Paper Title: A Janus-faced feminism: Gender in women-led right-wing populist parties.

Susi Meret and Birte Siim, Aalborg University, Denmark.

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Abstract

Male, authoritarian and charismatic are often mentioned as the key features of right wing populist leaders, well-fitting parties with an overrepresentation of male voters. The surge of (successful) women politicians at the leadership of several prominent right-wing populist parties in Europe questions today these assumptions: notably Pia Kjærsgaard, leader of the Dansk Folkeparti [Danish Peoples’ Party, DF] from 1995-2012, Siv Jensen, leader of the Norwegian Fremskrittparti [Progress Party, FrP] since 2006, Marine le Pen leader of the Front National [FN] since 2011 and Frauke Petry, leader of the newly formed Alternative für Deutschland [AfD] since 2015. From this outset, the paper analyzes the role of female right wing populist leaders and the articulations of gender and women’s rights in right wing populist parties’ discourses. The aim is to understand new elements of right-wing populism connected to the parties’ political ideologies and leadership and to gender the academic debate on right-wing populism, by developing a feminist approach to the study of neo-nationalism and rightwing populist ideology and leadership.

Keywords: populism, gender, nationalism, Danish People’s Party, Front National, Alternative für Deutschland, Marine Le Pen, Pia Kjærsgaard, populist right-wing, Progress Party, Siv Jensen, Frauke Petry.
Rightwing Populism, Male Charismatic Leadership and the Gender Conundrum

The paper aims to understand new elements of Rightwing populism connected both to the parties’ political ideologies and to party leadership. The first theoretical part presents two main strands to understand Rightwing populism. One strand of literature has emphasized the male aspects of these party’s programs, members and voters, including debates on charismatic leadership, and the other strand of literature has proposed critical approaches to gender the phenomenon. The second empirical part presents a study of four Rightwing Populist Parties (RPP) with female leadership, Pia Kjærsgaard founder and longtime leader of the Danish Peoples’ Party (Dansk Folekeparti, DF), Siv Jensen, leader of the Norwegian Progress Party presently part of the government (Fremskridstpartiet, FrP), Marine le Pen from Front National (FN), Frauke Petri, and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). The focus is on two dimensions, the party leadership and party ideology.

Populist charisma has entered into everyday jargon as a result of this term’s frequent use and vulgarization by pundits, journalists, political communicators and scholars, among others. The two definitions are often correlated, and it is a commonplace to find populist parties described as dominated by ‘charismatic leaders’ (Mény and Surel, 2004; Taggart, 2000; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008; Zaslove, 2008). Yet, just like the concept of populism, that of political charisma remains in many ways ambiguous, vaguely defined and methodologically problematic operate with (cf. McDonnell, 2015).

Historically, the figure of the charismatic leader was associated to the archetype of the Great Man and the Conqueror; to some extent this was typified by the masculine, heroic, self-confident and enlightened leader ‘with extraordinary gifts of body and mind’, whose leadership talents were most needed in times of crisis and emergency (Willner 1984: 43). Charisma is thus a transient, mainly individual attribute, relying on the endorsement of the followers/supporters and frequently procuring problems of succession, particularly once the crisis situation is over. A premise for charisma is the endorsement from the followers (18). As Weber suggested, charisma requires the ‘recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for the validity of charisma’, which also highlights the strict relationship between charisma, leadership and (acknowledged) authority.

Times of crisis¹ are considered to craft propitious conditions for the emergence of charismatic and populist leaders, encouraging them and supporting their radical demands for a sociopolitical change, although these may be self-destructive for the society.

¹ The fascination of the masses with authoritarian and despotic strong men that plagued twentieth-century history stirred the scholarly studies in the sociological and psychological mechanisms and motivations explaining the support to and relationship between the charismatic authoritarian leader and the lead. In the late 1940s, a group of American scholars with diverse disciplinary background were invited by the American Jewish Committee to initiate a study on the social-psychological mechanisms behind prejudice and its dynamics, which also should explain the violent destructiveness of anti-Semitic positions that had led to the extermination of millions of human beings in the span of a few years. The initiative resulted in a number of publications, among these the foreknown volume on The Authoritarian Personality.
Taking advantage of all the weaknesses of the present social order, the agitator intensifies his listeners' sense of bewilderment and helplessness, terrifies them with the specter of innumerable dangerous enemies and reduces their already crumbling individualities to bundles of reactive responses. He drives them into a moral void in which their inner voice of conscience is replaced by an externalized conscience: the agitator himself. He becomes the indispensable guide in a confused world, the center around which the faithful can gather and find safety. He comforts the sufferers of malaise, takes over the responsibility of history and becomes the exterior replacement of their disintegrated individuality. They live through him.

This extraordinariness is strengthened - inter alia - by the leader’s unique communicative skills, aimed at mobilizing followers, earning their trust, conquering their loyalty and support; hence e.g. the definition of the Agitator, by Lowenthal and Guterman. Support, trust and loyalty can be attained, at least in part, through a proficient use of a rhetoric that appeals and persuades. According to Lowenthal and Guterman (1950):

…the agitator [is] the expert propagandist who has assumed the role of leader, dwells necessarily, on his own person. He portrays himself as both leader and common man. By suggesting that he too is a victim of sinister social forces, by displaying his own weakness as it were, he helps conceal from his followers the very possibility of independent thinking and autonomous decision’

Charismatic political leaders are a featuring component of right-wing populist parties (cf. Eatwell 2006). Particularly in the party inception phase, when the leader needs to show his out-of-ordinary skills, rhetoric and style that will bring the party to political breakthrough and visibility. These qualities, role and style often reveal in the past and present scholarly literature the traits of a hegemonic political masculine charisma. And scholarly and non-scholarly studies have throughout the years contribute to strengthen this picture: right-wing populist leaders portrayed as charismatic, authoritarian by nature, plain-spoken and attracting predominately male followers (Eatwell 2002). In her book The Spellbinders, Willner (1984: 34-35) recognizes the gendered bias:

“Where,” I was asked by someone to whom I mentioned my sample of twentieth-century charismatic political leaders, “are the women charismatic political leaders?” … It might well be argued that for most of this century talented women were able to gain recognition accorded to their male peers mainly in the fields of popular entertainment and literature. In politics perhaps to an ever greater extent than in other traditionally ‘male’ occupations, women gained an opportunity to develop and demonstrate latent talent only accidentally or indirectly. In most societies, rulership, or even aspiring to it has generally been a male prerogative”.

