This paper explores the implications of the tension between universality and particularity for conceiving of future forms of cosmopolitan political community ‘beyond’ the state. It proceeds by exploring the very different ways in which the problem of articulating universality and particularity in world politics ‘after’ the state is approached in two of the most influential texts in contemporary international political theory – Andrew Linklater’s *The Transformation of Political Community* and R.B.J. Walker’s *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. It shows that Linklater, a cosmopolitan, and Walker, a poststructuralist, differ profoundly on the proper relationship between universality and particularity in conceptions of world politics. It also shows that, nonetheless, their work overlaps in setting the problem with statist political community in these terms, and also in suggesting the possibilities of global civil society for imagining new forms of political community in which universality and particularity might be successfully reconfigured in cosmopolitan ways. Global civil society, then, is identified as central to current attempts to rethink the possibility of both a renewed universality and diversity in world politics. It is also identified as ultimately failing in this task due to the impulse to suggest either that global civil society constitutes a universal structure of particularity or to argue that global civil society is all about the flourishing of particularity. In neither of these cases, it is argued, is the possibility, arguably the necessity, of a just *accommodation* between universal and particular in world politics taken seriously.

Why is the relationship between universality and particularity important to imagining future forms of political community? First, because particularity alone is insufficient to conceiving of political community today – the communitarian attempt simply to deny universality, to deny that there is, or ever could be, a ‘world’ politics falls down on the grounds that such a politics is increasingly being imagined today under the rubric of global civil society. And imagined communities have real world effects, as we know all too well from our long
experience with nation states.¹ So emphasising particularity alone will not suffice in our conceptualisations of world politics. Besides, particularity per se is not the point of political community, where it is always a matter of positing some more universal account of who, or what, is inside and who, or what, is outside. Particularity, as much as universality, is political, and requires some purchase on universal claims such as the nature of the good life (universal) which is to be enacted in the political community (particular).

Second, universalism alone similarly distorts our view of political community. Thinking through the place of particularity is essential to non-utopian understandings of the possibilities for a properly world politics. Claims to universality involve the deployment of a lot of power in the world, so they will inevitably provoke resistance. Particularities, then, as used to be said of the poor, will always be with us. Any non-utopian account of alternative forms of political community will have to deal with them whether it likes it or not. And, in fact, a purely universalistic account of world politics is something of a straw man. For few wish to deny that there are particularities in world politics – identities which for their own part refuse absorption into anything as universal as ‘humankind’. The question for universalists is much more one of how to reconcile particularity with their own brand of universalism. In sum, neither universality nor particularity can be wished away in our thinking about the future of political community. The two must rather be thought together, or brought into accommodation with each other.²

Indeed, this is why this paper ultimately finds global civil society wanting as an idea of political community. Rather than promising a just accommodation between universal and particular, the imagination of global civil society seeks their reconciliation, either upwards in the name of cosmopolitan right (seeking a universal right of particularity, that is) or downwards in the name of difference (namely, a universal flourishing of particularity). What then becomes interesting is to account for these impulses to resolve universal and particular either upwards or downwards, and the dissatisfaction felt by advocates of both these moves with attempts at a just accommodation, such as the UN system seeks to be. For the purposes of this paper, though, we will orientate our discussion towards what will be shown to be the

² This is Kimberly Hutchings’ conclusion in ‘Global Civil Society: Thinking Politics and Progress’ (in Gideon Baker and David Chandler (eds), Global Civil Society: Contested Futures, Routledge, 2005.
dominant universalist end of this spectrum, with the cosmopolitan attempt to resolve universality and particularity upwards towards a future universal form of political community.

Universality and particularity: the problem
The central place to cosmopolitanism of the tension between the universal and particular is echoed in the term itself, in which we find the coming together of the universal order of the cosmos and the human order of the polis. Cosmopolitanism, then, provides an opportunity to think how it might be possible to manage the tension between the universalistic claims of justice and the particularistic character of the polity.

