among SMOs, as they represent one end or direction of the relationship. In other words, focusing exclusively on input degrees would not allow us to capture the reciprocity of transaction ties. Therefore, the most suitable way of measuring the first dimension of transactional capacity seems to be the all-degree measure, as in the context of our data it also reflects the instant importance of the linkage for both actors. As for the latter, we also treat transactional activism as a relative position of an organization within the network in the sense of its importance for both short and remote (potential) exchanges among other network members. We opt for the betweenness measure in order to measure this reachability dimension of the concept. We understand transactional activism as the concept capturing exchanges of both material resources through alliances and projects and ideas and know-how through multiple transverse contacts. Furthermore, the selection of these two measures enables us to avoid the nominalist-realist dichotomy in boundary specification approaches (Knoke and Yang 2008: 15).

What accounts for the emergence of transactional activism? According to the available literature, transactional activism in post-communist Europe has been enabled by the international programs of civil society building that created a system of international patronage, which supplied advocacy organizations with necessary resources to maintain themselves (Aksartova 2006, Cisar 2008, 2010). In fact, various foundations and philanthropic organizations have played a crucial role in the emergence of advocacy-based transactional activism worldwide.

---

1 The present analysis’ operationalization of the transaction activism concept does not include SMOs’ ties with public institutions; we focus on inter-organizational relations only. This is the reason for using the adjective ‘horizontal’.
According to Walker (1983, 1991), who compares materialistically-oriented participatory-based occupational groups with transactional post-materialistically-oriented citizens groups in the US, while only 49 percent of the occupation-based groups from the profit sector in his sample received start-up money from external sources, the proportion was 89 percent for citizens groups (Walker 1983: 398; calculated by authors). The same applies to their organizational maintenance: while in 1980 citizens groups were able to generate less than 50 percent of their resources by their own means, occupation-based profit sector interest groups received more than 75 percent of their funds through this mechanism of resource access (ibid: 400; calculated by authors). External patronage by foundations, individuals, and the state fundamentally contributed to the emergence of the US form of transactional activism (Berry and Wilcox 2007, Edwards and McCarthy 2004, Loomis and Cigler 2002, Walker 1983).

After the fall of Communism, American foundations entered the Czech Republic. What impact did they have on political activism in the country? They were familiar with advocacy organizations as an established form of political representation; since they had supported them at home for a long time, they wanted them to flourish also in post-Communist countries (see also Aksartova 2006). In other words, donor agencies followed the path the US politics had been following since the 1960s at the latest (Skocpol 1999, Berry and Wilcox 2007). As a result, the model of “advocates without members” together with post-materialist issues promoted originally by US citizen groups started to be exported outside of the country. By signaling to East Europeans that formally registered and more or less professionally managed organizations are most likely to receive funding, they helped the spread of transactional activism across the region (see also Narozhna 2004, Aksartova 2006). The situation did not change once US donors left, since the trend established by them continues under the influence of the presently most important external funding source, the EU, which even conditions its programs by the ability of recipient organizations to establish inter-organizational cooperative ties. Transactional activists remain to be dependent on external patronage (Fagan 2005).

A positive relation between the amount of foreign external resources and key network attributes of SMOs should be observed, if the hypothesis on the importance of external funding for transactional activism is to be proven right: The bigger the exposure
to international assistance programs, the bigger the capacity on the part of a local organization to assume a central position within inter-organizational networks (see also Bruszt and Vedres 2009). According to this hypothesis, although international programs of civil society building have not been able to foster participatory activism in post-Communist countries, they have contributed to transactional activism. They did not induce citizens to participate, but managed to motivate organizations to network among themselves (and to engage in exchanges with elites). Therefore, our goal is to figure out whether there is an association between the SMOs’ resource dependency and their relevant network characteristics. In order to meet this goal, we shall also control for variables usually associated with the centrality of SMOs such as annual income, number of issue areas, date of establishment, and membership (see Diani 2003: 108-109). The expected findings are important not only for the students of post-Communist politics, but for all of those who study the consequences of international assistance and democracy-building programs worldwide.