Männerparteien led by men? Apparently so, if relying on the widespread conviction that electorally successful right-wing populist parties hang together with the attributes shown by male charismatic leaders.

Recent studies have challenged this approach and started to think gender in relation to right-wing populism (see e.g. Spierings, Zaslove, Mügge, de Lange 2015; Meret and Siim 2013). Today there is a broad agreement in the scholarly literature that gender issues have been under researched. This turn out to be particularly the case of the recent developments of the populist right. One strand (see

Mudde 2007: 90-118; Givens 2004; Norris 1997) focuses on reasons that can explain the overrepresentation of male voters in the right-wing party electorate with reference to the socio-economic background and electoral and behavioral attitudes (Mulinari & Neergard 2014; Jupskås 2015). Another strand of the research on gender and the populist right focuses on the way gender is included in rightwing populist parties’ agenda, programs and discourses (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015; Meret and Siim 2013; Norocel 2010; Akkerman and Hagelund 2007). From these studies two positions can be identified: on the one side, scholars argue that it is the ‘national culture and the broader ideology that determine [the populists’] gender position’ (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2015: 17) thus influencing right-wing populist parties towards either progressive or traditional/conservative positions on gender. On the other side, studies hold instead to the position that traditional neo-conservative hetero-normative positions and opportunistic readings of gender identify the right-wing populist parties’ gender agenda, independently of the national contexts and the country’s gender politics (Norocel 2010, 2013; Akkermann and Hagelund 2007).

Relevant to our way to look at gender, charismatic leadership and the populist right-wing, is to what extent and in what form gender is a defining characteristic of right-wing populist parties. More accurately, we suggest to proceed by looking at: 1) How the leadership style of right-wing populist female leaders is gendered (also in view of the fact that this has until recently been considered an unusual pattern by these parties); 2) How and where the ideology and positions of right-wing populist parties gets gendered (similarities and differences); 3) Whether right-wing populist parties’ approaches to gender issues outline a ‘master case’ or master approach, in spite of the differences. The next section aims to explore competing approaches to gender, the nation and nationalism focusing on the intersections between gender and right-wing populism.

Gender, Nationalism and Right-wing Populism
Populism appeals to ‘the people’ by referring to an idealized notion of a national homogeneous community belonging to a Heartland/nation (see Taggart 2000). Cas Mudde defines populism as "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ and maintains politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (Mudde 2004). Populism denotes and contains primarily the binary opposition between ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’, that defines the main cleavages in between the people and the political and intellectual elites, between the people and the foreigners/immigrants. In this sense, populists proclaim themselves as the only legitimate voice of popular, commonly shared opinions and values, whose positions have historically been ignored by the “governments, mainstream parties and the media” (Canovan, 1999). As appropriately observed by Müller (2016), populist positions cannot only be explained as ‘only’ being against the establishment, but also against pluralism:

‘Populism…is a particular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully unified … people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some way morally inferior… In addition to being anti-elitist, populists are always anti-pluralist: populist claim that they, and they only, represent the people’.
When claiming to represent the legitimate voice and interests of virtually all the people (= ‘We are the People’) belonging to the nation-state construct, populist politics create and promote a sharp distinction between those included and those excluded from the community. National identity thus intervenes as a central concept of these populist and neo-nationalist claims. Identity and belonging allow populist forces to revitalize what are seen as commonly shared traditional values, principles and morals of the specific nation (Gingrich & Banks, 2006). Gingrich and Banks introduce for example the concept of “threatened identities” (2006: 17), which differentiate between layers of society that feel more (or less) threatened. Threatened identities are more likely to feel the need of protecting themselves against others (elites, immigrants, other) and more open to accept neo-nationalist and populist appeals. Populist politics build on these feeling by “enhancing, manipulating and instrumentalising their concerns and fears” and in that use national cultural values as tools for mobilizing their supporters (Gingrich & Banks, 2006; 17-18). According to Wodak (2016) the recent tendencies of re-nationalization across the EU create:

‘…ever new borders (and even walls), of linking the nation state and citizenship (naturalization) with nativist (frequently gendered and fundamentalist religious) body politics, lie at the core of right-wing populist ideologies. We thus seem to be experiencing a revival of the ‘Volk’ and the ‘Volkskörper’ in the separatist rhetoric of right-wing populist parties… At the same time, very real walls of stone, brick and cement are also being constructed to keep the ‘Others’ out, who are defined as different and deviant. Body politics are therefore integrated with border politics’

Following the above conceptual lines, it can be argued that in order to persuade the electorate of the indisputable homogeneous nature of the People, which populists often claim they represent, diversities and other ‘secondary’ differences must necessarily be silenced. The common denominator based on the homogeneity of the People and of their will within the national community (Taggart 2000) deliberately overlooks differences (among the people) deemed as less conspicuous: social class, gender, sexuality are among these. Only this, it can be argued, can help populists crafting a compact front against the political elites and against other ‘threatening’ groups. At the same time, this prompts us to question the role populists attribute to gender and gender issues more broadly, when they construct the concept of the people, of the nation, of belonging. Arguably this is what most of the theories on nationalism and populism usually pay little attention to, or only marginally discuss. Gendering the academic debate on right-wing populism, by developing a feminist approach to the study of neo-nationalist and nativist appeals and to right-wing populism can help to understand the role that gender and gender politics are given in relation to these right wing populist visions and understandings of the world.

Feminist scholars have pointed out that dominant readings of nationalism are still gender blind and have proposed approaches aimed at en-gendering nationalism (cf. Thapar-Björkert 2013). The feminist contributions have emphasized the symbolic association between the mother and the nation state, since woman as mothers are often perceived as the symbolic embodiment of the homeland and the nation (see Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1991; Yuval-Davis 1997). Yuval-Davis’ influential approach to nationalism distinguishes for example between belonging, conceived as an emotional feeling, and the politics of belonging, referring to the construction of boundaries of belonging, of a delimited and bounded collectivity that includes some people and excludes others (Yuval-Davis 2011: 86-94).
More recently, scholars have been concerned with the proliferation and growth of neo-nationalist and nativist movements in Europe (and beyond), which have marked the return to neo-nationalist and nativist positions (see Gingrich & Banks, 2006). However, no scholarly consensus exists about how to understand these developments. The modernization and normalization, of the discourse of gender and the family supporting gender equality, women’s and to some extent homosexual rights are understood as integral part of this development. Feminist research has documented that the principles of gender equality and homosexuality is increasingly being employed by right-wing populist organizations as a strategy to demarcate the ‘them’ and ‘us’ divide – in the shape of modernity vs. tradition, (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007; Norocel 2010; Meret and Siim 2013; Siim and Mokre 2013; Sauer et. al. 2017) democracy vs. feudalism. The question is how can we interpret, conceptualize and analyze these changes?

