The energy policy coordination in the European Parliament: discursive power-fights?

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Abstract
As energy policy-making becomes more interlinked and specialized, achieving policy coherence confronts the European Parliament with the greater challenge of political and administrative coordination. The nature of this policy necessitates a thorough coordination throughout various policy areas such as environment, foreign affairs, trade, development, enlargement, competition and research. This paper addresses the problem of horizontal policy coherence of the EU energy policy during the policy-making process in the European Parliament. In particular the paper focuses on coordination among the standing committees of the European Parliament. In this quest the process of inter-committee coordination was deconstructed and analysed through the lenses of discursive institutionalism. The results point to the importance of such factors as normative considerations, analytical capacities and discursive conduct of the standing committees.
The challenge of energy policy coherence from intra-institutional perspective

Energy policy has always been at the heart of European integration discourse. However, despite a long regulatory activity, the EU continues to stumble over the energy policy incoherence. The challenge is triggered by the widely cross-sectoral and extremely technical nature of the policy. The parallel discourses on energy policy continuously feature a variety of competing and sometimes contradictory policy ideas aiming at: increasing economic competitiveness, reducing subsidies, cutting import dependence, phasing out nuclear power, increasing the use of renewable energies, establishing common energy market, reducing emissions, improving relations with energy producing and transit counties. Such discursive heterogeneity constrains the formulation of coherent policy instruments which are economically efficient, politically sustainable and feasible (de Jong, Glachant, & Hafner, 2010; Keppler, 2007). Therefore, European energy policy requires great specialisation and harmonization with horizontal policy goals.

In order to improve policy coherence attempts are made to construct a general strategic vision of the policy. The European Commission introduced a concept of ‘policy triangle’ balancing three policy objectives: economic competitiveness, environmental sustainability, and security of supply. These objectives were consistently set out in the Commission’s White and Green Papers, Strategic Energy Reviews and eventually have been codified in the Lisbon Treaty. Most recently, the objectives were repeated in the Energy Strategy 2020, the Energy Roadmap 2050 and Communication on external dimension of energy policy. However, in practice, separate energy policy instruments remained fragmented to a surprisingly high degree. Balancing the three objectives in an integrated approach appeared to be challenging and difficult (de Jong et al., 2010). The development of internal energy market has been systematically prioritised at the expense of other two objectives even though market competitiveness is far less effective tool in promoting sustainability and security of supply (Andoura, Hancher, & van der Woude, 2010; Solorio, 2011). The objective of energy security has witnessed particularly insignificant developments. The attempts to improve energy security are undermined by the lack of an internal consensus on competing policy objectives (Keppler, 2007). The discrepancies have been found between development and external energy policies (Youngs, 2009) and environmental policy (Solorio, 2011). The external aspects of energy policy received particular attention in the Joint Paper which first pointed to the existing cleavages between internal and external energy policy measures and argued in favour of more coherent external energy security policy backed up by all sectoral policies of the EU.

The described perplexity manifests itself in serious vibrations inside the European Parliament. The European Parliament has been active in energy policy discourse since the early 1970s by

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1 See the triangle of European energy decision-making in Annex 1.
3 “Energy Roadmap 2050” (COM(2011)885)
means of various resolutions and parliamentary questions. The EP clearly spoke in favour of a common energy policy; however internal dynamics within the EP seemed to show discrepancies. As energy policy-making becomes more interlinked and specialized, achieving policy coherence confronts the European Parliament with the greater need of internal coordination. The EP has elaborated its legislative specialisation (Bowler & Farrell, 1995) raising the role of committees to cope with its legislative workload (Neuhold, 2001), but now it is facing a challenge to balance specialisation and horizontal policy coordination. As it has been recently noted, “political coordination is highly inefficient”, the working style of the Parliament remains fragmented and “inter-committee coordination is poor” (A. Jordan & Schout, 2006, p. 109, 136).

The increasingly compound policy environment makes it difficult to draw clear boundaries between committees. Not only energy policy cuts across traditional lines of left-right partisan cleavage but also across the jurisdiction of standing committees. Fulfilling their individual mandates, committees often compete with each other. For instance, the ill-defined policy competences of the ITRE Committee regularly provoke concerns of the ENVI Committee which deals with environmental issues; while the Committee on Budgets is concerned with the fiscal aspect and the Committee on Foreign Affairs has a strong voice in the external aspects of energy policy. The trade-offs between the different policies have become the matter of day-to-day intra-institutional coordination. The overlapping committee competences influence the deliberative quality and the outcomes of policymaking. Thus, the internal coordinative discourse among committees is important not only for reconciling competing demands, but it can also create a healthy tension among committees necessary for the development of balanced and objective policy. An elaborate and comprehensive discourse can provide more innovative solutions to policy problems and result in better integrated policy proposals. On the other hand, vertical thinking and competitive behaviour can only stall the policy-making process. Therefore, coordinative discourse among the committees is worth investigating. Given the manifold divisions, cleavages and tensions, internal dynamics in the EP are as important for policy coherence as inter-institutional interaction or debates in the Council.

Interaction among the committees is not a new problem in the EP. It has been addressed in 2004 (“Raising the game’ reform6) and in 2009 (“Roth-Berendt reform’) which introduced changes to the internal Rules of Procedures aiming to reduce inter-committee conflicts (more details on reform follow below). Although the new procedures lowered the costs of coordination for the committees and offered higher benefits of interaction, this had only a minor effect on improving horizontal policy coordination (Interview 4). This observation falls out of the merits of at least one theoretical explanation (the Rational Institutionalism) and suggests a need to explore a wider theoretical approach. In this quest it was thought to examine the potential of the newest type of new institutionalism, specifically Discursive Institutionalism7. Hence, the key research questions are drawn based on this perspective: To what extent inter-committee coordinative discourse contributes to the institutionalisation of

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6 A detailed overview of pros and cons of Discursive Institutionalism is beyond the scope of this working paper.
energy policy coherence? And under what conditions is it able to improve policy coherence (change)?

The paper is divided in five parts. The first part introduces the variety of studies on the European Parliament and places accordingly the current contribution into a separate research domain concerned with intra-institutional policy coordination. The second section presents the overview of key concepts and factors which have been previously found to have an effect on policy coordination. In the third part an analytical framework of the current study is set up, elaborating the operationalization of the key conditions and presenting the used methods. The fourth and fifth parts present the initial results of the case study and discuss implications for further research.

1. Locating current research contribution

The focus of academic research on the European Parliament has being fruitfully growing since the introduction of co-decision by the Maastricht Treaty. At the moment there are three interconnected bodies of research: a) research on the role of the EP in inter-institutional interaction with the Council and the Commission; b) studies of the general development and operation of the EP; c) research on internal politics in the EP (the focus of this study).