Before we will focus on the determinants of network properties of Czech SMOs, we first introduce our data set and present the distribution of all-degree and betweenness measures according to variables most relevant to us – thematic focus and the prevalent structure of resource access. We will also depict the most intensive transaction areas within our network.

Data
An organizational survey of political activism in the Czech Republic is our main source of information. The survey was carried out in the period of October 2007 – January 2009, and brought out information on 220 Czech social movement organizations. The representatives of organizations in the sectors of human, gay/lesbian and women’s rights, environmental protection, trade union and agrarian interests, social provision, and radical Left activism were asked by interviewers to fill in a questionnaire focusing on virtually all aspects of SMOs’ functioning, including their mission, funding sources, organizational structure, strategies, cooperation with other organizations, and perceived impact. The questionnaire consisted of both closed and open-ended questions; in addition, the respondents were encouraged to add whatever information they thought
relevant. The sample of organizations was created via the combination of snow-ball method and expert opinion.

As for the snow-ball method, it was used in order to capture the networks of activist organizations and include organizations relevant from the point of view of political actors themselves. The snow-ball started with five selected organizations in every sector included in our analysis. Organizations mentioned at least two times are included in the sample; the response rate was 70 percent. The data on networking were not retrieved from the original snow-ball question; we used the question focused on actual cooperative ties: “According to their importance, name groups, organizations or network that your group cooperates (consults, communicates) with.” The PAJEK and SPSS software packages are used in our analysis.

Networks of Social Movement Organizations in the Czech Republic
The first visualisation of the whole structure of transactional ties among the Czech SMOs with the distribution of all-degree measure suggests that the network is largely compact and symmetric (see Figure 1). Network’s all-degree centralization is 0.02 and the average degree is 3.19. There are several dozens of SMOs significantly more active in cooperation with others. These are the vertices with the highest all-degree, positioned around the clearly identifiable core area, which, on the other hand, makes it possible to identify the transaction periphery of the network (see Figure 2).
However, the first visualization does not show whether there are some completely disconnected areas of exchange within the network, or whether the network is strongly connected. If we check for its connectivity, we discover that the data contain nine independent (“weak”) components (see Figure 2). Nonetheless, the most important sub-network consists of more than 95 percent of all the vertices; this establishes the sufficient conditions for smooth material and un-material exchanges across large distances among SMOs. The other seven sub-networks of cooperation consist of six organizations at the maximum and one organization is completely excluded from transactions with others.\textsuperscript{2} This implies that there are specialized or for some other reason completely isolated activity areas, and that the transaction capacity of some organizations (or their willingness to make them public) is severely limited.

\textsuperscript{2} The representatives of this organization were not able to answer the question on cooperating entities.
Figure 2: The weak components of the network (energy layout, Kamada-Kawai, separate components)

Note: Circular shapes depict the interviewed NGOs; box shapes represent the rest of the snowball.

In order to see whether there might be an association between the thematic focus, structure of resources, and transactional (network) attributes of SMOs, we first need to visually identify the distribution of our centrality measures, i.e. all-degree and betweenness. Also, we will extract the most strongly connected parts of the network, in order to identify the most densely mutually interconnected SMO coalitions. We aim at uncovering the most cohesive subgroups of cooperation, i.e. the areas with the reciprocal and dense ties (see de Nooy et al. 2005: 66), searching for the visual pattern of differences across various types of SMOs’ issues and resource access.

First, we are interested in the differences of network (transaction) qualities between materialistically and post-materialistically oriented organizations. For the
purpose of our analysis we distributed the studied SMOs into five thematic categories, which aggregate the original list of 24 issues used in our survey, in order to identify the primary issue area of the SMOs. These five categories are:

1. human rights and freedoms, consisting of civil rights and freedoms, equality of opportunity, and minority rights (HRFR);
2. information, education and propaganda, covering the areas of education, information policy and media, training and cultural activities (IEPR);
3. environmentalism, i.e. environmental policy and animal rights (ENVI);
4. welfare and social service provision, including social services for the disabled people, poverty reduction, and health care (SSPR);
5. public policies, economic and professional interests, meaning the interests of trade unions and farmers, and the issues related to state policies and institutions (SUPI).