The early modern period saw Thomas Hobbes seek to remove the problem of universals – specifically, justice – from politics, and to replace the universalist Aristotelian understanding of just or unjust ‘regimes’ with the sovereign state, which was neither just nor unjust. Today, though, Hobbes’ ‘solution’ to the destabilising effects of appeals to universals/justice – state sovereignty – is increasingly seen as insufficient. First, cosmopolitans agree that state sovereignty is not what it used to be, so there is seen to be a failure of Hobbes’ solution in practice. More importantly for our purposes here, however, is the growing perception of a moral failure at the heart of state sovereignty – precisely, a failure to take the claims of justice with regard to outsiders seriously. This is, of course, the charge labelled at state sovereignty by cosmopolitans; and so cosmopolitanism becomes not only an opportunity for a reconsideration of the relationship between universal and particular, but also an obligation as far as cosmopolitan justice is concerned.

That the attempt to remove universals, or justice, from politics has broken down in our times is particularly visible in two key settings, both of them going under the banner of cosmopolitan politics. First, we see the erosion of a much more limited notion of international justice – the claim, enshrined in the UN system, of equal sovereignty between states and the right of non-interference that flows from that – in the face of a more ambitious cosmopolitan justice that calls for no boundaries to human rights. Second, and the focus of attention here,

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4 See Ch. XIX of Hobbes’ Leviathan
5 Of course, these two arguments, the empirical and normative, usually go together. We see this, for example, in the cosmopolitan claim that the political community of fate both cannot and should not any longer be located within the boundaries of a single nation state because of phenomena such as transnational harm.
we see the rise of an imagined community of ‘global civil society’, a community given content, for those who believe in it, by the cosmopolitan global justice agenda.

Regardless of what we think about global civil society as the future of political community, there is little doubt that the future of political community is a problem. Advocates of global civil society have a point in starting from the proposition that particularity in global politics can no longer be defined territorially, or at least not easily, or at least not by the weak. The deterritorialisaiton of economic, cultural and political spaces is one of the leitmotifs of our time, and rethinking what political community might mean in this context is rightly uppermost in many minds. It is also the case that the cosmopolitans’ global civil society must be treated seriously as an alternative future model of political community regardless of its present prospects and even of its very existence. Following Kant’s cosmopolitanism, most defenders of global civil society speak not, or not only, to its historical possibilities but rather to the moral imperative to act as if global civil society were possible.6

Andrew Linklater, in whose work all these various strands of cosmopolitanism receive perhaps their most thoughtful treatment, starts from the position that there are two dimensions to a properly ‘thin’ cosmopolitanism which, given that they cannot be reduced to one another, have to be held in tension. These parts are solidarity and pluralism, which he also articulates in the terms of universality and particularity.7 Linklater suggests that the recent history of thinking about international politics has seen those with cosmopolitan intent neglecting the claims of solidarity (or universality) in favour of pluralism (or particularity). In writing the concluding article to a special issue of International Affairs, for example, Linklater observes that many of the articles in the issue:

steer the discussion in the direction of universalistic conclusions after several years during which affirmations of the rights of the different often suggested universalism was the problem rather than the solution to the complexities of modern politics. Analysts of the politics of identity and difference have forced universalists to reflect carefully on the particularisms which run through their normative commitments and aspirations. Few now need reminding of the importance of the charge that

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universalists always carry with them ‘a clump of (their) native soil’; few now need lessons in the need to ensure that universalism must mean greater justice between different cultures.8

As set out in The Transformation of Political Community (his own account of cosmopolitan justice to which we will return later) Linklater seeks to achieve the necessary corrective to this perceived imbalance by locating pluralism within solidarity. He claims that diversity is a feature of universalism properly conceived; which is to say that particularisms have an important place, but only where these involve duties to fellow citizens that do not clash with obligations to wider humanity.

The break-down of modern attempts to reconcile universal and particular through statist approaches to political community is one of the few points of agreement between cosmopolitans and their critics. Though Linklater’s cosmopolitan solution to this problem is contentious, he will find few in disagreement with his argument that the search for new sites for citizenship is ongoing because the sovereign state cannot ‘reconcile the universal and the particular’.9 Many would be sympathetic also to Linklater’s claim that the task of critical social theory is therefore to support the normative ideal of wider, more inclusive forms of political community ‘which make new articulations of universality and particularity possible’.10

Rob Walker, though a critic of universalistically-orientated accounts of political community such as Linklater’s, agrees with Linklater that attempts to reconcile universal and particular is what the modern state has always been about; specifically, the attempt to resolve a universal notion of humanity with a particularistic notion of political community. This ‘resolution’ involves affirming the ‘primacy of the particular’, the statist community, but also attempts to identify legitimate political authority within these particular communities ‘through a reinterpretation and secularisation of claims to universal reason and natural law’.11 State sovereignty thus