Scholars have interpreted the modernization in right-wing populism as an expression of new forms of nationalisms but have competing interpretations. The modernization of values in relation to homosexuality and gender equality has been seen featuring expressions of liberalism (Joppke cited in Farris 2017), although feminist scholars propose alternative interpretations such as exclusionary intersectionality (Siim and Mokre 2013). Exclusionary intersectionality builds upon the support of women’s rights primarily targeting ethnic minority women and has also been conceptualized by definitions such as ‘homo-nationalism’ (Puar 2007) and ‘femo-nationalism’ (Farris 2017). We deal with both these approaches in the sections below.

Feminist studies have presented critical approaches to understand the apparent paradox that some of the positions expressed and defended by right-wing nationalist parties and movements nowadays are premised on the inclusion of universal principles such as gender equality and homosexual rights, although this primarily targets non-Western migrant groups. One example is the concept homo-nationalism introduced by the queer scholar Jasbir Puar (2007) which describes the new way in which gay rights have strategically been used to mobilize against Muslims and to racialize the non-Western Others. Puar argues that homo-nationalism and the critique of the way sexual diversity and LGBT right are used to sustain political opposition against immigration among right-wing populist parties (2013), must be situated within the wider geopolitical context. Homo-nationalism is described as an analytical category used as a means to understand and historicize how and why a nation’s status as gay-friendly has suddenly become desirable (Puar 2013: 336) and promoted among nationalist parties and movements. The term thus refers to: ‘a facet of modernity and a historical shift marked by the entrance of some homosexual bodies as worthy of protection of nation states, a constitutive and fundamental re-orientation of the relationship between state, capitalism and sexuality’ (337).

Another similar approach is proposed by Sara Farris (2017: 58) who claims that the dominant explanations of right-wing populism are unable to explain why right-wing parties support women’s and in some cases also homosexual rights. According to Farris, populism must be understood not as a master signifier of contemporary rightwing politics vis-à-vis women and non-western migrant, but rather as a political style or a rhetorical device whose conceptual signifier lies within nationalism and nationalist thinking and within its historical (racist) institutions (58). In her recent book ‘In the
Name of Women’s rights. The Rise of Femonationalism’ (2017). Farris proposes the term femo-nationalism referring to a combination of the terms of feminism and femocratic-nationalism. The aim is introducing a more robust theoretical framework to describe a common political ideology focusing on the new centrality given to gender issues by rightwing nationalism, anti-migration and anti-Islam campaigns that have started to adopt the language of women’s rights and gender equality – central to the national or European or Western values/civilization. Femo-nationalism is not only reserved to right-wing populist discourses but describes a complex phenomenon of three political groupings. The term is challenging referring ‘on the one hand to the attempt of Western right-wing and neo-liberal parties to advance xenophobic and racist politics through the touting of gender equality, while on the other hand it catches the involvement of a number of well-known and visible feminist and femocrats in the current framings of Islam as a quintessentially misogynous religion and culture.’ (4). Farris uses the term convergence to describe the similarity in the political ideology between rightwing nationalists, feminists and femocrats but emphasises that convergence does not mean identity, although it creates the opportunity to right-wing nationalists to work on broader alliances and relationships.

Arguably these broad definitions of homo- and femo-nationalism are open to the danger of losing their critical edge in studies of women’s and homo-sexual rights on specific right-wing populist organizations. Farris’ contribution, however, includes detailed studies of femo-nationalism in right-wing political parties in the Netherlands, France and Italy, which add to the understanding of the substance matter of the right-wing populist appeals. They show that there are differences between the right-wing parties in Netherlands, France and Italy (2017: 53) between the pro-gay policies of Party for Freedom (PVV) – the in-between and often contradictory talk of Front National and the harshly homophobic language of the Lega Nord.

Right wing Populism and Exclusionary Intersectionality
The discursive shift in the rightwing discourse on gender equality, women’s and gay rights questions whether the previous nationalist framing of women ‘as mothers of the nation’ has been substituted by a new gender hegemonic approach strongly promoted by right-wing populist discourses. Recent feminist studies comparing the interplay of gender, sexuality and right-wing populism confirm that not only is it possible to identify support of gender issues by right-wing populist parties and movements, but gender also entered discursively and programmatically in the right-wing agenda, by referring to women’s and eventually gay’s rights as essential liberal democratic ‘wins’ in Western democracies. It is, however, contested how to conceptualize these changes and to what extent the national and political contexts influence the political discourse of these parties (Siim and Mokre 2013).

A recent study of new forms of governance of gender equality and LGBT-rights has identified three conflicting approaches at the intersection of ethnicity, religion, and nationality (Sauer et al. 2017). One discourse is labelled the bio-political argumentation perceiving gender and sexual roles as natural as the basis for the existence of the nation. The second discourse is a pragmatic appeal to good morals and liberal values allocating women and homosexuality to the public sphere. Only the third approach is premised on claims that gender equality and homosexuality are part of ‘Western
‘culture’ and can be interpreted as homo-nationalism, or femonationalism, by referring either to the normalization of homosexuality, or to the normalization of gender equality and women’s rights. Interestingly some organizations seem to use and shift between all three lines of argumentation (106-115). In spite of these differences, the authors interpret the common political ideology of all discourses conceptualized as ‘exclusive intersections’.

A comparative study on the articulation of gender and family issues in six European right-wing parties (Siim, et al. 2016; Krizsan and Siim forthcoming) and focusing on conflicting (policy) framings of gender and family characterizing the agendas of right-wing populist parties reach similar results. The focus is on tensions, similarities and differences among right-wing populist parties and it identifies the diverse and eventually conflicting articulations of gender and family politics between and within the parties. Although the majority of the right-wing populist parties refer to gender equality as a relative norm, this is primarily to target immigrant minorities. Some parties though such as the Lega Nord, construe gender equality as a threat to social values and demographic sustainability. Interestingly, Alternative für Deutschland even claim that gender equality is a dangerous ideology that positively discriminates women at the expenses of men. The study suggests that in spite of the different understandings, all discourses are premised on what is interpreted as exclusionary intersectionality and exclusive welfare nationalism, although referring to different economic and moral justifications (see Krizsan and Siim, forthcoming).