While we regard the former three categories as post-materialistically-oriented, the later two are materialistically-oriented.

Second, we focus on the differences in the distribution of network properties according to various types of resource access. We distributed the surveyed SMOs into six categories according to the ratio of internally-mobilized resources in their budgets in 2006. We regard membership fees, revenues from selling publications and other goods, selling services to private sector and fundraising events as internally-mobilized resources (see Edwards and McCarthy 2004). The six categories are:

1. internal aggregation of resources equals to less than 5 percent of the budget;
2. internal aggregation of resources equals to 6 - 10 percent of the budget;
3. internal aggregation of resources equals to 11 - 20 percent of the budget;
4. internal aggregation of resources equals to 21 - 40 percent of the budget;
5. internal aggregation of resources equals to 41 - 60 percent of the budget;
6. internal aggregation of resources equals to 61 - 100 percent of the budget.

---

3 Each organization was asked to identify its three most important issue areas; we categorized it on the basis of its first choice. Organizations unable to identify their primary focus were categorized on the basis of our knowledge of them.
Figure 3 offers the visualization of the distribution of all-degree measure within the issue-labeled SMOs network. Even a brief look at the figure suggests that the human rights and freedoms’ SMOs and the environmentally-oriented groups largely display higher number of ties, both in-coming and out-going, than materialistically-oriented organizations, and are mostly situated in the very core of the network. In terms of their issue-orientation, the post-materialistically-oriented SMOs appear to be more reachable than the representatives of material interests; they have greater opportunities to select their transaction partners and channels, and thus to exert more influence within the studied cooperation network.

Figure 3: Distribution of the all-degree centrality within the network - main issue (energy layout, Fruchterman Reingold)

Note: All degree is measured within the whole network, but only SMOs under study are visualized.

Similarly, the visualization of all-degree centrality within the income-type labeled network shows a certain pattern: while the organizations with smaller proportions of internal resources tend to have bigger all-degree centrality, those generating more
resources internally are rather structurally disadvantaged and are situated on the periphery of the network (see Figure 4).

**Figure 4: Distribution of the all-degree centrality within the network – internal resource mobilization (energy layout, Fruchterman Reingold)**

Note: All degree is measured within the whole network, but only SMOs under study are visualized.

Next we focus on the more abstract and relational dimension of transactional activism, i.e. betweenness of organizations. The visualization in Figure 5 brings once again the same picture as in the case of the all-degree measure. The post-materialistically-oriented organizations, i.e. environmental and human-rights SMOs, are most centrally-positioned in terms of their intermediary function for the whole network. Therefore, this type of organizations has the highest capacity to broker contacts among unconnected organizations and to control the flow of communication in general.
Figure 5: Distribution of the betweenness centrality within the network - main issue area (energy layout, Fruchterman Reingold)

Note: Betweenness is measured within the whole network, but only SMOs under study are visualized.

Taking into account the structure of resources, figure 6 clearly suggests that the most intermediary or ‘regulatory’ organizations mediating both immediate but potentially also far reaching (information) connections across the whole network are those predominantly dependent on external resources, i.e. foundations, public budgets, and EU funds. On the other hand, both internal and external aggregation of resources goes together with the position of peripheral or rather one-sidedly connected groups (see Figure 6).
Figure 6: Distribution of the betweenness centrality within the network – internal resource mobilization (energy layout, Fruchterman Reingold)

Note: Betweenness is measured within the whole network, but only SMOs under study are visualized.

We further focus on the visualisation of the densest parts of the network, its strong components. This mode of visualization shall check for the existence of cohesive subgroups and outline exclusive clusters of SMOs that engage in mutual transactions. With the reasonable condition of displaying transactional coalitions containing at least three members, the strong components analysis suggests that the whole network contains seven identifiable cohesively cooperating coalitions to which approximately half of the total number of SMOs (99) under study belongs (see Figure 7).