9 The Transformation of Political Community, p. 201.
10 Ibid. p. 49.
offers an account of the spatial differentiation of political communities through a spatial resolution of the primary ontological question about the relation between universality and particularity. As an answer, the principle of state sovereignty already expresses a theory of ethics, one in which ontological and political puzzles are resolved simultaneously. It affirms that the good life, guided by universal principles, can occur only within particularistic political communities.12

Yet as with Linklater, Walker sees the modern state as no longer able to hold universality and difference in sufficient tension since contemporary transformations have undermined the way in which states, organised spatially, have attempted to close off the possibility of meaningful political community beyond their boundaries.13 It is not that territorially defined political community has completely lost its hold. Like Linklater, with his acknowledgement of the force of claims for international justice, or justice with borders (which he nonetheless seeks to surpass with borderless cosmopolitan justice14), Walker acknowledges that counter-hegemonic action in world politics by ‘particularistic identities’ has itself often reproduced bounded political community as the marginalised seek states for themselves. Nonetheless, Walker sees these identities pushing particularity ‘further’ than ‘the limited pluralism established through state sovereignty’. In short, nationalism and self-determination can be imagined beyond the life of the nation state; it is ‘possible to offer an alternative account of the plurality of peoples than is associated with the restricted pluralism of state sovereignty’.15

Walker and Linklater agree, then, that the historically specific modern state is inadequate to the task of the reconciliation of universal and particular today, though for different reasons. For Walker, reconciliation is not in any case desirable since universalism is always the terms on which ‘reconciliation’ is achieved – state sovereignty establishes only a ‘limited pluralism’.16 Neither is it indeed possible for reconciliation to be rescued from the modern state (where Linklater talks, by contrast, of achieving ‘higher levels’ of universality and difference17), since it is this very state, especially its claim to sovereignty, which constitutes this hope of reconciliation in the first place. When the state as a timeless universal dies, so does the false hope of a universal structure of particularity – the system of states as a

12 Ibid. p. 64.
13 Ibid. p. 13.
14 ‘The Evolving Spheres of International Justice’, p. 481.
15 Inside/Outside, p. 77.
16 Inside/Outside, p. 77; see also p. 78.
17 The Transformation of Political Community, p. 17.
permanent resolution of universality and particularity. The reason why state sovereignty was always a false dawn for the possibility of a resolution between universal and particular is because its ‘resolution’ is arbitrary, indeed paradoxical – life within states is particularistic even while states make universalistic claims about their authority (sovereignty), and universalistic claims of sovereignty are made in the name of a particular group of citizens rather than universal humanity.  

Walker’s emphasis on the impossibility of any reconciliation between universal and particular in world politics, however, leads him implicitly to reject even the possibility of an accommodation between them, even though this is actually a very different project from reconciliation. Walker’s valorisation of particularity means that he is ultimately no more interested in an accommodation between universal and particular than is Linklater. His critique of state sovereignty for its ‘limited’, or ‘restricted’, pluralism and his rejection of the notion that there could be a ‘universal structure of particularity’, ultimately leaves no place for universals in worlds politics at all. Walker’s concern, then, is very much with the flourishing of particularity as an end in itself, as his call for an alternative account, not of political community, but of the ‘plurality of peoples’, suggests. Arguably, political community thereby disappears from his account of world politics altogether. This is somewhat inconsistent with his treatment of state sovereignty, which he recognises as having been a compelling account of political community precisely for attempting a resolution between universal and particular. It also involves a failure to deliver on his call ‘to consider how universality and particularity might be rearticulated without capitulating to the modernist assumption that the different must always be resolved into the same’. The reason for this failure is that Walker acknowledges no degrees of difference between a reconciliation of universal and particular and the flourishing of particularity per se, thus missing the possibility, arguably the necessity, of an accommodation between them. Although Walker acknowledges that universality and particularity are irreducible in principle, in practice he rather partially criticises infringements of this principle in the direction of universality while indulging them himself in the direction of particularity. Because there is no middle ground in Walker’s

18 Inside/Outside, p. 63.
19 Ibid. p. 77.
20 Ibid. pp. 77-8. Walker makes a similar point when criticising challenges to state sovereignty made on the grounds ‘of universalising claims about peace, justice, reason and humanity in general’ when it is precisely these grounds upon which ‘claims about state sovereignty were advanced in the first place. It cannot offer the possibility of critique’ (p. 14).
account, he ends up throwing the baby of ‘accommodation’ out with the bathwater of ‘reconciliation’.