The theoretical and empirical studies of gender, nationalism and populism thus raise challenging issues for the scholarly literature engaged with the modernization/normalization narratives of right-wing populist discourses on women’s and gay rights. The following sections address some of these questions focusing on right wing populist female leadership. Pia Kjærsgaard, Siv Jensen, Marine Le Pen, Frauke Petry have been selected, not only as female leaders of right-wing populist parties, but also because the different national and political contexts can help enlighten different ideological positions in relation to gender issues.

Self-representations: Pia Kjærsgaard, Siv Jensen, Marine Le Pen, Frauke Petry

Do populist female leaders address gender issues differently than men? And particularly: What kind of gender narratives do populist female leaders construct when they portray themselves, their role and relationship to the party members and the public opinion? How do they narrate their role as party leaders (continuity or rupture), civil status (single, divorced, married, …), mothers (or not mothers). And how do they discursively address gender issues in relation to the feminist struggles and achievements?

If gender matters to the way right-wing populist leaders’ rhetoric, narrative, and style are communicated, the leadership of former DF party front woman Pia Kjærsgaard, Norwegian FrP leader Siv Jensen, Marine Le Pen and Frauke Petry can be used to illustrate gendering patterns in right-wing populist parties within different contexts.
The DF and the Norwegian FrP are among the electorally most successful and politically best consolidated right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. Pia Kjærgaard founded the DF in 1995 and the first woman to launch a new party in Danish politics and to be leading a male-dominated party. She started her political career in the ranks of the Danish Progress Party back in 1978, at the age of 31. When the flamboyant tax-lawyer and Progress Party leader Mogens Glistrup was imprisoned for tax fraud in 1984, Kjærgaard replaced him at the party leadership. This was a significant step forward in a party predominantly driven and supported by men. Kjærgaard not only turned against the image of party ‘window dressing’, but started criticizing Glistrup’s ‘anarchic’, ‘chaotic’, ‘provocative’ leadership style (Kjærgaard with Meier Carlsen 2013: 72). She saw herself as the only legitimate follower to Glistrup, but her strategy failed (Ringsmose 2003) and in 1995 Pia Kjærgaard left the FrP and launched the DF.

Considering the support and stability gained by the DF since the late 1990s, Pia Kjærgaard is emblematic for the successful and powerful right-wing female populist leader. In the nearly two decades (1995-2012) as DF leader, she succeeded to launch a new party; get loyal followers and support; consolidate the party and gain political influence. In 2015, Kjærgaard was appointed by the majority of the parties in parliament to the post of speaker of the Presidium, the Danish Parliament supreme authority. But Pia Kjærgaard is also knows as the politician in Denmark who polarized and divided opinions. The Danish electorate was for long time split between those (the many) not susceptible to her political appeal and charisma and those (the fewer) supporting her (Meret, 2015).

Siv Jensen became the FrP leader in 2006, after almost thirty years under the undisputed leadership of Carl I. Hagen, notoriously called ‘the party’s sun King’. The leadership shift seemed not to affect the FrP electoral results; in 2009 the party gained 23 pct. of the votes and in 2013 the FrP joined the coalition government with the Conservatives. Siv Jensen was appointed Minister of Finance, a position she still holds. Similarly to Pia Kjærgaard, Siv Jensen succeeded a party leader with power and charisma, although being a younger woman could be an advantage, being expectations different by reason of the different sex (Jensen in Aurdal 2006: 11):

It was an open question whether Carl sees Siv as his natural follower. Also Siv thinks it is an advantage to be a woman, now that she has to put herself in his shoes. It is a self-given that those shoes must look very different now that she is to wear them

Being a woman is portrayed as an advantage, when following a charismatic and authoritarian right-wing party leader.

For Marine Le Pen the election at the FN leadership in 2011 was almost a succession to power. Championed by her father, Jean-Marie, who preferred keeping the leadership of the party in the family. she won with more than 67 pct. of the congress votes against the contender Bruno Gollnisch. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s long-time devoted guardian of ideological continuity, the favorite of the party’s old guard did not stand against the daughter of the FN founder.
There are similarities between Pia Kjærgaard’s, Siv Jensen’s and Marine Le Pen’s pathways to leadership; all three followed after authoritative men, who had introduced them into the party and had initially supported their ascending power. In the French case the gender issue was from beginning ‘family’ embedded; Marine Le Pen was the first women to take the lead of the FN, but also the younger daughter of the man who had united under the party roof the various strands of traditional French right-wing extremism: the anti-Semites and racists, the nostalgias of Vichy and l’Algérie française, the ultra-traditional Catholics. His withdrawal, after 40 years of activity inside the FN, had opened the way to several strategic options about the future of the party.

Arguably, all three women have challenged traditional readings centered on hegemonic masculine authoritarian charisma and point at new elements to understand the role played by gender and by women leaders in contemporary right-wing populist parties (see e.g. Blee and Deutsch 2012).

Public and private self (re)presentations
Stubbornness, an aggressive tone and an authoritarian style are frequently mentioned among the traits of Pia Kjærgaard’s leadership style. In contrast to the authoritarian style often reserved to analysis of right-wing male leaders, this image required explanations from both Kjærgaard and the press. Kjærgaard never made a secret of her resolution to keep party issues and organization centralised and ‘hardly-disciplined’, by applying a straightforward ‘top-down control’ (Sommer and Aagaard, 2003: 31). This implied the use of authoritarian methods and style, as Kjærgaard bluntly explained (Kjærgaard, in Ankersens, 2008):

I want to be super-oriented, and I can get really very angry if there is something I do not get to know. When I founded the DF, I made clear that I must always be informed, although not necessarily involved. I want to know all and everything […] There is nobody [in the party] who is in doubt about who decides here. […] I really do not need to struggle to make my standpoint clear and through

Kjærgaard’s authoritarian traits are often as being part of her nature; a result of her personal biographical life experiences, for example the need to cope with the divorce of her parents at the age of twelve and with the responsibilities that originated from her early marriage and motherhood (Kjærgaard 1998; 2013).