The matter of EP’s internal divisions has been drawing academic attention for some time (Bowler & Farrell, 1995). Scholars focused on cohesion among political groups (Hix et al., 2003; Hix & Noury, 2009; Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2005), the role of civil servants in legislative assistance to MEPs (Dobbels & Neuhold, 2011; Neunreither, 2003; Winzen, 2011), administrative reform (Kungla, 2007), socialization (Scully, 2005) and more recently on the MEPs’ activeness in legislative process (Jensen & Winzen, 2012). The operation of the standing committees has attracted attention relatively recently. The literature on the parliament’s committees has focused on the committees’ powers and compositions (Mamadouh & Raunio, 2003); the influence of the rapporteurs (Hoyland, 2006); committees’ tasks in relation to the plenary (Yordanova, 2009) and national party influences on the committees (Whitaker, 2011).

While these studies have developed the understanding of internal organisation of the European Parliament and its committees, the coordination between committees on cross cutting issues remained an underdeveloped topic. This area has not been a subject of systematic empirical investigations and theoretical build up. Some studies have touched upon consensus-seeking inside the committees (Neuhold, 2001; Settembri & Neuhold, 2009) and the impact of inter-committee competition on the EP’s position in inter-institutional negotiations (Burns, 2006). However, the impact of the coordination between committees upon the EP’s policy output has not been investigated previously. By looking at this in some detail, this study aims to add to this body of research.

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8 The first pillar of literature predominantly focused on the formal powers and growing legislative influence of the EP as a single entity (Crombez, Steunenberg, & Corbett, 2000; Tsebelis & Garrett, 2000).

9 In this paper output refers to the EP’s position (legislative or non-legislative report) in general EU policy-making process.
2. State-of-the-Art

2.1. The key concepts: policy coherence, institution coherence and coordination

This part presents the overview of various concepts closely related to the concept of policy coherence. It has been noticed that study of coherence which accompanies the research of the European Union’s institutions is short of clear concepts and solid theoretical grounds. The growing attention to the problem led the research about ‘coherence’ into becoming incoherent as such. The literature review in this and other research areas showed that similar concepts have been often differently termed, approached from various theoretical perspectives and accompanied by fragmented empirical studies.

The concept of policy coherence was found to be related in one or another way to such concepts as: policy coordination (Alexander 1995; Alter and Hage 1992; Jordan and Schout 2006), policy integration (Jordan and Lenschow 2008), policy consistency (OECD, 2003), collaborative public management (Williams, 2012), cross-cutting policy-making, holistic governance (6, Leat, Seltzer, Stoker, & Seltzer, 2002), joined-up government (Bogdanor, 2005; Pollitt, 2003), institutional coherence (Christiansen, 2001) and coordinative discourse (Schmidt, 2010). These concepts have been scattered around the literature on institutional analysis, intergovernmental management, policy networks (Agranoff, 2007) and research on governance (Levi-Faur, 2012).

In addition, the organisational literature has provided such concepts as coherent governance (Christiansen, 2001), inter-organisational coordination (Alexander, 1995; Hanf & Scharpf, 1978; Rogers & Whetten, 1982), inter-organisational collaboration (Alter & Hage, 1992) and collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008). It must be noted that these concepts are usually more related to the cooperation between institutions and less to the intra-institutional cooperation within one organisation. Nevertheless, the factors which affect coordination are very similar. Inter-institutional and intra-institutional policy-making are relatively comparable when it comes to integrating issues that are cross-sectoral (Meijers & Stead, 2004). At the end of the day, even within one institution, sectoral units operate as separate institutions with their particular modes of operation, professional approaches, resources and agendas.

So what is policy coherence?

Being the major problem under study and approached here as an explained variable, policy coherence demands clear definition. More often than not, policy coherence refers to the management of cross-cutting issues in policy-making that cross the borders of policy fields and institutional responsibilities of individual departments (Meijers & Stead, 2004). Approached more broadly, policy coherence refers here to the result of systematic coordination of ideas regarding the definition of problem, its origins, and possible solutions directed towards the achievement of objectives across individual policies.11

Among the key qualifications of policy coherence scholars have underlined the following:

- comprehensiveness (acknowledging wide-ranging policy consequences)
- aggregation (evaluation of policy alternatives from a broad perspective)
- consistency (an extent of policy integration into related policy fields and institutional units) (Underdal, 1980).

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10 Major studies include but not limited to: (Ashoff, 2005; Bigsten, 2007; Carbone, 2009; Christiansen, 2001; Cremona, 2008; Gauttier, 2004; Gebhard, 2011; Krenzler & Schneider, 1997; Missiroli, 2001; Nuttall, 2005; Portela & Raube, 2008)

11 An alternative broader definition compared to others used in (Cremona, 2008; den Hertog & Stroß, 2011).
Policy coherence is often broken down into two pairs of classifications: horizontal/vertical and internal/multilateral. On horizontal level coherence refers to the difficulties raised by the overlaps of various policy areas (main concern of this research). For instance, energy policy horizontal coherence is about combined contribution of the intersecting policies such as development, trade, environment and foreign policy. Vertical coherence is usually seen as the relations between the member states’ policies and the EU policies. With regard to energy security, for example, it refers to the overlap of different policies in terms of their combined contribution to the security of supply objectives.

At this point, it is important to make clear the relations between policy coherence and institutional coordination. The literature generally treats institutional coordination as the main prerequisite of policy coherence (Pollitt, 2003). After all, despite of variations, policy making is inevitably processed through the institutions. Institutional coordination is required to eliminate duplication and contradictions between different policies and increase their effectiveness. It is expected to improve the exchange of ideas and collaboration among different stakeholders in a particular policy sector (Pollitt, 2003).

Furthermore, the literature often places coordination in the core of policy coherence. Challis et al defined coordination as a search of “coherence, consistency, comprehensiveness and of harmonious compatible outcomes” (1988, 25). More precisely, coordination aims to ensure:

- coherence between the various objectives and instruments of a single policy;
- consistency within a set of horizontal policies which fall under responsibility of more than one institutional actor;
- transition of policy into a consistent course of action within various organizations units;
- implementation that effectively addresses the problem by consistent and coherent policy package (Challis et al., 1988, p. 30)

2.2. Perspectives on the factors of coordination

There are different views in the literature on explanatory and intervening variables of coordination. The UK’s Cabinet Office in its “Wiring it up” report identified a number of potential factors such as: management mechanisms, incentives and professional culture. (Wiring It Up, 2000). In a similar vein, the report of the OECD underlined the following structural facilitators of policy coordination:

- central overview and coordination capacity to ensure horizontal consistency among policies
- availability of advice based on a clear definition and good analysis, with explicit indications of possible inconsistencies
- mechanisms to anticipate, detect and resolve policy conflicts early in the process
- flexibility of procedures to ensure adjustments with regards to new information
- administrative culture that promotes cross-sectoral cooperation and a systematic dialogue between policy communities (OECD, 2003)

Mintzberg has included such variables as hierarchical mechanisms, bureaucratic procedures, specifications of output and objectives, mission statements, and horizontal coordinating mechanisms (Mintzberg, 2002). Approaching the problem from the perspective of network governance, Kickert included such factors as: the number of actors, diversity within networks
and openness of network (Kickert, 1997). Other studies have suggested that the procedure with associated committees, informal intergroup forums and the political groups coordinators were the key factors for hammering out a consensus on the legislative proposals internally in individual committees (Settembri & Neuhold, 2009). Elsewhere the other explanations of institutional coordination were based on the rational institutionalism’s ‘logic of consequences’. In this model separate institutional actors within the Parliament were perceived as quasi-individuals striving for survival and maximising their strategic interests. Their attitudes towards coordination were seen through the pre-set objectives and their behaviour was based on cost-benefit calculations. Viewed from this perspective insufficient coordination of environmental policy was explained by high costs and little benefits of coordination for MEPs. Jordan and Schout (2006) argued that coordination within the European Parliament was undermined by high labour intensity and small political rewards. The MEPs in Environmental Committee refrained from proactive coordination with other Committees during the opinion giving procedure because saw this procedure politically unrewarding (Jordan and Schout 2006). Approaching coordination from yet another perspective, Christiansen has underlined the importance of socialization grounded on ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Christiansen, 2001).

Alexander (1995) has attempted to take into account a broader range of factors which influenced coordination. He concluded that inter-departmental interaction depended on the combination of conditions ranging from specialization, administrative routines, political goals, lack of interest, secrecy, partisan politics to beliefs, organizational ideologies, differing values, time, and accountability (Alexander, 1995). He also suggested that the actors’ perceptions (interpretive factors) play the same vital role as contextual (objective) factors.\(^\text{12}\)

Despite of the existing multitude of different factors the exact weight of all these factors is unclear from the literature. This allows claiming that the above factors might be necessary but not sufficient to study intra-institutional coordination. It is, therefore, suggested taking into account various configurations of the factors. In order to do so, the focus must be shifted on the alternative level of analysis, particularly to the often overlooked micro-level processes of coordinative discourse. This perspective can provide a useful heuristic device which is able to bring the configuration of factors under one umbrella.

3. Analytical framework

In order to approach the problem of coordination in the most inclusive manner, this study utilises the concept of ‘coordinative discourse’ as a heuristic analytical tool. Intra-institutional coordination is approached here from the perspective of Discursive Institutionalism (DI), which provides a novel perspective on institutional change and continuity as well as policy evolution.

Discursive Institutionalism is an analytic framework concerned with the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of policy argumentation in institutional context. DI holds that institutional and policy change is defined primarily by the ideas of institutional actors and the manner in which these ideas are communicated. The key reasoning builds on the so-called “logic of communication” (Schmidt 2008, 314) which is a combination of two explanatory conditions: background ideational abilities and foreground discursive abilities (Schmidt, 2008).

\(^{12}\) Annex 2 presents this broad list of factors.
Vivien Schmidt distinguishes two domains of discursive interaction: *coordinative* discourse among policy actors and *communicative* discourse between political actors and the public. This study is primarily concerned with the coordinative discourse among policymakers who generate policy ideas and engage in deliberating, arguing, bargaining, and reaching agreement on policies.

The coordinative function of discourse is apparent in the backroom dealings, bureaucratic negotiations, and nitty-gritty debates that occur among policy-makers as compromises are hammered out and policy emerges. The audience for communication as it occurs within the coordinative discourse is other policy-makers. The coordinative discourse among institutional actors represents the interplay of their discursive and ideational abilities. In other words, it suggests that policymakers generate policy ideas and arguments with different degree of influence or persuasiveness. One implicit assumption exists with regard to the effects of coordinative discourse. Thick coordinative discourse is assumed to reconcile and integrate multiple ideas into a common understanding of policy problem and necessary solutions in the most effective manner, while thin discourse indicates a less coherent policy outcome (Schmidt, 2010).

*Ideational ability* signifies the process of ideas’ composition and indicates the capacity of institutional actors to generate required information. In terms of policy making, ideas are believed to pre-define policy trajectories. Ideational abilities determine the policy maker’s complete/or fragmented understanding of the policy problem and its solutions. The strength of ideational abilities depends on the institutional actor’s access to information and ability to process it during the legislative process.

In contrast to RI where ideas strictly correspond to the strategic interests of actors, DI separates ideas from the interest by drawing an analytical line between interests and material reality (Figure 1).

*Figure 1:* Visualisation of the DI perspective on interests being constructed by ideas and discourse.

DI suggests that the institutional actors build their policy preferences first and foremost on the basis of ideas – incomplete knowledge and fragmented perception of material reality (Schmidt, 2010).

Ideas inform choices under conditions of so-called ‘Knightian uncertainty’ (Blyth, 2002) – that is, where the consequences of decisions are hard to determine. In such circumstances, policy-makers cannot look out for their ‘interests’ and choose accordingly (as RI would have it), as these interests are hard to define with great certainty. Instead, they formulate interests through their ‘ideas’ about the situation. As such, what informs their choices aren’t so much
their interests as their ‘perceived interests’ about a particular situation. Thus, Blyth outlined a number of assumptions about the causal functions of ideas (Blyth, 2002):

- Ideas affect the collective action by defining ‘causal stories’.
- Ideas reduce uncertainty and define ‘courses of action’.
- Ideas can be used as ‘weapons’ to alter other actors’ actions.

**Discursive ability** is another important condition which if successful can add coherence to policy-making in a divided polity by “framing the way in which various actors define their interests” (Van Den Hoven A., 2004, p. 275). Discursive abilities are primarily the practical performance – the persuasive abilities utilized in legislative negotiations to reshape or add different elements to the ideas about policy solution. Such discursive abilities are emphasized in various definitions. For instance, Campbell and Pedersen noted that:

> Actors select various relevant concepts from ideas available to them and use them in ways that displace the existing order of interpretation and trigger a shift of policy attention, preferred policy models and opportunities for political action. (Campbell & Pedersen, 2001, p. 229)

Therefore, discursive ability refers to the ‘speech act’ of the agents who convey ideas through the interactive process. In other words, discursive abilities constitute “transformative power” based on Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (1989, 1996). These abilities “…enable people to reason, debate, and change the structures they use” (Schmidt, 2008, p. 316). Language is regarded as a tool in the ‘arsenal’ of skilful actors that can empower or render redundant certain policy choices (Radulova, 2011, p. 34).