While the preceding graphs suggested that the human rights and freedoms and environmentally-oriented SMOs dominantly belong to the most reachable members of the network, the strong components analysis confirms that these types of organizations also enjoy membership in the largest reciprocally-connected transactional coalition. All this suggests that these SMOs rarely enter into reciprocal transactions with thematically different types of organizations outside this sub-network. Furthermore, the sector of
human rights and freedoms is somehow internally divided, since there is also an exclusive cooperation sub-network of human rights and freedoms SMOs operating outside this dense coalition. Also, materially-oriented SMOs, i.e. social service providers and economic interest groups, are internally divided, since they form several separate reciprocal coalitions (see white and red clusters, and green and yellow clusters). As a result, their transaction capacity even within their own sectors seems to be somewhat less developed than in the case of post-materialists.

Figure 7: Extraction of the strong network components – the main issue area (energy layout, Fruchterman Reingold)

While focusing on resource access, the situation is somewhat less clear-cut than in the case of the issue focus (see Figure 8). The largest cluster is mostly, although not as homogenously as in the case of thematic areas, composed of organizations dependent on external resources (usually mobilizing 0-20 percent of internal resources); at the same time, various types of funding are more mixed than in the case of issue-specific areas. The transactional coalitions of SMOs based on different structures of resources are
present. We may conclude that while the externally-funded SMOs tend to interact with each other, and sometimes even establish small homogenous sub-networks (see white and yellow clusters), the reciprocal transactions across completely different types of funding are also common (see orange, pink and green clusters). Last but not least, there are almost no exclusive and shared transaction ties among SMOs dominated by internal resource mobilization (the red cluster is the closest to this type of funding).

Figure 8: Extraction of the strong network components – internally mobilized resources (energy layout, Fruchterman Reingold)

The Determinants of Transactional Capacity
The figures presented in the previous section suggest a relation between resource access mechanisms and network properties. SMOs not mobilizing resources internally tend to be positioned in the center of the network. Consequently, externally-mobilized resources seem to correlate with the central positioning of organizations within the network. Since these SMOs cannot obtain resources from their own supporters, they substitute for this
inability by cooperating with other organizations. In order to test this hypothesis we conduct a multivariate analysis, including all the variables commonly associated with network centrality, i.e. the number of individual members, financial resources (annual income), the number of issue areas an organization is active in, and the length of existence (Diani 2003). In our analysis we include as independent variables types of resource access hypothesized to have an influence on transactional capacity/network centrality: membership fees, EU grants, Czech and foreign public institution’s grants, foundation funding, and money from other SMOs (see Table 1).

Model 1 in the table includes all the hypothesized variables as explanatory factors of all-degree and betweenness scores respectively. Surprisingly, the commonly-identified determinants of network centrality do not appear as relevant factors in neither of the full models. Specifically, although the theory expects a positive relationship, issue multiplicity is related neither to normalized all-degree nor to betweenness centrality. The hypothesis ‘the more issues an organization is involved in, the more chances to get involved in networks, contacting and cooperation with other organizations’ does not seem to hold in the Czech case. Similarly, the length of existence does not have any explanatory power in the case of Czech SMOs. Probably, the reason is that the supposed influence of time as providing an opportunity to build cooperative ties is deformed in the Czech Republic by the fact that the existence of free civil society and SMOs was enabled only in 1989; in other words, all types of organizations were founded at about the same time. Last but not least, Czech SMOs cooperate with each other regardless of the size of their budgets; their annual income does not play any role in networking.