Mainstream press has contributed to strengthen the image of Pia Kjærgaard as a dictating, organizing, ever controlling leader. The DF is often referred to as Kjærgaard’s ‘personal creation’, as the place ‘where everything is calculated, nothing left out to coincidence’ (Kragh 2003: 89). But against this image, other accounts also uncover her emotional and impatient nature, her hypersensitivity and ‘temper’ which draw upon stereotypical images of the woman not in control of her personal feelings and bearing. Several articles portray Kjærgaard as a woman with a strong temperament and the politician who is inclined to ‘drive politics more through gut than mind’ (Jyllands Posten, August 9, 2012). This is a rather interesting portrayal since it scratches on the surface of Pia Kjærgaard’s representation as a domineering party leader. It also shows a ‘private Pia’ as the unpretentious family woman, the ordinary mother and devoted housewife. Or the ‘huffy domestic worker’, as the broadsheet Polititken nicknamed her in the 1990s. The DF leader is thus described as ‘an emotional person’ bluntly displaying how she feels, no matter whether ‘she is
angry, disappointed, mad or touched’; a politician ‘standing up for issues that expose her emotions to the Danes’. This is understood as part of her personal and affective communicative style and rhetoric, which strives to articulate what DF voters want to hear in ways not always supported by facts. It is the image of the ordinary woman, speaking on behalf of the majority that seeks to contrast the controlled business style of the mainstream and routined politicians. As Pia Kjærsgaard observed:

[From time to other] I can get very surprised to see what reactions my words provoke. I only say aloud what I mean. I speak out and act as the loudspeaker for all those people, who perhaps do not dare to speak up and to put themselves in the front in the public debate’ (Kjærsgaard in Sommer and Aagaard, 2003: 271).

The border between private and public life is thin in the case of Pia Kjærsgaard. She liked to be portrayed in informal homely settings, together with her husband, her dog, while doing the Sunday or Christmas baking. In fact, Kjærsgaard seems to have well understood the advantages of cultivating both the public and private sphere, in the attempt to balance her authoritarian style in politics. Sending a signal of ordinariness, of familiar intimacy and housewife style by ‘wearing an apron’, she conveys a signal of reassuring normalcy and ‘safety’. In this sense, Kjærsgaard has striven to merge roles and images when convenient; her private role as a wife, mother, friend and that of the party leader, politician. Political and private life overlaps and contributes to crafting the image of the determined and authoritarian leader, but also that of the ordinary old-fashioned woman. This reminds of the late Margaret Thatcher who also ‘exalted domestic expertise as a potential political skill, by declaring that running a home was a good practice for running a campaign’ (Campus 2013: 95). Kjærsgaard appreciates this parallel since ‘[…] she was tough and I am flattered that I was sometimes called Iron Lady just like her’ (Kjærsgaard with Meier Carlsen 2013: 93).

In the above accounts, the references to Kjærsgaard’s populist style and behaviour draw upon gender constructed features and strategies. She actively works to consolidate an image of herself as a populist, rather than a charismatic political leader. The most evident gendered construct features Kjærsgaard as the ‘mother of the party’. Motherly representation and references to the female body are often used by and for women in politics (Campus 2013: 60-64). Women political leaders have also used self-representations as mothers of the nation. This gendered representation associate the woman with culturally endorsed models and roles of female leadership rooted in traditional values and stereotypes of women as nurturing mothers of the nation.

DF members strengthened this image of Kjærsgaard by openly calling her ‘the mother of us all’. The biography of current DF leader Kristian Thulesen Dahl is packed with references to Pia Kjærsgaard as his ‘political mother’, such as in the chapter significantly titled ‘Pia’s boy’ (Thulesen Dahl 2009: 93-112). Thulesen Dahl’s legitimation as a leader derives from his familial association to former party leader and Kjærsgaard has willingly buttressed these associations to her mother role (Kjærsgaard with Meier Carlsen, 2013: 122).

Pia Kjærsgaard offers an unusual profile of a political leader that challenges both charismatic models and Scandinavian approaches to womanhood/motherhood and gender equality. Kjærsgaard
likes to be portrayed as the caring, but strict mother. Her status as caring mother, housewife and social worker deliberately contrast the image of other women in Danish politics. Her conduct recalls the efforts of women leaders to find the balance between male constructed attributes: strength, determination and assertiveness associated to party leadership style, and the ideal of a female leader based on the image of the mother of the party and of the nation.

Siv Jensen also had to deal with the charismatic and authoritarian style established by decades under Carl Ivar Hagen leadership. When Hagen stepped down in 2006 he rewarded Jensen by acknowledging his ‘great trust’ in her leadership competences and skills (Hagen 2007: 303). This was an opportunity to identify Jensen’s political qualities: among others her ‘determination and lack of respect for the other parties’ authority’, her talent to quickly learn the rules of the political game’, and also ‘her good looking’, ‘her youth’ and ‘modesty’ (Hagen 2007: 303, 316). But the former FrP leader also referred to what he saw as an ‘obvious grey spot’ in Jensen’s profile, namely the fact that ‘she is unmarried and does not have a boyfriend’ (Hagen 2007: 408).

Being a single woman in her forties exposed Siv Jensen to rumors of being lesbian, or of being blamed for having deliberately sacrificed her affective life and sexuality to benefit her political career (Aurdal 2006). The ‘going-personal’ of the press started from a less advantageous position in the case of Siv Jensen; a potentially stigmatizing condition that Jensen had to reverse to her advantage. In her biography Jensen condemns the media focus on her private life as a gendered stereotyping approach that only addresses women in politics (Aurdal 2006: 29). Being blunt about the consequences for her private life, Jensen sought to gain the solidarity of the public opinion, in particular amongst other women.