The strength of discourse depends on the scope of cognitive arguments and the resonance of normative arguments (Radaelli & Schmidt, 2005, p. 201); relevance; adequacy of information on which the arguments are build; consistency across policy sector; coherence; credibility and applicability; appropriateness and legitimacy (Schmidt, 2008).

Furthermore, underlining structure-agency duality of the DI, institutional context also matters. DI emphasizes the importance of formal and informal “forums” which determine who talks to whom, about what, where and establish when discourse matters the most (Schmidt, 2010, p. 17). Institutional context shapes the flows of ideas and the form of interaction between competing interests (Lenschow & Zito, 1998). With regard to inter-committee coordinative discourse institutional context sets the limits on intensity of discourse by determining the ways of interaction between the committees.13

Based on above assumptions the following working hypotheses are advanced:

**H1**: Coherent policy output is the result of coordinated policy-making process where involved institutional actors hold symmetric ideational and discursive abilities.

**H2**: The more thick coordinative discourse is – the greater is policy coherence. Thin coordinative discourses results in lower policy coherence.

Drawing on the above theoretical expectations coordinative discourse can be illustrated as an equilibrium model (Diagram 1). Symmetric coordinative discourse is expected when committees engage in deliberation featuring the same strength of ideational and discursive abilities - the equilibrium line. Any fluctuations from the equilibrium would point to the

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13 Relations among the committees are governed by the internal Rules of Procedure, in particular Rules 49-51 which determine the setting of coordinative discourse.
asymmetric coordinative discourse where one of the discourses becomes hegemonic or dominating.

The level of policy coherence is theoretically expected along the equilibrium line where the points from C1 to C4 indicate the ‘thickness’ of discourse – the lowest and the highest intensity and scope of coordinative discourse (thick/thin discourse). The most coherent policy output is expected at the point C4 when institutional actors exercise strong discursive ability (D) and strong ideational ability (I).

The ideational ability is theoretically more significant than the discursive ability of the institutional actors (I>D). The strong ideational side is more significant because it supplements the discourse with broader scope of cognitive arguments. The more cognitive arguments available the more legitimate is the discourse (less political and more technocratic discourse). Thus, the combination of weak ideational and strong discursive abilities (iD) has been assigned less weight than a combination of strong ideational and weak discursive abilities (Id).

Diagam 1:

3.1. Operationalization

With regard to the strength of ideational abilities the following indicators have been evaluated: the range of normative considerations and the scope of available cognitive information; as well as the capacity to generate required information (analytical capacity; available knowledge and expertise). The scope of information was measured as the quality of available information about: a) policy problem; b) policy options; c) implications of policy options (economic, environmental, foreign relations).

With regard to the strength of discursive abilities the following indicators were examined: credibility of constructed arguments; the resonance of normative arguments; relevance; consistency across policy sector; coherence; applicability; appropriateness; legitimacy.
Assessing the intensity of interaction the formal and informal coordinating mechanisms were evaluated such as bureaucratic procedures, degree of hierarchical structures and the usage of informal horizontal coordinating mechanisms.

The key indicators measured in the study are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2

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<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<td>Strength of Ideational Abilities</td>
<td>Policy Coherence (EP’s policy output)</td>
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<td>(analytical capacity and expertise):</td>
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<tr>
<td>- range of normative considerations</td>
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<td>- scope of cognitive (objective) information (capacity to collect and absorb required information)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strength of Discursive Abilities:</td>
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<td>1) Characteristics</td>
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<td>- credibility (factual, empirical claims)</td>
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<td>- resonance (normative arguments which resonate with actors’ values)</td>
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<td>- consistency across policy sector (time wise);</td>
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<td>- coherence (content wise)</td>
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<td>2) Intensity of interaction (institutional context):</td>
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3.2. Method

In order to look closely at the ideas of institutional actors and the manner in which they were communicated this research uses a combination of methods including case study analysis, process tracing, discourse analysis and interviewing key policy-makers.

The case study covers the coordinative discourse on the legislative dossier on external energy policy better known as ‘IGAs report’. The dossier represents a distinctive case as it is one of the first policy instruments constructing the external dimension of energy policy. The case was chosen for analysis based on three criteria. First, it is related to the horizontal energy policy coherence. The proposal aims to contribute to the energy security objective, which combines various dimensions and falls under the competences of more than one committee. Secondly, the proposal is salient enough and got considerable political attention. Thirdly, the case could in principle prove false the working hypothesis, which argues that symmetric coordinative discourse between committees is likely to lead to coherent policy output.

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14 Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on setting up an information exchange mechanism with regard to inter-governmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the field of energy (COM (2011)540 final).
15 The proposal triggered 131 amendments and 2 opinions.
The study treats the lead committee and the opinion-giving committees as two separate “discursive policy alliances”\(^{16}\) (key analytical units) comprising of members of the respective committees, their assistants, policy advisors of political groups and officials of the Committee Secretariats. The study scrutinises the early stages of policy-making at the EP starting from the preparation of the draft report until the indicative vote in committee (agreeing the mandate for informal negotiations with Council).

Process tracing is used to identify the different sequences of interactions in the decision-making process. The method of process tracing was mainly theorized by Bennett and George, who define it as follows: ‘The process tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable’ (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 6). Process tracing is particularly relevant for all scholars interested in the explanatory power of ideas because, as Berman underlines, beyond formal processes such as voting, ‘process tracing means opening up the “black box” of decision-making instead of “bracketing” it, looking closely at the way a decision was arrived at and the factors that influenced the participants’ (Berman, 1998, p. 34).

The analysed elements of coordinative discourse consist in:

- justifications which accompany the reports of the lead committee;
- justifications which accompany the reports of the opinion giving committee;
- interpretations of committee competences laid out in the in the Rules of Procedure;
- meetings between committee representatives.

The semi-constructed interviews were conducted with responsible rapporteurs, shadow rapporteurs (or assistants), draftsmen of opinion reports and administrators at the Committee Secretariats.

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\(^{16}\) The introduced here notion of ‘discursive alliance’ is narrower than the notion of Hajer’s ‘discourse coalition’ which includes influence of external discourse on the policy makers.
4. The study of inter-committee coordination

4.1. Institutional context

The EP continues to radiate its aspiration of becoming a stronger institutional actor. Intra-institutional coherence, therefore, is clearly in the EP’s interest. First of all, institutional coherence ensures that the EP has a stronger position vis-à-vis the Council during their informal and formal negotiations. Secondly, internal coordination facilitates comprehensive political debate which is necessary to carry out critical scrutiny vis-à-vis the Commission. Furthermore, since most of the technical legislative work in the EP takes place in the parliamentary committees, cooperation among committees can increase inclusion of the stakeholders’ views, provide for balanced and more representative outcome and reduce the number of conflicts before the final vote in plenary.