**Universality and particularity: the solution?**

Returning to the shared ground between Linklater and Walker – namely their recognition that the modern state no longer provides the possibility of articulating the relationship between universality and particularity – what is interesting for our purposes here is that both are led to something like global civil society. In one case this is defined as the sphere of universality – or, more precisely, the possibility of *reconciliation* between universal and particular. In the other case it represents the sphere of difference – or, more exactly, the refusal to see reconciliation between universal and particular as something to be sought after.

As we have seen, Linklater prioritises universality in cases where there is a direct clash between the interests of fellow citizens and those of fellow humans. To this end, of course, the sovereign state is the significant obstacle. ‘Post-Westphalian arrangements’, which Linklater sees as having the potential for deeper commitments to universality and difference, thus require ‘significant inroads into state sovereignty and the concurrent development of transnational citizenry’. Indeed, cosmopolitan justice requires nothing less than ‘uncoupling citizenship from the sovereign state so that a stronger sense of moral obligation is felt to all members of the species’ rather than just to those who share the same territorial political community.

And for this to happen, transnational communities are required that can develop moral allegiances such that exclusive submission to a territorially defined sovereign – the state – begins to appear illegitimate. Enter global civil society. Indeed, Linklater concludes his discussion of post-Westphalian forms of political community and citizenship with the observation that that the principles of an international society which have previously reserved full membership only for sovereign states will have to be ‘modified’. The inclusion of non-state actors is seen as particularly crucial in providing a future post-Westphalian configuration of western societies with addressees outside of the West:

> A post-Westphalian political order which is not closed in on itself can widen the boundaries of dialogue by recognising that a variety of non-state actors, including non-governmental associations, social movements and national minorities, can enjoy

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22 Ibid. p. 204.
membership of an international society which is not just a society of states but a
society of peoples and individuals. The promise of solidarism is the partial dissolution
of the international society of states within this wider communicative domain.\textsuperscript{23}

So, with Linklater, we have \textit{universal} dialogue as the basis for the recognition of greater
particularity of ‘peoples’ and, ultimately, of individual humans themselves. For Walker,
differently, today it is necessary to ask what \textit{particularist} ‘identities and struggles for
autonomy can now be under new historical conditions’. And in asking this question, it will
become ‘apparent that structural change in world politics will not take the form of a move
from particularity to universality’. Indeed, notwithstanding his wider concerns as to the global
relevance of a concept deeply rooted in western political theory and practice, Walker sees the
idea of global civil society as offering the prospect of precisely this:

perhaps it is possible to appeal to a rather less abstract and apparently more political
engaged account of an emerging global civil society. Indeed, much of the recent
literature attempting to make sense of social movements/world politics has begun to
draw quite heavily on the notion of a global civil society, not least so as to avoid
falling back on some pre-political or even antipolitical claim about an already existing
ethics or world politics...\textsuperscript{24}

Global civil society, then, is central to current attempts to rethink the possibility of both a
renewed universality \textit{and} diversity in world politics.

\textbf{Ethics beyond borders or a universal ethic?}

Following Linklater rather than Walker, most commentators on global civil society find the
concept seductive precisely because they see in it a successful \textit{resolution} of universality and
particularity. Indeed, intimations of global civil society have become by far the most
significant attempt to flesh out Linklater’s call for a form of universalism that has found a
proper place for difference. Take, for example, John Keane on global civil society as a new,
universalisable, ethic ‘beyond borders’, which is at one and the same time ‘a condition of the

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid. p. 209.
possibility of multiple moralities – in other words, as a universe of freedom from a Universal Ethic’. 25

Even those who celebrate the ‘difference’ aspect of global civil society, as Walker notes, are given to ‘read the construction of world politics as the discovery of similarities elsewhere…or as a global space that is more or less the same as a statist space, only larger’. 26 Indeed, even William Connolly, suspicious as he is of the ‘single entry’ universalism of most cosmopolitanisms, is seduced by a cosmopolitanism which challenges ‘the closures’ of nationalism ‘with a more rhizomatic network conception of political culture’, a political culture which takes ‘advantage of the possibilities created by the compression of distance to enact a more vibrant plurality of connections’:

> For existing patterns of identification, allegiance and collaboration already exceed the concentric image of them. You might cultivate ties to ecologists or feminists in South America that are more significant than those you share on those two issues with some neighbors, in-laws, or corporate leaders in your own state. You might support cross-country citizen networks designed to protect rain forests in several countries (including your own) to reduce toxic emissions in the world, doing so to nourish the future of life anywhere and everywhere on the planet. You might cultivate extra-state lines of identification with aboriginal peoples, targets of state torture, refugees, or boat people, partly because you extrapolate from experiences of minority standing in your own state to those more radical conditions, partly because your state may have helped to produce the injuries involved, and partly because you realise that cross-state citizen pressure is often needed to modify oppressive state, interstate, and international corporate practices. 27

This is a characteristic indication of the possibilities of global connectedness enacted by global civil society. It is characteristic also in moving easily from the call for ethics to reach beyond borders to the implication that there is a universal ethic. This is most clearly visible in the suggestion that that the state is simply the problem for a new, more universal, form of political community. In fact, as Walker argues, the state as such is not the real problem but

26 ‘Social Movements/World Politics’, p. 690.
27 ‘Speed, Concentric Cultures and Cosmopolitanism’, p. 604.
rather an attempted solution to the problem of founding any political community at all, namely of how to establish legitimate authority in time and space. For Walker, ‘the notion of civil society is a modification of, not an alternative to, that solution’.28

This suggests that attempts to substitute a global politics of civil society for a global politics of states, far from rearticulating the relationship between universality and difference in new ways, represents merely another version of the longstanding hope that world politics will ‘take the form of a move from particularity to universality’.29 As Walker has demonstrated, the driver in this hoped-for move from particularity to universality is the ongoing search for a universal basis for ethics in international relations. That a cosmopolitan ethics claims universality is of course true by definition; the interesting question is exactly how such an ethic is able to portray itself as universal, or, more exactly, what is left out so that this claim to universality is made to seem plausible. What is left out or obscured is the role of the singular theorist in legislating universal ethics. And projections of a global civil society are crucial here, for they appear precisely to move the cosmopolitan project away from this ‘theorist as legislator’ mode which has dogged it since Kant, towards a cosmopolitanism of practice, ‘from below’. Thus Richard Falk, for example, writes of the need to move beyond abstract cosmopolitan theory by emphasizing instead ‘the agency role of global civil society’30, since this is ‘the hopeful source of political agency need[ed] to free the minds of persons from an acceptance of state/sovereignty identity’.31 As to the universality of this agency, Falk sees nothing less than an ‘embedded and emergent consensus’ rising from global civil society around ‘substantive democracy’, human rights and non-violence.32 Elsewhere, Falk articulates this universality in terms of global ‘normative convergence’ around visions of a more sustainable, compassionate and democratic future world order: ‘The historic role of

28 ‘Social Movements/World Politics’, p. 696. I would disagree with Walker that civil society even counts as a modification of the question of legitimate authority in the establishment of political community. It seems to me that issues of legitimacy are seriously and systematically underplayed in accounts of global civil society, which hardly ever reflect, for example, on the representativeness or accountability of movements in global civil society. See my ‘Problems in the Theorisation of Global Civil Society’ (Political Studies vol. 50(5), 2002), for a fuller statement of this argument.
29 Inside/Outside, p. 77-8.
globalization-from-below is to challenge and transform the negative features of globalization-from-above’. 33

Universality and particularity in global civil society:
The importance of the call for a global politics of states to give way to a politics of global civil society cannot be understated. For all its many contradictions, the emergence of the UN system in 1945 witnessed the attempt to hold universal and particular in tension. The universal system of sovereign states as enshrined in the UN was at once a system of particular polities, polities that projected their particularity through universally recognised (though of course not universally upheld) rights of non-interference in their affairs. This was a territorial way of holding universal and particular in tension and, through the development of international law, the Herculean attempt was made to fix this holding mechanism in place, with no thought of ‘resolving’ it as such, or even that it was amenable to ‘resolution’.