Otherwise the mainstream media reception of Siv Jensen has generally been positive. One example is the favorable comparison to Gro Harlem Brundtland, who had served three terms as Prime Minister of Norway. Siv Jensen is described b as ‘the new queen of Norwegian politics’ (Dagbladet, May 5 2006; Dagavisen May 6, 2006), and her election in a male-dominated party considered an achievement that takes up the heritage after Brudtl and. This comparison seems hazardous, since Brundtland is well-known internationally as a strong Social Democrat and feminist. However, political commentators also referred to important differences between the two profiles. Among these the women’s class background: Brundtland came from the well-educated elite, Siv Jensen from the lower-middle class (Aurdal 2006). Another difference is politics: Brundtland was socialist; Jensen defines herself as a liberal-conservative. Differences count also their opposite relationship to the Norwegian model of gender politics: Siv Jensen (and the FrP) is strongly against the gender quota system, arguing that equality must be achieved by women on the behalf of their skills and talents and not for their gender. Siv Jensen’s response to the comparison to Brundtland took distance from the former Socialdemocratic PM’s positions on gender politics, arguing women do not need gender politics, but must make it on their own. Asked about the women government in 1986, she replied (Jensen in Dagbladet May 06, 2006):

Gro Harlem Brundtland did something historical with a women government, which she must get credit for. She proved that it was possible to find competent women for top positions in Norwegian
At the same time the development of society means that competent women have been able to reach top positions, when and if they wished it. Women must be credited for that.

Siv Jensen’s position on gender is ambiguous. She disagrees with the Norwegian politics on gender equality arguing it has gone too far, but complains that women and men are treated differently, referring explicitly to the way media treat her and publicly expose her private life.

Siv Jensen cannot as Pia Kjærsgaard use her private life to strengthen her public image and consolidate her leadership position. Instead she constructs the image of her private life as a single and independent, educated woman without children, similar to many other Norwegian women, although this is not done without attempting to justify why she is still unmarried and without children. She complains that her status as unmarried and childless shows that ‘for a woman with power it is not an easy task to find someone to be together with’ (Aurdal 2006: 32).

Marine Le Pen’s way to power and public position in France contrasts with the two previous cases. The new president was keenly aware of the severe problems, which the FN’s image and her father’s reputation posed for her political ambitions. In order to succeed, she had to assert herself on several fronts: as a woman in a traditionally chauvinist, even misogynist environment; as the newly elected leader of a right-wing extremist movement that was treated as a political pariah; and as a professional politician in an organization long on ideology and doctrine yet short on practical political expertise and professional competence. Also, Marine Le Pen had serious image problems. Reputed to be a “night-clubbeuse” and “party girl”, she was dismissed as a political lightweight who owed her rise in the FN to patronage and nepotism (Meret, Siim and Pingaud 2017). A twice divorced single mother of three involved in a domestic partnership with a party militant (himself divorced), she stood in sharp contrast to the FN’s self-promotion as the defender of traditional family values.

The question about the effects of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s legacy on his daughter is also a gender issue. One way to analyze the role of gender in the transformations of the party is thus to consider how gender has been used by both commentators and by Marine Le Pen, as a way to distinguish both herself and her party role from her father’s. It took her a few years to impose her authority on the party and to project herself as a tough, determined, decisive yet empathetic leader (TNS-Sofres, 2015). Despite her reputation as an accomplished lawyer, she did not “escape the classical representations of women in politics,” centered round her subordinate role of daughter, wife, and mother (Boudillon 2005: 81). For the media, she was the quintessential example of the devoted and loyal daughter, motivated to engage in politics by compliance to an “hereditary fatality”. At its most extreme, she was characterized as the “daughter of the devil” or, equally unflattering, the female and younger version of her father. Yet, Marine Le Pen showed to be able to use “the stigma of femininity,” to her advantage. By means of a “discourse of suffering” (Boudillon 2005), Marine Le Pen reshaped her biographic narrative.

The marginalization and victimization experienced from early on in life were also the leitmotif of her autobiography published a few years later: Being a Le Pen entailed guilt by association, meant being constantly held “accountable” of her father’s “actions and gestures,” his “political options
whether you agree with them or not”. She suggested that the permanent confrontation with hostility and derision had prepared her well for the tough world of a professional politician committed to bringing about fundamental change. The result was an image that oscillated between femininity and virility, which led to the charge that she had “nothing of a blond” (Libération, 15 January, 2011). Yet Marine Le Pen was not only concerned about her own image, she was also determined to impose a new image on the FN. These were the origins of her strategy of dédiabolisation, aimed at convincing the public that the FN represented a “future-oriented” mainstream “parti populaire” capable of rallying “millions of French” to the defense of the nation and its citizens.

By the time of the presidential election of 2012 the process of dédiabolisation was in full swing. Marine Le Pen filled top positions in the party with young newcomers unencumbered by its ideological heritage; she had also imposed -- at least in economic and social policy -- a new, left-wing programmatic course. The presidential campaign gave her an opportunity to cultivate and project a new image: a serious and experienced politician who understood the numerous challenges faced by the country; a trustworthy candidate who had always considered “sincerity” not only “a character trait and a moral necessity” but “a political weapon” (Marine le Pen 2012: 8).

Yet the French media also insisted that Marine Le Pen was more dangerous than her father. Under its new leadership, the FN might have changed its “posture but not its nature.” Dédiabolisation was nothing more than an attempt to make unacceptable ideas such as xenophobia palatable to the general public. Marine Le Pen might dress up as a gay-friendly, divorced feminist embracing republicanism and secularism (laïcité), in reality, however, she was merely an updated version of the old brand Le Pen.

By early 2014, Marine Le Pen was caught in a dilemma. Election results and surveys suggested that the FN was well on its way to become “a party like the others.” To get to this point, Marine Le Pen had imposed a regime of strict discipline demanding party candidates and militants to be “irreproachable”. Not everyone complied. Jean-Marie Le Pen increasingly used his position as honorary party president to derail the process of normalization, which he considered a strategic error. After stripping him of his honorary position, she suspended his party membership and finally excluded him from the party.

This was a decisive show of force, a demonstration that she had imposed herself as the undisputed party leader. Even Marion Marechal-Le Pen, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s favorite grand-child, reputed to be ideologically closer to her grand-father than her aunt, fell in line, as did a large majority of FN supporters. In the regional elections of 2015, the FN made historic gains.