However, the interaction between committees remains far from perfect. What has become characteristic for the vertical structure of the European Parliament is the drive of “guarding” the committee’s own competences from other committees. More and more often members of the committees tend to play technocratic role in chosen field of expertise which allows them to maintain and build up their authority. High degree of expertise is important for decision-making process, but it should not inhibit ability to make wider assessments of draft legislation. Otherwise, it can result in technocratic bias in a legislative process. Previous studies found that domination of the rapporteur led to a one-sided view with little exchange of information among the committees (Neuhold, 2001, p. 6).

In 2007 recognizing a need for internal improvements in the European Parliament, the Conference of Presidents, on a proposal from President Pöttering, formed the Working Party on Parliamentary Reform. The Working Party examined the way Parliament conducted its daily business and suggested reform proposals covering among other issues the work of the committees. In one of its reports the Working Party has examined structural and organisational matters of parliamentary committees. Some of the suggestions were implemented and resulted in the following changes:

- strengthened position of the opinion-giving committee vis-à-vis the lead committee, thus facilitating cooperation between the committees (by revised Rule 50 ‘procedure with associated committees’ and introducing new ‘procedure with joint committee meetings’ (Rule 51) in cases where matters fall equally within the competence of two or more committees);
- strengthened the role of the Conference of Committee Chairs in resolving the conflicts of competence between committees (by revised Rule 179);
- reinforced the principle of proportional representation in the committees (by revised Rule 177 which prohibited ‘horse trading’).\(^{18}\)

However, other important proposals were only partially accepted. First, the reform failed to bring more clarifications into the powers and responsibilities of committees. In order to reduce the number of conflicts of competence the Working Party proposed to define more clearly committees’ adjoining competences, in particular of those four committees (LIBE, IMCO, ECON and JURI) with the highest percentage of conflicts. However, the revision of Annex VII of the Rules of Procedure was found to be very sensitive issues and was limited

\(^{17}\) It comprised of one MEP from each political group and was chaired by Mrs Dagmar Roth-Behrendt (PES -DE).

\(^{18}\) Conference of Presidents Minutes of the ordinary meeting of Thursday, 19 March 2009, PV CPG 19.03.2009.
only to minor adjustments. That did not reduce the number of time-consuming and distracting conflicts of competence between parliamentary committees (Interview 1). The approximate estimations show that the number of conflicts did not decrease: before the reform – 57 conflicts of competence and 196 requests for enhanced cooperation procedures; compared to the numbers after the reform – 28 conflicts of competence and 142 requests for enhanced cooperation procedures (mid-term figures).

In addition, the reform proposals suggested developing a distinct from the Commission’s impact assessment procedure with a view to ensure coherent approach between committees; provide committees with qualitative technical advice; and achieve better balance between in-house and external expertise capacities. This, however, had little results in practice. The Conference of Presidents adopted internal guidelines on impact assessments. However, in practice these guidelines are not more than internal Handbook on impact assessment which is never used (Interview 3). In the beginning of 2012 a new internal DG on impact assessment was established. Its role is still hard to evaluate as it remains understaffed and currently works on identifying its mandate.

Secondly, the report recommended to strengthen the role of coordinators, rapporteurs and shadows and to enhance the assistance provided to them. However, this also was unaccomplished (Interview 5).

4.2. The case of ‘IGAs report’: connecting “market logic” with “foreign policy logic” and “environmental logic”

Considering the described above setting it is time to present first empirical results of the case study which focused on the inter-committee coordinative discourse concerning the legislative proposal on the information sharing mechanism in the field of energy (also known as ‘IGAs report’).¹⁹ The proposal represents a distinct intersection of energy policy with foreign policy as well as environmental and trade policies.

On 7 September 2011 the European Commission issued a proposal for a Decision on Setting up an information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the field of energy. The proposal translates the conclusions of the European Council of 4 February²⁰ calling for a better coordination of Union and Member States' activities in EU external energy relations and thus asking Member States to inform the Commission about bilateral energy agreements with third countries. The European Council defined it essential to improve: “…the coordination of EU and Member States' activities with a view to ensuring consistency and coherence in the EU’s external relations.” In other words, the idea behind this proposal is to ‘pool buyers’ together.

The proposal was presented together with a communication on EU’s external energy relation. With regard to the definition of the problem, the Commission emphasized that the lack of information on agreements made it impossible to assess their compatibility with internal energy legislation. Additionally, the absence of information on the amount and sources of imported energy made it impossible to assess and avert implications of intergovernmental agreements on the collective security of supply situation in the EU. Moreover, the lack of

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¹⁹ Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on setting up an information exchange mechanism with regard to inter-governmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the field of energy (COM (2011)540 final).
²⁰ As well as conclusions of the Energy Council of 28 February 2011.
information was said to cause "a mess for investors and a mess legally". The Commission, therefore, suggested that the new mechanism would ensure transparency, the legal compatibility of agreements with the EU legislation; increase Member States’ negotiation power vis-à-vis third countries, and provide legal certainty for investment.

The proposal envisaged that all relevant existing intergovernmental agreements have to be notified to the Commission and Member States are obliged to inform the Commission about opening new negotiations with a third country. Member States would have to send the draft agreement and all other documents to which the agreement refers including commercial agreements. Furthermore, the Commission would assess ex-ante the compatibility of each draft agreement with the EU law (notably EU internal energy market provisions) and may participate as observer in the negotiations. It would also develop best practices in a form of "standard clauses" that Member States could use in future intergovernmental agreements.

Although the proposal engaged deeply in specifying instrument’s procedures, little attention has been paid to horizontal policy areas. The proposal was transferred to the EP without the Commission’s impact assessment. Accordingly, the information on impacts on other policy areas (cross-policy interdependencies) and externalities which go beyond Member States’ borders was missing.

Shortly after it was transferred to the EP, the European Economic and Social Committee pointed out that proposal might potentially add to horizontal policy incoherence. The EESC found the Commission proposal unclear regarding the link to key energy policy objective:

“the link with the three more established goals of competitive, sustainable and secure energy has not been made totally clear, not least as competitive energy and sustainable energy are not always compatible.” (EESC, p.2)  

EESC has further noted that:

“closely related aspects including diplomatic and socio-economic relations with supplier and transit countries have not been included. Nor is it clear that this Proposal is fully linked with the wider trade related aspects of energy. […] The proposal under consideration focuses mainly on oil, gas and electricity imports. We regret that it does not mention […] potentially extensive agreements on renewable energy, such as Desertec.” (EESC, p.3)

Thus, the standing committees in the EP got a plenty of opportunity for further amendments.

Distribution of the dossier

At the EP the legislative proposal was allocated to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). The work on the dossier started in September 2011 and lasted for 5 months from early internal procedural stages until the indicative vote.