The significance of the global civil society ‘solution’ to universal and particular, then, is that it is no longer an accommodation but an attempted overcoming – representing as it does a plurality of movements with a universal, that is global, membership. Where once political membership (citizenship) was pluralized and political form (the state) universalised, now we hear of political form being pluralized and membership universalised in the community of global civil society. Universal and particular appear at last to be resolved in ways conducive to deterritorialised or cosmopolitan justice.

Abandoning the territorial attempt to provide physical space for particularity, the imagination of global civil society hopes for nothing less than to resolve particular and universal by advancing the cause of a universal but ‘difference-recognising’ model of justice. Contra Linklater, then, when it comes to the cosmopolitans’ ‘global civil society’, the problem of political community is resolved definitively in the direction of universality, not particularity.

Global civil society discourse is shown to be an instantiation of what Walker has claimed about IR generally – namely that, contrary to received wisdom, Linklater’s included, the dominant tradition of thinking in the discipline is actually a ‘constitutive claim to universality’. 34 Of course, the imagination of global civil society on one level celebrates a certain diversity of movement. However, it is suggested that the cosmopolitan reading, by

33 Ibid. pp. 164-5.
34 Inside/Outside, p. 22.
investing the movements of global civil society with a singular ethical project, in fact renders them as different expressions of the same.

It is important to see just how significant this shift is for the study of International Relations. Once upon a time the possibility of future convergence towards a global political community was denied by a discipline that could not see beyond the spatial bases of the exclusionary ethic of state sovereignty. Now the open spaces of global political community loom large for a discipline that increasingly cannot perceive any barriers to the emergence of the universal ethic needed to underpin it. If state sovereignty spoke of the spatial bounding of ethical principles, global civil society speaks of ethics unbound.

Yet in subsuming political questions into ethical ones, the imagination of a global civil society is actually weaker and less compelling than the principle of state sovereignty which, as Walker has argued, expresses a theory of ethics ‘in which ontological and political puzzles are resolved simultaneously’ – ‘It affirms that the good life, guided by universal principles, can only occur within particularistic political communities’. In this formulation, however obsolete, we find a place for universality and particularity and thus for political community.

**Conclusion**

The idea of a global political community of civil society ultimately fails to articulate universal and particular in world politics. The critique of the paradoxical dependence of claims to universality that arise from within states on the claims of particularistic groups of citizens must therefore be expanded to take account of the claim to ethical universality that arises from within particularistic forms of transnational action. Global civil society, in short, is no more the universal structure of particularity than the state once claimed to be. At one and the same time (to turn the terms of Linklater’s critique of state sovereignty back on him) the universality of global civil society is portrayed in terms that are far too ‘puffed up’ to be plausible, while acknowledgements of its particularity are far too ‘thin’ to successfully incorporate the fact of difference and conflict in world politics.

The free-floating image of a transnational global civil society appears at first glance to offer a better account than state sovereignty of the present possibilities for political community in a

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35 Ibid. p. 66.
36 Ibid. p. 64.
speeded up world in which spatial boundaries are increasingly irrelevant. But because it cannot offer a conceptualisation of world politics that simultaneously articulates universality and particularity – other than to suggest that difference (global civil society) is seeking a new form of universality (cosmopolitan right) – it is difficult to accept the oft-made claim that global civil society constitutes a substantively new way of doing politics. Indeed, it might be said as much of global civil society as of states that it is only within the secure confines of the particular that it becomes possible to aspire to be universal – ‘possible to almost forget about the particularity of the community that is shown to be capable of reason and justice, democracy and liberty’.37

However, the impulse to read global civil society as a universal structure of particularity is not the heart of the problem as far as the argument here is concerned. Just as unsatisfying, ultimately, is the implication of critiques like Walker’s that global civil society is pure particularity. This move dodges the problem of imagining future forms of political community – where it is always a matter of elements of both universality and particularity – just as seriously as the universalist approach. Though they nod in the direction of universal and particular as irreducible elements of world politics, then, neither approach takes us any further forward in conceiving of an accommodation between them. Importantly, neither approach is therefore able to mount an effective challenge to the UN system of states as just such an attempt. For if universal and particular really are irreducible elements of world politics, if both must be thought together, then what else other than an imperfect attempt at accommodation could there be?

37 Inside/Outside, p. 177.