Arguably Marine Le Pen’s break with her father marked a turning point with respect to her position as the strong leader of Western Europe’s premier RRP party, a necessary act of emancipation not without a touch of tragedy. The last Presidential campaign illustrates Marine le Pen’s general strategy attempts ‘to keep a tactical silence on the issue of abortion, gay equality and religious practice in order to both keep happy its most Conservative internal areas and constituencies and to gain some consensus from gay voters (Farris, 2017; 37).
What role for female leadership in Rightwing Populist Parties’ political discourse/ideology?
This section provides a brief overview of previous studies of RPP’s political ideology in relation to gender equality, women’s and sexual rights. It aims to discuss to what extent if any female leadership makes a difference for the political ideology of these parties, and if yes, what do they add to the previous studies of Rightwing populism? Do female leaders of these parties tend to support or attack the modernization of the parties’ political profiles concerning gender, family and sexuality? And how do the national and political contexts influence the position of female leadership of RRP parties on gender, sexuality and family issues (Siim and Meret 2013; Sauer et al. 2017; Krizsan and Siim forth).

Comparative research has proposed that there has been a modernization of the political ideology of Rightwing populism in relation to gender equality, women’s and gay rights. First gender equality is no longer contested in society and has generally been accepted by RRP. This picture is confirmed by the political ideologies three of the parties, DF, FP and to some extent also FN. Gender equality is perceived as a relative thing primarily targeting non-western migrant minorities, especially Muslim migrants, which needs gender equality because of their backward cultures and religion, whereas gender equality is no longer perceived to be a problem for the native population. AfD and FN claim that gender equality has gone too far and want to abolish gender quota (Kriszan and Siim forth.).

Yet comparative research also notice that there are still differences in the parties’ gender and family profiles, for example between DF on the one side and FN and AfD on the other side (Meret, Siim and Pingaud 2017; Krizsan and Siim forth.). For the two Nordic parties, DF and FrP, gender equality, women’s and gay rights no longer present major conflict lines within the party profiles or for their voters (Meret, Siim and Pingaud 2017). The DF recognizes homosexual rights, and also ‘alternative families’ than the ‘core family’, consisting of mother, father and children, however the party still poses some restrictions as for instance: the right of same sex couples to adopt; to be positively discriminated; to marry in the Church (DF Working Programme, 2009). This is different from FN where abortion and gay rights present a conflict line within the party as well as for the voters (Beneviste and Pingaud 2016). In addition, it is remarkable that Alternative for Germany (AfD) with Frauke Petri has expressed somewhat extreme positions on the issue of gender equality and the family claiming gender equality to be a dangerous ideology, which threatens social cohesion and discriminates men, and that ‘alternative’ family forms threaten the natural foundation for society (Gesterkamp and Kemper 2015).

Gender equality, the family and sexuality
Gender equality as a general principle is accepted to some extent by most RRP parties with the exception of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), but the articulation depends on the reference group: whether national citizens or minorities, European migrants, third country migrants or targets
of European development aid (Krizsan and Siim forthc). In contrast AfD, and with respect to reproductive and LGBT rights perceive gender ideology as a threat to core social values.

Arguably the ideology of the family and sexuality is more contested. One dividing line is the extent to which RRP parties find family and sexual issues to be salient policy issues and whether they accept or oppose (further) state intervention into family matters. For the Danish Peoples’ Party (DF) and The Progress Party (FrP) the family is no longer a contested issue that divides the party or the constituency. The DF recognizes homosexual rights, and also ‘alternative families’ than the ‘core family’, consisting of mother, father and children, however the party still poses some restrictions as for instance: the right of same sex couples to adopt; to be positively discriminated; to marry in the Church (DF Working Programme, 2009). This contrasts with the FN that proposes family policies to strengthen state intervention to protect French families and AfD that perceive the family to be the foundation of society but should be free of state intervention (Krizsan and Siim forthc.).

Previous research show that the political programs of DF and FrP support the principle of gender equality, but claim that gender equality has already been achieved for native women with minority women who lack gender equality. According to both the DF and the FrP, the implications of the modernization of gender roles and the achievements in gender equality reached so far in both Denmark and Norway, are something to be acclaimed, whereas further adjustments can only be reached by the labor market’s self-regulatory mechanisms. The two RRP parties oppose state feminism and new pro-active gender policies such as quota systems (Meret and Siim 2013; Meret, Siim and Pingaud 2017). In the Norwegian context the FrP has asked for the abolition of the Norwegian gender equality law and the removal of the gender equality ombud, an old well established organization in Norway since 1976 (Meret and Siim 2013; 86).

Particularly in the past two decades, the DF and FrP gender patterns have turned increasingly towards culturalist positions, mainly exploiting gender as a category to criticize migrant (mostly Muslim) communities, as part of a broader discourse premised on the incompatibility between the Muslim and the Danish cultural (and gender) values. As clearly exemplified by a passage on ‘Immigrant women’ included in the DF 2009 party program:

Immigration to Denmark from especially the Islamic countries has brought other and feudal family structures into the country. These do not harmonize with the approach to gender roles, women and gender equality, which are the norm in Denmark. DF claims that we have to be politically actively in the field of immigration and integration politics to make Denmark does not allow the formation of a ‘proletariat’ of immigrant women who do not get access to the same rights and opportunities, which Denmark has historically develop over centuries.

Migrant women are portrayed as being trapped by their oppressive, male chauvinist and patriarchal culture and religion (Meret and Siim 2013). The Danish and Norwegian welfare and gender model are based on women’s active labour market participation, and gender equality is presented as a
means to assimilate them to the Danish culture, language and values. Women’s active labour market contribution to Danish society is juxtaposed to non-Western migrant women’s comparatively higher rates of unemployment and reliance on social benefits. Gender equality and women rights among ethnic minorities have thus become an integrating part of a new master frame for Scandinavian right-wing populist parties (Meret and Siim, 2013), especially in countries where gender equality policies are an integrated part of the national political agenda.

The studies show that DF and FrP’s culturalist references to the perceived discriminatory gender patterns in migrant (mostly Muslim) communities is part of a discourse premised on the incompatibility of the Muslim and Danish or Dutch cultural values. Migrant women are portrayed as being trapped by their oppressive patriarchal culture and religion (Meret and Siim 2013). They point to the importance of the Danish and Norwegian welfare and gender model is premised on women’s active labour market participation, and one of the solutions to Muslim women’s perceived lack of gender equality is to use gender equality as a means to assimilate them to the Danish culture, language and values. In both cases the native women’s active labour market contribution to society is contrasted with non-western migrant women being on social assistance [kontanthjælp]. Meret and Siim (2013) suggest that gender equality and women rights among ethnic minorities have become an integrating part of a new master frame for some Right-wing Populist parties, especially in countries where gender equality policies are an integrated part of the national political agenda.