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22 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council setting up an information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the field of energy’ (2012/C 68/12)
The dossier was seized by the EPP group which appointed their rapporteur, Krišjānis Kariņš. Accordingly, the groups of S&D, ALDE, Greens, ECR and EFD appointed their shadow rapporteurs.\textsuperscript{25}

In general, besides ITRE the committees which deal with energy policy in one or another way are: the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), the Committee on International Trade (INTA), the Committee on Development (DEVE) and indirectly the Committee on Budget. None of these committees have a specific energy policy mandate listed under their competences except ITRE and they are not obliged to monitor energy policy horizontally.

In the analysed case, only AFET and INTA Committees asked to give an opinion on the report. With regard to inter-committee relations with these two committees, officials at the ITRE Secretariat perceived the dossier to be “ordinary, but not unproblematic”, noting that ITRE has already became used to the intensified and sometimes difficult coordinative discourse with associated Committees since the Lisbon Treaty (Interview 3).

\textit{Work on the draft report}

ITRE featured rather strong ideational and discursive abilities (ID). With regards to the ideational ability, despite of limited analytical capacities, ITRE holds a sufficient scope of information on the matters of market competitiveness.

The exceptional knowledge of trade and market related matters, gained at previously held ministerial position at the Latvian Ministry of Economics, has pre-determined the rapporteur’s focus on economy dimension. From the very beginning, the rapporteur had a number of productive informal meetings with the Council and the Commission representatives to clarify the parts which specifically referred to market matters.

On the request of the rapporteur the EP’s Library was tasked to prepare background information on intergovernmental agreements and available research on the topic.\textsuperscript{26} Hosting strong info-mining resources the library services promptly delivered results in an extensive list of references.\textsuperscript{27} The auxiliary guidelines on policy evaluation provided in the EP’s

\textsuperscript{23} The DG Presidency allocated the legislative proposal having regard Articles 294(2), 294(3) and Article 194 of the TFEU.
\textsuperscript{24} Starting from the appointment of ITRE rapporteur in September 2011 till an indicative vote in ITRE:

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Timeline} & \\
\hline
Exchange of views & 29 November 2011 \\
Consideration of draft report & 12 January 2012 \\
Consideration of ITRE amendments & 24 January 2012 \\
INTA opinion & 26 January 2012 \\
AFET opinion & 7 February 2012 \\
\textbf{Indicative vote ITRE} & 28 February 2012 \\
Final vote ITRE & pending \\
Vote plenary & pending \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{25} According the internal Rules of Procedure, Rule 192.4
\textsuperscript{26} Certain individuals and bodies in Parliament (the President, the Secretary-General, a parliamentary committee or a delegation) can ask, in the light of their political priorities for the technical expertise that they need. The expertise may take the form of: a note; a study; a workshop; a panel of experts; an impact assessment.
\textsuperscript{27} The library services also provide briefings on the topic under investigation, but this was not used in the case of IGAs report.
Handbook on impact assessment were not used during the preparation of the report. However, the Political Department had previously conducted a number of studies on the topic. Meanwhile, the rapporteur exhibited a great openness and received a substantial informational input from the industry (Interview 2).

The rapporteur also favoured a teamwork approach allowing broad engagement of his assistant, the experienced administrator of the ITRE Secretariat and the advisor of the EPP group. The information gathering and the drafting of first report was mainly performed by this team. Later on, the shadow rapporteurs provided additional input by tabling 131 amendments.

The rapporteur’s draft perceived the policy problem in a particular light and thus framed security of internal market as the main priority of the proposed legislation. The legislative proposal was presented as a tool exclusively required for the protection of internal energy market from harmful pressure of energy suppliers from third countries. In its explanatory memorandum the justification underlined that:

“… sometimes the aim of the third country is to bind the MS to assure the commercial contract or to secure a monopolistic position in energy supplies via particular infrastructure.”

In addition the legislation was said to ensure safe supplies at a competitive price for European costumers; a predictable economic environment for citizens and the industrial sector; and long-term legal certainty for investors. For this very purpose, the rapporteur proposed amendments to ensure that the IGAs must be checked against the EU competition law and internal energy market legislation. The report further clarified how to react in case the ex-ante assessment identified incompatibilities of IGA’s with Union law by setting-up a two-step mechanism to address potential incompatibilities. Furthermore, the report tightened provisions to give adequate guarantees for the companies that commercially sensitive information would remain confidential.

Many tabled amendments supported the general line of the rapporteur. The amendments aimed to strengthen confidentiality provision, clarify the deadlines and reporting provisions and define the scope vis-à-vis commercial agreements. The main part of amendments focuses on the provisions for existing IGAs and possible ex-ante monitoring.

Strong discursive ability of the ITRE was ensured by several measures. First, the institutional context provided for a strong discursive domination. The dossier was governed by the Rule 49 of the Rules of Procedures, which put the lead committee into supreme position vis-à-vis the opinion giving committees. It provided ITRE with the right to propose key amendments and reject the suggestions of opinion-giving committees without the right to re-table them in the plenary. In this case, the opinion-giving committees needed to employ very strong discursive ability to make its points accepted.

Secondly, ITRE featured the key qualities of the strong discursive ability. The arguments of the rapporteurs were based only on the credible facts referring to widely accepted numbers used in the evaluations of the Commission. For instance, import dependency was often brought up repeating that “the EU imports over 60% of its gas and over 80% of its oil” along with the reference to “the gas supply crisis in 2009”.

The rapporteur’s arguments also had a broad resonance in the audience since they referred to common values such as security. The

28 Annex 3.
29 Explanatory Statement, Draft Report (PR\882629EN)
rapporteur consistently employed securitising rhetoric emphasizing internal market integration as a security mechanism against a monopolistic Gazprom. In the explanatory memorandum the energy policy objective was interpreted not as to ensure security of energy supply, but ensure security of internal market: “… the energy policy of the Union is to secure the functioning and security of the energy market.”

Another key argument related to the necessity to reach a wide consensus within the committee and with opinion-giving committee in order to ensure broader negotiation mandate for trialogs with the Council. The rapporteur regularly employed these arguments during the exchange of views, the discussion of draft report, the consideration of amendments as well as during informal meetings with shadow rapporteurs and opinion-giving rapporteurs. The rapporteur’s arguments got an extra resonance at the public hearing on the issues of external energy policy held in ITRE before the indicative vote. Invited by the rapporteur speakers were meant to project likeminded explanations to the proposed legislation. In addition to the opportunity to reiterate envisioned judgments, the discussion also touched upon wider issues such as the impact of sanctions on Iran, the role of LNG, the fate of Nabucco, the need to strengthen partnership with emerging economies, the substitution of high CO2 emission fuels, pick oil forecasts and the role of unconventional gas.