Unlike the ‘traditional factors’, the type of resource access variables perform differently. Generally, the external-funding dependence makes groups to engage in transactions: the more SMOs rely on external funds, the more they are connected in inter-organizational networks. Importantly, only some of the mechanisms of external resource access produce this effect. EU and foundation funding and resources from other SMOs are positively related to betweenness; EU grants and foundation funding positively influence all-degree scores. On the other hand, funds coming from the Czech state are not related to inter-organizational networking.
These findings are in line with our expectations, since it has been (mostly foreign) foundations and the EU which, according to our theory, contributed to the emergence of transactional activism in the Czech Republic. Czech SMOs dependent on foundation funding compensate for their undeveloped mobilization capacity by networking; moreover, under the current dominance of EU funding, SMOs are virtually forced to enter into cooperation with others, since it increases their administrative capacity, on which their ability to receive EU funding depends (Cisar and Vrablikova 2010).

Table 1: OLS Coefficients Predicting All-degree and Betweenness Scores (N = 220)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Normalized all degree</th>
<th></th>
<th>Betweenness centrality</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0,004***</td>
<td>0,004***</td>
<td>0,001</td>
<td>0,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual membership</td>
<td>0,001</td>
<td>-0,141</td>
<td>-0,001*</td>
<td>-0,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual income</td>
<td>0,001</td>
<td>0,045</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of issues</td>
<td>0,001</td>
<td>0,064</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of existence</td>
<td>0,001</td>
<td>-0,010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership fees</td>
<td>0,001</td>
<td>-0,075</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU grants</td>
<td>0,001***</td>
<td>0,304</td>
<td>0,001***</td>
<td>0,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech public institutions’ grants</td>
<td>0,001</td>
<td>-0,058</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign public institutions’ grants</td>
<td>0,001</td>
<td>0,078</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundations</td>
<td>0,001*</td>
<td>0,145</td>
<td>0,001**</td>
<td>0,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other SMOs</td>
<td>0,001*</td>
<td>0,153</td>
<td>0,001**</td>
<td>0,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R2</td>
<td>0,129</td>
<td>0,160</td>
<td>0,034</td>
<td>0,170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0,1.
** p < 0,05.
*** p < 0,01.

In addition, our hypothesis is supported by the individual membership factor which is negatively related to normalized all-degree centrality. It is only slightly above the significance level in the first model; however, it turns out to be significant in the second model, which includes only significant factors. We suppose that organizations
mobilizing members not only in terms of finance but also volunteering and expertise tend to network with other groups less than those unable to mobilize. SMOs able to mobilize resources internally are less motivated to engage in inter-organizational networking. All in all, our analysis shows that the access to external resources increases the likelihood of SMOs to network among themselves, and thus become agents of transactional political activism.

Conclusions
In this paper we have focused on networks of Czech social movements, in order to see whether there are differences regarding network centrality between two types of political activists – those advocating principled ideas such as human and women’s rights and those lobbying for material interests such as trade unions. The paper has indeed identified important differences, which seem to support the conceptual argument that points out two different logics of functioning of contemporary SMOs – one associated with transactional activism of rather small advocacy organizations, the other related to membership-based participatory organizations. In the paper we have turned to resource access mechanisms to explain these two different logics. The main finding of our paper shows that externally-mobilized resources contribute to transactional capacity-building of SMOs. Although these organizations lack the capacity to mobilize individuals and integrate them into inter-personal networks (Skocpol 1999, Howard 2003, Petrova and Tarrow 2007), they are capable of inter-organizational networking. They hardly integrate citizens into community life, but nevertheless establish numerous organizational ties. To paraphrase our paper’s motto, it is not citizen bonds, but instrumental transactions of activists that create the basis of civil society in the Czech Republic.

What are the implications of our research for civil-society building programs? In general, the programs of international assistance have not created conditions conducive to the emergence of membership-based organizations and participatory social movements. The critics of the civil society building programs rightly pointed out the lack of mobilization capacity on the part of civil society organizations in East-Central European countries. However, this paper has demonstrated the capacity of international patronage to contribute to the development of capable transactional activists/policy advocates.
References


Cisar, Ondrej. 2008. Politický aktivismus v České republice. Sociální hnutí a občanská společnost v období transformace a evropeizace [Political Activism in the Czech Republic: Social Movements and Civil Society in the Periods of Transformation and Europeanization]. Brno: CDK.