*Front National* presents a different story used by researcher as an illustration of the contradictions and tensions in RPP parties’ modernization and normalization of their political ideology, including positions on gender equality, women’s rights and homosexual rights (Benveniste and Pingaud 2016; Meret, Siim and Pingaud 2017; Farris 2017; Scrinzi 2017). They show that Marine le Pen played a key role in the de-demonization and normalization of FN as coordinator of FNs electoral campaign since 2002, and as the president of the party since 2011 she was the dominant front figure who led the party through two Presidential elections in 2012 and 2017. In the 2012 Presidential campaign the FN strategy was to adopt republican themes such as secularism and the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), and to mobilize for women’s rights and (less prominently) gay rights. As a result of this change there was a general growth in FN votes in the May 2012 Presidential election from 13 percent in the previous Presidential election under Maurice le Pen to 17.9 % of the votes under Marine le Pen including a growth of female votes for FN (pp 34-37). In the recent Presidential election the party even tried to hide the family name le Pen emphasizing Marine’s name in all the posters.

Yet Marine Le Pen’s and FN’s positions on women’s rights including abortion have been and still are ambivalent (Benveniste and Pingaud 2016; Farris 2917; 35-36), Gender equality is a relative issue, and Marine le Pen has publicly stated that ‘sexism is only a problem among non-French communities’. In FN’s program and party statements women are considered primarily as mothers and supports pro-natality policies by encouraging ‘French’ women to have more than two children. FN’s primarily supports French families; a) calling for a parental income of 80 % of the minimum wage and family allowance reserved for families with at least one French parent. Concerning gay rights FN has also returned to a traditional homophobic agenda. Finally FN has attacked the French
laws on ‘positive discrimination’. Research referred to the tensions within the party between the dominant Catholic model of family and Marine Le Pen’s attempts to modernize the party on positions on same-sex marriage and abortion (Benveniste and Pingaud 2016; 68-71).

The last Presidential campaign supports the conclusion that Marine le Pen’s general strategy attempts ‘to keep a tactical silence on the issue of gay equality in order to both keep happy its most Conservative internal areas and constituencies and to gain some consensus from gay voters (Farris (2017; 37). However, deep controversies still exist around abortion, gay marriage and religious practices within the party. This supports the hypothesis that Marine le Pen can be interpreted as a figure who attempts to strengthen the modernization of the Party profile in relation to gender, family and sexuality. Her self-presentation as a ‘working women’ who represents ‘the people’ fits better with the support for than the resistance to women’s and gay rights. However, there is no doubt that the party and the constituency/voters are still deeply divided on these issues.

Finally the recent example of Alternative für Deutschland\(^2\) (AfD), founded in 2013, according to Gesterkamp and Kemper (2015) presents a more aggressive anti-feminist position claiming that ‘gender equality is a threat to social values’ and aims to protect fundamental Christian values and civilization against the principle of gender equality. Gender equality is labelled ‘gender ideology’ and presented as a threat leads to the demographic crisis, to the emergence of alternative family models threatening the traditional monogamous heterosexual family. AfD claims that gender equality blurs the lines between the sexes, encourages child adoption among same-sex couples, abortion, and lead to a general masculinity crisis (Krizsán and Siim forthcoming). AfD perceives the family as a stronghold against state ideology and opposes any state or EU interventions in gender equality (Gesterkamp and Kemper 2015).

AfD is violently opposes gender mainstreaming integrated as a “battle of the sexes” (cf. Gesterkamp and Kemper 2015) and the party’s overall aim is to annihilate the “leftist domination of terms” and to re-establish the “natural order of gender”. To accomplish these goals, AfD proposes to abolish gender mainstreaming as well as to eliminate “all laws and regulations decreed in the spirit of gender ideology” (Gesterkamp and Kemper 2015). AfD also calls for withdrawal of subsides for any measures that promote gender ideology and for abolishing positions for equal opportunities officers, termination of diversity offices in all type of establishments, cancellation of funding for gender studies and the removal of chair holders (Ibid.). The party opposes gender quota that allegedly leads to discrimination of men and claims that gender ideology is against nature and prevents the German nation from counteracting the negative demographic trend (Meuthen and Jongen, 2015). Finally the party opposes abortion, supports homophobic campaigns and requests the removal of education on sexual diversity from school curricula. AfD’s example is deeply anti-

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Islam and exclusionary but seems to deny the trend towards modernization of RPP parties. It is, however, still too early to speculate on what role of Frauke Petri has played in developing AfD’s position on gender, sexuality and family issues.

**Concluding Reflections**

To the question to what extent and in what form gender has become a defining characteristic of right-wing populist parties our study suggests that populist female leaders must deal with conflicting images when it comes to self-representations and style: on the one side they can prize gender equality achievements in Western democracies and their rhetoric and style does not necessarily differ significantly from that of their male predecessors, although they tend to frame themselves as agents of rupture and innovation within the party. At the same time, this image contrasts with the politicization of the private life, which still often promotes the morally virtuous and traditional images of women as mothers. Some of this gender constructs and images are influenced by: the different perceptions of women political leaders in the diverse national contexts; by differences in party history and position; personal attributes, styles, rhetoric (cf. Meret, Siim and Pingaud 2017).

In relation to the feminist strand of literature on nativism/nationalism the analysis confirms the trend towards forms of opportunistic modernization of gender approaches strengthening these parties’ nationalist and exclusionary messages. Women are mothers – but motherhood includes different forms, such as: ‘single mothers’, or ‘single women’. However, these gender configurations also revive tensions and conflicts within the parties on issues dealing with reproduction, abortion, homosexual rights, as clearly epitomized by the recent developments opposing Marine to her niece Marion Le Pen in the Front National, or the blatant opposition to gender equality expressed by the AfD.

The paper supports the argument that gender matters to study and understand new-nationalisms and populist politics and a general trend towards support for women’s and gay rights in most RPP parties, which needs to be further explored, Even if there is a general trend to show support for women’s and gay rights in most right-wing populist parties, these issues are still ambiguously dealt with, when not directly contentious, or blatantly opposed in parties such as AfD. Arguably, diverse national contexts contribute to inform the gendering of right-wing Populist Party leadership and ideology, but the way gender intersects with nationality, religion, ethnicity/race suggests exclusionary and opportunist relationship to gender by right-wing populist parties.
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