With regards to the parallel discourse the alliance of opinion-giving committees combined INTA and AFTE. The committees engaged in the coordination with different abilities, but their performance as an alliance featured strong ideational and discursive abilities (ID). These factors have prevented the argumentation of ITRE from becoming dominating and ensured thick coordinative discourse between the committees.

In INTA the dossier was taken by the Greens and assigned to rapporteur Yannick Jadot. The rapporteur has exhibited strong ideational abilities, having access to the broad analysis on climate change and information on investment agreements. Remarkably, INTA’s opinion was prepared with due consideration of horizontal links with trade and environmental policies.

First and foremost, INTA articulated the nexus between trade and energy policies, whereas trade policy had to assure favourable conditions for trade in energy products. The proposed legislation was considered to supplement trade policy objectives in reducing the EU foreign energy dependence and increasing geopolitical independence. The opinion argued that better information about agreements must support the formulation of the trade policy vis-à-vis big energy supplier states, such as Russia. For this purpose, it was advocated to assess IGAs against the legislation in competition policy, strictly inspecting the cases of third party access exemptions.

Furthermore, INTA advised that the new mechanism must be linked to the energy sustainability objective. It was estimated that the new information exchange mechanism in combination with efforts to meet 20% energy savings target would reduce the wealth transfer from EU economies to energy producing countries by €50 billion per year. Referring to the assessments previously presented in the so-called ‘Bendtsen report’, the rapporteur maintained that “achieving the 20% energy savings target would save as much energy as

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30 The panel at the Parliament’s hearing on “Energy policy cooperation & External energy relations” (24 January 2012) consisted of Commissioner Günther Oettinger (DG ENER), Deputy Secretary General Maciej Popowski (EEAS), Beate Raabe (Secretary-General of EUROGAS) and only one independent technical expert Dr. Frank Umbach (Centre for European Security Strategies).

fifteen Nabucco pipelines could deliver.” For this purpose, INTA proposed to broaden the scope of assessment procedure where the Commission should not only assess the compatibility of the IGAs with internal energy legislation, but also with the Union’s long-term energy and climate change objectives. In particular, the agreements which include energy investments plans must be specially checked to prevent the duplication of energy infrastructure, leading to a lock-in effect with unnecessary surplus of fossil fuel capacity.

Deliberating its position, INTA rapporteur demonstrated strong discursive abilities. Using his position as a shadow rapporteur in ITRE, Yannick Jadot first tabled his amendments to ITRE’s draft report, making platform for better resonance of the following INTA’s opinion, largest part of which constituted the same amendments. INTA’s rapporteur also consistently reiterated INTA’s position every time the report was discussed with ITRE’s rapporteur. Ultimately, INTA’s clause which required compliance of future intergovernmental agreements with the EU’s long-term energy and climate objectives was successfully included to the report.

With regard to AFTE, the committee illustrated weak ideational, but strong discursive abilities (iD). AFET focused on the intersection of energy and foreign policies seeing the information exchange mechanism as a foreign policy instrument. The Committee’s perception of the problem had its distinct character. The poor information exchange was seen to weaken the EU foreign policy capabilities and diminishing its political leverage at international level.

For this purpose, AFET insisted on advancing the scope of compatibility assessment even further. In addition to the compliance with internal energy legislation, AFET advised to check IGAs for conformity with the Union’s international agreements. In practice, such assessments have a potential to expose the long-standing regulatory conflict with Russia. In particular, the EU has signed such international agreement as the Energy Charter Treaty. The key aspect of the Treaty is the establishment of a regulated third party access to natural gas transmission lines. Being the main stumbling block this clause left the Treaty non-ratified by Russia for many years.

Furthermore, AFET perceived the new mechanism as a tool to promote the EU’s policies for the respect of human rights, democracy, good governance, the rule of law and social dialogue, climate change, the protection of the environment, energy efficiency, and renewable energies. In order to strengthen these policies, AFET recommended adding the above provisions to the non-binding standard clauses incorporated in the future IGAs.

Due to the internal cleavages within the committee, AFET postponed the appointment of their rapporteur to the very last moment leaving extremely limited time to consider the wide scope of information required for their opinion. Thus, all other amendments of the AFET were close to the draft report of the lead committee and even partly contained similar wording.

AFET’s strong discursive ability was ensured by the fact that the dossier in this committee was taken by Marietta Giannakou, MEP from the same political group as the lead committee rapporteur. The arguments in its explanatory statements not only broadly resonated with arguments voiced in ITRE, but to a large extent resembled the justifications of the ITRE’s rapporteur. Notably, the similar practice of nominating rapporteurs has been found previously in the case of the Bolkestein Directive (Settembri & Neuhold, 2009). This shows that ‘double appointments’ of the same group has become a regular strategy employed by the Committees. In order to ensure even stronger resonance of their ideas, the EPP group members of the
AFET committee conducted a separate hearing on Energy Diplomacy and also published a video emission on the EPP TV Channel.\textsuperscript{32}

At the end, AFET successfully inserted into the final report a clause related to horizontally interlinked aspects of foreign policy such as the respect of human rights, democracy, good governance, the rule of law and social dialogues. In addition, AFET increased the resonance of INTA’s input on climate change, the protection of the environment, energy efficiency, renewable energies, and EU biofuel targets. Only one of the AFET suggestions was not accepted during the indicative vote in ITRE. The rejected amendment was emphasizing the role of the High Representative for foreign and security policy and the EEAS in the implementation of the proposed policy instrument.\textsuperscript{33}

Overall, the coordinative discourse which accompanied the legislative proposal throughout the process in the EP gained its “thickness” towards the end of the process, including the opinions of three standing committees which have covered a broad scope of related issues and engaged into intensive deliberations. Despite of the limited procedural formulations on the inter-committee cooperation, the discourse had benefited from various informal horizontal mechanisms such as platforms of political groups and European Energy Forum.\textsuperscript{34}


\textsuperscript{33} Amendment 9, Opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs for the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council setting up an information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the field of energy (COM(2011)0540 – C7-0235/2011 – 2011/0238(COD))

\textsuperscript{34} European Energy Forum serves as unofficial platform for the exchange of views among MEPs from different political groups – see Annex 4.
5. Preliminary conclusions

While energy policy-making becomes more interlinked with related policy sectors, achieving policy coherence confronts the European Parliament with the greater need of internal coordination. The standing committees of the European Parliament find themselves soaked in parallel discourses on energy policy raising a variety of competing policy ideas such as: cutting energy import dependency, phasing out nuclear power, increasing economic competitiveness, increasing the use of renewable energies, reducing emissions, improving relations with energy reach counties.

The aim of this paper was to explore how the committees manage to coordinate their policy input. In particular, the goal was to examine conditions under which the inter-committee coordinative discourse was able to ensure energy policy coherence. In order to do so, the analytical framework was developed on the basis of discursive institutionalism. It was noticed that the concept of coordinative discourse was rather implicit and has not been directly used in previous research. An attempt has been made to advance the concept and propose one way of its actual operationalization. The elaborated concept of coordinative discourse was applied as a heuristic analytical tool in the case study.

At this moment it is still early to draw far-reaching conclusions from one empirical case. However, some preliminary findings are worth mentioning. First and foremost, the case study helped to uncover the intricate internal discursive power battle which took place among the committees during their work on the legislative report. The results of this battle were reflected in a coherent policy instrument – the European Parliament report on the proposal for a decision setting up an information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements in the field of energy. The initial proposal was primarily geared towards the security of internal energy market and the link with two established goals of environmental and foreign policy has not been made clear. ITRE, INTA and AFET have all contributed their amendments to the proposal and balanced it out towards a more coherent policy instrument. “Thick” inter-committee coordinative discourse had positive effect on the legislative proposal enhancing its horizontal policy coherence. The report acknowledged wider ranging policy consequences, recognized broader policy alternatives and ensured consistency with foreign policy objectives and long-term energy and climate change objectives.

The case confirmed working hypotheses which assumed coherent policy output would be ensured by a configuration of two conditions: symmetric ideational and discursive strength of the involved committees and thick coordinative discourse among them. Remarkably, the opinion-giving committees managed to secure high acceptance of their amendments despite of the unfavourable rule of procedure which gave stronger initial position to the lead committee. The discourse alliance of INTA and AFET exercised strong ideational abilities tabling the substantial number of amendments to the initially imbalanced policy proposal and ensured high resonance of their amendments by engaging strong discursive abilities.

From the theoretical point of view, the results suggest the limits of previously presented arguments build on the ‘logic of appropriateness’ or cost benefit calculations of rational institutionalism (A. Jordan & Schout, 2006). The inter-committee coordination took place under conditions of Rule 49 which implied high costs and lower benefits for the opinion-giving committees. Nevertheless, the associated committees successfully engaged into the deliberations and saw their suggestions incorporated into the final report.
Annex 1

The triangle of European energy policy objectives:

1. Security of Supply
   (stability of International trading system, short term emergency storage)

2. Environmental Objectives
   (Kyoto Protocol, share of renewable energies)

3. Economic Competitiveness
   (liberalization, Lisbon Strategy)

*Source:* Jan H. Keppler.
Annex 2

Factors of policy coordination:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpretive factors (subjective)</th>
<th>Contextual factors (objective)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- perception of costs &amp; benefits (threats, rewards, risks, sanctions by network members)</td>
<td>- actual balance between needs-benefits-rewards / threats-risks-sanctions-losses</td>
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<tr>
<td>- attitudes (positive/negative)</td>
<td>- decentralisation (centralization)</td>
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<td>- administrative consensus</td>
<td>- professionalism (professionalization)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- maintenance of paradigm integrity</td>
<td>- standardisation (specialisation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- perceived loss of authority</td>
<td>- informal contacts, exchange of information (bureaucratization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- perception of interdependence</td>
<td>- broad range of tasks</td>
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<tr>
<td>- ability to serve new clients</td>
<td>- boundary crossing actors</td>
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<tr>
<td>- service effectiveness</td>
<td>- scarce resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>- evaluations of other organisations</td>
<td>- frequency of internal and external communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>- access to other organisations (socialisation, leadership, staff training)</td>
<td>- structural similarities</td>
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<tr>
<td>- cosmopolitan ethos</td>
<td>- geographic proximity</td>
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<tr>
<td>- record of good relations with other organisations</td>
<td>- volatility in political/economic system</td>
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<tr>
<td>- common commitment</td>
<td>- turnover of personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>- common language</td>
<td>- level of personnel’s training</td>
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<tr>
<td>- agreement on domains and value of coordination</td>
<td>- governmental intrusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>- shared definitions, ideologies</td>
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Based on (Alexander, 1995; Rogers & Whetten, 1982)
## Annex 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITRE</th>
<th>Studies of the Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy</th>
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<th>AFET</th>
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<th>INTA</th>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>“EU Economic and Trade Relations with Russia”, Delivered by: German Institut for Economic Research, DIW Berlin)</td>
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</table>
Annex 4

52 Members of the European Parliament were directly involved in the EEF’s activities in 2011/2012. The biggest number of Members were from ITRE (22) and ENVI (10), with the couple of Members from other committees: AFET (2), INTA (2), JURI (1), ECON (1), REGI (1), IMCO (1), BUDG:

Giles Chichester (ECR, President of the European Energy Forum since 2004), Alejo Vidal-Quadras (EPP, Treasurer and Vice-President of the European Energy Forum), Jerzy Buzek (EPP, Vice-President), Norbert Glante (S&D, Vice-President), Edit Herczog (S&D, Vice-President), Romana Jordan (EPP, Vice-President), Herbert Reul (EPP, Vice-President), Paul Rübig (Vice-President), Britta Thomsen (Vice-President), Daniel Caspary (Director), Robert Goebbels (Director), Corinne Lepage (Director), Justas Vincas Paleckis (Director), Vittorio Prodi (Director), Vladimir Remek (Director), Vladimir Urutchev (Director), Inese Vaidere (Director), Lambert van Nistelrooij (Director), Richard Ashworth (Active Member), Cristian Silviu Bușoi (Active Member), Pilar del Castillo Vera (Active Member), Ioan Enciu (Active Member), Vicky Ford (Active Member), Ashley Fox (Active Member), Gaston Franco (Active Member), Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy (Active Member), Julie Girling (Active Member), Françoise Grossetête (Active Member), András Gyürk (Active Member), Fiona Hall (Active Member), Satu Hassi (Active Member), Roger Helmer (Active Member), Arturs Krišjānis Kariņš (Active Member), Evgeni Kirilov (Active Member), Eija-Riitta Korhola (Active Member), Werner Langen (Active Member), Jo Leinen (Active Member), Astrid Lulling (Active Member), Alajos Mészáros (Active Member), Miroslav Mikolášik (Active Member), Angelika Niebler (Active Member), Antonyia Parvanova (Active Member), Anni Podimata (Active Member), Teresa Riera Madurell (Active Member), Richard Seebäer (Active Member), Robert Sturdy (Active Member), Konrad Szymanski (Active Member), Evžen Tošenovský (Active Member), Niki Tzavela (Active Member), Derek Vaughan (Active Member), Glenis Willmott (Active Member), Marina Yannakoudakis (Active Member).

Source: The European Energy Forum
http://www.europeanenergyforum.eu/sites/default/files/eef/files/EEF_Active_Members.pdf
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